The Origins of N A TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

European Economic Recovery power production), and dollar reserves to pay for necessary and European Integration imports. The war had rent the social fabric of many nations, setting social class against social class and ethnic group n the aftermath of the total defeat of Nazi Germany in against ethnic group. Political tensions were exacerbated by 1945, Europe struggled to recover from the ravages of the participation of many Europeans in collaborationist occupation and war. The wartime Grand Alliance be- regimes and others in armed resistance. Masses of Europe- tweenI the Western democracies and the Soviet Union ans, radicalized by the experience of war and German collapsed, and postwar negotiations for a peace settlement occupation, demanded major social and economic change foundered in the Council of Foreign Ministers. By 1947 and appeared ready to enforce these demands with violence. peace treaties with Italy and the defeated Axis satellites were The national Communist Parties of Western Europe stood finally concluded after protracted and acrimonious negotia- ready to exploit this discontent in order to advance the aims tions between the former allies, but the problem of a divided of the Soviet Union.2 and occupied Germany remained unsettled. U.S. leaders were acutely aware of both the dangers of In April 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall re- renewed conflict in Europe and of their ability to influence turned from a frustrating round of negotiations in the the shape of a postwar European political and social order. Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow to report that the Fresh from the wartime experience of providing major United States and the Soviet Union were at loggerheads over Lend-Lease aid to allied nations and assistance to millions of a prescription for the future of central Europe and that the refugees through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Soviets appeared ready to drag out talks. “We cannot ignore Administration, they recognized the critical role massive the factor of time involved here,” Marshall warned. U.S. aid could play in promoting a peaceful and democratic “The recovery of Europe is far slower than had been reconstruction. expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The The U.S. domestic political picture, however, initially patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. . . .Action appeared unfavorable to dramatic action. Congressional cannot await compromise through exhaustion.”1 elections in 1946 produced a Republican majority in both Houses of Congress. President Harry S. Truman’s leader- West Europeans felt vulnerable not only to a possibly ship was repudiated, and the strongly conservative Republi- resurgent Germany but even more to communist expansion can majority appeared set upon a major reduction in govern- by subversion and the threat of direct Soviet military action. ment expenditures. Tensions ran high between the two The first stages of postwar economic reconstruction were major American political parties.3 painfully slow. Europe faced shortages of housing, basic foodstuffs, raw materials (especially coal, the key element in NATO

In spite of intense market and a common toward the military corollary partisan political warfare, the defense and foreign policy. to the Marshall Plan came Truman administration and U.S. enthusiasm for integra- from Britain and France at Congress, laying aside a tion programs was strongly the end of 1947. The failure century and a half of influenced by a small but of the Soviet Union and the isolationist tradition, agreed active group of European West to come to terms for a to a vast expansion of federalists, especially Jean postwar German peace peacetime international Monnet, who had close settlement at the Moscow leadership responsibilities. personal relations with Council of Foreign Ministers Both the Marshall Plan American leaders and were meeting in March and April initiative and subsequently strongly pro-American in 1947 had been an important NATO were part of a U.S. outlook. Monnet’s vision of impetus in the launching of response to Europe’s crises a United States of Europe the Marshall Plan effort. that viewed greater European struck a responsive chord In June 1947 Secretary integration as critical to among Americans. Winston of State George Marshall successful resistance to the George C. Marshall, Churchill’s early champion- took the next major step and communist challenge and as Secretary of State from ship of European unity formally invited the Euro- the platform for building a further popularized the idea January 1947-January pean states to submit plans peaceful Europe. In the early in the United States. (Ironi- for a European recovery 1949, after whom the years of the process, the cally, Churchill favored a effort. Pointing to a “disloca- United States prodded its Marshall Plan was united Europe without British tion of the entire fabric of reluctant allies toward named. participation.) U.S. support the European economy” as a greater cooperation, while (Department of State photo) for European integration was result of a decade of “abnor- leaders of the European couched in terms of the mal conditions,” Secretary states—although recognizing By 1947 U.S. officials creation of an Atlantic Marshall offered assistance the need to integrate their recognized that European partnership that would resources—continued to reconstruction would fail enhance prosperity and directed not against any insist on the primacy of the without a major contribution security on both sides of the country or doctrine but 4 against hunger, poverty, national state. from occupied Germany, but Atlantic. U.S. enthusiasm for desperation and chaos. Its rebuilding the German purpose should be the European integration had a economy was bound to revival of a working variety of motivations. A cause severe concern among Roots of the Atlantic Alliance economy in the world so coordinated program of its former enemies, above all as to permit the emergence European economic recon- France. Integration offered a of political and social struction and defense was path for both rebuilding he economic recovery conditions in which free cost-effective, a key point Germany’s economy and of Europe was institutions can exist. with a Truman administra- binding the new German inseparable from tion that was struggling to state to its former enemies Tsome solution to the un- Secretary Marshall’s win congressional and public with ties of mutual interest. settled postwar political initiative, carefully framed to approval for an enormous Subsequently, integration situation. It became evident avoid confrontation with the outlay of American money to proved a useful vehicle for to European leaders during Soviet Union and coordi- finance its aid programs. bringing Germany into 1947 that recovery of their nated with the major U.S. European integration had an European defense arrange- war-shattered national allies, provided the basis for equally important role in ments. economies could not be a European response. Britain preventing the recurrence of In addition to these accomplished without and France together with the conflicts between European motivations, U.S. officials political and military security. Benelux nations—Belgium, states, which had twice were convinced of the Moreover, these leaders the Netherlands, and Luxem- drawn the United States into benefits that both the United were convinced that such bourg—took the lead in war. Of particular impor- States and Europe would military security arrange- organizing a conference of tance, of course, were gain from an enlarged single ments would require the the Committee of European French-German relations. involvement of the United Economic Cooperation, States. The first steps

2 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO

which met in Paris June 27- July 2, 1947, to discuss a coordinated program of economic cooperation aimed at integrated economic recovery. Italy and Greece pledged their cooperation. The Marshall Plan, launched as a joint U.S.-European program, pointed the way to European economic union and was America’s first step toward becoming a super- power with global interests and responsibilities. The conference in Paris in the summer of 1947 proved critical in defining a security response to threats to political stability in Western Europe. Soviet Premier Stalin initially permitted the states of Secretary Marshall’s offer, Bevin felt that the Western Berlin schoolchildren Eastern Europe to join the simultaneously began a democracies, including the watching a C-54 cargo discussions and sent a campaign of strikes and United States, should plane approach demonstrations designed to organize themselves with Tempelhof Airport during Soviet delegation as well. He 6 concluded, however, that undercut the initiative. power, money, and resolute the 1948 Berlin airlift. participation in the Marshall At the conclusion of the action to resist communism. (AP/Wide World photo) Plan threatened his hold over London session of the Bevin and French Foreign Eastern Europe and would Council of Foreign Ministers Minister Bidault had already Brussels Pact and the other mean abandoning his plans in December 1947, the East- started discussing the including the United States for Soviet postwar recon- West deadlock was fully creation of a European and Canada.7 struction. The Soviets confirmed, and the hope for alliance that could include A month later, in January withdrew from the prelimi- a German settlement seemed the United States, but Bevin 1948, Bevin followed up his nary talks and forced the further away than ever. initially stressed to Marshall informal presentation with a East European states to Secretary of State Marshall that he was not looking for a note to the State Depart- decline invitations to attend and British Foreign Secretary formal alliance so much as a ment arguing that the the subsequent organiza- Bevin met privately several way to create confidence Marshall Plan was not tional meeting. In September times at the end of the among West Europeans that enough to save Europe and 1947, a Soviet-organized conference to decide what the Soviets would be proposing, with the support meeting in Poland set up the they would do next. Bevin stopped. Bevin urged a of the United States and the Communist Information wearily commented: system, “a sort of spiritual Commonwealth, to form a Bureau (Cominform) whose federation of the West,” that Western democratic “sys- I am convinced that the would include the United major purpose was to Soviet Union will not deal tem” that would include coordinate action against the States and Italy as well as Scandinavia, the Low with the West on any Britain and France. He Marshall Plan. While the reasonable terms. . .and Countries, France, Italy, Soviet Union assumed the that. . .[its] salvation outlined his thinking for Greece, Portugal, and major onus for the division depends upon the Marshall by suggesting an eventually Germany and of Europe, the Communist formation of some form of alliance comprising two Spain.8 Parties of Western Europe, union. . .backed by the concentric circles, one which had initially taken a United States. composed of the nations that cautious approach toward would later form the

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The Crises of 1948 Norway: A new steel plant under ast-West tensions construction by the Norwegian escalated in the first Government with Marshall Plan aid, half of 1948 as just north of the Arctic Circle, at CzechoslovakiaE fell under Mo i Rana. (Department of State photo) communist rule, Italian elections approached, and in June Stalin instituted a blockade of the access routes to the city of Berlin. The situation in Germany created an acute case of war jitters. Since late 1946 the United States and Britain had been pursuing policies designed to encourage the rebuilding of the economic potential of their respective zones of occupation in Germany and simulta- neously promote political democracy. By early 1948, the growth of the West German economy led to major currency reform that was extended to the Western- occupied zones of Berlin in the heart of the still eco- nomically depressed Soviet zone of Germany. Western nist takeover. In March the United States and the Soviet American Military policies were hotly con- U.S. Military Governor, Union to the brink of war. Involvement in tested by the Soviet Union, Gen. Lucius Clay, warned Truman dispatched B-29 Western European which insisted that wartime Washington that U.S.-Soviet bombers to the United Reconstruction and and early postwar accords tensions over Germany Kingdom but prudently kept Security on German occupation were rising to dangerous the atomic bombs they would carry at home. Under required its consent to any levels and that “war may uring and after Secretary of State Robert major changes in treatment come with dramatic sudden- World War II, Lovett visited Berlin and of the former enemy. U.S. ness.” military power and reported that Clay “was and British officials brushed In June the Soviets cut Dsecurity considerations drawn. . .as tight as a steel aside Soviet complaints as off all ground transportation assumed a far greater role in spring.” Fortunately, a obstructionism designed to routes between West foreign policy calculations massive U.S. program of air impede overall European Germany and the Western than American leaders had supply kept Berlin supplied, recovery and leave a zones of occupation in ever previously experienced. Stalin made no threatening desperate West Germany Berlin. Without supplies of Although the United States military moves, and the war prey to an eventual commu- food and fuels, the city quickly reduced the massive hysteria gradually faded. The seemed doomed to fall land, sea, and air forces under Soviet control. The success of the audacious Berlin blockade brought the Berlin airlift raised morale throughout the West.9

