MALONEY: ELECTIONS IN

ELECTIONS IN IRAN: A NEW MAJLIS AND A MANDATE FOR REFORM

Suzanne Maloney

Dr. Maloney is a research associate at the Brookings Institution.

historian once observed that bold, last-minute intervention by the revolutions devour their own supreme leader. As the parliamentary children. Last February in Iran, session got underway in late May, one Athe children of the Islamic thing is certain: more than two decades Revolution did just the reverse. After a after the revolution that shook the world campaign marked by bitter factional and transformed Iran into a turbulent rivalries and unprecedented public liberties, theocracy, the country is once again Iranians went to the polls on February 18 undergoing profound change. This time, a to elect a new . They handed an new generation of Iranians is demanding overwhelming victory to the advocates of that its voice be heard, and it is generating reform and a humbling setback to the a steady, sweeping transformation in the stalwarts of the revolution. politics of the Islamic Republic. However, rather than ending it, this seemingly decisive outcome only intensified CAMPAIGNING AND Iran’s protracted power struggle. For while FIRST-ROUND BALLOTS the parliamentary elections powerfully Politics in the Islamic Republic remains underscored the popular mandate for almost entirely the province of the clerical expanded political participation and looser authorities who assumed control of the social restrictions, their outcome also state after the ouster of Mohammad Reza dramatically raised the stakes in the Shah Pahlavi in 1979. However, since the competition to chart the future course of election in 1997 of a moderate president, the Islamic Republic. And over three Seyyed , the faction- ensuing months, the system appeared alism that has long characterized politics in poised to devour itself. the Islamic Republic has assumed an Yet, despite the fierce contention increasingly popular dimension. Khatami’s revived by the February polling, the basic tenure has ushered in tentative political outlines of the electoral verdict stood reforms, fitful cultural liberalization and a intact. A second round of balloting returned less antagonistic approach in the interna- another convincing win for the reformist tional arena. In turn, these developments coalition, and the results of the vote have exacerbated the struggle for power, received a long-delayed confirmation in a provoking a bitter and often violent reaction

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from hard-line factions that seek to reas- outgoing parliament’s last-minute tinkering sert revolutionary orthodoxy. with the electoral guidelines, most observ- With the organs of power in the hands ers of Iranian politics anticipated a rela- of these hard-line conservatives and the tively modest result. Moreover, one of the potent force of public opinion solidly behind leading lights of the reformist coalition, the reformers, Iranian politics in the former Interior Minister Hojjatoleslam Khatami era became mired in stalemate , had been jailed on religious and intermittent unrest. At the same time, dissent charges in November 1999, depriv- Iran’s small but significant policy changes ing the movement of one of its most and the popular support demonstrated charismatic standard-bearers. As a result, again in municipal elections in 1999 drew in numerous conversations in Tehran in late the world’s focus to the February 2000 January, Iranians expressed expectations parliamentary elections as a critical gauge that were hopeful, but only hesitantly so. of the prospects for reform. Although all The outcome, however, bore out the legislation must pass the scrutiny of the careful planning of the reformist coalition conservative Council of Guardians before (the 2nd of Khordad Front) and, in particu- entering into law, the Majlis has nonethe- lar, its leading party, the Islamic Iran less served as an enterprising forum for Participation Front (IIPF or Mosharekat). political competition under the Islamic By recruiting thousands to register as system and represents a critical element of potential candidates, they effectively clerical rule. precluded wholesale vetting by the Council The anticipation launched intense of Guardians, which instead exhibited politicking long before the kick-off of the notable restraint, rejecting only about 11 brief (one week) official campaign period, percent of the applicants, as compared to as the factions and forces centered at approximately one-third in 1996. In addi- either end of the political spectrum in Iran tion, the reformist coalition fashioned a jostled for position and coalesced into two cutting-edge mode of campaigning, com- main camps. Each of these in turn repre- plete with pep rallies and press briefings, as sented a diverse and often divided assort- well as an appeal to the issues that reso- ment of groups and political personalities, nate with the Iranian public (including the which made for a multiplicity of candidate resumption of relations with the United lists and continuing contention within the States) rather than a restatement of stale umbrella coalitions. For example, the revolutionary orthodoxy. months leading up to the election witnessed The results also demonstrated just as a particularly vicious dispute between the clearly the voters’ utter disaffection with moderate supporters of former president the conservatives, whose campaign in style and those who and in substance was not geared to appeal viewed him as an obstacle to genuine and to Iran’s disproportionately young popula- substantial reform. tion. Many interpreted their pre-election Given the perpetuation of internecine maneuvers, such as lowering the threshold strife among the reformers, the power of of the popular vote required for first-round the Council of Guardians to vet candidates victory, as an attempt to prevail by splitting based on their political proclivities, and the the reformist vote. However, if this was

