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DOTY, Charles Stewart, 1928— MAURICE BARR^S AND THE EATE OF BOULANG- BM: THE POLITICAL CAREER OF MAURICE BARRES (1888-1906).

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1964 History, modern

University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan Copyright by

Charles Stewart Doty

1965 MAURICE BARRES AND THE FATE OF BOULANGISM:

THE POLITICAL CAREER OF MAURICE BARRES (1888-1906)

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

Charles Stewart Doty, A.B., M.A.

The Ohio State University 1964

Approved by

Department of History V ita

September 8, 1928 Born - Fredonia, Kansas

1950 ...... A. B., Washburn Municipal University, Topeka, Kansas

1953-1954 • • • Research Assistant, Department of History, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas

1955 ...... M.A., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas

1957-1960 . . . Graduate Assistant, Department of History, The Ohio S ta te U niv ersity, Columbus, Ohio

I960 ...... Part-time Instructor, Department of History, Denison University, Granville, Ohio

1960-1961 . . . Part-time Instructor, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1961-1964 . . Instructor, Department of History, Kent S ta te U niversity, Kent, Ohio

Fields of Study

Major Field: History

Studies in Modern Europe, 1789-Present, Professors Andreas Dorpalen, Harvey Goldberg, and Lowell Ragatz

Studies in Renaissance and Reformation, Professor Harold J. Grimm Studies in United States, 1850-Present, Professors Robert H. Brem- ner, Foster Rhea Dulles, Henry H. Simms, and Francis P. Weisenburger

i i table of contents

Page

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER

I . FROM LITERARY TO POLITICAL REBEL (1 8 6 2 -1 8 8 8 ) ...... 4

I I . THE CAMPAIGN OF 1889 33 I I I . BARRES AND THE FAILURE OF BOULANGISM AS A PARTY AND parliamentary bloc (1889-1893)...... 83

IV. MAURICE Da RRES AS POLITICIAN AND DEPUTY ...... 128

V. AT THE CROSSROADS (1 8 9 3 -1 8 9 7 ) ...... 158

VI. THE NaNCY PROGRAM OF NATIONALISM (1 8 9 8 ) ...... 202

V II. BARRES AND THE NATIONALIST aND ANTI-DREYFUSARD LEa GUES (1898-1906) 231

CONCLUSION...... * 270

APPENDIX...... 274 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 277

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1. Distribution by arrondissement of Boulangist vote in P aris in 1889 ...... 77

2. Departments which, in 1889 , elected Deputies who sat in Boulangist bloc ...... 79

i i i INTRODUCTION

A few weeks before his death in 1923 Maurice Barres wrote, "I was born in 1862. These sixty years are the lowest point in the sweep

[courbe] of French energy. An epoch of deep depression. This depres­ sion governed my destiny."^ In those years Barr&s was a major critic of this lack of "energy" with an enormous influence in the world of ideas.

Originally he criticized the shortage of energy as one of the principal wriT -vrs to revive the psychological novel in France. Before he was thirty his novels, which emphasized individuality, had so taken young French in­ tellectuals by storm that he was virtually "the prince of youth." His influence was so great on young writers in the 1890's that the French novel was very much under his spell for two decades. Also in the 1890's he emerged as a political thinker with one of the foremost intellectual attacks on the Third French Republic. His attack in the name of national­ ism, a presidential republic, federalism, and social reforms ir.itia.ny had considerable influence on young men of both Left and Right. Although he lost his devoted following in the first decade of the twentieth century, his political ideas persisted in riddling the thought of the French Right.

Because he enjoyed such a great influence on his own and subse­ quent generations as a novelist and political thinker, Barres scholars have tended to concentrate on these aspects of his career. They have not shown us the Barrfes who was a follower and leader of political movements,

^Maurice Barr&s, Mes Cahiers (Paris, 1929-1957), I> 8.

1 who was a polemical journalist and editor, who was, in short, a politi­

cian and engagg intellectual. This study will attempt to complement

these other works by concentrating on Barr&s as politician and activist:

his beginning as a follower of Boulangism, his search for a new mode of

political expression when Boulangism fails in 1889, his seeming failure

to found a viable political movement at the very time he found personal

political and literary recognition in his 1906 election to the French

Academy and to the Paris constituency which he represented until his

death in 1923. These were the most important years for Barres, because

they shaped his political ideas. By 1906, his ideas had fully matured.

In dwelling on the political career of Barrfcs this study, first

of all, will show that there was an interplay between his ideas and ac­

tion and that both evolved through stages, often under the influence of

key figures and events. His literary rebellion led to his involvement

in the political rebellion of Boulangism. His campaign in a working-

class district and his participation at the extreme Left of the Chamber

of Deputies moved him into socialism. After the collapse of Bounalgism, he

tried to build both a new political movement in socialism and nationalism

and a new political success at Neuilly (1893 and 1896), Nancy (1898), and

Paris (1903 and 1906). This examination of his political involvement

will show that the ideas of Barr&s were not born full-blown, as he and

most Barres scholars have contended. Instead, the ideas evolved under

the impact of events, earlier ideas, and the influence of men and move­

ments such as Alfred Gabriel, Paul Dlroulede, Pierre Joseph Proudhon,

and the Boulanger and Dreyfus Affairs. Secondly, this study will show the fate of Boulangism as it was reflected in the political career of Barr&s. It will examine what Bou­ langism meant to Barres and its other participants, how they moved into socialism and nationalism, and how Barrfcs and the old Boulangists failed in their attempt to build a new mass movement like Boulangism out of na­ tionalism and the Dreyfus Affair. CHAPTER I

FROM LITERARY TO POLITICAL REBEL (1862-1888)

Maurice Barr&s originally entered politics for psychological and literary reasons. As a young writer in the 1880's he rebelled against the literary and educational conventions of his youth, pseudo-scientific naturalism and positivism. To Barrfes, tK se conventions dehumanized man, destroyed his individuality and ego, and submerged him in the mediocre, barbarian herd. The literary rebellion of Barres took the form of dica­ dence or symbolism. It rejected the world of positivism as false and sought reality by magnifying the individual ego. By 1887-1888 even thi3 failed Barres. His whole world seemed to conspire against him. His novels had failed to give either him or his protagonist self-fulfillm ent in the ivory-tower, his literary efforts went unrecognized, and he felt crushed by a political, literary, and social world which, in its common­ place meanness, attacked him and his movement. In the emotional crisis which these feelings created, Barres concluded that he could break out of this psychological impasse only by abandoning the ivory-tower and seek­ ing the people. By uniting himself with the mass in political action, he could re s to re h im self. At th a t very tim e a p o litic a l movement came in to

being which re b e lle d a g a in st conventional p o litic s in th e same way th a t

symbolism re b e lle d a g a in st conventional l it e r a t u r e . That movement was

Boulangism, and for a Barres forced into politics by psychological needs,

such a movement inevitably drew him into it. 5 I

The intellectual world against which Barr&s rebelled originally took: him and attempted to shape him in its image. His father, as a civil engineer from Charnes—sur—Moselle (Vosges), was prosperous enough to send him to the college of Malgrange in 1873. From there, the young Maurice advanced to the lyc£e at Nancy in 1877. At both, he and nis classmates received an almost official philosophy of optimism which reflected the mood of France itself. Faith in science as the solution to all human problems had triumphed. The positivism of Comte turned into the scient­ ism of Taine and Kenan, who dominated intellectual circles in the days following 1870. Taine1s race, milieu, et moment, which had expressed an earlier realism, became the rationale of naturalism with Zola and Daudet as the successors of Flaubert. The political outlet for these philoso­ phies was Opportunism. For twenty years the Opportunists held power with the rhetoric of Le<5n Gambetta's 1869 Belleville Program, which promised to bring a democratic republic, separation of church and state, and free­ dom for labor to organize when the opportunity arose. Except for the

Trade Union law of 1884, somehow the opportune moment never came. In the meantime, Opportunists stood for conservative republicanism and mild anti­ clericalism. For a France becoming increasingly republican in the 1870's and turning its back on monarchy and clericalism, for a France increasing­ ly believing that the untrammeled advance of science and industrial prog­ ress would in itself bring the better life, Opportunist goals seemed enough. That this temper could be reflected in the French educational system which shaped the youthful Barres was largely the result of the

1870 defeat which had brought a revaluation of the school system. France, felt the followers of such influential thinkers as Charles Renouvier and

■Smile Littr6, had suffered defeat at the hands of the Prussian school­ m aster.Educators credited the victory to German scientific and educa­ tional superiority over Catholic and Imperial France. If France were to remain a major power, if it were to stage a successful revanche in the dim fu tu re , i t must beat Germany a t i t s own game. To be su re, French education dould never fully break out of its traditionalism, but to the

French classics were added those republican romantics who could provide a vehicle for liberty, republicanism, and revanche; Edgar Quinet's Le

G&iie des religions, Jules Michelet's popular patriotism and love of the people, and Victor Hugo a3 symbol of the patrie. While the positivism of

Littr£ and the neo-Kantianism of Renouvier did not appear in the curriculum of Barrfes (although they were fixtures of the curriculum in the 1880's),

they did come through in many of his teachers. One of these was Auguste

Burdeau, who taught philosophy to Barres in 1879-1880. Burdeau made sure

his students shared his love for those nineteenth-century German thinkers who appeared to give Germany its superiority: the categorical imperative

of Kant, the ego of Fichte, the ego and non-ego of Schelling, and the ab­

solute spirit of Hegel. After his conversion to Boulangism, Barrfes at­

tacked Burdeau*s Kantianism, identifying it with Germanism (i.e. treason)

^For an analysis of the forces which shaped French education in the 1870's, see: John A. Scott, Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradi­ tion in France. 1870-1914 (New York, 1951), passim. : Claude Digeon, La Crise allemande de la pens^e francaise, 1870-1914 (Paris , 1959), pas­ sim; and Georges Weill, Histoire de 11Enseignement secondaire en France 11802-1920) (Paris, 1921), pp. 154-169. and with the Protestant ethic of duty. The latter, it appeared to Bar­ res, made for moral degeneracy as revealed in frequent parliamentary scandals. That Burdeau was by then an Opportunist member of the Chamber of Deputies and a minister somewhat tainted by the Panama Scandal only confirmed Barres rejection of his teacher's philosophy.

II

Yet, even before he finished school, Barr&s began to rebel against this faith in science and idealistic universals, which pervaded so much of French life. If positivism and Kantianism were the intellectual dis­ position of France in the 1870's, symbolism was on the ascent, too, and would take Barr&s with it.

The elements which would lead Barres to symbolism came early. At his mother's knee he received the romantic novels of Walter Scott. While

Burdeau was introducing him to Kant, one of Barr&s*friends, Stanislas de

Guaita, initiated him into the mysteries of Gautier, Madame Ackerman, Le­ conte de Lisle, Baudelaire, and later nineteenth century poets. There was also a German element in this aspect. The post-1870 introduction into

France of Schopenhaur systematized the pre-1870 pessimism of the romantic republicans. This was illustrated in the writings of Brunetiere, Lemaitre,

Anatole France, Zola and the naturalists, and even in the late writings of

.Renan and Taine. As a budding man of l e t t e r s , Barr&s was knowledgeable of 2 and influenced by the writings of these men.

o Although Barrfcs wrote frequently on Renan and Taine, his most celebrated passages are: Huit jours chez Monsieur Renan (Paris, 1888) and a section entitled, "L'Arbre de M. Taine," from Les DSracines (Paris, 1961), I, 202-231. 8 By 1880, then, Barnes had. been exposed to two streams of thought, one optimistic and the other pessimistic. He would not resolve their con­ tradictions for four or five years. In the meantime, he wanted to write.

Under parental pressures, however, he registered at the Faculty de droit at Nancy in November, 1880, and remained there two years. His attendance at lectures was irregular and he hated his studies. He spent most of his time reading and writing. His writing ability had been developed and en­ couraged by a lyc€e teacher, Albert Collignon, but his first efforts were unsuccessful. An early rejection slip from a literary competition shows that the style and thought were far from perfected. "The work . . . ," the anonymous critic commented, "is nothing but an incoherent mass of com­ monplaces and compiled theories. What the author passes off for original­ ity is only excentricity .... In this work there is neither style nor 3 ideas." His reading, however, was voracious and profitable. He came to

Stendhal, and through him to a love of Napoleon. He discovered the German psychologist Hartmann's theory of the unconscious. Here was a further de­ velopment of the earlier influences: French and German, optimistic and pessimistic.

Barres the writer finally found an audience in 1882 in the pages of Jeune France, a literary magazine which carried contributions by Le­ conte de Lisle, Sully-Prudhomme, Francois CoppSe, Alphonse Daudet, Ana- tole France, and Paul Bourget. This success won him parental permission to establish himself at Paris in January, 1883* Although his parents sent him there to pursue his studies at the Faculty de droit and the Ecole des hautes Etudes, he spent most of his time engaged in the heated

^Jean Dietz, Maurice Barr&s (Paris, 1927), p. 23* 9 literary arguments of the brasseries. In an 1887 article Barres des­ cribed his typically Latin Quarter bohemian existence, with its students from the Ecole Polytechnique and Ecole Norma/la, its bad restaurants, its streetwalkers "evidently subsidized by families to inspire in their young men a horror of illic it conjunctions,11 its cold and lonely lodgings, and in its caf6s the eternal talk condemning a philistine society.^ With his

Latin Quarter friends, Jean Mor£as, Mallarm6, V illiers de l'Isle-Adam, and Charles de Groffic, Barres played the role of the dandy and got caught up in all the intellectual currents of the day. He met Leconte de Lisle and Bourget. He came under the spell of Anatole France, who introduced him into the brilliant salon of Madame de Loynes. With them he rapidly emerged as a thoroughgoing disciple of symbolism in its struggle against the prevailing naturalism.

To be sure, symbolism was hardly clear in the minds of its ad­ herents in these early 1880's. They could not even decide whether to call it decadence or symbolism. Both seemed based on the notion that the exterior world was false, crass, and barbarian. Both held that this so-

called reality was only a starting point for exploring the magic of the mysterious, perhaps terrible, inner reality of the ego. Both emphasized

the eccentric, satanic, mystic, pessimistic, and dreamy. In style, both showed less interest in a book's unity than in the quality of a single

sentence or word. Both wished to brush aside old literary traditions and

seek new forms and diction. Influenced heavily by the music of Richard

Wagner, both sought, through alliteration and assonance, the music of

colors, mood, sounds, and odors which would heighten sensation in reader

^Maurice Barrfes, "Au Quartier des Etudiants," Le Voltaire, November 2, 1887. 10 and writer. Their early disciples seemed to call these attributes in poetry, symbolism, and in prose, decadence. The decadent prose accentu­ ated the understanding of the inner self, the meaning of individual existence, and the preference for the inner world of consciousness to that of exterior reality. Both, of course, were in rebellion against current modes of expression—Parnassian poetry and naturalistic prose— which were based on positivism and scientism. Both drew heavily on the same French and German sources which were operating on Barrls. By the mid-1880's Baudelaire, Barbey d'Aurevilly, Hartmann, and Wagner were added to them.

With his literary powers tempered by these decadent fires of the

Latin Quarter, Harris felt strong enough to launch a monthly review in

November, 1884, probably through the generosity of his allowance. The review, Les Taches d*Encre. got under way with sandwich-men whose boards read, "Morin no longer reads Les Taches d'Encre." In a cause celebre.

Morin, who had insulted his fellow deputy Clovis Hugues, had just been murdered by Madame Hugues. In spite of such morbid ingenuity the review folded after four issues. Yet, its pages reveal Barres' debt to nine­ teenth-century German thought, the French romantic republicans, and the decadence of the Latin Quarter of the 1880's. All of these merge into an embryonic super-individualism, which will mark the later BarrIs, but without the later Harris chauvinistic nationalism.

Les Taches d'Encre. as one of the first symbolist reviews, added much to BarrIs' rapid rise in that movement. More than that, however, it gives us insights with respect to the intellectual formation of BarrIs, particularly how he would shape his emerging political position. In this 11 regard, Barres first sought to establish himself as a symbolist and de­ cadent rebel against the fin de siecle philistine society. In his very first sentences he wrote: "It seems to me that the mode of the day sacrifices a little too much the study of superior spirits to that of mean humanity. I gladly esteem with others that there is no drama more interesting than the concourse of ideas in the mind of a sage, artist, or philosopher. . . . All is vain, all is futile aside from what touch­ es our ego (moi). "That great indolent people which cares for nothing aside from the unseizable shadows of its dreams," was not nearly as great an object for artistic concern as the magnification of the self, the dis­ covery and. fulfillment of the artist's inner spirit. Here, with symbolism as the catalyst, Barres separated himself from the current mainstream of

French literature and life. Yet, his rebellion was only an artistic one, indeed, almost indulgent toward a society which, he believed, would eventually see the error of its ways. However, he felt more distress over the young and attacked the Parisian student organizations because they bred conformity. He believed this conformity was encouraged by the lycees, where the ideas of Littrd and Renouvier had recently become offi­ cial doctrine. They, more than the student associations, thwarted indi­ vidualism and were products of "this Jacobinism which everywhere sacri­ fices the individual to the mass."^1

Secondly, Les Taches d'Encre showed the attitude of Barres toward

Germany and nationalism. His review of the Voyage au pays des milliards

^Maurice Barres, "Psychologie Contemporaine," Les Taches d' Encre, November $, 1881+, pp. 1 and 2. The quotation which immediately follows also comes from this article.

^Maurice Barres, Les Taches d'Encre, January, l88£, p. i+8. 12 by V ictor T issot revealed a deep attachm ent to Germany which comes as a particular surprise to those who think of Barrfes as an uncompromising hater of Germany. In criticizing Tissot for fanning the flames of French resentment of the 1870 defeat and for calling the German spirit totally m aterialistic and beneath French contempt, Barrfes exhibited no trauma over the events of 1870, feeling, as Claude Digeon points out, that they were hidden by the "vague fog" of his youth. This was in sharp contrast to his mature attitude, generally accepted at face value, that the memory of the Bavarian hussars herding him into the local school indelibly marked on him a lifelong Germanophobia. On the contrary, Digeon adds,

Barr&s asked only for a readjustment of the frontiers, and his urgent in siste n c e on ju s tic e fo r Germany was hardly "the h ab itu al language of 7 revanchard patriots." Yet, in criticizing Tissot's handling of the German spirit, Barres singled out for special consideration a man of that point of view, namely, Paul D^roulfede, head of the most revanchard organization, the League of Patriots, and poet of the Chants du soldat. "We hardly love the warlike poems of M. D^roulSde," Barrfes wrote, but only because they are second-rate poetry. Nevertheless, Barrfes continued,

i f h is chauvinism appears cumbersome to some, i f h is League of Patriots seems a little too noisy to others, no one at any rate can doubt his disinterestedness .... He praised France, and he believed enough in it not to deprecate the enemy. We will go to th e end. We say Great France and Germany a ls o . Moreover, whatever be the moments of politics, three peoples guide civili­ zatio n in th is century; F rance, Great B rita in , Germany a lso . And it would be an irreparable loss for all if one of these flames disappeared. Humanity would stagger .... We have intellectual fathers in all countries. Kant, Goethe, and Hegel have rights on the first floor among us.8 7 Digeon, pp. 404-406. g Maurice Barr&s, "Un Mauvais Franjaiss M. Victor Tissot," Les Taches d 'E n cre. November 5* 1884, P« 31* 13 Very early, then, Barr&s distinguished between the intellectual and the p o litic a l.

These two themes of Les Taches d’Encre. patriotism and the deca­ dent reaction to existing society, were most important in shaping the emerging political position of its editor. In the years immediately fol­ lowing the failure of his short lived journal, he continued developing them in a series of novels under the heading le Culte du moi, and in var­

ious Paris journals, such as Le Voltaire,-a very sophisticated and repub­ lican daily. These columns showed in Barres a continuing admiration for

German c u ltu re and a growing apprehension of German p o litic s . Caught up

in the veritable Wagner cult which made such a great impact on the sym­

bolists and inspired a Revue Wagn^rienne, Barr&s even journeyed to Bayreuth

in 1886 and 1887. In writing of his 1887 trip, Barrfes concluded that

German animosity toward France was far deeper than it had been the pre­

vious year. "In recent years," he wrote, "I found a sentiment I would

describe as made of envy and bonhomie rather than of hate. Today all

that has changed. I am assured, however, that a Frenchman is still able

to travel in Bavaria without vexations; I admit that, but according to 9 th e mood I saw, most of Germany has become im possible fo r u s." However,

this would have been the observation of almost any traveler in the after-

math of the SchnaebelS Affair, the war scare in 1887 arising out of the

German arrest of a French border official and go-between for French spies

in Alsace-Lorraine. These articles also reflect an admiration for Napo­

leon I, an admiration gained from reading Stendhal.^ Such a respect was

^Maurice Barr&s, "En Allemagne," Le Voltaire. October 19, 1887.

^Maurice Barr&s, "En Entretien de Bonaparte," ibid., October 5, 1887. solely patriotic. It no more converted Barr&s into a political Bona- partist, a party still strong in France, than a trip to the Invalides would convert the average tourist. They reflected little of the anti-

Semitism which marked so much of French nationalism. For example, Bar- rhs regretted the death of banker James de Rothschild and the passing of

his salon.^ Indeed, these articles reflected no overwrought nationalism.

They exhibited a fairly conventional patriotism, consistent with the re­

publican policy of Le Voltaire. Generally, they merely acted as spring­

boards into literary criticism. In one of them, Barres displays his

lack of excitement and enthusiasm for the rising Dostoyevsky cult, say- 12 ing that Dostoyevsky simply had read his Stendhal. In this Barr&s

combined his patriotic theme with his decadent one to attack naturalism,

urging that French writers should stop aping the Russian novelists and

return to the spirit of Stendhal and Balzac, as did Dostoyevsky, and

look inside their characters. In another article, Barr&s contended that

the "historians of the scientific method," such as Taine, Sorel, and La-

visse, "will more serve to reawaken the national spirit than will the ef-

forts of our most affected 'patriots' [nos patriotes les plus affich^s]." 13

Here was little enthusiasm for the professional patriot which so marks

nationalism.

Yet, contemporaneous with these articles were others which do

give an insight into why the patriotic feeling of Barrfes would be directed

■^Maurice Barr&s, "Un salon ferm£," ibid., September 7* 1386.

"^Maurice Barrfes, "Dostoiewski," ibid., July 10, 1886. 13 Maurice Barrfes, "Les Historiens en 1887," ibid., December 16, 1887. toward the nationalism which marked his entry into politics. In spite

of his intellectual sensibilities and disdain for the "barbarian" mob, he came to accept a love of country geared to the irrational and emo­

tional. He illustrated this in an article he published on Bastille Day

in 1886. The sentimental pap which the Marseillaise passes off for pa­

triotism, he wrote, becomes real patriotism simply because it stirs the

mob who sings it. It does that just as "words of love, which each day

become more banal and prostituted, appear sublime to lovers if they say

them with accents of sincerity."^ On another occasion Barrfes was re­

pelled by the bad verse of a patriotic music hall song. Yet, he was

moved by its saccharin, because of its effect on a rapt soldier audience.

The whole episode caused him to toast the a r m y and forget the tinsel at-

mosphere of the song and cabaret. 15 Barrfes could feel the exhilaration

of being caught up in the mob. Such a feeling explains why this ivory-

tower intellectual, two years later could go before the "barbaric" work­

ing class at Nancy to win their votes for an anti-intellectual national­

istic movement. Barrfes later recalled that at the time of his first

plunge into politics, he had "profoundly enjoyed the instinctive pleasure

of being in a herd.These examples illustrate the relation of deca­

dence to his politics. The shallowness of these patriotic songs was only

a surface reality. Their inner meaning, their true reality, was expressed

in the way they fulfilled the consciousness of the mob. Perhaps Barres

^Maurice Barr&s, "Les chansons du 14 juillet," ibid., July 14* 1886. ■^Maurice Barr&s, "La Chanson en province," ibid., October 19* 1887. "^Quoted by Jean Dietz, "Les Debuts de Maurice Barr&s dans la v ie p o litiq u e ," La Revue hebdomadaire. August 16, 1931* 275* 16 saw that he could vicariously magnify his own ego, could heighten his own sensations, by empathizing with this barbarian crowd.

I l l

These symbolist ideas of Barrfes—sensitive, impetuous, colorful, if not too original—climaxed in 1887-1888 with the writing of his first novel,

Sous l'o eil de3 barbares (1888). As they did, the thought of Barrls headed on a disaster course which led him first to the verge of a nervous breakdown and then to a plunge into politics. In the novel, wrote Rend

Lalou, Barrls "relates the violent birth of a personality,11 that of Phil­ ippe, the hero and, indeed, Harris himself.

"The whole book is Philippe's struggle to maintain himself among the barbarians who wish to bend him to their image." The ego is the one reality, since it creates the universe. Whosoever opposes the free growth of a being is unpardonable. To the ego which seeks itself all weapons are permitted, scorn being the most effective. Is this the assertion of an unrestrained indi­ vidualism? No, for this right really to live involves a sacred duty. There is an imperious necessity to find oneself. The generation of which Barris was the spokesman rebels against the pseudo-scientific idea that thinking can be done wholesale and collectively. Each must show himself irreducible to the rest. The hero of Sous l'o eil des Barbares does not yet succeed in reconciling action, his desire for ideology and his taste for "feeling the pulse of the emotions." His individualism has no intention of being anarchy. He aims at Goethe's serenity. He rarely attains these heights. He weakens, loses his footing, acknowledges his fatigue, his fear. At times he seems about to founder in that dilettante nihilism, probably the one tempt­ ation ahich seriously threatened Barrls' thought. He capitu­ lates in silence: "Would our words, which are imprints of ef­ forts, evoke the furtive felicity of this soul in dissolution, happy because it feels only as little as possible."^

Here, for Barrls as for the hero, Philippe, a man could find reality and fulfillment only in himself, not in the crowd. Only in the ivory-tower

17Renl Lalou, Contemporary French Literature (London, 1925), pp. 63-64. 17 could a man master himself and become truly strong. However, saying this was one thing and doing it another. The novel raised more prob­ lems than it solved, for both Barr&s and Philippe. As Barres wrote, he discovered that detachment from the world increasingly proved to be an intellectual dead end. The Self must be fully developed, but the Self alone could not provide enough nourishment for its growth.

In other words, Barrfes came to a crisis period in his life and thought much like the one he portrayed in a later novel, Les D6racin£s

(1897)* His heroes, seven young Lorrainers like himself, had been up­ rooted from their local traditions by a positivist and neo-Kantian edu­ cation. Adrift in Paris, their education did not equip them to put down new roots for their individual self-fulfillm ent. New roots could be found, Barrfes insisted, only by maintaining ties with the native place and its traditions and people. Like his young heroes, Barr&s rebelled against the conventions of his education and society. However, the in­ dividualistic rebellion of symbolism neither prepared Barrfes for solving the problems raised in this, the first novel of his Culte du moi, nor for winning acceptance in the artistic world. His efforts to establish a re­ view, Les Taches d'Encre. had not succeeded; his literary criticism had earned him only a bare existence; his novels were yet to be widely ac­ claim ed. Moreover, by 1887 the sym bolist movement which nourished him was under wide attack in almost all the press and the literary journals under the influence of Jules Lemaitre, Ferdinand Brunetiere, and Anatole

France. The campaign had been particularly vicious in La Revue bleue and had greatly offended Barres and other symbolists Critics had increased their ire when symbolists wrote in prose which was universally denounced 18 for its incomprehensibility and obscurity, its gnarled diction and syntax, and i t s ivory-tow er d isd a in fo r th e mob. B arres him self was named as one of a group with "the same objective: a refined and sickly incoherence 18 which causes one to fear for their reason if they linger in their ways."

Add to this his feeling that he was being crushed by the entire world of barbarians, that world of businessmen, politicians, and thinkers who made up the crass, herd-like society the symbolists rejected.

With all this bearing in on him at one time in the winter of 1887-

1888, Barrfes underwent one of his periodic nervous collapses. His exhaus­ tion and depression drove him first to Lorraine and then to Venice. Under the therapeutic Italian sun, the uncertainties of his work and life reached solution, the loose ends of his thinking drew together. He saw that the

Self, surrounded by barbarians, must become part of a greater Self, as in

Hartmann's Unconscious. It had to identify with something greater than i t s e l f or i t would become s t e r i l e . The road ahead became c le a r to Barrfes, a road he took in the second Gulte du moi novel, Un Homme libre (1889):

To grow, the ego must feed on a race and a locale, with which it can feel communion. More than t h a t , however, the ego must "understand th e soul of the human masses [of this locale] which neither know nor posses themselves, being [like the individual ego] . . . governed, swept away by instinctive fo rc e s." 19 Barrfes found th is communion w ith a lo c a le and a people in

Venice and Lorraine in the winter of 1887-1888. He decided that if he was to fu lfill his ego, driven as it was by the unconscious, he must turn

Auguste Marcade in Le Figaro*s literary supplement, September 8, 1888. Quoted in Kenneth Cornell, The Symbolist Movement (New Haven, 1951), P. 73. 19 Henri Mi&rille, La Pens6e de Maurice Barrfes (Paris, 1934), P* 57. 19 outward, not inward* outward toward a "suffering and instinctive people," 20 also driven by the Unconscious. By loving them, working with them, shaping them, he could magnify both them and himself. Barrfes had reached a turning point. His literary and psychological crisis demanded contact with the people and the classic way for such involvement for a French man of letters, following the example of Chateaubriand, Hugo, and Lamartine, was politics. It was into politics that Barres felt he must go in order to fulfill, like them, the Self.

IV

At the very time his intellectual and artistic development demanded political involvement, a political movement appeared which perfectly suited the needs of Barres: the politics of the brav1 gdnSral, Georges Ernest

Boulanger. Sybil, of La Revue bleue, a journal which had carried on an un­ relenting campaign against the symbolist writers, later observed that it 21 was logical for this literary decadent to adhere to a decadent politics.

The observation was more apt than ita author could have imagined, for

Boulangism was, indeed, decadent—mystical, obscure, irrational, com­

pletely against conventional political parties. Moreover, Boulangism was attacked by the orthodox politicians of that same barbarian world which was crushing Barres and the decadents. Because of their mutual

enemy, Barr&s and Boulangism were made for each other. From Venice, Bar- r&s sent an article to La Revue Indgpendante. entitled, "M. le gdn^ral

2 0 Digeon, pp. 418-419* ^Syiiil, "Croquis parlementaires: M. Maurice Barrfes," La Revue bleue, November 23, 1889, PP* 641-644* 20 Boulanger et la nouvelle g&iSration," which was published in the April,

1888, issue. In it, Barres gave his adherence to the politics of the

G eneral.

The 1885 legislative elections had thrust Boulanger into politics.

These elections saw the massive Opportunist and Left Republican majority,

which had been created in the late 1870’s, broken by the increase of Con­

servative and Radical representation. This was a result, first, of the

general economic slump following the 1882 crash of the Union g£n|rale,

a Catholic bank founded to offset the Rothschild interests and, secondly,

of Catholic and Radical resentment over the anti-clerical education laws

and imperialist policy, respectively, of Jules Ferry, the principal Opn-

portunist leader, whose fall had precipitated the 1885 elections. In the

new Chamber of Deputies the Opportunists discovered that they could form

a government only with Radical or Conservative support. In the first

major cabinet change after the elections, the formation of the Charles

Freycinet government on 7 January, 1886, Clemenceau and the Radicals suc­

ceeded in getting Clemenceau’s old friend, Boulanger, named war minister. Boulanger soon proved to the Radicals that their trust had not

been misplaced. Within a month he was questioned in the Chamber for

transferring a cavalry brigade holding ardently royalist views. To his

royalist antagonist Boulanger replied, "I pose . . . the simple ques­

tion: Are we, yes or no, in a republic? (Loud applause at the Left)."

When the interpellator said, "I let the army judge," Boulanger an­

swered, "As long as I am its head, the army will not judge; it will

obey." 22 Several months later, when he sent troops to the strike at pp Quoted in A. Dansette, Le Boulangisme (Paris, 1946), p. 28. 21 DScazeville, he had told the soldiers to take no side in the dispute, but to share their soup and bread with the strikers. Through his dramatiza­ tion of the reforms initiated by his predecessors, such as the reduction of the length of service from five to three years with no exemptions for rich sons or priests and the adoptions of better agricultural leaves and the Lebel magazine rifle, the army recovered its confidence and morale for the first time since Sedan. The troops, according to one observer, felt bold enough to wear their k£pis cocked over one eye. Boulanger got the credit for these improvements.

However, the activity of the minister soon became disturbing.

Without consulting the prime minister, Boulanger relieved seven officers of royal blood from their commands. At the Bastille Day review of 1886, a custom Boulanger reinstituted, the troops turned their hearia right toward Boulanger instead of left toward President Gr^vy, and the crowd shouted1 Vive Boulangerl far more than it cheered the President of the Re­ public. Music hall composers wrote songs celebrating the brav1 g£n&ral.

Early in 1887 Bismarck, determined to insure a majority in the next par­ liamentary elections large enough to pass his seven-year army b ill, and worried because the French war minister had survived the fall of the

Freycinet cabinet, attacked Boulanger in the Reichstag for making too many revanchist noises. A few months later, during the Schnaebel^ Af­ fair, Boulanger demanded immediate mobilization, and when Bismarck freed

Schnaebeld, French chauvinists were convinced that Boulanger was the

only Frenchman who would stand up to the German Chancellor. The music

halls now sang of General Revanche. Maurice Barrfes, returning from Italy

through Nancy, was caught up enough into the fervor engendered . / 22 by Boulanger to "write, "The sentiment rises daily in everyone that 23 France is sworn to master her fate."

Faced with Boulanger's popularity, insubordination, and warlike threats, the Opportunists were determined to get rid of him and seized the first excuse to overturn the government and form a cabinet without him. With Radical cooperation dependent on Boulanger's inclusion in the new cabinet, the Opportunists for the first time in the history of the republic turned to the royalist parties which offered support if the cab­ inet dropped its anti-clericalism and Boulanger, the persecutor of the princes in the army. The war minister of this new government appointed

Boulanger commander of the 13th Army Corps, stationed at Clermont-Ferrand,

On July S, 1887, a mob chanting "Vive Boulanger'" and "We must prevent the exile of the general" halted rail traffic for hours trying to keep Boulan- ger from leaving Paris. The Bonapartist character of this demonstration ended once and for all the support of Clemenceau: the general's popularity 25 "wounded his pride and alarmed his republicanism." Boulanger had become too popular for Clemenceau to control; moreover, the discovery of a fawning letter to the Due d'Aumale in 1880 revealed Boulanger's opportunism and political ambiguity.

Although Boulanger was safely in the provinces and opposed by Op­ portunists, royalists, and Clemenceau's Radicals, he appeared finished.

Yet, so many disgruntled politicians were in touch with him and continued

23Maurice Barr&s, "Les F ra n ja is ma.lgr£ eu x ," Le V o lta ire . May 25, 1887. ^■Jacques Chastenet, Histoire de la Troisieme R^publique (Paris, 1952-1961), II, 191. 25 Dansette, p. 96. 23 to publicize his exploits that observers began to speak of Boulangism by the end of 1887. However, as Dansette points out, it was more accurate to speak of the "m ultiplicity of Boulangisms." The Boulangism of Boulan­ ger was very simple: he was willing to use any political friend and al­ most any means to return to the war ministry. For the other Boulangisms, it was a more complex story. Only by looking at them can Boulangism, and what it meant to Barres, be discovered.

One of these Boulangisms was originated by Henri de Rochefort, a

Second Empire Jacobin, Communard, Blanquist, and violent opponent of the

Opportunists, a term he coined. His Jacobin nationalism and Blanquist revolution-for-revolution's sake made him see Boulanger, the protector of strikers and enemy of the royalists and Bismarck, as the vehicle for a nationalist social revolution. Rochefort publicized the General's chau­ vinism and working-class sympathies in his widely-read personal journal,

1 'Intransigeant, and was one of the key figures in the demonstration when

Boulanger left Paris.

The German war scare of 1887 created another Boulangism, led by

Paul Dfiroulede. After the fall of Gambetta, in whom he had placed a ll his revanchist faith, D^roulede founded the League of Patriots to revive the dying revanchist spirit in France through military and patriotic education and the consolidation of all patriots, regardless of party. The league had national and local committees and a newspaper, Le Drapeau, with the masthead, "Who goes there? France." When Boulanger became war minister in 1886, Dferoulede threw his league behind the general's army reforms and tough talk to Bismarck which, D^roulede believed, made a revanche really

possible. The League of Patriots played a major role in the demonstration for Boulanger at the Bastille Day review in 1886. 24 A third Boulangism consisted of those men of the extreme Left and Radicalism, who refused to follow the lead of Clemenceau. One of them, Alfred Naquet, whose Radicalism had caused him to sponsor the di­ vorce law and turn against Gambetta for being too conservative, believed that the Third Republic was finished. No rSgime since 178y had lasted longer than eighteen years. The 1885 elections and the Wilson Scandal were, to him, symptomatic of decline. His solution was to use Boulanger to provoke a political and constitutional crisis and use it to transform

France into a republic on the American model. Other Radicals, many of whom s a t a t the extreme L eft of the Chamber of Deputies as a groupe ouvri&re, concluded after the 1885 elections that Radicalism1s credo of anti-clericalism , social reforms, and suppression of the Senate would never triumph through strictly parliamentary means. Boulanger coula be a vehicle for them, too. This concxusion led to a break between Clemen­ ceau and several deputies; Georges Laguerre, the fiery defense attorney for Peter Kropotkin, the anarchist leader, and the striking miners of

Montceau-les-Mines and D€cazevillej Charles Laisant, a hater of the par­ liamentary regime who eventually became an anarchist; Jean Baptiste Saint-

Martin, a biographer of both Mirabeau and Raspail; and Jean Turigny, an old victim of Louis Bonaparte's 1851 coup d1gtat and fighter of forty years standing for a Radical republic. Also coming to Boulangism were the old Gambettist, Francis Laur, whose book Mine aux mineurs made him the parliamentary champion of mine reforms, and Ren6 Le H6riss6, whose intran­ sigent royalism even had caused him to rally to a Spanish Bourbon instead of Orleans after the death of Chambord. Although he had turned to Radi­ calism in 1886 as the wave of the future, Le HSrissS was useful in later negotiations between the Radical-Boulangists and his old friends, the royalists. Less socialistic than Rochefort and the Blanquist-Boulangists and more socialistic than D^roulede, these Radicals rallied to Boulanger as the only instrument capable of instituting a social republic. Consti­ tutional change under Boulanger would be the medium.

Boulangism's strength lay in the fact that in their faith in

Boulanger irreconcilables like Rochefort, the enti-Clemenceau Radicals, and D6roul£de could be reconciled. In 1886, for example, DSroulede sought

Rochefort's support for a Russian alliance. Horrified at the thought of an alliance with an autocrat, Rochefort replied, "You ask me to deny my past." "Your past!" admonished D6roul&de. "Your past is France mutilated, its provinces lost, Alsace and Lorraine violated. When it is a matter of changing all that, what is the past to you and me."^ Following this logic both men came together to support a Russian alliance, because it was the only way German num erical s u p e rio rity over France could be o ffs e t and to accept Boulanger as an agent for achieving their ambitions. In like man­ ner, by 1887j the various Boulangisms, often with considerable reserva­ tions, adopted each other's programs so that something called Boulangism emerged throughout France, built on the clientele of these various Bou- langist lieutenants and Boulanger's nationwide popularity, to stand for

dissolution of the parliament, constitutional revision through a consti­

tuent assembly, sweeping social reforms, and a vigorous foreign policy.

A series of events in 1887-1888 brought the royalists to Boulangism,

Some of them came to Boulangism when the Wilson Scandal—the discovery that

Daniel Wilson, a deputy and son-in-law of President Grdvy, had used his

^Jero m e and Jean Tharaud, l a Vie e t l a mort de D&roul&de (Paris, 19^5), p. 47. 26 contacts at the Chamber and Elys€e for influence-peddling—drove Gr£vy from office, brought in Sadi Carnot, and in late 1887 renewed the old Rad­ ical-Opportunist alliance. Some royalists, seeing the end of their alliance with Opportunism and hoping that the prestige of Boulanger might rally the army, whose officer corps was full of royalists, behind a coup d1 dtat. now saw in Boulanger an instrument for restoring the throne or, at least, for establishing a strong Catholic and rightist regime. Boulanger, who was negotiating with anyone who could give him back the war ministry, let them believe he was their man, and in December, 1887, Baron de Mackau, parlia­ mentary leader of the Union des Droits, came to court Boulanger and a jour­ nalist secretly conducted the General to Jerome Napol4onv Most royalists, however, remained unconvinced until events of the spring, 1888, proved the popularity of Boulanger. With money from an old friend, Count Dillon,

Boulanger woo 55>000 votes in seven parliamentary by-elections at the end of February. By March, a Paris newspaper, I*i Cocarde, was founded with the Boulangist program of "Dissolution, Revision, and Constituant" and titling itself, "organe boulangiste." At another by-election in the Aisne on March 25, Boulanger, now out of the army, won first victory against a royalist and a Radical. He won again in the rural Dordogne and industrial

Nord, both of which had gone Opportunist in 1885, on a Boulangist platform and without a local organization or newspaper.

The surprising victories of this so-called plebiscite campaign once and for all brought the royalists into Boulangism. They saw that two-thirds of the Boulangist voters of 1888 had been conservative in 1885. The con­ servative vote of 1885 had been a protest vote, and now this protest vote was going to Boulanger. If the royalists continued their alliance with 27 the Opportunists against Boulanger, the republic would be consolidated permanently upon the defeat of Boulangerj if Boulanger were victorious, the conservatives would not profit from it. Seeing no other alternative, the royalists joined Boulangism and increasingly financed the movement, but never captured it. The Boulangist National Republican Party, formed after the Nord election, always kept the Radical Boulangists in the lead­ ership. Even after the 1889 elections Dgroulede said to the royalist

Arthur Meyer, "You still come trying to remove Boulanger from us. You will not succeed. Boulanger is ours. Seek elsewhere for a bridge be- 27 tween the republic and monarchy." Even the source of the campaign funds were more or less hidden from the Boulangist republican rank and f i l e .

V

The success of the plebescite campaign coincided with the formal conver­ sion of Barrgs to Boulangism. It took the form of the article he sent from Venice to La Revue indgpendante. the principal organ of the symbol­

ists. In a frank appeal to the younger generation of writers to join

him in rejecting the parliamentary republic and embracing Boulanger,

Barr&s wrote:

I would have a great effect if I could bring to my side several of those who will be at one with the France near at hand, a France which impatiently endures the parliamentary tumult and aspires to find the man of vigor f11homme fort] who will open the windows, throw the babblers out of them, and air out the p lace.

^Arthur Meyer, Ce que mes yeux ont vu (Paris, 1911)* p. 88.

^Maurice Barr&s, "M. le ggngral Boulanger et la nouvelle gg- ngration," La Revue indgpendante, April, 1888, pp. 55-56. 28

Like all "honest men," Barres hoped for "the man elected by popular in- 29 stinct." "Since Gambetta," he added, "General Boulanger is the only

clear-sighted man of all those vino have risen to power.

Until the appearance of this article there is, interestingly e- nough, not one hint in the writings of Barres that he was attracted to

Boulanger. Only once did he even mention the existence of the General,

and then only to use a Boulangist song as an excuse to praise the army.

His conversion to Boulangism, then, becomes a problem of motivation.

From his pre-1888 writings it is clear that he did not become a Boulangist

for the reasons others did. Never did he give any evidence of the poli­

tics of Naquet and Laguerre, the social concerns of Rochefort and the

groupe ouvriere, the nationalism of Deroulede, or the royalism of the con­

servative Boulangists. Indeed, his pre-1888 writings show no political

or social awareness at all. To be sure he was patriotic ana feared Ger­

many. But even here his views were so commonplace that had they been

his motivation for becoming politically engage, he would have been led

into conventional Opportunist of Radical politics. However, as we have

seen by 1887 he rejected the entire culture for which Opportunism-Rad-

icalism stood. In short, he became politically engage because the intell­

ectual dead end of the Culte du Moi made it a compelling necessity for him.

He chose Boulangism s o le ly because i t attack ed h is enemy: th e O p portunist-

Radical parliamentary agents ox the "barbarians." He agreed with De­

roulede who wrote, "I am of the party of the disgusted, and they are

29Ibid., p. 57.

