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Drd De Paris INSTITUT DRD DE PARIS Bulletin de liaison et d'information I N" 160.161 I Juillet-Août 1998 Ce bulletin paraît en français et anglais Prix au numéro: France: 30 FF - Etranger: 35 FF Abonnement annuel (12 numéros) France: 300 FF - Etranger: 350 FF Périodique mensuel Directeur de la publication: Mohamad HASSAN Numéro de la Commission Paritaire: 659 15 AS ISBN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE, 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tél. : 01-48 24 6464 - Fax: 01-47 709904 Sommaire • L'INTERNATIONALE SOCIALISI'E DEMANDE UNE SOLUfiON POLITIQYE À LA QYESTION KURDE • WNDRES :L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE AKTICLE 19 DÉNONCE LA RÉPRESSION CONTRE LA UBElUÉ DE PRESSE Er DE L'EXPRESSION EN TURQYIE • NOUVELLES CONDAMNATIONS DE DISSIDENTS EN TURQYIE • DOCUMENT: UNE INTERVIEW DES DÉPurÉS KURDES EMPRISONNÉS • ANKARA: LE PREMIER MINISTRE TURC REJEl'l'~ L'OFFREDE CESSEZ-LE-FEUDU PKK • TÉMOIGNAGE DE R. PELLETREAU :NÉGOCIATIONS AVEC LES KURDES D'IRAK • AINSI QYE... • EN BREF, LA REVUE DE PRESSE L'INTERNATIONALE SOCIALISTE DEMANDE Oye l'Europe a un intérêt dired à trouuer UNE SOLUfiON POLITIQYE des JOlutions à ces problèmes, non pas pam À LA QYESTION KURDE que cela a causi une aise tit ~. Qy'une solution stohk etjusI£ à la question kurde ne peut jamais être rig/ie par des ES 2 et 3 juillet 1998 une "Nous, les députés sociaJistes européms des ~ militoiTes ou uidents mois seulement conférence sur le thème de partis socialistes europiens des États pur un proœs.sus po/iJitJue tit dioJDgpe ment "En route vers l'Europe: membres tit l'Union Européenne, dédorons enIn les rejJrisenJonJs kurdes et Ie.r auIlJritis L'autnir tit la question kurtit cea: gouvernementaks aussi bien qu'entre les pour la Turquie et ser wisinr" a (}y'une paix durahlt ne peut êln itahlie au ~kurdes. réuni une soixantaine de Mo/en-Orient S01IJ que soit prise en compte Qye la base d'une quelconque solution représentants de partis occidentaux la question kurde. ~ doit ùu:lure: membres de l'Internationale Oye les problèmes mIfJJTItrés pur les Kurdes, -la dimtx:ratû po/iJitJue dons cespays socialiste, des représentants des partis Y compris ks uiolatians 1TUlS.Iives des droits - la reamnoissona et des garanties des droits kurdes (pDK-Iran, PDK-Irak, UPK, politiques, socio-iconomiqutet aJturels, k des Kurdes (ciuils, jxJiiJüJues et aJbmls) à HADEp) et des experts. Au terme de sous-diveloppement iconomique et la l'in!irieur des.ftrm/ièrts tit cespays diverses communications, des migration jurrie, ont eu, et ont totgours un - k respect tit l'intip tmiJuriok des pays auditions et des débats, une impad sur la paix, la siaJriIi et la stabiliti aJIIlt17Iis déclaration a été rendue publique. En tit la ri#n et tit l'Europe, procuront une - k diueInppement iœnmniqut et soci11l dons voiciles principaux extraits: dimension interntJtionoJe aux problèmes. larigWn • 2 • Bullcun (IL Iid/:>un L'I (/'iJlI( IfII/dU()JI n° 160-161 • juillet-août 1998 Oye, tifin de contribuer awe entreprises de Sur la situation des Kurdes d'Iran suhstanJielsd'une solution: solutions politiques, l'Union Européenne -Des droits aJ!Jure1s garanlis par deuraitfaire des iffurts spéciauxpour opoiser 8- Considirant l'élection du président la constitution, renfermant la liberté la so1f.ifrance des victimes des conflits à