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the intention, it backfired spectacularly, as outgoing Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, most of those elected on the margin hailed simply chose not to run. The final tally from the reformist camp. included only a handful of clerics. In fact, the change in the election On the other side of the fence, the regulations, which awarded victory to those reformist victors include some well-known candidates who reached 25 percent of the faces, as well as many unknowns. The vote (rather than the one-third margin brothers of President Khatami and of the previously required), produced a much jailed Abdollah Nouri – both medical more definitive outcome in the first round doctors and relative political neophytes – than in Iran’s previous elections. More figured among the top vote-getters in than two-thirds of the seats were filled on Tehran, as much in solidarity with the February 18, as opposed to approximately plights of their respective siblings as in half in the first round of the 1996 elections. support of both candidates’ frank advocacy This appeared to have of greater political and left fewer possibilities social freedom. The rest for the sort of conser- Nearly all the senior of the winning slate in vative vote tampering leaders of the outgoing Tehran reads like a that occurred be- register of the younger tween the two rounds parliament – staunch generation of left-wing in previous cam- conservatives – were theoreticians and activ- paigns. However, turned out of their seats. ists, many of whom have events were to prove proven instrumental allies otherwise. of Khatami. The margin of the reformist victory in Ironically, the most stinging setback this first round was much greater than the was delivered in the form of an apparent modest anticipation of many of the victory; the candidacy of former president coalition’s supporters; approximately 160 Hashemi Rafsanjani morphed from what seats went to the 2nd of Khordad Front, was once expected to be a runaway win while the conservative coalition netted only and a certain shot at the Majlis speakership 40 seats in this first round. Independent into a brusque comeuppance from a and unaffiliated candidates won another 21 population weary of politics, and politicians, places, while 65 constituencies were sent as usual. After the lengthy and disputed re- to run-off balloting because no candidate count of the Tehran ballots, Rafsanjani managed to secure the minimum vote. placed twentieth out of the 28 individuals These results are even more stunning who secured seats (two other seats were on an individual basis. Nearly all the senior sent to a run-off), a convenient advance- leaders of the outgoing parliament – ment from his initial standing at the bottom staunch conservatives – were turned out of of that list. While the former president won their seats, including deputy speaker the seat, he lost the larger battle to re- Hassan Rowhani, former intelligence establish himself as the chief parliamentary minister and influential power broker, and resigned his seat under lawmakers Mohammad Reza Bahonar and mounting public pressure days before the Mohammad Javad Larijani. Others, like first session of the new Majlis.

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These results were greeted with coup-plotting among the military leadership euphoria on the streets of Tehran and with splashed across the front pages of much talk of a parliamentary agenda that Tehran’s newspapers. In response, the would tackle many of the enduring issues conservative courts raised the temperature of popular discontent: cultural restrictions through a multi-front campaign that in- such as the press law and satellite ban, the volved jailing writers and editors, banning institutional impediments to democracy in 16 reformist newspapers and chipping the electoral structures, and economic away at the margin of the parliamentary insecurity. Abdollah Nouri was given a few victory through annulments. Particularly days leave from prison, and Western worrisome were reports from the Council governments and investors poised them- of Guardians of serious irregularities in the selves to further re-integrate the Islamic Tehran balloting, which constitutes the Republic into the world community. most politicized competition and tradition- Even among the reformers, however, ally provides the Majlis speaker and other the extent of the electoral margin also leaders. triggered some uneasiness over the pros- The jihad against journalists extended pects for broad consensus building among across the board; even those newspapers the still predominantly conservative political managed by the president’s brother, himself élite. Moreover, the bitter rupture between a leading MP-elect, and by the injured the IIPF and Rafsanjani threatened to push Hajjarian were officially shuttered. The moderates and conservatives into making heady confidence sparked by February’s common cause in order to preserve their election was displaced by widespread own positions. foreboding, and the reports that the muz- zling of the press represented a preliminary THE BACKLASH AND stage in a wider bid for control by hard-line THE SECOND ROUND Revolutionary Guards convinced many that Even though many feared a backlash, reform in Iran was utterly derailed. few expected the series of events that The loss of the newspapers, which shook Tehran over the ensuing three serve as proxies for political parties in the months. First, just three weeks after the Islamic Republic, was a particular blow to election, came a brazen assassination bid the reformers, especially coming just as the that gravely wounded Tehran city councilor date for the second round of the Majlis , a reformist editor cum elections was announced. The flow of political strategist and a key ally of Presi- information has been a powerful weapon dent Khatami. Hajjarian survived, but his for change; the scrappy dailies have pried shooting sapped some of the exhilaration open some of the darkest domestic scan- from the reformist victory and foreshad- dals, particularly the abuses and assassina- owed an even more serious reassertion of tions orchestrated by the intelligence the hard-liners. ministry. The real crackdown came in mid-April And yet, despite all these impediments as speculation grew over the delay by the and provocations, the second round of Council of Guardians in scheduling the balloting took place on May 5 in relative second round of balloting, and rumors of calm, in a testament to the proclivity of the

