BUILDING POSTWAR EUROPE Also by Anne Deighton

*BRITAIN AND THE FIRST COLD WAR (editor) THE IMPOSSIBLE PEACE: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War

*From the same publishers Building Postwar Europe National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-63

Edited by Anne Deighton Senior Research Fellow University ofOxford

M in association with St Antony's College, Oxford Selection, editorial matter, Introduction and Chapter 7 © Anne Deighton 1995 Chapters 1-6,8-10 © Macmillan Press Ltd 1995

All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission . No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced , copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London WIP 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

First published in Great Britain 1995 by MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world

This book is published in the S, Antony'stMacmillan Series General Editor: Alex Pravda

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 978-1-349-24054-8 ISBN 978-1-349-24052-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-24052-4

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I 04 03 02 01 00 99 98 97 96 95

------First published in the United States of America 1995 by Scholarly and Reference Division, ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Puhlication Data Building postwar Europe: national decision-makers and European institutions, 1948-63 / edited by Anne Deighton . p. em. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0- _, 12-12580-1 I. Europe-Politics and government-I945­ 2. Europe-Military policy. I. Deighton, Anne. D84O.B86 1995 940.55--de20 94-43717 CIP Contents

List ojMaps vii List ofAbbreviations viii Notes on the Contributors x Acknowledgements xi Introduction xiii

In Search of a European Consciousness: French Military Elites and the Idea ofEurope, 1947-54 Claude d'Abzac-Epezy and Philippe Vial

2 The French Administrative Elite and the Unification of 21 Western Europe, 1947-58 Gerard Bossuat

3 German Decision-Making Elites and European Integration: 38 German 'Europolitik' during the Years of the EEC and Free Trade Area Negotiations Sabine Lee

4 The Approaches to European Institution-Building 55 of Carlo Sforza, Italian Foreign Minister, 1947-51 Marion Miller

5 The British Military View of European Security, 1945-50 70 Paul Cornish

6 British Officials and European Integration, 1944-60 87 John W. Young

7 'A Conditional Application': British Management of the 107 First Attempt to Seek Membership of the EEC, 1961-3 Anne Deighton and Piers Ludlow

8 Belgian Decision-Makers and European Unity, 1945-63 127 Thierry Grosbois and Yves Stelandre

v VI Contents 9 'Longing for London': The Netherlands and the 141 Political Cooperation Initiative, 1959-62 Bernard Bouwman

10 European Integration: An American Intelligence Connection 159 Richard J. Aldrich

Select Bibliography 180 Index 183 List of Maps

1.1 MacKinder's geopolitical representation 6 1.2 The IHEDN's European project 10

vii List of Abbreviations

ACUE American Committee on United Europe AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Independent Organizations AS Armee Secrete BAOR British Army of the Rhine BoT Board ofTrade BTO Brussels Treaty Organisation CAC Conseil des Accords Commerciaux CAD Conseil Administratif des Douanes CAMBL Commission Administratif Belgo-luxembourgeoise CDU Christian Democratic Union (German) CEI Commission Economique Interministerielle CIA Central Intelligence Agency CIMUE Comite International des Mouvements pour I'Unite Europeenne CMCE Comite Ministeriel de Coordination Economique CO Colonial Office CUE Conseil de I'Union Economique CoS Chiefs of Staff DFE Direction des Finances Exterieures DREE Directorate ofExternal Economic Relations ECA European Cooperation Administration ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDe European Defence Community EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Area EIB European Investment Bank EPC European Political Community EPU European Payments Union ESE Economic Steering (Europe) Committee ESGA Ecole Superieure de Guerre Aerienne Euratom European Atomic Energy Community FA Interior French Forces FO Foreign Office FRG Federal Republic of Germany FTA Free Trade Area

viii List ofAbbreviations ix GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade IHEDN Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defence Nationale IMF International Monetary Fund JPS Joint Planning Staff MAC Mutual Aid Committee MFE Movimento Federalista Europeo MoD Mini stry of Defence NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OEEC Organisation for European Economic Cooperation ORA Organisation de Resistance de I'Armee OSS Office of Strategic Services PUS Permanent Under-Secretary PUSC Permanent Under-Secretary's Committee PUSD Permanent Under-Secretary's Department SFIO French Socialist Party SGCI Secretariat General du Comite Interministeriel SIS Secret Intelligence Service SPC Schuman Plan Committee SPD German Social Democratic Party TA Territorial Army UN United Nations UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration WEU Western European Union WO War Office WU Western Union MRP Mouvement Republican Populaire Notes on the Contributors

Claude d'Abzac-Epezy is Research Fellow in the Service Historique de I' Armee de I' Air (SHAA), and Lecturer in Contemporary History at the University of Paris III (Sorbonne Nouvelle).

Richard J. Aldrich is Lecturer in Politics at the University of Nottingham.

Gerard Bossuat is Professor of Contemporary History at the Institut Pierre Renouvin , University of Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne),

Bernard Bouwman has recently completed a doctorate at the University of Oxford, UK, and now works as a journalist in the Netherlands.

Paul Cornish is Fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.

Anne Deighton is University Senior Research Fellow and Fellow of St Antony' s College, Oxford University.

Thierry Grosbois is Jean Monnet Research Assistant at the University of Lou vain-la-Neuve, and teaches economic history at the University of Lille.

Sabine Lee is Lecturer in German History at the University of Birmingham.

Piers Ludlow is doctoral research student at the University of Oxford.

Marion Miller is Associate Professor of History and Director of Graduate Studies at the University of Illinois at Chicago.

Yves Stelandre is Research Assistant at the Catholic University of Louvain.