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created to wage World War and economic negotiations. world power, Congress rationale for providing II, it nonetheless retained a He also determined that passed the National Security economic and military aid to significant capability and national security needs had Act of 1947, creating a Greece and Turkey. It also was until 1949 the sole state to be reconciled with any National Security Council set the crisis in a larger possessing a nuclear arsenal international undertakings (NSC) to harmonize foreign context: and delivery capability. that the United States might policymaking and to take American leaders were quick assume.10 into account the role of the I believe that it must be to recognize that U.S. While the Department of new unified American the policy of the United States to support free military capability was State resumed a major role military managed by the peoples who are resisting essential in the postwar Department of Defense.11 in policy planning after attempted subjugation by world, both to ensure Roosevelt’s death, the JCS armed minorities or outside national security at home and and U.S. military leaders pressure. . . . It would be to protect essential national continued their involvement Isolationism, the an unspeakable tragedy if interests abroad. The Soviet in policy planning and UN Charter, and these countries, which challenge to global U.S. policymaking after the war. Postwar U.S. Foreign have struggled so long strategic and national Civilian leaders relied on the Policy against overwhelming security interests joined the military for advice on dealing odds, should lose that more long-standing political with the rapidly expanding he Greek crisis of victory for which they sacrificed so much. and economic determinants scope and severity of the 1947 was the catalyst Collapse of free institu- of foreign policy and made a Soviet threat. Postwar for active U.S. tions and loss of indepen- significant militarization of clashes over occupied Tinvolvement in the European dence would be disastrous the American engagement in Germany and Austria and crisis. From the beginning, not only for them but for Europe inescapable. Soviet-dominated Eastern U.S. leaders recognized that the world. Discouragement The State Department, Europe, and confrontations the response they gave to and possibly failure would the traditional manager of or near confrontations in Greece’s problems had to be quickly be the lot of neigh- U.S. foreign relations, had Venezia Giulia, Czechoslova- presented to the American boring peoples striving to lost its unquestioned primacy kia, Berlin, Iran, and Turkey people in the broadest maintain their freedom and during the Roosevelt admin- strengthened the military’s possible context. independence. istration. The President’s role. When policymaking President Truman’s By calling for U.S. clashes with and mistrust of and coordinating mecha- March 12, 1947, speech to economic and military the Foreign Service were nisms carried over from the Congress, prepared by the assistance for Greece and legendary. During the war end of the war proved State Department in consul- Turkey, the President had he limited the State Depart- unequal to the United States’ tation with the American confronted European ment’s involvement in the new role as the predominant military, outlined a specific decision-making process, communism and committed dividing responsibility for U.S. foreign policy among a It is of vital importance that we act now, in order to number of new agencies and vastly increasing the role of preserve the conditions under which we can achieve military leaders in policy lasting peace based on freedom and justice. The decisions. Late in 1943 when the war was still being achievement of such a peace has been the great goal fought, President Roosevelt of this nation. confirmed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) needed —President Truman to be involved in postwar Address to the Congress, March 17, 1948 planning to ensure that military considerations were taken into account in political

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the United States to a his advisers designed the dangers of communism, and against bypassing the United massive effort to support United Nations and its the Soviet Union. As Presi- Nations. The administration European democracies in Security Council mecha- dent Truman explained to nevertheless continued to which it would deploy its nisms to respond to these Congress in his March 1947 insist that the United Nations economic, political and public concerns about long- address: should be excluded from military resources.12 term international commit- calculations about Greek Many Americans at- ments that could lead to new We have considered policy. When Secretary of tached high hopes to the conflict. And it was a vision how the United Nations War Patterson and Secretary United Nations in the first embraced by Congress, the might assist in this [Greek- of the Navy Forrestal Turkish] crisis. But the years after the end of the traditional stronghold of explored the possibility of a situation is an urgent one public acknowledgement of war. The new international isolationism, which ap- requiring immediate action, organization, located in New proved U.S. participation in and the United Nations the role of the United Nations York and providing a vivid the United Nations with little and its related organiza- in the proposed provision of primer on the emerging new of the rancorous suspicion tions are not in a position aid to Greece and Turkey, world order in which the and opposition that marked to extend help of the kind Acting Secretary of State United States held great Senate rejection of U.S. that is required.13 Dean Acheson reiterated promise and responsibility, membership in the old State’s position “that we seemed to offer a guarantee League of Nations. The address paid lip might as well face the fact of lasting peace worthy of The State Department service to the UN Charter that the UN will not settle the great sacrifices of the led the campaign to secure but, in effect, dismissed the problems of this type and war. For most Americans, congressional approval of new international body as that it is impossible for the the United Nations promised the UN Charter, and it unable on its own to resist UN to intervene in cases to be the embodiment of a envisaged a role for the violations of the status quo involving subversive move- powerful and humane United Nations in U.S. and the Charter by force and ments.”14 internationalism that would foreign policy. U.S. violence. Acheson deleted a overcome their long-held policymakers, however, did Much to the dismay of reference to the United fears of dangerous foreign not believe that the United the Truman administration Nations from the draft entanglements—fears that Nations could deal effec- and Congress, the American Greek-Turkish aid legislation had engendered prewar tively with the major issues public, while accepting the forwarded by the State isolationism. of the early Cold War, U.S. need to assist Greece and Department to Congress in President Roosevelt and confrontations with the Turkey, reacted strongly March 1947. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who had become a zealous advocate for an interventionist role for American foreign policy and favored assistance to Greece and Turkey, viewed the omission of a role for the United Nations as a “colossal blunder,” and he made his support for the aid package conditional upon bringing the UN into the legislation. In

First session of the UN General Assembly, Flushing Meadows, Long Island, New York, 1946. (Department of State photo)

6 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO

place of the vanishing spirit of isolationism, the Senate now embraced the United We must be ready to take every wise and necessary Nations as the principal step to carry out this great purpose [securing the vehicle for discussing and peace and preventing war]. This will require assis- resolving foreign policy issues. Despite State tance to other nations. It will require an adequate and Department misgivings, in balanced military strength. We must be prepared to May 1947, a large bipartisan majority in the Senate pay the price of peace or assuredly we shall pay the passed the Greek-Turkish price of war. Assistance Act, which included a “Vandenberg —President Truman amendment” calling for the Address to the Congress, March 17, 1948 United Nations to take over the Greek-Turkish assis- tance program from the United States should U.S. States and its West European European recovery. West “the United States will, by assistance no longer be allies. Also critical to Euro- Europeans, whose main appropriate means, extend necessary. Enabling legisla- pean thinking, albeit un- postwar goal continued to be to the free nations the tion for the Truman stated, was the belief that the reconstruction of their support which the situation program of aid to Greece both the Marshall Plan and economies, were convinced requires.” The President and Turkey assigned the the nascent Western Euro- that economic rehabilitation stressed the gravity and responsibility for the long- pean Union were crucial could not occur without urgency of the situation term reconstruction of steps toward linking Europe military security. when he went on to say: Greece to the UN.15 Senator and the United States in a Between January and Vandenberg would have common defense pact. Only March 1948 Britain, France, There are times in world more to say about the role the United States possessed and the Low Countries history when it is far wiser of the United Nations in the finances and equipment completed negotiations for a to act than to hesitate. There is some risk forging the postwar world necessary to support military alliance of West involved in action—there European countries and the order. effective West European always is. But there is far rearmament. Moreover, the establishment of the Western more risk in failure to act.17 overwhelming military European Union. The The Western power of the United States, Brussels Treaty, under The President’s encour- European Union and at that point the sole state which the allies promised to agement and call for action the Origin of the possessing nuclear weapons, come to each other’s demonstrated a sympathy Atlantic Alliance was essential to the effective military assistance in case of for the idea of collective deterrence of both immediate attack, was signed on March defense, but a great deal of 16 he internal unrest internal and longer term 17. negotiation within the U.S. created by national external threats to Western The United States Government and with the communist parties Europe. encouraged European unity European allies remained Tand increased East-West Another important and self-defense measures before an agreement tensions, as well as the concern were French fears and welcomed the Brussels ensuring collective action immediate or direct military about the effect on the Pact. President Truman became a reality. Early threat posed by the Soviet European balance of power, went further in an address to initiative again came from Union, were the driving and on France’s position in Congress on March 17 when Britain. In early March, even force behind the decision to Europe, of the economic and he acknowledged the historic before the signing of the create a military security political revitalization of nature of the Union and Brussels Treaty, Foreign pact between the United Germany, which was expressed confidence that Secretary Bevin asked the essential to facilitate West United States and Canada to

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agree to immediate military Lovett took the lead in commitment that an attack European Union but the staff discussions regarding advocating negotiations for a on one country would entire Atlantic area, including collective security measures defense pact. The Truman require a prompt, collective Norway, Sweden, Denmark, for the defense of the administration eventually response by the entire Italy, Portugal, Iceland, Atlantic and the Mediterra- reached a consensus to alliance.20 Ireland, and Canada. The nean areas. Secretary proceed with discussions, While the Pentagon Talks basis for an eventual mutual 18 Marshall at once agreed. and the secret Pentagon had defined a future North defense treaty would be Despite the President’s Talks among U.S., British, Atlantic alliance, American Article 51 of the UN Charter, concerns about the necessity and Canadian staffs were policy had not yet coalesced which recognized the right for quick action, some U.S. held in Washington from in support of U.S. participa- of nations to self-defense. policymakers were hesitant March 23 to April 1, 1948. tion. A State Department The United States would, in to accept the British call for At the final meeting, the U.S. policy paper of late March any case, have to provide military staff conversations. representatives circulated the on the U.S. relationship to Western Europe with The JCS was reluctant to so-called “Pentagon Paper” the Brussels Pact evolved military as well as economic move forward with such outlining next steps the into the interagency paper assistance if it was to ward 21 talks, fearing they would United States was prepared NSC 9 of April 13, “Position off communist expansion. lead to a transfer to Europe to take aimed at the conclu- of the United States With U.S. military leaders of arms that American sion of a “collective defense Respect to Support for the continued to be reluctant to forces needed. George agreement for the North Western Union and Other endorse undertakings Kennan, chief of the State Atlantic Area” in accordance Related Free Countries.” originating in the State Department’s Policy Plan- with Article 51 of the UN NSC 9 provided that the Department that would involve U.S. armed forces in major military commitments. The success of certain free nations in resisting aggres- They feared that U.S. sion by the forces of Soviet directed world commu- military strength would be compromised at the expense nism is of critical importance to the security of the of Europe which was not United States. Some of these nations require not only doing all that it could for self-defense and was economic assistance but also strengthened military probably not defensible capabilities if they are to continue and make more against a determined Soviet effective their political resistance to communist sub- attack in any case. President Truman and Secretary version from within and Soviet pressure from without Marshall informed the and if they are to develop ultimately an increased National Security Council of Foreign Secretary Bevin’s military capability to withstand external armed at- warning that the United tack. States would have to be willing to assume certain —National Security Council paper obligations and should NSC 14/1, July 1, 1948 initiate Western negotiations for a security treaty. The JCS resisted a commitment ning Staff, argued against Charter and applying the United States would support to an undefined defense pact the militarization of an experience gained in drafting but not join the Brussels and recommended limiting alliance before economic and the Rio Treaty in 1947.19 Pact. Instead the United U.S. participation in the political unification issues While the composition of States would explore a larger proposed Brussels Pact had been addressed. State military staff talks scheduled an alliance was not yet mutual defense undertak- 22 Department European expert defined, the United States ing—one that would include for July in London. John D. Hickerson and made clear the need for a the United States—embrac- Under Secretary Robert A. ing not only the Western