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entire spectrum of Iranian politicians to issue, and on others, demonstrates a keen close ranks at tense moments. In the few awareness of the inherent limitations to the days available for campaigning, President conservative crackdown; the unrest that Khatami issued a pointed call for his erupted so vividly in central Tehran during supporters to resist the temptation to take July 1999 appears to have convinced their frustration to the streets. In return, Khamenei of the value of stability, even at Supreme Leader Ayatollah the price of a parliament overwhelmingly balanced his disparagement of the press committed to systemic change. with an explicit defense of the president and the reform process. THE SIXTH MAJLIS AND The results of the second round only ITS AGENDA deepened the reformers’ electoral triumph, The conclusion of the agonizing bringing in another 46 seats to the conser- electoral process has not by any means vatives’ gain of 15. This appeared to seal a capped the fundamental power struggle nearly two-thirds majority, which would among the political élite of the Islamic enable the reformers to undertake an Republic. In fact, the task of governing is aggressive legislative agenda. However, likely to prove more tortuous and treacher- the outcome did not entirely temper ous than ever. Even the most liberal, remnant uncertainties about an additional activist legislature will face severe resis- backlash or the possible dismissal of the tance from the Council of Guardians and Majlis altogether, particularly given the other oversight bodies that have stymied profound ambiguities over the status of the change thus far. In addition, it will be Tehran vote. burdened with the expectations of an The standoff over the Tehran results impatient public and the suspicions of a continued until literally the final moments. cornered conservative power structure. Tensions escalated amidst fears that these Still, despite limitations on its ultimate returns, which included all the reformist authority, Iran’s Majlis wields enormous leadership, might be dismissed altogether. political, social and economic power. From Only a week before the opening session of its inception, the parliament assumed a the parliament, Ayatollah Khamenei once prominent role in the factional power again took a decisively conciliatory stand, struggle, and, over time, disputes increas- decreeing a halt to the continuing recount ingly played out via sophisticated dueling and paving the way for the immediate over government policies. The most endorsement of nearly all of Tehran’s 30 significant of its discrete powers include seats. This confirmation, announced May approval (and impeachment, as in the case 20, reportedly came over the objections of of Abdollah Nouri) of cabinet ministers, the Council of Guardians. ratification of international agreements, and In doing so, Khamenei not only facili- responsibility for economic policy-making tated the convening of the parliament on through the annual government budget and schedule, but he defused, for the moment the long-term planning process. at least, a predicament that was gradually Through its legislative program, the escalating toward an existential crisis for parliament has molded the political frame- the Islamic Republic. His decision on this work through its changes to the election

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laws and provincial structures, and it began at the top of the new parliament’s priorities, the process of introducing greater transpar- particularly reforms to the legal framework ency into the Islamic system by undertak- for ensuring freedom of expression in order ing investigations of fraud and corruption. to return Iran’s vibrant independent press Through its control of the nation’s purse to the newsstands. Legislation to facilitate strings, the parliament has shaped the reform of the country’s labyrinthine judicial economic climate on such key issues as system, a stronghold of the right wing, is foreign investment liberalization, exchange also likely to win support. Feel-good rate unification and subsidies. In addition, measures, such as the repeal of the ban on the parliament has dramatically affected satellite dishes, will occupy early attention the social life of the nation through its as a means of rewarding the fortitude of cultural policies, such as the 1994 satellite the electorate, although the probability of ban and 1998 attempts to segregate health- the Council of Guardians approving such care facilities. bills remains uncertain. But, while the parliament is a powerful Economic reform is desperately institution, the agenda of its new reformist needed in Iran, where at least 800,000 new majority remains somewhat inchoate and young people come onto the job market their leadership relatively inexperienced. each year in an economy that creates less Welfare, security, freedom: this was the than half that number of new jobs. How- succinct slogan ever, the of Iran’s economy does moderate party, Political and cultural issues will not occupy the the Servants of emerge at the top of the new top spot on the the Recon- parliament’s priorities, particularly agenda of any struction, and it political faction encapsulates reforms to the legal framework for because of the multi-front ensuring freedom of expression in both ideological challenge that order to return Iran’s vibrant differences the sixth Majlis independent press to the newsstands. and institutional will face. Only sclerosis. 27 percent of Moreover, in a the new MPs served in the previous Majlis, system whose legitimacy centers on the and it is widely understood that many of promise of social justice, fundamental the leaders of the IIPF and the 2nd of reforms must be predicated on political Khordad Front are considered too provoca- stability and broad consensus, which tive to serve as speaker, for reasons of remain elusive. As long as the price of oil both politics and social position (i.e., they remains sufficiently high, the sixth Majlis are not members of the clergy). Compro- will focus its economic program on the mise candidates will likely come from margins, pushing forward measures to lure among the elder statesmen of the Islamic more foreign investment, while leaving the system, such as long-time leftist Ayatollah structural questions unaddressed. . In foreign policy, too, the high expecta- Political and cultural issues will emerge tions generated by the dramatic election