Philippe Vial is Research Fellow at the University of Grenoble II (Pierre Mendes France ), and Lecturer at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris .

John W. Young is Professor of Politics at the University of Leicester.

x Acknowledgements

This book has its genesis in a European Community-wide research project, 'Vers une identite et une conscience europeennes au XXe siecle', directed by Professor Rene Girault of the Institut Pierre Renouvin, University of Paris I (Pantheon-Sorbonne), France. The research programme of the project was broken down into ten themes, and ten transnational groups were created. The project has spawned many international conferences and publications. The group that focused upon national decision-makers and European integration was led by Dr Peter Morris (University of Nottingham), Professor Wolf Gruner (University of Hamburg), and myself. The brief for our research group was the perspectives and policies of national decision-makers towards postwar European institutions. This book arises from a conference on this theme held at St Antony's College, Oxford, in September 1993. The conference participants were drawn from most member states of the European Community. The leadership of Professor Girault has sustained the project through a five-year period, with funding provided in part by the EuropeanCommunity. The Institut Pierre Rcnouvin, the British Academy and the European Studies Centre of St Antony 's College all contributed financially to the conference. I am particularly grateful for the encouragement of the Warden of St Antony's, Lord Dahrendorf, and of A. J. Nicholls, Director of the European Studies Centre in the College; as well as to the National Westminster Bank, which funds my fellowship . Victoria Child, Renata Dwan, Anthony Forster, Elizabeth Kane, Piers Ludlow, Claire Vial, Megan Phillips, Jennifer Law and Anna Lever all provided indispensable logistical support. David Hine, Anand Menon, William Wallace, Geoffrey Warner and Ngaire Woods susb­ sequently provided helpful comments on various parts of the book.

ANNE DEIGHTON Oxford

Other publications within the project:

Girault, R. (ed.) Les Europe des Europeens (Paris, 1993). Girault, R., Bossuat, G. and Frank, R. (eds), ldentite et Conscience europeennes au XXe siecle (Paris, 1994).

XI xii Acknowledgements

Dumoulin, M. and Bussiere , E. (eds), Les cercles economiques et l'Europe au XXe siecle (Louvain-la-Ne uve, 1992). Dumoulin, M., Girault, R. and Trausch, G., L 'Europe de Patronat. De la guerre f roid aux ann ees soixant (Berne/Paris/V ienna, 1993 ). Hud emann, R., Kaelble, H. and Schwabe, K., Europiiische Integration und Europabewusstsein in historicher Perspektive (Berlin, 1994 ). Girault, R. and Bossuat, G. (eds), Europe brisee, Europe retrouvee. Nouvelles refiexions sur l'unite europeenne au XXe siecle (Paris, 1994). Varsori, A. (ed. ), The Role of the Seas in the Shaping ofEuropean Identity (London, 1994). Espados-Burgos, M. (ed.), Los intellectuales y la identidad culturel de Europa (Madrid, 1994). Du Reau , E. (ed.), Est-Ouest, regards croises et cooperation en Europe (Le Mans, 1994) . Fleury. A. and Franck, R., La memoire des guerres et l'Europe (Geneva, forthcoming). Trausch, G., Identifi cation et structuration de l'Europe atravers les insti­ tutions (Luxembourg, forthcoming). Crossick, G. and Kaelble, H. , The European Way (Oxford/B erghahn, forthcoming). Introduction Anne Deighton

POSTWAR EUROPEI

The motivations for and the starting point of postwar European construc­ tion have always been disputed. Any discussion on the construction of postwar Western European institutions must take into account the effects of the Second World War upon Europe. The war left Europe in a desper­ ately weak position relative to American and Soviet power, and, for the first time, both the USA and the Soviet Union had a strategic foothold on the continent. Defeated, Germany had American, Soviet, British and French armies stationed within its borders, and was divided into zones of occupation by the victorious powers . Soviet troops also remained in those countries further east that had been liberated from Nazism by the Red Army , and American troops remained on the territory of most of the member countries of what was to become the North Atlantic Alliance. The cold war division of Germany and Europe therefore had consequences for the future pattern of membership and functions of European institutions, and perceptions by European powers of their relationships with the USA and the Soviet Union is a recurring theme in many of the chapters that follow. These perceptions were made more complex because the postwar German settlement was inconclusive and awkward, and depended for its continuation upon the global bipolar division. Western European countries were also in urgent and continuing need of dollars to help to restore the economic life and trading patterns that had been shattered by war. Even after immediate needs were met through UNRRA funds, bilateral loans, and then the Marshall Aid programme, the drive in Western Europe to aspire to the economic performance of the USA remained a powerful incentive to integration. The effects of the war were also felt in another way, in that resistance thinkers and planners had also been building upon the federalist work of the interwar years, drawing the conclusion that it was the baleful effect of the nation state that had led Europe into two world wars.? In all these ways, the consequences of the Second World War upon the patterning of European international politics lasted at least until the collapse of the cold war division of Germany and