3°Ibid., p. 59. 29 numerous. It is with this rubric that we can line up all of France."^"

Unlike D€roulede, however, Barr&s was an intellectual degout£, and on that disgust he hung his entire argument in "M. le glndral Boulanger et la nouvelle g6n6ration." "I have confidence," he wrote, "that my country w ill know how to escape the tide of barbarians which covers and dirties itj but involving ourselves in public affairs is now a prime redemption for us, the young men, pushed aside by the interests and tricks of the vulgar band which exploits our elders and which will know how to bring 32 down." He saw himself and other young men of his age "sensitive and disoriented," "in sad isolation," in a world controlled by barbarians and vulgarity. Such a conviction doubtless grew out of the belief that there was a veritable conspiracy against symbolism. The decadent assault on the barbarians and the vulgarity of a mass driven forward by popular

optimistic positivism had not gone unchallenged. The public and poli­ ticians had remained indifferent to the poetry of the symbolists, but

they objected to their novels, believing that the pessimism and individual

isolation of the works were decadent in the sense that they debilitated

rather than revived the nation. When he experienced the massive attack

against symbolism, accompanied as it was by his emotional and intellectual

■^"Dansette, p. 139. Italics in original.

3 Barres, "M. le g5n5ral Boulanger et la nouvelle g£n£ration," p. 56. This is a fairly free rendering of the original: "J'ai confiance que mon pays connaitra d'^chapper au flot de bar bares qui le recouvre et le salit; mais, sortir de nous-memes pour prendre gout & la chose publique, ce nous est dfija un premier relevement pour nous, jeunes gens, qu'ont re- pouss6 it l'6cart les intSrets et les artifices de la bande vulgaire qui exploits nos ain£s et que nous saurons r^duire." The article's style al­ most defied comprehension. Indeed, Barres rewrote the article for Le Fi­ garo, May 19, 1888, under the title "La Jeunesse Boulangiste," so that a larger audience could understand it. The following analysis of Barr&s conversion to Boulanger is based on both articles. crisis which gave birth to the Oulte du moit Barrfes came to only one con­ clusion: The barbarian mob, buttressed by the established literary cri­ tics, and had behind it a parliamentary regime which attacked the decadents openly, and which perpetuated the intellectual climate the decadents so despised. Thus, for Barres an intellectual revolt against the barbarians, as in the Gulte du moi, became a political revolt against the parliamentary regime, which supported barbarism, and particularly against the parlia­ mentary parties, the Opportunists and Radicals.

Barres then proceeded against Parliament on two fronts. Most ob­ vious to him was the Parliament's complete rejection of intellectuality.

According to him the deputies were inclined to "hate, maltreat, and pro- 23 scribe" the intellectual aristocracy. He pointed this out especially in the ignoring by parliament of Jules Simon's abilities, the exile of

J. J. Weiss [the conservative foreign policy advisor of Gambetta) to a provincial library, the non-recognition of the university talents of

Louis Menard and Jules Soury. With this attitude toward contemporary thinkers, the politicians had the arrogance to misquote and warp the great liberal writers of the past, men like Voltaire, Diderot, and Hugo whose ideas had created the Third Republic. Even the politicians who did value the intellectual aristocracy, and there were such men in all parties, were unable to be effective because of parliamentary intrigues and quarrels. The best, men in Parliament were sacrificed in governmental turnovers and party victories. "When [politicians] organize themselves in groups for the priest," Barr&s wrote,

•^Maurice Barr&s, "La Jeunesse Boulangiste," Le Figaro, May 19, 1888. 31 when they commend, themselves in vassalage to the most mali­ cious among themselves, when tney go even farther and pro­ voke a thousand petuy quarrels, create intrigues, and, using cunning with sincerity, impassion the country with futilities until sick: there is the infany of which they are the of­ fenders ana which must cease. If we recognize that there are [in Parliament] men of value, such as MM. de Mun, Pelle- tan, ttibot, Simon, ana Spuller and a very few others we re­ cognize as true intellectuals, as spirits we honor, we are obliged to recognize that, drowned intthe parliamentary flood, they are impotent to use the gifts Providence sure did not lavish on them for squandering in the vain agitation of mediocrity S*

In other words, it wqs not enough to "chase the rascals out," for new rascals would come in. Since 1870, Barres felt, several hundred

"inexhaustible lawyers" and "ridiculous writers" had dominated Parlia­ ment, had formed themselves into a new aristocracy by using politics to make their fortunes and to perpetuate themselves and their families. By serving their self-interest these political aristocrats had endangered the country. They c o n sisten tly deluded the e le c to ra te and kept them­ selves in power by calling themselves the successors to the heroes of

•93 and the martyrs of the Bastille and of December 2, 18$1. To Barres they only showed the depths to which they would stoop. With such a system it was impossible to work within existing parties, for the system itself was corrupting. Wo matter how idealistic a new deputy would be, he would, have to compromise himself when he joined the "villainous men" of the multi-party Chamber and its perpetual intrigues and governmental coalitions and falls.

In such a situation, Barres was certain that Boulanger was the only answer, that Boulanger was convinced that changes were needed and

^Barres, "M. le g£n£ral Boulanger et la nouvelle glnlration," pp. 60-61. he had the youth necessary to put such new ideas into circulation. More than that, he was sympathetic to artists. Barrfes naively assured his fellow decadents tnat Boulanger was "of our race, in the large sense of that beautiful word." With Boulanger in power, "we will forget the years in which we lived in humiliation and isolation, among the obscure circle which guided the stupid free-thinkers, bureaucrats [chefs de bureau!, and charlatans [v£t£rinaires]."35 For Barres, then, "Boulanger represents the opposition to the parliamentary regime. Through Boulanger—who alone is capable of this audacity today—will disappear these barbarians, so decidedly decried among honest Frenchmen of any caste."

35Ibid., p. 59.

3^Ibid.. p. 60. CHAPTER II

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1889

During his emotional distress of 1887-1888, Barres had decided on political involvement as a way to free his Self from the cul de sac his

ivory-tower existence had led him. He had chosen to express this purely

intellectual political involvement in Boulangism because he believed only

a "man of vigor" like Boulanger could rid France of the parliamentary sys­

tem which represented and perpetuated the rule of those same "barbarians"

Barr&s and the decadents attacked. However, the year and a h a lf following

his joining Boulangism, which was to have little effect on the intellectual

community, saw him join the inner circle of Boulangism and accept without

question the ready-made program of its national committee and supporters

at Nancy where he conducted a successful campaign for a seat in the Chamber

of Deputies, Thus, by the end of 1889 Barres was a politician in a move­ ment he had not shaped, but which, instead, had taken him and determined

this, the first, stage of his political, ideas and career,

I

In 1888 the commitment of Barr&s to Boulangism had l i t t l e e ffe c t

on his fellow intellectuals, but it did take him into Boulangism, In turn,

the progress of the Boulangist movement in 1888 made Barres decide to

carry its cause to Nancy.

33 34 If Barres intended his appeal in La Revue indgpendante to touch off a wave of conversions among writers to Boulanger, he could not have been more disappointed. Paul Adam, a novelist whose literary and intel­ lectual development paralleled that of Barrfes in the 1880's and who joined

Barr&s in the 1889 campaign at Nancy, was the only significant writer to espouse the General.^- While Boulanger became increasingly a frequenter of the salons, the intellectual aristocracy remained aloof from him and continued to consider him more anti-intellectual than the barbarians Bar­ res despised. The intellectuals doubtless felt like Francis Magnard of

Le Figaro, who hardly expected Boulanger to make a pilgrimage to Bayreuth to hear Parsifal or read Verlaine just to please Barres. The General's artistic tastes were too ordinary for that. Indeed, said Magnard, Bou­ langer was f la tte r e d by the support Barrfes gave him in La Revue indgpen­ dante. but he did not understand the article. According to a story making the rounds, a friend of Barres offered to have him explain it. "No," re­ plied the General, "it is enough that M. Barres admires me. I will dis­ pense with his reasons for it." Magnard thought that the story was false, but that the failure of Barrfes to see through the General's intellectual shallowness illustrated "the sunstroke afflicting so many of the men who 2 support the hrav1 ggngral." Another Figaro writer almost a year later remarked th a t Barrfes1 appeal "was coldly welcomed by the 'r is in g genera­ tion, '" which felt that Boulanger was more interested in winning the votes

^Camile Mauclair, Paul Adam (1862-1920) (Paris, n.d.), passim. . and Claude Diggon, la Crise allemande de la pensge francaise. 1870-1914 (Paris, 1959), PP. 399-400. 'Trancis Magnard, "M. Maurice Barr&s," Le Figaro, May 11, 1888. 35 of the multitude than the votes of artists and that his soldier back- 3 ground put him against art and intellectuality. The article of Bar- rfes perhaps contributed to large student demonstrations for and against

Boulanger on April 21, shortly after the appearance of "M. le g£n£ral

et la nouvelle g&ifiration." The group most involved was the Association

g&ldrale des tStudiants. According to Le Figaro 1300 of its members were

against and 700 for the general.^ For Barr&s, taking everything in

stride, the motivation of the anti-Boulangist students was simple. “They dream of settling themselves some day at the bosom of the Parliament and 5 do not want that milk cow driven to the slaughterhouse."

Even though his adherence to Boulangism was largely ignored by the

audience to whom he addressed himself, Barres was welcomed into the Bou­

langist movement. To its very end Boulangism accepted all comers and Bar-

rfes was no exception. He joined the staff of La Presse, the official

newspaper of the movement, and wrote critical articles for it similar to

his writings for Le Voltaire, where he was no longer wanted. By December,

1888, his rise in the movement allowed him to speak briefly at a Boulangist

banquet in Nevers honoring the deputy, Jean Turigny.^

However, it soon appeared that Barrfcs had joined Boulangism just

as the movement began to decline. On June 4, amid frequent interruptions,

Boulanger spoke in the Chamber for a revision of the constitution to

3 Maurice de Fleury, "L'Opinion politique des artistes et des savants," ibid.. January 20, 1889.

^Ibid. . April 22, and 23, 1888.

^Maurice Barr&s, "La Jeunesse boulangiste," ibid., May 19, 1888.

^Adrien Dansette, Le Boulangisme (Paris, 1946), pp. 328-329. provide for the popular election of the president, a single-chamber le­ gislature with commissions, ministers drawn from outside the legislature and not responsible to it, and the referendum. Shortly afterwards, he surprisingly enough lost a duel against the elderly prime m inister, Charles

Floquet, who had replied to the speech in a personal attack on Boulanger.

Even the General’s magic with the voters appeared to be losing its touch when he was defeated in an Ardeche by-election called on the heels of

Floquet's brilliant victory with the foils. D6roulede also was defeated in Charente even though Boulanger told the voters, "A vote for DSroulfede is a vote for me." Moreover, in spite of victories in three later by- elections, the royalist alliance with left-wing Boulangism stood on a tightrope throughout 1888. In an anniversary celebration for a Boulangist victim of the December 2, 1851 coup of Louis Bonaparte, Boulanger pointed out that no royal son had succeeded his father in the 19th century. The general reversed himself a few days later by supporting a royalist candi­ date in a by-election in Ardennes. However, the National Committee de­ clared that no candidate could be called Boulangist unless he declared him­

self for a republic. When the royalists objected to this, reminding Bou­

langer of their heavy financial contributions to him, he reassured them,

told them of his difficulties with the committee, and reminded them of his

support for the Ardennes royalist. Naquet, Laisant, and other left-wing

Boulangists now really began to worry about the sources of the committee's

money, especially for the terrific expenses of the summer by-election

victories, and about the General's support of the Ardennes candidate.

They were not satisfied with the repeated claims of Count Dillon, the

party treasurer, that he furnished the money. Laisant made plans for a y i big rally which would have such a republican profession of faith that there would be no doubts, but he could not raise the money for it. The republican noises of these left-wing Boulangists caused Prince Jerome, the Bonapartist pretender, to break with the movement.

This decline and threatened breakup of the Boulangist alliance was prevented by the calling of a by-election in Paris, the most repub­ lican part of France. Boulanger had never won in an ardently republi­ can constituency, and he was up against a candidate who was backed by every shade of anti-Boulangist opinion from Radical to Opportunist. Yet, the government's determination to stop Boulangism at Paris could not have been more unwise. Elsewhere Boulanger had won through royalist money and the coalition of disgruntled Conservatives and .Radicals. But in Paris, and only in Paris, the left-wing Boulangists had real organization. Draw­ ing on the organizations of D6roul&de, Rochefort, Laguerre, and Le H6riss6, and Bonapartist-Plebescitist organs, the Boulangists established an effi­ cient electoral machine even on the arrondissement and quartier level. It had behind it the not inconsiderable Boulangist Paris press and 500,000 francs of the Duchesse d'Uzes money. Paris was the only place in France where the republican Boulangists were strong and they delivered the votes—

^45,236 for Boulanger against 162,875 for Edouard Jacques, the principal

opponent. On election night, January 2 7 , 1889, an enormous Boulangist mob surged around the cafd where its leaders were celebrating, shouting "A

]5£lys5e, a l'Elys£e." As the general's supporters urged him to follow the mob, he re p lie d , "Why do you wish th a t I should ille g a lly take power when

I am sure of being carried to it in six months by the unanimity of France.

^Maurice Barres, Mes Cahiers (Paris, 1929), I, 203. Nor would Boulanger follow the advice of Ddroulede that he go to the

Chamber th e next day, ask fo r d isso lu tio n and re v is io n , and, when i t was refused, leave and let D&roulede's leaguers enter. Several days later he asked D&roul&de, "What do they day?" "They say to them selves," re p lie d

D^roulede, "what is a broom which does not sweep." The General's repub­

lican upbringing was so deep that he could not forget the illegality of

the Second Empire, but the power he refused to take t}y force would not be given him at the polls.

II

These events—the royalist versus republican tensions within Bou­

langism, the emergence of a definite program of constitutional revision,

and the heady feeling after the Paris elections that victory was sure and

easy—left their mark on Barres and would be reflected in his own elec­

toral campaign of 1889. Preparation for that campaign began in December,

1888, in Nancy, where he sought to launch a Boulangist movement. In many

respects the situation in Nancy was auspicious for such an undertaking.

During 1888 Boulangist sentiment rose in Nancy as it did elsewhere

in France. It dated from the Schnaebel4 Affairs,. which had so greatly af­

fected Barr&s on his 1887 v isit. Anti-German excitement was given no

chance to abate during 1888. There were known to be German tro o p move­

ments around Nancy, which some observers feared threatened to provoke

frontier incidents. Le Progres de l'E st, Nancy's principal Opportunist

newspaper, discounted the importance of these, but Le Figaro was worked

up enough by them to run an entire series in August, 1888, on the military 39 situation around Nancy. The very reluctance of the Opportunist press to support revanchism. at such a time probably encouraged patriots to ex­ tremes. Nancy had a chapter of the League of Patriots, which undoubtedly was antagonized enough by the local Opportunists who controlled politics to identify itself with Boulanger. An indication of Boulangist strength appeared as early as spring, 1888. On April <16, anti-Boulangist students at the university, following the lead of their fellows at Paris, organized a demonstration against Boulanger. Thus aroused, Nancy Boulangists turned out 5,000 strong on April 27 in the Cours Leopold. The demonstration soon turned into a riot, spread over most of the city, and went on well into 9 the night before the police put it down.

Those of a left-wing persuasion in Nancy also gravitated more and more toward Boulanger during 1888. By December some Nancy Radicals, like a ll the Radical committees which joined Boulanger, had become disgusted with the failure of their party to deliver on its platform or to do more in Nancy than to assure Opportunist victories against the conservatives.

Their leader was Alfred Gabriel, a journalist of Blanquist leanings, whose role in the success of Barr&s in Nancy politics was to be decisive. He had run on the defeated 1885 Radical lis t, with its program of constitu­ tional revision, progressive income and corporation taxes, separation of church and state, and worker reform s.^ Throughout the 1889 campaign, in arguments which Barr&s would take as his own, Gabriel indisted that although

- Le Figaro. April 27 and 28, 1888. The estimate of 5,000 par­ ticipants is probably accurate. Le Figaro was not yet sympathetic to Boulanger at this time.

■^The background of Gabriel can be pieced together from Alphonse Bertrand, la Chambre de 1889 (Paris, 1889), p. 309 and various Gabriel speeches o f 1889* France had been a republic for twenty years , the necessary reforms had not materialized. Parliamentarianism, established by the monarchist framers of the 1875 constitution, had become only a pretext for booty and corruption.^ For years reformers had felt that success would follow the abolition of the undemocratic Senate, but the leaders of this strug­ gle for revision, Clemenceau1s Radicals, had abandoned this struggle in spite of their promises.^ Feeling this way, Gabriel turned to revolu­ tion: the people "has been eternally oppressed and duped byall the revo­ lutions, and in spite of that it believes in the revolution and wants it.

That is why the people are Boulangist. The destruction of the oppressor is the dream of the proletarian, the hungry and exploited of humanity." 13

Paul Adam, the novelist friend of Barr&s who campaigned with him at Nancy, later felt that Gabriel came to Boulangism because of its principle pf federalist reconciliation; that is , if there were local autonomy, left- wing strongholds could pass social reforms without having to wait for

France as a whole to be converted to reformism. Adam also held that Ga­

briel, with his program and following, almost single-handedly brought

over to Boulenger the metal workers of Frouard, Champigneulles, and Dom-

basle, the main working-class centers of Nancy.^ For an extreme left­

ist like Gabriel to be taken in by Boulangism was not unusual. Even Paul

^R^union r^visionniste a Frouard," Le Courrier de l >Est. Feb­ ruary 26, 1889. ^"Les Reunions revisionnistes," ibid., September 1, 1889.

"^Alfred Gabriel, "La Rgpublique nouvelle," ibid., April 7, 1889. ■^*Mauclair, 276. A daft1 s views appear in his preface-introduction to Francis Laur, Epoque boulangiste (Paris, 1914 )> reprinted as an ap­ pendix to Mauclair's biography, pp. 259-284. 40* Lafargue, the son-in-law of Karl Marx, leaned toward Boulangism for a- while until Friedrich Engels set him straight.15

In large part, the social and economic conditions of Nancy aided the political efforts of Gabriel and Boulangism. A virtual explosion of industrialization had followed the Treaty of Frankfurt (1871), which brought in many factories from Alsace-Lorraine and gave Nancy the fastest economic growth rate in France. In 1870, for example> Nancy had only five hosiery factories; by 1890 it had twenty-two and the domestic system had been ended. Other industries experienced similar growth so that Nancy was a center for tanning, brewing, textiles, clothing, pottery, and glass.

The key to Nancy's in d u s tr ia l economy was mining. The Nancy iro n ore basin, the area containing the constituency Gabriel won in 1889, pro­ duced 5^,460 tons of steel in 1888. The Thomas-Gilchrist process was just being introduced and had not yet ended the Nancy basin's predomi­ nance in iron ore production in eastern France. At the southern edge of

Nancy, the area containing the constituency Barres would win in 1889, was a major salt producing district which produced 400,000 tons in 189^. This rapid growth had given Nancy a population of 213,364 by 1891, with about

an equal number of patrons and ouvriers, by census classification. The rapid industrial growth, however, had also necessitated considerable im­

portation of workers so that the city had 29,788 foreigners. According

to Barres and Gabriel,, during the campaign, these foreign workers had

created social problems and depressed wages. With thirty-four parishes,

Nancy was overwhelmingly Catholic, but there was also one Protestant

■^Frederick Engels and Paul and Laura Lafargue, Correspondence, tra n s . Yvonne Kapp (3 v o ls .; Moscow, 1959), I I , passim. a church and six Jewish clergymen, a fact Barres was not to let the voters fo rg e t. Moreover, w hile th e economy boomed, th e re was a la g in s o c ia l reforms. This was illustrated by the weakness of the trade union move­ ment and the fact that there were only 1,546 students in secondary schools,

compared to the 66,957 in elementary ones. Thus, industrial growth had made Nancy a fertile field for a reformist political movement. The city's

large foreign element and proximity to Germany, particularly because of

the anti-German resentment of Alsacian employers and working-class re­

sentment against Belgian and Italian workers, had made it nationalistic.

The nationalism and reformism of left-wing Boulangism was made to order

for such a situation.^

At the end of 1888 some of the Nancy Boulangists asked Barres,

because of his Nancy origins and position on the foremost Boulangist

newspaper, to come to Nancy to sustain Boulanger's cause. Barr&s con­

fessed later that neither he nor Boulanger was very confident of the

General's chances in the east. The vagueness of Nancy Boulangism was il­

lustrated by the fact tnat in December, 1888, Gabriel tried to line up one

Radical-Revisionist who was to run against Barres in the 1889 elections.

It was also experienced by Barres and Paul Adam who came to Nancy to write

Boulangist articles for Paul Sordoillet's Le Courrier de la Meurthe-et-

Moselle. On January 1, 1889, this Opportunist newspaper suddenly became Boulangist, but, after four issues in this vein, it just as suddenly re­

verted to anti-Boulangism. Barres and Adam were dining in the country

■^"Meurthe-et-Moselle," La Grande Bncyclop^die (31 vols.j Paris, 1886-1902), XXIII, 828-845 and E. Eisenmenger, LasLorraine au travail (Paris, 1925), PP. 68, 78, 108, 117, 133-164, 170-190. 42 when Sordoillet returned to the office and substituted an article from

Le Temps for their Boulangist one. 17 Evidently Sordoillet had been caught up in what he thought was a revisionist, but not Boulangist cam­ paign. He told Barres, "Ah! I know you are very revisionist, but

Boulangist, who would have believed i t.11 18 A more likely explanation for. the behavior of Sordoillet was the financial instability of his news­ paper. Since spring, 1888, he had approached various parties in an ef- fort to sell it to them. 19

The temper of Nancy politics in 1889 can be partially adduced by looking at its press. Its two principal newspapers were Opportunist, which Gabriel contended stood for imperialism and "Tonkin, the peril of the Left, the crushing of the feeble by the strong . . . ; the organiza­ tion of a powerful bourgeois and atheistic oligarchy, keeping the church and catechism for the suffering people" so long as the church did not go

contrary to the state. They were, continued Gabriel, "republican for the privileged only, anti-democratic and anti-social for the mass of the nation." Next in importance was the D£p6che, which alternately called itself progressiste, at this time somewhere between the Opportunists and

Radicals, and Radical. It attacked with equal vehemence Ferry and Bou­ langer. There were also a conservative newspaper and a clerical one.

While these could no longer praise the monarchy, Gabriel said, they could _ Le Figaro. January 9, 1889. ^Maurice Barrfes, "A un ami politique de la premiere heure," Le Courrier de l'E st, August 18, 1889.

^Le Courrier de l'E st, November 9, 1890. 43 not bring themselves to support the republic. Thus, they opposed Bou­ langer, Opportunists, and even the social Catholicism of the Count de Mun.u 20

With the e n tire Nancy press closed to him, Barr&s launched the

Boulangist campaign in Nancy by using his own money to buy the Courrier de la Meurthe-et-Moselle. With "revisionist republican journal" at the masthead, he got it under way on January 22, 1889, as Le Courrier de 1'

Est. He proposed to serve the Boulangist cause with it in the depart­ ments of Meuse and Vosges as well as Meurthe-et-Moselle. For collabora­ tors he used Paul Adam and others from Paris and filled out the local news and political articles with material from La Presse. He also printed political letters from his friend Prince Edmond de Polignac, a Bonapartist turned Boulangist and who probably helped to finance the enterprise. By

March c irc u la tio n fa ilu re forced Barrfes to turn his ambitious jo u rn a lis tic endeavor into a weekly almost exclusively put together by him, Adam, and

Gabriel. It was on this base—a newspaper and Gabriel*s organization— that Barr&s would take Boulangism to the Nancy voters on two occasions in

1889: at the cantonal elections of July 28 and the legislative ones of

September 22 and October 6. The entire campaign would fit together as a single piece in argument and opposition.

I l l

As the campaign got under way, Barr&s became a changed man. His

conversion to Boulangism in 1888 had grown out of his resentment against the "barbarians" and the parliamentary republic which reinforced them. on Alfred Gabriel, "Sur la sellette," ibid.. July 7, 1889. 44 His political thinking included only the conviction that Boulanger could rid France of the parliamentary republic and, by so doing, end "barbarism."

Now, all of a sudden, he had to be a politician. Most of all, he had to learn to counter the opposition, and it was being roused on both the nation­ al and local level in 1889. In large part, the opposition shaped the open­ ing salvos of the campaign.

First of all there was national opposition, which mounted a big attack on Boulangism. The victory which seemed so certain after the

Paris victory of Boulanger soon became less sure. Between February and

July, 1889, the interior minister, Jean Constans, pushed through laws end­ ing the scrutin de liste and multiple candidatures in order to prevent de­ partment-wide lists of candidates and the Boulangist plebescite tactics.

Barres called these "lois d1exception," put through by the "caesarians" 21 of parliament to help a "little group of the privileged." He conceded that they would hurt Boulangism nationally, but would help in Nancy, where

Alfred M^ziere's popularity had carried the entire Opportunist slate in

1885. 22 In March, the government broke up the League of Patriots, that highly effective vote-getting Boulangist troop, by arguing it was a secret society threatening the state. "It is very evident," remarked Barres,

"that if our leaguers adored Ferry, [the government] would not dream of 23 breaking into its tills." The arrest of the leaguers lent credence to rumors that Boulanger was next. On April 1 he fled the country, soon fol­ lowed by Rochefort and Dillon. The Courrier tried to explain away the

^Maurice Barres, "Les BSlisaires," ibid., January 31* 1889*

22Maurice Barres, "Bonne nouvelle," ibid., February 14, 1389.

2^Maurice BarrSss, "On demands des p oliciers," ib id . , March 5, 1889. apparent cowardice of Boulanger by saying, "it is on the formal injunc­ tion of the [National] Committee that the General, after a long resistance, ni decided to leave." Barr&s argued that Boulanger could not have allowed himself to be imprisoned, because his jailers would not have let him com­ municate with his followers. Such communication was necessary for Bou­ langer's personal popularity alone would bring victory for his lieutenants 25 and their program. On April 28, Barrfes returned from a meeting at Brus­ sels with Boulanger where the Boulangist high command decided to capital­ ize on the "martyrdom" of Boulanger, hoping that his magnetism would trans­ fer to them at tne elections and praying that the voters would not view the flight as cowardice. Barres reflected the concensus of the Brussels meeting when he admitted that scrutin d1 arrondissement would make it dif- 26 ficult for the parliamentary candidates. This difficulty was all the more real since the anti-Boulangists were now able to face the parlia­ mentary elections with Boulanger gone, his lieutenants on the defensive, their principal organization in disrepair, and electoral machinery changed to prevent the personal popularity of Boulanger from rubbing off on his follow ers. This national anti-Boulangist campaign found its counterpart at

Nancy in the Republican A lliance, founded on February 1, 1889 from Oppor­ tunists and those Radicals who refused to come under Boulanger's spell.

In rallies, the press, and heckling at Boulangist rallies, these anti-

Courrier de l'E st. April 7, 1889. Italics in the original.

^Maurice Barr&s, "Leur Betise fait notre maliwe," ibid., April 7, 1889. .Maurice BarrSs, "La R^publique en exil," ibid. . April 28, 1889. Boulangist republicans directed two attacks on Boulangism. There was, first of all, the threat of Boulanger’s caesarism, The alliance charged

that Boulangism1s lack of a positive program, and the reliance exclusively on Boulanger’s magic with the crowd would turn its purely negative program

of anti-parliamentarianism into dictatorship. Thus, the republic would be

destroyed and, considering the record of Boulanger’s war ministry, the

threat of war would loom large. The latter was a particularly touchy is­

sue in the frontier departments. Secondly, there was Boulanger's flirta­

tion with the royalists. Alliance speakers, writers, and hecklers labeled

the Boulangists "false democrats" and the "clerical party," because of the

financial support of the royalists and the stand of Boulangism for an

"open republic," tolerant of all opinion. These charges were leveled as

early as January and February, 1889, and alliance candidates in the July

cantonal and fall legislative elections were still using the same arguments.

At the beginning, Barr&s and Gabriel simply tried to laugh off the

charges of monarchism. The letter from the Due d'Aumale, which some heck­

ler invariably wanted to read at almost every Boulangist rally, could be

explained as a courtesy to a distinguished commander. As to "Where does

the money come from," cried by anti-Boulangist hecklers as they turned

out their pockets, who had any proof that Boulanger was being financed by

rojr&list coffers? Such baiting made sense in other electoral contests,

but not at Nancy. When the Opportunist press asserted that he had re­

ceived a check from Mackau, the royalist treasurer* Barr&s made an un­

answered challenge that the issue be settled by a .jury d'honneur with the 27 loser giving 1000 francs to charity. (Paul Adam later claimed that the

^Le Courrier de l'B st, July 28, 1889. 47 Nancy Boulangists never received more than a bundle of posters and "sev- 28 eral louis" with which to paste them up.) Thus, when the Republican Al­ liance hecklers made these charges at Boulangist rallies, they could be fended off with cries of "Down with the Opportunists!" When the Progres de l»Est charged that the Boulangist alliance with royalism was treason, the Courrier countered that it was no worse than the Ferry-Clemenceau al­ liance to elect Jacques, Clemenceau's alliances with the Right to tumble

•JQ cabinets, or the Opportunist parliamentary support of the cultes budget.

However, Barres had to take the charge of royalism serio u sly a fte r

Boulanger spoke at Tours on March 17, 1889. The volume of written and spoken words on this issue testify to its effect on the thoroughly re­ publican Nancians who adhered to Boulanger. At Tours, Boulanger set at rest whatever doubts the royalists had entertained toward him. Although he reminded them that the people were against the corrupt republic, not republicanism, he offered them a plebescite, an open republic, tolerant of all religious beliefs, and the repudiation of "jacobin" anti-clericalism.

Barr&s tried to still the uneasiness raised in republican hearts by the

^Mauclair, p. 276. This is also borne out by Mermeix, "Coulisses du boulangisme," Le Figaro. August 20 and 27, September 3, 10, 17, and 24, October 1 and 22, 1890. This exposS by Mermeix, a disillusioned insider, has the ring of authenticity if a bit hazy on details. He deliberately used the experience of Barr&s to show that not all Boulangists got royal­ i s t money. Mermeix wrote on October 1, 1890 th a t Barr&s went to Nancy "where he i s unknown. He published a weekly newspaper, and, without means of action, without any other trumps than those in his hands, he is elected." The most plausible explanation for the failure of Barr&s to draw on the national Boulangist treasury, as other candidates did, is that the National Committee was convinced that the inexperienced Barres had no chance of win­ ning. Although there is no documentation for it, the most plausible sources for the funds were the personal wealth of Barr&s, admission fees to ral­ lies, and perhaps the support of de Polignac.

^Le Courrier de l'E st. January 30, 1889. 48 Tours speech by reminding the voters that at the side of the irrecon­ cilable monarchists were others who voted with the Left on social reforms, and supported Boulanger. Their unconverted fellows told them that if they joined Boulanger, the republic would triumph. "Ah, yes," Barres a- greed, "it is the Republic which will triumph; but a Republic purged of 30 parliamentarianism." After Tours, he returned to this theme by saying that the apostles of monarchy or empire were joining Boulangism because they saw that the liberty-loving people were opposed to any kind of res­ toration. Yet, Boulanger could reconcile authority and liberty, a Con­ servative principle. In addition, the Bonapartists could embrace Boulan­ ger, for while he condemned the hereditary principle, he upheld that of the plebescite; the royalists, who had argued that only a king could unify France's factions, could find in Boulanger a man who would unify

France against a unitary Germany. Barres was firmly convinced that the

Conservatives had seen the errors of their ways and had joined Boulanger on his terms. 31 Of course, Barr&s had been just as convinced that other men of letters would follow his example and flock to the banner of Bou­ langism .

As spring became summer, Barr&s h it th is theme even hard er. He noted that even the Bonapartist l'Autoritg admitted that Boulanger unfor­ tunately would not bring a restoration. "Never," he added, "has General

Boulanger missed an occasion to explain himself unequivocally. He wishes a Republic fortified by the adhesion of all honest Frenchmen and by tne

•^Maurice Barrfes, "Quel3 sont nos allies," ibid., March 10, 1889. ■^Maurice Barr&s, "La K6publique ouverte," ib id ., March k4» 1889. 49 expulsion of Wilson and Constans; but he believes firmly that the re- publican form is definitive in France.1' Sid Because the republicanism of some Boulangists in eastern France had been questioned, Barres said that he had personally questioned the General on this score. Boulanger re­ plied, according to Barr&s, "No candidate at the next elections will be authorized to present himself as my candidate if he has not made a clear republican declaration. I will disavow without scruple and regard all those who would try to usurp my republican popularity to make their mo­ narchic sympathies triumph." At one of the Boulangist rallies Barr&s answered a vigorously applauded criticism of Opportunism by a royalist.

Said Barr&s,

It is not at the side of monarchy that this country wants to go; it is attached to the republican form. The enormous effort of a right-thinking portion of republicans goes to give us a purified republic: a republic where all honest men can live, where the scoundrels will be unveiled, where the interests of the workers finally will be taken to heart. At the present time only General Boulanger is able, without reversing the Republic, so justly dear to the masses, to give France an honest government, as only he has known how to cry to all: Down with the thieves!"-^

On the anniversary of the Tennis Court Oath Gabriel echoed this theme and gave it a socialist twist. The view of Gabriel was important for two reasons. First of all, his words were more widely believed by the workers, with whom he was in complete rapport, than those of Barres.

Secondly, Barres, whose political thinking was developing under the in­ fluence of Gabriel, adopted almost identical views. According to Gabriel, the people had to overthrow the aristocracy to get a new constitution in

1789J to get one in 1889 the people had to "coalesce against the bourgois

•^Maurice Barr&s, "Le Flot qui monte," ibid. . May id6, 1889.

33Maurice Barr&s, "La Noce empoisonn^e," ib id ., June 30, 1889* 50 o lig arch y whose emblem i s parliam en tarian ism and the S en ate." The oppo­ sition claimes, said Gabriel, that the Boulangists were the party of the

16th of May, but the republic was hardly in danger from men like Roche­ fort, who overthrew the second Empire, or Laisant, who in protest resigned his army commission: "The Republic of the National Party is in the hands of men animated with a great spirit of justice. And if General Boulanger ever breaks the promises he solemnly made, these men w ill turn against him while his adversaries of today will offer him their services.

On another occasion Gabriel admitted, "The hatred of Opportunism is the beginning of wisdom. But the love of monarchy is the worst of follies."

Using Rousseau's argument against Grotius, Gabriel held that when monar­ chists spoke of restoration by "universal consent and universal suffrage," they spoke in contradictions, for these applied only to a republic. The essence of monarchy went against popular w ill, for it necessitated the alienation of sovereignty and a man cannot alienate his son's sovereignty.

Because a monarchy is immutable while a republic must constantly go to the people, there cannot be popular sovereignty in a monarchy. Thus, by standing for popular w ill, Boulangism's emphasis on the referendum posed it against both Opportunism and monarchism. He contended that the monar­ chists had rallied to the Boulangist republic by necessity. However, the original Boulangists were republicans by conviction and had spent a long time fighting for that conviction. While Gabriel, like Barres, welcomed the conversions of the monarchists, he saw no danger of them capturing the movement. 35

^"Le Punch du 20 Juin," ibid., June 23, 1889.

•^Alfred Gabriel, "La R6publique triomphante," ibid. . June 30, 1889. 51 From the beginning Barres discovered that he could defend him­ self far easier against the charge of monarchism by shifting to the offens­ ive, by tarring all the opposition with the brush of Opportunism. Through­ out 1889 this attack proved so attractive to the Boulangist clientele that it became the major issue. Moreover, on this issue more than on any other, one can discern the political evolution of Barres, for from the beginning his campaign was quite frankly worker-oriented in appeal, reform program, and nationalism.

In the early issues of the Courrier de l'E st, Barr&s' criticism of Opportunism was s till that of his Revue ind€pendante article of 1888: the uncreativity, barbarism, inaction, and corruption of the Opportunist

Republic. Barr&s set this theme in bola-face type as early as February

1, 1889—"Opportunists: Financial society organized for the exploitation 36 of France under the Third Republic." The Opportunist republic was also permanently immobilized, for in a remarkable feat it had established a system which institutionalized immobility. Thus, any party which, like the Radicals, supported the parliamentary constitution likewise helped to perpetuate Opportunism no matter how reformist its rhetoric was. In such a way the Courrier could label the Nancy Republican Alliance of

Radicals and Opportunists as the "Ferryist Alliance" and the party of 33 "liars and false republicans." Moreover, the deputies of this par­ liamentary republic knew about Wilson and Gr6vy for years and did

^Le Courrier de l'E st. February 1, 1889. ^Ibid . . February 15, 1889 and "Les Reunions r^visionistes," ibid., September 1, 1889. 52 38 nothing. Barres asked a rally at Frouard: "What is a deputy? It is today a man whose impotence and immobility would astonish the cripple 39 himself. (All the audience is delignted.)" Periodically the Cour­ rier published a facetious "letter from an Opportunist," which bore the stamp of Barres' ironic sense. One of these letters, objecting to the contention of the Courrier that the Opportunist deputies from Meurthe-et­ hos ell e were dishonest, argued that they were good family men, against sin, and so on. In another, the "Opportunist" insisted that deputies only appeared to be immobile, for they required two years of legislative apprenticeship':

In arriving you are as much as lest at the Chamber. You get lost in the corridors. You do not know where the buvette is. You are the laughingstock of the door-keepers who direct, you to the water-closet when you ask them where the cabinet is. That happened to our poor Cordier in 1885 (i.e. one of the local Opportunist deputies) the first day of his arrival at the Palais Bourbon. And, as an apprentice he had to do in the first two years a thousand disagreeable things, as do the errand girls in Parisian workshops. He made himself use­ ful in making up the commissions. He was able to carry to the sharpener the knives his colleagues would apply [to the current cabinet]. He made rumeurs. murmures. He prepared black coffee.^*

The implication of this line of attack was obvious: Only Boulangism

could bring reform, for only it would cut through the institutionalized

immobility by ending parliamentarianism.

This in itial attack of Barres on Opportunism was hardly unexpected,

considering his reasons for joining Boulangism; however, the early issues

■^^Maurice B arres, "Somraes-nous p rets?" ib id . . February 2, 1889.

39 "Ji5union rSvisionniste a Frouard," ibid., Feoruary 26, 1889.

^"Lettre d'un Opportunists," ibid., March 7, 1889. 53 of Le Courrier de l'E st revealed a surprisingly new Barr&s—the ivory- tower decadent had become working-class oriented. "The workers are

clearly revisionist," Barr&s wrote in the very first issue, because

their patriotism and demands for reforms have not been met by a parlia­ ment "absorbed in petty intrigues."^" And again, "The small shopkeep­

ers, the workers, the peasants are not pleased that [parliament] has

done nothing for them, that life is difficult for them. We bring them

the means to drive out the parliamentarians, who have argued with steril­

ity for twelve years, and directly undertake power themselves."^ He in­

sisted that "social reforms ought to be generously dispensed to the work- IQ ers," but he made no effort to spell them out. Hardly an issue of the

Courrier went by without a story about workers somewhere in France sup­

porting Boulanger and suggesting that France awaited the decision of Nancy

workers. He constantly reiterated, even throughout the subsequent cam­

paign, how parliamentary government was unwilling and incapable of help­

ing the workers. This same tone expressed itself in the initial rallies

the Nancy Boulangists held in January and February to get the campaign

going. On January 26., with a so-called "revisionist committee" only a

month old, Gabriel drew an audience of 800 through the appeal that Bou­

langer was the only hope of the proletariat.^ On February 10,. in

^Maurice Barrfes, "Combien sommes-nous?" ibid., January 22, 1889. i 2 Maurice Barres, "Les travailleurs d^cideront," ibid., January 26, 1889. jo Maurice Barr&s, "Quels sont nos allies?" ibid.. March 10, 1889. ^Paul Adam, "Le Comit6 r6visionniste," ibid.. January 30, 1889. Estimates of rally audiences were often contested by the opposi­ tion press, which usually cut the Courrier1s estimate in half. 54 keeping with his determination to serve more than Nancy, Barres shared

a rostrum at Saint-Die with Edmond de Polignac. It was the last time

Barres would venture from the Nancy area during 1889, and de Polignac

retired from the scene within a month.

This sudden working-class orientation of Barres was the result of

two things. Barres revealed one of them in an article he wrote several

months after the 1889 campaign. In it, he implied that his discussions

with his "dear workers," in their "sad working-class sections," as they

" fra te rn a lly smoked th e ir c ig a rs," seemed to draw him into an almost

existential involvement with the "popular soul." It gave him a kind of

romantic socialism, reminiscent of the way Fourierism had influenced

George Sand and others in an earlier generation. "It is impossible," he

confessed, "to live for several weeks in the milieu of the disinherited

without receiving from them an emotion, a sincere impulse of love." Yet,

this contact with the mass not only stirred his pity. The thrill of his

touching the people and the rough and tumble of the campaign, with the

workers defending him from hecklers and rowdies, compelled him to follow

up his words with deeds: "It was [during the campaign] that I grasped

how to unaerstand and love life and the completely laid bare instinct.

After that, would I have the ingratitude to neglect the improvements de­

manded by these brave men who, without knowing me, did not h e s ita te to

love me and who personally bettered me?" 45

However, Barres cqme to the workers mostly because of Alfred Ga­

briel. At Nancy, Barres had native roots and a newspaper, but he had no

following. The Nancy "revisionist committee" was largely Gabriel’s

^Maurice Barr&s, "Autorit^ et d&nocratie," La Presse, February 4, 1890. 55 creature.^ He presented Barres and Polignac to a Nancy audience on

February 9, but at the next revisionist meetings on February 23 and 24, it was Gabriel and Barres only. Gabriel could come to Barres because of the l a t t e r 's s ta tu re in the n a tio n a l B oulangist movement and because h is news­ paper offered Gabriel a forum. De Polignac had no credentials comparable to these and had the further taint of a Bonapartist background. Although

Barres brought to Nancy his own Paris entourage, he came to rely increas­ ingly on Gabriel, who dia have a well-developed working-class program.

Gabriel wanted, first of all, that education should be truly open to working-class children. Education was paid for with taxes on the work­ ers, but only bourgeois sons were permitted in the dcole supgrieure, col- in lfege, Facultds. Saint Cyr, and the Polytechnique. Secondly, there should be equalization of taxation with "the end of the tax crushing the little purse in order to enlarge the big one, the end of theft and thieves

...... Yes or no, is it just, is it theft," he asked, that workers be taxed indirectly at 20 percent while the rentier is taxed at four and one-

Id half percent. Thirdly, he urged a national program of pension funds.

Fourthly, the referendum should be used to solve social problems. With a local referendum, reforms could be made in socialist strongholds that might fail in the nation as a whole. A national referendum would bring reforms through bypassing the veto of the Senate. Fifthly, there should

be equalization of m ilitary service, so that sons of the wealthy could no

^Adam, "Le Comity r£visionniste."

^"RSponse aux alliancards," Le Courrier de l^ s t, February 19, 1889. I g Alfred Gabriel, "La R^publique nouvelle," ibid., April 7, 1889. 56 49 no longer exempt themselves. Finally, the legal personality of work­ er and agricultural unions should be increased to allow them to own the means of production. In short, the pattern of the campaign was established

by February: Barres and the Courrier de l'E st would operate exclusively in Nancy, the local Boulangist leadership would be Barres and Gabriel, and through Gabriel, Barres would learn to direct his vague working-class sympathies into concrete reforms.

Barres was quite cool toward the program of Gabriel at the begin­ ning. After Gabriel spelled out his reforms at a Frouard rally on Febru­ ary 24, Barres hastened to remind his readers that General Boulanger, and

by implication, he himself, would not support such a sweeping reform pro- 50 gram. They would, however, initiate more reforms than Opportunists would .y

Yet, by summer, Barr&s had adopted Gabriel's program, at first because he wanted the victory which was possible only through working-class votes.

This illustrates the interplay between the thought and action of Barres:

He had joined Boulangism because his thought necessitated action. His day

by day involvement in Boulangist action at Nancy reshaped his thought. A His constant association with Gabriel on the newspaper and in political

rallies exposed him to left-wing ideas; his mingling with the worker and

shopkeeper followers of Gabriel eventually made him truly sensitive to

their plight; his awareness of the hold social reforms had on these work­

ers showed that victory lay in such a program, and the scent of victory

was sweet. The process was complete when, on the anniversary of the

^"Les Reunions r£visionnistes," ibid., September 1, 1889.