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State Department collective security arrange- Europe; the role of the policymakers pressed on, ments in Europe were held United Nations in collective nevertheless, with a revised between April and June security arrangements; and paper that moved the 1948. The talks reflected the the legislative preparation alliance-making process likelihood of a Republican needed for eventual conclu- forward. The new paper, presidential victory in the sion of a long-term European NSC 9/2 of May 11, empha- November elections. Repub- security agreement. A week sized the need for Senate lican Senator Arthur H. later Vandenberg and Lovett consultation on a possible Vandenberg, Chairman of the discussed the wording of a alliance and included a draft Senate Foreign Relations resolution that would provide resolution endorsing negotia- Committee and President the legislative groundwork tions aimed at an Atlantic Pro Tempore of the Senate, for a long-term pact.25 alliance. The paper called for was a leading contender for On May 11 Vandenberg exploratory diplomatic talks the GOP presidential nomi- presented a resolution that he with interested European nation before dropping out had drafted with Lovett to nations and military staff of the contest. In friendly the Senate Foreign Relations talks during the remainder of Republican Senator and candid talks with Committee, which approved the year pending the out- Arthur H.Vandenberg, Secretary of State Marshall it. On June 11 Vandenberg come of the 1948 U.S. and Under Secretary Lovett, introduced and the Senate national elections. NSC 9/2 then-Chairman of the Vandenberg embraced the passed by a vote of 64 to 6 a also asked the West Euro- Senate Foreign Relations concept of a North Atlantic resolution advising the pean nations to do a better Committee and President alliance and agreed to President to seek U.S. and job of preparing their own Pro Tempore of the support it in the Senate, but free world security through defense efforts and advo- Senate embraced the only if substantive negotia- support of mutual defense cated the standardization of concept of a North tions were delayed until after arrangements that operated their arms.23 Atlantic alliance, intro- the elections and the UN within the UN Charter but ducing what became Charter were more clearly outside the Security Council, known as the affirmed and invoked in the where the Soviet veto would The Vandenberg 24 Vandenberg Resolution, prospective treaty. thwart collective defense Resolution: The UN The role of personal arrangements. Paragraph Charter and the which was passed on June 11, 1948. relations in foreign policy three of the resolution Future Alliance (Department of State photo) was demonstrated by referred to issues of military Lovett’s informal discus- assistance or alliance, egotiations over the sions with Vandenberg. The encouraging “association by nature and degree of treaty, patiently wove Senator, now a convinced the United States, by the U.S. commit- together a text that balanced internationalist, wanted to be constitutional process, with Nment to the defense of its the concerns of its European helpful but was mindful of such regional and other North Atlantic allies were allies, of the Senate, and of political realities, which he collective arrangements as complicated by the conflict- the U.S. military. Domestic sought to impress on the are based on continuous and ing desire of the allies for an U.S. politics, particularly Under Secretary and the effective self-help and iron-clad assurance of those arising from the Truman administration. mutual aid, and as effects its 26 immediate U.S. intervention presidential election of 1948, In an April 11 meeting, national security.” in case of a Soviet attack played an important role in Lovett tactfully probed The Vandenberg Resolu- and the insistence of the the international and con- Vandenberg’s thinking on a tion was the landmark action U.S. Senate that its constitu- gressional negotiations. number of key issues, that opened the way to the tional prerogatives be In keeping with practices including the type of aid negotiation of the North preserved, especially the worked out during the Congress would approve; Atlantic Treaty. While it is power to commit the United congressional debate over the form of a pact, particu- clear that the concept of States to war. State Depart- the Marshall Plan, discus- larly the willingness of the such an alliance first arose ment officials, after assum- sions between administration Senate to approve a slightly ing a common position of and Republican leaders over modified version of the Rio support for the idea of a Treaty with regard to

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during the Pentagon Talks in interested the Secretary in economic aid to Europe, left urgency. The State Depart- Washington in March, the concept of an Atlantic the State Department in mid- ment did not, however, American action would have area security undertaking. 1948. Robert Lovett, who speak with a single voice. been stymied without the By March 1948 Marshall formally took over as Under George Kennan, chief of the Senate action endorsing an had explained to President Secretary of State in July State Department’s Policy internationalist role for the Truman the dangerous 1948 but started preparing Planning Staff, was an early United States. situation in Europe and for the position in May, opponent of a military obtained his approval to go quickly became the solution to the Soviet threat forward with contacts with Department’s principal to Europe and the creation of The Department of the Western European Union alliance negotiator and an alliance with Western State Debate Over about some sort of collective spokesman. Secretary Europe on the grounds that it the Atlantic Alliance defense arrangement. Marshall weighed in at would harden the division of Secretary Marshall turned to critical junctures, but he was Europe into opposing blocs. assage of the senior Department European preoccupied with the many Only economic competition Vandenberg Resolution experts John D. Hickerson foreign affairs crises of would succeed. Rather than was a victory for and Theodore C. Achilles to 1948 and away from the arming Europe, he felt that Pthose State Department guide the exploratory Department for long periods, both Soviet and allied troops policymakers who worked contacts with the British and traveling to South America would have to be withdrawn through the winter and other Europeans regarding or attending UN sessions in from Germany and Austria. spring of 1948 to advance such an undertaking in the Paris concerned with Kennan later remarked on the idea of an Atlantic early months of 1948. resolving the Berlin situation. the irony, considering his alliance. Secretary of State Hickerson and Achilles Under Secretary Lovett, views, of his assignment by Marshall’s leadership can became strong proponents who directed the diplomatic Lovett to serve on the scarcely be underestimated. of a North Atlantic alliance. negotiations throughout the working group of Brussels By the end of 1947 he was After agreement had remainder of 1948 leading to Pact diplomats who devel- manifestly disillusioned with emerged at the Pentagon the NATO treaty, from the oped the actual language for the possibility of negotiating Talks in March-April 1948 start regarded such an a treaty.28 a European peace settlement on an Atlantic alliance and alliance as the essential Chief Soviet expert and with the Soviets, and he the need to gain congres- military complement of the Counselor of the Department recognized the threat to the sional support became Marshall Plan.27 of State Charles Bohlen, security of Western Europe essential, Under Secretary of Within the Department of although not directly in- without such a settlement. State Dean Acheson, who State’s Bureau of European volved in the alliance Foreign Secretary Bevin’s had worked shoulder to Affairs there was from the planning and negotiation discussions with Marshall shoulder with Secretary start an undercurrent of during 1948, was at first after the London Council of Marshall on the launching of support for the alliance idea opposed because of the Foreign Ministers meeting the Marshall Plan for as well as a feeling of presumed likely reactions of the Soviet Union. Bohlen was also concerned about the utility of alliances in There are times in world history when it is far wiser to general. Bohlen feared act than to hesitate. There is some risk involved in overreacting to the Soviet threat in Europe and joined action—there always is. But there is far more risk in Kennan in an April 1948 failure to act. For if we act wisely now, we shall memorandum opposing the alliance on the grounds that strengthen the powerful forces for freedom, justice, it was premature and might and peace which are represented by the United well cause problems of its own in the West.29 Nations and the free nations of the world. In July 1948 Bohlen —President Truman wrote of his continued Address to the Congress, March 17, 1948

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opposition until there was Moving Toward plans or any other steps for arms that marked the better coordination with the Military Assistance toward unifying defenses first few postwar years. Europeans and until it could to Europe and such as standardization of Moreover, Plan Half Moon— be better determined what Coordinated Military weapons.31 the JCS plan for responding the Soviet reaction to such Planning The Joint Chiefs of Staff to a major Soviet military an alliance would be. While had not been enthusiastic attack in Europe, which was not denying a Soviet threat, he basic concept of supporters in the spring of approved in May 1948 and Bohlen, along with Kennan, an Atlantic alliance 1948 of military assistance to guided U.S. military planning denied that the Soviet Union against communist West European countries or through 1948—assumed an was bent upon world Taggression that emerged of any sort of strategic American evacuation of domination, and they argued from the secret Pentagon commitment to those Europe, strategic defense of that the West was stronger Talks in Washington in the countries. The JCS were Britain and Suez, and vis-à-vis the Soviet Union greatly concerned that eventual liberation of Europe spring of 1948 envisaged 33 than at any time since the both the provision of U.S. military assistance to Europe later. end of the war. Bohlen military equipment and would be achieved at the France presented a argued that the period from supplies to West European expense of arms and equip- special problem to U.S. 1945 to 1947 had been the armed forces and U.S. ment desperately needed for advocates of an Atlantic time of greatest danger for involvement in a coordinated the buildup of U.S. armed alliance. In the summer of the United States and the defense against an attack on forces to meet their expand- 1948, France made mani- West with their armed forces any of the West European ing postwar missions and festly clear that it would not demobilizing and the Ameri- partners. Despite the obligations. The deep rely for its own security on can public not yet alerted to Brussels Pact military staff concerns of the U.S. military U.S. troops and that it the Soviet threat. talks that were held in leaders were partially allayed needed to be rearmed and re- But the Soviet army had London in August, which by a policy approved by the equipped first before not moved. Through 1948 included U.S. officers as President in early July 1948 concerning itself with the Soviet Union had not observers, the United States regarding the provision of coordinated long-range moved beyond the Iron and Europe remained far military assistance to Europe. European defensive planning Curtain. An Atlantic alliance apart in forging a common NSC 14/1 called for the against a Soviet attack. For a at this time might provoke a military stance against the enactment of legislation to time U.S. negotiators put off dangerous Soviet response communist bloc throughout permit military assistance to these French requests with and do more harm than the remainder of 1948. The selected non-communist explanations about the lack good. Europe needed to be Europeans looked for the nations in Europe. Any grant of available arms to give economically strong to best immediate delivery of U.S. of military aid should not France and the need for resist communism. Bohlen arms and supplies to the jeopardize U.S. military legislation before any such wanted the West to avoid armies of the individual requirements, and recipient assistance could be ren- overreacting and unneces- partners, but the United countries were expected to dered. In September, sarily provoking the Soviet States insisted that military provide as much self-help however, Under Secretary Union. When in November assistance be contingent on and mutual assistance as Lovett informed French 1948 Secretary of Defense Europe coordinating and possible, integrate their arms diplomatic representatives Forrestal asked if the Soviet essentially unifying its armed industries, and standardize that the United States would threat had expanded so their weapons on American try to meet, at President defenses against the Soviet 32 seriously during 1948 that it Union. types. Truman’s direction, the most justified deployment of a While diplomatic explor- Nor did the JCS look urgent French requests by larger U.S. military force, atory talks began in Wash- with favor on alliance plans transferring from U.S. Bohlen responded, with ington in July 1948 on the that would deprive U.S. stocks in Germany equip- Marshall’s concurrence, that nature and scope of the forces of the flexibility to ment for three French little had changed since the meet global demands with divisions.34 30 Atlantic alliance, American spring of 1948. leaders waited in vain for the the dwindling appropriations development among the Brussels Pact nations of any coordination of military