xiii xiv Introduction Europe, the emergence of a united Germany, and the retreat of the Soviet Union from her Eastern European empire. It was in June 1947, after American Secretary ofState, George Marshall, made his famous offer of aid, that the inevitability of a divided Europe became clear.' opening up intense debate about European reconstruction and the ways in which Western Europe, at least, might organise itself in a more integrated fashion. At this stage, the Americans were prepared to accept an organisation to administer the aid (the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, OEEC) that was broad-based in mem­ bership, and intergovernmental in form." It was thus an organisation marked out from other future institutions like the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), which were characterised by supra-national decision-making. The dollars that were distributed through the European Recovery Programme made a significant impact upon the speed of recovery and helped Western European economies to grow and to deliver the prospects of prosperity . But the OEEC did not address adequately either the political, security, or the economic dilemmas facing the nascent 'Western' European commu­ nity: how to meet the perceived Soviet threat; how to work with a German state that had itself been the central threat to European peace, but which now had a key role to play for the West; how to organise itself to max­ imise the economic and political potential of the region.' In March 1948 the Brussels Treaty Organisation (BTO) was created, and enjoyed momentary fame until it was thrown into the shadow of the more far-reaching North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in April 1949.6 The BTO was significant in that it gave institutional shape to the possibility of a 'European' as well as a national dimension to defending Western Europe both from German aggression and from the Soviet Union. However, the BTO did not immediately set out to create a new integrated defence force, although exploratory talks were held between the partners .' By 1948, even as the OEEC was beginning its work, ambitious plans were also being laid to create more integrated political structures, and the much trumpeted Hague Congress in May 1948 spawned a number of groups that hoped for a European Assembly with real powers." The Council of Europe was finally created by May 1949, but it bore all the hallmarks of Anglo-Saxon (and Scandinavian) distaste for supra-national institutions. As well as an Assembly consisting of appointed, not elected, delegates , an intergovernmental Committee of Ministers was created. Proposals had to be channelled through this Committee, and Council of Europe decisions were not binding upon participating countries. This Introduction xv diplomatic coup, led by the British, effectively neutered the Council's integrative potential. In the summer of 1950, it was to be a French diplomatic coup that shifted the focus, starting one of the most intense phases of negotiation between Western European states over common institutions. First, with the announcement of the Schuman Plan in May 1950, the six countries who were to form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) were precipitated into intense talks." Informal discussions were already taking place about closer links between the coal and steel industries of France and Germany, but the importance of the publicity surrounding the Schuman Plan talks was to create a new atmosphere and hope of Franco­ German reconciliation, and a public determination to make war imposs­ ible again.'? The treaty was signed between the Six in 1951, and came into operation in 1952. The UK too was involved in prolonged discus­ sions on a coal and steel pool, but decided against fun membership as a 1 founder member, and then opted for association with the ECSC in 1954. J This concept of association added one more ingredient to the already com­ plicated mix ofEuropean international cooperation.P In October 1950 the Schuman Plan talks were supplemented by even more dramatic proposals - those of French Prime Minister Rene PIeven ­ for a European Army. There had already been, as in the case of the Schuman Plan, quite elaborate private talks between the Americans and the Western Europeans on the possible contribution that the newly created West German state might make to the defence of Europe. The Americans in particular hoped that the Germans would soon play more than a passive role as receivers of Western security guarantees.'? The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 added a particular urgency to these talks, as the cold war now appeared to take a more precise and tangible form. The treaty establishing a European Defence Community (EDC) was signed in 1952. Between 1952 and 1954 an intense debate raged between the Six, the UK and also the USA, who exerted constant pressure on the Europeans to produce a workable solution. The talks took place against the background of the Korean War, greater concessions to the new West German state, the death of Stalin, and the establishment of the ambitious Lisbon force goals, that sought to give a substantial organisation and force structure to NATO, as well as additional plans for the creation of a European Political Community.!" Then, inevitably, ratification of the EDC treaty was rejected hy the French Parliamentary Assembly in August 1954. It was after this moment of truth that exposed the frailty of Western cohesion that the compromise package of Western European Union (WED) was effected.'! XVI Introduction WED was an enlargement ofthe BTO, with West Germany and Italy being brought in as members. However, the WEU solution also allowed the resolution of the core problem of how to bring the resources of West Germany to the Western cause: NATO expanded its membership too, to include West Germany, which also agreed to a self-denying ordinance on the use of atomic, biological and chemical weapons while being given sovereignty. The British played a major role in the final stages of the com­ pletion of a Western security system. This stronger arrangement was to provide just the framework of security that would enable the Six to move ahead confidently with their plans for another phase of Western European institution -building." For Britain, the EDC debacle was further evidence of the continuing instability, immaturity and unreliability of the new Western European democracies: but WEU was to prove the last moment of British leadership in Western Europe.!" By mid-1955, Western European institutions comprised the relatively weak, intergovernmental OEEC that had passed its most useful phase when Marshall Aid was phased out in 1952; the Council of Europe which lacked a clear focus ; and the ECSC, whose chairman, the energetic planner Jean Monnet, had resigned in 1954, in disgust at the slow pace of integration. IS Western Europe was firmly within the embrace of an Atlantic, rather than just a European, security system, and WEU was able to coexist with NATO in a formula that remained essentially unchanged until the Maastricht Treaty . In the relatively more settled security environment talks opened once again on the management of the Western European economy.'? At a foreign ministers' meeting in Messina, Italy, the Six decided to set up a committee chaired by Paul-Henri Spaak, that forged a compromise between GermanlBenelux and French interests by negotiating for both a European Economic Community (EEC) and a European Atomic Energy Community (Euratomj.'? The British withdrew from their 'observer' status in December 1955,21 and by 1957 the Rome Treaty was signed. Its ambiguity has been its most effective, indeed legendary, feature. It pro­ vided for negative and positive integration (and in fact laid down much of the agenda for the Single European Act) . It acted as a spur to greater econ­ omic growth without a crippling loss of national autonomy, and was seen to be flexible enough to embrace both free marketeers and dirigistes. It did not provide for a common foreign policy or a political federation, retaining instead the obscure catch-all word, union. However, it also con­ tained provision to open its doors to potential new or associate members. Meanwhile, the British were leading talks within the framework of the OEEC about a larger free trading area. These talks reflected the different Introduction xvii currents of opinion within Western Europe about open and closed trading areas.P But the British proposal for a free trade area for industrial goods that would embrace the Six, other West European countries and the British Commonwealth was rejected by General de Gaulle in November 1958. The British rashly turned to their peripheral allies, and set up the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 1959.23 The General was to dominate Western European international politics for the next ten years. From the collapse of the free trade area in November 1958 to the col­ lapse of the first enlargement talks in January 1963 (and well beyond), the issue of the enlargement of the EEC remained one of the most important questions relating to European integration. Britain, Denmark and Ireland all applied to join the EEC at much the same time, and the Norwegians put in an application some months before the January 1963 collapse. But even before the enlargement talks began there were continuing discussions among the Six over political cooperation. The phrase had unhappy conno­ tations after the Political Community debacle of 1954, but political coop­ eration was in essence about matters more directly relating to political influence on the world stage. De Gaulle wished for an essentially intergov­ ernmental type of cooperation over political issues, an idea that emerged after the dismissal of his directorate proposal of 1958.24 The difficulties with political cooperation were twofold. The Benelux countries and Italy were very unhappy about any new initiative that might threaten the exist­ ing EEC structures and voting procedures. They did not wish to pose any challenge to the Community, and if a political community were to be created, they wanted it to be within the framework of the EEC. Second, they feared that political cooperation might strengthen the power of the bigger countries in the EEC - France and West Germany - unless they retained voting mechanisms that protected the smaller countries. It was in part for this reason that the Fouchet negotiations became emotionally and literally entangled in the enlargement talks. For the smaller countries were not prepared to countenance further political progress unless Britain was inside the EEC as a balancer against any putative and exclusive Franco­ German axis.25 It was when the Fouchet Plan talks finally disintegrated amidst great acrimony in April 1962 that de Gaulle started to work towards creating the bilateral Franco-German Treaty that was to be signed in January 1963, only ten days after de Gaulle's great speech opposing British entry to the EEC.