KIza.tomi et œrtains initiatives prises par son d'expression et de publication en langue trauers sesprogrammes humo:nitaires et, JUT gouvernement comme des signaux positifs kurde awsi bien que /es droits à l'éduœJion I la base de ceci, adoptons les 'Positions pour le développement futur de la en sa • moleTneUe JUT tout le territoire • I suiutmles JUT la situation des Kurdes en IraA, République islamique d'Iran, nous espérons , de la Turquie (notons que les droits i Iran et la Tw-quie. âuec furœ que les riformes démoiratiques et lingUistiques sont ream:nus dons le traité de spédolernent des ,ame1ioratùmJsuhsla11tieOes Loustmne) Sur la situation des Kurdes en Irak . dans le domaine des droits de l'homme -des r{[armes démocratiques qui JUivront. permettraient la participatio,n et la 1- Nous cruyunsque le régjme iralàen aduel représenJoJÜm juste des Kurdes au sein de la empêche le diveloppement d'une solution 9- Dans ce contexte, nous appelons les Grande Assemblée Naiionok, œmprerumt la durablepour les Kurdes du nord de l1rok et aJJtmiJés iraniennes à cesser leurs accusations refirme de la loi sur /es partis politiques, la qu'une directionresp01'lJOhledémocratique est amtinueOes relotiues à la popuIoJion kurde loi éledorale et, en partiaJ.1ierl'abaissement requirepour des. de1ihératiims et nlgrxiotions. en Iran et spéciolemenJC01liredes membres du seuil de 10%pour la députmimz. sérieuses sur l'avenir de la région du du Parti Démocratique du Kurdistan -(oo.) des pas vers la Xurdirtan irakien. Toute solution similaire Iranien (pDKI) viuant en Iran aussi bien démilitarisatio de'la sociététurque. doit impliquer une large autonomie de la . que ses ~punsab/es en exil (. ..) -la levée de l'état d'urgenœ dons régjnn. les provinces du Sud et Sud-Est et 11- Nous summes d'aa:ordpour eniouraur démantèlement du système de gardiens de 2- Ceperulont, nous cruyons qu ü est uital et soutenir le diueloppement de l'adiuité des uiIlage dons cesréfions. que toutes lesforces politùJues fOJSenf tout organisations d'aide humanitaire qui -développement social et leur possible pour promouvoir des viennent en aitfe aUx dizaines de milliers de éfXJTlllTTlique enfaueur de la populotion locale diveloppements positifs dans la région et Kurdes iraniens vivant danr des corulitionJ dans ces régftms dévastées par un conflit encourager une OJSÏfepolitique durable au aitiques dons des comps de r{/i#s, pour la uiolent et qui a souffert pendont longtemps cor!flit UPK-PDK (...) plupart au Nani de l'Irak. (..;) des effets de manque d'investissement et destrudion d¥astnu:ture (...) 4- Nous reconnoissuns les dfets positjfi du Sur la situation des Kurdes en -la révision de la législation programfTl£des,NatioJu. Unies ('pétro/! amtre Turquie établissant "les aimes de la pensée Il et, en TlOUT'liture" et soutèrionsson extensitm et sa 13: NoUs (lift:mons que l'Eùrope a un partiaJier, l 'abrOgation de l'aiticle 8de la loi mire en œuvre en mai:ntenotit 11ntég;7Jédu intérêt dired dons la réso/utûmde la question œzti-temnirte ,et de l'artitle 81 de la loi sur programme et des fonds alloués pour la kurde en Turqrie étont dan:ni le stotut de la les partir politiques restreigrumt la liberté régjnn dU Kurdirton iraIàen œmme le stipuk Turquie comme p'ays candidat à l'Union politiqUe. la résolutUm986 du Conseil de séaJriJi de ' européenne. '-la fin du règlement l'ONU pour apporter wie bare solide au gouvernemental par décret, sans développement économique de la région, 14- Nous cruyunsfermement qu'une so/utûm promuIgatitm de la loi (.oo) Nous .