MALONEY: ELECTIONS IN IRAN ELECTIONS IN IRAN: A NEW MAJLIS AND A MANDATE FOR REFORM Suzanne Maloney Dr. Maloney is a research associate at the Brookings Institution. historian once observed that bold, last-minute intervention by the revolutions devour their own supreme leader. As the parliamentary children. Last February in Iran, session got underway in late May, one Athe children of the Islamic thing is certain: more than two decades Revolution did just the reverse. After a after the revolution that shook the world campaign marked by bitter factional and transformed Iran into a turbulent rivalries and unprecedented public liberties, theocracy, the country is once again Iranians went to the polls on February 18 undergoing profound change. This time, a to elect a new parliament. They handed an new generation of Iranians is demanding overwhelming victory to the advocates of that its voice be heard, and it is generating reform and a humbling setback to the a steady, sweeping transformation in the stalwarts of the revolution. politics of the Islamic Republic. However, rather than ending it, this seemingly decisive outcome only intensified CAMPAIGNING AND Iran’s protracted power struggle. For while FIRST-ROUND BALLOTS the parliamentary elections powerfully Politics in the Islamic Republic remains underscored the popular mandate for almost entirely the province of the clerical expanded political participation and looser authorities who assumed control of the social restrictions, their outcome also state after the ouster of Mohammad Reza dramatically raised the stakes in the Shah Pahlavi in 1979. However, since the competition to chart the future course of election in 1997 of a moderate president, the Islamic Republic. And over three Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the faction- ensuing months, the system appeared alism that has long characterized politics in poised to devour itself. the Islamic Republic has assumed an Yet, despite the fierce contention increasingly popular dimension. Khatami’s revived by the February polling, the basic tenure has ushered in tentative political outlines of the electoral verdict stood reforms, fitful cultural liberalization and a intact. A second round of balloting returned less antagonistic approach in the interna- another convincing win for the reformist tional arena. In turn, these developments coalition, and the results of the Tehran vote have exacerbated the struggle for power, received a long-delayed confirmation in a provoking a bitter and often violent reaction 59 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. VII, NO. 3, JUNE 2000 from hard-line factions that seek to reas- outgoing parliament’s last-minute tinkering sert revolutionary orthodoxy. with the electoral guidelines, most observ- With the organs of power in the hands ers of Iranian politics anticipated a rela- of these hard-line conservatives and the tively modest result. Moreover, one of the potent force of public opinion solidly behind leading lights of the reformist coalition, the reformers, Iranian politics in the former Interior Minister Hojjatoleslam Khatami era became mired in stalemate Abdollah Nouri, had been jailed on religious and intermittent unrest. At the same time, dissent charges in November 1999, depriv- Iran’s small but significant policy changes ing the movement of one of its most and the popular support demonstrated charismatic standard-bearers. As a result, again in municipal elections in 1999 drew in numerous conversations in Tehran in late the world’s focus to the February 2000 January, Iranians expressed expectations parliamentary elections as a critical gauge that were hopeful, but only hesitantly so. of the prospects for reform. Although all The outcome, however, bore out the legislation must pass the scrutiny of the careful planning of the reformist coalition conservative Council of Guardians before (the 2nd of Khordad Front) and, in particu- entering into law, the Majlis has nonethe- lar, its leading party, the Islamic Iran less served as an enterprising forum for Participation Front (IIPF or Mosharekat). political competition under the Islamic By recruiting thousands to register as system and represents a critical element of potential candidates, they effectively clerical rule. precluded wholesale vetting by the Council The anticipation launched intense of Guardians, which instead exhibited politicking long before the kick-off of the notable restraint, rejecting only about 11 brief (one week) official campaign period, percent of the applicants, as compared to as the factions and forces centered at approximately one-third in 1996. In addi- either end of the political spectrum in Iran tion, the reformist coalition fashioned a jostled for position and coalesced into two cutting-edge mode of campaigning, com- main camps. Each of these in turn repre- plete with pep rallies and press briefings, as sented a diverse and often divided assort- well as an appeal to the issues that reso- ment of groups and political personalities, nate with the Iranian public (including the which made for a multiplicity of candidate resumption of relations with the United lists and continuing contention within the States) rather than a restatement of stale umbrella coalitions. For example, the revolutionary orthodoxy. months leading up to the election witnessed The results also demonstrated just as a particularly vicious dispute between the clearly the voters’ utter disaffection with moderate supporters of former president the conservatives, whose campaign in style Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and those who and in substance was not geared to appeal viewed him as an obstacle to genuine and to Iran’s disproportionately young popula- substantial reform. tion. Many interpreted their pre-election Given the perpetuation of internecine maneuvers, such as lowering the threshold strife among the reformers, the power of of the popular vote required for first-round the Council of Guardians to vet candidates victory, as an attempt to prevail by splitting based on their political proclivities, and the the reformist vote. However, if this was 60 MALONEY: ELECTIONS IN IRAN the intention, it backfired spectacularly, as outgoing Speaker Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, most of those elected on the margin hailed simply chose not to run. The final tally from the reformist camp. included only a handful of clerics. In fact, the change in the election On the other side of the fence, the regulations, which awarded victory to those reformist victors include some well-known candidates who reached 25 percent of the faces, as well as many unknowns. The vote (rather than the one-third margin brothers of President Khatami and of the previously required), produced a much jailed Abdollah Nouri – both medical more definitive outcome in the first round doctors and relative political neophytes – than in Iran’s previous elections. More figured among the top vote-getters in than two-thirds of the seats were filled on Tehran, as much in solidarity with the February 18, as opposed to approximately plights of their respective siblings as in half in the first round of the 1996 elections. support of both candidates’ frank advocacy This appeared to have of greater political and left fewer possibilities social freedom. The rest for the sort of conser- Nearly all the senior of the winning slate in vative vote tampering leaders of the outgoing Tehran reads like a that occurred be- register of the younger tween the two rounds parliament – staunch generation of left-wing in previous cam- conservatives – were theoreticians and activ- paigns. However, turned out of their seats. ists, many of whom have events were to prove proven instrumental allies otherwise. of Khatami. The margin of the reformist victory in Ironically, the most stinging setback this first round was much greater than the was delivered in the form of an apparent modest anticipation of many of the victory; the candidacy of former president coalition’s supporters; approximately 160 Hashemi Rafsanjani morphed from what seats went to the 2nd of Khordad Front, was once expected to be a runaway win while the conservative coalition netted only and a certain shot at the Majlis speakership 40 seats in this first round. Independent into a brusque comeuppance from a and unaffiliated candidates won another 21 population weary of politics, and politicians, places, while 65 constituencies were sent as usual. After the lengthy and disputed re- to run-off balloting because no candidate count of the Tehran ballots, Rafsanjani managed to secure the minimum vote. placed twentieth out of the 28 individuals These results are even more stunning who secured seats (two other seats were on an individual basis. Nearly all the senior sent to a run-off), a convenient advance- leaders of the outgoing parliament – ment from his initial standing at the bottom staunch conservatives – were turned out of of that list. While the former president won their seats, including deputy speaker the seat, he lost the larger battle to re- Hassan Rowhani, former intelligence establish himself as the chief parliamentary minister Ali Fallahian and influential power broker, and resigned his seat under lawmakers Mohammad Reza Bahonar and mounting public pressure days before the Mohammad Javad Larijani. Others, like first session of the new Majlis. 61 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. VII, NO. 3, JUNE 2000 These results were greeted with coup-plotting among the military leadership euphoria on the streets of Tehran and with splashed across the front pages of much talk of a parliamentary agenda that Tehran’s