^Maurice Barres, "Nos Gontradicteurs," ibid., February 27, 1889. 57 Tennis Court Oath, Barres toasted those workers "who buy with the ef­ fort of their arms and minds the gold which goes to fatten the thieves and men worthy of prison who are our deputies." 51

In trying to establish rapport with the workers this dandy and decadent reminded them that besides the travailleurs ouvriers. there were travailleurs de la bourgeoisie, obviously himself, who had abandoned their privileges to work for the cause of labor. In pleading for old- age pensions he went so far as to tell his audience that such a reform could not be realized by an "incapable bourgeoisie." By the end of the legislative campaign he had advocated the program of Gaoriel before most of the working-class groups of Nancy. An example of his reformist rhe­ toric can be seen in this excerpt from a speech to the workers of Saint

N icolas:

We w ill occupy ourselves . . . with founding pensions which will protect old and tired workers from their last years of poverty. In addition, the recognition of the civil indivi­ duality of labor and agricultural unions will permit these societies to . . . become a real force, instead of being, as they are now, at the caprice of a government able to dis­ perse a union and seize its funds. Only union independence will assure the independence of labor to resist capitalism or give it armor in the economic struggle.

"Le Punch du 20 ju in ," ib id . . June 23, 1889. The q u otation which immediately follows is from this account. All contemporary ob­ servers agreed that Barres was an ineffective speaker. However, his verb­ al mastery of sensitivity, invective, and humor could put him in touch with the workers, as this quotation shows. This is also seen in the con­ cluding plea of the speech: "Mindful of the weary worker, whose worn- out muscles refuse to to il any longer for his stomach's food, these mea­ sures would protect him from the poor-house, from the malevolence of that authority which right now 'walks the streets' under these windows to find out the words of our orators and to gape at our independent c itiz e n s ." CO "Les it bunions r&visionnistes," ibid. . September 1, 1889. This article contains the compte rendu of several rallies held by BarrSs, Gabriel and Adam. Yet, attractive as this relatively mild program might sound to the work­ ers , Barres made no attempt to buttress it with any theories on property or society. Instead, he simply accepted the Gabriel program as a formula for victory and as a plan for working-class amelioration. 53

For both Barres and Gabriel, as well as for most of the Boulangist movement, social reforms were tied to political ones. For years the Radi­ cals had insisted that social reforms were impossible so long as the

Senate exercised its veto; but the Radicals had failed to win the na­ tion. Boulanger, through strong presidential leadership, could galvanize the nation into constitutional, change which would guarantee the various reforms his entourage wanted—Radical, nationalist, Blanquist, and even royalist. Often, as in the case of Barres and Gabriel, the various Boul­ angist elements came to adopt each other's point of view. Barr&s, drawn by Boulangism's promise of national revival through constitutional change, came to accept social reform. Gabriel, drawn to Boulangism by the inabili­ ty of parliamentarianism to bring social reforms, came to accept Boulan­ gism' s offer of national revival. Boulanger was so vague that to his voters and supporters he appeared to accept all the views of his lieu­ tenants. In short, the promise of constitutional revision united the divisions of Boulangism.

Arguing as he did that the Third Republic had institutionalized immobility, Barrfes sought to convince his prospective constituents that a Boulangist republic would change all that. Pressed by his opposition to prove that Boulangism had a program as well as a personality cult,

Barres spent much of February and March, 1889, spelling out the details CQ The social ideas of Barres will be treated in a later chapter. 59 of the proposal for constitutional revision, deposited by Boulanger at the Chamber on June k, 1888 and ghost-written by Naquet. Since 1789,

Barres held, France had been gripped by political schizophrenia. On the one hand, it had sought unity and continuity capable of making a consist­ ent foreign and military policy. It had turned to monarchy to accomplish this end, but at the expense of the liberty and popular sovereignty which a parliamentary republic could Dring, Yet, the instability of the parlia­ mentary republic had been unable to bring France unity and continuity.

The Boulangist republic alone could bring unity and continuity as well as liberty and popular sovereignty.^ The parliamentary republic could work if the electorate were homogeneous, impartiax, attentive, and dis­ interested and if a parliament elected by such voters would usher its best members into the ministry. 55 Unfortunately, voters chose deputies on the basis of electoral programs, but they could not force deputies to carry out these programs. Once in the Palais-Bourbon the politicians distributed themselves into groups and served the interests and ambitions of the group instead of the interests of the nation. Ministers were unable to follow a

"suitable and durable" policy, since they were the "servile agents" of the political coalition which supported them. Because they wanted to stay in power, they could not antagonize any faction of the coalition.

Thus, they could do nothing. "At the end of several weeks of using [a new ministry], the ' outi coteries recruit several malcontents and become

^*Maurice Barres, "Quels sont nos allids?" ibid., March 10, 1889. 55This analysis of the Boulangist constitution and the quotations which follow a re from: Maurice B arres, "Le Programme du p a r ti n a tio n al boulangiste," ibid. . February 28 and March 1, 2, and 6, 1889 and "La Prochaine constitution," ibid., February 21, 1889. 60 in turn a majority; a new coalition is tied together; the ministry falls; a new ministry is raised in the same conditions to pursue the same destiny.11 These conditions could be remedied by establishing a presidential republic with separation of powers: The president would

be directly elected by universal suffrage to prevent an electoral col­ lege from naming a nonentity; he would appoint the cabinet, which would be approved by but independent of the legislature and responsible to him; he could veto legislation, but the vote of two-thirds of the members of

the legislature could override a veto. Indeed, Barres insisted that the

constituant assembly, which would write the constitution, must "find ways to prevent any peril of dictatorship." It could even decide whether

or not to keep the Senate, so long as a new Senate were directly elected.

The constitution would also provide for the initiative, referendum, and

r e c a ll.

Such ideas were certainly not original with Barres. His expres­

sion of them at this stage in his development simply reflected the posi­

tion of the Boulangist leadership, which formulated them. The form of

this constitution had various origins. First of all, and like so much of

Boulangism, it lay in the political frustration of the various Boulangist

elements, which found themselves unable to achieve their aims through the

parliamentary republic. Obviously, Barrls shared this feeling of frustra­

tion, especially in his conviction that such a republic perpetuated "bar­

barism." Secondly, in rejecting the Third Republic the Boulangist consti­

tution harked back to the Second Republic. Frequently the Boulangist

leadership admitted this. Thirdly, foreign republican models influenced 61 the framers of the Boulangist constitution. The American republic, with its checks and balances, provided a formula for preventing both a dicta­ torial president and an immobile legislature. Boulanger, himself, admit­ ted being impressed with the American experience as a result of his trip to the United States as the French representative to the centennial of the battle of Yorktown. Other Boulangist leaders expressed similar feel­ ings. Likewise, Swiss use of the initiative, referendum, and recall made its mark on the Boulangists. On reading Barres one gets the feeling that he was drawn to the Boulangist constitution for these reasons and for an additional one, namely the translation into politics of the culte du moi philosophy. The strong president, fulfilling his ego, above politics but involved in the life of the nation, could inspire the renewal of France and, perhaps, the self-renewal of individual Frenchmen, who could find in him sustenance for their own egos.

Moreover, through the Boulangist constitution and the "open re­ public," the factions would be reconciled and could finally bring France the unity, continuity, liberty, and reform which parliamentary factionalism prevented. For Barr&s, the "open republic" meant that civil rights and civil liberties would be guaranteed for all but those "in irreconcilable and revolutionary opposition to the free institutions accepted by the people." Through this formula Barres opposed equally the persecution of

D&roulede and the Due d'Aumale, for both had been brave soldiers for

France.^ Besides, Boulangism proved its ability to unite factions with its record of electoral victories made possible by uniting conservatives, patriots, and disgusted Radicals. Barr&s scoffed at other alternatives:

"Un Camouflet & l'A lliance," ibid., March 13, 188V. 62 M. Clemenceau, M. Ferry (ohI improbable hypothesis) today will support revision, but they will not bring it about. Their friendw today who try to take our program from us will not even get the right to speak from their disgusted voters. General Boulanger alone . . . is_able today to serve France usefully and save the Republic.

In this wide-ranging attack on Opportunism and its republic,

Barrfes regularly sharpened his jabs by applying his generalities to spe­ cific local issues. In such a way he hoped his readers could see the proof o£ his argument in their own experience. In denouncing the incom­ petence of the current government, for example, he claimed that a local school official, dead for six months, had just been promoted according to the Bulletin administratif. 58 In attacking the anticlericalism of the Opportunist government and its decision to get the nuns out of hos­ pitals, Barres alleged that Nancy hospital nuns cost the government 900 francs a year while lay personnel would cost 2000 francs. Worse yet, he felt (ana he was sure his readers would agree from their own experience) that the sisters were more dedicated to their vocation. 59 In trying to

prove Ferry the national villain andatoilabel the Alliance k^publicaine

the "alliance ferryiste," Barr&s on more than one occasion reminded the workers that the "Ferry of Saint-Di£," an industrial town in neighboring

Meurthe, had called the workers "mud." 60 Of course, this Ferry was Albert,

not Jules, and had been defeated for reelection as mayor, but if the work­

ers confused him with Ju le s, no harm was done.

^Maurice Barres, "Leurs efforts inutiles," ibid., March 2, 1889.

^^Maurice Barr&s, "Nos Grotesques," ibid., January 25, 1889.

^Maurice Barr&s, "Pour des filles du peuple," ibid.. February 16, 1889.

^Maurice Barres, "MisArables occupations," ibid. , February 13, 1889 and "Boulangistes, par nScessitS," ibid., February 23, 1889. Related to this was the anti-Semitism of Barrfcs. In 1889 it fit­ ted perfectly with his labeling of the entire opposition as "Opportunist."

The Courrier de l'E st reported that at the second meeting of the revision­ ist committee, "Barrfes flogs with terms which are proper when he speaks of the flunkeys, the menials of the Jewish High Bank with imprisons the liberty of France under the title of Opportunists."^" Late in the cam­ paign he argued that everyone in eastern France distrusted the Jew;

I say distrust, I do not dare write that they hate the Jew .... We distrust the Jew; we refuse to hate him. We belong to the party of conciliation .... We accept all sons of the Revo­ lution as a reality .... We do not say: War to the Jew! But it would be stupidity for a son of the French soil not to defend him self.

Then he launched into an attack on the "high bank," Jewish control of the cattle business in eastern France and its legal cheating of the peas­ ant. He contended he heard one Jew say, "We will be running the Chris­ tians in twenty yearsi" He went so far as to believe that the Jews of eastern Europe probably deserved the pogroms, dewish "usurpation" bad

even been protected in the French parliament where "Jews and Opportu­ n is ts consolidate. It is difficult to determine how much of his

anti-Semitism derived from his own attitude and how much was due to po­

litical expediency. Barr&s had numerous Jewish literary friends, and

one of the principal Boulangist lieutenants, Naquet, was Jewish. Barres

could never attach himself to any doctrinnaire cause. It is certainly

true that anti-Semitism was good politics at Nancy. Barres was defeated

in the 1898 election at Nancy by a candidate who was even more anti-Semitic

"Tieeting of February 9* 1889 as reported on February 12, 1889.

^Maurice Barres, "Le Juif dans l'Est," ibid., July 14* 1889. than he was. Indeed, anti-Semitism was in wide currency in the 1880's and 1890's, infecting the pages even of the influential socialist journ- 63 al La Revue socialiste. Only~the Dreyfus Affaire would clear the air.

V

Perhaps the resort to anti-Semitism was due in large part to the heat of the electoral campaign as it reached its climax between July and

October, 1889. Here, and only here, was the real test of the Boulangist campaign and program which the inexperienced Barres and the so-far unsuc­ cessful Gabriel had conducted for several months. They met tne challenge and emerged victorious from the cantccul elections of July 28 and the le­ gislative elections of September and October. As it turned out the two elections were part of the same campaign and they illustrated the ef­ fectiveness of Barres as a politician and the strategy for victory.

For the Boulangists the cantonal elections were but the prelimi­ nary bout for the main event, the legislative elections, and in Nancy the

Boulangists were running scared. Not to present a candidate would be a mark of cowardice, but in a day of no opinion polls there was no way of

evaluating Boulangist strength, and Barres seemed particularly worried.

The meteoric rise of Boulangism imparted to its followers a feeling of desperation which only successive victories could dispel. For this reason

Barres and Gabriel felt compelled to enter the cantonal lists, although

they believed that defeat would be ruinous. Faced with this prospect,

they had already Drought in some of the biggest names in Boulangism to

63 For a summary of anti-Semitism in the 1880's and 1890's, see: Robert F. Byrnes, Anti-Semitism in Modern France (New Brunswick, 1950), passim . speak at rallies in June. Having no guarantee that either of them could defeat any of the Alliance candidates, they submitted the name of Boulan­ ger himself for Nancy-Ouest, the most solidly Boulangist canton, against

Larcher, the mildly reformist president of the bar association. Then they embarked on a dedicated smear campaign to discredit the General's opponent.

Anti-Semitism was a club with which to beat Larcher. Jews, Barr&s contended, were the most ardent anti-Boulangists and would vote for Lar­ cher en masse, for Larcher would uphold the parliamentary republic which refused to crack down on the influence of Jewish bankers. How to prove it?

Just look at the Nancy press which supported Larcher, said Barres, for all of it was in the hands of Jews.^ Of course, what relevance this national issue had to do with a campaign for local office was beside the point in a battle which was obviously being waged only for the propaganda value it would provide for the national elections in September.

Barr&s carried this technique of "guilt by association" into other areas. Larcher was not a "dishonest man," but he was chairman of the Re­ publican Alliance which supported Grlvy, Wilson, and Opportunism. "Thus,

M. Larcher is the representative of [Constans], and defends him and does not want him to leave the ministry any more than formerly he defended 65 Wilson and did not want the Gr5vy family to leave the EJLjis^e. As in the anti-Semitic attack, there was the artful shift from moderation (i.e. distrust, not hatred of Jews) to extremism (i.e. Jewish attempt to "run"

^Maurice Barrfes, "L1Opportunisms: Parti des juifs," Le Cour­ rier de l'E st. July 21, 1889. ^Maurice Barres, "L'Attitude de M. Larcher en face des concus- sionnaires," ibid., July 21, 1889. 66 Christians). The article began by calling Larcher honest, then attached him to the Opportunists, and finally made him appear the direct supporter of Wilson, Grevy, and Constans.

However, this line of attack was probably unnecessary, for Larcher had a weak spot elsewhere. Earlier in the year he had spoken on behalf of the foreign workers of Nancy, mostly Italians, who unlike the French workers were willing to work on Sundays and had a lower ansentee rate.

Barr&s and Gabriel added the charge, far from substantiated, that Larcher also believed that employers alone could determine worker salaries, since he was for laissez-faire. Had Larcher been born in a worker section of

Nancy, said Gabriel, he would not support so vigorously Sunday work and

"capitalist exploitation."^ Such an attack was successful enough to de­ feat Larcher in a workingclass section where workers were quite sensitive about low wages and job security.

Faced with the candidature of Boulanger the Nancy Alliance, like

Barres and Gabriel, treated the cantonal campaign as a trial run for the

big autumn election. Boulanger was the nominal candidate, to be sure.

Yet, it was generally believed that he had no desire to sit on a cantonal

council ana that he would run in September for a Paris seat in the Chamber.

His name had been presented for several cantonal seats throughout France

by men who, like Barres and Gabriel, intended to run in September but who

were unsure of their own popularity. Because Boulanger was no threat to

the future operation of the government of Nancy, the Alliance trained its

guns on Barr&s and Gabriel, who would be a threat in the next elections.

^Alfred Gabriel, "Les Ouvriers Strangers," ibid., July 21, 1889. See also Maurice Barres, "Comment on se dSconsidSre," ibid., July 28, 1889. In doing so, th e A lliance showed th a t Boulangism had no monopoly in

French politics for innuendo, mudslinging, and intimidation. Rallies of both siaes were invaded by hecklers and hoodlums. According to Gabriel some of these were, naturally, knife-carrying Italiam workers of Larcher.

If such knifings occurred one would be surprised if they had not been met in kind by the workers of Barres and Gabriel. They persistently charged that officials refused them meeting-halls, apparently in the interest of public order, and that employers fired and threatened to fire Boulangist workers. Such intimidation was certainly not unusual for French public officials and employers of the period.

The biggest job of the Alliance in this campaign to discredit Bar­ res and Gabriel was to alienate the workers from their champion, Gabriel.

The great lengths the Alliance went to in order to defame him and its al­ most total unconcern with Barres testified to the effectiveness of Gabriel

in delivering the worker vote to Boulanger, and, in turn, to himself and

Barres. At one rally Larcher asked his audience how Gaoriel, his opponent

"with the most ferocity," could call himself a defender of the workers

when he was twice arrested by the police, once for attacking a worker.

Gabriel took great pains to explain that at the time, fifteen years be­

fore 1889, he haa simply defended himself against "deux valets.11 As for

the other, as editor of the Patriote de l'E st he had been fined for print­

ing a libelous letter. According to the law the newspaper was responsible

whether it wrote the piece or not. Nonetheless, the Alliance press and

speakers kept referring to him as "ex-citizen," apparently for losing his

civil rights in these cases, and berated him for wearing a very unprole­

tarian frock coat. However, a far jnore effective attack on Gabriel and Barres emerged, for the campaign gave substance to the charge that Boulangism was monarchist, The first ballot necessitated a run-off election in

Nancy—i£st where the Alliance candidate went to the second ballot against a monarchist in what was normal Nancy politics. The conservative had gotten neither support nor coverage in the Courrier de l'E st before the first ballot. Now the Courrier, like the Boulangist National Committee, was faced with the difficult decision of choosing between an anti-revi­ sionist republican and anti-republican revisionist. How to £ace the voters when there was either no revisionist-republican (i.e. Boulangist) or when his cause was hopeless? Barres alleged that the conservative was a revisionist, and anti-Alliancard, a "democrat" in that he supported the "great national constituant consultation and the appeal to the people."1

Yet, Barres could not bring himself to tell the voters to vote for the con­ servative j he could only te ll them to vote against the Alliance candi­ date, for any revisionist was better than an Opportunist. Gabriel pointed 68 out the dilemma more sharply. He knew the workers would vote republican, he had to prove that the opponent of the monarchist was not really a re­ publican. If republic meant the Opportunist republic, the Alliance can­ didate was a republican; but if it meant government by all and for all and for suppression of "bourgeois oligarchy," then he was not a republi­ can. In a choice between a revisionist and a non-revisionist, Gabriel advised the voters to choose the revisionist and make him declare his re­ publicanism. Obviously the conservative would make no such statement.

Maurice Barres, "L1Opportunists ou le r&visionniste," ibid., August 4, 1889.

^Alfred Gabriel, "Avant tout, . pevision," ibid., August 4, 1889. Never one to miss an opportunity, the Est R^publicain used this to link

Gabriel and Barres to reaction. While Gabriel could laugh off the Al­ liance 'anti-labor11 tries at him, this was one charge he and Barres simply ducked.

Because of the monarchist question, the Nancy Boulangists knew they must go to the voters with an impeccable republican slate in the

September legislative elections. By the end of August, they decided to run in only half the constituencies of Meurthe-et-Moselle. These were the three surrounding Nancy, containing the principal workingclass sec­ tions. Barres, with the blessing of the National Committee, chose the third circonscription or district, the safest one. In turn, the local committee parcelled out the second, the weakest one, to Paul Adam, and the first to Gabriel. They all duly received the inevitable letter of investiture from Boulanger, couched in vague terms, which proclaimed that 69 a vote for so-and-so was a vote for Boulanger.

The Republican Alliance could not find candidates until just be­ fore the election. The Larcher defeat had convinced many of the incum­ bents not to seek re-election. The Larcher campaign had been identified so thoroughly with Opportunism that the Alliance council was broadened to include some workers. Against Gabriel ran Dominique Antoine, an ex-

Reichstag member from Metz, who had won considerable space in the Paris press earlier in the year for his patriotic fervor in deserting Germany.

Antoine had tried to ingratiate himself with one party after another and had unsuccessfully sought support in several localities before picking

^Le Figaro. September 7, 1889. 70 Nancy. Adam was opposed by Pierre Albert Papelier, the Alliance candi- 70 date. Against Barr&s went Albert Colson, a professor who had led a group of anti—Boulangist students at a Boulangist rally in the spring.

Colson must have been of a Radical-Revisionist orientation, for Gabriel had approached him in December, 1888. Indeed, throughout the campaign

Harris showed considerable concern that Colson would take the Radical-Re­ visionist vote away from him. Unable to find anything like the Larcher

"foreign worker" issue, Barres had to admit that Colson was a good man.

Only when Colson hedged that his demand for constitutional revision "will be for later," 71 did Barres find an opening. Now Barr&s could associate

Coicon with the party of Opportunism, the party of Ferry, Larcher, and Constans.

Throughout September the central thrust of the Boulangists at

Nancy was to convince the voters that the Republican Alliance would bring no new ideas, only new face® with the same ideas held by the incumbent deputies who did not dare to run again. The arguments which Barres and

Gabriel battered home all year continued to be repeated: The offers of social reform and revision made by the Alliance candidates were empty pro­ m ises. The New A llia n ce was the same as th e 1885 one, s t i l l committed to the immobility of the parliamentary system, its bankruptcy proved by multi­ party ministerial instability. The new candidates were the representatives in spite of their professions, of the same old "Nancean Opportunism, of- 72 fender of the workers and sustained by Jews."

^ Ibid., September 8, 1889.

^""Trop d'habilet^c; nuit," Le Courrier de l'E st. September 29, 1889.

^Maurice Barres, "Les Masques," ibid., September 1, 1889. See also the last manifesto of Barrfes before the run-off election: "Aux £lec- teurs de la 36 circonscription," ibid., September 29, 1889. 71 It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of Barres as a politician and campaigner in 1889. He was constantly criticized by the

Nancy Alliance for being a political dilettante. At the height of the campaign an opportunity came to reply to that charge which would plague him throughout his political career. Paul Buquet, a writer for La Voix of Millerand, wrote in Parti Ouvrier that Barres was one of 11 those de­ tached from politics who have created a literary and political party."

Buquet argued that Barr&s entered politics not to secure a program nor to pursue a political career, but only to experience something new, to satisfy a momentary urge of his ego. Thus, men like him were deluding the voters, were using the voters to serve their solely literary self- interest. They had jumped on the Boulanger bandwagon because "they are at bottom adorers of the fait accompli." Because they have no real com­ mitment to their man or program, they will just as readily "accept the collapse of Boulanger." 73 Seizing this opportunity to reply to the at­ tacks of the Alliance, Barrfes admitted to loving the fait accompli. In explaining why, he again revealed his attitude toward politics. "I am a lover of the force vraie," he wrote, "that is to say, I intend to march always with the force vive de la nation. Compared with the great popular current, politics is only a dispute, mediocre arguments without any con­ sequences." In other words, Barres could find self-sulfillm ent in Bou- langism not because it was politics, but because it was above party poli­ tics. Unlike the other parties Boulangism was of the "great popular cur­ rent" which demanded national strength, serious social reforms, and re­ conciliation of all parties to the republic. By attaching himself to

"^Maurice Barres, "Une lettre," ibid.. August 2$, 1889. This letter contains both the comments of Buquet and the reply of Barrfes. 72

Boulangism Barr&s could finally get out of himself and into the "force vive de la nation" where he could truly magnify his Moi. Thus, he was not, nor did he claim to be, a politician in the strict sense of that term. He was attached to a movement which sought control of the state, but which did not follow the orthodox pattern of factional politics.

As to his campaigning ability, the Gourrier unwittingly gave an interesting insight. Describing the performance of Barres at a rally, a reporter wrote:

He is no longer a fiery orator such as Gabriel, an indignant demolisher .... Maurice Barrfes has all the gravity of a savant, of aui economist discussing with the voters the princi- p les of a better administration, possible ameliorations, and indispensible reforms. He is a man of valor; he is a deli­ cate and refined spirit that the press of the entire world came to sanction not long ago as one of the foremost thinkers of the age.'^

When Gabriel spoke, he went on, the workers and hecklers responded with great enthusiasm, but not while Barr&s spoke. As they listened quietly were these workers and peasants in awe of the grand seigneur? Reading this, one gets the feeling that its author was trying to convince the Nan­ cy workers that Barres was every bit as good as Gabriel. No, Barres was not fiery like Gabriel, and that was what the workers liked and expected.

As a "savant" Barres might bore them to death, but they were privileged to be offered this "foremost thinker." Barres lack of warm rapport with his voters in this article bears a striking resemblance to the observations of a later eyewitness who accompanied him to his post-1906 Paris constituency.

"He performed with strict correctness and almost with ritual his role as

^"Les Reunions r£visionnistes," ibid., September 1, 1889. 73 deputy," Dumont-VTilden wrote, "except that he turned as little as pos­ sible to public rallies where he felt inferior. He did a great many minute services and shook hands with everyone, but with the air of a king of France touching his subjects in order to cure their scrofula." 75

His vivid Courrier writing, his stature in the national party, and the support of Gabriel could command the respect of the earthy, impressiona­ ble, and loyal Nancy workers, but his performance at the tribune left them cold.

however, the assets of Barr&s outweighed his liabilities. The vote of September 22, 1889 gave him 6,241, Colson, 5,090, and the conserva­ tive Renard, 2,667. Although Nancy conservatives retired in favor of the

three Boulangist candidates, both Barrfes and Colson picked up 1,000 votes 76 each in the run-off on October 6. Barrfes emerged with 7,133 votes to

the 6,108 of Colson. 77 Gabriel also was victorious, but Paul Adam lost.

The campaign had been so hard fought that even in victory, the Nancy 78 Boulangists were bitter. In a front page article in the Courrier Adam

insisted with the usual shibboleths that the Jews had financed the anti-

Boulangist campaign. 79 Barres still had harsh words for Colson and the

^L . Dumont-Wilden, Le Cr6puscule des Maitres (Brussels, 1947), p. 100. ^Le Figaro, October 3, 1889. ^ Journal officiel de la R^publique francaise. D6bats, Chamhre, November 13, 1889, P* 35* 78 In at least two cases the prefect deported two Boulangists of Alsacian origin for reasons so flimsy that they suggest intimidation.

^Le Courrier de l'E st, October 20, 1889. After the years had cooled his passions, Adam Delieved that his defeat had come from a coali­ tion of Radicals and reactionaries. bee Mauclair, p. 276. 74 employers who had fired Boulangist workers. He felt a double duty of living up to his program in the Chamber and healing the scars left by 80 the campaign. He felt that one way would be for the employers to ac­ cept the election results and hire back the discharged workers. By the end of October the victory was sealed with the fusion of the Nancy Bou­ langist and Radical committees. Many members of the latter had already supported the Boulangists in the election.

VI

Elsewhere in France the elections did not fu lfill the hopes that even the brilliant victory of Boulanger at Paris in January had inspired.

Even after the flight of the General, his followers believed the September elections would vindicate them. However, aside from Meurthe-et-Moselle the republican Boulangists were successful only in Paris, the Northwest, and the Gironde. Victory also came in the departments of Ille-et-Vilaine and Nievre, where the electoral machines of Le H3riss£ and Turigny operated.

Le Temps commented th a t the provinces saved the rep u b lic from P a ris , while

Rochefort's L1Intransigeant proclaimed that the run-off elections produced 81 escamotage, not ballotage. As soon as the election results came in, the royalists, seeing that Boulanger could not muster a majority in the Cham­ ber let alone bring restoration or an authoritarian "open republic," melted away. This betrayal confirmed the fears of those Boulangists who had al­ ways distrusted the alliance with royalism. It also left only 35 deputies

^Maurice Barr&s, "Aux Ouvriers," Le Courrier de l'E st, October 20, 1889. Quoted in Le Figaro, October 8, 1889. 75 who continued, to profess both Boulangism and republicanism. For the most part, these were the Naquet-Laguerre Radicals, the Rochefort Blan- quists, and the D^roulede nationalists. The problem is to see what brought about the defeat of this group, whose victory seemed so certain in January, 1889.

On the surface, the defeat was the direct result of the flight of

Boulanger and the electoral reforms which prevented him from turning the election into a plebiscite. His lack of courage in fleeing might have lost considerable votes. Certainly his lieutenants constantly urged his return, to prison and martyrdom if necessary. Yet, Rochefort, whose ca­ reer testified to his bravery, also fled. Ten years later Emile Zola, in the aftermath of his J1accuse, also fled without losing support. The flight seemed to do no damage to Boulanger in the Paris constituency he won handily in September, 1889.

However, the electoral reforms of Constans were a different story, and they help explain that the real cause of the republican-Boulangist de­ feat lay in its lack of party organization. In the 1888 plebiscite cam­ paign the Boulangists had only an improvised organization. The first full- scale organization emerged for the Paris election of January, 1889. It centered around three groups: The League of Patriots, which had committees in every arrondissement; a few Radicals who came to believe that their fellow Radicals, elected in 1885, had failed to live up to their promises; and those Blanquists and revolutionary-socialist committees who followed

^*Tor the following analysis of the defeat of Boulangism, see: "Notes su r boulangism e," Le F ig a ro . November 18 and December 4 and 11, 1889; Dansette, pp. 362-337; Pierre Denis, Le M&aorial de Sainte-Bre- lade (Paris, 1894), pp. 147-169; Alexandre Zdva&s, Au Temps du bou­ langisme (Paris, 1930), pp. 144-192; Mermiex, "Coulisses de boulangisme." Rochefort into Boulangism. The Boulangist leaders mistakenly viewed the

Paris election as a popular groundswell. Although 50,000-60,000 conserva­

tives voted for Boulanger in that election, his principal support came

from republicans, and it was organization which had delivered their votes.

In the months which followed, the Boulangist lieutenants spent their time

seeking headlines from tneir Chamber oratory rather than mobilizing and

organizing the Radical and nationalist discontent in the hustings. Gabriel

was a case in p o in t. He and h is Nancy R adicals simply walked in to the arms

of Boulangism, rather than being courted by its national organization.

Boulangism put all its faith in the ability of Boulanger to use scrutin de

liste and multiple candidatures to carry Boulangist lists in the depart­

ments. When the government ended those and began proceedings against the

League of Patriots and the exiled Boulanger, Rochefort, and Dillon, the

Boulangists had neither organization nor candidates to substitute for the

earlier technique. In the months which followed only the League, whose

dissolved units transformed themselves into Boulangist committees, was able

to exercise any important national action. It was particularly effective

in coalescing with Radical groups in the Northwest and Southwest. For

example, its president, Ddroulede, built a winning organization in Cha-

rente. In Bordeaux, a Laguerre man, Albert Chich6, built an organization

of League, Radical, and socialist committees which was able to bring vic­

tory for him and two others. All the areas of Boulangist victories in the

Northwest had been the scene of 1888 elections of Boulanger, where local

candidates in 1889 were able to use the organizations set up earlier.

Meurthe-et-Moselle was an exception to this. So were the departments

where long-established deputies like Le H6riss6 and Turigny were able to MAP 1

DISTRIBUTION BY ARRONDISSRlffiNT OF

BOULANGIST VOTE IN PARIS IN 1889

49 % of vote for left-wing Boulangist

4 6 - 48 $ of vote for left-wing Boulangist

E I Z S 2 I 49$ of vote for right-wing Boulangist 17 } " 7 " / f LiZZZ/ / 46-48$ of vote for right-ving Boulangist

34$ of vote to winning left-wing Boulangist

77 bring their constituents to Boulangism. One reason for the failure of the republican Boulangists to build an effective national organization was their inability to agree among themselves. Even republican Boulangism was at best a disparate coalition which constantly clashed on the choice of tactics or candidates. Even if it could unite behind an organization* not even this could guarantee success. For example, Vaucluse in 1885 bad elected three men—Naquet, Laguerre, and Saint-Martin—who were high in

Boulangist circles. Yet, they deserted Vaucluse in 188S to serve Paris, where Boulangism was better organized and had sufficient clientele to in­ sure success.

The success of Barres and Gabriel in Nancy bears out the role of organization. Barres arrived at Nancy virtually unknown only nine months before the election. Within two months he had a newspaper and joined forces with Gabriel, whosd party had been denied earlier victories because of scrutin de liste . Gabriel brought to Barres certain discontented Hadi- cal committees, the embryo of an organization. With the newspaper, meet­ ings, and innumerable rallies came six or seven months of intensive cam­ paigning on the actual scene where the voters would declare themselves.

Also, Barres and Gabriel arrived at a program which had real appeal for these working-class voters. By election-time, having already tested their organization and popularity in the cantonal elections, their organization and support were strong enough to carry them..to victory and to almost car­ ry the equally unknown Paul Adam. Most of all, they had done it by them­ selves, without appreciable help from Boulanger, the Boulangist treasury, or th e B oulangist lie u te n a n ts . Two p o litic a l unknowns had cracked an MAP 2

DEPARTMENTS WHICH, IN 1889, ELECTED

DEPUTIES WHO SAT IN BOULANGIST BLOC

79 80 Opportunist stronghold, through organization, unrelenting effort, and an appealing program.

With governmental electoral changes and proscriptions and organi­

zational disarray, the Boulangist National Committee, in spite of the mis­

givings of some of its members, saw that a coalition with the Right was im­

perative for any victory of revisionism. By election-time the conserva­

tives did have respectaole candidates for almost every district, with

money and organization to back them up, while the republican Boulangists

were short of candidates and without organization. For example, Le Figaro

told of a man who just walked in off the street and volunteered his serv­

ices. Because he had been a naval surgeon, he was offered the Senegal

candidature. The same Figaro writer felt that Barres had been chosen for

Nancy in the same way, simply because no one e lse presented him self. 83 To

save their skins the Boulangist powerhouses ran in Paris, their only well-

organized stronghold. The provinces got either conservatives or left­

overs. Boulanger and Naquet, whose desire for victory caused him to de­

sert his old anti-royalism, were so convinced that only a coalition with

the monarchists could save them that they were often more willing to sup­

port conservative provincial candidates than republican ones. Dfiroulede,

with more insight into the political realities, protested vainly that there

were many fiery men c£ the League of Patriots with strong local support,

but the Boulangist high command consistently turned them down in favor of

the untrustworthy conservative allies. With these developments the al­

liance with the Right became inevitable.

®^Gaston Jollivet, "Au Petit bonheurl" Le Figaro. October 14, 1889. 81 An examination of the constituencies which returned republican-

Boulangists reveals that their voters were mainly workers, lower middle class, petty civil servants, pensioners, chauvinists, and anti-Ferry ex- soldiers. The workers who voted Boulangist worked mainly in large stores and factories, rather than small ones. The very nature of their employment contributed to making them part of an atomized society. Their relationships with their fellow workers and neighbors were so impersonal that they had been unable to find their identity in themselves, neighbor­ hoods, jobs, or class. They give every impression of being typical of the lumpenproletariat which had supported Louis Bonaparte and which, along with the other types which "found" themselves in Boulangism, would form the flotsam and jetsam that would rush to the irrational mass movements of the twentieth century. As a case in point,, the workers in the small shops of the Saint-Antoine and Marais districts, who felt a real bond toward one another and who had been tested in the workingclass struggles of the entire nineteenth century, were not Boulangist. Illustrative of the atomized nature of Boulangist workers was the fact that generally they had either no union or a weak one. Boulangism could win over the unorgan­ ized workers of Dunquerque, but not the Word coalminers, highly organized by Jules Guesde. Gabriel wailed that no "serious union" existed at Nancy, out had there been unions he and Barres would have had less chance of vic­ tory.®”* This meant that in Paris the Boulangist vote was heaviest in the

®^In addition to the items listed in footnote 8«i, see for the fol­ lowing analysis: D. W. Watson, "The Nationalist Movement in Paris, 1900- 1906," Saint Anthony's Papers Number Id: The Right in France. 1890-1919 (Carbondale, Illinois, 1962), pp. 50-55* 82 newer lower-class and poor arrondissements on the northern and southern edges of the city, including the suburbs of Saint-Denis, Sceaux, Neuilly, and Juvisy. 'i'he only exception to this was the conservative-Boulangist

Marius Martin, who represented the upper-class eighth arrondissement.

In the aftermath of the election, it was obvious to the Boulan­ gist high command that they would not sweep the nation, that their coali­ tion with the conservatives had been built on sand, and that their base was narrower that suspected, but at least defined by the election results.

It was likewise obvious that Boulangism still had a considerable, if pa­ rochial appeal to large numbers of nationalistic workers and petit bour­ geoisie. This clientele had elected some thirty deputies. The job for this nucleus, certainly one far larger than that of the Cinq who had op­ posed Louis Napoleon, was to conquer the nation. The arena for this bat­

t l e would be the Chamber of Deputies, and the weapons would be nationalism and socialism. Barres would be in the thick of the fight and would be

further shaped by its outcome.

^"Le Punch du 20 juin," Le Courrier de l'E st, June 23, 1889. CHAPTER i n

BARRES AND THE FAILURE OF BOULANGISM AS A PARTY and parliamentary blog ( 1 8 8 9 - 1 8 9 3 )

The 1889 Boulangist campaign had made Barres a politician and had brought him victory. The influence of Gabriel had given him a slight working-class orientation. However, the elections had not established Boulangism as the majority political movement in France, as Barres and the other Boulangists had hoped. The effort to become a national mass movement dominated Boulangism between 1889 and 1893, and its failure to become one would round out the first stage of Barrfes1 political career.

In particular, this effort saw four developments. First, Boulangism shifted

to socialism right after the election and Barres became a principal spokes­ man for that change. Second, the parliamentary activity of Barr&s and the

Boulangists showed that they took this shift to socialism seriously and

became one of the most important left-wing blocs in the Chamber. In doing

so, however, Boulangism retained its unique personality, at least in the

opening sessions of the 1889 Chamber of Deputies. Third, in 1890 and 1891

Boulangism failed as a party and its unity as a parliamentary bloc eroded.

Fourth, by 1893, most of the Boulangists had drifted into the socialist

p a r t i e s . Although Barr&s was really a minor figure in Boulangism1s failure

as a party and a parliamentary bloc, an exploration of this failure is,

nonetheless, relevant to the political career of Barr&s. For one thing,

83 84 Boulangism shaped Barres1 political ideas so much that an examination of what it stood for, as revealed in the voting record of Barres and his fellow Boulangists, gives us insights into the political development of

Barr&s. Secondly, the failure of Boulangism obviously limited the options open to Barres for future political involvement, and his options paralleled those of Boulangists in general. Finally, the subsequent efforts of Bar­ res to build a new mass movement from the debris of Boulangism would be influenced by the friendships, lessons, and ideas he had found as a minor figure in national Boulangism.

I

With the elections over and Boulangism deserted by the royalist parties, Jules Lemaitre, the critic, predicted that in the first vote of th e new Chamber of D eputies th e r e s t of th e B oulangists would become Radi­

cals, that by spring, 1890, Boulanger would get an offer to be an agent for a London life insurance company, and then there would be "no more than

a single Boulangist deputy: M. Maurice Barres. Yet, he is one for exclus­

ively literary reasons understood by him alone." Most of Lemaitre's read­

ers doubtless agreed that historians a hundred years later would consider

Boulangism of little importance, in spite of its noise. In a time of re­

publican weakness it had simply been able to unite all those malcontents,

held together only by "hatreds and negations."^ The Boulangists were not

worried about 1 that Lemaitre predicted. However, their concern over

possible breakup and oblivion brought 21 of them to Jersey at the beginning

^Jules Lemaitre, "Donee eris felix," Le Figaro, October 12,. 1889. 85 2 of November. There Boulanger had taken refuge to gaze across the sea to France like the Hugo of a preceding generation. This handful of depu­ ties, plus an additional 17 "excused11 ones, were the only ones who still called themselves Boulangists after the election had smashed the alliance with the Right. From these men came a program and plan for eventual vic­ tory. The plan was to rebuild the party by winning the Paris municipal elections in 1890. The program was socialism, and Barres was one of its principal spokesmen.

To understand why Boulangism would shift to socialism, it is neces­ sary, first of all, to look at the men who made up this Boulangist remnant.

After the election, as before, there were several Boulangisms. One group came from socialism. Bordeaux and Paris were its centers. At Bordeaux

Albert Chichi, a lawyer and biographer of Louis Blanc, led two other so­ cialists to victory: Henri Aimel, a left-wing journalist, and Antoine

Jourae, an old Communard and Guesdist. At Paris there were the Blanquist lieutenants of Henri Rochefort: Ernest Granger and Ernest Roche. Alfred

Gabriel was of this group too, and was already revealing his Cri du peuple background which he had soft-pedalled during the campaign. Other social­ ists were Eugene Farcy, who had fought in the siege of the Commune and sat on the extreme Left of the Chamber ever since; Emile Revest, mayor of the left-wing Paris suburb of Saint-Denis; Georges Le Veill£, a Limoges at­ torney who "presented himself as a socialist republican" under the aegis of Boulanger; Jean Baptiste Argelies, active in the cooperative movement and municipal councilor of Juvisy; and Francis Laur, the champion of a

^Le Figarot "Hors Paris," November 8, 1889. "mine to the miners" socialism. Another group came from Radical-Social- ism. In addition to such Boulangist insiders as Georges Laguerre, Alfred

Naquet, Charles Laisant, Rene Le H^risse, and Jean Baptiste Saint-Martin, this group included Leon Borie, mayor and manufacturer of Tulle; Jean furigny and Gaston Laporte from Nevers; Louis de Belleval, whose negative answer in his Sommes-nous en R^publique? brought his dismissal from a gov­ ernment post; Alfred Martineau, formerly of the Paris prefecture and lead­ er of the League of Republican Action; Jean Pontois, a former judge in

Tunis whose disagreement with colonial policy drove him to Laguerre; and

Dieudonn6 Terrail-Mermiex, a writer for La Cocarde and La Presse. A third group came from the League of Patriots or the kind of nationalism it ex­ pressed. Usually led by Paul D&roulede, elected at Angouleme, these men went to the v o ters as v ir tu a l unknowns and won. From P a ris came Jean Bou- deau, the "fiery right arm" of D&roulede; Emile Goussot, a league publi­ c is t; C harles Le Senne, an unknown a tto rn e y sp e c ia liz in g in l i t e r a r y pro­ perties; C^sar Paulin-M5ry, a doctor whose presidency of the league in his arrondissement gave him victory over the socialist Emile Basly; and

Pierre Richard, secretary-general of the league. From Aisne came Andr5

Castelin and Jean-Marie Dumonteil. Barr&s, himself, was typical of this group and, lik e them, trooped to Jersey fo r th e November 7 m eeting. Anoth­ er group came from those monarchists who had not reverted to their former ties. Only Lucien Millevoye, a Bonapartist rentier whose League of Pa­ triots ties involved him in the 1888 campaign, accepted the new Boulangist program completely. However, other conservative Boulangists at least at­ tended the meeting at Jersey: Marius Martin, a Bonapartist and Parisian municipal councilor; Albert Gauthier de Clagny, a Bonapartist from Sevres

Charles Lalou, a journalist on the National Committeej Robert Mitchell, who won at Bordeaux with the aid of Ghich£; Jules Delahaye; and Raoul du 3 Saussay. Since more than two-thirds of these men had left-wing pasts and most of the other third, Paulin-M6ry for example, were elected from left- wing constituencies, they quite naturally adopted a left-wing program when their broader one of 1889 failed to win a majority in France.

Barres, himself, became one of the chief publicists for explaining this new left-wing program. On the anniversary of the January, 1889, vic­ tory of Boulanger in Paris, he announced that in a year Boulangism had be­ come a socialist party. Boulangism of early 1889 bad only a negative pro­ gram. Boulanger was simply more popular than "the other republican chiefs

"'Dissolution' was only a battle cry. 'Revision, Constituant, Referendum' were excellent indications, but too abstract, unable to satisfy for long the heart of profound France." Barres argued that Boulangism had always been concerned with the "disinherited." For Boulangists of Radical-So­ cialist or socialist persuasion such a concern had always been evident.