Serious writing on the creation of Western European institutions was in something of an academic cul-de-sac until the 1980s, and much of the material that did exist was highly politicised or autobiographical." xviii Introduction The vast mass of the international history-writing on the 1950s was focused upon the cold war, and particularly upon American policy. The kind of topics that are covered by this book found little place of their own, and were largely ignored or represented as facets of American or Western policy. European historical writing tended to concentrate upon the general foreign policies of particular countries, or surveyed domestic and foreign policies of particular periods. Alan Milward, in a trilogy of important and provocative books, has pre­ sented the most hard-hitting English-language challenge to previously accepted historical explanations of this period. In The Reconstruction of Western Europe, he challenged the conventional view that the creation of successive and successful European institutions was primarily driven by the experience of the Second World War and the federalist thinking that emerged from some, particularly resistance, circles as the war ended. He opened up a completely new approach to European integration that was driven by economic history, and a re-examination of the nation state's role and fortunes in the early postwar period.F In The European Rescue ofthe Nation State, he developed these arguments further and, in a collection of linked essays, argued that, far from evaporating in the face of the onward march of integration, the nation state has been very successful in the euro­ peanisation of its policies." In The Frontier of National Sovereignty, he and his co-authors argued that states needed to create an international framework to survive economically in the postwar world, and the success of European economies showed that the integrative policies pursued proved to have advantages over interdependence.P His work has provoked widespread discussion, helped by the fact that the publications were per­ fectly timed. Reconstruction appeared as the debate on the Single European Act was under way; Rescue and Frontier as the end of the cold war, recession and the Maastricht debate threw open all traditional assumptions about the nature of the EC. The new insights he has brought to the economic dimension of European construction need to be echoed by those in different branches of the historical profession. What in part makes Milward 's work so powerful is that his evidence is drawn from primary archival sources. It is this vast archival resource of the past that lies at the heart of the historians' debate on postwar Europe. The release policy for national, international and private archives is however still very idiosyncratic, as many of the contributors to Building Postwar Europe explain. It varies from country to country, and also between different ministerial archives in one country. The regimented Thirty Year Rule in the UK may have its detractors, and there is still much that is withheld for 'security' reasons, but there is nevertheless a large Introduction xix amount of material that is systematically released each year. The French introduced a rule similar to the Thirty Year Rule in 1979, while access to certain categories of German and Italian papers (the Italians have a Forty Year Rule), remains patchy. The Dutch have the most exemplary national release policy of 25 years. Further archival release is essential, not only to prevent national histories being written only with the use of another country's archive, but also to dispel any suspicions about the motivations behind release policies. There are still gaps in archival material that are little short of scandalous (the non-availability of NATO documentation is the most obvious example, and access to the EEC's own archive, although technically under a Thirty Year Rule, is not yet completely satisfactory), not least because of the flood of documents that are now being made avail­ able in countries that were behind the Iron Curtain.P Having said this, historians still have much to debate and to learn from the archival sources that are now available. There have also been two major sets of edited collections by historians which, apart from their intrinsic contribution to the practice of historical explanation, have raised important questions about whether the quantity of multi-archival research which is now necessary for the international historian to undertake is in fact beyond the capability of many lone scholars who are not working in a team, or with a support group of scholars with similar interests."