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The Washington Atlantic alliance. Secretary Western Europe against a On August 9 during the ninth Exploratory Talks, of State Marshall decided Soviet attack. The United working group meeting, July-September 1948, that the talks were not for States argued for the State Department Counselor and the Debate Over the purpose of making final inclusion in any alliance of Charles Bohlen indicated that the Scope of the decisions, and no special Norway, Denmark (espe- U.S. involvement would be Alliance military representatives or cially Greenland), Iceland, conditioned by the terms of officials from other Foreign Ireland, and Portugal the UN Charter and “must Ministries were to attend. recognize the separation of n June 28, 1948, the (especially the Azores). State Department officials powers within the U.S. National Security Those islands bridging the headed by Under Secretary Government.” At its next Council, in directive Atlantic made U.S. involve- of State Lovett met in 10 meeting (August 12) the ONSC 9/3, authorized the U.S. ment in an effective alliance formal sessions and other working group began Government to seek means, workable. Sweden also was private meetings with the studying the Rio Treaty as a within the terms of the considered by U.S. officials Ambassadors and other model for a North Atlantic Vandenberg Resolution, to as a potential alliance diplomats of Britain, France, treaty.37 provide support to the free member. the Netherlands, Belgium, Article 5 of the North states of Western Europe.35 The Brussels Pact Luxembourg, and Canada. Atlantic Treaty emerged The nations of the Western nations preferred that a The negotiators considered from discussions regarding European Union were prospective alliance be two main issues: the scope the nature of the U.S. advised that the President limited to the United States of the alliance and the form obligation to come to was prepared to authorize and the Pact. There was it would take. U.S. negotia- Europe’s assistance in case U.S. participation in talks clear anxiety among the Pact tors were careful, however, of attack. The Europeans with European representa- nations that an expanded not to exceed their essen- argued for the formulation tives to draw up military alliance would greatly reduce tially limited mandate under already included in Article IV plans for use in event of a the amount of U.S. military the Vandenberg Resolution, of the Brussels Treaty under Soviet attack and to coordi- assistance and equipment and they kept the alliance which the allies would nate military supply. Discus- that alliance members would negotiations essentially “afford the party attacked all sions led to the convening of receive. European diplomats tentative, foreseeing that the the military and other aid and the Washington Exploratory tried to cling to the Brussels real negotiations would take assistance in their power.” Talks on Security on July 6 group as the inner core of place after the November State Department representa- attended by representatives any alliance but eventually national elections and tives insisted that the United of the United States, Britain, conceded and went to their inauguration of a new States could not constitu- Canada, France, and the governments with the President. The Exploratory tionally enter any alliance Benelux states. The talks proposal for a wider group Talks did succeed, neverthe- that would require it to go to continued through Septem- of associated nations. less, in bringing the Brussels war automatically. They ber 10. By July 9 when the George Kennan was sympa- Pact nations and the United offered the wording of the talks moved to the key thetic to the European States much closer to an preference for a two-pillared Rio Treaty—already ap- question of U.S. association 36 alliance. proved by Congress—as the with the European states, the alliance of the United States The major debate in the best alternative. Article 3 of Europeans broached the idea and the Brussels Pact, but Washington Exploratory the Rio Treaty stated that an of a “North Atlantic Pact” to Lovett and his aides such as Talks arose as the Brussels attack against one party include U.S. membership. John Hickerson pressed for Pact representatives strongly would be regarded as an During the talks, which the expanded alliance that resisted the State Depart- attack against all, but Article were held at the State was eventually achieved. ment determination to 4 provided for “individual Department, U.S. and West The U.S. negotiators and broaden any alliance to determinations by each European diplomats negoti- the Brussels Pact diplomats include not just the Brussels party, pending agreement ated the basic scope and also wrestled over the Pact members but all nations upon collective measures, of structure of the North essential clause in any bordering the Atlantic that alliance undertaking: the the immediate measures could have an important role basis on which members which it will individually take in the successful defense of were obliged to come to each other’s aid and defense.

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in fulfillment of the obliga- The establishment of the OEEC and the signature of tion.” U.S. and European negotiators agreed to blend the Brussels Treaty. . .indicate the intent of the the provisions of the peaceloving countries of Europe to work together in Brussels and Rio Treaties. The agreed compromise their common interest, and additonal steps designed language made the re- to bring about a substantial and permanent degree of sponses by the individual cooperation and unity among these countries would alliance members to cases of attack conditional on their materially improve the present position. . . .Those “constitutional processes.” nations having a primary interest in the security of the Looking back a quarter century later, Dean Acheson North Atlantic area should collaborate in the devel- recalled that negotiations for opment of a regional or collective defence arrange- the North Atlantic Treaty “became a contest between ment for that area. . . . our allies seeking to impale —Washington Paper, the Senate on the specific, summarizing the Washington Exploratory Talks on Security, and the senators attempting 38 July 6-September 10, 1948 to wriggle free.” On September 9 the participants submitted a memorandum to their no further progress on the bipartisan foreign policy, and that the alliance was more a governments that outlined treaty was possible until the Republican leadership in political weapon than a the text of an alliance after several essential events the Senate continued to military one. Under Secre- treaty.39 The alliance negotia- in the last months of the support the negotiations tary Lovett explained to the tions went into a 3-month year: the U.S. national begun in Washington. NSC on December 2 that the recess to avoid involvement elections, review and President Truman approved military value of the alliance in the November 1948 U.S. appraisal by the U.S. and the on November 6 the Wash- was secondary to its political elections. By keeping the Brussels Pact governments ington conference paper of symbolism of Western unity. creation of a Western of the results of the Wash- September 9, setting the The alliance would be mainly alliance out of the campaign, ington Exploratory Talks, an stage for accelerated treaty a consultative body. It could European and American approach to the other negotiations. make recommendations, but diplomats believed that the possible members of an During October and only Congress could declare anticipated Republican expanded Atlantic alliance, November the Joint Chiefs war for the United States. victory would have little preparation of an actual draft of Staff and the State Moreover, specific commit- impact on the final agree- treaty, and additional Department prepared status ments and obligations could ment when talks resumed. progress in unifying the reports for the NSC on the only be undertaken within West European military military and diplomatic the constitutional processes planning and command. aspects of the negotiations. of each member state, and Drafting the North The November 2 national The October 19 JCS report the United States would Atlantic Treaty, elections in the United States indicated that the U.S. remain free, as would every October–December not only resulted in President military was satisfied with other member state, to take 1948 Truman’s re-election but the the course of the military whatever measures it return of a Democratic talks but cautioned that deemed fitting to halt Soviet 40 y September 1948 majority in Congress. The much time and effort would aggression. U.S. and Brussels outcome worked in favor of be needed to provide By the end of October, Pact diplomats had the ongoing efforts to Western Europe with its the Brussels Pact nations had Bmade substantial progress in conclude an Atlantic alliance. minimum defense require- also accepted the September formulating the basic The President had cam- ments. The State Depart- 9 paper and had approached elements of an alliance, but paigned on a platform of ment for its part stressed

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the Danish, Icelandic, leadership of the prospective member. Two definitions of encouraged economic Norwegian, Portuguese, alliance. Agreement was the North Atlantic area were collaboration among the Irish, and Swedish Govern- reached to defend Western included in the December 24 member states.44 ments about association with Europe at the Rhine, and draft: one would include On January 5, 1949, the the alliance. All but Ireland various command possibili- northwestern Africa and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a agreed to join in the treaty- ties were weighed until it western Mediterranean in the memorandum to Secretary making process. Under was decided in early Octo- alliance area, and both of Defense James Forrestal, Secretary Lovett and the ber that British Field Marshal definitions specified the reaffirmed their approval of U.S. negotiating team also Bernard Montgomery would Tropic of Cancer as the the idea of collective defense pressed on the Brussels Pact become commander in chief southern limit of the alli- with the proviso that the representatives the impor- of Western European Union ance.43 treaty offer only a “broad tance of including Italy and forces. Secretary Marshall, Even as the negotiators general basis” for implemen- possibly other nations not who opposed earlier sugges- struggled to agree on the tation of military matters. On actually bordering on the tions that such a commander substance of the treaty, January 20 Truman, in his Atlantic. Emphasizing the be an American, recom- Canada sought to include inaugural address, publicly strategic importance of Italy mended and President economic and social unity in outlined administration policy and its ongoing struggle Truman accepted the language proposed for to “make it sufficiently clear, against communist subver- designation of Montgom- Article 2. The Canadian in advance, that any armed sion and takeover, the U.S. ery.42 representative argued that attack affecting our national negotiators sought agree- Under Secretary Lovett there was need for ideologi- security would be met with ment on a formula under and the representatives of cal unity among the North overwhelming force,” and which the alliance could be the Brussels Pact powers Atlantic powers. Secretary announced that he would expanded to include Italy and resumed their discussions of Acheson opposed strong send to the Senate a Treaty other countries in the future. the alliance in early Decem- language proposed by respecting the North Atlantic Secretary Marshall, who ber even as an ambassadorial Canada and warned of the Security plan. In addition, spent much of September working group began danger of alienating the U.S. we will provide military and October at the UN drafting an actual text of a Senate. Eventually Canadian advice and equipment to free General Assembly session in treaty. By December 24 the Prime Minister St. Laurent nations which will cooperate Paris, closely monitored the draft treaty was forwarded gained support directly from with us in the maintenance alliance progress and to the governments for President Truman for a of peace and security.45 personally interviewed the review. The draft obliged the compromise Article 2 that Norwegian and Swedish signatories to consider an Foreign Ministers about attack against any of them participation. The Swedish as an attack against all and efforts to organize a neutral to take whatever action was Nordic Pact posed serious necessary to assure security Too often peace has been thought of problems for Norway. of the North Atlantic. The as a negative condition—the mere Marshall questioned parties also were to consult Sweden’s claim to a tradition with one another on per- absence of war. We know now that of neutrality. Sweden was ceived threats to the terri- we cannot achieve peace by taking not invited to join in the tory, security, or political 41 a negative attitude. Peace is posi- negotiations for an alliance. independence of each other; While State Department strengthen their capacity to tive, and it has to be waged with all officials were meeting with resist aggression; and create our thought, energy and courage, Brussels Pact diplomats in a council to facilitate the Washington during the implementation of the treaty. and with the conviction that war is summer, U.S. military The working group was not inevitable. planners held a series of unable to agree on inclusion discussions with Pact of French North Africa in —Secretary Acheson military leaders regarding the treaty and whether to Address to the nation, March 18, 1949 alliance planning and the invite Italy to become a

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We sincerely hope we can avoid strife, but we cannot avoid striving for what is right. We devoutly hope we can have genuine peace, but we cannot be compla- cent about the present uneasy and troubled peace. A secure and stable peace is not a goal we can reach all at once and for all time. It is a dynamic state, produced by effort and faith, with justice and cour- age. The struggle is continuous and hard. The prize is never irrevocably ours. To have this genuine peace we must constantly work for it. But we must do even more. We must make it clear that armed attack will be met by collective defense, prompt and effective. That Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, January 1949- is the meaning of the North Atlantic pact. January 1953. —Secretary Acheson (Department of State photo) Address to the nation, March 18, 1949

Consultations With November 1948 and re- Secretary Acheson foreign consultations. He Congress, January- signed in December, and personally directed all of the met a half-dozen times in March 1949 Under Secretary Lovett diplomatic negotiations February and early March insisted on leaving govern- regarding the alliance from with Senator Vandenberg and he Brussels Pact and ment service along with February until the treaty with the new Democratic Canadian Govern- Marshall.46 was signed and ratified. Chairman of the Senate ments approved the The President chose State Department experts Foreign Relations Commit- Toutcome of the Washington Dean Acheson as Marshall’s John Hickerson, Theodore tee, Tom Connally, and once Exploratory Talks and the successor, and Acheson was Achilles, and Dean Rusk with a delegation from the September 9 paper during sworn in on January 21, continued their important House Committee on Foreign the autumn of 1948. Formal after bruising hearings roles as well. President Affairs. From February U.S. approval required before the Senate Foreign Truman was kept closely through the middle of consultations with Congress, Relations Committee that informed on the progress of March, Acheson met with which were delayed until the focused on the mounting the difficult negotiations the Brussels Pact, Canadian, newly elected Congress accusations of communist with the allied Ambassadors and eventually Norwegian convened. Secretary of State subversion in the State and with Congress, and he Ambassadors for nine more Marshall and Under Secre- Department and the indict- weighed in when necessary sessions of the Washington tary Lovett, who had ment of Alger Hiss on to keep moving toward Exploratory Talks.47 maintained such close charges of espionage. conclusion of the treaty. During this February- contact with key Senators Nonpartisan collaboration During the final drafting of March 1949 period of during 1948, were unable to between the State Depart- the treaty these consulta- consultation regarding the see the alliance negotiations ment under Secretary tions were most intense, emerging draft of the treaty, through to their conclusion. Acheson and the Senate and Secretary Acheson considerable attention was Secretary Marshall was never gained the intimacy moved back and forth given to the admission of hospitalized at the end of reached earlier by Marshall, between the domestic and Lovett, and Vandenberg.