$outenons également d~ 1TU!Jens à la question kurde en Turquie implique la -lafin de l'horœlementdes ftO!tis . ayant le but d'ame1iarer les corulitionJ de vie dimocratÏf, les droits de l'homme et des politiques légaux et la libération d'es du .peuple et la reconstruction de minorités en Turquie (...) prisonniers politiques associés dont i~ux l'irffrastructure de la ré{!jim du Kurdistan 15- Nous croyons également que la arrêtés alors qu'ils étaient déftutés; Leyla iralàen (..) reamnoissanœ et la solution subséquente de Zana, lauréate du Prix Sakharov du la question kurde constitue non pas une RuIement européenen ,1995, Hoiip Dide, 6- Nous sommes d'accord pour l'examen menaœ à son inli[7i1é territmia/e, mais tout Orlum Dogan et &/im Smink cumpletde la requête œrgointe du PDK et de au contraire, renforcerait les institutions, - protection et sécurité des l'UPK pour: la tenue d'une coriférence sodité et üknJité politiques de la Turquie. défenseursdes droits de l'homine en Turquie internoiionale JUT la ream.rJnu:tion et l'avenir pour mettre défirà1ivement fin aux aimes tels de la ré~ du /(urdirton irakien. (. ..) 16- Nous croyons que les propositiuns ci que la tentative d'assassinat contre Akin dessous énumérées ronstituent des e1émenJ.s Birdal (.oo) n 160-161. juillet-août 1998 /, ,: ,,j, l' 1/" "l, [ci Il'1, IrPI"I/".) • ~ • LONDRES: victimesde torture et ayant fait appel L'ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE AKTICLE à la fondation, sont issues de la 19 DÉNONCE LA RÉPRESSION CONfRE LA région kurde en état d'exception LIBElITÉ DE PRESSE Er DE L'EXPRESSION EN (OHAL). À la suitede l'étude réalisée TURQYIE sur 518 des 537 victimes ayant eu recours aux services de soins et de réhabilitation d'Ankara, d'Istanbul, ANS un communiqué universitaires,journalistes, et vendeurs de d'Izmir et d'Adana, la pratique de publié à Londres, le 23 journaux et mime des hommes politiques tortures systématiques dans les juillet 1998, l'organisation e'lus dimoo-atiquement. D âutres ontfait Jàa commissariats et les gendarmeries, internationale de lutte à des mesures extrajudidaires, allant de des détentions arbitraires et contre la censure Article l'harcellement policier aux assassinats extrajudiciaires, et des kidnappings 19, a dénoncé la répression perPétrés par des groupes armés liis à ont été constatés. Regroupées en 30 exercée par la Turquie contre les l'État': rubriques, les méthodes de tortures journalistes,les partis politiqueset les les plus répandues sont "insultes, Frances Da Souza, directrice minoritésculturelleset religieuses. passages à talxu, menaces, bandeau sur les exécutive de l'organisation, note yeux, mise à nu, jet d'eau froide, L'organisation affirme d'une part qu' "il est ironique que la Turquie sep/oi{J1e emPêchement d'aller aux commodités, qu'avec 67 journalistes emprisOIUlés, d'être tenue à l'écartde l'UE à causede sa privation deau et de 1WU17'iture erfermement plusieurs partis politiques dissous et popuhtion musuImone quand le même État au.froid, e1ectro-chocr,pendoison '~ interdits,de plus la répression sévère persécute quitonque tente d'exprimer une des minoritésreligieuseset culturelles, identité islamique dans le pays".
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