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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization the Origins of NATO the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION The Origins of N A TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION European Economic Recovery power production), and dollar reserves to pay for necessary and European Integration imports. The war had rent the social fabric of many nations, setting social class against social class and ethnic group n the aftermath of the total defeat of Nazi Germany in against ethnic group. Political tensions were exacerbated by 1945, Europe struggled to recover from the ravages of the participation of many Europeans in collaborationist occupation and war. The wartime Grand Alliance be- regimes and others in armed resistance. Masses of Europe- tweenI the Western democracies and the Soviet Union ans, radicalized by the experience of war and German collapsed, and postwar negotiations for a peace settlement occupation, demanded major social and economic change foundered in the Council of Foreign Ministers. By 1947 and appeared ready to enforce these demands with violence. peace treaties with Italy and the defeated Axis satellites were The national Communist Parties of Western Europe stood finally concluded after protracted and acrimonious negotia- ready to exploit this discontent in order to advance the aims tions between the former allies, but the problem of a divided of the Soviet Union.2 and occupied Germany remained unsettled. U.S. leaders were acutely aware of both the dangers of In April 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall re- renewed conflict in Europe and of their ability to influence turned from a frustrating round of negotiations in the the shape of a postwar European political and social order. Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow to report that the Fresh from the wartime experience of providing major United States and the Soviet Union were at loggerheads over Lend-Lease aid to allied nations and assistance to millions of a prescription for the future of central Europe and that the refugees through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Soviets appeared ready to drag out talks. We cannot ignore Administration, they recognized the critical role massive the factor of time involved here, Marshall warned. U.S. aid could play in promoting a peaceful and democratic The recovery of Europe is far slower than had been reconstruction. expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The The U.S. domestic political picture, however, initially patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. .Action appeared unfavorable to dramatic action. Congressional cannot await compromise through exhaustion.1 elections in 1946 produced a Republican majority in both Houses of Congress. President Harry S. Trumans leader- West Europeans felt vulnerable not only to a possibly ship was repudiated, and the strongly conservative Republi- resurgent Germany but even more to communist expansion can majority appeared set upon a major reduction in govern- by subversion and the threat of direct Soviet military action. ment expenditures. Tensions ran high between the two The first stages of postwar economic reconstruction were major American political parties.3 painfully slow. Europe faced shortages of housing, basic foodstuffs, raw materials (especially coal, the key element in NATO In spite of intense market and a common toward the military corollary partisan political warfare, the defense and foreign policy. to the Marshall Plan came Truman administration and U.S. enthusiasm for integra- from Britain and France at Congress, laying aside a tion programs was strongly the end of 1947. The failure century and a half of influenced by a small but of the Soviet Union and the isolationist tradition, agreed active group of European West to come to terms for a to a vast expansion of federalists, especially Jean postwar German peace peacetime international Monnet, who had close settlement at the Moscow leadership responsibilities. personal relations with Council of Foreign Ministers Both the Marshall Plan American leaders and were meeting in March and April initiative and subsequently strongly pro-American in 1947 had been an important NATO were part of a U.S. outlook. Monnets vision of impetus in the launching of response to Europes crises a United States of Europe the Marshall Plan effort. that viewed greater European struck a responsive chord In June 1947 Secretary integration as critical to among Americans. Winston of State George Marshall successful resistance to the George C. Marshall, Churchills early champion- took the next major step and communist challenge and as Secretary of State from ship of European unity formally invited the Euro- the platform for building a further popularized the idea January 1947-January pean states to submit plans peaceful Europe. In the early in the United States. (Ironi- for a European recovery 1949, after whom the years of the process, the cally, Churchill favored a effort. Pointing to a disloca- United States prodded its Marshall Plan was united Europe without British tion of the entire fabric of reluctant allies toward named. participation.) U.S. support the European economy as a greater cooperation, while (Department of State photo) for European integration was result of a decade of abnor- leaders of the European couched in terms of the mal conditions, Secretary statesalthough recognizing By 1947 U.S. officials creation of an Atlantic Marshall offered assistance the need to integrate their recognized that European partnership that would resourcescontinued to reconstruction would fail enhance prosperity and directed not against any insist on the primacy of the without a major contribution security on both sides of the country or doctrine but 4 against hunger, poverty, national state. from occupied Germany, but Atlantic. U.S. enthusiasm for desperation and chaos. Its rebuilding the German purpose should be the European integration had a economy was bound to revival of a working variety of motivations. A cause severe concern among Roots of the Atlantic Alliance economy in the world so coordinated program of its former enemies, above all as to permit the emergence European economic recon- France. Integration offered a of political and social struction and defense was path for both rebuilding he economic recovery conditions in which free cost-effective, a key point Germanys economy and of Europe was institutions can exist. with a Truman administra- binding the new German inseparable from tion that was struggling to state to its former enemies Tsome solution to the un- Secretary Marshalls win congressional and public with ties of mutual interest. settled postwar political initiative, carefully framed to approval for an enormous Subsequently, integration situation. It became evident avoid confrontation with the outlay of American money to proved a useful vehicle for to European leaders during Soviet Union and coordi- finance its aid programs. bringing Germany into 1947 that recovery of their nated with the major U.S. European integration had an European defense arrange- war-shattered national allies, provided the basis for equally important role in ments. economies could not be a European response. Britain preventing the recurrence of In addition to these accomplished without and France together with the conflicts between European motivations, U.S. officials political and military security. Benelux nationsBelgium, states, which had twice were convinced of the Moreover, these leaders the Netherlands, and Luxem- drawn the United States into benefits that both the United were convinced that such bourgtook the lead in war. Of particular impor- States and Europe would military security arrange- organizing a conference of tance, of course, were gain from an enlarged single ments would require the the Committee of European French-German relations. involvement of the United Economic Cooperation, States. The first steps 2 The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO which met in Paris June 27- July 2, 1947, to discuss a coordinated program of economic cooperation aimed at integrated economic recovery. Italy and Greece pledged their cooperation. The Marshall Plan, launched as a joint U.S.-European program, pointed the way to European economic union and was Americas first step toward becoming a super- power with global interests and responsibilities. The conference in Paris in the summer of 1947 proved critical in defining a security response to threats to political stability in Western Europe. Soviet Premier Stalin initially permitted the states of Secretary Marshalls offer, Bevin felt that the Western Berlin schoolchildren Eastern Europe to join the simultaneously began a democracies, including the watching a C-54 cargo discussions and sent a campaign of strikes and United States, should plane approach demonstrations designed to organize themselves with Tempelhof Airport during Soviet delegation as well. He 6 concluded, however, that undercut the initiative. power, money, and resolute the 1948 Berlin airlift. participation in the Marshall At the conclusion of the action to resist communism. (AP/Wide World photo) Plan threatened his hold over London session of the Bevin and French Foreign Eastern Europe and would Council of Foreign Ministers Minister Bidault had already Brussels Pact and the other mean abandoning his plans in December 1947, the East- started discussing the including the United States for Soviet postwar recon- West deadlock was fully creation of a European and Canada.7 struction. The Soviets confirmed, and the hope for alliance that could include A month later, in January withdrew from the prelimi- a German
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