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draft. He warned that the Senators feared that the United States “was rushing into some kind of automatic commitment.” He suggested that the phrase “military or other action” in Article 5 was “an unnecessary embellishment.” The Secretary stressed not only the need to bring along the Congress but also the limits of congressional understand- ing of the seven nations’ undertaking. During a February 8 meeting with Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, Bohlen reflected continuing concern about the wording of Article 5. He told Lange that the alliance had to leave a potential President Harry Truman additional members beyond formulation in Article 5 of aggressor with no doubts addresses the Washing- the original Brussels Pact the December 24 draft of about “what he would run ton Summit prior to the group, Canada, and the the automatic involvement of into if he started something” signing of the North United States. Norway the United States and other and provide a “sense of Atlantic Treaty on April 4, joined the Washington members in case of a security” to European states 1949. Seated are the Exploratory Talks in late conflict. Neither Senator that would permit economic foreign ministers of the February, and agreement Connally nor Senator and political recovery. While the representatives of the 12 signatory nations. In was finally reached by early Vandenberg found the March on the admission of original version of Article 5 Benelux states, France, the front row (left to Iceland, Denmark, Italy, and acceptable. More than a Britain, and Canada ex- right): Ernest L. Bevin, Portugal. Senators also month was needed before pressed strong reservations United Kingdom; strongly opposed Article 2 in Secretary Acheson and his regarding any watering Halvard Lange, Norway; the early draft treaty and its team were able to reconcile down of the wording of Joseph Bech, Luxem- prescription for cultural, both the Senate leadership Article 5, particularly bourg; Bjarni social, and economic and the Brussels Pact anything that might undercut Benediktsson, Iceland; cooperation, and Secretary diplomats with a compro- the suggestion of swift Gustav Rasmussen, Acheson had to obtain mise Article 5 and an reaction to aggression, they Denmark; Paul-Henri modification from the understanding of the agreed to make small Spaak, Belgium; Dean Ambassadors before the automaticity of commit- changes in the wording to Acheson, United States; Senate was willing to accept ments under the treaty. meet the Senators’ con- cerns.48 Lester B. Pearson, the treaty. Secretary Acheson reported But the most difficult at several February meetings Initially Secretary Canada; Robert issue in these early spring of the Washington Explor- Acheson’s consultations Schuman, France; Count consultations was the atory Talks on his consulta- with key Senators had been Carlo Sforza, Italy; Dirk tions with the Senate and the private, as were his parallel U. Stikker, Netherlands; unacceptability of Article 5 meetings with North Atlantic and Jose Caeiro de Mata, in the December 24 treaty ambassadors. Public Senate Portugal. (Department of State photo)

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debate over the draft treaty, should be removed. Connally drawn into repelling any defined “action,” or some and particularly Article 5, recommended that the attack on the alliance, no still less definite “mea- unexpectedly and prema- phrase “as it may deem matter what technical sures.”52 turely erupted, however, in necessary” be inserted in responsibility the Senate had Acheson presented these mid-February when the order to emphasize that a for declaring war.51 drafts to President Truman Kansas City Times printed a “military” response would Following up on Secre- who threw his personal story about a February 7 not always be necessary.50 tary Acheson’s efforts to weight behind the effort. meeting between Acheson Most European represen- find some compromise The President intervened and Lange, during which tatives regarded the Senate language for Article 5 that with Senator Connally and Acheson may have reflected outburst as a dire threat to would satisfy Senators urged his full support for some ambivalence of his the draft treaty, claiming that Vandenberg and Connally, Acheson in the Article 5 own. The Times reported any watering down of Arti- Bohlen drew up four matter. By the end of that the Secretary of State cle 5’s wording would alternate drafts of the article February, after still more had concealed Senate diminish the alliance’s value. hoping to find at least one meetings with leading Foreign Relations Committee British Foreign Secretary version that would meet the Senators and with the concerns about the wording Bevin, although dismayed by desires of both the allies and ambassadors, Secretary of Article 5 from the Euro- the proposed changes, was the Senators. These several Acheson’s efforts led to a pean ambassadors and had willing to go even further to drafts differed essentially in compromise that reconciled told Lange that although only accommodate the Senate and the language describing the Senate concern about Congress could declare war, ensure approval of the treaty. action to be taken by holding on to constitutional the United States would Bevin concluded that in the member states in case of powers to declare war and assume a moral commitment long run the wording of attack on an alliance mem- commit the United States to act against an attack on Article 5 would not matter. ber: providing for military and the Allies’ desire for the alliance.49 The United States would be action, some other less automatic involvement. During the February 14 Senate debate, Senator Connally joined the For us, war is not inevitable. We do not believe that “irreconcilables,” such as Senator Forrest Donnell, in there are blind tides of history which sweep men one disclaiming any moral or way or the other. In our own time we have seen brave legal commitment to go to war for Europe. “I do not men overcome obstacles that seemed insurmount- believe in giving carte able and forces that seemed overwhelming. Men blanche assurances,” with courage and vision can still determine their own proclaimed Connally, suggesting that the European destiny. They can choose slavery or freedom —war or negotiators had cleverly peace. I have no doubt which they will choose. The hoodwinked the State Department. After the treaty we are signing here today is evidence of the debate, Vandenberg and path they will follow. If there’s anything inevitable in Connally met with Acheson to lay out the concrete the future, it is the will of the people of the world from changes to the draft Article 5 freedom and peace. needed to secure passage. Vandenberg told Acheson —President Truman that action under the article Remarks at the signing ceremony, April 4, 1949 “should be a matter of individual determination” and that the word “military”

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To meet the specific political opinion strongly objections raised by the endorsed Italy’s inclusion in Senators, the concepts in order to stiffen Italian these statements were resistance to communist applied to Europe through subversion.56 reference to the Vandenberg Portugal also took up the Resolution. Further clarify- invitation to join the alliance ing language was placed in although reluctantly, noting the first sentence of Arti- the danger to its alliance with cle 11 (“The treaty shall be Spain but recognizing the ratified and its provisions strong sentiment in Western carried out by the Parties in Europe against any alignment accordance with their with Franco-ruled Spain. respective constitutional Among the negotiators, the processes.”). This permitted sharpest argument regarding Senators to claim that their membership arose over the powers over issues of peace decision to extend the Surrounded by congres- prospective alliance mem- and war had been respected territory covered by the sional leaders, President bers at the Washington while the language of Arti- alliance to include Algeria. By Truman ratifies the North Exploratory Talks and on the cle 5 provided reassurance March 17 the negotiators Atlantic Pact at the White text of the draft treaty that to the allies of speedy U.S. issued invitations to Italy, the ambassadors had response in case of aggres- Denmark, Iceland, Norway, House, July 25, 1949. 55 (Bettmann Newsphotos) approved. The committee sion. and Portugal to be original 57 followed the lead of Senators signatories of the treaty. Connally and Vandenberg Strong representations and quickly approved the Scope and Member- from disappointed Govern- ship of the Alliance ments of Turkey and Greece Agreement was finally draft, making only minor pointed out that the admis- reached on the complete text language changes that he founding member sion of Italy was a signifi- of a treaty that satisfied the confirmed the constitutional ship of the North cant departure from the principal Senators and the prerogatives of the Senate. Atlantic Alliance was Atlantic concept of the ambassadors who reflected Senator Vandenberg repeat- edly cautioned the Secretary Tnot decided until March alliance. It was not until the views of their govern- 1949. Norway, which was 1951 that these countries ments. The agreed Article 5 that the tighter the commit- ment to automatic involve- withstanding a press and became members of the included the minimal defini- 58 ment, the less likely the diplomatic campaign of alliance in their own right. tion of automaticity by threats from the Soviet committing each of the chance of rounding up the two-thirds majority vote Union for considering member states to “take such aligning itself with the North Signing and action as it deems necessary, needed to ratify the treaty in 53 Atlantic powers, was invited Ratification including the use of armed the full Senate. The Truman administra- to join in early March, force, to restore and main- followed soon after by n March 8 Acheson tain the security of the North tion issued statements that made reference to language Denmark and Iceland. U.S. reported to the Atlantic area.” and Brussels Pact military President that he Secretary Acheson in the Rio Treaty (attack on one is an attack on all) and in opinion was against the Ohad won the approval of the moved the treaty process Article 51 of the UN Charter inclusion of Italy in the Senate leadership, with forward as rapidly as alliance because of the extremely minimal wording possible, appearing before (allies jointly and severally taking measures to restore probable drain on resources changes, for the Decem- the Senate Foreign Relations and the thought that Italy ber 24 draft treaty produced Committee on March 8, peace and security) as precedents for U.S. involve- would be unable to contrib- by the Ambassadorial where he reported publicly ute to the defense of the Working Group. The on the progress of treaty ment in a multilateral defense 54 West. On the other hand, language of Article 5 very negotiations with the arrangement.

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closely follows that of draft Defense Committee, and dinner for the Foreign equipment. Foreign Minister A of Bohlen’s February 16 other subsidiary bodies to Ministers in honor of the Bevin steered the ratification memorandum.59 implement the treaty. occasion.62 process forward on the basis The allies offered no The signing ceremony Soviet efforts to deter the of assurances from Secre- serious disagreements with took place on the afternoon conclusion of the Atlantic tary Acheson that legislation the wording agreed on by of April 4 in the Departmen- alliance included clumsy would be introduced into Acheson and the Senators. tal Auditorium on Constitu- attempts at diplomatic Congress as soon as ratifica- The 18th meeting of the tion Avenue before an intimidation of Norway and tion was completed.64 Exploratory Talks, March audience of some 1,500 threats to suspend the The Senate Foreign 15, conducted a general diplomats, Cabinet officers, wartime treaties with Britain Relations Committee held 16 review of the draft treaty, Members of Congress, and and France. The main Soviet days of hearings on the during which the members other dignitaries. The effort was made in the UN treaty with most of the briefly discussed the rela- meeting, which was broad- General Assembly when it discussion centered on tionship of Article 5’s cast live over a national convened in New York in Article 5 and the automatic- wording to the UN Charter, television and radio hookup, April 1949 soon after the ity of the obligation of made small corrections to began at approximately 2:45 signing of the North Atlantic member states to come to the text of the document, p.m. Secretary Acheson Treaty. Foreign Minister the aid of treaty members in and approved it, subject to made some welcoming Gromyko’s attempt to case of attack and the French concordance. No remarks, and the 11 other characterize the treaty as an relationship to the UN interpretations were attached Foreign Ministers then each attack on the UN Charter Charter. Senator Vandenberg to either Articles 5 or 11.60 made a 5-minute statement. failed to elicit any support in and others were concerned Foreign Ministers of the President Truman arrived at the United Nations.63 Oppo- with Congress’ constitutional 12 founding member states 4:25 p.m., made his formal sition to the North Atlantic prerogatives, and the of NATO—Britain, Canada, remarks, and then presided pact was strongest in France hearings made a clear record Denmark, France, Iceland, over the formal signing by and Italy, states that not of Secretary Acheson’s Italy, Norway, Portugal, the Foreign Ministers. Out of coincidentally had the largest assurances on behalf of the Belgium, Netherlands, deference to Secretary communist parties in the Truman administration that Luxembourg, and the United Acheson, the President left West. In addition to heated the treaty would operate States—began to assemble in to him the honor of signing rhetorical exchanges, fights within the parameters of Washington in late March for the United States.61 broke out in the Italian Article 51 of the UN Charter. 1949. Secretary of State In his address, Truman chamber, and parties of the In its June 6 report to the Acheson commenced a tied the objectives of the left organized mass anti- Senate recommending series of informal discus- new treaty to those en- treaty demonstrations. ratification, the Foreign sions with individual Foreign shrined in the U.S. Declara- Parliament in both states, Relations Committee made Ministers at the Department tion of Independence. The however, ratified the docu- the strongest possible case of State on March 31. On treaty “would create a shield ment with strong majorities. for preserving congressional April 2 the Secretary chaired against aggression and fear The ratification process prerogatives.65 a formal conference of the of aggression—a bulwark was completed by August The Senators also 12 Foreign Ministers which will permit us to get 24, but not without further worried about several other (accompanied by senior on with the real business of difficult negotiations and matters not so thoroughly Foreign Ministry officials government and society, the discussions. The Govern- aired with the West Euro- and resident ambassadors) at business of achieving a fuller ments of Britain and the pean ambassadors in the the Department of State. The and happier life for all our other Brussels Pact nations, 1948 and 1949 talks. first order of business at this citizens.” which postponed ratification Secretary Acheson was able 2-hour meeting was ap- The meeting ended action until the U.S. Senate to meet the concerns of proval, by acclamation, of shortly before 5 p.m. after had acted, were particularly Senators regarding the the text of the treaty. The concluding remarks by concerned that a treaty had process for the accession of ministers then held a prelimi- Acheson. Later that evening been concluded but the new members to the treaty nary discussion on the President Truman hosted a United States had not yet by obtaining President procedures to establish the done anything about provid- North Atlantic Council, the ing actual arms and military