For others, it was an extension of the principle of reconciliation in

Boulangism: For Boulanger, it flowed from his "instinctive love of the commander for his soldiers." Throughout 1889, however, this concern for social reform had been dulled by other Boulangist planks which, Barres believed, would have facilitated social reform: "The cult of the American

3For backgrounds and programs of the Boulangist deputies, see: Alphonse Bertrand, la Chambre de 1889. biographies des 576 deputes (Paris, 1889), passim.; Adrien Dansette, Le Boulangisme (Paris, 1946), passim.; Alexandre Z6vaes, Au Temps du boulangisme (Paris, 1930), pas­ sim. ; Jean Jolly, Dictionnaire des parlementaires francais (Several vols. in progress; Paris, I960- ), I, passim.; Henry Fouquier, "Quelques 6lus," Le Figaro, October 9, 1889. 88 constitution" achievable through the constituent, the abandonment of anti­ clericalism, the "defenestration of parliamentarianism," as well as pa­ triotism, revanche, anu a Russian alliance. The defeat of these planks in autumn, 1889, told Barres that these "better hammers are crushed in our hands" and had to be abandoned. This defeat showed that the Boulangist political program was incapable of victory and, because of that, unable to bring social reforms. By 1890, the uesires of the people for the ameliora­ tion of their misery "alone still impassions them." Thus, it appeared to

Barres, socialism was what had uriven the voters—at least a majority of them—to elect those deputies who remained Boulangist. As their back­ grounds show, most of these deputies had been left-wing anyway, so that they simply returned to their original principles. Because of that, held

Barres, the evolution of Boulangism to socialism was not "contrived" nor did it come from the "dexterity" which Boulangists were so often accused of having. Instead, "necessity created this wisdom for us." Socialism provided a base on which to restore the National Party, Perhaps the base would be strong enough to bring victory. The defeat at the 1889 elections made it appear that Boulangism would perish, Barres concluded, "but we rediscovered ourselves on this hospitable shore of socialism. It is a fair abode which necessity created for us. For us, our Jersey is socialism .

Barres had stated these principles as early as October, 1889, and events bore out his analysis. He credited his own surprising victory at the polls to his left-wing program and the help of Gabriel. His election

Siaurice Barres, "Les Enseignements d'une ann£e de boulangisme," Le Figaro. February 2, 1890. 89 and that of his fellow Boulangists had revealed the instinctive desires of the nation, had shown what really moved the people:

The word of the day is not politics: it is neither EMPIRE nor MONARCHY; the republican form satisfies us;—it is no longer an appeal to GLQIRE; . . . our workers are preoccu­ pied little with foreign complications: the profound ef­ forts of the people are uniquely for demanding social re­ forms. SQCIALISMj-is the dictum where contemporary France has put its hope.

Any examination of the election returns shows that Boulangists won in either working-class, petit-bourgeois, or monarchist districts. The lower- class voters apparently voted Boulangist as a way of achieving social re­ forms which the old parties had not given. When the monarchist-Boulangists had deserted, the Boulangist leadership concluded that these deserters would remain with the conservative parties in the next election regard­ less of the future program of Boulangism. Hence, revision and revanche took the back seat, and socialism became the way to power. Yet, as Har­ ris pointed out, socialism was only a Jersey, a place of temporary exile.

When Boulangism won power, it would also institute the rest of the old

program.

If the position described by Barres was socialism, it had a pecu­

liarly Boulangist tinge to it. For example, Barres insisted that social­

ism could triumph only through the leadership of a strong president.

Writing in the Boulangist La Presse, he took the view that socialism was

necessary to "reestablish the free equilibrium between the downtrodden

mass and a few egoistic monopolies." Yet, he continued, such free equi­

librium could not come of itself, because "the little world of capitalists"

co n tro lled both the economy and the parliam ent. "L iberty of commerce, a l l

^Maurice Barres, "Notes d'un nouvel 5lu," ibid., October 27, 1889. this pretended liberalism is only a fiction: the contest is not equal between the workers and their exploiters. It is necessary that a force intervene in favor of the first to re-establish equality." That force, he believed, was the strong leadership only a Boulangist presidential re­ public could provide. In a similar vein, he thought how ironic it was that the two most authoritarian capitals of .Europe, according to him, the

Berlin of Bismarck and the Rome of Leo XIII, were also the most social­ istic. William II, for whom Barres could not find harsh enough words, haa ju s t commemorated the 1881 workmen's compensation law, id e n tic a l to one just introduced in the Chamber by Laisant and the Boulangists. Bar­ res concluded that while Leo XIII "speaks nobly of socialism" and the

Reichstag "applauds a socialist program," the French government engages in "shabby quarrels.Of course, if Barres could call William II and

Lao XIII socialists, he did not interpret socialism as public ownership of the means of production, not did many of the other Boulangists. He meant by socialism, social reform. Yet, social reform in this period was widely interpreted, except by genuine socialists, as socialism. Jules

Huret, writing in Le Figaro in 18V6, put his finger on this mood:

The pope is socialist, William II is socialist, Maurice Barres is socialist .... The more ren te s one has, the more one has nothing, the more poker one plays, the more one p a r tic i­ pates in the "five o'clock," the more one is clothed by Red- fern, the more one is coiffed by Lenth&ric, the more one is s o c i a l i s t .'

^Maurice Barres, "Autorit6 et d&nocratie," La Presse, February U, 1890 . ^Quoted in Jacques Chastenet, La Rgpublique triomphante, 1893- 1906 (Paris, 1955), P. 30. 91 Another example of the Boulangist nature of this socialism, be it merely social reform, was its continuing concern for the reconciliation of all parties. The break of the royalists with Boulanger found Barres increas­ ingly sceptical of the old alliance being renewed, but socialism might provide a new accommodation with royalism. Expediency s till demanded that g Boulangism "sup with the conservatives and vote with the people." The efforts of Leo XIII might motivate the conservatives, through their sense of peril or charity, to accept the force of socialist ideas. However, he felt, the conservatives had to be willing to make the complete revolution for the masses (he quoted Saint-Just: "Those who make half-way revolutions only dig their own graves"), just as the masses had to renounce anti-cler­ icalism. These concerns caused him to write: "Suture of Old Regime France and democracy in socialism, the forgetting of shabby anti-clerical quib­ bling , the acceptance and completion of the Revolution of 89. And it is necessary to avow that the election of last September-October in Meurthe- 9 et-Moselle created the first lines of this new mental state in France."

Barres would recruit a revolutionary personnel by appealing through reason and education to the privileged like himself and through Christian love to the conservative Catholic. The social Catholics of the Count de Mun, who often voted with the Left in the Chamber, made the latter appear pos­ sible, but Barres willingness to cooperate with the social Catholics was only tactical. He did not support de Mun's religious reasons for being a

^Maurice Barrfes, "Du Recrutement d'un personnel r^volutionnaire," Le Figaro, April 2, 1890. See also his "Coup d’oeil sur la Session parle- mentaire qui vient de finir," Le Courrier de l'E st. March 3> 1890. 9 Maurice Barrfes, "Le role de la politique s'amoindrit chaque jour," Le Courrier de lUSst, April 13 » 1890. Italics in original. By this Bar- r&s meant that h|s own victory had been the first indication of the social­ ist nature of the electorate. 92 reformer."^

The Boulangist evolution to what Barres called socialism was soon complete. By February, 1B90, the Courrier ae l'E st proclaimed that

"today the National Party is composed only of socialists." It proudly at­ tributed this development to the articles of Barres "which made great noise declaring that the politics of the National Party ought to be en­ tirely socialist."'^' In a widely reported speech in November, 1889, at

Reims, Gabriel declared that the republic would be "democratic and social," that it was necessary to "relieve the lot of the small and humble, and to protect labor against the financial syndicates." 12 At Ivry-Port, to a wildly cheering crowd for de Belleval, who had been anything but socialist, antoine Jourde compared the exile of Blanqui to that of Boulanger and boasted that "our chief," Boulanger, would lead the National Party to 13 social reforms. At the Pfere Lachaise cemetery on the anniversary of the death of Blanqui, Granger revealed that the Boulangists followed the politics of Blanqui. On the anniversary of the Commune Ernest Roche paid his respects to Boulanger by saying that France removed "a general who has never done but his duty while a G allifet is covered with honors." 15

^Whatever ties Barr&s had with Catholic social action and cor­ porativism will be dealt with in a later chapter.

, "La Politique socialiste," Le Courrier de l fEst. Febru­ ary 16, 1890. 12 Le Figaro and La Presse. November 19, 1889.

~^La Presse. February 4, 1890.

~^Le Temps, January 5, 1890.

^Le Figaro, March 19, 1890. 93 For non-Boulangists it was amazing enough for Boulangism to be turning socialistic, but for Barres to be its chief publicist was beyond belief. The ability of this effete celebrator of the ego even to be elected had been shock enough. For him to be a socialist was simply in­ conceivable. This mooa of incredibility was captured by this parody of th e opening session of the new Chamber:

The session opened at two o'clock. The President gave the floor to M. Maurice Barres to interpellate the Minister of the Interior concerning the working-classes.

M. MAURICE BARRES—Gentlemen, I come before you to plead the sacred cause of the worker, the proletarian. It is our role to grasp the ingenuous victory of suppressing the shadows. Thus, the worker is in the shadow of the dominant personality. (Murmurs from the Center: Explain yourself. We do not under­ stan d .)

THE PRESIDENT—I invite the speaker to clarify his thought.

M. BARRES—Poor worker. Better his lo t. (Agreement from the Left: We have understood.) Let him come to us, in our arms (Protests from several benches) and in our arms smile dreams .... It is not necessary that the worker keep from re­ nouncing or instituting in a dream evil or ugliness, but that he deigns to desire that those things gave birth to beauti­ ful and good things.

M. CONSTANS [Minister of Interior] (To his bench).—It will be difficult to reply to the previous speaker.

M. DEROULEDE—I understand him. That is enough.

M. Ba REES—I continue and I present an ordre du .jour con­ ceived in th is way (Movement of a tte n tio n ): "The Chamber, set free with the hymn of renouncement regarding those who, Bearing a life scarcely worth living, turning aside from re­ formers and other fine souls, as sterile sensualists who gesticulate at the crossroads and, abandoning hymns, will ignore all martyrs [all this is quoted directly from Sous l'O eil des barbares], passes to the ordre du jour."

M. CONSTANS—The minister declines to reply. He feels over­ whelmed. He asks the ordre du .jour pure and simple (Yes, pure and sim ple, from a g reat number of benches). 94 The ordre du .jour pure and simple, having the priority, was voted by a c o lo ssa l m ajo rity . Those voting against: M. Barres and M. D&roul&de, who asked M. Barres for permission to put his speech into verse. "My speech? No," replied M. Barres, "but the text of my ordre du jour, yes." ^ If that is not modesty, I do not know what it is.

II

The opening session of the new Chamber, meeting from November,

1889, through July, 1890, showed that x,he Boulangists did, indeed stand for the position Barres had set forth and revealed which deputies really were Boulangist. Both can be discerned from the Boulangist legislative proposals and voting record, which also show what Barres stood for. 17

Before their position can be analysed, however, it is first neces­ sary to verify which deputies were really Boulangists. This is made dif­ ficult by the multi-party system, in which the Boulangists were almost always forced to ally on particular issues with other parties and blocs.

Fortunately, the first session of the 1889 Chamber of Deputies contained two proposals on which the Boulangists stood by themselves against the rest of tne house. The first of these came on May 13, 1890, when the

Chamber verified the election of Auguste Delpeuch, who had just gained in a by-election the seat won in 1889 oy a Boulangist. The Boulangist1s election had been invalidated by the Chamber, as had those of several of his fellows and conservatives. In the first months of the session

^Albert Millaud, "Le Premier discours de M. Barres a la Chambre," Le F ig a ro . November 5, 1889. ^ In the following analysis of this voting record, the emphasis will be on the Boulangist bloc as a whole. Unless otherwise indicated, Barres always voted with the bloc. 95 conservatives and Boulangists had votea together against all invalida­ tions, but by May, 1890, only 33 Boulangist die-hards, including Barres, claiming to be upholding the infallibility of universal suffrage, could 18 be found to oppose the seating of Delpeuch. The second time in the first session when the Boulangists stood completely alone was in opposing new duties on sugar. Such issues usually invited the support of the Radi­ cals or the dozen non-Boulangist socialists. On July 26, however, only 31

Boulangists, including Barres, were found to vote for the proposal of

Francis Laur to eliminate all indirect, taxes on sugar destined for the table. Laur, speaking for the Boulangist brand of socialism, argued that revenue should be raised by progressive income and corporation taxes rather than by indirect taxes effecting food prices. "We are," he concluded,

. . . of that socialist, school (Exclamations from diverse benches) which thinks that the worker ought to De favored principally not by giving him laws on hygiene and inspection which, in reality, have no influence on his well-being, but by being preoccupied with augmenting the purchasing power of his wage in the basic necessities of life (matieres aliment . taires ae premieres necessit6s 1.^-9 a comparison of these two votes, neither of which won the support of the sometime allies of Boulangism, shows that Barres and 27 other deputies 20 voted alone on both occasions. Three additional conservative-Boulangists—

18 Journal officiel de la ft4publique francaise. Ddbats. Chambre. May 14, 1890, pp. 789-791 and 799-800. Hereafter cited as JOG. For the vote of each Boulangist deputy on this issue, see the appendix listing under this footnote number. All other major votes discussed in this chap­ ter are similarly listed by the footnote number used in this chapter.

19Ibid., July 27, 1890, pp. 1649 and 1656-1657.

20Besides Barres, these were Airael, Argelies, * de Belleval, Borie, Boudeau, Castelin, Chichi, Dumonteil, Farcy, Gabriel, Goussot, Jourde, La- guerre, Laisant, Laur, Le H6riss3, Le Senne, Le Veill6, Millevoye, Naquet, Paulin-M6ry, Pontois, Revest, P. Richard, Saint-Martin, Terrail-Mermiex, and Turigny. Marius Martin, Raoul ciu Saussay, and Gauthier de Clagny—voted only a- gainst Delpeuch, while two Blanquist.-Boulangist&-Granger and Ernest Roche— voted only for the Laur proposal. These five, especially the last two, could oe relied upon in most Boulangist votes. Ada to these the thoroughly

Boulangist DSroulede and Laporte, who were absent from the Chamber on one or both of these votes, one gets a bloc of 30-32 Boulangists.

By following the votes of these men on the issues which commanded a multi-party vote in the Chamber, one can discover that the program of 21 Barres and the Boulangists was twofold. Socially, it stood for sweep­ ing working-class and petit-bourgeois ameliorations; politically, it de­ manded a program of constitutional revision and nationalism.

The f i r s t session of the new Chamber soon showed th a t on so cial questions Barres and the Boulangists were side by side with the socialists 22 and, less often, the left-wing Radicals. For example, Barrfes and the

Boulangists were in the minority when on November 23, 1889 the Chamber turned down, 362 votes to 74, the proposal of the socialist Jean Bap­

tiste Dumay for a minimum wage in match factories to be established by 23 workers and municipal councilers. They likewise supported the Ferroul

project of financial assistance and amnesty for Nord strikers, defeated

by 364 to 117 on November 25, 1 8 8 9 .^ With Barres they composed 34 of

_ The following analysis is based on that procedure. 22 In these votes, a bloc of 45 to 50 generally indicates Boulan­ gist, Radical-Socialist, a socialist cooperation; 60 to 75 adds the left- wing Radicals; 90 to 115 adds the Radicals and perhaps the social Catho­ lics of de Mun.

23J0C.. November 24, 1889, p. 146.

^ Ibid., November 26, 1889, pp. 153-157 and 169-170. 97 the 50 votes in favor of the urgence on March 28, 1890 for the proposed

Granger-Paulin-M£ry aid to slaughterhouse and tanning workers, unemployed 25 as a result of a hoof and mouth epidemic. They made up 31 of the 44 votes favoring Le Veill£1s amendment to the trade union b ill allowing an indem­ nity of 16 days pay to a worker whose employer had prevented his employee 26 from joining a union. In the debate of May 19, 1890, on the mine ins­ pection b ill, which would have allowed workers to elect a fellow worker as a mine inspector, Roche was the principal speaker for a Ferroul amend­ ment to create full-time inspectors, but the Chamber beat down the 111 vote minority of Boulangists, socialists, Raaical-Socialists, Radicals, and

Barres. Other amendments to put teeth in the bill and provide for ins­ pector independence were supported by Barres and the Boulangists and de- 27 feated by similar majorities. The debates of July 5 to 8, 1890, on the

Senate child and female labor bill saw Barres and the Boulangists support­ ing every amendment, many sponsored by Roche, Granger, Chichi, and Gabriel, to strengthen it. Most were defeated with a minority made up of Boulan­ gists, Radicals, Radical-Socialists , and socialists. Others, with the help of de Mun, commanded larger minorities or were even victorious. The lure of de Mun defined the differences between the socialists and Boulan­ gists. A de Mun amendment on July 7 to make Sundays and holy days the required days of rest for women and children even mustered 22 Boulangist votes, including that of Barres, with only 9 remaining true to socialist

25Ibid., March 29, 1890, pp. 693-694 and 696 - 6 9 7 .

26Ibid. . May 14, 1890, pp. 797 and 803-804.

27Ibid. . May 20, 1890, pp. 823-843 and 848-849. 98 28 anti-clericalism. In addition to voting for those social reforms which reached the floor, Boulangists introduced several proposals in the first session, which promptly died in the commissions. Laguerre sought to unify all pension funds, Le Veill£ to lower the price of ordinary to­ bacco while raising that of deluxe, and Laisant, Gabriel, and Laguerre to establish old age pensions for workers through an elaborate tax scheme 29 against gas and railroad companies.

Although the Boulangists and Barr6s almost always voted with

their fellow blocs of the extreme left of the Chamber on social questions,

th e ir record was more complex on p o litic a l questions. On some, Barr&s

and the Boulangists still cooperated with the Left. They were 35 strong

for the proposal of the Radical Adolphe Maujon, turned down 345 to 123 on 30 November 19, 1889, to revise the constitution immediately. They over­

whelmingly supported the amnesties of Emile Moreau, defeated 317 to 180

on February 24, 1890, and Joseph Ferroul, defeated 305 to 134 on June 5, 31 1890. On June 14, 1890, they comprised 27 of the 45 deputies who re­

fused to vote the ordre du .jour pure and simple following the Valentin

Couturier interpellation objecting to the use of troops to crush a I^on 32 strike of glassworkers earlier in the year. Barres voted with the Bou­

langists on all these issues. Other issues put Barres and the Boulangists

28Ibid. . July 7-9, 1890, pp. 1320-1328, 1335-1338, 1342-1346, 1354-1361, 1363-1364, 1379-1380, 1383-1386, 1395-1398. 29 X., ”La Politique socialiste,11

3QJ0C.. November 20, 1889, pp. 87 and 97. ^Ib id . . February 25 and June 6, 1890, pp. 331-333, 351, 959, and 975-976.

32Ibid. . June 15, 1890, pp. 1062-1064, 1076-1077. on the side of the royalists, and against the Left. The vote of the

ChamDer on January 25, 1890, to annul the election of Jules Delahaye, who had deserted his former Boulangist friends, found Barr&s and the

Boulangists unanimously on the side of the defeated Right in objecting 33 to all invalidations. On February 10, 1890, only Boudeau, Granger, and Roche refused to follow the support of Barres and the Boulangists for the royalist proposal to repeal the 1886 law against the entry to

Ql France of members of former ruling families. In so voting, the Bou­ langist press described itself not as "authoritarian Jacobins," but as partisans of the "open republic." 35 On March 25, 1890, when the Boulan­ gist ue Belleval proposed that the Paris municipal council be based on proportional representation of the parties, Barr&s and the Boulangists won support from the Right instead of the Left. The strangeness of the sometime Boulangist cooperation with the Right was illustrated in the proposal of the Baron de Mackau on June 16, 1890, allowing city gov­ ernments to use the referendum. Alaquet, speaking for the Boulangists, made an eloquent speech in favor of a kind of Swiss federalism, arguing that only the referendum could really implement universal suffrage in the

French republic. Although Naquet criticized the undemocratic features of the de Mackau bill, particularly its concurrent majorities principle of voting by tax groupings without the secret ballot, he nonetheless led

^ Ib id ., January 26, 1890, pp. 98-99*

3^Ibid. . February 11, 1890, pp. 254-255. ^35 As quoted in Le Figaro, February 9, 1890.

36J0C.. March 26, 1890, pp. 641-644. 100 Barr&s and the Boulangists in unanimous opposition to the government's attempt x-o k ill it. 37

In short, the first session of the new Chamber of Deputies saw

Barr&s and the Boulangists seeking allies on any side of the house to

carry out their program. In demanding sweeping social reforms, Barres

and the Boulangists regularly voted with the Left. In hope of carrying

out at least part of the Boulangist political program of the "open re­

public" and whatever remained of "Dissolution, Revision, and Constituent,"

Barres and the Boulangists voted with both Left and Right. No other bloc

in the Chamber followed this Boulangist voting pattern.

I l l

However, the Boulangists could not oe content with being a par­

liamentary bloc. Their central thrust had been to conquer France for

their constitution. Their alliance with the Right had been a mistake,

the 1889 elections had been a great loss, but the Boulangists were so

caught up in the mystique of their movement that they would not abandon

their cause, as Laguerre pointed out in the opening days of the new Cham­

ber, the National Party would reouild itself on socialism, find revenge

in the Paris municipal elections of 1890, ana go on to capture France. 38

In 1890 and 1891, however, the opposite occurred: Boulangism's unity as

a parliamentary bloc declined, and its party collapsed and died. Through

i t al 1 Bstrrfes stood by lik e a mourner a t a wake.

37Ibid., June 17, 1890, pp. 1083-1087 and 1091-1092. 3®Pierre Denis, Le Memorial de Sainte-Br£lade (Paris, 1894), p. 178. 101

Early in 1890 the Boulangist National Republican Party, as it called itself, still had several factors which augured well for its fu­ ture and others which pointed in the opposite direction. Its approximate­ ly 30 deputies were the most disciplined bloc of the extreme Left and, in many ways, the most left-wing. By comparison, the dozen socialists were disunified and so minute in numbers that they created scarcely a stir.

The National Party had a substantial press, headed by La Presse and L'ln- transigeant; the potential of formidable leadership in men like Laguerre,

Naquet, Laisant, Deroulede, and Rochefortj and well-established electoral

committees at least in Paris, Nancy, and Bordeaux. It was not for nothing that Dfiroulede could te ll his supporters at Angouleme, "The Boulangist group is to the Chamber what the flame is to the candle."39 Yet, there

also wqs a built-in instability in the National Party. As time went on,

th e apparent voting d is c ip lin e in the Chamber was but a th in veneer hiding

the poorly joined segments of the party. This factionalism tended to dis­

sipate the leadership potential, split the local organizations, and pre­

vent the party from pursuing a united policy.

N onetheless, th e common p e r il a t th e beginning of th e new Chamber

held the factions together, and the most immediate danger, it appeared to

Barres and his fellows, was the Chamber's invalidations of the elections

of several Boulangist deputies.^ As. the invalidated candidates stood

for reelection, their rallies reflected the unity of the National Party.

On December 23 j Revest, invalidated at Saint-Denis, shared a platform

■^Quoted in Le Temps, A p ril 1, 1890.

^Maurice Barres, "L1Infaillibilitd du suffrage universel," La P re sse . December 8, 1889. 102 with Laguerre, Jourde, and the Blanquist, Elie May, while a League of

Patriots rally at Montreuil brought together Laguerre, Millevoye, Pierre

Richard, Jourde and G abriel.^ Barrfes concluded a speech at a rally for

Naquet by saying, "If I cry ' Vive Boulanger I Vive Naqueti' it is that ip these two cries with to say: 'Fatherland and Liberty!1 Barres and

Gabriel also attended rallies for Paulin-M6ry and de Belleval.^ They sat at the table of honor with 18 other Boulangists of all stripes to hear

D&roul&de call for returning the invalidated deputies and winning the spring Paris municipal elections.^* The call was successful for Paris and its suburbs, where the invalidated deputies were easily re-elected, but it aid not prevent the defeats in the provinces. The elections showed that Boulangist strength lay chiefly in the cities, and that the 1889 vic­ tories had been achieved in the provinces through the help of conserva­ tives. At Toulouse in 1889, for example, a Boulangist had trailed Cons- tans 6,883 to 8,394 with only token opposition from a monarchist and so­ cialist. The Boulangist vote haa apparently come from monarchists and anti-Constans Radicals, who did not present a candidate. In a by-elec­ tion in March, 1890, for the same seat the total vote was 2,000 less, but the Boulangists was cut in half and the Center Republican's by two-thirds.

The Radical victor got 4,000 more votes than the socialist had in 1889, and monarchism tripled its vote.^ In other words, the voters were

^ I b i d . . December 24, 1889.

^Le Figaro, February 14, 1890.

^"Les Reunions a Paris," Le Courrier de l'E st, February 16, 1890.

^*Le Temps. January 28, 1890.

^Ibid., March 11, 1890. 103 returning to their old loyalties. Boulangism could no longer count on .Radical and monarchist support.

Unfortunately for the Boulangists, one of these elections pointed

out the difficulties of maintaining unity. For the seat at Morbihan of the invalidated Dillon, who had won by 9*000 votes to 2,800, Fr€d£ric

Soulid ran a poor third behind a monarchist and republican.^ This re­

sult split the National Committee. A Naquet-Millevoye-Laguerre group

of attentjstes convinced the committee to have Souli£ withdraw purely and simply. Deroulede and Laisant actionists urged hint to continue in the run-off. If that were not Dad enougn, Martineau, who was of the group wishing that Souli£ retire in favor of the republican, resigned from the

committee. Within aays he was denounced in the Boulangist press by Cas-

telin and Millevoye and was castigated before his constituents by his in former friend Goussot. He then joined the opposition.

The dust from this had not settled when Boulangist unity was

threatened by anti-Semitism. A rally og January 18 for the invalidated

Francis Laur, attended by the usual wide spectrum of Boulangist leadership,

also included Laur's anti-Semitic friends, Edouard Drumont and the Marquis

de Mores, who spouted their usual shibboleths about the "jewish financial

coalition." The violence of their arguments bothered many Boulangists,

especially when two of their leaders, Naquet and Elie May, were Jews. At

the rally, Laisant agreed that it was all right to shout "A bas les juifs11

so long as one added all those who lived on the labor of others. D6rou-

lede hedged by saying, "Naquet is not a Jewj he is a philosophe. a patriot,

^Le Figaro, January 14, 1890.

^ Ibid. , January 18, 19> 22, and ff., 1890. 104 i r t and a French republican.11 Laisant repeated his formula two days later at a rally for the invalidated Naquet, and at the Boulangist anniversary banquet of January 27, attended by Barres, a letter from Boulanger was read saying, "I wish liberty of conscience for all, for tfte Jews as for

IQ Catholics, Protestants, and even Moslems."

The anti-Semitic furor in Boulangism brought a reaction from

Barres, which gives us an insight into his anti-Semitism. For him, anti-

Semitism was only a technique for leading the mob to socialism. "The crowd has always needed a battle cry to be rallieaj it wants some cry of passion which will make abstract ideas tangible." "Hatred . . . is one of the more vigorous sentiments which produced our civilization" and anti-Semitism happens to be the most popular hatred of the time. When it goes out of style, find another. Barres argued that the anti-Semitism of

Drumont and his ilk was incomplete and only hatred. "A bas les .juifsi"

had to be converted into "A bas les inegalit^s socialesl11 At present,

the Jews personified to the public the chief perpetrators of these inequali­

ties. As such, anti-Semitism was a useful tool to lead various non-so­

cialists to socialisms Catholics ruined in the Union g£nerale crash,

patriots hating German Jews, the bourgeois and peasant debtors. "State

socialism," he concluded, "is the indispensable corrective of the anti-

Jewish formula." State socialism under a strong man would be able to re- 50 concile classes and end the injustices which Drumont simply labeled "Jews."

^Ibid., January 20, 1890.

^ I b i d . , January 28, 1890 and Le Temps, January 22, 1890. 50 Maurice Barres, "La Formula antijuive," Le Figaro, February 22, 1890 . 105 One year later Barres saw what he thought proved his argument. Accord­ ing co him, Drumont*s Testament d'un antisomite, which favorably men­ tioned Jules Guesde and Benoit Malon, editor of La Revue socialiste. more than any other writers, sold 100,000 copies. If each of these had 30 readers, 3,000,000 Frenchmen were exposed to Drumont*s socialistic, as well as anti-Semitic, ideas and made receptive to the socialist cause.

Since these 3,000,000 had to come from the old parties, the promise of

Boulangism to bring working-class reforms by reconciling and "declassing the parties" was possible through anti-Semitism. 51 Such anti-Semitism was in keeping with that expressed by Barres in the 1889 campaign, and markedly different from thetwentieth-century variety.

The rapid falling away of the provincial vote confirmed Boulangist aesire to find revenge in the municipal elections of Paris, where the

party was oest organized and had its biggest vote. However, by iXtarch

arguments over the naming of candidates split the party between the sup­

porters of Laguerre and D6roul&de. Both prepared separate lists of can- 52 didates. In some quarters D^roulede struck bargains with the Blanquists.

A third group, led by Louis Andrieux, who had broken with the National

Committee at the time of the Martineau split, sought a Boulangism based on

the revisionist principle without the revisionist man or the alliance with

the R ight.^ The followers of Drumont and Mores formed a small fourth

group, since Boulanger would have none of their anti-Semitism. To heal

“^Maurice Barr&s, "Les Adhesions d&aocratiques," Le Courrier de l'E st. March 28, 1891.

^ L e Temps, March 25, 1890.

^Le Figaro, April 3, 1890. 106 the Laguerre-D&roulede oreak the Boulangist high command, including Bar- rfes, trooped to Jersey on April 5th to parley with Boulanger and Roche­ fort. On their return, Laguerre told the press that there would be a single slate in all but four or five quarters and that even the candi­ dates of Andrieux would be tolerated.^ A list of 82 candidates, "invested11 by Boulanger, was then prepared with almost unbelievable incompetency, with some names appearing in more than one quarter and others refusing the in­ vestiture. Moreover, the factional feuding continued. A typical case was at Clignancourt where the invested candidate engaged in three weeks of mutual recriminations with the candidate of the quarter's Boulangist com­ mittee. Despite the personal intervention of Boulanger, both candidates so wore themselves out against each other that neither won in this most ardently Boulangist quarter. 55 The same continued elsewhere between the

Laguerre and D^roulede men. The electoral program contained so few local issu e s th a t i t was n a tio n a l Boulangism warmed o v e r, an obvious attem pt to win the national power for the National Party. 56

By election night, april 27th, the Boulangist dream of capturing the nation through the Paris Hotel de Ville was shattered. Only one B oulangist was e le c te d , although s t i l l another was elected in the May 4 run-off. The defeat testified, in part, to the lack of organization.

Two or more Boulangists ran in 20 quarters and so split the votes that their opponents won more easily. Had Boulangism had single candidates, they might have won in the seven other quarters where Boulangist majorities

^Le Temps, April 6, 1890.

^ Ibid.. April 18 and 24, 1890.

*^Le Figaro. April 13, 1890. 107 on the first ballot were split up among as many as four candidates . ^ By the second ballot the feuding had so broken Boulangist dlan that even these sections faileu to give the single remaining Boulangist a majority. Of course, the other parties, particularly the Radicals, had organizational problems, but Boulangism could not afford them. With its platform of na­ tional reconciliation, it was supposed to be above faction and, unlike the other parties, it could no longer make deals on the second ballot, its socialism alienating the Right and its authoritarianism repelling the Left.

Yet, even with oetter organization and less factionalism, the Boulangists still could never have won more than 10 seats. Charles Chincholle pointed out that Paris had given Boulanger 247,000 votes in January, 1889. In

1890 this same total was split between Boulangists (127,000) and their 58 conservative allies of 1889 (120,000). The old alliance no longer worked.

Naquet, speaking for the National Committee, now wrote the General that all was finished unless he returneci, that being the only way to keep the people worked up. Otherwise, continued agitation would only keep the anti-Boulangists united. Boulanger wrote Laisant, now chairman of the

National Committee, that he would not return, that further fighting.was sterile, and that the elections provea he no longer needed the National

Committee as intermediary between him and the people. 59 Within a week the committee was dissolved.

a ll this is to show how unreal were the dreams of Barres and his fellows. Barres spent the summer advising his workers how to form trade

C O " As shown by the election results in Le Temps. April 29, 1890.

**8Le Figaro. A pril 29, 1890.

59Denis, pp. 189-195 and 210-211. 108 unions and consoling himself with the fact that there still were .30

Boulangists to agitate in the Chamber of Deputies. However, even this crasned down with the revelations in the conservative Le Figaro of the

"Coulisses du Boulangisme" [roughly, "Behind the Scenes of Boulangism"] 50 by a mysterious "X." Installment after installment of this vibrant ex- pos6, too accurately detailed to be written by anyone other than a Bou­ langist insider, revealed among other things that the Boulangists had indeed planned a coup d1£tat for the night of the Paris elections of

January, 1889, had negotiated with and taken money from the royalists, and had seen to it that Boulanger, himself, secretly met with the Pre­

ten d ers.

After in itial shocked disbelief, the Boulangist press guardedly

admitted the authenticity of the "Coulisses." Barres, typical of the

Boulangist apologists, pointed out that even "X" admitted that Boulanger refused to adhere to the coup a1gtat because of his republican attach­ ments, Thirty years of military service under civilian control, however,

had ill-prepared him for politics. It had conditioned him to accept with­

out question his civilian political lieutenants, who had thrust themselves

on him, and not all of them were good men. From the bad ones, the ones

urging victory at any cost, came the "thousand shameless, absurd steps of

Boulangism," especially the willingness for a coup d^tat and a royalist

alliance when republican means had failed. Although the Boulangists had

the best "intentions in the world, they made stupid blunders: Too many

^X. [DieudonnS Terrail-Mermiex, ] "Coulisses du boulangisme," Le Figaro. August 20 and 27, September 3, 10, 17, and 24, October 1 and 22, 1890. 109 politickers, and questionable meetings with reactionaries."^-

By September, Laguerre admitted that he had permitted Mermiex to vqrite the "Coulisses," nat knowing they would tell so much.^ The old

National Committee revived itself long enough to read Mermiex, now being called "Merde-miex,11 out of the party and to pledge continued dedication to constitutional revision for a "liberal, democratic, and social Repub- lie." Then its members ran for cover. Not until the end of September did they brave their voters and then only to claim, as did de Belleval, that they followed the Boulangist program without becoming "infeudated" to the General or paid by royalist gold.^ He could only hope that his voters had forgotten his expensive American-style campaign of 1889. Ral­ lies such as the one for Laguerre, which Barr&s attended, were almost 65 broken up with chants of "Re-sign." But the worst was yet to come.

at his "trial" Mermiex, who was not an insider of Boulangism until after the 1889 legislative elections, said his information had come from monarchists and "republican friends." Who were they and why did they al­ low Mermiex to tell all? Fingers pointed to Naquet and, especially, La­ guerre. To the party faithful at a rally on October 31st, Laguerre ap­ peared to let down Boulanger when he said that Boulangism was finished and

^Maurice Barres, "La Voie du peuple et le proscrit," Le Courrier de l'E st. August 31, 1890. See also: Maurice Barres, "Impressions de Rentr6e," ibid., November 9, 1890.

^Le Temps. September 2, 1890.

^Xbid., September 6, 1890.

^Ib id ., September 30, 1890.

65•'"Bien joue Laguerrei" Le Figaro, November 1, 1890. Laguerre's quotations which follow in the next paragraph are from this article. 110 no more than a "fact of history,11 The nation needed "peace and repose," and revisionism should "look to the future and go forward" without Bou­ la n g e r. On November 9 th , D&roul&de accused Laguerre of being behind the

"Coulisses" as a way of getting back into favor with the governmental par­ ties: "M. Laguerre . . . pleaded the cause of General Boulanger with so much talentj now that this cause appears lost to him, he abandons it for a new c lie n t. Who? . . . Is i t M. C o n sta n s? "^ November ra n i t s course with a series of duels between Laguerre and his faction and DSroulede and h is .

These feuds so broke the National Party's unity that by December, the Boulangist bloc in the Chamber was down to 24 members, having lost

Radicals or Radical-Revisionists like Naquet, Laguerre, Le H£riss6, Pon- tois, Turigny, Borie, and Laports and Conservative Revisionists like Martin and du Saussay. This figure was revealed by the votes on seven issues in the first three months of the session, which began in October. Although many of these transactions were supported by other blocs of the Left or

Right, these 24 Boulangists supported all of them. These also showed just what Barr&s and Boulangism stood for by the end of 1890.

The first issue, supported by Barres, the Boulangists, two dozen others of the extreme left, and a handful of rightists, showed the Bou­ langist financial position: A series of amendments to the budget by de

Belleval and Chichi demanded more governmental efficiency and economy.

Typical was a proposed reduction in the appropriation for the Conserva­ toire des arts et metiers which, according to the committee report, had

k^Le Temps. November 10, 1890. I l l an insufficient number of students in several courses.

The second, another fa c e t of the B oulangist "economy d riv e ," was the de Belleval proposal, mustering a total of 39 deputies including Bar­ res, and reflecting the Boulangist claim of corruption in the parliament­ ary republic, to reduce the ministry of justice appropriation. De Belle­ val argued that until judges were elected by universal suffrage appoint- 68 ments were political plums and judges "the creatures of 14. Wilson."

The third, supported by Barres, the Boulangists, and a handful from Left and Bight, was the de Belleval proposal for caisses des in- valides. Typical of the nationalistic nature of Boulangist social re­ forms, it would be financed by taxes on the operation of the Bourse, which was the center of "the international financial conspiracy," ac­ cording to the Boulangists, and resident aliens and by paring down sala- ries of the most highly paid civil servants. 69

The fourth, illustrating the Boulangist plebiscitist tendency, was the Paulin M3ry proposal to submit to a referendum the proposed con­ version of outstanding short-term bonds into long-term ones. Socialists and Boulangists both contended that the conversion amounted to a new bond issue and would play into the hands of speculators and financiers; but only a handful of socialists supported the Barres and Boulangist use of the referendum by voting against tne governments proposal.

Growing out of the bond conversion was a fifth issue, the refusal of 53 Socialists, with Ferroul as their spokesman, rightists, Barres and

JOC. , November 5, 1890, pp. 1873 and 1889-1890.

^ Ib id . . November 9, 1890, pp. 1958 and 1964-1965.

69Ib id . . December 9, 1890, pp. 2522-2523 and 2530-2531. .

70Ibid., December 11, 1890, pp. 2536-2537, 2556-2558. 112 Boulangists to vote for the budget of 1891. In the explanations of the budget vote DSroulfede, speaking for "twenty-seven irreconcilables" who would serve the Third Republic like the Cinq served the Second Empire, said that they would vote against the budget as a way to vote against the m inisterial republic and for the Boulangist tolerant, open,presiden- tial republic. 71 Barres and Gabriel later claimed that they voted a- gainst the budget because it was not in balance and its new taxes fell 72 on the poor instead of the rich. In his 11 twenty-seven irreconcilables"

D6roulede optim istically included tne Badical-Hevisionist ex-Boulangists

Borie, Laporte, and Turigny. They did not join the Boulangists on the sixth issue, the vote against the validation of Lavy for the Clignancourt seat of Boulanger. On this, 24 Boulangists, including Barres, were jpined by eight conservative-revisionxsts, six of whom had voted for the budget. 73

According to Gabriel in a rally explaining his and Barres votes, Boulan­ ger had been "regularly elected," never verified by the Chamber, and his

nr i election only "had been annuled administratively" by the government.

On the final issue, these same 24 Boulangists were the only depu­ ties to vote, without discussion, against a credit to Sudanese flood vic- tims. 75 The nationalism of Boulangism meant taxes on foreigners and a vigorous European m ilitary and diplomatic posture, but an intransigent anti-colonialism.

71Ibid. . December 11, 1890, pp. 2550-2551 and 2859-^560.

7^Le Oourrier de l'E st, April 19, 1890.

73JOC.. December 23, 1890, pp. 2614-B617 and 2621-2622.

7^"R6union de la Salle Poirel," Le Courrier de l^Est, April 18, 1891. 7, JOC., January 27, 1891, PP» 105 and 117-118. 113 Although the Boulangists were fewer in number, they s till con­

tinued to show considerable s o lid a rity in the Chamber. Yet, they were only a parliamentary bloc and no longer a party. As a bloc, they kept

their reformist stance. For example, with Barres they sought to strengthen the Senate child and female labor b ill, even to supporting strongly de 76 Hun's efforts to make holy days the required days of rest. They, with­

out Barres, were joined by socialists and Radical-Socialists when Francis

Laur proposed the extension of the 12 hour day to all workers. 77 As a

party, however, their leadership, press, and organization split or dis­

appeared. as soon as the Laguerre-Mermiex authorship of the Coulisses

became obvious, D^roulede sought permission from Boulanger to take com­

mand of the parliamentary party. Boulanger, ambiguous as ever, granted

it so long as the Boulangist deputies agreed, but Dfiroulede met such stub­

born opposition from the non-league Boulangists that Boulanger withdrew 78 whatever support he had given. With this development, it was obvious

that only Boulanger could unite the disparate factions, but he was so

absorbed with his dying mistress that he refused to return to France or

direct the party from abroad, even after the death of his mistress in

the summer of 1891. Barres, for example, publicly refused to accept the

*^Ibid., January 28, February 3, 4, 6, and 8, 1891, pp. 124-12$, 131-138, 182-184, 192-193, 199-202, 207-21$, 219-220, 226-227, 240-241, 247-246, and 266.

77Ibid. . June 4, 1891, pp. 1112-1121 and 1126-1127. 73Tharaud, Jerome et Jean, La Vie et la mort de D^roulfede (Paris, 192$), pp. 74—77J Denis, passim.; and Dansette, pp. 350- 358. 114 leadership of either D^roulede or ttochefort, the most obvious choices.^

The party press likewise disappeared with the withdrawal of the Laguerre faction, save the readerless La Voix du Peuple of Pierre Denis, the last rem aining confidant of th e G eneral. The comment of Le Figaro not only summarized the state of the Boulangist press but that of the party as a whole:

Sign of the times: The Courrier du Soir called La Presse a "Boulangist journal." La Presse objects to this epithet.

Whatever illusions Boulangism had about preserving its separate identity were dispelled at the end of September, 1891, when General Bou­ langer shot himself on the grave of his mistress in the Brussels cemetary of Ixelles. At first the old Boulangists, who trooped to his funeral, saw this as an opportunity to renew their solidarity. The group of Le Veill£,

Paulin-M6ry, and Denis issued a manifesto that they would remain true to the Boulangist program, and Henri ttochefort told the London Daily Tele- graph that the suicide would reunite the Boulangists. 81 With his usual defiance he wrote that Boulanger was a Hannibal, killed not by Scipio but by "German Jews, thieves and mercenaries froutiers 111 and added:

This man who was master of the ttepubiic and whose scruples alone prevented him from seizing it when it was offered to him will have his legend and enter history, in spite of the dung and filth that the hirelings [entretenus] of the slimy press will once more discharge on him. Constans ought to be enraptured: a new cadaver enriches his vast cemetery.

^"tt£union de la Salle Poirel," Le Courrier de l'E st. April 18, 1891, and Maurice Barres, "Chez ttochefort," ibid., September 19, 1891.

8^Le Figaro, January 13, 1891.

81Ibid., October 3, 1891.

Q'J Quoted in Le Courrier de l 'E s t, October 3, 1891' 115 Barres wrote, "If I loved the Ideas of General Boulanger, is it necessary that I say so again?" Apparently it was, for it took him two columns to reassert his Boulangism and swear;,his undying devotion to the cause, des- 83 pite its possible adverse effect on his political career. The funeral reunited old Boulangists of all stripes, even the Laguerrist Le H6riss6 and conservative du Saussay. 8 L.

Although a 200,000 person crown cheered the faithfulness of the lieutenants, they knew that "the faded carnations they had worn as bou­ tonnieres and thrown into the open tomb at ixelles were the last flowers 8 S of the Boulangist bouquet." Le Temps told them that by themselves they were nothing and probably could not effect "the alliance with the .Radicals 86 which they seek." Francis Magnard also told them they were finished.

Without press, leadership, or program they would return to their origins.

Borne might remain successful where Boulangism was strictly anti-capitalist 87 and anti-bourgeois, but it was all over in the provinces. Barrfes knew it too. He saw that the Boulangists might sentimentally remember their days of near glory but that "without doubt they will follow—such is my

Maurice Barres, "Levant le cercueil," ibid. . October 3> 1891.

^According to Charles Chincolle, "Les Obseques du General. Bou­ langer," Le Figaro, October 4> 1891, the list also included Rochefort, D€roul£ae, Laur, Barres, Gabriel, Boudeau, Ernest Roche, Pierre Richard, Le Senne, Laisant, Paulin-M^ry, Dumonteil, Castelin, Elie May, Goussot, Revest, Madame S6verine, L5ouaon-Leduc, Vergoin, Pierre Denis, and lesser lights, including a delegation from Nancy.