There are, broadly, four different perspectives upon which historians and political scientists have based explanations of the phenomenon of postwar European construction. The first perspective derives from a view which argues that a quest for European integration has been based upon a common cultural and religious experience which is part of European history . The creation of European institutions, based upon a working rela­ tionship between states that is more than intergovernmental, is seen as being essentially a normative and a teleological process, leading ultimately o a United States of Europe. The experience of war in the twentieth century acted as a catalyst to this long-term drive by European peoples for greater unity and peace, and the construction of such institutions in the postwar period was driven by the determination of a small number of highly committed indivlduals.P A second , systemic, view is grounded in the conventional view of the postwar international system, and deals with integration in Western Europe within the framework of the balance of power in a bipolar world. The emerging power-political and ideological conflict between the USA and the USSR dominated the political, ideological, and economic debate within Europe . The effect of the bipolar divide that created the cold war xx Introduction was that Western European states looked to the USA to create an umbrella for their survival, defence and military security. They also reflected the dominant American ideology of capitalism, coupled with an emphasis upon individual freedoms. The USA thus provided a model for Western Europe, encouraging a view of itself as a large, strong and prosperous federal system , which contrasted sharply with European states' experience of territorial and ideological conflict culminating in two bloody wars, in which the USA had had to intervene to bring to an end. The USA worked to enhance this perception of itself through its continual strong commit­ ment and active interest in attempts to promote Western European political and economic integration. The relentless opposition of the Soviet Union to European integration ironically acted as both threat and reminder of the ideological alternatives that the East offered." A third, and sometimes overlapping, perspective derives from the work of international political economists, and from the experience of the inter­ nationalisation of Western economies. On the one hand, constant and increasing expectations of economic growth and, on the other, the dra­ mat ic changes in technology meant that, to survive and compete, national economic enterprises would increasingly give way to larger and more efficient units. In this process, the role of the state itself would begin to weaken to enable their populations to prosper and compete. Transnational economic processes and increasing interdependence were thought, there­ fore, to indicate the erosion of the nation state." This was most obviously to be seen in the creation of the EEC with its characteristics of both nega­ tive and positive integration, a supra-national Commission, quasi-federal undertones of movement towards an 'ever closer union' and assumptions about the increasing use of majority voting by participating nation states. More specifically, such explanations of Western European institution­ building have been dominated by functionalism and more particularly neo­ functionalism.P The fourth perspective bears very close resemblance to the so-called post-revi sionist school of cold war historiography. The phrase 'post­ rev isionist' was popularised by one of the leading historians of the cold war, John Lewis Gaddi s, who examined the new approaches taken by his­ torians to the cold war in the 1970s, at a time of detente when the severe bipol arity of the earlier cold war years was waning. Historians were now working with recently released archival material, and Gaddis noted their interest in the role of smaller powers in the cold war, their use of new material that looked at domestic policy and the sources of cold war foreign polic y formulation, as well as an increasing familiarity with other, related disciplines." The same revival of interest in postwar European Introduction XXI construction as a historical phenomenon can be observed: we may call this European post-revisionism. Much recent writing on this period of postwar Western European history, including the chapters that follow, reveals a new emphasis upon private and public archival material, with scholars similarly show ing a greater interest in drawing upon different historical approaches." There is also increased interest in making use of the experi­ ence of political scientists and upon relevant international relations theory. 38 Recent work largely rejects a determinist approach to European integration, and has a concern to break down or disaggregate an inevitable 'process' of integration.'? Much writing examines, often with teams of his­ torians, particular episodes of the 1940s and 1950s as historical phenom­ ena rather than as episodes on an inevitable route towards a united Europe.t" So far, such writings have focused upon the perspective of indi­ vidual states, rather than upon particular international institutions." It is also striking that articles and chapters in collected editions are, as yet, far more widespread than monographs, and that little comparative archival work on states' diplomacy leading to new institutions has yet been pub­ lished. Given the amount of archival material now available, and the com­ plexities of both international history and of international relations theories, it seems evident that more collaboration will become the norm. Our prime concern in this volume has not been to test a particular model or theory. The task of historical reconstruction and explanation using the wealth of documents available on a particular subject needs to precede more theoretical discussions. Attention to detail; an acceptance of incon­ sistencies and contradictions in the evidence ; speculation and the exercise of the historical imagination contrast sharply with the necessary demands of parsimony and generalisation that characterise much political science theorising." Decision-making processes also vary widely between coun­ tries and between sets of negotiations that themselves take place in a shift­ ing international environment. Indeed, the point has been well-made that, for international relations theorists , it is increasingly the case that the dis­ tinction between accepted levels of analysis is breaking down 'under the collective weight of empirical anomalies ' .43 The chapters in this book therefore fall into the European post­ revisionist perspective, drawing as they do upon recently released archival material to examine the motivations and forces acting upon key decision­ makers at particular moments. Within the remit of the 'European Identity' project, they concentrate on the international politics of states as actors and of key decision-makers in Western Europe, and their efforts to construct common European institutions. Building Postwar Europe does not focus upon individual European institutions, but takes as its XXII Introduction perspective ministers and officials at state level who made decisions that led to the construction of, or the failure to construct, particular institutions." The chronological spread of the chapters reflects the research interests of contributors and the availability of archives, as well as the wide range of institutions that were being examined and developed over this period, and does not pretend to be a systematic coverage of every national policy towards each institution. However, a number ofcommon themes emerge. The book confirms that the interests and pressures that led nation states towards institution-building in the postwar period - why and how states sought to build common institutions - remain very complex to analyse. Key decision-makers, it emerges, took regional bilateral relations very seriously indeed, a dimension that has hitherto often been underestimated. Indeed, many of the chapters emphasise that the regional environment and the attention which was given by Western European states to each other's strategies and interests was as important as those with the USA and USSR. This indicates that, alongside the emerging bipolar world system, there was still a strong perception of and concern about the European balance of power. Although the Franco-German relationship has frequently been analysed, the European balance of power was not simply a general desire to tie Germany down, and it is possible to argue that creating 'little coali­ tions' between Western European countries was far more important to all Western European national decision-makers than has often been appreci­ ated." This emerges in the chapters by Grosbois/Stelandre and Bouwman on the importance of the Benelux axis, and on the BeneluxlFrench conflict over the Fouchet Plans; in Marion Miller's account of Sforza's attempts to build support outside Italy and his extreme sensitivity to British concerns, a sensitivity shared by the Belgians and Dutch; and the importance of Anglo-German and Anglo-French relations, as well as a putative Anglo­ Italian link in 1962 referred to in the Deighton/Ludlow chapter. (These 'little coalitions' are echoed by the current European 'game' of building bilateral or sectoral coalitions within the EC.) Second, calculations about the domestic environment played a major role in the international deliberations of decision-makers, with decision­ makers concerned to protect both sectoral interests and perceived 'national' interests. Cornish's chapter argues that Montgomery sought, above all, to defend the cause of the army within Whitehall. As a result, Britain was neither capable nor willing to playa leading role in defending the Continent 'on the ground' . Likewise, party and electoral considera­ tions were extremely important in 1961-3, to Harold Macmillan, who, for tactical reasons, did not publicly project the British application as a matter of overriding national interest. Bossuat argues that French officials, albeit Introduction xxiii reluctantly, came to the conclusion over the 1948-63 period that the advantages that European institutions brought (an 'entente fonctionelle') would outweigh the constraints for French national interests. Thus, France would be able to enable the economy to grow, and to preserve her role as a great power. The chapter by d' Abzac-Epezy and Vial reveals how an idea of 'Europeanisation' that already existed among French military elites was debated during the EDC negotiations against the backcloth of France's history and how best to maximise French national security interests over­ seas. It also emerges that it is impossible to generalise about at what point nation states become prepared to 'upgrade the national interest' to the European level. Bouwman shows that the Dutch were prepared to agree to the rather protectionist system advocated in the Treaty of Rome because of a perception that the Treaty would lock in the major players irreversibly, and therefore prevent a repetition of the setbacks Holland faced in the interwar period. Miller shows that Sforza quite explicitly linked the cre­ ation of quasi-federal European institutions with the need for Italy to con­ struct a more integrated European civil system that would, in turn, protect and nurture Italian democracy and the postwar Italian state. Finally, within the domestic environment, the structure, influence and cybernetics of the bureaucratic system is of central importance to an understanding of the diplomacy surrounding these institutions. But bureaucracies cannot be considered entirely in isolation from the influence of key players, officials and ministers. It is perhaps unfashionable to lay emphasis upon the importance of the individual decision-maker, and the evidence here is mixed. (Aldrich's chapter is a-typical in that its research focus is upon the USA , but its startling conclusions serve as a reminder of the context in which some key European desicion-makers and politicians were operating.) The chapters that consider Sforza, Mollet, Adenauer, Spaak, Luns and Macmillan reveal the ability of individual senior minis­ ters to influence policy, often in spite of their officials. Adenauer's over­ whelming dominance of foreign policy in areas he considered to be of prime importance is analysed in detail by Sabine Lee; Luns's rejection of the Fouchet Plan is assessed by Bouwman; and de Gaulle's 14 January 1963 speech in the wake of the largely unscripted Macmillan/Kennedy meetings at Nassau are also examples of the same phenomenon. But in the chapters of Bossuat, Young and Grosbois/Stelandre, evidence also appears to point to the frequent weight of officials over ministers , despite conflicts within the bureaucracies. The contrasting evidence within this book probably has its origin in two factors. One is the.determination, strength and personality of particular individuals, whether officials or ministers: it is always difficult to place the 'heroic' policy-maker. Second, xxiv Introduction in a period either of considerable political instability (as in France), or when the issue in question is not at the top of the political agenda (as was the case with the European institutions in Britain before 1960 as Young shows), then officials can have greater authority, particularly when there exist well­ established traditions and practices of bureaucratisation, as there did in both France and Britain. In general, the chapters that follow show that it is too simplistic to generalise about the relative influence of either individuals or bureaucracies over this period, and that the efforts to build European institutions during this period remain a complex and rich area for analysis.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