U.S. Department of State • April 1999 19 Truman’s commitment that a delegation of U.S. military whose tasks was the the United States for military the accession of any new officers charged with preparation of military assistance. Later in April the member nations would exploring with Brussels Pact assistance legislation. In the Truman administration require the advice and military leaders their essential winter of 1949, the Depart- submitted military aid consent of the Senate. The military assistance require- ment of State, at the direc- legislation to Congress, but Secretary was later to ments. These early sound- tion of the President, took action was delayed until after greatly regret another ings were carried out within the lead in fashioning the the ratification of the treaty assurance he gave to the the terms of official U.S. military aid program, with in late July. After 3 months Senate, in response to policy (NSC 14/1) that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of lengthy committee concerns that Article 3 favored providing military the Defense Department hearings and debates in the would mean providing assistance to non-communist providing expert analysis and House and Senate, the substantial numbers of U.S. nations. sometimes critical restraint. Mutual Defense Assistance troops to Europe in support An August 1948 report The FACC had by March Act of 1949 was approved of NATO, that there was by the State-Army-Navy-Air 1949 developed an outline of by Congress in late Septem- absolutely no such expecta- Force Coordinating Commit- prioritized military assistance ber and signed into law by tion of the assignment of tee listed 59 nations qualified that would provide “substan- President Truman. Congress U.S. troops.66 for aid and assigned the tial” assistance to the appropriated $1.4 billion for The Senate, after 10 days Brussels Pact the highest Brussels Pact nations, the Mutual Defense Assis- of debate, agreed with the authority. The U.S. military Canada, and Turkey and tance Program (MDAP) in Foreign Relations Committee establishment continued to limited or token assistance to October 1949, and military and approved the treaty on be concerned that such a number of other non- assistance began flowing to July 21 by a vote of 82 to assistance would deplete the communist countries in the North Atlantic countries 13. The President ratified equipment available for the Europe, Asia, and Latin early in 1950 following the the treaty on July 25; it U.S. armed forces, and the America. The first year establishment of an MDAP entered into force August 24, argument grew for foreign assistance would total nearly program and the conclusion 1949, after the other signa- military assistance to be a $1.8 billion, of which nearly of necessary bilateral tory nations quickly ratified. separate congressional $1 billion would go to the agreements.68 The first meeting of the appropriation. This position Brussels Pact nations under North Atlantic Council was was endorsed by Averell the North Atlantic Treaty. convened by Secretary Harriman, the European The evolution of dollar Conclusion Acheson in Washington on Recovery Program represen- estimates for military September 17. tative in Europe, who argued assistance was accompanied he danger of Soviet that the provision of military by debates within the U.S. aggression against assistance to West European Government as to whether war-ravaged Western Military Assistance nations in order to promote the United States would EuropeT following the end of to NATO economic recovery was receive base rights from World War II led to a drastic stalled by the unsupportable nations receiving assistance. change in traditional Ameri- ven before ratification defense budgets.67 Article 3 of the treaty with can foreign policy. After 160 was completed, the President Truman moved the Western European Union years during which Ameri- issue of U.S. military more confidently toward afforded a vehicle for can leaders had avoided Eassistance for the NATO legislation for a military reciprocal exchanges, peacetime “entangling countries had become a assistance program after his including base rights, under alliances,” the United States major matter of concern and re-election. In December the provision for collabora- in 1948 and 1949 embarked even conflict within the U.S. 1948 the Secretaries of State tion and cooperation among with the non-communist Government and with the and Defense and the Admin- the treaty members. nations of Europe on a other NATO allies. In the istrator of the Economic Within days of signing search for collective secu- summer of 1948, Gen. Cooperation Administration the North Atlantic Treaty, the rity. The North Atlantic Lyman Lemnitzer had headed constituted a Foreign Brussels Pact nations, alliance was a recognition of Assistance Coordinating Denmark, Norway, and Italy Committee (FACC), one of all made formal requests to

20 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the growing interdependence repelling rampant communist serves as a shield for an and uncertain days of 1947, of the nations bordering the expansionism. It was a emerging united Europe and but the new challenges that North Atlantic and an historically unprecedented has demonstrated the have arisen in Europe make acknowledgment of how kind of alliance, based on interdependence of the evident that the alliance has much the security of the democratic values that United States and Europe on not yet lost its purpose. The United States depended on would make possible many levels beyond the vital commitment made by the the security of Europe. But Europe’s postwar recovery, military relationship. The original allies in 1949 to even as the North Atlantic historic integration, and United States and Europe defend peace, security, and Treaty Organization began to continued freedom. have come an enormous democracy in Europe form, many recognized that After 50 years the mutual distance since the difficult remains valid today. ■ it was more than a means of effort of the United States and its NATO allies still

U.S. Department of State • April 1999 21 NATO

END NOTES

1Text of a radio address formation of the Comintern The Joint Chiefs of Staff American Foreign Policy: by Secretary Marshall, April and Soviet treatment of and National Policy, 1945- Basic Documents, 1941- 28, 1947, printed in Depart- West European parties, see 1947, pp. 63-67. 1949, pp. 534-537. ment of State Bulletin, May Eugenio Reale, Nascita del 16For text of the Brussels 11Kaplan, A Community 11, 1957, pp. 919-924. Cominform (Milan, 1958). Treaty, see the United of Interests: NATO and the Nations Treaty Series, 19 2 7Bevin’s views are See the summary of Military Assistance Pro- UNTS 51. Extracts are discussed in Don Cook, Europe’s problems offered gram, 1948-1951, pp. 4-5. printed in American Foreign by Under Secretary of State Forging the Alliance: NATO, 12For text of President Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Will Clayton in a May 27, 1945-1960 (New York: Truman’s March 12 ad- Documents, Vol. I (Washing- 1947, memorandum, in Morrow, 1989), pp. 88 ff. and dress, see A Decade of ton, DC, 1957) pp. 968-971, Foreign Relations, 1947, Vol. Peter Weiler, Ernest Bevin American Foreign Policy: and Department of State III, pp. 230-232. A concise (Manchester, UK: Manches- Basic Documents, 1941- Bulletin, May 9, 1948, p. summary of the political and ter University Press, 1993) 1949, pp. 530-534. A 600. economic problems of pp. 176-177. participant’s dramatic reconstruction is in David 17 8Forrest C. Pogue, description of the events Regarding the Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe: George C. Marshall: States- from the Greek crisis to the President’s strong feelings Western Europe, America, man, 1945-1949 (New York: enunciation of the Marshall about the menace of and Postwar Reconstruction Viking, 1987), p. 285; Plan is Joseph Jones, The aggressive communism, (London: Longman, 1992). Lawrence S. Kaplan, A Fifteen Weeks (New York: see Harry S. Truman, 3The political Community of Interests: Viking, 1955). Memoirs (New York: crosscurrents of 1947-1948 NATO and the Military Doubleday, 1965), Vol. I, p. 13See A Decade of are outlined in Robert Assistance Program, 1948- 279. For full text of the American Foreign Policy: Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: 1951, (Washington, DC: President’s March 17 Basic Documents, 1941- The Presidency of Harry S. Office of the Secretary of speech, see Department of 1949, p. 531. Truman, 1945-1948 (New Defense, Historical Office, State Bulletin, March 28, York: Norton, 1977). 1980), p. 17. For text of 14Record of a meeting 1948, pp. 418-420. Bevin’s note, see Foreign 4 among Acheson, Gier Lundestad, Empire 18The March 11 British Relations, 1948, Vol. III, pp. Patterson, and Forrestal, by Integration: The United aide-memoire and Secretary 3-6. March 19, 1947, summa- States and European Marshall’s response are 9 rized and quoted from in Integration, 1945-1997 (New For texts of the July printed in Foreign Relations, Foreign Relations, 1947, York: Oxford University 1947 JCS directive on 1948, Vol. III, pp. 46-48. In Vol. V, pp. 126-127. Press, 1998), outlines the policy toward Germany, the recalling the quick response rationale for U.S. support of March and June 1948 15Telegram 795 from to Bevin’s inquiry, President European unity. Western statements on Acting Secretary of State Truman assigned to Belgian German policy, and June Foreign Minister Paul-Henri 5For text of Secretary Acheson to Secretary of 1948 directives on currency Spaak the largest responsi- Marshall’s June 5 address, State Marshall in Moscow, reform together with Soviet bility for promoting the see A Decade of American April 3, 1947, Foreign responses, see Documents Brussels Pact. See Truman, Foreign Policy: Basic Relations, 1947, Vol. V, p. on Germany, 1944-1985 137, and Walter Isaacson Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 243. Documents, 1941-1949 (Washington, DC, 1985), pp. (Washington, DC, 1985), pp. and Evan Thomas, The 91-99, 110-113, 124-135, 19The Inter-American 806-807. Wise Men: Six Friends and 140-156. the World They Made: Treaty of Reciprocal Assis- tance (or Rio Treaty) of 6For text of the Soviet 10The JCS 570 series, Acheson, Bohlen, September 2, 1947, estab- statement rejecting the which was approved by Harriman, Kennan, Lovett; lished precedents critical to Marshall Plan, July 2, 1947, President Roosevelt in and McCloy (New York: the formulation of a North see A Decade of American November 1943, is summa- Simon and Schuster, Atlantic pact. The Rio Treaty Foreign Policy: Basic rized and quoted in James 1986), p. 400. For text of was regional and defensive Documents, 1941-1949, pp. F. Schnabel, History of the the Greek-Turkish Assist- in nature as provided under 807-809. For a senior Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vol. I, ance Act, approved on May Communist official’s 22, 1947, P.L. 75, 80th recollections about the Congress, see A Decade of

