University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2016 Making Autocrats Accountable: Interests, Priorities, and Cooperation for Regime Change Başak Taraktaş University of Pennsylvania,
[email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Taraktaş, Başak, "Making Autocrats Accountable: Interests, Priorities, and Cooperation for Regime Change" (2016). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2050. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2050 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2050 For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Making Autocrats Accountable: Interests, Priorities, and Cooperation for Regime Change Abstract In nearly all authoritarian regimes, democratization finds significant societal support and a number of organized opposition groups struggle for regime change. In some cases—such as in Iran in 1979— opposition groups are able to cooperate with one another and bring down authoritarianism. In others—such as the Assad regime in Syria—groups are not able to cooperate, and the ruler remains in place. Studies that apply cooperation theory on regimes predict that shared grievances about the current government and common interests in changing the existing regime foster cooperation among challengers. Yet, evidence suggests the contrary. This study examines the conditions under which diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, are able to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo. It uses the case studies of the Ottoman transition to constitutional monarchy (1876–1908) and the French transition to constitutional monarchy (1814–1830), paired according to the least similar systems design, in combination with network theory.