I. This section of the introduction is intended to serve as a general historical introductionto the more detailed analyses of subsequent chapters. 2. Walter Lipgens, A History ofEuropean Integration, Vol. I: 1945-1947: The Formation of the European Unity Movement (Oxford, 1982); M. L. Smith and P. M. R. Stirk, Making the New Europe - European Unity and the Second World War (London, 1990). 3. AnneDeighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division ofGermany and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford, 1990/1993), ch. 7, 'Taking off the Gloves'. 4. Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan, America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge, 1987); Gerard Bossuat, L'Europe Occidental a l'Heure Americaine. Plan Marshall et Unite Europeenne, 1945-1952 (Brussels, 1992); Pierre Melandri, Les Etats-Unis face aI'Unification de l'Europe, 1945-1954 (Paris, 1980). 5. Rene Girault, 'On the Power of Old and New Europe', in Ennio di Nolfo (ed.), Power in Europe? II, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins ofthe EEC, 1952-1957 (Berlin/New York, 1982); Wilfred Loth, The Division of the World, 1941-1955 (London, 1989). There was a continual tensionbetween the desire for the restoration of Western European power as a Third Force in world politics, and for the creation of a Western, Euro-Atlantic Community. Jean Monnet certainly favoured the latter. 6. The founding members of the BTO were Britain, France and the Benelux countries; of NATO, the USA, Canada, Britain, France, Italy, Benelux, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Iceland. 7. John Young and John Kent, 'The "Western Union" Concept and British Defence Policy, 1947-8', in Richard 1. Aldrich (ed.), British 1ntelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51 (London, 1992) . Olav Riste (ed.), Western Security: The formative years, 1947-1953 (New York, 1985); Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds), Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-1962 (London, 1992). Introduction xxv