22 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO

Articles 51 and 52 of the UN 24Escott Reid, Time of 29T. Michael Ruddy, The working groups set up by Charter. Articles 1 and 2 of Fear and Hope: The Making Cautious Diplomat: Charles the conferees are printed in the Rio Treaty established of the North Atlantic Treaty, E. Bohlen and the Soviet Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol. means for member states to 1947-1949 (Toronto: Union, 1929-1969 (Kent and III, pp. 148-250 passim. The achieve peaceful resolution McClelland and Stover, London: The Kent State discussions are summa- of their outstanding differ- 1977), pp. 87-98. Reid was a University Press, 1986), pp. rized in Pogue, George C. ences, including the use of participant in the negotia- 84-85. For text of the April Marshall: Statesman, 1945- UN mediation. Article 3 tions in 1948 and close 29 memorandum, see 1959, pp. 328-332. committed the American observer of the succeeding Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol. 37Minutes of these States to collective defense. steps to the final treaty. III, pp. 108-109. meetings are in Foreign Article 4 clearly defined the Senator Vandenberg’s views 30Ruddy, The Cautious Relations, 1948, Vol. III, pp. boundaries of the collective are examined in detail in Diplomat: Charles E. Bohlen 209-214. defense arrangement. Most Arthur H. Vandenberg, ed., and the Soviet Union, 1929- importantly, the U.S. The Private Papers of 38 1969, pp. 86-87. Acheson, Present at Congress fully supported Senator Vandenberg (Bos- the Creation, pp. 369-370. ton: Houghton Mifflin, 1952). 31 and endorsed the Rio Pact Condit, The Joint Chiefs 39 anchored in the UN Charter. of Staff and National Policy, For text of the Septem- 25Memoranda of these It was a fateful step away 1947-1949, pp. 224-226; ber 9 agreed memorandum two discussions, prepared from traditional U.S. isola- Kaplan, The United States by the participants, the so- by Lovett, are printed in tionism. For text of the Rio and NATO: The Formative called “Washington Paper,” Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol. treaty, see A Decade of Years, p. 80; Foreign see Foreign Relations, 1948, III, pp. 82-84, 92-96. American Foreign Policy: Relations, 1948, Vol. III, pp. Vol. III, pp. 237-245. Presi- Basic Documents, 1941- 26Lawrence S. Kaplan, 188-193. dent Truman approved the 1949, pp. 226-229. The United States and general principles contained 32Condit, The Joint Chiefs NATO: The Formative Years in the September 9 paper; 20 of Staff and National Policy, The exchanges leading (Lexington, KY: The Univer- see ibid., p. 271. 1947-1949, pp. 219-220. For to the Pentagon Talks and sity of Kentucky Press, 40 text of NSC 14/1, July 1, On the role of the the record of those secret 1984), pp. 70-76, and 1948, see Foreign Relations, military in the creation of the talks are presented in Rearden, The Formative 1948, Vol. I, pp. 585-588. pact, see Timothy P. Ireland, Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol. Years, 1947-1950, pp. 461- Creating the Entangling III, pp. 55 ff. 464. For text of the 33Plan Half Moon is Alliance: The Origins of the 21Foreign Relations, Vandenberg Resolution, described in Condit, The North Atlantic Treaty Organi- 1948, Vol. III, pp. 85-88; Senate Resolution 239, see Joint Chiefs of Staff and zation (Westport, CT: Kenneth W. Condit, History Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol. National Policy, 1947-1949, Greenwood Press, 1981), of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, III, pp. 135-136. pp. 365-367. pp. 121-128, and Reid, Time of Fear and Hope: The Vol. II, The Joint Chiefs of 27Secretary Marshall’s 34Memorandum of Making of the North Atlantic Staff and National Policy, involvement in the creation conversation by Bohlen, Treaty, 1947-1949, pp. 147- 1947-1949 (Washington, of NATO during the last year August 6, 1948; Record of 148. D.C. 1966), pp. 193-104; and of his service at the State the 12th exploratory meet- Steven L. Rearden, History Department is authorita- ing, August 16, 1948; and 41The discussions on of the Office of the Secre- tively described in Pogue, note from Lovett to the expanding the charter tary of Defense, Vol. I, The George C. Marshall: States- French Embassy, Septem- membership of the Alliance Formative Years, 1947-1950 man, 1945-1959, pp. 316- ber 6, 1948, Foreign Rela- are documented in Foreign (Washington, DC, 1984), pp. 329, and Acheson, Present tions, 1948, Vol. III, pp. 206- Relations, 1948, Vol. III, pp. 462-463. at the Creation (New York: 209, 217-219, and 253. 255-343 passim, and 22 Norton, 1969), p. 236. summarized in Kaplan, The Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 35For text of NSC 9/3, Acheson succeeded United States and NATO: II, pp. 244-245. see Foreign Relations, 1948, Marshall as Secretary of The Formative Years, p. 83. 23 Vol. III, pp. 140-141. See Foreign Relations, State in January 1949. Marshall’s memorandum of 36 1948, Vol. III, pp. 101-103; 28 The official records of his conversation with Rearden, The Formative George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 the 10 formal meetings of Swedish Foreign Minister Years, 1947-1950, p. 463; the Washington Exploratory Unden is in Foreign Rela- Condit, The Joint Chiefs of (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 413. Talks and the meetings of tions, 1948, Vol. III, pp. 264- Staff and National Policy, 266. 1947-1949, p. 195.

U.S. Department of State • April 1999 23 NATO

42The military negotia- summarized in Kaplan, The to the alliance and obtained 61Acheson, Present at tions are described in United States and NATO: the President’s approval to the Creation, p. 284. Condit, The Joint Chiefs of The Formative Years, pp. proceed with the invitation 62For text of Acheson’s Staff and National Policy, 112-114. although he would have and the President’s state- 1947-1949, pp. 197-200. preferred “certainly at this 49See Acheson, Present ments as well as those of time a pact without Italy.” 43For text of the Decem- at the Creation, pp. 370-372, other conference partici- See the memorandum by ber 24 draft treaty, see for his meetings with the pants, see Department of the Secretary of State, Foreign Relations, 1948, Vol. Senators and subsequent State Bulletin, April 17, March 2, 1949, Foreign III, pp. 334-337. political fallout. Memoranda 1949, pp. 471-482. Relations, 1949, Vol. IV, pp. of the February 7 and 8 44Reid, Time of Fear and 141-145. 63The efforts of the meetings with Lange are in Hope: The Making of the Soviet Union to counter the Foreign Relations, 1949, Vol. 57The membership North Atlantic Treaty, 1947- negotiation of the Atlantic IV, pp. 66-73. negotiations are described 1949, pp. 170-179 passim. alliance are described in in Acheson, Present at the 50Ireland, Creating the Kaplan, The United States 45For the JCS com- Creation, pp. 277-279. Entangling Alliance, p. 111. and NATO: The Formative ments, see Foreign Rela- Documentation is presented Years, pp. 96-97. tions, 1949, Vol. IV, pp. 10- 51Weiler, Ernest Bevin, in Foreign Relations, 1949, 13. Truman’s address is in pp. 181-182. Vol. IV, pp. 1-285 passim. 64Kaplan, The United Public Papers of the Presi- States and NATO: The 52Bohlen’s various drafts 58For a time in early dents of the United States: Formative Years, p. 124. are published in Foreign March 1949, the United Harry S. Truman, 1949, pp. Relations, 1949, Vol. IV, pp. States and Britain consid- 65Excerpts from the 112-116. 113-116. ered, but then abandoned, Committee report are 46Lovett chaired one issuing a public declaration printed in A Decade of 53See Foreign Relations, more meeting of alliance expressing the Atlantic American Foreign Policy, 1949, Vol. IV, p. 174. Ambassadors on January alliance members’ interest 1941-1949: Basic Docu- 14 before resigning effective 54Kaplan, The United and support for the security ments, pp. 944-957. January 20. States and NATO: The of Greece, Turkey, and 66Acheson, Present at Formative Years, p. 116, perhaps even Iran. The 47The available records the Creation, p. 285. points out that some question confronting allied of Secretary Acheson’s Americans would have negotiators was whether an 67Rearden, The Forma- meetings with Members of preferred identifying Articles expanded NATO alliance tive Years, 1947-1950, pp. Congress in February and 53 and 54 of the UN Charter without Greece and Turkey 493-496, and Condit, The March, the meetings of the as the authority for a (and even Iran) would Joint Chiefs of Staff and Washington Exploratory regional alliance, but this embolden the Soviet Union National Policy, 1947-1949, Talks, and the private would have made NATO to attack or if not, whether pp. 219-226. meetings Acheson had with susceptible to review by the the declaration might individual ambassadors 68The steps within the UN Security Council where provide provocation to the during this same period are U.S. Government and the the Soviet Union had a veto. Soviet Union. The issue of presented in Foreign the NATO declaration is negotiations with the North 55 Relations, 1949, Vol. IV, pp. For text of the treaty, documented in Foreign Atlantic nations is described 66-237. Acheson’s own vivid see A Decade of American Relations, 1949, Vol. IV, pp. in detail in Rearden, The recollections of these Foreign Policy, 1941-1949: 175-176 and 209-210. Formative Years, 1947-1950, consultations are in Basic Documents, pp. 936- Chapter XVII; Condit, The Acheson, Present at the 939. 59For text of Acheson’s Joint Chiefs of Staff and Creation, pp. 277-284. March 8 report, see Foreign National Policy, 1947-1949, 56Secretary Acheson Relations, 1949, Vol. IV, p. Chapter 12; and Kaplan, A 48Acheson’s consulta- discussed with President 174. Community of Interests: tions with the ambassadors Truman on March 2 the pros 60 NATO and the Military and with key Senators are and cons of Italy’s invitation Foreign Relations, 1949, Vol. IV, pp. 213-224. Assistance Program, 1948- 1951. ■

24 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization The Origins of NATO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Office of the Historian U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs

Released April 1999

Publication Number 10617

Printed on recycled paper

U.S. Department of State • April 1999 25 Contents

i Foreword iii Preface iv Chronology of Agreements, Declarations, And Negotiations 1 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1 European Economic Recovery and European Integration 2 Roots of the Atlantic Alliance 4 The Crises of 1948 4 American Military Involvement in Western European Reconstruction and Security 5 Isolationism, the UN Charter, and Postwar U.S. Foreign Policy 7 The Western European Union and the Origin of the Atlantic Alliance 9 The Vandenberg Resolution: The UN Charter And the Future Alliance 10 The Department of State Debate Over the Atlantic Alliance 11 Moving Toward Military Assistance to Europe and Coordinated Military Planning 12 The Washington Exploratory Talks, July-September 1948, and the Debate Over the Scope of the Alliance 13 Drafting the North Atlantic Treaty, October-December 1948 15 Consultations With Congress, January-March 1949 18 Scope and Membership of the Alliance 18 Signing and Ratification 20 Military Assistance to NATO 20 Conclusion 22 End Notes

26 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Foreword

here is much to celebrate in the history of NATO’s first half-century. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been the most successful alliance of all time. It has deterred aggression and defended its borders, maintained itsT unity and safeguarded democracy. It has allowed a generation to grow up in prosperity and peace. Its success can be measured not in battles won, but in lives saved, liberty preserved, and hope shared with freedom-loving peoples everywhere.

NATO was forged in the aftermath of Holocaust and war, by the survivors of war, to prevent war. NATO brought together nations that shared a community of interests and a commitment to democratic values. America’s special goal in this effort was to draw the nations of Europe together to help guard against a resurgence of the conflict that had twice in 30 years drawn our troops across the Atlantic and plunged them into war. But, as this short history reminds us, NATO’s success was by no means foreordained. Its negotiation and adoption alone required the best efforts of diplomats, militaries and legislators in each member nation. Its endurance depended—and still depends—on the dedication of each ally to the principles upon which it was founded. Readers of these pages will be struck by the important role that congressional leaders of both parties played in supporting NATO’s creation and influencing its shape. In recent years, we have seen a reprise of that role, as a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives has contributed counsel and strong public backing to the effort to enlarge NATO and prepare it for new missions. Thus looking backward to NATO’s history inspires us to look forward with confi- dence. Since NATO was formed, our world has been transformed. But the destinies of Europe and North America remain inseparable. As President Clinton welcomes the lead- ers of our 18 NATO allies and 25 partner nations to NATO’s Washington Summit, we will be looking ahead to NATO’s next 50 years. The NATO Summit will issue a blueprint for the future in the form of a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. That document will recognize that, while our essential goals remain unchanged, the risks we face have been transformed by the end of the Cold War and the steady advance of technology. In Washington, our leaders will agree on the design of an Alliance that is strengthened by new members; an Alliance that is more flexible; an Alliance committed to collective defense and capable of meeting a wide range of threats to its common interests; and an Alliance that works in partnership with other nations and organizations to advance secu- rity, prosperity, and democracy in and for the entire Euro-Atlantic region. Our Alliance is and must remain a Euro-Atlantic institution that acts by consensus. But we must be prepared to prevent, deter, and respond to the full spectrum of threats to Alliance interests and values.