^Maurice Barres, "Impressions de rentrfie," ibid., October 16, 1891. The carnation was Boulanger's favorite flower and the badge of his fo llo w e rs. 8 6 Quoted in ibid., October 4» 1891. ^ F ran cis Magnard, "Echos," ib id . , October 5, 1891. 116 intention at least—the program and temperament of the voters they rep- 88 resent, and differences will be accentuated among them." As to the other Boulangists, Barres concluded (as a result of a poll he took of

them) that some would constantly harass the government through interpel­ lations and debates for their own ends—Laur to ruin Constans, Ddroulede

to champion patriotism. Naquet, the philosopher of Boulangism, would

philosophize on h is new co n dition. Although Laguerre would become a member of the governmental bloc, Barres could not: "When I take a place 89 at the theatre, it is not in the claque." Instead, Barres sympathized

most with Laisant who felt that parliamentary agitation by individual

deputies or in a bloc was now sterile. The scene of combat was now out­

side parliament to mobilize public opinion in favor of nationalism, re­

conciliation, ana social reform and to wait until the public became tho­

roughly disgusted with the Opportunist Republic. "Let us never forget,"

concluded Laisant, "that the Republic is only a word if it does not sig- 90 nify social justice ana grandeur of the fatherland." To his voters

Barres identified himself several times with the views of Laisant. 91

as long as Boulanger had been alive, there had always been the

possibility that he might return, galvanize his forces, and again threaten

^^Maurice Barres, "Impressions du cimetiere d'lxelles," Le Courrier de l'E st. October 10, 1891* 89 Maurice Barres, "Impressions de rentree," Le Figaro, October 16, 1891* This article reprints exerpts of letters to Barres from Laur, Laguerre, and Laisant.

^"Une Lettre de M. Laisant," Le Courrier de l*£st. October 17, 1891. 91 "Reunion du Comity r&visionniste-socialiste," ibid., October 17, 1891* and Maurice B arres, "Deux mots en couran t," ib id . . November 7, 1891.

t the status quo. His death allowed two inter-related developments to occur oetween 1891 and 1893. First of all, the republican extreme Left could now openly cooperate with the Boulangists without fearing the down­ fall of the republican form. Secondly, the Boulangists, left adrift, were swept up into the more orthodox socialist movements which readily accepted them.

With the death of Boulanger, Barres welcomed these developments.

By November, 1891, he thought he saw the emergence of an anti-governmental leftist bloc in the Chamber, extending from the Radicals to the Boulan­ gists and socialists. Of course, such a bloc was still negative in char­ acter, since its members could not agree on a positive program. However, i t s fu tu re was b rig h t fo r the n a tio n was moving leftw a rd , as shown by th e I recent election of Paul Lafargue, a socialist and son-in-law of Karl Marx.

The speech of Lafargue at the Chamber on December 8, 1891 for an amnesty, cosponsored with Lafargue by other socialists and the Boulangists Aimel and Jourde, seemed to Barres to bear out the possibility of this coali­ tion. According to Lafargue,

The Boulangist crisis has been only the shrill manifestation of [a sick society]. Today, Boulanger is dead and Boulangism is finished; but the causes which gave it birth still persist and each day continue to create a considerably larger number of malcontents. These malcontents formerly grouped themselves behind General Boulanger; now they are beginning to group them­ selves behind the socialists.93

Barres particularly applauded Lafargue's unsuccessful appeal to de Mun for a coalition of Left and Right for social reform, but cautioned that

^Maurice Barres, ".Renaissance de 1'Opposition," ibid., No­ vember 14> 1891.

93JOC., December 9, 1891, p. ^ 8 9 . 118 such a coalition hinged on the abandonment of the religious question and had to include the question of national defense.^ He further showed his growing tolerance of the members of this new bloc by attacking those who claimed that proletarian socialist leaders were "soured by extreme poverty" or that opportunistic and bourgeois socialists were declassed.

Quite the contrary, argued barres. Benoit Malon of Ia Revue Socialiste was a "noble and gentle man," Jules Guesde of the Parti ouvrier an

"obstinate logician;" Lafargue, a "very adorned mind;" and Paul Brousse of the Possibilists an "acknowledged great man." 95

Ever since 1889, of course, socialists and Boulangists had voted together on social reforms; early in 1891 they cooperated in getting sufficient signatures for scrutin public demands in the Chamber; and by late 1891 a thoroughgoing alliance existed between them. With Barres they formed the basis of the 38 votes cast on December 15, 1891 against the total budget and the 39 votes against preventing the Boulangists from 96 interpellating Constans, the Interior Minister, on January 19, 189*!. Insignificant as the latter was, it nonetheless had a touch of the bizarre and grotesque which marked so much of Boulangism. The Blanquist-Boulan- gist 1rIntransigeant had engaged in a particularly scurrilous series of attacks on Constans. Le Senne, Laur, and Goussot, anything but Blanquist,

sought to interpellate Constans on the charges. When the ministry re­

fused to allow the interpellation, Laur accused it of "sacrificing one of

^Maurice Barres, "Attitude nette," Le Courrier de l fEst. December 12, 1891. ^Maurice Barres, "Les Meneurs," Le Figaro, December 8, 1891.

^JQC., December 16, 1891 and January 20, 1892, pp. 2712-2713 and 4 2 - 4 3 . 119 our liberties . . . in order to cover a member of the government who is condemned by public opinion." On th a t remark Constans, who had taken from Laur one vendetta too many, slapped him. Auguste Delpeuch, perhaps remembering Boulangist opposition to his validation as deputy, struck the Boulangist Castelin who, with Barres as a second, challenged Delpeuch to a duel. After a brief suspension, the Chamber returned to vote against allowing the interpellation. Twelve socialists voted with the Boulangists.

All too fresh in socialist minas, apparently, was the shooting down of demonstrators by Constans1 police at Fournies on May Day, 1891. Inter­ estingly enough, Possibilists like aim6 Lavy and Jean Baptiste Dumay voted with the government on this issue. 97 They had also opposed the inclusion of Rochefort in the Lafargue amnesty. For reasons such as these, Gabriel constantly condemned th e ir factio n in the pages of Le Courrier de l 'E s t . 98

The attitude of the Possibilists suggests that socialists were every bit as split into factions as were the Boulangists and all the parties of the Left. On social reforms, such as the Pierre Richard minimum wage proposal of February 16, 1892, and amendments to strengthen the conciliation and arbitration law of December 27, 1892, the deputies of the Left, including Barres, could agree. 99 On other legislation, notably the various laws dealing with the anarchist outrages of 1892,

^Ib id ., January 20, 1892, p. 41J De Temps and Le Figaro. January 20 and 21, 1892j Maurice Barres, "Francis Laur," Le Figaro. January 24, 1892. 98 See particularly Alfred Gabriel, "Socialistes de Gouvernement," Le Courrier de l'E st, June 27, 1891 and Alfred Gabriel, "L'Amnestie Repoussfie," ib id ., December 12, 1891. ^JOC., February 17, 1892 and October 21, 1892, pp. 104-106, 118- 119, 1275-1283, 1290-12%. 120 the parties of the Left of every stripe split in every possible direc- 100 tion. The only issue which consistently distinguished the Boulangists from other socialists was nationalism, most marked in votes on colonial appropriatxons. In the most extreme example, 18 left-wing Boulangists, including Barres, voted alone against the ChamDer on the supplementary credit for colonialism of July 4, 1892, whjle another seven of their group abstained. Even Boulangist flirtation with conservatives which had long distinguished Boulangists from other leftist republicans increas­ ingly lessened, particularly on the clerical issue. The votes in favor of the appropriations for the embassy to the Vatican on November 6, 1890, Oc­ tober 26, 1891, and January 19, 1893, saw the 27-28 Boulangist deputies becoming increasingly anti-clerical. By the time of the last vote, only four of these voted for the appropriation and Barres for the first time, 102 shifted from "for" to "abstain." Of course, no Boulangist could sup­ port the proposal of October 29, 1891 for separation of church and state, made in reaction to the clergy's objection to the government's recent con­ demnation of anti-Italian French pilgrims to Rome, since it came from the

"isra£lite" Camile Dreyfus. Yet, when a similar proposal was set forth by a non-Jew on December 12, a f te r a n ti- c le r ic a l p ro tests had become more 103 heated, no Boulangist, including Barres, could vote against it.

1QQIbid. . May 22, 1892 and July 3, 1892, pp. 593-600, 608-609, 1011, and 1025-1026.

1Q1Ibid. . July 5, 1892, pp. 1031 and 1055-1056.

^ 2Ibid. . November 7, 1890, October 27, 1891, and January 20, 1893, PP. 1915-1916, 1971, and 133.

^°^Ibid., October 30, 1891 and December 13, 1891, pp. 2011-2013, 2017-2018, 2626-2627, and 2604-2624. 121 By 1892 the alliance between socialists and Boulangists went out­ side the Chamoer. On March 2, 1892 socialists like Joseph Ferroul, Valen­ tin Couturier, Paul Lafargue, Gustave Cluseret, and Radical-Socialists like Giroaet and Louis Theron joined 18 Boulangists in a meeting to de­ c la re they would stop th e ir obstructionism in the Chamber as a way to help pass several pending social reforms."^4" In early July, similar men held a rally at the Cirque d'Hiver in Paris, chaired by Cluseret, to de­ mand amnesty for the Boulangist Rochefort and the Marxist Culine, a lead­ er o f th e Fourmies dem onstration, and hear G abriel condemn Lavy and Du- 105 may. If Francis Magnard was right in believing the rally had "a

Boulangist scent whose nature is not aole to excite republican and, above all, governmental sympathies,11 socialists were becoming Boulangist rather than the other way around.

The following year, however, showed Magnard's analysis to be wrong.

In January, 1893 Boulangists like Granger, Turigny, Jourde, Roche, Laporte, and Chichi, joined by socialists and Radical-Socialists as varied as

Alexandre Millerana, Ddsir6 Barodet, ana Lafargue, held a rally at the

Tivoli-Vauxhall in Paris to demand the creation of a social republic through an anti-Panama, anti-Fourmies revision of the constitution by a constituant assembly. 107 Only days before, Chiche argued that a demand

^^■"DSclaration des Dgput6s Socialistes et rdvisionnistes," Le Courrier de l'E st, March 5* 1892.

^ ^ L e Temps, Ju ly 5, 1892, and Le F ig a ro , Ju ly 4 , 1892.

^^Francis Magnard, "Echoes," Le Figaro, July 5, 1892, 107 "L'Union socialistel" ibid., January 15> 1893* La Revue Social- iste, XVII, 239-240j and Alexandre Z^vaes, Histoire du socialisms et communisme en France, 1871-1947 (Paris, n.d.), pp. 226-227; and Aaron Noland, The Founding of the French Socialist Party (1893-1905) (Cam­ bridge, 1956), pp. 30-31. 122 being debated fo r d isso lu tio n of a Chamber corrupted by the Panama Scan­ dal was not enough. Instead, "it is necessary to dissolve both chambers and throw into the fire the bastard Constitution of 1875." His plan to let the Barliament remain to legislate a budget while a constituent as­ sembly sat concurrently was repulsed 320 to 187 Radicals, rightists, so- cialists, and Boulangists. 108 The Tivoli-Vauxhall rally was followed by a flight of Boulangists into socialist ranks. By spring, Gaston Laporte became a charter member of the Federation of Independent Socialists, the 109 Millerand group. The Boulangist Henri Aimel attended the Revue so- e ia lis te banquet in Ju ly , 1893. He had already been welcomed back in to that journal's pages in May, 1892 and soon became a regular contributor of apologies for Boulanger.Antoine Jourde became a delegate to the

1893 congress of the Parti ouvrier and a member of its national commit­ tee. Socialist journalist-s like the Blanquist Victor Jaclard and the

Guesdist Hugues Thiercellet came not to care whether a man had been a n p Boulangist or not, so long as he was now a socialist.

On th e face of i t , however, the Panama Scandal, whose proportions made the Wilson Scandal pale in comparison, was just the kind of incident to rekindle the dying embers of Boulangism rather than drive its members into socialism. The scandal should have been able to revive the public

^ ^JQC. . January 13, 1893, pp. 12-17, 19-20, and especially 14.

109La Revue S o c ia lis te , XVII (May, 1893), 351.

■^See la Revue Socialists. XV (May, 1892), 567-589 and XVII (February, 1893), 167.

m ibid. . XVIII (November, 1893), 602-603. 112Victor Jaclard, "Tactique socialiste," ibid. . XVII (April, 1893) and Hugues Thiercellet in L'Ere nouvelle, I (August, 1893), 202. L'iire nouvelle tended to be Marxist. 123 disgust with the parliamentary republic, which had been the lifeblood of

Boulangism in 1889. For y ears th e Panama Canal Company, sadly under­ capitalized for overcoming the mountains and disease of the tropical isthmus, had kept the public and creditors at bay by bribing the press and politicians, particularly through its agents Baron de Reinach and

Cornelius Herz. The scandal first broke in November, 1892, in the pages of La Libre Parole, the anti-Semitic sheet of Edouard Drumont, and in the Chamber on November 19, in mild interpellations by the Boulangist or some-time Boulangist Argelies, Gauthier de Clagny, and Jules Delahaye. 113

With the mysterious death of de Reinach on the 20th, there was no turning

back. Delahaye, amid general tumult and shouts of "give the.inames,"

charged on November 21 that more than 100 deputies received checks from

Reinach and Herz and that the government knew who they were.^"^

From then on, Rightists and Boulangists (notably Millevoye, D6-

roulede, Paulin-M6ry, Gabriel, Le Veil6, Argelies, Martin, and Chiche)

kept up a steady barrage against the commission of inquiry, named by the

Chamber to investigate the charges, and the government. These formidable

Boulangist speakers colored with the stain of Panama almost every issue

debated in the Chamber until the spring of 1893. In return, the Chamber, which had almost forgotten the Boulangist past of these gentlemen, turned

that past on them again and again. On December 5, for example, Millevoye

insisted that the "honor of the parliament" depended on making the pro­

ceedings of the commission of inquiry open to the public. Lavy, who held

~^~^J0C. . November 20, 1892, pp. 1638-1640.

^^JQ C . , November 22, 1892, pp. 1645-1655* The color and drama of this was ably captured in Maurice Barr&s, "L'Accusateur," Le Figaro (February 23, 1893). 124 Boulanger's seat, replied, "Do not speak all the time about the honor of parliament." At that Gabriel turned toward him and said, "You are not even a deputy."^"'’ On December 23 Maurice Rouvier, a member of the

cabinet, replied to a vicious Boulangist attack by admitting that he had

taken money from Reinach only to save the republic from Boulanger. De- roul&de came back with the argument that the taking of French royalist money was preferable to that of German Panamist money and continued with

the most brilliant, unrepentant, and concise statement ever made of the

Boulangist republic, at its end came this exchange:

M. MILLERAND. It is the Republic of 1802 that you espouse. M. PAUL DEROULEDE. I t is the Republic of 1848. M. MILLKRa ND. It led to 1851. M. PAUL DEROULEDE. It would not have, if the president could have been re-elected.

Save for the Delahaye interpellation, the most dramatic of these

attacks was DSroulede's accusation that Clemenceau was a "chequard,"

dramatic because no one before D£roulede had braved Clemenceau1s pur­

ported excellence with pen, sword, and tongue. Yet, if Panama's ability

to demolish the Constitution of 1875 so obviously depended on the coopera­

tion of all the revisionist parties—Boulangists, socialists, Radicals

and rightists, why would D^roulede threaten the success of the operation

with such a spirited attack on Clemenceau, even if he were in the pay of

Herz? After the D^roulede-Clemenceau parliamentary clash and a duel the

following day, Barres gave this explanation: according to Edouard de Gon-

court, Barres believed, with the likely concurrence of D€roul&de, that

~*~^JUC. . December 6, 1892, p. 1754*

■^■^Ibid., December 24, 1892, pp. 1944-1953 and esp ecially 1951- 1953. 125 Clemenceau had a gentleman's agreement with the government, which al­ lowed him to lead the opposition, vote against the m inistries, and tum­ ble cabinets so long as he delivered his 48 supporters to the government on critical issues. 117 Clemenceau had also not only deserted his one­ time proteg6, Boulanger, but haa led the anti-Boulangist: opposition in

1889, and D&roulede could forgive neither of those, More than that, how­ ev er, th e a tta c k on Clemenceau alm ost made i t appear th a t D&roul&de and his followers in Boulangism (principally those who led the anti-Panama debates) had resolved to use Panama more to ruin their enemies than to bring down the republic. A further example of this also came in the D6- roulede-Clemenceau exchange on December 20. Clemenceau, said D^roulede,

"has all his troops, all his flexibility, all his connections; in that 118 he very much resembles M. Laguerre, his student." The D£rouledists came even more to th is ta c tic when th e commission and Chamber exonerated all the accused deputies, save one who had the incredible folly to con­ fess. Even after the scandal failed to bring down the republic, D6rou- lede almost singlemindedly continued after Clemenceau.

The climax of it came in June. When Clemenceau spoke on June 19,

1893 against a b ill for only partial renewal of the Chamber, DSroulfede

interrupted him with comments such as these: "It is the friend of Cor­

nelius Herz, the friend of England who speaks I" "See what Cornelius Herz

thinks about partial renewal;" "The sick man of Bournemouth speaks [Herz

had fled to England and claimed he was too ill at Bournemouth to return n 7 Edmond de Goncourt, Journal: m&noires de la vie litt£raire [par] Edmond et Jules de Goncourt (Monaco, 1956-1958), XIX, 52.

118JOC.. December 21, 1892, p. 126 and face charges. This was undoubtedly agreeable to the government, which did not want Herz telling a court what he knew about the politi- 119 cians.jj" "Why not speak in English," These comments came not only from Panama and Clemenceau1s American past, but from the so-called Norton papers. These letters, which purported to be from the British ambassador to France and which had fallen into the hands of D^roulede and Millevoye, held that Clemenceau, Auguste Burdeau (the old teacher of Barres), and

Rochefort were in English pay. Even though the foreign minister con­ vinced him that the papers were forgeries, DSroulede agreed to have

Millevoye use them against Clemenceau, but not against Rochefort, in an interpellation of the government on June 22. With luck Millevoye might duplicate Delahaye1s success at withholding the names while getting the

Chamber to appoint an in v estig atin g commission. However, when th e Chamber kept shouting "the papers, read the papers," Millevoye lost his head and read the papers dealing with all three men. The foreign minister re­ vealed that Millevoye was the victim of a hoax, D^roulede resigned his seat in disgust and left, but Millevoye read on and on. With the entire chamber hooting the ludicrous performance, Castelin and Barres told Mille­ voye to resign like D^roulede. Roche pounced on him for besmirching the

patriotism of Rochefort. Castelin and Barres swore that the Boulangists would abstain out of friendship on the motivated ordre du .jour censuring

Millevoye, but the smear of Rochefort drove seven Boulangists to vote for

the censure.

~^~^Ibid. . June 20, 1893, p* 1764. 120lbid., June 23, 1893, pp. 1787-1795• See also: Tharaud, pp. 90-94 and Maurice Barres, "The Panama Scandal," Cosmopolitan. XVII (June, 1894), 203-210. The last is a convenient summary in English of Barres' views of the entire scandal. The farce played out by Millevoye, preceded by the irresponsible

Dgrouledist treatment of the entire Panama Scandal, forestalled any pos­ sibility of Boulangism to capitalize on the scandal, unite, and win back the support of the voters at the 1893 legislative elections. No self- respecting Boulangist could now claim to be of the same party as D6rou- lfede and Millevoye. When the pair followed up their absurdities with still another, the questioning of French socialist patriotism for ac­ cepting campaign money from German socialists, they felt the wrath even of the tolerant Lafargue.la Hevue s o c ia lis te condemned such D6rou- lede-Millevoye chauvinism as one of the most ridiculous features of Bou­ langism, having nothing in common with socialist patriotism."*-^

If Boulangists still had any reservations toward socialism, they were now removed. The b£rouledist use of Panama and the Millevoye inter­

pellation on the Norton papers so thoroughly discredited Boulangism that

only 10 members of the post-1890 B oulangist rump won re -e le c tio n in 1893*

None of these made any claim of being Boulangists, and most chose to run

as socialists. The May 1, 1892 municipal elections had already shown 123 that Boulangism had little chance with the voters. Panama turned

them even farther away. By 1893 socialism was not just a Jersey for

Boulangism. It appeared to be a permanent home.

^■^■Paul Lafargue, "Les Dernieres Elections legislatives," L'Ere nouvelle, II (August, 1894)> 367ff.

*~^La hevue socialiste, XVII (July, 1893) > 84. CHAPTER IV

Maurice barres as po l it ic ia n and deputy (1889-1893)

Boulangism had elected Barres, but with its rapid decline after the Parisian municipal elections in 1890, it certainly was not going to re-elect him. The failure of national Boulangism, obvious as early as

1890, convinced Barres that in building a political career he was strict­ ly on his own. His political fortunes were dependent on building a per­ sonal electoral machine. The years 1889-1893 > then, brought three de­ velopments in the political career of Barres. First, these years pro­ duced an attempt and failure to construct an electoral machine in Nancy capable of bringing re-election in 1893* Second, they generated an un­ successful try in 1893 to found a political career on a new program and in a new constituency, the Paris suburb of Neuilly. Finally, because the failure of Barres to be re-elected anywhere in 1893 brought to a close the first phase of his political career, the defeat provides a good point at which to analyse his effectiveness as a deputy and politician and the ways his legislative and political experience of 1889-1893 changed the ideas he had held in 1888.

I

The attempt of Barres to build a personal electoral machine in

Nancy, separate from national Boulangism, did not begin until 1890, because in 1889 Boulangism s till looked like a national force. That appearance

128 129 brought the fusion of Boulangists and the Nancy Radical Committee, many of whose members had supported the Boulangists in the run-off election, to form the Socialist-Revisionist Committee on October 24, 1 8 8 9 The theme of Boulangist national power and the role of Barres in shaping its socialism marked several rallies which Barres held in April, 1890, just before the Paris elections.^ After the defeat in Paris and the admitted desertion of some Nancy Boulangists, Barres tried a new approach. He sought to renew his direct contact with the voters by circulating ques­ tionnaires, ostensibly to buttress his legislative program, to discover, for example, the number of foreign workers at Nancy, the number of un­ employed French workers replaced by them, and the household budgets of 3 a typical working-class family. Concentrating increasingly on building up his Nancy following, he and Gabriel filled the summer issues of the

Courrier de l'B st with articles to educate the voters in consumer self- help and social reform through political action. He discussed with them the nature of borrowing and profits, and ways to form trade unions, co­ operatives, and a more equitable tax structure. In particular, Barr&s offered his assistance in achieving the formation of trade unions at

Saint-Nicolas-du-Port and Domnasle.^

^■"Le Comity socialiste rSvisionniste," Le Courrier de l'E st. October 27, 1889. ^Ibid., April 13 and 20, 1890.

^Ibia.. April 27, 1890. Sdaurice Barres, "Lettre ouverte a des amis de Saint-Nicolas et de Dombasle," and "Seconds lettre ouverte a des amis de Saint Ni­ colas et de Domnasle," ibid., July 27 and August 3, 1890. 130

However, the same period saw the Nancy anti-Boulangists renew their attack, which eventually would make it difficult for Barres to re­ tain and increase his vote-getting ability. The Paris Coulisses du bou- langisme provided the opportunity for reopening the Nancy anti-Boulan- gist campaign. Adding to these revelations, the Est Rdpublicain and

Progres de l'E st revived the charges that Barres and Gabriel had de­ ceived royalist- money in 1889, curried favor with the bishop of Nancy, and made an electoral deal with the Nancy conservatives to steal the 1889 5 election. The Est R^publicain even ran an unsigned letter from "a group of socialist republicans" demanding the resignation of Barres and Gabriel.^

Against these charges Barres came back fighting, and repulsed this line of attack. He denied he saw the bishop and challenged the anti-Bou­ langists to prove he got royalist money. Besides, his royalist support was irrelevant: "My program and my votes are republican and anti-Oppor- tunist. They demand reforms always repressed by the band of Ferry and

Rouvier. If men belonging to the clerical party prefer to fortify the cause of the workers more than that of the exploiters, we are not at all 7 surprised." Both he and Gabriel took special umbrage at the supposed de­ fection of socialists. Gabriel admitted there was an anti-Boulangist so­ cialist group in Nancy, but said that they, like all socialists, had the

^H.S., "Au Progres de l'Est," ibid., August 31» 1890; Maurice Barrfes, "Les Vraies 1 Coulisses,1" ibid. , October 5, 1890; "D&nenti de M. G abriel a l'Est R^publicain," ibid., October 18, 1890; "D&uenti," ibid., October 18, 1890; Maurice Barr&s, "Les Pharisiens," Le Figaro. No­ vember 1, 1890. ^Alfred Gabriel, "Pol Unique d^loyale," and Maurice Barres, "Au Raseur satisfait," Le Courrier de 1'Est, September 21, 1890.

^Maurice Barres, "A nos amis de Dombasle," ibid., October 12, 1890. 131 Q courage to sign their letters. Barr&s went on to dismiss all the anti-

Boulangist charges. "For my part," he said, "I could resign out of dis­ gust with those Opportunists and mediocrities of all colors on the benches

of the Palais Bourbon who sicken me, but the belches of our Opportunist 9 Alliance will not sound ray retreat." Barres added that the Boulangists

did not steal the 1889 election with royalist gold and votes. Rather,

they won because of their opposition's disdain of the working-class and

its attacks on Boulangism, attacks which simply gave him and Gabriel the

publicity they could not have achieved on their own. The workers had

seen that he and Gabriel would carry out a working-class program.^

Such arguments retained for Barres and Gabriel their support a-

mong Nancy Boulangists. On September 26, 1890 the Socialist-Revisionist

Republican Committee of Nancy passed a resolution summarizing their argu­

ments: Mermiex1 s Coulisses only proved the duplicity of the royalists

who deluded themselves into believing they could capture Boulangism; on

the other hand, the voting record of Barres and Gabriel in the Chamber

confirmed that they were carrying out their electoral mandate to achieve

"revision of the Constitution of 1875 and the realization of democratic

and social reforms."'^' By mid-October, Barres and Gabriel were confident

enough to hold a series of rallies to win back their constituents. Their

speeches at all of them took the same format: they refuted the Coulisses £> Gabriel, "Pol&nique ddloyale" and Barres, "Au Raseur satisfait." 9 Barrfes, "Au Raseur satisfait."

^Barrfes, "Les liraies ’Coulisses,1"

^■"Comite republican revisionniste de Nancy," Le Courrier de l'E st. September 28, 1890. 132 by saying that Boulanger was a better general than politician. In the words of Barres, Boulangism "haa been a revolutionary instant of the g re a t re v is io n is t movement" ana had won Nancy to socialism , although th ere had been many disreputable politicians in the shadows. They summarized the Barr&s-Gabriel voting record, pointing out its similarity to those of

Clemenceau, Pelletan, Boyer, and Cluseret, as compared to those of the other heurthe-et-Moselle deputies, especially when the latter voted along- 12 side the royalists. Because Barres and Gabriel did have an impeccably republican and reformist voting record, the anti-Boulangist attack, based on the Coulisses, proved fruitless.

However , the anti-Boulangists discovered a line of attack which ultimately destroyed Nancy Boulangism. By 1891 the followers of Pierre

Albert Papelier launched a campaign to convince the workers that their votes were wasted on socialists who could make noise but not realize their program, and that the governmental parties could and would give the workers more than would the Boulangists and socialists. Papelier, a grain merchant and founder and director of the Docks nanc|ians, an or­ ganization for agricultural and commercial development, had beaten Paul

Auam in 1889 on a program of protectionism, conciliation of all parties, and such social reforms as old age pensions, workmen's compensation, rural public assistance, and reform of apprenticeship contracts. 13 With the later addition of planks for a Nancy Bourse du travail, tax reform, and measures against foreign workers, he had a ll the Boulangist program ] 2 "La Reunion dy Gymnase" and "Reunions de M. B arres," ib id ., October 18, 1890. ^Alphonse Bertrand, la Chambre de 1889. biographies des 576 deputes (Paris^ 1889), P» 310. 133 except constitutional revision and Boulanger.With credentials such as these Papelier successfully debated his thesis of socialist, incompe­ tency against Gabriel at a trade union meeting at Pont-Saint-Vincent, ten miles south of Nancy, in January, 1891. Papelier likewise headed a com­ mission in the Chamber which had just, favorably reported an old age pension

bill. 1‘his and his speech won him an honorary presidency of the Pont-Saint-

Vincent union. By 1891, Papelier's thesis Decame the basis of the anti-

Boulangist attack on Barres and Gabriel.

So effective was this new assault on Boulangism that throughout

1891 and 1892 almost the entire Nancy Boulangist movement and propaganda,

including virtually every issue of Le Courrier de 1'Kst. directed them­

selves against what Gabriel dubbed "Papelierism:" the technique of false­

ly appearing reformist to win over the workers while really remaining in

favor of the status quo and employers. Gabriel argued that the success

of Boulangism had finally forced the Nancy Republican alliance to become

worker-oriented. Yet, the Alliance's Papelierism was just a ruse to woo

the workers.,, for Papelier and his fellows knew that his pension bill would

fail in the Senate. His real views could be discerned from his votes,

such as his support for age 12, rather than age 13, as the minimum age for

a 10 hour day.^ Barres added that the Papelier program was too little

and t,oo late and only the result of the public being conditioned to social

reform after years of socialist propaganda.^ With the entry of

^Alfred Gabriel, "Leur Programme," Le Courrier de l'£ st, July 23, 1892. 15 Alfred Gabriel, "Le Papelierisme," ibid., January 31, 1891.

^Maurice Barres, "Le Mauvais quart d&heure," ibid. . June 13, 1891. 134 Papelierism coinciding with the Chamber's consideration of the bill, passed by the Senate, on hours for women and children, Gabriel sponsored several amendments to it. 17 The Courrier took great delight in pointing out that while the Meurthe-et-Moselle deputies voted for the Gabriel a- mendment, which required miners to be 14 years old, their Nancy newspapers 18 opposed i t . Another C ourrier w rite r commented th a t while the P a p e lie r- ists posed as the friends of trade unions in the Chamber and in rallies, their employer-clientele prevented the formation of unions in their fac­ tories and even blacklisted a stonecutter who tried to form a union. Bar­ res and Gabriel protested against this, the writer claimed, but they were powerless since the Trade Union Law of 1884 did not prevent employer re- prisals. 19 Papelierism also colored the Barres-Gabriel rally of April 12, their first confrontation with the voters since October, 1890, where Ga- oriel explained his and Barres' votes. He took special pleasure in con­ tra s tin g th e ir votes in favor of the Dumay amendment of January 27, 1891, to include office and department store workers in the child and female 20 labor bill, against the opposition of Papelier. The same was true of a "non-political" meeting on April 19, chaired by the president of the carpenters union and called to have the three Nancy deputies explain the trade union law. Papelier bowed out at the last minute and at the T7 Journal officiel de la R^publique francaise. Dgbats. Chambre. February 3 and 8, 1891, pp. 184, 192-193, and 247-248. Hereafter cited as JOC. 18 X., "Contradictions opportunistes," Le Courrier de l'E st. February 7, 1891. ^A.S., "Les Amies des syndicates," ibid., April 11, 1891.

"Reunion de la S a lle P o ir e l," ib id ., April 18, 1891. 135 meeting one of Gabriel's lieutenants pushed through a vote censuring him .21

In spite of this meeting, Papelierism had a telling effect on the efforts of barres and Gabriel to hold their working-class clientele. In

1889, Gabriel had bewailed the absence of effective unions, and in 1891 victory for the Nancy trade union movement was no closer. L£on Goulette of l'J£st Republicain. in trying to discredit boulangism and win the work­ ers to Papelierism, gave this as the explanation:

I f , so far, unions have not prospered in Nancy, the responsib­ ility for it is very much incumbent on M. Gabriel, who diverted the worker movement first to his profit and then to the profit of M. Barr&s.

Goulette contended that all Gabriel's political committees, be they Radi­ cal, Boulangist, or revisionist-socialist, had been hatched from the unions, which dissipated their economic power in unpopular political activity. 22

Gabriel admitted his political ties to the unions, but argued that worker amelioration was possible only through both economic and political action. barres viewed the unions as pressure groups able to force parliament into 23 working-class reforms. Apparently the arguments of Goulette and Papel­ ier had their effect. Otherwise, barres and Gabriel would not have spent so many words telling the workers not to be taken in by the governmental ' parties. Some Nancy socialists split with the Boulangists, formed their

21 "Conference publique sur la loi et l'avenir des syndicats," ibid., April 25, 1891. 22 Quoted in Alfred Gabriel, "Le True de Goulette," ibid., May 2, 1891. 23 Conference publique ..."

^See, for example, Alfred Gabriel, "Defaite sur Defaite," ibid., June 13, 1891. 136 own organization, and one group of them even won four seats on the city council of M alzSville, a Nancy s u b u rb .^ Yet, the Courrier de l'E st con­ tinued to pose as the single champion of Nancy socialism. On February 7,

1891 the masthead was changed from "revisionist republican journal" to

"socialist republican journal" with the sub-heading, "All social insti­ tutions ought to have for their end the improvement of the moral, intel- 26 lectual, and physical condition of the poorest and most numerous class."

The opportunity for Papelierism to test its strength against Nancy

Boulangism, which no longer had the glamor of Boulanger nor the prospect of a national Boulangist victory, came with the calling of municipal elec­ tions for May 1, 1892. Although May Day of 1891 had seen working-class demonstrations at Nancy under Gabriel (barres was ill in Paris), Barres and Gabriel urged the workers to demonstrate in 1892 with their votes. "A fragment of the future is in your hands," Barres told them. "Each ballot lies heavily on the destinies of the working-class. If you want tomorrow to resemble today, abstain or vote for the Opportunist [i.e. to Barr&s, the followers of Papelier were still Opportunists], If you are malcontented 27 today, vote for the party of reforms." Gabriel told the workers that so­ cialism was not strong enough to win a national election, but that by win- 28 ning municipalities "the socialists will attain the government."

Before long, however, Nancy Boulangists , renamed revisionist-

25 Maurice Barres, "IEtape socialiste," ibid., April 18, 1891.

^Ibid., February 7, 1891. 27 * Maurice Barr6s, "La Derniere semaine," ibid., April 23, 1892. 28 Alfred Gabriel, "Le Prochain premier mai," ibid., April 16, 1892. socialists, saw that such strategy required new tactics. Gabriel admitted that before 1889 Nancy politics had been split three ways among Opportu­ nists, conservatives, and "the socialist party, which was then called the

Radical party." In order to prevent royalist victories, the socialists had always supported the Opportunist candidates, but when the latter were elected, they did not repay the socialists with social reforms. The so­ cialists had broken out of this impasse in 1889 with the complete victory of Barres% and Gabriel, who were socialists disguised as Boulangists. 29

However, by 1892, with Boulanger dead and Papelierism on the rise, so­ cialists were again in the minority at Nancy, just as they were in the nation as a whole. Thus the socialists had to settle for a partial vic­ tory or none at all. To do this, they formed a united front with the

Independent Republican Committee and the Conservative Committee, with each party naming 12 men to a common slate of candidates. 30 Victory for this proportional representation slate over Papelier1s Central Republican

Committee, the renamed Republican Alliance, would mean that 12 socialist city councilmen could urge enactment of the socialist platform: council sessions at night to allow working-class participation; no foreign work­ ers on either the city payroll or jobs contracted by the city; a minimum wage for city employees; employment of trade unionists on city jobs; es­ tablishment of a municipal pharmacy, a free technical school, and a Bourse du travail; and improvement of the hospital, the fire and police

29 Alfred Gabriel, "Representation proportionaelle," ibid.. April 23, 1892.

30Ibid. . April 30, 1892. 138 31 departments, and street lighting. Moreover, Barr&s and Gabriel had some justification for oelieving that part of that program could be re­ alized, even in coalition with the other two parties. At the beginning of April the Bishop of Nancy, newly won from reaction by the Rerum Nova- rum of Pope Leo XIII, had begun a series of conferences in the cathedral on working-class problems. The first meeting was so poorly planned, per­ haps even sabotaged by the bishop's unsympathetic clergy, that before the bishop could finish his opening address his working-class audience started throwing chairs and shouting, "Vive la Rdpublique" and "You are not a 32 worker." at the time, Barres and Gabriel were sceptical of the bishop's new concern for the worker and fearful that his views would woo some workers from socialism, which the bishop attacked. 33

The opportunity never arose to test whether or not the

Nancy conservatives had joined Leo XIII, for only one candidate of the O J proportional representation slate survived the first ballot on May 1.

The election was a clear victory for the Republican Alliance, as reshaped py Papelier. The voters had obviously rejected the lure of partial vic­ tory under proportional representation in favor of the promise of Papel­ ierism that it would produce real results. The defeat was a heavy blow to Barres, but a burdeh he could share with Gabriel. Yet, other events

31"Comitd R dpublicain S o c ia lis te de Nancy: • Programme M unicipal," ibid., April 23, 1892.

3Sm Temps. A p ril 6, 1892. ^Maurice Barr&s, "A la Cathddrale," and Alfred Gabriel, "Trou­ bles de Cathddrale," Le Courrier de l'Est, April 9, 1892.

•^*Le Temps. May 3 , 1892. 139 of 1892, in which he was solely responsible, put his stock so low that his political career in Nancy was finished.

The first was his tariff position. On February 17, 1892, Barres gave an account of his mandate before 200 to 400 supporters at Saint-

N ic o la s-d u -P o rt. A ll went w ell u n t i l an a n ti-B o u la n g ist member of the municipal council asked him to explain his tariff position. The accounts of the meeting and the votes of Barres are contradictory and confused, but the reality must have been as follows: In his speech Barres favored the ideal of free trade, but thought it was impossible with the interna­ tional situation such as it was. The bill in question, he said, did not pose an alternative between free trade and protectionism, but only between the present high tariff and a higher one. Faced with that and with depu­ ties, who voted according to the economic interests of their constituents rather than according Do tiieir party's politics, even socialist ones.,

Barr6s claimed he voted in favor of higher duties for agriculture, but against higher rates for goods consumed by workers, such as coffee, oils, and table raisons. This might have been satisfactory had not his audience

been conditioned by the cries of the Courrier de l'E st that all protec­

tionists were "starvers of the people [affameurs]," "ignoble exploiters," and "imbeciles," and had not the Journal Officiel shown Barres as voting

for the high tariff bill while Gabriel voted against it. Le Temps did not exaggerate very much when it said that the audience was unable to

understand his "nonsensical explanations." Indeed it was so completely

bewildered as to Barres' position that only 30 or 40 members gave him a 140 confidence vote while the others abstained. 35 At the Chamber on January

16, Barrls corrected the Journal Officiel record of his vote of January

7 from "for" to "voluntarily abstain." He then told his readers that that had been his original vote, that the Journal Officiel had erred, and that he had not read its account m itil it had been brought to his attention at 36 Saint Nicolas. However, the damage was done. Even though Gabriel came to his rescue with an article upholding the Barresian tariff votes, the voters were still suspicious. To them the tariff votes showed that, at best, Barr As could not make decisions or explain clearly and convincingly his position] at worst, he was one of the "exploiters" who had changed his vote only when it came under fire.

The tariff issue plus the municipal election defeat brought a great decline in the popularity of Barres. This was evident by June 6, 1892 when Sadi Carnot, president of France, visited Nancy on a nation-wide tour.

Both Barres and Gabriel supported the visit as part of their campaign, be­ gun with the socialist-Boulangist declarations in March and continued dur­ ing the municipal election campaign, to convince the voters that socialists were not intransigently opposed to everything or unable to get along. 37

According to Le Temps. Barres started out as part of the presidential

35 "Les Mensonges de M. Goulette," "Mauvais Foi," "Maurice Bar- rAs a Saint-Nicolas," "Analyse du Discourse prononc£ A Saint-Nicolas," Le Courrier de IfEst, February 20, 1892; Le Temps, February 17, and 23, 1892. The latter were summaries of accounts sent by L6on Goulette from Nancy's l'E st Rgpublicain and 1 'Impartial. •^^Maurice BarrAs, "Le T arif des douanes e t mes v o tes," Le Courrier de l'E st. February 27> 1892. •^Maurice BarrAs, "Opposition raisonA," ibid., April 16, 1892; Maurice BarrAs, "Les Fetes de Nancy" and Alfred Gabriel, "Vive la pa- trie," ibid., June 4> 1892. 1 4 1 procession as it moved through Nancy. However, he dropped out before it reached the wildly enthusiastic students at the University of Nancy, be­ cause along the way he "had been received by shouts , which were not very 38 sympathetic." Shortly afterwards, Barres and Gabriel retired as politi­ cal directors of the Courrier de l'E st, claiming their Parisian affairs were keeping them too busy.

Within a month, however, Barres seized upon an opportunity to halt his slipping political fortunes. Paul Didier, a docteur-es-sciences and son-in-law of Louis Th£ron, Radical-Socialist deputy, had been named to the faculty of Saint Cyr by the minister of public instruction, Charles

Freycinet. Somehow, the candidacy was withdrawn upon pressure, not from the government, but from Nancy. Chamber debate and newspapers disclosed that the culprit for this was Albert Colson, a member of the Ecole Poly­ technique faculty, the Republican Alliance candidate against Barrfes in

1889* and more rec en tly the c o n se ille r h£n6rale of S ain t-N ico las. His op­ position to Didier, his critics charged, was an act of spite motivated in part by Didier's support of Barres in 1889. 39 Never one to miss a chance like this, Barres swung into a full-scale campaign to elect Didier to Col­ son's seat at Saint-Nicolas in the cantonal elections of July 31* Didier's platform was thoroughly that of Barres; religious liberty on the Tours formula of Boulanger and reforms in favor of relief, old age, and medical assistance funds and against foreign workers and speculators,^ The

~^Le Temps. June 7* 1892.

39 Various a r tic le s in Le Courrier de l'E s t of June 25 and July 2, 1892 . ^°Ibid. . July 19, 1892. The campaign was a complete mistake. First of all, Barrfes put his own prestige on the line in pushing Didier's candidacy. "I am here," Barres told the voters at the initial rally for Didier, "as a friend accompanying a friend, as the elected accompanying the one designated by the committee whose expression I am, the one designated by the workers whose faithful representative I am proud to be."^- Barres put himself completely into the campaign, while the more cautious Gabriel appeared in no rally and wrote only one article in support of Didier. This would have been 1 r i g h t , except th a t D idier was a weak can d id ate. He was imm ediately charged, and justly so, with being the stooge of Barres and a "theoretian," a candidate campaigning as an affair of honor rather than as a serious office seeker, supported by the conservative Journal de la Meurthe-et-

Moselle, a non-resident in spite of his Nancy birth. Weak as he was,

Didier migho have beaten Colson, but the latter refused to stand for re- election. Instead, the Central Republican Committee followed the Papel­ ier reformist plan of victory by naming Courtois, who had run against the

Central Republican Committee as an Independent Republican Committee can­ didate on the May 1 proportional representation slate. With this prospect

Barres and others unsuccessfully urged Didier to withdraw but were too Ip committed by then to drop him. The result was a disaster; Courtois IQ received 2,853 votes to Didier,'s 1,011. After the election, the

^■"Les Reunions de Saint-Nicolas," ibid. , July 19* 1892. For the entire story, see Le Courrier de l'E st for June 25 through August 6, 1892 . ^Maurice Barres, "Colson ou Courtois—Courtois ou Colson," ibid., August 6, 1892.

^Le Temps. August 2, 1892. IA3 Courrier de l'E st tried to discount the anti-Boulangist boast that this was a personal defeat for Barres, just as Gabriel had suffered a set-back with the failure of his chief proteg^ in May.^ Yet, the defeat was com­ plete. Before August was over the Courrier de l'E st ended publication and

Barrfes retired from the Nancy political arena.

II

After the defeat of Didier, Barrls deserted Nancy, traveled in

Spain, established himself in the Paris suburb of Neuilly, renewed his critical writing for various newspapers and reviews, and limited his po­ l i t i c a l a c tiv ity to the Chamber and h is p o litic a l w ritin g to th e Panama

Scandal. Not until the legislative campaign of 1893 did he again active­ ly throw himself into politics. When he did, the scene of his political action was not at Nancy, but at the fourth circonscription of Saint-Denis, the seat for Neuilly deserted by the Boulangist Francis Laur, who had gone to Mexico. Moreover, Barres went to the voters of Neuilly not as a so­ cialist, the title he had been operating under at Nancy, but as a mild reformer. Yet, even this new title did not bring him victory.

