Country of Origin Information Report Iran January 2008

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Country of Origin Information Report Iran January 2008 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT IRAN 31 JANUARY 2008 Border & Immigration Agency COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE IRAN 31 JANUARY 2008 Contents Preface Latest News EVENTS IN IRAN, FROM 20 JANUARY 2008 TO 31 JANUARY 2008 REPORTS ON IRAN PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED BETWEEN 20 JANUARY 2008 AND 31 JANUARY 2008 Paragraphs Background Information 1. GEOGRAPHY ......................................................................................... 1.01 Map ................................................................................................ 1.03 2. ECONOMY ............................................................................................ 2.01 Sanctions ...................................................................................... 2.15 3. HISTORY ............................................................................................... 3.01 Pre 1979......................................................................................... 3.02 1979 to 1999 .................................................................................. 3.04 2000 to date................................................................................... 3.14 Student unrest .............................................................................. 3.20 Parliamentary elections – February 2004................................... 3.35 Presidential elections – June 2005 ............................................. 3.39 Elections – 2006 ........................................................................... 3.44 4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ....................................................................... 4.01 5. CONSTITUTION ...................................................................................... 5.01 6. POLITICAL SYSTEM ................................................................................ 6.01 Political parties............................................................................. 6.04 Human Rights 7. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 7.01 8. SECURITY SITUATION ............................................................................. 8.01 9. SECURITY FORCES................................................................................. 9.01 10. MILITARY SERVICE............................................................................... 10.01 11. JUDICIARY........................................................................................... 11.01 Organisation ................................................................................. 11.04 Independence ............................................................................... 11.05 Fair trial ......................................................................................... 11.13 Juveniles in the Justice System ................................................. 11.23 Court documentation ................................................................... 11.33 12. ARREST AND DETENTION – LEGAL RIGHTS............................................ 12.01 13. PRISON CONDITIONS............................................................................ 13.01 14. DEATH PENALTY.................................................................................. 14.01 Stoning .......................................................................................... 14.06 15. POLITICAL AFFILIATION........................................................................ 15.01 Freedom of association and assembly ...................................... 15.01 16. OPPOSITION GROUPS AND POLITICAL ACTIVISTS................................... 16.01 Political dissent ............................................................................ 16.01 ii This Country of Origin Information Report contains the most up-to-date publicly available information as at 31 January 2008. Older source material has been included where it contains relevant information not available in more recent documents. IRAN 31 JANUARY 2008 Mojahedin-e khalq MEK/MKO or PMOI (Peoples Mojahedin of Iran).......................................... 16.08 Rastakhiz Party and Monarchists ............................................... 16.18 Savak ............................................................................................. 16.21 Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) ................................... 16.22 Komala .......................................................................................... 16.28 Pjak ................................................................................................ 16.30 17. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MEDIA ........................................................ 17.01 Internet and satellite .................................................................... 17.34 18. CORRUPTION....................................................................................... 18.01 19. FREEDOM OF RELIGION........................................................................ 19.01 Legal framework........................................................................... 19.11 Sunni Muslims .............................................................................. 19.13 Christians...................................................................................... 19.17 Apostasy/conversions ................................................................. 19.21 Jews............................................................................................... 19.29 Zoroastrians.................................................................................. 19.33 Sabeans (Mandeans).................................................................... 19.36 Baha’is........................................................................................... 19.38 Ahl-e Haq (Yaresan) ..................................................................... 19.59 Sufis............................................................................................... 19.60 20. ETHNIC GROUPS .................................................................................. 20.01 Kurds ............................................................................................. 20.06 Arabs ............................................................................................. 20.15 Baluchis ........................................................................................ 20.31 Azeris............................................................................................. 20.38 21. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PERSONS....................... 21.01 Transsexuals ................................................................................ 21.20 22. DISABILITY .......................................................................................... 22.01 23. WOMEN............................................................................................... 23.01 Legal Rights.................................................................................. 23.13 Political Rights ............................................................................. 23.20 Social Rights................................................................................. 23.23 The hijab........................................................................................ 23.27 Economic Rights .......................................................................... 23.30 Violence against women.............................................................. 23.33 Honour killings ............................................................................. 23.36 Marriage ........................................................................................ 23.38 Temporary Marriage..................................................................... 23.40 Mehriyeh........................................................................................ 23.42 Divorce .......................................................................................... 23.44 Abortion ........................................................................................ 23.54 24. CHILDREN ........................................................................................... 24.01 General information ..................................................................... 24.01 Education ...................................................................................... 24.04 Child care ...................................................................................... 24.09 25. TRAFFICKING....................................................................................... 25.01 26. MEDICAL ISSUES ................................................................................. 26.01 Drugs ............................................................................................. 26.03 Drug addiction .............................................................................. 26.04 Illegal drugs situation .................................................................. 26.05 HIV/AIDS – anti-retroviral treatment ........................................... 26.15 Mental health ................................................................................ 26.19 27. HUMANITARIAN ISSUES ........................................................................ 27.01 This Country of Origin Information Report contains the most up-to-date publicly available information as at 31 January 2008. iii Older source material has been included where it contains relevant
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