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results require a dose of realism. Iran’s the tension between the divine mandate of parliament lacks any firm authority over religious authority and the popular pressure these policies and institutions, which remain for increased democratization can no largely the province of hard-line revolution- longer be finessed. A choice looms for aries under Khamenei. As for the ever- Iran, and the alternatives are stark: genu- contentious issue of relations with the inely representative government or full- United States, even a reformist parliament scale repression. To many Iranians, there is is unlikely to bring the estrangement only a single option. As the outspoken (and between the two countries to a quick or now imprisoned) journalist has cathartic conclusion. At the same time, the said, no one has created these reforms – impact of the election itself should not be and thus no one can stop them. discounted; the frank campaign rhetoric Still, those fearful of losing their power sanctioned a new climate for public debate can certainly try. It is unlikely that the on all these issues, and the outcome has conservatives, though, having been rejected empowered a distinctly less radical agenda by the electorate in three national ballots and a new slate of parliamentarians keenly since 1997, will back away quietly, nor will attuned to the demands of a war-weary their agenda fade quickly. Many key public. conservatives retain positions in the power structure and, through their control of the THE FUTURE OF armed forces, the state media and the THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC unregulated bonyads, will wield ample The real battleground will emerge as influence over decision making. It would the new parliament tackles those issues also be a mistake to discount Khamenei that conflict squarely with the absolutist himself, despite his somewhat negligible framework of clerical leadership, the personal charisma and dubious theological backbone of the Islamic Republic. These credentials. The supreme leader has include changes to the electoral laws, in proven quite a political survivor and has order to mute the influence of the Council cultivated networks of clerics and institu- of Guardians, and increased parliamentary tions that are beholden to his financial and oversight of the institutions currently political support. He is likely to remain an supervised only by the supreme leader: the active force in shaping the political fortunes mammoth economic foundations of Iran for some time to come. (bonyads), the security apparatus and the For the foreseeable future, then, the state broadcasting authorities. Each of Islamic Republic will continue to be these moves, which received prominent buffeted by the forces of divisiveness and placement in the reformists’ campaign unresolved questions of authority. Nonethe- rhetoric, would progressively encroach on less, the February elections provide power- the domain of Khamenei’s divine authority ful evidence that the system is evolving in as well as on the fiefdoms of his influential an irreversibly democratic fashion. In this supporters. balloting, modern political parties, for the As these issues materialize on the first time, played a significant and substan- legislative agenda, the Islamic Republic will tive role in mobilizing issues and voters. approach a fundamental crossroads, where The outcome effectively passed the mantle

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of leadership to a savvy new generation of and greater accountability from their political entrepreneurs. government. These changes reflect the relative In his first public address upon his youth of Iran’s population; two-thirds of its return from exile in 1979, Ayatollah citizenry is too young to remember the , the charismatic font of revolution itself, and through their votes, the revolution and the architect of the they are rapidly and dramatically shifting Islamic state, told the jubilant throngs the center of political gravity in the Islamic assembled to greet him that “the destiny of Republic. Politicians such as Rafsanjani, each generation must be in its own hands.” who offer cautious gradualism to solve the Twenty-one years later a new generation is country’s economic woes and political reaching out, this time through the ballot frustrations, have become suddenly obso- box, and slowly but surely seizing its own lescent. Instead, young Iranians are fate. demanding greater freedom for themselves

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