Barr&s explained his decision to leave Nancy in various ways, but

Neuilly was not too promising either. He told the Neuilly voters he left

I r Nancy "for family reasons owing to personal occupations." Later, he gave a different reason. Papelier's forces, Barr&s argued, had promised

^"L'Election de Saint-Nicolas," Le Courrier de l'E st, August 6, 1892 . ^Maurice Barres, "Quverture g5n^rale," Le Journal. July 28, 1893. 144 the Nancy Boulangists that if he were sacrificed, the Republican Alliance would run a candidate sympathetic to working-class aspirations in an ef­ fort to restore republican unity. "I gave in to this argument," said

Barr&s, "with the approval of iny electoral committee and the voters and advisors I consulted, I gave way. The sympathetic Figaro agreed that

Barres had been forced from Nancy by the success of Papelier. No longer was Nancy a bastion of Boulangism. Papelier had rallied around his or­ ganization all malcontents, republican, conservative, or socialist, be­ cause he was moderate, conciliatory, and constitutional. The writer added I *7 that success at Neuilly was not certain either. The enormous Laur ma­ jority of 1889 had melted away by 1892. In the municipal elections of that year the Boulangist alate, led by a 11Intransigeant writer, garnered only 500 votes against the 3>700 split between republican and Radical 1 rt candidates. The Radical victor, Louis-Victor Lefoulon, became conseil- leur general and was now the candidate against Barres.

More important, however, was the marked difference between the

Neuilly program of Barres and the one he had been espousing. Under Gab­ rie l's influence at Nancy he had gradually moved to where he could call himself and his newspaper socialist, but at Neuilly he asked for victory

only "to aid in the formation of a party in favor of honest and intelli-

gent government."^- 49 Moreover, he admitted to an interviewer that he

^ Maurice Barrfes, "Premier article," Le Courrier de l'E st. A p ril 10, 1898» ^"Les Elections legislatives," Le Figaro. August 10, 1893.

^ L e Temps. May 3> 1892. ^Barr&s, "Ouverture gen^rale." 145 wanted only his 1889 program; "constitutional revision, complete appli­ cation of universal suffrage, respect for religious liberty, and three or four more specific social reforms; a national pension fund for workers and the protection of national workers against foreigners." Although he told the interviewer that "it was the workers who made me enter political life to serve their just interests, " the only "just interest" he felt deeply enough to comment upon was the foreign workers issue. His argu­ ment favoring it made it unclear whether his prime concern was nationalism or socialism;

In the next political campaign I intend to insist very much on the great national theme of France for the French, which cer­ tainly gains ground more and more and impassions the workers. In philosophy, modern evolution is nationalist. In the practi­ cal order, there is reason to state that protectionism intro­ duces the notion of fatherland into political economy.

The exclusion of foreign workers is the necessary correct­ ive of protectionism. Since industrial and agricultural owners are protected by tariffs against foreign products . . . it is just that workers, who have only their labor and their arms, also be protected against competition of foreign labor and arms .... This question is a meeting point of antisemitism, so­ cialism, and the patriotic current.50

He endea by admitting that it would be difficult to find a widely supported formula for achieving this. Such hesitation resulted from the

Chamber debates of May 6, 1893 on proposals for strengthening a bill re­ quiring registration of foreign workers. The debate had once and for all separated the old Boulangists into two camps, nationalist and socialist.

The nationalists wanted some kind of tax on the employers of foreign workers; socialists saw the answer in requiring foreign workers to be

^Jules Huret, "Les Litterateurs h. la Chambre: M. Maurice Bar- r e s ," Le F ig aro , Ju ly 31* 1893. 146 paid at the same rate as Frenchmen. Although both formulae failed, the scrutins publics on the taxes found Barr&s on the nationalist side with

12 other Boulangists of the Dlroulede variety, the Right, and a handful of socialists, including Jean Jaures. Twelve other old Boulangists, in- eluding Gabriel, took the position of most of the socialists. 51

However, the foreign worker issue became the principal plank in the 1893 platform of Barres. In a series of articles in Le Figaro, pub­ lished as an electoral pamphlet entitled, Gontre les Strangers. Barris spelled out his views. He admitted that France should be hospitable, but that the 1,300,000 resident aliens posed a threat to French workers. For­ eign workers came to France because of the promise of good jobs and no m ilitary service. Because they lived like animals they accepted lower pay than French workers demanded. Using reasons he would later redevelop

Barres went on to dismiss the arguments made by the opponents to anti- foreign workers legislation: in spite of what the liberal LSon Say and

Marxist Jules Guesde said, the world was not a single economic unit, but a collection of national units; in spite of the internationalist aspect of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens the French Revo­ lution encouraged nationalism, which now ruled the universe. Just as

Frenchmen would not stand for m ilitary conquest of France, neither should

they stand for economic conquest, either from cheap goods or cheap labor.

To keep cheap foreign labor from preventing full employment in France,

Barre8 proposed the following: tax employers at 10$ of the salaries they

pay foreign workers, subject foreigners to the same m ilitary obligations

51J0G., May 7, 1893, pp. 1360-1361 and 1363-1365. 147 owed by Frenchmen, exclude foreign workers from m ilitary construction, deport all foreigners who go on public relief, apply the American formula of excluding paupers, insane persons, the diseased, and contract laborers, and exclude foreign workers from projects undertaken, subsidized, or con- 52 tracted oy governmental units.

With this program Barres threw himself into a heated campaign at

Neuilly in which he faced a vigorous opposition. His growing nationalism and Boulangist background, both used to identify him with the Right, focused on him the attacks of the Left. On August 18 anarchists, who saw him as a reactionary, entered his Neuilly headquarters, beat up his secre- tary, and left his house placarded with anarchist posters, 53 Barres was certain the police put them up to it, but was perfectly delighted when his supporters formed a body guard for him .^ a socialist candidate, Francis de Pressens£, had such anti-Barres posters that Barres challenged him to a duel, fought without result on September 4. 55 For the Radicals and re­ publicans, Barres was too much of a socialist and Boulangist. One local newspaper, La Chronique Boulonnaise, added these charges: he was a doubt­ ful republican who was supported by the Bonapartist Authority, who was al­ most too much of a fence-straddler between the republicans and reactionar­ ies for his electoral committee to swallow, and who claimed that he was

^Slaurice Barr&s, Contre les Strangers. reprinted in his Scenes et doctrines du nationalism s(Paris, 1925), II, 186-207*

53Le F ig aro, August 19, 1893, and Maurice B arres, "Moeurs nouvelles," Le Journal, September 1, 1893*

^Edmond de Goneourt, Journal: m&noires de la vie littgraire [p ar] Edmond e t Ju les de Goncourt~ (Monaco, 1956-1958), XIX, 201.

^L e Figaro, September 5> 1893* 148 only a former Boulangist; moreover, he was an outsider who came to

Neuilly only because he was finished at Nancy, as if a Paris seat were created just for his convenience. 56

Another factor which hurt his chances was the lack of a newspaper.

Le Journal. for whom he was writing critical articles again, allowed him some space, out not endorsement, after the first ballot on August 20, when he led a field of five candidates, he did win the support of Le Figa- ro. 57 This endorsement came, in part, because he appeared to have a good chance of victory. Until the eve of the second ballot the Radicals could not agree on a candidate capable of galvanizing the anti-Barr&s vote.

"Moreover," added Le Figaro, "the tolerant opinions and program of prac­ tical reforms of M, Barres have encountered the liveliest approval in numerous rallies which he organized with none of his concurrents having r rt dared to meet at any of them with him."

let, the endorsement of conservative newspapers, like L'Autorite and Le Figaro, was the kiss of death at Neuilly. On the second ballot of

September 3, Barres picked up only 659 votes while his opponent, Lefoulon, picked up 1593 to beat him 4*149 to 3*923.*^ The fate of Barres was the same as that of so many of his Boulangists brothers in 1893. He was not

^Quoted in B., "Cinq ans apres," Le Progres de l'E st, May 12, 1898 . ^Charles Chincolle, "Les Elections legislatives," Le Figaro. September 3, 1893. The first ballot gave Barr&s 3*264 votes; the Radi­ cal Lefoulon, 2,556; a republican, Houdard, 1,089; Alcabe, a socialist, 1,221; and de Pressense, 421. ^ I b id . . September 2, 1893. See same newspaper for August 28, 1893. ^ I b id ., September 4* 1893* 149 only in the same position of Boulangism—without press, leadership, or party; he no longer had a local following or a seat in the Chamber.

Where was he to go?

I l l

The defeat of Boulangism in France and of Barres in Nancy and

Neuilly, both of which brought to a close the first phase of his career, raises the question, what had it all meant for him? Specifically, was he an effective deputy and politician? In what ways had the legislative and political experience changed the ideas he had held at the time of his decision to enter politics?

In answer to the first question, Barres was not an effective deputy, except for his respectable voting record. He spoke but five

times, and hardly ever engaged in the fine art of interrupting, which so marked his Boulangist fellow deputies. A notable exception was during an

interpellation on the July, 1893 Paris student uprising when he told Pre­ mier Charles Dupuy, "You are the parrot of the police."^ His speeches

give every appeanance of having been read from a prepared text and in al­

most every case concerned themselves with government censorship. On Octo­

ber 23, 1890 he interpellated on the Hachette monopoly of book sales in

railroad stations. According to Barres Hachette established a de facto

censorship by refusing to sell books it considered immoral, such as works

by Emile Zola, Guy de Maupassant, and Camila Mendes, and detrimental to

"social order," such as books on socialism, anti-Semitism, and even a work

^JOC.. July 10, 1893, p. 2062. 150 by Yves Guyot, the minister of public works whom Barrfes was interpellating.

The Chamber rejected his motivated order of the day for giving bookselling concessions to the highest bidder.^ Barrfes also spoke during the Joseph

Reinach interpellation of January 29, 1891, contesting the government's closing of Francisque Sarcey's play, Xhermidor. because it cast an un­ favorable light on the Revolution and, particularly, the grandfather of

Sadi Carnot. Although the debate brought forth the leaders of each bloc to give its historical interpretation of the French Revolution, Barres limited his remarks to a summary of the play's plot and theme and a plea 62 for free artistic expression. On March 17, 1892, he interpellated theihe government on the deportation of a Nancy Boulangist of Alsacian birth. 63

On March 6, 1893, he interpellated the government on its closing of Paul

Adam's L'Automne. a play of working-class sympathies, climaxing in a strike scene. "It is necessary that political passions maintain art,"

Barres argued. "Shall we permit one of those who cuts such a figure in this Chamber, a Chamber which is more particularly a theater of political tragedy, to ban a competition on the part of those who aspire to nothing more than a theater for political comedyi'^' As we have seen, Barrfes also spoke after the Millevoye interpellation on the Norton letters.

In all these Barres came off badly, faced with inattention or

6l Ibid. . October 24, 1890, pp. 1745-1748.

^Ibid., January 30, 1891, p. 155*

63Ibid. . March 18, 1892, pp. 285-286.

64Ibid. . March 7, 1893, PP. 859-860. 151 65 interruptions. Those who replied to his charges and those who inter­ rupted invariably won their points at his expense with ironic references to the ego, psychology, the ivory tower, and barbarians. He was so un­ skilled in debating that he could not come back in kind. He came off just as badly as far as legislation went. Seldom did his ideas reach the floor. Once he did co-sponsor with Gabriel an amendment to a bill setting up labor arbitration boards which would allow the boards to act on work rules, but Gabriel did the talking.^ Coming as it did on the eve of the

Nancy m unicipal e le c tio n s, th e amendment was l i t t l e more than e le c to ra l propaganda.

As a debater and legislator in the Chamber, then, Barres was a failure, but it may be unjust to judge him by these criteria. When he f i r s t went to the Chamber he wrote:

At th e Chamber th ere are 560 in te re s tin g physiognomies. They are there under diverse titles, but one could prepare an inter­ esting catalog of them. And, by reducing these varied charac­ ters to thirty types, one will get a kind of illustrated guide [tableau] composed of little likenesses with descriptive le­ gends underneath them. Such a guide would be suitable for post­ ing in city halls and analogous to those I have seen in grammar schools in the country entitled: Illustrated Guide of Harmful In s e c ts . ” '

Indeed, throughout his years as a deputy Barr&s seemed to see himself as a student looking at an illustrated guide of harmful insects. Given his frame of reference—the sterility of pursuing his program, which forced

For example, The Progres de l ’Est took great delight that the Barr&s speech on Naas, the deported boulangist, had been received with "a glacial silence." See Le Courrier de l'E st. April 2, 1892. The Courrier probably would not have replied to the charge had not Barres’ ineffectiveness as a deputy been used by the opposition.

66JOC., March 18, 1892, pp. 295-296.

^Maurice Barrfes, "L'Invalideur," La Presse. December 10, 1889* 152 him to act like the rest of the deputies and do nothing—there was no choice but to play the part of the student and chronicler of a Chamber not famed for its creativity or probity. 68 In this role the power of

Barr&s was more than adequate. It was certainly evident by the time of his descriptions in Le Journal and Le Figaro of the Panama Scandal debates many of which were incorporated into his novel, Leurs Figures. It was al­ so visible at the beginning. Witness this succinct analysis of a politi­ cian who typified the dynamic of the Opportunist Republic: "[Charles Flo- quet, an Opportunist Prime Minister] is the navel of the Chamber, the flower of the parliamentary belly—of that center which costs France so much. He is the spot where the governmentals of Radicalism and Oppor- tunism can contemplate each other and be reconciled." 69

Nor could partisan politics blind him to the good qualities of those people and institutions he opposed. For example, his treatment of

Millevoye's attempt to demolish Clemenceau with the Norton letters, a dem olition Barres believed th e Chamber would have loved to se e , alm ost puts him on the side of Clemenceau. 70 D. W. Brogan has described how this process shaped Barres:

The main source of knowledge for Barres, as a politician, writer and political thinker, was that body so dispised by h is n a tu ra l enemies, th e Chamber. The Chamber forced him to face, every day, the fact that France had gone through the Revolution, the fact that a theory of France had to ex­ plain the Chamber, nor merely explain it away .... I t

^Maurice Barr&s, "Huit jours a l a Chambre," i b id ., November 25, 1889. ^Maurice Barr&s, "Le Tour d1esprit de M. Floquet," ibid.. December 24, 1889* "^Maurice Barr&s, "RShabilit^s," Le Figaro. July 22, 1893. 153 had its Jews, its Protestants, its "M£tiques ," and its Free­ masons. And . . . [he] was always ready to hit them in the solar plexus when he got the chance. But he was too keen an observer not to see how French the Chamber was, whether it was for good or ill.71

Yet, Barres could have accomplished this role of student and chronicler of the Chamber just as well from the press gallery as from the benches. It was not a record on which to build a political career. His inability or refusal to meet the criteria usually prescribed for deputies continued to dog him with charges of dilettantism, of being in politics simply to magnify his ego and literary horizons. "M. Maurice Barr&s," wrote Henri Beranger, "seems to make of politics the occasion of a game and of his legislative mandate a literary curiosity .... When he came to sit in the parliament he was still a dilletante and ironist. The con­ nection between his obscure fever of energy and reality did not reveal itself until much later, around 1893 and 1894* When it did, his voters 72 sent him back to literature." Theodore Duret, the art critic, told

Edmond de Goncourt that Barr&s "is very wrong to become a socialist poli­ tician since he has an aristocratic air, which is never favored in poli­ tical rallies, since he is not even a journalist of those benches, since he is too literary, too refined, too metaphysical." 73

In his interview with Barres, Jules Huret brought up these very charges of "dilletantism, curiosity, and need for emotion" as the motiva­ tion for the political involvement of Barres. The latter admitted to the

7Ld . W. Brogan, French Personalities and Problems (New York, 1947), P. 109. 72Henri Beranger, "De Chateaubriand A Barres," ki Revue bleue, XXXIV, part 1 (January 30, 1897), 134. ^Goncourt, XX (January

pate in the passions of my epoch, to put myself in their service." He added that it was necessary to get on a "ground of truth, to be fixed on

it solidly and intimately." Politics provided such a "ground of truth."

By such a grounding, Barrfes saw himself as a "publicist," that combina­

tion of the man of letters with the man of affairs in the tradition of

Chateaubriand, Constant, Lamartine, and Disraeli. Moreover, he was con­

fident that his voters would see him in that way and dismiss the charges rji of diletantism. He touched on this again during the campaign of 1893.

Only by communicating his dreams to the masses, he said, could a thinker

realize his dreams, even though he might prefer the solitary dreaming in

the Bibliotheque Nationale reading room. He added that what really ex­

cited him in politics was not the hobnobbing with fellow deputies, most

of whom were mediocrities, but the electoral campaign. Only there did he

really touch the people. 75 Imagine this being written during the heat of

a campaign by a man supposedly fighting to get elected in order to serve

his constitiants in the Chamberi

There was truth in both these charges and rebuttals. To be sure

Barres too often looked like an ineffective dilettante to his critics and

voters. Yet, legislative and political experience had given him more of

a "ground of truth.11 In spite of the similarity of programs, he was a

different man in 1893 from what he had been in 1889. The Nancy record

shows that. No longer did he create dreams out of thin air. The mere

74Huret, "Les Litterateurs & la Chambre."

75Maurice Barres, "Entre deux reunions," Le Journal. August 11, 1893. See also: Maurice Barres, "De l ’Utilitee des injures," Le Figaro, August 12, 1890. 155 contact with the workers in rallies and interviews made him aware of their plight more than any book could have done. Seeing at first hand the difficulties of forming trade unions forced him to think more con­ cretely on solutions. The failure to build political victories from an almost solely working-class base, showed him he had to seek a broader base, a fact which drew him closer to nationalism and anti-Semitism as bridges able to span the gulf between the socialist Left and the Catholic

R igh t. The day by day p a rtic ip a tio n in the Chamber of Deputies impressed him with the uncreativity of the Opportunist Republic more than Boulangist polemics ever had in 1887 and 1888.

More than th a t, however, th e Nancy and Chamber experience forced him into making his own judgments. His political immaturity of 1889 had brought him to accept Boulangism as it was, but by 1893 he accepted no doctrinaire position. Gabriel had led him into socialism, but Gabriel's growing dogmatism, with its hatred of Possibilists like Lavy and Dumay and

Catholic reformers like de Mun, offended the conciliatory position of Bar­ res, just as socialism's inability to win bothered his ambition. In turn, the attitude of Barres, increasingly alienated Gabriel. Barres could em­ brace anti-Semitism, but could not follow Drumont, for whom anti-semitism was the only answer. He could admire the patriotism of D£roulfede, but

could not become a D&rouledist, whose nationalism subordinated every other

concern. Barres could see merit in all these positions and be influenced

by them, but he was still unable to synthesize them. Yet, these and cer­

tain other influences were pointing the way to the future.

One such influence was a book by G. Platon, probably Le Droit de

propri£t6 dans la soci£t6 franque et en Germanie. published at Paris in 156 1890. Barr&s was enough taken by this book to recommend it wholehearted­ ly and write two articles on it. Through it, he came for the first time under the influence of Marxism. Barres summarized Platon's position as follows: From the earliest warfare of tribe against tribe there has been a hierarchical social structure with class struggle. Within the 19th century, with "a division of labor resting on science," the capitalist class became all important, all-powerful, and international in operation.

With the French Revolution, the capitalist class had conquered the state.

"Against the culture of the Church, it opposed its philosophy, the cul­ ture of the State. At the same time, it took possession of other social functions: justice, police, administration. All that is the property of the capitalist class," and it used them to exploit the workers. Yet, the workers had the potential to end capitalist exploitation by follow­ ing the capitalist example of invoking the revolutionary heritage, which included the vote, and by organizing themselves as effectively as inter- 76 national capital. However, the nationalism of Barres prevented him from accepting from Platon more than the analysis of society and history. He could not

see an international class struggle against international capital. After the Brussels Conference of the Second International in 1891 Barres wrote,

"We cannot say that the German worker is a brother. We cannot say any

longer that the Belgian and the Italian have the right to work in our

country with as much ease as a Frenchman." He added that solidarity

sounded very well, but it had to come later. Socialists had to win power

^^Maurice Barres, "La Classe capitaliste," Le Courrier de l'E st, September 21, 1890 and "La.Lutte entre capitalistes et travailleurs,'! ibid., September 28, 1890. 157 77 at home first. This national orientation completely pervaded the thought of Barrbs. He still argued, as he had before 1889, that French writers allowed themselves unnecessarily to fall under the foreign in­ fluences, even though they could find the same ideas in French writers:

Dostoyevski had read Eugene Sue and Hugo, Tolstoy described Borodino like Stendhal’s Fabrice, the compassion of Dickens was in Michelet, the heroism of Tolstoy's Souvenirs des Crim£e was in Vigny's Grandeur et ser­ vitude m ilitaire. Indeed, with Rousseau, one could throw away all the 78 Russians. Barres could admit to an interviewer from the Berliner Lokal

Anzeiger that he was heavily in debt to German thought, but that his in­ tellectual debt could not overcome his loss of Alsace-Lorraine. As long as France was incomplete, he argued, she was anti-German. 79

Thus, the influences were at work. The four years in the Chamber and Boulangist politics had left their mark. The job for Barres now was to put these ideas and experiences into a synthesis which could win where

Boulangism had failed.

^Maurice Barres, "Apres le Congres," ibid., August 29 > 1891. 78 « Maurice Barres, "La Querelle des nationalistes at des cosmo­ polites," Le Figaro. July 4> 1892.

79 Maurice Barres, "France et Allemagne," Le Courrier de l'E s t , April 11, 1891. UHAPTEH V

AT THE CROSBHOAUS U893~18y7)

The end of Boulangism and the 1893 election brought to a close the first phase of the political career of Barres. He had entered Boulangism as a political innocent for literary and psychological needs. As a result he had accepted the ready-made Boulangist solutions. Thgough such teach­ ers as D^roulede and Gabriel, Barres had come to nationalism and socialism and had found both reconciled in parliamentary Boulangism. The Dreakup of

Boulangism brought the second phase of Barres1 political career, the at­ tempt to find a new movement which, like Boulangism, could bring together nationalism and socialism . The years 1893 through 1897 saw him seeking t h i s 1 in the French socialist movement. Unfortunately for him, those same years saw French socialism reject nationalism, even as Barres set about defining his own brand of socialism, a kind of Girondin Socialism, which would keep nationalism and socialism united within federalism. By 1897, be found himself at the crossroads: he had to choose either socialism or national­ ism or wage a solitary fight.

Accompanying this ideological problem in the years 1893-1897 was a tactical one, the continued attempt to find the electoral success denied him in 1893. In 1889 he had ridden in on the coattails of Gabriel, From his Boulangist past, so distrusted by republicans, and his obvious poli­ tical liabilities, in order to find movement capable of electing him to an office from which he could put his ideas into action. His inability to gain socialist support for his one attempt at office in these years added to his ideological differences with socialism.

158 159 I

In 1393 socialism did indeed seem to be an option for Barf^s. One reason fo r i t was h is Boulangist record in the Chamber, where as early as

1890 he and his 29-31 fellow Boulangists thought of themselves as socialists.

Indeed, in that year they were as close to it or closer than the future leaders of socialism, Jean Jaur£s and Alexandre Killerand. One-third of the 30-32 Boulangists had even come out of socialist backgrounds,,and the entire group had formed one of the largest blocs of the Extreme J-eft, By

1393 as many as a dozen of them had been welcomed in to s o c ia lis t ranks, had adhered to the Tivoli-Vauxhall manifesto, or had cooperated with socialists in the 1893 elections.^ By 1894# seven out of the ten Boulangists re-elected in 1893 joined the Union raocialiste, the parliamentary group organized 2 "to unify and direct the activities of the Socialist Deputies." The beliefs of BarrSs made it quite logical for him to follow their example0

Yet, another reason was the willingness of socialists to accept their former enemies, the Boulangists. This willingness was due to the fragmen­ tation and weakness of the French socialist movement in 1893-1894* Just as there had been a "multiplicity of Boulangisms", there was a division of socialism into five major groups: the nationalistic and revolu­ tionary Blanquists, themselves sometimes split between the followers of

Rochefort and Vaillantj the Marxist followers of Jules Guesde of the Parti

^See Chapter 3# above.

^Aaron Noland, The Founding of the French Socialist Party (1893-1905) (Cambridge, 1956), p. 40J Alexandre Z6va8s, Histoire du Socialisme et Com- munisme en France. 1871-1947 (Paris, n.d.), p. 237* These Boulangists were Argelies, Goussot, Jourde, Paulin M8ry, P. Richard, E. Roche, and Turigny. Missing were Castelin, l*e Senne, and i*aporte. 160 ouvrier, whose charter had been approved by Marx himse lf - the gradualist

Possibilists, Marxist like the Guesdists, but differing from them in their willingness to accept bourgeois support and refusal to be part of a cen­ tralized party; the Allemanists, rejecting both Possibilist reformism and Guesdist revolution in favor of trade union activity; and the Inde­ pendent Socialists, re-emphasizers of the humanitarian elements of Uto­ pian Socialism and seekers of some doctrinal and tactical common ground among the various socialist factions. In such a diverse socialist world it was not impossible to think of Boulangists as socialists.

However, this factionalism made socialism weak, and so did voter reluctance. In the 1889 legislative elections, for example, much of the potential socialist vote had gone either to Boulangist candidates or, because of socialist determination to beat Boulanger at any cost, to anti-

Boulangist republican candidates of Badical-Socialist orientation. Hardly more than a dozen s o c ia lis ts reached the Chamber 01 Deputies as pure so­ cialists. Later, just as the failure of Boulangism drove the Boulangist-

Socialists closer to their socialist allies in the Chamber, the failure of the Chamber to pass sweeping social reforms drove the socialist depu­ ties away from their 1889 allies, the anti-Boulangist republicans, and closer to the Boulangist-Socialists. This socialist willingness to co­ operate with Boulangism marked Lafargue's speech for an amnesty on Decem­

ber 8, 1891. By 1893 Victor Jaclard, reflecting a widespread socialist at­ titude, argued that there was no longer any need for republican concentra­

tion against Boulangism. The need now was for a new concentration of so­

cialists, ex-Boulangists, and BadicalrSocialists to achieve a social republic

against the "new Boulangism" the alliance of the Center and Bight in the 161 3 Chamber. Finally, the spectacular gains made by socialism in the 1893 elections can be explained largely by the continued dissatisfaction of the

voters with Center governments, the ability of the socialists finally to

cooperate among themselves electorally, and the absence of Boulangism.

Of course, the gains were not so dramatic if one remembers that the Extreme

Left of 30-32 Boulangist-Socialists and a dozen socialists in the 1889

Chamber was not much sm aller than the approxim ately 50 members of the

Union s o c ia lis ts o f the 1893 Chamber.

In short, socialism in 1893 was an option for BarrEs because, in its

weakness and fragmented diversity, it was willing to accept all comers.

Out of expediency and the need for parliamentary and electoral cooperation

in a time of weakness, a wide divergence of socialist views was bolerd&edd

Even many Radical Socialists and Boulangists could be considered comrades.

In turn, his voting record and public statements as a deputy could cause

Barres to consider himself a socialist so long as socialism had no pre­

cisely defined program or single party. With the Blanquists he shared the

view that the proletariat needed the leadership of an elite of advanced

bourgeoisie and the concern for nationalism. With the Guesdists he shared

the Marxist view of history and the need to be "scientific." He loved to

quote Marx’s dictum, especially in evaluatingjthe corruption of the Pan-

amists, "In history there is no place for choler."^- With the Independant

Socialists he shared a willingness to work with all reformers of good

will and to laud the ability of Jean Jaures to bring to the Chamber both

^Victor Jaclard, "Tactique socialiste," La Revue socialiste, XVII M pril, 1893), 385-401. ^Maurice BarrSs, "M. Jean Jaures," Lfe Journal. January 20, 1893* 162 socialism and "the preferences of a philosopher."'* With the Possibilists he shared the efficacy of reformism, not revolution, and localism, not centralization. As long as socialism retained an armed truce among its followers and a willingness to respect each other1s doctrinal differences,

Barres could remain a socialist. However, Bhould socialism ever resolve its differences and should it in particular reject nationalism, Barres and the Boulangist-Socialists would be driven away. Yet, that moment seemed far in the future.

II

Until 1894* Barres simply stayed on the fringes of socialism. No longer in the Chamber, he returned to his writing, mainly to criticism and to the penning of an unsuccessful anti-Panama play, Une Journee parlementaire.

In September, 1894* however, he became political director of the Paris daily, La Cocarde. turned it into a socialist newspaper, and plunged into socialism. In his brief direction of La Cocarde, he showed the kind of contribution he could make to socialism. His literary prestige made the newspaper perhaps the liveliest member of the socialist press and brought to socialist readers a wide variety of writers, which was bound to in­ fluence young intellectuals.

La Cocarde had had a chequered past. Founded as a Boulangist news­ paper, it declined and passed from hand to hand until it was bought by a paper merchant who thought that Barres1 literary prestige could cause the newspaper to prosper. The "new" Cocarde, as it called itself, dis-

5Ibid. 163 claimed any connection with the old. It asserted that, its only past was

Maurice Barres, twice the candidate of "socialist committees," and its fu­ ture would be dedicated to "republican opposition where socialists and intellectuals will group themselves" and to Barres1 principles of

"patriotism and social solidarity."^ The nev/spaper was a tabloid in both size and style, with lurid headlines. The first headline was typical:

"The Scandals of the Episcopate; the names of the accused bishops." As political director, Barres wrote nearly every day a lead editorial, patterned on Francis Magnard's "Echos" in Le Figaro, after a brief morning 7 conference with other La Cocarde writers. As a newspaper of information,

La Cocarde mainly sought rapid news release with several editions, but with little depth or breadth. On September y, for example, its hawkers hit the streets with the first news in Paris of the death of the Count of Paris.

Its news coverage was so thin that it made its mark mainly as a journal of opinion. This was possible because Barr&s was able to bring to a single newspaper a great variety of literary and political writers: Augustin.,

Hamon, the anarchist; socialists of varied factions like Eugene Fourniere,

Louis Menard, P ierre Denis, Paul Pascal, Alfred G abriel, Paule Minck;

Fernand Pelloutier, the rising young trade-union leader; royalists like

Fr£d£ric Amouretti, Hugues Rebell, and Charles Maurras. La Cocarde was open to Jews as varied as Gustave Kahn, Lucien Muhlfeld, and Elie May.

^"La Nouvelle 'Cocarde'," La Cocarde. September 5> 1894* n Edmond de Goncourt, Journal»m6moires de la vie littS raire [parO Edward e t Jules de Goncourt (Monaco. 1956-1958). XX. 145 (entry fo r November.1.11» 1894)* Goncourt was convinced that this journalistic venture showed th a t lite r a tu r e fo r Barres was "only a contrivance [moyen] and th a t he has above all a political ambition." Ibid. . XX, 119-120 (entry for September 2, 1894). 164 The ability of BarrSs to fill the pages of La Cocarde with the views of such a varied group of writers resulted, first of all, from his cap­ acity to recruit old Boulangists, like Denis and Gabriel, whose views were no longer welcome at any other newspaper. Secondly, there was the fac­ ulty of Barres to recruit socialist intellectuals like Eugene Fourniere.

This came from the enormous stature Barres had attained by the 1890’s with young intellectuals of both Left and Right. During the Paris stu­ dent uprising of July, 1893, for example, a group of students seeking parliamentary help for their cause addressed an appeal to Barres as "the most eminent representative of intelligent youth." Alexandre 2£vaes, the future Guesdist, described Barres as the most influential and popular writer among the students of the Latin Quarter in the early 18901 s, lauded his socialist-oriented articles of 1890 in Le Figaro. spoke warmly of

La Cocarde, and concluded that "Maurice Barres drew me out of the Latin 9 Quarter." Joseph Paul-Boncour wrote that Barres' linfluence on us was incontestable," especially through his writings in La Cocarde and his socialist campaign at-Neuilly in 1896.^ LSon Blum, a frequent visitor to the home of Barres in the 1890's, recalled, "I am sure that [Barres]

g Le Figaro. July 4, 1893- Although Barres did circulate among the rioters, he limited his remarks, in the parliamentary debate of July 9 on the riot, to calling the Prime Minister the "parrot of the police." Journal officiel de le R^publique francaise. Chambre. P6bats» July 10, 1893, p. 2062. 9 Alexandre Z6va.es, Notes e t Souvenirs d'un M ilita n t. (P a ris, 1913), pp. 26-31.

^Joseph Paul-Boncour, Recollections of the Third Republic, trans. George Marion, Jr. (New York, 1957), I, 62. had for me, a true fondness, a solicitude of an older brother-... He was for me, as for most of my associates, not only the master, but the guide.

We formed around him a school, almost a court. In La Petite H^uublique. the editor of La Revue socialiste. Georges Renard, could salute Barres 12 as a "companion in arms." Many of these men had been drawn to Barres as a result of the doctrine of the moi, the need for individual fulfillment outside one's self. This had been expressed, of course, in the novels of the Culte du moi, but also in frequent newspaper articles as early as

1889. 13 In them, Barres attacked an educational system which , he believed, isolated the student from the working-class, while boarding schools, with their valets and maids, made it difficult for the student to fit into his post-graduate economic status. Either way the schools, v/ith their hot­ house atmosphere, did not prepare students for real life. More than that, the schools and student organizations bred conformity. In associations, students conformed to a standard of mediocrity and vulgarity. Barres urged young men to break out of this isolation and conformist mediocrity, to search for individual fulfillment by getting out of themselves and into, first, Boulangism, and, later, socialism. Doubtless, Zevaes, Blum, and

Paul-Boncour had agreed, as had many of La Cocarde1,s w riters.

From their arrival at La Cocarde, these varied writers were allowed complete freedom of expres sion because of Barres's own commitment 6o individualism. It was this which made La Cocarde so lively and contri-

^L^on Blum, Souvenirs sur 1'Affaire. (Paris, 1935)* p. 86.

^Quoted in "La Vie intellectuelle," La Cocarde. January 31* 1895*

^Maurice Barres, "Sur 1’Education nationale," La Presse, December 31* 1889, "Du Recrutement d'un personnel r^volutionnaire," Le Figaro, April 2, 1890, "L'Enr^gimentement de la jeunesse," ibid. . May 26, 1890. buted to its influence. In literary criticism, for example, "Hugues Re­ bell was able to express his disgust for Zola only several days after the dithyramb of an enraptured [Faul] Brulat," an old Boulangist who later became one of Clemenceau's Dreyfusards.^ In politics, views ran the entire socialist gamut. Pierre Denis could argue the need for an elite,

"selected" not "elected," to give force to revolutionary energy and ideas which the masses could not give spontaneously. 15 Louis Menard could write on October 1, 1994* "In the conflict of interests, which in our day takes the proportions of a religious struggle, [Labor] represents the

legitimate interest: the future belongs to it." Fourniere could argue, on November 5, 1994* that the struggle between capital and labor "will

come to an end only when la b o r and c a p ita l a re re u n ite d in th e same hands," while Gabriel could settle for the gradual state acquisition of railroads,

the Bank of France, and mines. Gabriel could laud the collective working

o f land by a communal so c ie ty in Sedan, w hile Denis could r e je c t i t in

favor of the independent peasant holding.^ Virtually every article of

Paul Pascal, who saw society's salvation in Proudhonist decentralization, 17 quoted or referred to, with complete approval, the ideas of Barres.

Years later, Charles Maurras, hardly a proponent of these views, explained

how he and this assortment of socialists could co-exist on La Cocarde:

^Henri Clouard, "La1 Cocarde' de BarresJ' LaRevue critique des Id€es et des livres. VIII (1910), 219; Dictionnaire de biographie frangaise, V II, 498. ^Pierre Denis, "Les Conditions de la Revolution," La Cocarde, January 31, 1895. ^Quoted in Clouard, pp. 219-224. ^See, for example, Paul Pascal, "Simple exemple contre la centralisa­ tion," La Cocarde. January 1, 1895. 167 "Everyone was reconciled and harmonized through the love—there is no other word to describe it—the love for a man, through the fondness all these men had for Maurice Barres."« 18

On his part, Barres could welcome this diversity, because he valued h is w riters as in te lle c tu a ls , giving them th a t very name. An in te lle c ­ tual, he wrote, is "a man who has had the good fortune to receive an integral education" and who, because of his concern "to lift all humanity to intellectuality," seeks a social transformation. 19 He later wrote that the young intellectuals of La Cocarde were men who "came quite nat­ urally to carry the curiosities and moral uneasiness" of earlier "psych- ologues" and "analysts," like the Goncourts, Taine, and Renan, "into dreams of social transformation. One saw it clearly at La Cocarde, where num- 20 erous young men were impassioned with sociology." At any rate, this approach certainly made La Cocarde lively reading and added to the stature and influence of Barres.

I l l

Such was the creation of La Cocarde. It was important for Barres as a vehicle for his ideas, which were shared in part by all his writers.

These ideas revealed a second stage in the ideological growth of Barrel— his expression of a Girondin Socialism.

^Charles Maurras, Malt res et t&noins de ma vie d* esprit (Paris, 1954)* p. 26. 19 Maurice Barrls, "La Question des 1 Intellectual^’, " La Cocarde. September 20, 1894• 20Maurice Barres, "L’Histoire interieure d'un journal," La Revue encyclopedique, November 15, 1895* 417* 168 In the early issues of La Cocarde. Barres stated what any i-

deology had to aim at if it were to win his support. "Free and profound

individualism,11 he wrote, "social solidarity, there are the two concerns

of our ideal." This was, of course, hardly a new idea in the thought of

Barres. In simpler form it had been the central notion in the Culte du moi, just as it would be the unifying principle in all his writings:

Individualism through anarchy was not fulfilling; the ego could not feed

on itself alone; it had to identify with society. By individualism, Barres

now meant "total liberation [affranchissement. his favorite term in La

Cocarde]," which would satisfy not only the economic and bodily needs of

the individual. Each individual also had to bring all his powers into

action, recognize his vocation, "single out his likings, conform himself 21 to his destiny." He agreed with Marx that, for the individual self-

fulfillment of the worker, at least, economic liberation was necessary.

Yet, Barres felt, the Marxist analysis fell short of explaining why the

economically undeprived young bourgeois could not find self-fulfillm ent.

Thus, for Barres the problem of individual liberation was double, nec­

essitating economic emancipation for the worker and educational liberation

for the bourgeois. The latter needed deliverance from a hidebound educ­

ational system which bred conformity and isolation and which poorly prepared 22 him for the struggles of life. The second part of the stated ideal, social solidarity* by which

Barres meant the corporate determination to create the conditions capable

^Maurice Barres, "Individualisme et solidari'Ce," La Cocarde, September 6, 1894* 22Maurice B arres, "Le Probleme e s t double," ib id ., September 8, 1894 and "Opprim^s et humili^s," ibid., September 14* 1894» 169 of emancipating the individual, marked a considerably further develop­ ment of the Gulte du moi and would seem to place Barres into either Radical

or socialist politics. Indeed, in several articles, published separately

as De Hegel aux Cantines du Nord, he discussed the ability of these two

parties to solve the problem he had set forth. As to an immediate program

Barres found himself in agreement with both Ren£ Goblet of the Radicals

and Jaures. Like them he stood for nationalization of mines, railroads, 23 the Bank of France, and tax reform. Yet, that was as close as he could

come to Radicalism. Its legislative program was perfectly acceptable,

but it had no view of the ideal society toward which the legislation would

2/l lead and toward which the party would educate the voters. Any party

which wanted Barred support had to have such an ideal.

In contrast, socialism did have such an ideal, Barres thought, the

transformation of society. What Barres said he learned from Taine, as

Jaures had learned from Marx, was that "our epoch is a moment of an evol­

ution which, under the pressure of the same causes which produced capi­

talism, conducts us toward a situation that Marx calls collectivism."

Because of that, Barres was convinced that the people supported the Rad­

ical and socialist legislative program only because it was the indispen-

sible station "on the path to the ideal." "The people wants to be pres­

ented with complete social perfection [un ensemble de perfection sociale]

..... What impassions us is not the introducing of a little harmony into

^"ConftSrence de Maurice Barres," La Cocarde. October 3* 1S94- ^ speech made before the Union des R^publicains patriotes et revisionniates de France on October 1, 1894* ^^Maurice Barres, "Conversation de Goblet et Jaures," De hegel aux cantines du Nord (Paris, 1904), pp. 39-42 ^Originally in La Cocarde, September 13* 1894). 170 the world, it is the proceeding toward complete justice, liberty, and harmony." Barres then made the interesting observation that many so-

called socialists, at heart only advanced Radicals, would be horrified by "the immediate and complete applj cation of the doctrine which they

sanction. What pleases them in socialism...is its ability to give them

an important role in the history of the universe; it permits them to con­

sider themselves as a moment in a sublime evolution, as workers for the

great and final social harmony: it keeps them nearer the ideal." In

spite of the contradiction, socialists were wise to champion the people's

ideal. In so doing it was necessary to operate on two fronts: legislate

for the present intermediate stage; then educate the people for the final 25 «. stqge of social perfection, This was purely practical, Barres believed,

in that the people* s desire for an ideal had all the aspects of a religious

f a ith . Because voting was "more a movement o f f a ith than one of personal

reflexion," socialists had to put themselves with the people by "embracing

large hopes.

In his discussion of the need for an ideal and the incapacity of the

Radicals to formulate such an ideal, barres showed himself heavily under

the influence of Jean Jaures, even to imagining a debate between Jaures

and Goblet, willingly making the former the obvious victor in the argu- 27 ment, but the ideal he embraced was not collectivism. Much as Barres

^Maurice BarrSs, "II faut un id£al," ibid., pp. 43-47 (Originally in La Cocarde. September 13, 1894)*

O i l Maurice Barres, "La Foi en sociologie,11 ibid. . p. 94 (Originally in La Cocarde. October 26, 1894)• 27 For Jaures1;- views in this period, see: Harvey Goldberg, The Life of Jean Jaures (Madison, 1962), pp. 110-115 and 134-136. Barres seemed especially influenced by the Jaures debate with Paul Lafargue on January 12, 1894. 171 was willing to be convinced by the ’’verbal force, fluency, and evident

conviction" of Jaures that collectivism would not "crush us under a uniform dictatorship," Jaures could not allay Barres’ fears of "this

immense dictatorial infinity that Marxism was able to be." 28 Barres

could accept the Marxist interpretation of history, but not its plan for

the future. "The Marxists," he wrote, "are not content with the force­

ful analysis of the successive forms of property: they pretend to for- 29 mulate what will be the future and to bring us under this formula."

This did not mean, however, th a t Barres was ready to go to war against

collectivism. To be sure, collectivism, for him, was only one "hypothesis,"

"fiction," "Salente" (i.e. the utopian state in the T£l6maqueoof F&ielon),

a "remote sociological hypothesis" of social transformation just as Dar­

win’ s theory was a hypothesis for biological transformation, supported

by the "collectivist socialists" of La Petite it£publioue» Yet, he still

wanted to cooperate with the collectivists as well as with the Radicals.

"On the ideal," as he put it, "each of us has his views, the sincere ex­

pression of his temperament. It is necessary to let the future ferment

in our brains. But on the immediate w ork,...it i3 necessary that we take 30 a common view of the first stage." If, in the mind of BarrSs, Radicalism lacked an ideal, anarchism

negated solidarity, and collectivism destroyed the individual, what could

28 Maurice Barr&s, "Pas de dictature," De ftegel, pp. 75-76 (Originally in La Cocarde. December 30, 1894). 29 Maurice BarrSs, "L'Arbre de vie d'une idee," ibid., p. 25 (Originally in Le Journal. December 7 j 1894)* 30 Maurice BarrSs, ”L' Id£al et les premieres Itapes, " ibid. . pp. 56-57 (Originally in La Cocarde. September 18, 1894)• 172 achieve individualism and solidarity? For an answer, Barres turned to

Proudhon. Proudhon did have an ideal, one which Barres saw as a Hegelian synthesis of Marx's collectivist thesis of solidarity and Bakunin's an­ archist antithesis of individualism. In Proudhon's desire for "federalism and contract" lay the solution. "It is federalism," Barres wrote, "which best respects the diversities and disagreements of the physical and moral universe. It is contract [I.e. the voluntary and free association of man with other men] which permits the 'ego' to arrange tolerable relations with other 'egos.'" 31 Barres never tired of quoting Proudhon's dictum,

"Who says republic and does not say federation says nothing; who says liberty and does not say federation says nothing; who says socialism and does not say federation still says nothing." Barres believed that feder­ alism was thoroughly rooted in French tradition. It had been supported by the Girondins, many of whose ideas were incorporated into the Jacobin

constitution of the Year II; by the 1871 Commune movements in Paris, iyon,

and Marseille; by Centre Gauche leaders such as lAon Say, Aynard, and Des-

chanal; by Radicals in their support of municipal autonomy; by socialists

like Millerand and Abel Hovelacque, who proposed in 1890 to divide *ranee

into IB regions; by a variety of literary men as varied as the Provencal 32 poet Frederic Mistral, and Hippolite Taine. let, Barres believed,

Proudhon always remained the master of it.