8. Raymond Poidevin (ed.), Histoire des Debutsde La Construction Europeenne, mars 1948 - mai 1950 (Baden-Baden, 1986); Clive Archer, Organising Western Europe (Sevenoaks, 1990), ch. 4. 9. The six countries were France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg. In August 1949, the state of West Germany came into being, with the introduction of the Basic Law - the new German constitution ­ and with limited sovereignty which did not extend to foreign policy. 10. William Diebold, The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959 (New York, 1959); Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1951 (London, 1984), ch. XII; Klaus Schwabe (ed.), The Beginnings of the Schuman Plan (Baden-Baden, 1988); John Gillingham, Coal, Steel and the Rebirth ofEurope. 1945-1955 (Cambridge, 1991); Raymond Poidevin and Dirk Spirenberg, The High Authority ofthe European Coal and Steel Community (Paris/London, 1994). II. Roger Bullen and M. E. Pelly (eds), The Schuman Plan. The Council of Europe and Western European Integration, 1950-1952, Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series II, vol. I (London, 1986). 12. There is a loose hierarchy of language used to describe the different types of international links in postwar Western Europe: intergovernmental; coop­ erative ; associative; integrated. Integration has been described as 'a process [where] there is movement towards (or away from in the case of disintegra­ tion) collective action based upon consensual values for the achievement of common goals .... The process is self-maintaining'; William C. Olson and A. J. R. Groom, International Relations Then and Now. Originsand Trends in Interpretation (London/New York, 1991). This definition highlights the difficulties about the relationship between integration and disintegration, as irreversibility is often typified as a characteristic of integration. For a more detailed discussion of this debate see Brigid Laffan, Integration and Cooperation in Europe (London/New York, 1992). 13. See, for example, Charles C. Maier, 'Finance and defense: implications of military integration, 1950-1952', in Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham (eds), NATO: the Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration ofEurope (Basingstoke, 1992); Saki Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-1955 (Cambridge, 1991). On the American role, see Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power. National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), pp.317-23,383-90,453-63. 14. On the European Political Community see Rita Cardozo, 'The Project for a Political Community', in Roy Pryce (ed.), Dynamics of European Union (Beckenham, 1987). It finally collapsed with the EDC. 15. Elizabeth du Reau, 'Pierre Mendes France, la creation de I'Union Europeenne Occidentale (UEO) et son devenir' , in Rene Girault (ed.), Pierre Mendes France et le Role de la France dans le Monde (Grenoble, 1991); Dockrill , West German Rearmament; John Young (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration. 1951-1955 (Leicester, 1988). XXVI Introduction

16. See, in particular, contributions to Gilbert Trausch (ed.), European Integration from the Schuman Plan to the Treaties ofRome (Baden-Baden, 1993). 17. Anne Deighton, 'Britain and the Cold War, 1945-1955: an overview' , in Brian Brivati and Harriet Jones (eds), From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe since 1945 (Leicester, 1993). On the French role, see also Georges Soutou, 'La France, I' Allemagne et les accords de Paris', Relations Internationales, vol. 52, (1987), pp. 451-70. 18. Rene Girault and Gerard Bossuat (eds), Europe Brisee, Europe Retrouvee. Nouvelles Reflexions sur l' Unite Europeenne au XXe siecle (Paris, 1994). 19. Although the Beyen Plan talks predated the Messina talks: Alan Milward with George Brennan and Federico Romero, The European Rescue of the Nation State (London, 1992), pp. 186ff.; Richard Griffiths (ed.), The Netherlands and the Integration ofEurope. 1945-1957 (Amsterdam, 1990). 20. Hans-Jurgen Ktlsters, 'The Treaties of Rome . 1955-57', in Pryce , Dynamics; chapter by Bossuat below. 21. John Young, • "The Parting of the Ways?" Britain, the Messina Conference and the Spaak Committee, June-December 1955', in Michael Dockrill and John Young (eds), British Foreign Policy, 1945-56 (London , 1989). 22. See chapter by Sabine Lee below. 23. Members of EFTA were Britain , Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland, Iceland. Membership of the EEC was widely discussed within all the EFTA countries, but was not, at this stage, a realistic option for those with neutral status, or traditions of neutrality. 24. He had suggested a Three Power Directorate within NATO. Both Macmillan and Eisenhower had dismissed it, and Adenauer was furious at the implications it had for West Germany: Pierre Gerbet, 'In search of Political Union. The Fouchet Plan negotiations' , in Pryce, Dynamics of European Union. 25. See chapters by Bouwman and Grosbois/Stelandre in this volume. 26. To give one extreme example, Oliver Crawford, in Done this Day. The European Idea in Action (London, 1970), argues that 'The conviction that unites the very diverse chapters of this book is that for us in Europe, the European Idea is the most creative idea of our century, and its logical imper­ ative is that we must combine our experience, our energies, our ability and our faith towards one single aim - the eventual creation of a European Federal Government for all Europe and in perpetuity ... Dare we forget that for evil to triumph "it is necessary only for good men to stand still"?, It is this kind of rhetoric that has blighted much of the literature on this period. 27. Milward, Reconstruction, particularly pp. 492-3. 28. Milward, European Rescue. 29. Alan Milward, Frances M. B. Lynch, Ruggiero Ranieri, Federico Romero, Vibeke Sorensen, The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and Theory, 1945-1992 (London , 1993). 30. There are also official collections of documents available, but these are far from providing a comprehensive coverage of this period. 31. One is the series of multi-lingual publications of the European Community Liaison Committee of Historians: Raymond Poidevin (ed.), Histoire des Introduction xxvii