U.S. Department of State • April 1999 27 i And when we respond, it only makes sense to use the unified military structure and cooperative habits we have developed over the past 50 years. This approach should not be controversial. We’ve been practicing it successfully in Bosnia since 1995. We are also taking steps to ensure that NATO’s military forces are designed, equipped, and prepared for 21st century missions. It is with this in mind, as well, that we support the development within NATO of a European Security and Defense Identity—by which we mean an increased capability for Europeans, acting together, to assume a greater share of our common responsibilities. And we expect the Summit to produce an initiative that responds to the grave threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. This will also be the first Summit to include NATO’s three newest members—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland. As the reader of this history will learn, the United States has from the beginning sought to open NATO to all who would, and could, share in its goals and take on its duties. These three nations have proven their ability to meet Alliance responsibilities, uphold Alliance values, and defend Alliance interests. This is NATO’s first enlargement since the Cold War’s end, but, as our leaders will reconfirm in Washington, it will not be NATO’s last. The door of the Alliance remains open, and we will continue to help prepare aspiring members to meet NATO’s high stan- dards. From the beginning, NATO has been part of an interlocking set of Euro-Atlantic insti- tutions. Today, NATO is a central pillar of a community that is increasingly secure, pros- perous, and democratic. It is more important than ever that the Alliance work with other countries and institutions to extend stability throughout this broader region. We seek to erase, and not replace, the lines that divided Europe. For that reason, the Alliance has forged the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Partnership for Peace to develop close and cooperative relationships with 25 other na- tions. In collaboration with regional institutions, we are encouraging the resolution of old antagonisms, promoting tolerance, and ensuring the protection of minority rights. Thus NATO can do its part to help realize, for the first time in history, the dream of a Europe whole and free. Although a great many things have changed since April 1949, that dream which motivated our predecessors is alive—and well. Our Alliance still is bound together by a community of interests. Our strength still is a source of strength to those everywhere who labor for freedom and peace. Our power still shields those who love the law and still threatens none except those who would threaten others with aggression and harm. Our Alliance has endured because the principles it defends are timeless and because they reflect the deepest aspirations of the human spirit. It is our mission now, working across the Atlantic, to carry on the best traditions of the past 50 years and prepare NATO to defend our principles and values in the century ahead. Encouraged by the example of those who came before us, we will dedicate our best efforts to that end.

ii28 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Preface

his study was prepared in response to a request from the National Security Council. It is intended to provide essential historical back- ground for the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the signing of Tthe North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949. The basis of the study was the official historical record of American foreign policy published in the Department of State’s historical documentary series Foreign Relations of the United States. Relevant historical publications prepared by the Historical Office of the Secre- tary of Defense and the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also were consulted along with memoirs, authoritative biographies, and historical studies by aca- demic experts. A chronology has been included to afford readers a convenient context and timeline to understand the negotiations and consultations of 1948 and 1949. This study seeks to remind readers of some essential milestones in the concep- tion, negotiation, and conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty. No new research has been undertaken, and a thorough and detailed account of the negotiations or evaluation of the context, motives of participants, or consequences of the events of 1948 and 1949 for an Atlantic alliance has not been attempted. The choice of scholarly works cited in the study is not intended to represent an official judgment as to their special merit as against any other of the many books and articles written about the North Atlantic Treaty or bearing upon the events leading up to its signing. This is an attempt at assembling some basic facts to help give some greater meaning to the commemoration of this 50th anniversary. As is the case in the writing of most history, more time, more research, and more advice would result in a perhaps different and certainly more complete review of these memorable events. James E. Miller of the Office of the Historian did the original research and writing from which this study emerged. Rita M. Baker edited the study and prepared the chronology. William Slany The Historian Department of State

U.S. Department of State • April 1999 29iii Chronology of Agreements, Declarations, and Negotiations

V-E Day May 8, 1945 End of the war in Europe

Moscow Council of Foreign March-April 1947 Marshall warned about the slow recovery of Ministers and Secretary of Europe and Western differences with the U.S.S.R. State Marshall’s report

President Truman’s speech March 12, 1947 Proposed military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey

Greek-Turkish aid approved by May 22, 1947 Congressional approval of military and economic U.S Congress assistance to Greece and Turkey

Secretary Marshall’s address June 5, 1947 Proposed for Marshall Plan; invitation to the European nations to submit plans for a European recovery effort

Conference of the Committee June 27-July 1, 1947 Produced European recovery program, proposed of European Economic courses of action, and estimated costs; Soviet Cooperation, Paris Premier Stalin rejected the Marshall Plan for the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe

National Security Act approved July 26, 1947 Provided for a comprehensive program for the future by U.S. Congress security of the U.S. and to coordinate and integrate U.S. policies and procedures to that end

Inter-American Treaty for September 2, 1947 Established mutual defense pact among the American Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) Republics, including the U.S.

Creation of Communist Information October 5, 1947 Created to coordinate activity of European communist Bureau (Cominform) parties; ensured Soviet control of national communist parties

London Council of Foreign Ministers December 1947 Confirmed East-West deadlock

Communist coup in Czechoslovakia February 1948 Communist government took over on June 7

Brussels Treaty March 17, 1948 Created Western European Union (Brussels Pact); members promised to come to each other’s aid in case of attack

President Truman’s address March 17, 1948 Expressed support for the Western European Union

Pentagon Talks March 23- April 1, 1948 Secret U.S.-British-Canadian military staff talks

Economic Cooperation Act April 3, 1948 • Legislative implementation of the European approved by U.S. Congress Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) for the economic recovery of Europe • $4 billion appropriated for the first year iv 30 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NSC 9, “Position of the United States April 13, 1948 Expressed U.S. support for but not membership in the With Respect to Support for the Brussels Pact, pledged to explore larger mutual de Western Union and Other Related fense agreement based on Article 51 of the UN Charter Free Countries”

Establishment of the Organization April 16, 1948 Agreement among 16 non-communist European for European Economic Cooperation nations to work together in using Marshall Plan aid (OEEC)

Congress of Europe Meeting, May 7, 1948 Discussed plans for establishing a European political The Hague union

NSC 9/2, “Position of the United May 11, 1948 Emphasized the need for Senate consultation on pos States With Respect to Support sible alliance and called for exploratory diplomatic and for the Western Union and military talks with European nations; called on West Other Related Free Countries” European nations to improve defense efforts

Creation of the State of Israel May 14, 1948 The U.S. and U.S.S.R. recognized Israel on May 16

Western agreements on Germany June 7, 1948 Communiqué announced U.S.-British-Benelux agree- ment on: • International control of the Ruhr, • German representation in the Marshall Plan, • Integration of the Western zones of Germany, • Drafting a federal constitution for Germany

Vandenberg Resolution June 11, 1948 Advised the President to seek U.S. and free world security through support of mutual defense arrange ments that operated within the UN Charter but outside the UN Security Council

Berlin blockade and airlift June 24, 1948- Soviet blockage of access to Berlin and subsequent May 11, 1949 U.S. supply by air of the city

NSC 9/3, “Position of the United June 28, 1948 NSC authorization to seek means, within the terms of States With Respect to Support for the Vandenberg Resolution, to provide military support the Western Union and Other Related to the free nations of Western Europe Free Countries”

NSC 14/1, “Position of the United July 1, 1948 Called for legislation to permit military assistance to States With Respect to Providing selected non-communist nations in Europe in order to Military Assistance to nations of strengthen their military capabilities to resist the Non-Soviet World” communist expansion

House Un-American Activities July 30, 1948 Whittaker Chambers confessed to being a communist; Committee hearings identified former State Department official Alger Hiss as a Communist Party agent

Washington Exploratory Talks July-September 1948 Negotiations over the basic scope and structure of the North Atlantic alliance

U.S. Department of State • April 1999 31 v Washington Paper September 9, 1948 Paper submitted to participating governments at the Exploratory Talks summing up the discussions and consensus reached on the membership of the alliance

Re-election of President Truman November 2, 1948 Surprise victory in the U.S. national elections

Ambassadorial Working Group meeting December 10-24, 1948 Prepared draft of the North Atlantic Treaty

Dean Acheson entry on duty as January 21, 1949 Secretary of State Marshall resigned in Secretary of State December 1948

North Atlantic Treaty April 4, 1949 Signed by 12 nations; created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization for collective defense

Creation of the Federal Republic May 8, 1949 Germany adopted the Basic Laws of the Federal of Germany Republic

U.S. Senate approval of the North July 21, 1949 On being assured that the treaty preserved congres- Atlantic Treaty sional prerogatives

Truman request to Congress July 21, 1949 Requested $1.45 billion for military assistance to Europe

Entry into force of the North Atlantic August 24, 1949 Canada was the first to ratify (May 3) and Italy the last Treaty (August 24)

First North Atlantic Council session September 17, 1949 Held in Washington and chaired by Secretary Acheson

White House announcement September 23, 1949 Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb

Mutual Defense Assistance Act October 6, 1949 Authorized $1.165 billion in military assistance to NATO signed by President Truman countries

UN General Assembly adoption of December 1, 1949 U.S.-British-sponsored resolution affirming the prin- “Essentials of Peace” Resolution ciples of the UN Charter and requesting members to cooperate to ease world tensions; submitted in re sponse to a Soviet-sponsored resolution against the North Atlantic Treaty alliance

North Korean invasion of South Korea June 25, 1950 Beginning of the Korean conflict

UN General Assembly adoption of November 3, 1950 Gave the General Assembly the right to recommend “Uniting for Peace” Resolution collective security measures if the use of the veto in the Security Council prevented UN action

Conference of NATO Foreign Ministers, December 18, 1950 Approved plans for the defense of Western Europe, Brussels including U.S. use of nuclear weapons if necessary to defend NATO nations

General Eisenhower appointment as December 19, 1950 Appointed by NATO Foreign Ministers with responsi- Supreme Commander of North Atlantic bility to create a force capable of repulsing an armed Soviet Forces attack

vi 32 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Senate approval of U.S. troops for April 4, 1951 Approved deployment of four divisions of the U.S. NATO Army to Europe but requested that the President consult with Congress before sending additional troops

U.S.-British-French Agreement September 10, 1951 Agreed to replace the West German occupation statute and use West German troops in a European army

Greek and Turkish membership in September 20, 1951 Approved at the NATO Council meeting in Ottawa; NATO NATO formal admission took place on February 18, 1952

End of U.S. Marshall Plan aid December 31, 1951 Mutual Security Agency replaced the OEEC; $7.2 billion provided under the Mutual Security Program for Economic, Military, and Technical Aid to Europe

Peace Conventions signed at Bonn May 26, 1952 End of Allied (U.S., Britain, France) occupation of Germany

Creation of European Defense May 27, 1952 Intended to unify West European defense plans and Community bind West Germany to European defense; included a NATO protocol with West Germany to extend NATO guarantees to that nation and a U.S. and British ` declaration that agreed to regard a threat to the EDC as a threat to their security; rejected by France in August 1954

U.S. Senate ratification of NATO July 1, 1952 Ratified NATO protocol with West Germany extending protocol NATO guarantees

West German membership in NATO May 5, 1955 Federal Republic of Germany became the 15th member pursuant to gaining sovereign status

Formation of the Warsaw Pact May 14, 1955 Soviet response to West German troops in NATO; signed by eight East European nations ■

U.S. Department of State • April 1999 33vii