■^^aurice Barres, "La F£d£ration donne a tous une patrie," ibid., pp. 29-33 (Originally in Le Journal, December 14, 1894 )•

■^Maurice Barres, "Partisans de la decentralisation," i and "Assainissement et f£d6ralisme," ■^e Journal, June 30, 1895* 173 In what can only be described as Girohdin Socialism, Barres held that the "inevitable social transformation" would not come from some scientific authority^ but "in multiplying the fields of experiences, in restoring autonomy to moral and geographical groups." Such groups would adhere to both individualism and solidarity: "The individual who follows to the end his instinct of expansion has a tendency to assemble and join together with others Ca se solidariser] according to his electoral affinities, his needs, his aptitudes, and his kinships in a social body, and thus to become a unity in a larger individuality, in a hundred individualities, local and moral groups." 33 On the one hand, society would organize it­ self into local or geographical groups according to communes, regions, nations, and so on: "Families of individuals, there are the communes; fam ily o f communes, th e re i s the region; fam ily of reg io n s, th ere is the nation; family of nations, socialist citizens, there is the federal hu­ manity." These regional groups would recognize national unity, national

constitutional guarantees to the individual, and national control of war and peace, tariffs, national bonds, and regulation of nationwide business en­

terprise. The commune, on the other hand,vould have the right "to buy,

sell, borrow, decree, and vote its budget by itself without authorization,

to provide for its poor and its roads, and to finance and direct its schools Ol without governmental intervention.Barres was not clear on the size

or location of these regions, but he did insist that they be viable units

•^Maurice Barres, "L1 Histoire int^rieure d'un journal," pp. 417-419*

■^Maurice Barres, "Assainissement et f£d<5ralisme." 174 with a realistic common bond in economics, tradition, and culture. Mar­ seille, he believed, for sample, filled the bill to be the center of all

Provenje. Whatever their size or location, these regions would finance themselves through direct taxes on incomes and profits, thus facilitating long overdue tax reform, while leaving indirect taxation with the national government. Regions would also have local legislative assemblies and utilize the referendum to keep the people closer to governmental decisions. 35

Barres was less specific with respect to another aspect of decen­ tralization, the moral groups. His discussion of them was limited to some variation of this passage:

Federation and c o n tra cti Geographic groups (reg ions, communes), moral groups (abrogations professionnelles ou [sometimes "et"] de tous ordres). are dependent only on themselves in a federa­ tion and are directed internally through contracts analogous to transactions and exchanges.

That passage was always followed by the comment that such an arrangement would prevent restraint, combine liberty and socialism, or allow "that QZ. free play which we insist on for the essential social precaution." Again, reference was always paid to Proudhon's ideas on the same subject. Ap­

parently, Barres simply accepted the Proudhonian scheme of "free contract."

At any rate, the whole point of the moral groups, as well as the regional

ones was to restore man's ability to cooperate with others in a society

based on free association. This would be possible, Barrfes believed, if

the moral groups were simply allowed to exist and to be strong. As it was,

laws prevented strong moral groups from emerging. Although Barres did not

Maurice Barr&s, "Commune et region," Le Journal. October 2, 1895. •^Ibid., Maurice Barres, "La F^dSration donne & tous une patrie," and "L'Histoire int£rieure d'un journal." 175 bring it up in these articles, one gets the feeling that his ideas were predicated on what he learned at Nancy, where the unions were weak be­ cause their civil personality did not allow them to own the means of pro­ duction. Remove these barriers and society would no longer be an "arti­ ficial creation." Instead, it would be based on "the spontaneous instinct of the individuals composing it," who had regained their "faculties of co- hesion" through free association. 37 In this plan, Barres believed, "I go father than the Marxist dream; with great good fortune I catch a glimpse of that spontaneous organization of society, such as Proudhon saw it, con­ forming itself to harmony no longer under the pressure of laws, but through 38 the simple play of natural necessities."

Convinced as he was that the socialist ideal would arrive in stages,

Barres believed that his Girondin Socialism was the best end fastest path to an ideal society in which man could fu lfill his highest individual po­ tential in harmony with others. Yet, Barres was just as convinced that man was still unprepared for that ideal state. Man had to relearn the cooper­ ation he had forgotten, and he could not relearn it in the mass, in a na­ tional framework. Because localities knew their needs better than central authority ever would, because the members of the localities were close to each other and to the immediate situation, there was the logical place to relearn cooperation. 39 In such a way, the communes and regions would act

— Maurice Barr&s, "L'Association libre c'est de la decentralisa­ tion," De Hegel. pp. 77-78 (Originally in La Cocarde. February 13, 1895)* See also Maurice Barres, "Les B5n£fices de la decentralisation."

^^Maurice Barrfes, "Le Point de vue historique," La Cocarde. February 16, 1895* 39 Maurice Barr&s, "Federation non uniformiste dans le socialisme,# La Cocarde. October 28, 1894. 176 "as laboratories of sociology:"

It is there that we will have political and economic experiences, tried in modest proportions, then generalized, not by acts of decree or mass laws, but through the spontaneous imitation of neighboring cities and regions, witnesses of the good or bad ef­ fects obtained here or there.

In other words, peculiar local conditions and problems would have peculiar

local solutions and more varied solutions could be tested with fewer risks

of big m istakes.^ Moreover, these sociological laboratories would more

firmly root the ideal end in ideal means, Barr&s was aware that teaching

harmony and cooperation would be a struggle. However, he was also con­

vinced that only if social solutions were arrived at spontaneously by the

people involved could community be restored. It was far easier, he be­

lieved, to learn cooperation with a close neighbor than with a distant one,

far easier to support a community and corporate solution than one imposed

from the outside.

To bring this about, Barres also visualized a Parti national et

social which would galvanize France to decentralize political institutions

and to renew society by encouraging existing "multiple organisms," to mo­

dify themselves "according to their needs and their aptitudes." These

could do so if they were freed from central authority.^ Even national

legislation for national problems, such as the joint legislative program

of the Radicals and socialists, would serve both as immediate social ame­

lioration and long-range education toward the ideal society.

One cannot but be struck by the enormous influence of Proudhon on

this program. The very vagueness in the discussion of the moral groups,

^Maurice Barres, "Commune et region."

^Maurice Barres, "Les B5n6fices de la decentralisation." particularly, indicates that Barres assumed that his readers would know he accepted the Proudhonist scheme completely. Admittedly drawn to

Proudhon through Taine's concern for the breakdown of reciprocity, Barrfes shared the Proudhonist regard for individualism, its aim to achieve justice rauher than collectivism, its opposition to the centralized state and par­ liamentary government, its fascination with contradictions (such as the tension between the individual and society), its belief that such contra­ dictions were the very stuff of life should not be abolished, its petit bourgeois orientation in which peasants and shopkeepers were the leaders of the proletariat, its desire for associations to preserve rather than abolish individual freedom, and its concern for the utilization of Rous- seauian sentiment rather than reason to bring justice. At the same time,

Barres showed little affinity for the Proudhonist idealization of the fam­ ily. Rather, the moral group itself would be the basic unit. Nor did he utilize Proudhon's credit system. Rather, Barres believed that legal per­ sonality was all the associations needed. Finally, he saw Proudhon not I p as an anarchist, but as a socialist.

Even though Barr&s called his program socialistic, its details and closeness to Proudhon made it appear closer to the corporative schemes of the 1890's than to socialism. Yet, one can look in vain for such influ­ ences. Once he used the term "corporation," but in this period he never mentioned the major corporative theorists such as Ren€ de la Tour du Pin,

^For Proudhon's ideas, see: G. D. H. Cole, Socialist Thought: The Forerunners. 1789-1850 (London, 1955)* pp. 201-218. 178

Albert de Mun, Jean Paul Mazaroz, Emile Durkheim, or L£on Duguit. ^ For

Barres, in his newspaper articles, speeches, and Mes Cahiers, the journal he kept from 1896 on, the master was always Proudhon. The Social Catholic corporativists were suspect because they distrusted individualism. Barres did not couch his ideas in religious terms. The aim of the moral and geog­ raphical groups was to liberate the free expansion of the individual, not to promote Christian brotherhood. The only corporative thinker Barres ap­ pears to have read was FrddSric Le Play. A Cocarde writer said that its staff agreed with Le Play on decentralization, "the necessity to favor individual initiative and on several details of the conditions of tne i.L workers." Yet, one is left with the feeling that Le Play was too much the darling of liberal critics of socialism for Barres to be committed to him.

Another tie with Proudhon was Barres1 glorification of the French fatherland. 45 He argued that federalism, which is how he visualized de­

centralization, would make men more patriotic and unify "national energy."

Federalism, he insisted, would not compromise the patrie, which would re­ main "one and indivisible" even though liberty had been given to groups.

Federalism would strengthen patriotism by making men masters of their local

economy and intellectual life rather than subjects without a real stake in

their nation. Federalism would unify national energy if the rest of France

^Matthew H. Elbow, French Corporative Theory. 1789-1948 (New York, 1953), PP* 53-121. Elbow, who lists most corporative thinkers, does not mention Barres as a theorist or follower, although he does discuss Charles Maurras and the Action Fransaise, to whom Barres is often linked.

^"Maid qu1aurait dit Le Play?" IAi Cocarde, January 11, 1895.

^Although Proudhon attacked Polish and Italian nationalism, he loved France and saw it as the center of the struggle for justice. See: Cole, p. 216 and J. Salwyn Schapiro, Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism (New York, 1949)> P* 350. 179 shared the economic, cultural, and political spotlight with Paris, The

Franco-Prussian War, he argued, saw the defeat of a centralized state, for once Paris, the seat of the centralized regime, fell, the nation col­ lapsed. On the other hand, it had been the provinces which had saved

Spain in 1808.^ Indeed, Barres even claimed his federalism was derived from his nationalism, for through federalism, "each of lis is more com­ pletely bound to his birthplace, to all that surrounds i t .

This nationalistic urge of Barres, like that of other Boulangist socialists, put him in conflict with rising internationalist socialism.

On the one hand, he believed, the internationalists were wrong in their analysis. The Marxist notion that workers were "sans pa trie 11 was every bit as bad as Lion Say's liberal notion of "the planet is a workshop."

Barres argued that history showed just the opposite, that since the six­ teenth century, history moved toward the national state and away from in­ ternationalism. Although the ideology of the French Revolution might have been international, its effect only sped the development of the nation.

Barres countered another internationalist argument by saying that nation­ alism, by which he meant common "language and legends," did not need to assert itself by war. "The socialism really respectful of historical laws and the directions of humanity will limit its effort to the mainten­ ance of harmony in Europe as in each nation." For Barres, it was as necessary to prevent one nation from crushing another as it was to keep

^Maurice Barrfes, "Assainissemant et fldlralisme," and "Commune et rlgion." ^Maurice Barres, "L'Histoire intlrieure d'un journal.

^Maurice Barres, "Exploitation du sentiment nationaliste," La Cocarde. October 24, 1894. 180 on© class from oppressing another within a nation.^ Thus, his national­ ism, he maintained, was not chauvinistic. "Here is our response," he in­ sisted, "to all the objections raised against us by the patriot, for whom only the German problem exists, or the internationalist, who wants to ef­ face all nuances of races: Federalism permits us to love the nation with­ out forcing us to hate the foreigner."^ Although such a view did not preclude some cooperation with the socialist parties of other nations,

Barr&s was distrustful of any permanent internationalist union of social­ ists, especially the proposed international congress of socialist parlia- mentary members. 51 However, such distrust of internationalism did not yet exclude Barres from the socialist movement.

S till another bond Barres had with Proudhon was his belief that solidarity could be aided by the utilization of heroes. When Barres spoke of the "glorification of energy," he meant individual self-fulfillm ent.

Not only could this be achieved by the self-discovery of one's own destiny through self-education and solidarity with one's fellow-man, region, and nation. One could gain it also by recognizing his own hero as the "desig- 52 nated intercessor" of his life. By seeking out and following the legend of a great man, one could rise to heights not possible otherwise, just as by following a saint the faithful are raised to God. "Great men," Barres

^Maurice Barres, "Evolution nationalists et contre la guerre," La Cocarde. October 25, 1894* ^Maurice Barr&s, "Assainissement et f£d£ralisme."

^Maurice Barrfes, "Contre 1 'extension du pouvoir parlementaire," La Cocarde. October 21, 1894 and- "Avant la rentr^e," ibid., October 23, 1894. ^^Maurice Barrfes, "La G lorification de 1 '3nergie," La Cocarde. December 19, 1894. 181 wrote, "are the heroic moments of history, its vivid aspects. We agree

that they do not determine events, but are determined by them ....

But on the imagination, who can deny^their victorious power? Sublime edu­

cators! Each of us must choose among them his guide, his director, the

chief of his breed. They are the intercessors between each of us and our 53 personal ideal." Barres was convinced that the "flabbiness of public

spirit in our epoch," the incapacity of the poor to create a "strong move­

ment," and the tendency for students to become "a collection of aspiring

functionaries" were due to a lack of "energy, w ill, enthusiasm."^ The

cure lay in seeking out a great man to follow, in order to integrate the

individual ego with the larger ego of the region and nation. The55 person­

al choices of Barres were clear; his guides were Napoleon and Loyola, not

for their political and religious ideas, but because of their "genius," 56 the "force of their souls," their "interior force." In all of this,

Barrfes demonstrated the continued influence of Boulangism upon him and

with the death of Boulanger, the need to find a new leader, be it even a

personal one from the past. He also mentioned the influence of Carlyle,

both for insights into the great man and the doctrine of silence, and

Jules Soury, a philosophy professor at the Sorbonne, but their influence

^Maurice Barr&s, "L'U tilitl des hdros," ibid., December 20, 1894*

5L Maurice Barres, "Napoleon, professeur d'6nergie," Le Journal. April 14, 1893. ^Maurice Barres, "Un philosophe du 'moi'," La Cocarde. Janu­ a ry 20, 1895* ^Maurice Barres, "Napoleon, professeur d'Snergie," "L*Utility des hlros," "Et pourtant 1*auteur n'est pas 'clerical'," La Cocarde. December 29, 1894* 182 only reinforced the Boulangist strain. Moreover, Barres attached this notion to socialism, for he was convinced that socialism needed to rely on more than rationality to win. He urged socialism to utilize "ex- citers of the soul," be they religion or great men. 57

IV

On the one hand, la Cocarde served as the medium for the politi­ cal and social ideas of Barres. This was its long range purpose. On the other hand, it was a journal of republican and socialist opposition, with Barres as its chief pundit. As such, its immediate purpose was to convince the public to get rid of a regime which was unable to cope with the problems of France. This latter purpose was for Barr&s the first step to social and political reconstruction. Just as his social and pol­ itical theories showed us one side of Barres1 relationship with socialism, h is comments on th e unfolding p o litic a l scene and h is evaluation of h is contemporary friends and enemies show us another side.

One aspect of Barres1 editorials on contemporary politics was his unrelenting campaign against the parliament and government.

It started out with only tne anti-Panama argumentithat the parliament was run by that "filthy band" of Chequards. Almost every day at the beginning of his stay at La Cocarde. Barres greeted his readers with an anti-parliamentary tirade. A typical one described the deputies as "ignorant, malicious, basely docile, mediocre, without ideas or conscience, sometimes

^Maurice Barres, "Tous les exaltants 3ont bons," ibid., January 13> 1895* 183 cunning." He regularly attacked the Dupuy ministry and the Casimir-

Perier presidency, insisting that the former had his bande while the lat­ ter his socifrtg. but that both were part of the Wilson—Gr^vy-Panama gang.

As early as September, Barres foresaw the clash between Dupuy and Casimir- 59 Perier. Not even death could mellow Barr&s, as seen in an obituary cas­ tigating his former philosophy teacher, Burdeau, for being connected with th e Panama S c a n d a l.^

By 1895, however, parliament provided Barres with enough new ma­ terial that he no longer had to reply on Panama alone. First, there was the resignation of Casimir-Perier. La Cocarde greeted this with the ob­ servation that "Casimir-Perier had been chosen by the entire reactionary syndicate .... He came to be the instrument of supreme resistance a- gainst the ideas of social renovation and against the manifestations of public contempt merited by a regime and a personnel sunk in scandal and shame. Barres was elated that the end was in sight. "Let us triumph, my dear friends," he wrote. "The system is rotten, the regime has fallen to the ground. Vive la RSpubliquel Parliamentarianism is no more than a game for the Assizes. Its stall is reserved at Noumea." All the presi­ dential candidates were "suspect, despised, disgraced:" L<§on Bourgeois was "the proteg£ of the Chequards;11 Henri Brisson was "choked by the Pan­ ama commission of inquest;" Challemel-Lacour, president of the Senate,

^M aurice B arres, "Sur B risson," ib id ., December 26, 1894* 59 Maurice B arres, "Deux p e rte s," ib id . . September 29, 1894.

^M aurice Barrfes, "M. Burdeau," ib id ., December 13, 1894 and "Nous l'e u s s io n s pr6f6r€," ib id ., December 16, 1894.

^La Cocarde. January 17, 1895* Quoted in Clouard, 222. 184 was "no more than a b reath of l i f e j " Dupuy was the "incompetent who in order to govern counts only on expedients and bribes;" Renfi Waldeck-

Rousseau was, to the poor, such a mouthpiece for big-business that he

"would give birth to hate." Barr&s welcomed the election of Felix

Faure which only illustrated for Barres that the parliamentary republic was on i t s l a s t le g s.

The second parliamentary development which gave Barres new ma­ terial against the regime were the events leading up to the fall of both

Dupuy and Casimir-Perier: the 1895 inquest into the railroad conventions of 1883* These conventions had been made to implement the ra ilro a d le ­ gislation of 1882 in which the government, in an effort to put the unem­ ployed to work in a depression, had encouraged the railroad companies to act as agents of public works. The state had assumed the cost of the roadbed, shared with the companies the cost of track and rolling stock, and guaranteed the company bonds issued to raise the operating capital.

The issue raised in 1894 was how long were these government guarantees to run. The companies, backed by Dupuy, insisted that the guarantees ran to the concession's termination date of I960; the Chamber replied that they ran only until 1914.^* Barrfes, who persistently pursued the issue throughout January, 1895# saw in i t a new Panama Scandal and c a lle d for an extraparliamentary commission to investigate. He argued that the

^Maurice Barres, "Quel couteau tuera l'6lu de ce soir?" ibid., January 18, 1895* ^Maurice Barres, "Nous aimons l'6ph6m&re," ibid. . January 19, 1895. A. Doulas, French Railroads and the State (New York, 1945), p p . 43-48. 185 confusion arose because there had been a "secret entente" between the 65 ministry and the companies in 1883. In February, he revealed to the parliamentary investigating commission his suspicion that the leaders of the "secret entente" were Raynal and Rouvier, members of the railroad com­ mission in 1883, and that they had been paid to withhold from the parlia­ ment the terms of the guarantees. Barres was convinced of this because the Companie d'Orleans in 1883 had told its stockholders that the guaran­ tees ran to the end of the railroad's concession.^ As in Panama, con­ tinued Barres, the companies had also bought off the newspapers by dis­ pensing "enormous sums under the pretext of publicity," which in effect 67 bribed the deputies who were the political directors of those newspapers.

Of course, Barres had no hard information and doubtless only hoped to re­ peat Delahaye's success with vague charges in instigating the Panama in­ vestigation.

The exposure of the railroad conventions only reconfirmed Barres' belief that the parliamentary republic was beyond redemption. "I swear to you that if a Boulanger reappeared," he wrote on New Year's Bay, "our

'republican aristocracy' would no longer find anyone to defend it. Neither 67 bandits, nor brave men." The "republican aristocracy" was the "Oppor- tuno-Radical coalition." It included the Orleanists, who had so embraced

^^Maurice Barres, "Line enquete extraparlementaire," La Cocarde. February 9, 1895. ^laurice Barres, "La Journ^e d'hier au parlement," ibid., February 14, 1895. ^Maurice Barres, "Des Dreyfus, pas de Canivet," ibid., February 19, 1895. ^Maurice Barr%s, "Premier mot de l'ann^e," ib id . , January 1, 1895. 186 the republic that the death of the Pretender in the previous autumn had 69 changed nothing more "than a page in the Almanach de Gotha." All these forces, this "band of lawyers," formed the "putrification and mediocrity of that parliament which depresses everything," "a dispised assembly

. . . composed of n u llitie s and scoundrels." 70 The f i r s t step in bring­ ing about social reconstruction was to cleanse the parliament of all the corruption since the days of Gambetta, whom Barres very much admired.

This could be done either by the real application of universal suffrage, that is, by the elimination of the Senate's veto, or by a new Boulanger.

Turn out the parliamentary clique which claimed to be the followers of

Gambetta but who were really traitors to him and the true followers of

Morny and republicanized Orleanists. 71

Interestingly enough, Barres placed Dreyfus in this same framework when his treason was first alleged in the autumn of 1894. He believed that both Dreyfus and the chequards were part of the same sick society.

Both had used their public trust for private gain. It was just as trai­ torous for the chequards as it was for Dreyfus to steal from the state, and just as the chequards cleared themselves, it was perfectly logical that Dreyfus be decorated for his theft. It was in this context of a traitorous parliamentary system and not within an anti-Semitic one that

Barres placed Dreyfus in 1894* Although other la Cocarde writers

^Maurice Barrfes, "Une perte pour la R^publique," ibid., Sep­ tember 9> 1894* *^Maurice Barr&s, "La Chambre cherche un a lib i," i b id ., Feb­ ruary 2, 1895. ^Maurice Barr&s, "L'Assainissement, voila la tactique," ibid.. February 6, 1895* and "27 Janvier," ibid., January 27, 1895* constantly hit the anti-Sfemitic theme, Barr&s believed that if Dreyfus was convicted as a Jew rather than as a traitor, he would become a martyr.

That would be disastrous. Barres insisted that the proof of the treason had to be overwhelming so that there would never be any issue of anti-Semi­ tism. When the verdict was finally reached, Barres wrote of Dreyfus, "It was neither hate, nor ambition, nor love, nor gambling losses which decided him. What then is the price of his infamy? The price? you ask—But . . . 72 thirty pieces of silver."

The solution to the treasonous corruption of Panama, the railroad conventions, and Dreyfus lay, Barres believed, in socialism. "The end is social transformation. The method is everything through universal suf- frage. The immediate way is cleansing." 73 Yet, socialists could not fra- ni ternize with the Opportuno-Radicals. To end their regime, Barrfes sought an alliance, as broad as Boulangism, extending from socialists of all schools through those Radical-Socialists, who were not tainted with Op-

portuno-Radicalism, to nationalists and anti-Semites. Thus, he could

praise Rochefort, Millerand, Jaures, and Ernest Roche as "voices of spirit,

ju s tic e , and independence." 75 At the same tim e, he could welcome an a l­

liance between Millerand and the Radical Goblet, "an honest man execrated 76 by his dishonored colleagues." He could also claim D^roulede as one of

"^Maurice Barres, "Les Trahisseurs," ibid. . November 4> 1894; "Dreyfus sera d6cor6," ib id ., December 1, 1894; "Ecoutons l'a c c u s ^ ," ib id ., December 8, 1894; and "Le M otif de sa tra h iso n ," ib id ., December 24, 1894* The elipses are Barres1.

Maurice Barrfes, "L'Assainissement, voilA la tactique

^M aurice Barrfes, "La Chambre cherche un a lib i."

"Philosophes et p o litic ia n s ," ib id ., September 9, 1894. 188 his "masters,11 along with Proudhon, Quinet, and Michelet, and a man of valor, honesty, and eloquence. 77 He could likewise praise the decentral­ ization league of the Radical deputies Charles Beauquier and Maurice Faure 78 as being a start in the right direction. At the reception for the amr- nestied Rochefort, Barres stood with Jaures, Viviani, and Millerand to hear the old Communard and Boulangist praise la Cocarde. 79 Yet, within the next few days, La Cocarde also sent representatives to welcome the return of the Allemanist Jules oreton and Barres, himself, headed a dele­ gation honoring the returning anti-Semitic Drumont, "the untiring strag­ gler against the Panamists, the intriguers of parliament, and financial 80 speculators." Barres consistently praised the leadership of Jaur&s.

Every day Ia Cocarde announced socialist, rallies in the same column as those of the nationalists. Sometimes, in the case of old Boulangists, the

two would overlap. A reading of the speaker lists for these rallies show

that the old Boulangists were still sticking together. However, it was not always easy for Barr&s to maintain socialist unity. He and Ia Cocarde

supported an old Boulangist at a Paris parliamentary by-election in De­

cember, 1894, hut rallied to Lion. GSrault-Richard, the Union socialiste

Maurice Barrfes, "D^roulede a Paris," ibid.. November 24, 1894.

78 Maurice Barres, "C'est peut-etre une id£e," ibid., December 23, 1894. 79 Maurice Barres, "A la gare du NordJ" ibid., February 3, 1895 and "La Fin d'un regime," ibid., February 5, 1895. 80 "Le Retour de Breton," ibid., February 6, 1895, and "Le Retour d'Edouard Drumont," ibid. . February 7, 1895. Barres and La Cocarde con­ sistently asserted that they did not support Drumont's anti-Semitism, only his anti-parliamentarianism. See: Pierre Denis, "Pourquoi parler de corde" and Paul Pascal, "Au Radical," ibid., February 6 and 7, 1895. 189 candidate, in the run-oi’f. 81

The toleration of Barres for varied views did have lim its, es­ pecially when they threatened his own influence. Such a view was ex­

pressed in a series or lectures for university youth by a Committee of

Defense and Social Progress, sponsored by the Liberal Anatole Leroy-Beau- 82 lieu, Albert Gigot, Georges Picot, and the "ineffable" Paul Desjardins.

This group had adapted the laissez-faire features of Le Play into a pater­

nalistic philanthropy as the answer to socialism. Barres warned the stud­ ents that these men were not believers in social transformation, but "the

accomplices of great Jews, friends of our chequards, associates of the

Opportuno-Radical quadrille," who insulted the real friends of the stud­

ents, called patriots "chauvinists," socialists "liars," and anti-Semites 83 "calumniators." Barres and his followers attempted to crash the first

lecture but were turned away and had to adjourn to a nearby caf£ where 150 8 L. students "acclaimed" him. La Petite Rlpublique and 1'Intransigent also

opposed the group. Barres and socialists arranged counter-lectures, one

by Paul Larfargue, chaired by daurfes, another by Albert Ddtr£, "treasurer rtc of the socialist library of the 6th Arrondissement," chaired by Barres.

^Alfred Gabriel, "L*Opposition socialiste au XIII1116," ibid., De­ cember 29, 1894 and "L'Exile et le prisonnier," ibid. , February 16, 1895; Maurice Barres, "Violence! Violence!" ibid., January 8, 1895.

^Maurice Barres, "Les Masques de mercredi prochain," ibid., January 9» 1895. 83 Maurice Barres, "Leroy-Gigot-Picot," ibid., January 10, 1895*

^"Les Opportunistes au Quartier," ibid., January 11, 1895. 85 "Conferences so c ia liste s au Quartier L atin,11 ib id ., January 11, 1895. 190 When one considers the vagueness of the ideas of Barres, with its almost equal parts of Girondin-Socialism, nationalism, and anti-par- liamentarianism, and his willingness to consort with such diverse and antagonistic types as socialists, Radicals, Boulangists, anti-Semites, and nationalists, one must ask just what kind of socialist was he. If socialism meant a collectivist society, Barres certainly was not a social­ ist. As Albert Thibauaet pointed out, the socialism of Barres was that of 86 the petit~;.-bourgeoisie: individualistic, Proudhonist, and patriotic.

This is somewhat revealed in the specific reforms he advocated. His

"minimum program" asked for no more than the nationalization of mines and railroads, tax reforms, and decentralization, as he told the Union des re- 87 publicains patriotes socialistes et revisionnistes. In addition to that he regularly called for legislation to protect French workers from the competition of resident aliens, who were attractive to employers because they accepted lower pay and had no military obligation. With the failure in 1893 of various tax schemes to solve this problem, Barres thought the answer might be for the police to force foreign workers to maintain them­ selves on the prevailing French working-class standard of living, but he admitted various solutions needed to be explored. At88 the same time, he

continued his support for unemployment compensation and old age pensions, with regional groups formulating such plains, perhaps on the Swiss model of

Albert Thibaudet, La Vie de Maurice Barrfes (Parisjii 1921), p. 275* 87 '■■Conference de Maurice B a rre s,11 La Cocarde, October 3> 1894«

88 Maurice Barres, "La Concurrence des ouvriers Strangers," ibid., November 17, 1894; "Le Sentiment nationalists," ibid., November 18, 1894; "Qu'on soumette les Strangers aux lois fran$aises,11 ibid. . November 29, 1894. 191 89 employee-employer contributions. With the same reasoning he supported 90 the unsuccessful attempt by Roubaix to create a municipal pharmacy.

Such a program, of course, really placed Barres closer to Radical­ ism than to socialism. Yet, he could not embrace Radicalism because of his anti-parliamentary and Boulangist background and because he believed that only the socialists wished to move forward. Proudhonism provided a socialist ideal without collectivism, but Proudhonism was fast fading on the French socialist scene. He was convinced that the conservatives were really counter-revolutionaries, not yet accepting the institutionaliza­ tion of 1789 and 1793, while the Center, with its determination to pre- serve the status quo, were the real conservatives. 91

V

Although Barrks appeared to be moving clo ser to socialism in La

Cocarde. his immediate post-Cocarde career saw him defect from the move­ ment. In March, 1895, Barres argued with the owner of l£ Cocarde over its finances. When the owner refused to put Barres in charge of the news­ paper's finances as well as its editing, Barres and his stable of writers resigned. 92 This caused him to shift his campaign to different terrains.

On the one hand, he carried the ideas he had begun in Ia Cocarde to the lecture platform in an attempt to win more adherents for his Girondin

go Maurice Barr&s, "Un canton laboratoire de rSformes sociales," De Hegel, pp. 68-74* ^Maurice Barres, "Encore l'ing6rence du pouvoir central," ibid., pp. 63-67• 91 "Conference de Maurice Barres." %

^2Clouard, 208-290 and Maurras, Maitres et t&noins, pp. 26-27. 192 socialism. Throughout 1895* this tactic seemed to gain some success and draw Harris closer to socialism. On the other hand, 1896 saw Barres re­ enter the political arena and this began to take him away from the ortho­ dox s o c ia lis t movement. By 1897* he was on the verge of breaking with the socialist movement altogether.

Immediately after Barres left La Cocarde, it began to look as if his ideas of Girondin Socialism would take him completely into the so­ c ia li s t movement. In 1895* some of h is follow ers founded a National Re­ publican League of Decentralization, headed by Deshayes de Marcere, the foremost writer in the decentralization campaign of La Nouvelle Revue.

The new organization was very much under the influence of Barres*ideas.

Through it and local organizations, Barr&s made two major speeches, sum­ marizing his Cocarde writings, at Bordeaux on June 29, 1895 and Marseille on October 1, 1895. In reviewing the Bordeaux speech, Assainissement et f£d6ralisme, Paul Lagarde described it as "une belle conference" and ident­ ified Barres with all the socialist decentralizers like Paul Pascal, Paul

Brousse, and Georges Renard.9^ When La Revue socialiste reprinted the speech in pamphlet form, Adrien Veber agreed that Barres was motivated by socialism when he desired economic ju s tic e through federalism . However,

Veber thought there were other motives as well: federalism would provide a vehicle for reconciling those patriots who thought the German question was everything with the socialist internationalists, a way to achieve pol- 95 itical cleansing, and a path to individualism. y However, Charles Maurras, go "Le F6d£ralisme de Maurice Barres," La Nouvelle Revue. XCV (July 15, 1895), 383-384. 9^*La Revue socialiste. XXII (July, 1895), 106-107.

95Ibid., XXII (September, 1895), 384. who accompanied Barr £3 to Marseille, wrote in 1939 that the speech before a largely socialist audience had been greeted with little enthusiasm be­ cause Barres was too much the aristocrat.^

Yet, the overall effect of the speeches was to advance the ideas of Barres. With them and Li Cocarde as a base, Barres co-sponsored with the Portuguese socialist Sebastian Magalhaes-Lima a federalist and inter­ nationalist conference in Paris on November 5, 1895,, It was attended by such varied French socialists and non-socialist decentralizers as Paule

Minck, Victor Jaclard, Rodolphe Simon, Paul Lagarde, Camile Mauclair, Mar­ cel Sembat, Leopold Lacour, Charles Maurras, and FrddSric Amouretti.

Georges Renard, director of La Revue socialiste. adhered to the conference.

Such a varied group of French delegates, not to mention the foreign ones, could not even agree, however, on whether federalism was to be among na­ tions, such as a Balkan or Iberian federation, or within a nation, such as a French federation. Nor could they agree whether internationalism 98 meant an alliance of nations or the destruction of nationalities. At any rate, this activity prompted one observer to say, "Maurice Barrfes,

Independent Socialist, makes at this time an active campaign for feder- 99 a lism ."

^^Maurras, Maitres et t&noins. pp. 27-28 and 106.

^La Revue socialiste. XXII (November, 1895), 631. 98 Charles Maurras , "L'ldSe de la decentralisation," La Revue encyclopedique. December 25, 1897, reprinted in Maurice Barres, Scenes et doctrines du nationalisms (Paris, 1925), II, 212. See also the view of Barr&s, ibid., p. 220. ^Llon de Seilac, "L1Organisation socialiste," La Revue bleue. XXXIII, part 1 (January 25, 1896), 108. However, the tendency of Barr&s to draw ever closer to the so­ cialist movement reached its zenith in the 1894-1895 campaign of La Co­ carde and the federalist conferences. The following year, 1896, saw a different trend as he re-entered pelitics. In February, he posed his

candidature in a by-election at Neuilly-Boulogne to replace the deceased

Lefoulon, who had beaten him in 1893* In a field of five serious candi­

dates, all with a left-of-center program* Barres ran with two otner so­

cialists. Since he had been the principal socialist candidate in 1893, he

felt fairly confident of victory. However, as the campaign unfolded, his

chances dimmed. All the candidates attacked his lack of permanent resi­

dence at Neuilly, contending he had deserted his Neuilly house right after

the 1893 campaign and was a Nancean anyway. They condemned h is opposition

to the popular proposed Exposition of 1900, an attack he had made in Le

Figaro of September 23, 1895 in the interests of federalism. They again ta rre d him with the brush of conservatism , because he was indorsed by Le

Figaro, which supported him because he was against governmental corruption. 100

As usual he was denounced as an "exotic," a political dilettante."**^" Yet,

even this might have been offset had he received the support of the Neuilly

s o c ia lis t committees. However, the campaign showed how flim sy was the a l­

lian ce of Barr&s with the s o c ia lis ts , how l i t t l e he was accepted by the

Union socialiste, in spite of the adhesions of some of its members to his

federalist campaign. Instead of backing Barres, the Union socialiste or, ion "A travers Paris," Le Figaro, February 22, 1896.

^■^""Chronique lle c to ra le ," Le Temps, February 20 and 21, 1896; B., "La Situation electorale," Le Progres de l'E st, May 1, 1898; B., "Entre trois," ibid. , May 13, 1898. These last two are reprints of charges leveled against Barres in 1896 by the Chronique boulonnaise and Gazette de Boulogne. 195 in Le Figaro’s words, "the militant chiefs of the socialist party," sup­ ported Louis Sautumier,^^ Barres did, of course, win the support of some

Neuilly socialists and even national ones, notably the old Communard, Clu- 103 seret. After the election, Barres admitted that he knew he was beaten as early as eight days before the election, because his socialism was on­ ly his own. The socialist committees wanted only the socialism of the

Union socialists, and Barres felt he could not reduce his integrity to accept that. As a result, he got only the unorganized socialist vote.^*

When the ballots were counted on February 23, he was in third place behind a moderate republican and Sautumier. 10b Yet, he maintained socialist unity and withdrew in favor of Sautumier, who won in the run-off on March 8 .^^

The defeat at Neuilly brought a marked change in Barres. His tol­ erance of all socialist schools, save the Guesdists, and respect for all socialist leaders rapidly disappeared. This change was rooted in two things: a resentment over his failure to receive the support of socialist leadership in the Neuilly campaign and a growing opposition to the emerg­ ing socialist stand on internationalism. These two developments created a gulf between him and socialism which grew even wider throughout 1896.

ir>3 "A travers Paris," Le Figaro, February 23, 1896.

^■^Maurice Barres, Mes Cahiers (14 vols., Paris, 1929-1957), I, 61. This almost daily journal from 1896 to the end of his life was pub­ lished posthumously by Barres’ son, Philippe. It does not at all appear to be expurgated. 1QivIbid. . I, 62. 105 "E lections le g is la tiv e s du 23 f6 v rie r," Le Temps. February 25* 1896. "^"Elections legislatives du 8 mars," Le Temps, Marhh 10, 1896. 196 Barres showed this growing bitterness in his journal entries. He was especially hurt that his socialist friends, Cluseret among them, had deserted him after the Neuilly defeat. On February 28 i t was a "p ain fu l impression" to find his socialist friends throw their support to Sautumier and make excuses for their earlier support for Barres. But, he added with indulgence, "It is just. In doing battle for myself I harmed them.

However, as time went on he brooded on this failure to get support from organized socialism. By August he was wanting revenge for socialist in- 108 gratitude. Deeply moved by the suicide of Sautumier in November, 1896,

Barres paid his respects to the family and recalled how, in the very same room, he had congratulated Sautumier on his victory in the spring. "While

I was alone with him, I had seen his hand open telegrams and more tele­ grams. I listened to the silences of his conversation, created by the reading of these telegrams of congratulation. He told me the names, and they were my friends who congratulated him." And now, the father was reading telegrams and more telegrams. 109 These entries at the time of

Sautumier's suicide show both a keen sense of loss over the death of the young man and a great gratitude that Sautumier, in his victory at Neuilly, had released Barres from the illusion that he could really be accepted by

French socialism. By snatching away the victory Barres felt was right­ fully his, Sautumier had ended the youth of Barres, had awakened him to

^^Barres, Mes Cahiers, I, 61.

108Ibid.. I, 99.

^ ^ Ibid.. I, 108-109. This passage runs to p. 117, one of the longest'passages on one subject in Mes Cahiers. the realities of his illusory tie with socialism. Because he felt his life had been so personally involved and changed by Sautumier, Bar­ res dismissed the funeral oration of Jean Jaures, who before the Neuilly election had enjoyed the admiration of Barr&s, as "sonorous vanities" and "intellectual poverty. When the funeral was over and the cortege moved to th e tr a in s ta tio n , Barr&s found him self surrounded by th e same

"circle of liars" which had icily greeted without applause his with- drawal in Sautumier's favor at the spring election. 112 Sautumier1s funeral convinced Barr&s that socialism had disowned him.

Barres growing bitterness with socialist leaders he had formerly admired was even more apparent in the campaign for Sautumier's seat. Al­ though he initially entered the race, he immediately withdrew when the socialist opposition, backed by Sembat, Jaures, and La Petite R^publique. appeared. 113 "What folly," he wrote, "is this ex cathedra socialism which requires phrases, which wants adhesions to these phrases, which re­

jects living men.""*"^*’ He increasingly believed that it was the refusal

of Marcel Sembat and Jaures, specifically, to accept divergent views which

had been most responsible for his Neuilly defeat, but "Jaurfes w ill be 115 destroyed [s'useral. Our turn will come again." And again: "I have

^1QIbid. . I, 110.

1X1Ibid., I, 112.

•^Ib id ., I, 114-115. ^ ^ I b i d . , I , 113-115; "Chronique S le c to ra le ," Le Temps, December 11, 1896,

^"^Barres, Mes Cahiers. I, 112. 198 reconsidered the tragic inside circumstances of my defeat at Neuilly.

It was not from having been betrayed by my friends. After all, I never made a real conjuncture with this Jaures and what is a Sembat? They are waiters selling wine at the establishment where I drink my liqueur."

In the minds of the socialist leaders, attempting to give social­ ism integrity by purging its hangers-on, the opposition to Barr&s was clear. For Juarfes, as for so many socialists, Barres simply was untrust­ worthy. He was too ineffective as a campaigner and speaker, he could not really rouse the voters. Moreover, he had too many politically strange friends like Drumont, Mores, Le Figaro, and royalists. "To de­ centralize without transforming property," Jaures wrote in a review of

Barres novel, Les D6racines, "is to reestablish the supremacy of the old 117 landholder influences and to return to the past." Barrbs was too bour­ geois and too willing to compromise with reactionary decentralizers.

Not only was Barres' widening rift with socialism due to socialism's rejection of him. Both he and other old Boulangists, who had attached themselves to socialism, were finding socialism increasingly difficult to accept. It had been easy enough to cooperate with the socialists tacti­ cally in the 1893 elections and in the parliament which followed. In 1896, however, a real attempt was made to find a common socialist program capa­ ble of uniting the factions. The sweeping socialist gains in the May, 1396 municipal elections, which gave the socialists 1,400,000 votes and majori­ ties on 150 municipal councils, occasioned this attempt, the so-called

^Ib id .. I, 231.

^"^Jean Jaures, Oeuvres (9 vols., Paris^. 1931-1939), II, 104. 199 Saint—Mand£ banquet of May 30, 1896. There, with old Boulangists Jourde and Argelies at the speaker's table, the socialist leadership gathered to hear Millerand set forth a minimum program. This Saint-Mand£ program, as it came to be called, asked for (1) the progressive collectivization of the means of production beginning with banks, transport, and mines and adding other industries as they became ripe for socialization} (2) the triumph of socialism through the ballot box rather than through the bar­ ricade, through seeking socialist majorities in commune, department, and national governments; and (3) the recognition that socialists could be both internationalists and patriots, could maintain an "international en- Tig tente of the workers" without destroying the "French fatherland." A few days later, the Union socialiste accepted this "minimum program" as the basis of what French socialism really stood for. After much soul- searching*the Guesdists and Blanquists were able to soften their stand on revolution, and accept the new program, and come together with the

Independent Socialists. But for most of the old Boulangists, including

Barres, this meant the parting of the ways. As long as they had only to accept the collectivization of mines, banks, and transport they could think of themselves as socialists when, in reality, they were only left- wing reformers. As long as nationalism was acceptable to socialism, they could think of themselves as socialists. The Saint-Mand£ program, with its stand on collectivization and internationalism, drove out Barre3 and the other old Boulangists.

The refusal of the Union Socialiste to give Barres electoral sup­ port had been bad enough, but after the Saint-Mande program he stepped up

~i i ft Noland, pp. 49-50; "Tous collect!vistes," Le Temps. June 1, 1896. 200 his attacks on the socialist movement to internationalism. Speaking at the funeral of the Marquis de Mores on July 19-»* 1896, in an implicit re­ b u tta l to s o c ia lis t attack s on th is anti-S em ite, Barres argued th a t Mores was a genuine socialist, wanting "the economic transformation and the al­ teration of personnel in our society," as well as a nationalist. "Certain socialists," however, were attched to internationalism which they erron­ eously thought was a consequence of the French Revolution. That belief was false and only a socialist inheritance from the Radicals. While the philosophes and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens did claim cosmopolitanism, the Revolution did not act to make a single state.

Quite the contrary, it "posed the principle of the right of peoples to govern themselves." 119 In a later article Barres insisted that the error of the socialists in believing that internationalism was the consequence of the French Revolution was compounded by th e ir acceptance of Marx's idea that history determined the triumph of internationalism. Quite the con­ trary, argued Barres. In the Middle Ages, dominated by the Holy Roman

Empire and the papacy, there was universalismj but with the emerging monarchies of the sixteenth century and since the French Revolution,

"Europe organized itself according to the principle of nationalities."

Yet, while this was the greatest error, it was not the only one. Ia Pe­ tite R^publique. the main organ of the Union sociali3te, not only swallowed the internationalist arguments, but "it had failed . . . to show the fatal, inevitable character of collectivism" and had fallen into the additional 120 error of trying "to define and to specify the future."