Debuts de la Construction Europeenne ; (Brussels/Miiano/Paris/Baden­ BadenfI986), Klaus Schwabe (ed.), Die Anfiinge des Schuman Plans. 1950-1951 (Brussels/MiianolParis/Baden-Baden, 1988); Enrico Serra (00.), II Rilancio dell' Europa e i Trattati di Roma (Brussels/MilanolParislBaden­ Baden, 1989); Gilbert Trausch (ed.), Die Europiiische Integration vom Schuman Plan bis zu den Yertriigen von Rom (Brussels/MilanolParisl Baden-Baden , 1993). The other is Josef Becker and Franz Knipping (OOs), Power in Europe ? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a postwar world, 1945-1950 (Berlin/New York, 1986); Ennio di Nolfo (ed.), Power in Europe ? II, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC. 1952-1957 (Berlin/New York, 1992). American historians of the cold war are also beginning to ask similar questions about the need to work in research teams: see, recently, Lynn Eden, The End of US Cold War History?', International Security, vol. 18, no. I (Summer 1993), p. 203. 32. Much of the writing of this genre is by those who were actively involved politically during the years of greatest optimism, the late 1940s and 1950s. For general overviews, see, for example, Lipgens, History of European Integration ; Derek Heater, The Idea ofEuropean Unity (Leicester, 1992). 33. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations. Bargaining. Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, 1977), esp. ch. VI; Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, 1959); Anton De Porte, Europe between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance (New Haven, 1986). That European integration has been at least in part a cold war phenomenon has only become increasingly widely discussed and acknowledged since 1989; see the chapters by Becker, Poidevin and Girault in di Nolfo (ed.), Power in Europe? II; Richard Crockatt, Theories of Stability and the End of the Cold War', in Mike Bowker and Robin Brown (eds), From Cold War to Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s (Cambridge, 1993); Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (eds), The New European Community. Decision Making and Institutional Change (Boulder, Colorado, 1991), esp. pp. 4-5; Anne Deighton, 'La Guerra frfa y los orlgenes de la integraci6n europea', Sistema, vol. 1141115 (1993). 34. See, for example, P. R. Viotti and M. V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (New York, 1987); R. O. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition (Boston, 1977); C. Kegley (ed.), The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections (New York, 1991). In Transformation of Western Europe (London, 1990), William Wallace gives weight to systemic factors, but also argues that 'modernization and integration go together' (pp. 53,93). He further notes that the concept of transformation is one that is full of unexpected consequences (Dynamics of European Integration (London, 1990),p. 8~ 35. Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 1957); Ernst Haas, The Uniting ofEurope: Political. Social and Economic Forces (London , 1958). Haas then had second thoughts about the validity of his earlier work, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration (Berkeley, 1975); but, as the impetus for integration appeared to be reinvigorated, see xxviii Introduction

'Words can hurt you, or who said what to whom about Regimes', International Organ isation, vol. 36, no. 2 (1982). Milward launches an intriguing attack on neo-funct ionalism as the cultu ral arm of American cold war policy - the 'intellectual foundation for a hegemonic foreign policy architecture' (Frontier, p. 3). Ironically, it was Haas himself who argued that what launched the ECSC and the EEC was '[c]converging economic goals embedded in the bureaucratic, pluralistic and industrial life of modem Europe [which] provided the central impetus', 'The uniting of Europe and the uniting of Latin America', Journal ofCommon Market Studies, vol. 5, no. 4 (1967), p. 322. 36. John Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War' , Diplomatic History, vol. 7, no. 3, (1983). 37. The work of economic historians influenced by the work of Milward, such as Frances Lynch, 'Restoring France: the Road to Integration', in Milward et al. , Frontier, and Ruggiero Ranieri , 'Inside or Outside the Magic Circle?', ibid.; Bossuat, La Fran ce, l'Aide Americaine et la Construction Europeenne; Richard Aldrich, below , an intelligence expert, as well as his­ torians of security issues, show the richness of the period for different his­ torical sub-disciplines. 38. One recent example of such work in English is that of Christopher Lord, British Entry to the Europ ean Community under the Heath Government of 1970-4 (Newcastle, 1993), which draws very heavily upon theoretical work to drive historical analysis. 39. '[T]here was nothing inevitable or self-evident about the extent of European integration, the aims which European union might pursue, or the institutions which developed ', David Weigall and Peter Stirk (eds), The Origins and Development of the European Community (Leicester, 1992), p. 2. 40. On teams of historians on security questions, see Heuser and O'Neill (eds), Securing Peace in Europe ; Peter Stirk and D. Willis (eds), Shaping Postwar Europe. European Unity and Disun ity, 1945-1957 (London, 1991); see also note 32 above. As shown in the note 44 Building Postwar Europe is also just one part of a much larger international project. 41. But see Poidevin and Spirenburg, Histo ry of the High Authority. 42. Eden, 'The End of Cold War History ?' , p. 183. 43. Andrew Moravcsik in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacob son, Robert D. Putnam, (eds), Double Edge d Diplomacy. International bargaining and domestic politics (Berkeley, 1993), p. 6. 44. The brief for the project's working group was national deci sion-makers and European institution s. Another research group is focusing upon the perspec­ tive of those who worked within European institutions, and yet another upon non-governmental groups and their influence upon decision-makers. The role of influential group s outside government - commercial interests, the press, intellectual elites as well as particular pressure groups and lobbies such as trades unions - was thus beyond the brief of the contributors, as was the role of particular politic al parties, but it was agreed that this is an area in which both national and comp arative studies could be very reveal­ ing. 45. See similar conclusions drawn by Heuser in Securing Europe, Introdu ction.