■^Barr&s, Scenes. II, 52-53- ^^Ibid., II, 168-174 (Originally in Le Journal. January 22, 1897). 201

For Barr&s, then, 18y6 marked the turning point. The Neuilly election and the Saint-Mand£ program convinced him that he could never accept or be accepted by the French socialist movement. In Im Cocarde and the federalist campaign he had attempted to blend a Girondin-Social- ism with nationalism. The refusal in 1896 of the Union socialiste to tolerate his position put Barres at the crossroads. He had to opt for either nationalism or socialism. The choice was really between national­ ism with a little socialism or socialism with a little nationalism. The year 1897 found Barres yet undecided, although the scales were tipping toward nationalism. By 1898, however, he would go all the way toward nationalism as a new element entered French politics: the Dreyfus

A ffa ir. CHAPTER VI

THE NANCY PROGRAM OF NATIONALISM (1898)

No doubt Barres would ultimately have rejected the internationalist and collectivist course French socialism was taking. However, two dev­ elopments of 1897 and 1898 sped the process. The first was the outbreak of the Dreyfus Affair in the autumn and winter of 1897-1898, in which

Barres and the socialists lined up on different sides. The affair meant that Barres irrevocably opted for nationalism over socialism. However, because the socialist parties were not thoroughly lined up behind Dreyfus in 1898, Barres still was not completely antagonistic to socialism. Nev­

ertheless, this beginning of the Dreyfus Affair in 1898 acted as a cata­ lyst to bring about a second development: the reshaping of the nationalist ideas of Barres, already apparent in the preceding period. These he took to the voters of Nancy in the general elections of 1898. He fought the

Nancy campaign on a purely nationalist and socialist basis, and unlike his campaigns of 1893 and 1896, without any attempt to win the support of the orthodox socialist parties which were weaker in Nancy than they were in Paris. At the same time, the Dreyfus Affair played a bigger role in Nancy politics in 1898 than it did in almost any other part of

France. The campaign, in itself, accomplished two things in the de­ velopment of Barres. First, it crystalizeo his political ideas so that

the nationalist program of Nancy was a permanent fixture of his thought.

Secondly, the failure of the program to win victory, that is, to build an

202 203 electoral alliance in Boulangist style of the discontented of Left and

Right, brought Barrfes to re-evaluate his use of electoral activity.

As we have seen, the reaction of Barres in 189U-1895 to the original

conviction of Alfred Dreyfus for selling secrets to a foreign power was

to see him as one illustration of the venality of the parliamentary re­

p u b lic . The fe a r of B arres in I 89 I4.-I 895 was not that the Jews were sell­

ing out the nation, but that Dreyfus would not get his just deserts.

Barrfes had been afraid that just as the Chequards had regained their pol­

itical fortunes, Dreyfus would be. a captain of Uhlans within three years.^

By the autumn of 1897, however, this situation began to change radically

and by the spring of 1898 the cause of Captain Dreyfus forced Barres to

break with his intellectual friends of the Left and engage in an electoral

campaign highly colored by anti-Semitism.

What brought about th e change in h is views was the r is in g b e lie f th a t

Dreyfus was innocent. To Barres and the public, however, the innocence

was far from certain in 1897, for much of the case, part of which con­

tinues to be cloaked in mystery, was s till known only to a few members of 2 the General Staff, the government, and the real traitor or traitors.

What was known was th a t in March, 1 8 9 6 , the intelligence section of the

"'"Maurice B arres, Scenes e t d o ctrin es du nationalism e (.P a ris, 192£), II, lUU (Originally: "La parade de Judas," La Cocarde, January 6, 189J?). 2 An analysis of the Dreyfus Affair is beyond the scope of this study. For more recent interpretations, consult: Guy Chapman, The Dreyfus Case (London, 195£) j M arcel Thomas, L 'A ffa ire sans Dreyfus ( P a ris , 19&L); Nicholas Halasz, Captain Dreyfus: The Story of Mass Hysteria (New York 1955 )I Jacques Chastenet, La Rdpublique triomphante (Paris, 1955), pp. 6j>-73j lOit-108, 111-135, 160-180; and Maurice Pale’ologue, An Intimate Journal of the Dreyfus Case (New York, 19!?7). French General Staff intercepted a petit bleu from the German embassy to a Major Ferdinand Walsin-Esterhazy. Colonel Georges Picquart, head of intelligence, trying to discover why secrets were still being sold to

Germany even after the conviction of Dreyfus, noticed the sim ilarity be­ tween Esterhazy's handwriting and that of the bordereau, the principal

evidence against Dreyfus. After unsuccessfully attempting to convince the War Office of the innocence of Dreyfus, Picquart revealed his discovery

to his attorney who, in turn, told a sympathetic Senator, Auguste Scheurer-

Kestner. The Dreyfus family had come independently to the same conclus­

ion when, after a facsimile of the bordereau had been published, Ester-

hazy1 s banker had told them of the sim ilarity of Esterhazy's handwriting

to that of the bordereau. By 1897, these varied Dreyfusard forces had

come together to accuse Esterhazy, who was tried and acquited in January,

1898 . Throughout all this, the government and the War Office for various

reasons, not the least of which was the fact that not even Esterhazy's

guilt could now erase all the fabricated or assumed evidence against

Dreyfus, continued to declare Dreyfus guilty.

It was only when the above revelations were made in the autumn of

1897 that Barres returned to the Dreyfus case. As early as November, he

expressed his fear that the publicity of the case was destroying faith in

the army* By December, he set forth the position he would hold through­

out the Affair. It was impossible to know the truth of the guilt or

innocence of Dreyfus, Barres argued, because it was wrapped in obscurity:

^Barres, Scenes, I, 2^-31 (Originally: "La Foi dans l'Arm^e," Le Journal, November 20, 1897). 205 The reasons for which this man has been condemned, the forms in which he has been judged, are the secret of a score of persons. And if I believe the individual guilty, it is be­ cause the exceptional people who are informed, through knowing the seven members of the court martial and several documents of the first inquest, have declared and still declare that he had deserved to be stripped completely.

Barrfes was willing to understand the family^ desire for revision. The trouble was, however, that its cause had won adherents and had divided

France into two parties. He was convinced that the Dreyfusard party, an alliance of Jews and Protestants, had seized upon the Dreyfus case as a lever to power. Thus, Joseph Reinach, the Jew and chief Dreyfusard jour­ nalist, used Dreyfus to regain Jewish prestige lost under the anti-Semitic attacks on Jewish high finance and internationalism^ Scheurer Kestner, the Protestant, supported Dreyfus in an attempt to head off the growing nationalistic resentment against the colonialism and anti-clericalism of the Protestant Jules Ferry. Their efforts, common only in that they had a mutual enemy, only served to weaken and divide France against foreign attack. Faced with this possibility, Barres asked the government to clear the air once and for all, to declare Dreyfus definitely guilty or innocent, and then keep quiet so that France could be reunited.^1

The p o sitio n of Barres a t th is po in t on the g u ilt of Dreyfus was not entirely unfounded, for very little of the case was known to the public.

It was mainly a choice of whose word one wished to believe: that of

Dreyfus, an isolated and convicted traitor, and the handful of journalists, politicians, and socialists who believed in himj or that of the respected

^Maurice Barres, "L'Education nouvelle," Le Journal, December U, 1897. generals, the bulwark of national defense. The evidence that the border­ eau was the work of Esterhazy was no more su b sta n tia l than the evidence that it belonged to Dreyfus. Both arguments hinged on the testimony of graphologists, highly inexact scientists, and tne most prestigious graph­ ologist, Alphonse Bertillon, wrongly believed Dreyfus guilty. When the evidence in favor of Dreyfus was not overwhelming as far as the public was concerned, and especially when Esterhazy was acquitted, it was easy to distrust the advocates of Dreyfus, especially if there were reasons

for distrusting anything they said. For example, Reinach and Scheurer-

Kestner were too identified with the parliamentary republic he hated for

Barres ever to believe them. A similar prejudice prevented him from

accepting the Dreyfusard testimony of Emile Zola.

The relations of Barrds with Zola were particularly interesting.

They reached a climax in the winter of 1897-1898. Barres had never

gotten along well witn Zola. In 1893, he had told Goncourt that Zola was "a conscientious imbecile.Zola, with his "scientific" novels,

stood for tne literary and philosophic traditions of naturalism and pos­

itivism which Barrds rejected. Yet, this antagonism did not prevent

the two from coming to g eth er as Zola trie d to lin e up the in te lle c tu a ls

in favor of Dreyfus. At the end of November, 1897, they lunched w ith

Paul Bourget. Zola, Barres reported, had just published an "absurd"

Dreyfusard article and said of it, "It is scientific, it is scientific,"

a term Barr&s recalled being used by the "foolish" and "ignorant" in pol­

itical rallies. Along with Anatole France and Bourget, Barrds lunched

with Zola again, but only on the condition that Dreyfus would not be

^Edmond de Goncourt, Journal (Monaco, 1956-1958), xiX, 93. 207 mentioned.^ After a third dinner on December 7, 1897, with the Daudets added, Barres recalled that tension was in the air at the dinner but that 7 Zola was a "brave man" for continuing his struggle.

However, even this armed truce ended when Zola in J*AccuseI, specifi­ cally denounced the government and various officers of falsely convicting

Dreyfus and of preventing the necessary revision. Soon, the courage of

Zola inspired three thousand intellectuals and artists to sign a petition in support of Dreyfus, and Leon Blum went to get the signature of Barres.

"Zola has courage. He is a man," Barres admitted to Blum. Yet, recalling his own attendance at the degradation of Dreyfus and his anti-Dreyfusard articles for Le Journal, he added:

Eh bieni 1 ask myself if 1 was not) mistaken. 1 realize that each of the attitudes. . . that interpreted (Dreyfus) as the sign of a total, perfect villainy also allowed the opposite conclusion. Was Dreyfus the villainj was he a stoic, a martyr? I no longer know anything about it.

He sent Blum away with the promise that he would think about it and send his decision by letter. A few days later he wrote Blum that the Dreyfu- sards had not convinced him, that the omissions in their arguments dis­ quieted ana irritated him. His refusal to sign the. manifesto hit Blum Q hard: "One of the avenues of my youth had been closed."

The shock of Blum was carried to other Leftist intellectuals, who had drunk deep of the Cu'.lte du moi, when Barrfes p u d ish e d , on February 1,

^Maurice Barres, Mes Cahiers (Paris, 1929-1957), I, 223-22lj..

7Ibid., I, 230. O LSon Blum, Souvenirs sur l 1Affaire (Paris, 1935), PP» 87-88. 208 an article directly against those intellectuals, as the press described then, who signed the Zola manifesto. In it, Barres argued that the Drey­ fusard intellectuals were not tne cultivated individuals they believed themselves to be; instead, they were part of a "demi-culture," which

"destroys the instinct without substituting for it a conscience." More­ over, intellectuality had no relevance to the Dreyfus affair, for

we do not possess all the elements for a real knowlege, but only some elements. We are able to construct only hypo­ theses. How are you, man of culture, man of method, able to undertake the resolution of a problem when you do not at all have all the datal

As a result, Barres believed, an "intellectual" was "an individual who is persuaded that society ought to be founded on logic and who fails to recognize that it, in fact, rests on necessities anterior and perhaps foreign to individual reason."9 As intellectuals of this category Barres

singled out especially Zola, Joseph Bertrand, and Anatole France, "a master that I have admired more than any other man in the world for fif­ teen years.

The motive in this for Barres was clear. Zola's J'Accusel forced him and others to make the choice between Dreyfus ana the army. So many charges had been fabricated against Dreyfus by Major Henry and others

^Barr6s, Scgnes, I, k(-50 (.Originally: "La Protestation des intellectuals," Le Journal, February 1, 1 8 9 8 ). Victor Brombert, in his "Toward a Portrait of the French Intellectual" (Partisan Review, XXVII, P a rt I I I (Summer, I960), U80-Jp02), argues th a t the use of " in te lle c tu a l" in its derogatory sense began with Barres. However, Barres himself had been described as an intellectual in that very sense. See: G. Bernard- Kahler, "La Litterature dans la politique," L'Ermitage ( 1891 ) , pp. !?13-!?i9. 10I b id ., I , $1. 209 that Esterhazy1s authorship of the bordereau was no longer sufficient to dispel them. The army and the government insisted, wrongly, that these charges were genuine. Ilence, Zola and the other Dreyfusards, frustrated in pinning the blame on Esterhazy, could only attack the army, and this

Barres could not tolerate. Blum saw the choice of Barres in this way:

He came to feel that his choice would decide the rest of his life. Until then, he had succeeded in reconciling the Boul- angist Barres with the Barres of Sous l ’oeil des barbares and Un homme libre. From this time he chosej he chose with the same stroke between his literary public, from whom he cut himself off, and his companions of the polttical strug­ gle. . . Boulangist solidarity swept him away, even him. . . Political action had not at all been for Barres, as I had believed, an exercise, a pastime, nearly a game."-I

Dreyfus might be innocent, although Barres doubted it. Even if he were,

the innocence could be proved now only by destroying the army. In the years which followed, Barres often referred to the formula of Deroulede:

"There is not any likelihood that Dreyfus is innocent, but it is absol- utely certain that France is innocent." 12 In such a situation, Dreyfus had to be guilty.

The article of Barres proved to be, as Blum suggested it was, the

declaration of war against the intellectual community, when it was

answered by Lucien Herr the librarian of the Ecole normale. Just as

Barres had led the young intellectuals to the moi, Herr had almost

singlehandedly led an entire generation of them into socialism. His

eloquence struck away the support Barres once enjoyed from the young

men of the Left. Against Barres, Herr wrote:

•'-•'-Blum, Souvenirs, pp. 88 - 8 9 .

-'-^Barres, Scenes, I, 32. 210 The young men whose demi-culture you deride know that in Tact they, no more than you, possess all the truth; but they have in themselves something which is perfect, the faith in a hu­ mane ideal, and this naive force of generous action will sweep away the absurd hatreds which excite the clever ones [habiles]. Take guard, you believe yourself in accord with the nation. Instead, you have with you only this course, noisy, fluctuating and changing fraction of the nation which disappointed you at the time of Boulangism, and which is not a force. You also have with you the men of parliament who disgust you, the sat­ isfied interests, the crowd, Jewish and Christian capitalism, and the Semaines religieuses of all of France. All that, you know, is a weakness. At the same time, you have against you the real people and the men of good will, . . . the majority of men who know how to put law and the ideal of justice be­ fore their persons, their natural instincts, and their group loyalties. ’

With Herr's article, the contact of Barres with the men of the Left, al­ ready seriously threatened since the election of 1896 and the rising tide of socialist internationalism and collectivism, was finished. His en­ tries in Mes Cahiers of 1897 show that he could still meet with men of the Left like Herr, France, and Zola. With 1898, there are no more such entries. Barres, who had sought in Boulangism, la Cocarde, and the fed­ eralist campaign to oridge the gulf between Left and Right, had now lost the orthodox Left. Before the Dreyfus Affair was over he would also lose the young men of the Right. Even his ability to retain the disgusted, un­ orthodoc Left and Right was precarious, as seen when he again went to the voters in the campaign of 1898.

II

It was against this background of the Dreyfus Affair that Barres conducted another electoral campaign, this time for a legislative seat at

Haney in the general elections of 1898. The campaign added two new

13Lucien Herr, "A M. Maurice Barres," Revue blanche, XV (February 15, 1898), 244* 211 dimensions to the political development of Barres, in addition to il­ lustrating once more his inability to win at the polls. First, it saw him formulate a new political program of nationalism which united his varied concerns for social reform, national strength against the weakening influence of $ generation of parliamentary corruption and inaction, and the reconciliation of classes within a kind of republican corporativism.

Secondly, although the campaign throughout France was fought out with a notable lack of debate on the Dreyfus Affair, the Affair entered the

Nancy campaign in its most vicious form, anti-Semitism. Barrfes had to face up to that issue and put to the test the anti-Dreyfusard creden­ tials he had established in the winter of 1897-1898.

The anguish of two successive defeats at Neuilly made Barr&s de­

bate with himself at length before deciding to enter the 1898 campaign.

Yet, the s itu a tio n a t Nancy seemed much improved for him over th a t of

1893. The efforts of Papelier had so restored voter support of govern­ mental candidates that tne supporters of Barres had urged him not to run

in 1893. At least, that was the version Barres told in 1898, and he went

on to add that the candidate of Papelier had so reneged on his promises

of governmental economies and working-class reforms that hjs loss of sup-

port had caused him not to stand for re-election. 15 Because of that,

Barres was now able to return to a better electoral position in Nancy

than he had had in 1889. On April 2, he won the support of his old

^Barres, Mes Cahiers, II, 7.

^'Wurice Barres, "Premier article," Le Courrier de 1‘Est. April 10, 1898; "Nos Reunions" and "Opinions et votes imposes par le Eongrfcs au Candidat opportunists de la 3e c irc o n sc rip tio n ," ib id ., April 17, 1898. 212

Republican Socialist Revisionist Committee, renamed Republican Socialist

Nationalist Committee, in a resolution demanding a new prosecution of

Zola, "insultor of the army and defender of the traitor Dreyfus."1^ On

April 19, Barres even won the support of the local Union socialiste, which

believed that Barres really was a socialist. 17 To publicize his campaign

he revived the old Courrier de l'E st as a purely electoral sheet and of­

fered its irregular issues free to all takers. Almost every issue had

an article by Gabriel, who had virtually retired from politics and lost

his old fire because of blindness.

The first issues of the Courrier de l'E st. now subtitled simply

"weekly, founded in 1889," were devoted to the program Barres would ex- 18 pand upon throughout the campaign. It was a natural outgrowth of the

revisionism of Boulangism, the Proudhonist socialism of Ia Cocarde. and

the nationalism of Barres' attacks on the Union socialiste and Dreyfus.

Barres may have described it and his committee nationalist-socialist, but

it was neither the chauvinism so often identified with nationalism or the

public ownership of the means of production of socialism. Instead, Bar­

res saw nationalism as the touchstone for uniting all classes and the

Left and Right around a purely domestic policy of social reforms and

national strength. The first job of this nationalism was to bring France political

security. "We are nationalists," Barres asserted, because "for twenty

^ "Un ordre du jour du comity," ibid., April 10, 1898.

^"Nos Reunions," ibid., April 24, 1898. 1 8 The basic program is conveniently reprinted in Scenes et doc­ trines dunationalisme. II, 160-168. It had originally appeared in var­ ious articles in Le Courrier de l'E st for April 10, 1898. Unless other­ wise noted, the following analysis of the program comes from that. 213 years the Opportunist system has favored the Jew, the foreigner, and the cosmopolite." The army, m inistries, courts, and administration were riddled with them and served their interests. The result was a genera­ tion of Reinachs, Cornelius Herzs, and Alfred Dreyfuses. Although the

Jews had opce been persecuted, they had been liberated by the French Revo­ lution and "have become dominators." "We are absolute partisans of com­ plete liberty of conscience," Barres wrote, but he believed that political balance had to be restored. Jewish influence should be proportionate on­ ly to their 70,000 numbers. The influence of foreigners had to be re­ duced by making m ilitary service a prerequisite for naturalization and by allowing the naturalized to have only civil rights of a private nature with the vote going only to second generation Frenchmen.

The second job of nationalism was to protect France against "econ­ omic insecurity." In this regard, Barrfes believed that nationalism nec­ essarily engendered socialism, which he still described as "the material and moral amelioration of the largest and poorest class." Such a defini­ tion, of course, would not obligate Barres to a program of collectivism, but would direct his attention to working-class insecurities: the retired worker had nothing to eat, while the young had insecurity of unemployment.

Foreign workers depressed wages. Machinery subjected the worker to a

"military discipline" and to the arbitrariness of the employer in establish­ ing work rules. "Certain organisations d1 economat turn man into a virtual slave." The shopkeeper class shared the same economic insecurities: The bourgeois bought frpm the large store, but the worker dealt with the small merchant who gave him credit when he was unemployed. In a long period of unemployment this extension of credit exposed the shopkeeper to ruin, just 214 as it created so many hardships for the worker. In addition, the shop­ keeper paid higher prices than his large competitor did. The farmer al­ so had insecurities. He was at the mercy of world grain prices, driven down by large American and Indian harvests. This was only partially off­ set by the tariff, which Barres considered a socialist measure, because grain speculators absorbed too much of the profits from the tariff. Fin­ ally, even the bourgeoisie had economic insecurities. It was "menaced by international financial feudalism which turns securities into dry leaves." Although the little rentier furnished the capital for French industry, this capital was controlled by a "financial general staff," made up of no more than 1500 persons who, in tu rn , were c o n tro lle d , through interlocking directorates, by several dozen former Genevan Pro­ testant bankers and Jews. These feudal financial lords had become "the veritable masters of modern society." They controlled industry, because they decided where investments were to be made. They also controlled the dividends of rentiers and wages of workers, because they manipulated the profits of industry.

To remedy these economic insecurities, Barres recommended a wide program. He would require foreign workers to fu lfill a military obliga­ tion. They would also be ineligible for employment on public works. He would overcome the barrier to the establishment of a national, state-con­ trolled old-age pension plan by finding a reasonable way to finance the scheme. He would replace indirect taxation with progressive tax on in­ come and the profits from bonds and French investments abroad. He would improve and decentralize agricultural credit with funds from the Gaisses d'Epargne. and guarantee minimum grainiprices to the producer, since too many of the benefits of the Moline tariff went to the grain speculators.

He would extend the civil personality of the trade unions and agricul­ tural unions so that they could raise capital and own factories. In that way workers could emancipate themselves through voluntary associations, modeled on the Albi glassworks which still had to operate illegally, rather than through collectivization. He would encourage the association of lit­ tle investors, so that they could retain control over the capital they created . In such a way, "the modern corporative movement" could combat the financial aristocracy just as the "commune movement of the twelfth century" battled feudal tyranny. He would extend vocational education in public schools to "permit all national aptitudes and dispositions to be developed," He would revise the constitution to widen the effect of uni­ versal suffrage, particularly through the proposal of "our friend Argelifes," an old Boulangist, to allow municipal referendums on economic and adminis­ trative matters. He would extend the civil personalities of communes so that they could try new solutions to social problems. He would support the Georges Berry proposal to require large stores to have a fixed and proportional license for every line of goods they sold, thereby making their prices more competitive with those of the small shopkeeper. He would support the re-establishment of the right of bouilleurs de cru. 19 Vo Maurice Barrfes, "Les nationalistes" and "Insecurity 6cono- miques," ibid.. April 10, 1898 (both reprinted in Scenes, II, 160-168); Maurice Barrfes, "La F6odalit6 financiers," ibid., April 10, 1898; "Les grands magasins et le petit commerce," ibid. . April 10, 1898; Maurice Barr&s, "Discours du Congr&s," ibid., April 24> 1898; "La Referendum municipal," ibid., April 24, 1898; Maurice Barrfcs, "RSponse A M. Gavet sur les Syndicate et les Impots," ibid. . May 1, 1898; "Sur les bouil­ leurs de cru," ibid., May 1, 1898; Alfred Gabriel, "Le Progr&s s'accentue," ibid., May 5, 1898; Maurice Barr&s, "Que faut-il faire?" ibid., May 12, 1898. 216 The striking features of this program were its continuities, ana lack of them, with the past. First of all, Barrfes played down the Boul- angist strain in his past. He made no mention of constitutional revision in favor of a presidential republic, although he continued to hold such views privately. Perhaps because he sought a major office of the parlia­ mentary system, he $ow saw the political solution in the federalist pro­ gram of decentralization, the increase of communal powers. Secondly, he even modified his former position on decentralization. He adhered to statist solutions for pensions and agricultural credit, programs which were supported by n e a rly a l l th e p a rtie s of th e L e ft, minimum g ra in prices, and legislation against foreign workers. He would have argued, of course, that in his federalist framework these were natinnal problems, re­ quiring national solutions. Yet, the fact that these were more central to his program than were the advocacy of voluntary solutions by geographical and moral groups, modeled on the Albi glassworks, showed that he had modi­ fied his position in the face of political exigencies: national amelior­ ation in these areas simply was more easy to achieve, although decentrali­

zation remained the long-range goal. Thirdly, the 1898 program was thor­ oughly couched in nationalism. The program was to reconcile classes and

create the social justice, economic security, and political strength nec­ essary to make France strong. .Even his electoral committee carried the nationalist epithet. However, the emphasis of this nationalism was almost

solely domestic. Foreign affairs was noticeably absent in a campaign

fought out only three months before Fashoda would re-ignite nationalist fires on the foreign situation. For Barres in 1898 the "foreign" threat

in his nationalism lay almost exclusively in the internal machinations of

the Reinachs and Dreyfuses. 217 In a normal election year this program might have been sufficient to bring victory for Barres, considering the mood of Nancy. As the cam­ paign unfolded, however, a surprise awaited all the candidates: anti-

Semitism, engendered by a Dreyfus Affair still in its earliest stages, was far deeper in Nancy than any of the candidates suspected. Anti-Semitism first showed itself with the original republican candidate. The Republican

Congress, formerly the Republican Alliance, of the third circonscription, met on April 17 and chose a Radical, Eug&ne Nicolas, over the old enemy of Barr&s, L£on Goulette of l'E st RSpublicain.^ Since the inbunjbant, a proteg£ of Papelier whose magic with the voters had ruined Barr&s and

Gabriel in 1893, refused to stand for re-election, a progressive candidate like Nicolas certainly seemed the logical choice. Within days, however, came an indication that this was no ordinary campaign. In April 23, all the candidates held a joint meeting. Besides Barr&s and Nicolas there was also Ludovic Gervaize, formerly a conservative Boulangist and ralli6 and now an anti-Semite. Barres was fairly well received and Gervaize, who impassively insisted he was only against government bureaucracy and not freedom of conscience, was largely ignored, except that the audience ob­ jected to being addressed as messieurs rather than as citoyens. On the other hand, Nicolas was almost hooted from.the h a ll.^ The case against

Nicolas was this: he was Dreyfusard. In particular, he had helped finance and occasionally proof-read a socialist and Dreyfusard newspaper in Nancy, 2n "Chronique &Lectorale," Le Temps. April 10 and 19, 1898 and "Chronique Electorale," Le Progres de l'E st. April 18, 1898. 21 "Chronique electorale, la reunion de la salle Gauchenot," Lg Progres de l'Est. April 24, 1898. 218 22 l'Etincelle. At several rallies the following week, Nicolas fared

badly for this position and for trying to pose both as a radical and

conserv ative. Faced w ith th is , so many members o f the Republican Cong­ ress claimed that Nicolas had packed the congress, that a committee was 23 formed to choose another candidate. Not until a week before the elec­

tion was a new man chosen, this time an anti-Dreyfmsard, Demenge-Cremel,

a Nancy businessman.

The difficulties of Nicolas should have signaled the importance

of anti-Semitism as an issue. To be sure, both Demenge-Cremel and BarrAs

struck at Nicolas for that reason. Demenge-Cremel contended that he

would never support Nicolas in a run-off, because of the support of

Nicolas for l'Etincelle and Dreyfus and his attempt to manipulate the

Republican Congress.^ On his part, Barrfes consistently repeated his 25 charges against Dreyfus and Jewish control of finance. Usually, as in

a speech at Dombasle on April 14, he lumped the two together:

It suffices me to cite this pitiful history of Captain Dreyfus, condemned by h is p eers. His defenders, instrum ents of an oc­ cult financial power, condemn themselves for insults to the army, and to justify their criminal intrigues reach to obtain the annulment of the verdict. Is that not a challenge which financial feudalism hurls at the French nation? And what kind of reaction against this Jewish feudalism can be made by

22E. I., "Les origines de la candidature Nicolas," Le Courrier de l'E st. April 17, 1898 and "Nicolas renie et trahit son comitfi," ibid. . April 24, 1898. ^Various articles in Le Progrfes de l'E st. April 18-26, 1898.

^■"Chronique 6lectorale," ibid., May 6, 1898.

^"Discours de Maurice Barres A la reunion publique du 23 avril, a Nancy," Le Courrier de l'E st. April 28, I898j "Ce que disent les proldtaires," ibid.. April 10, 1898. 219 Opportunism which, even at Nancy, is penetrated, dominated by the Jewish world.

In particular, Barrls used this theme against Nicolas. On the eve of the election Barres and his followers intercepted a letter from a Nicolas sup­ porter to his father stating that Nicolas was, indeed, at one with Zola. 27 Barres had the letter photographed and posted on kiosks. The Progrfes de l'E st denounced the poor taste of publishing such a personal letter, but it had daily attacked without giving quarter the involvement of Nicolas with the Dreyfusard l'E tincelle, an involvement Nicolas unsuccessfully denied. Yet, except for their mutual denunciation of Nicolas, neither

Barres nor Demenge-Cremel exploited anti-Semitism. Indeed, both dis­ missed the candidature of Gervaize who made anti-Semitism virtually his whole campaign. The Courrier de l'E st never mentioned Gervaize, and Le

Progres simply considered his candidature a laughingstock with anti-Semi- 28 tism his only appeal, an appeal incapable of ever coming close to victory.

However, when the votes were counted on May 8, Barres and Demenge-Cremel discovered how poorly they had gaged the difficulties of Nicolas.

With anti-Semitism as such a side issue, Barres and Demenge-Cremel simply wore themselves out in mutual personal attacks. The campaign had to be fought on such a level, for in specific proposals tne program of

Demenge-Cremel was almost identical with that of Barres: decentralization, respect for the army, solidarity between labor and capital, and legislation

^ "Nos reunions," ibid., April 17, 1898. 27 "Chenevier, agent dreyfusard de Nicolas," ibid., May 8, 1898 and "Chronique &Lectorale," Le Progres de l'E st, May 11, 1898. 28 "Chronique S lectorale," ib id ., May 7, 1898. 2 2 0 against foreign workers. 29 Compared to his intemperance in dealing with

Nicolas, BarrIs was a paragon of restraint when it came to Demenge-Cremel, mainly because the latter entered the race so late. To Barres, ^emenge-

Cremel was the self-seeking.promoter of a monument to Carnot, even placing his own name on the base, the incompetent president of the League of Gas and Tribunal de commerce, and an inarticulate speaker. 30 It appeared

sufficient simply to identify Demenge-Cremel with the Opportunist-Prog- ressist forces which had always opposed Barres.

The Progres de l'E st, however, was not as restrained. Even be­

fore Barres officially posed his candidature, it dredged up every piece

of information and misinformation it could find against him. When it

failea to prove its charges that BarrIs was a second generation Lorrainer

and, hence, foreign to the country, it took on the impossible task, by

quoting him out of context, of making him appear to hate Lorraine. It

harped on his undistinguished parliamentary career, arguing that he spoke

but once. Forced to recognize that Barres spoke five times, it then

pointed out, correctly this time, that four of the speeches were on ques--

tions of art and literature and one in defense of a German pensioner ex­

pelled from France for passing out Boulangist literature. It poked fun

at the "feeble constitution,11 "pale, hatchet-faced figure," and poor

speaking ability of Barrls. It further compromised his ties with Nancy

by recalling his Neuilly campaigns and Paris residence and his reneging

on his 1893 claims of permanent Neuilly residence. It quoted every social­

ist it could find who would denounce Barres' socialism. It attacked his

^"Chronique llectorale," ibid., May 7 and April 27, 1898.

30See especially various articles in Le Courrier de 11Est, Mqy 5> 1898 221 opposition to the Paris Exposition of 1900. Finally* it could always reopen that old wound* the Barrfes voting record on the ta riff.^ Against these charges* Barres defended himself fairly-well. He could easily prove his Lorraine ancestry and his parliamentary record. The latter was no less brilliant than that of the retiring incumbent in speeches, and certainly more progressive in votes. Barres* projects against

Panama* foreign workers, and the Exposition and those in favor of de­ centralization had considerable popularity in Nancy* one of the centers of the d ecen tralization movement. Even the t a r if f issu e was e a sily handled in 1898 , for the popular Papelier was not happy with the same provisions Barrfes had objected to.^ 2

As a campaigner Barr6s could handle himself fairly-well with the pen.

I t was at the podium that he had trouble. Even at the Nancy meeting on

April 23 with Nicolas and Gervaize, where the audience was so Barresian that it elected his chief lieutenant* Gaston Save, as chairman, he could not get a resolution favorable to his candicacy despite a personal appeal.^3

Generally* he stayed close to the working-class strongholds of Nancy*

Dombasle, and Champigneuilles* which had been his strength in 1889-1893*

^E ., "Questions d'origine," Le Progres de l'E st* March 30* 1898 ; "Chronique e le c to ra le , la reunion de la s a lle Gauchenot," ib id . April 23, 1898 ,* B ., "Comparez," ib id . * A pril $, 18983 B. * "Cinq ans 2 la Chambre*" ibid., April 8 , 18983 "Echos locaux, leurs mensonges," Le Courrier de l'Est, April 10, I 8983 "II est capable de nous servir" , ib id . , April 2k, 18983 Maurice Barres, "Reponse," ibid. , April 28* 18983 Maurice Barres* "Sur le protectionnisme," ibid., May 8 , 18983 "Leur caricature," ibid.* May 8 , 1898 .

32In addition to the above, see: Maurice Barres, "Une reponse," and "Lettre-r^ponse," ibid.* April 17* 1898 .

■^Chronique electorale* la reunion de la salle Gauchenot," Le Progres de l'E st, April 2k, 1898 . 222

Even at Dombasle, on April lU, a heckler who shouted that Barres'• arguments were "words, words" almost broke up tne meeting and did pre­ vent the voting of a resolution of indorsement.-^ Barres was especially discouraged when he campaigned in the countryside, where he found the 3d voters against him before they ever say him. The worst experience was at the village of Champenoux on May 2, where an unruly audience, egged on by the chairman, hurled at Barres local elaborations of every fantastic anti-Barrds story, including a most fascinating one that he had sought to run in Constantine, Algeria, and marry a moukere, the daughter of the Bey of Tunis. In the middle of the meeting, suddenly the lights went out.

The mob se t upon Barres and Save with canes and f i s t s . The two escaped out a back door only to find their carriage a block away. The mob beat them all the way to the carriage, knocking Barres to the ground several tim es.3k

In spite of it all, the May 8 election came and found Barres ahead, but without a majority. Long upset since his poor showing at Neuilly in

1896 , Barrds was now e c s ta tic : 'With vigorous h elp , I f in a lly had unmoored the ship; it glided on the waterj luck had returned, we were going to

sail.-^ However, his elation was premature. Gervaize followed the £,100

3^"Nos reunions" and "Pour les electeurs de Dombasle," Le Courrier de l'Est, April 17, 1898 .

^Barres, Mes Cahiers, II, 11.

■^"Chronique Electorale," Le Temps, May 8 , 1898$ Maurice Barr&s, "Guet-apens de Champenoux," Le Courrier de l'E s t , May £, 1 8 9 8 $ "La Bagarre de Champenoux," ib id . , May 8 , I 698 ; Barres, Mes Cahiers, II, 9-10.

■^Barres, Mes Cahiers, II, 19-20. votes of Barres with 5,051, while Demenge-Cremel garnered 3,139 to the

1,797 of Nicolas. Everyone was surprised at Gervaize's showing, including the candidate himself. All were convinced that the priests had created an electoral success that no one could have foreseen. The anti-Semitic feeling, signaled by the reaction to Nicolas, was far stronger than anyone had realized, for Gervaize ran on a program Gaston Save called "death to the Jews" and Jean Cordier termed "racial hatreds."^ The unexpected anti-Semitic surge worked to the disadvantage of Barrfes. Before the cam­ paign Barrfes had sent agents to get the withdrawal of Gervaize. They argued that the programs of both candidates were close to eacn other on nationalism and Dreyfus that Barres, as a former deptuy, had priority.^

Although these several efforts had failed, Barres undoubtedly believed th at G ervaize would make a poor showing and throw h is v o tes to Barr&s on the run-off ballot, just as the conservative Renard had done in 1889. It was probably for that reason that Barres had not attacked Gervaize in the first ballot campaign. However, with only 50 votes separating him from

Barres, Gervaize was not about to withdraw.

Now, Barres had to face up to the realities of the electoral situ­ ation. Gervaize, with the backing of tne conservative Journal de la

Meurthe-et-Moselle and La Croix de l'E st, was not only riding a conservative

3^Gaston Save, "Le Triomphe de ’La Croix’," Le Courrier de l'E st, May 12, 1 8 9 8 ; B ., "Les B a llo ta g es," Le Progr^s de l ’E st, May11, 1898 \ J. Cordier, "Le Retour offensif," ibid., May 19, 1898.

^Letter of Houdaille to Philippe BarrSs (December 10,1929), Mes Cahiers, II, 309J f,M. Barres et les clericaux," Le Progres de l ’Est, May 20, 1898. groundswell in the East which had brought victory for a conservative on the first ballot in the first circonscription of Nancy. He also had been able to convince many conservative republicans that he was a repub­ lican. For example, he had won the support of l'Est Republicain. Its editor, Leon Goulette, had opposed Barres in 1889 and had been a candidate against Nicolas for the indorsement of the Republican Congress. He was a ctiv e in the d ecen tra liza tio n movement and in 1899 would be one of the adherants to the anti-Dreyfusard Ligue de la Patrie Franpaise. The Bar­ res program of anti-Semitism coupled with social reforms, which the Est

Republicain called "caesarist socialism ," could make no appeal to men like Goulette. Even l 1Impartial, although it attacked the anti-Semitism of Gervaize, considered him a republican. Barres also had to contend with Demenge-Cremel. This candidate, backed by Le Progres de l'E st, did not consider Gervaize a true republican, but it did not think that

Barrds was one either, because of his Boulangist past. Thus, the Progres de l'Est argued that the voters had to reject both the "caesarism of the saber" and the "caesarism ox the aspersorium." In addition, Barres had deserted Nancy and was a d ile t t a n t e .^

All this meant that for Barres to win he had to do two things. First, he had to prove his reformist republicanism to win the votes away from

Nicolas, who retired, ana Demenge-Cremel. To do this, he first sought to

^°J. Cordier, "Ce qu'il faut faire," ibid., May 17, 1898$ B., "Pour en finir," ibid., May 22, 1898$ B., "Les Ballotages, 11 ibid. , May 11, 1 8 9 8 $ J. Cordier, "Sauce Barres, sauce Gervaize," ibid., May 21, 1 8 9 8 . establish a unified republican ticket headed by himself 5 failing that, he offered to retire in favor a third candidate, acceptable to both his voters ana those of Demenge-Cremel.^ To be sure, the Progres de l'Est contended that he offered this just to cover himself if Gervaize won. instead, it went on, he should withdraw in favor of Demenge-Cremel so that he could be forgiven for the "old mistakes (pech^s) of his youth and enter the republican party by the front door.The earlier negotiations with

Gervaize did not, in themselves, give the lie to the sincerity oi Barres.

He had done no more than to seek the nationalistic votes of the Right before a campaign in 'which it had little chance, if past elections in

Nancy were any indication. He had not at all altered the republican na­ ture of his program to get those votes, and besides, many did consider

Gervaize a republican. Also, Barres had maintained republican solidarity in h is second N eu illy d efea t. F a ilin g to get the retirem ent of Demenge-

Cremel, Barres had to show that Demenge-Cremel had no chance to bring victory for republicanism. Part of the technique was to thoroughly rei- icule Demenge-Cremel as inept, imcompetant, senile, and, possibly, corrupt.

The Courrier de l'E st, for example, constantly punned his name: Demenge

Cremen'a, Demenge-Kummel, Demenge-Caramel, Demenge-Gamelle, Demenge-Crim- in el, Demenge-Grimel, Demenge-Gromelle, and Demel-Cremerge.^ Moreover,

Barrds, Gabriel, and Save a l l argued that votes for Demenge-Cremel would

^G aston Save, "Le Triomphe de 'La C roix'," Le Courrier de l'E s t, May 12, 18983 Maurice Barres, "Sauvons la Republique," ibid., May 17, 18983 Maurice Barres, "Concentration nationale efcrepublicaine," ibid., May 19, 1898 .

^ J. Cordier, "Le Retour oifensif," Le Progres de l'E st, May 19, 1898 .

k3ie Courier de l'Est, May 17 and 19, 1898. 226 bring, if he lost in favor 01 Gervaize, the triumph of a new loth of May to Nancy, put Nancy in the hands of "a coterie of reactionaries," and

"compromise the republic." If Demenge won, the voters would leave power in the hands of the Opportunists who had favored Jews for twenty-five y e a r s . ^ On the other hand, Barres was a thoroughgoing republican and reformer. He again summed up his "socialist" reform program. As if to prove his sincerity he insisted that, while the opposition called him a

"millionaire," he wanted his proposed income tax to begin with him.^

Secondly, in order to win Barres saw that he had to keep his voters from switching to Gervaize, whose chance for victory was no longer the impossibility it had formerly seemed, and to win voters away from Gervaize.

Antisemite that he was, Barr6s now made it quite clear that his anti-

Semitism was solely political and patriotic, not racial or religious.

That of Gervaize, on the other hand, vras of "clerical fanaticism" just as that of Drumont was of "religious enthusiasm.Save added that

G ervaize, u n lik e the moderate Barrfe's, shouted "Death to th e Jews" in

J 7 place of advocating "serious reforms." Indeed, said the Courrier, Barres was so moderate that his refusal to demand that Jews be strung up on the nearest lamp-post caused the Est Republicain to accuse him of "surface

^Maurice Barres, "Avis aux Republicains, aux Democrates et aux Pa- triotes," Alfred Gabriel, "Dernieres reflexions," Gaston Save, "Le disiste- ment de M. Nicolas, " Le Courrier de l'E st, May 19, 1690.

^Maurice Barres, Que faut-il faire?, ibid., May 12, I898j "Reproches absurdes," ibid., May 19, 1 8 9 8 . 1 / Maurice Barres, "Citoyens," ibid. , May 17, 1898 and Barres, "Que faut-il faire?"

k^Save, "Le Triomphe de 'La Croix1," I b id ., May 12, 1898 . 227 antiS em itism .T he newspaper also took pains to show how extreme

Gervaize1s position was. It quoted the Independent story that Gervaize was running in the third circoncision, instead of the third circonscription, and repeated a tale that Gervaize clubbed a Jewish client and invited his friends over to dine on the corpse. The menu of "this fraternal agape" included "omelette aux bouts coupes d’aspdrge, hors-d'oeuvre et prepuces d 1Algerie [Drumont had ju s t won an electio n in A lg iers], f i l e t de Ju if grille 'Inquisition1, langue hebraicue fumde aux lentilles d*Ssau, desserts de Sahara" while the wines included "Sang juif en carafons,

Lacryma Christi."M-7li9 Both the Progres de l'E st and Barres argued that

Gervaize was using anti-Semitism to create a "republic of priests," which

Barr6s wanted no more than he wanted a "republic against priests," and to parlay this victory into control of the municipal and cantonal elec­ tions.^ The Est Republicain had become so clerical and monarchist that it was virtually an Est Jesuitique. It even printed anti-Barres articles by the Bonapartist Paul Cassagnac.

Barr6s attacked ;■ the clerical and conservative anti-Semitism of Ger­ vaize by saying that his own antisemitism was far more moderate and

firmly based. He pointed out that he had been with Drumont at the funeral

of Mores, with Rochefort and Drumont in the forefront against Dreyfus.

Even the C ourrier de l'E s t had attacked Jewish p o litic a l and fin an c ia l

"Antisemitisme et antisemitisme," ibid., May 19, 1898 .

U9Le Courrier de l'E st, May 19s 1898.

^Maurice Barres, "Sauvons la Republique," ibid., May 17, I 898 . domination as early as 1889.'^' To buttress these credentials Barres reprinted articles from Drumont's Libre Parole and statements from the

Jeunesse antisemite et nationaliste urging Gervaize to retire in favor of Barres. He also brought in Deroulede and his lieutenant, Marcel

I-Iabert, for a series of rallies in every village in the circonscription.

De'roulede insisted that the voters abandon the "false anti-Jew" and

"remain faithful to republican discipline," because Gervaize was using anti-Semitism to bring clericalism .^ By the eve of the run-off election

11Intransigeant and La Libre Parole believed that the tactics of Barres were paying off and that Gervaize was, indeed, about to retire.^

However, it did not happen that way. Gervaize ended with 5,887 votes to the 5,786 of Barres. Demenge-Cremel, with 3,268, came in a poor t h ir d .^ As Barr&s saw i t , h is defeat resu lted from h is fa ilu r e to get the withdrawal of Gervaize before the campaign, or to later repair ct. the damage of that failure. ^ Gervaize, testifying a year later in a trial against Deroulede, attributed his success to the "more feeble" anti-Semitism oi Barres.^ Barres also attributed his defeat to the

^2 f ? ' * ' "Gervaize desavoue" and "Paul Deroulede dans la de circonscription ibid., May 17, 1 8 9 8 . "Chronique E le c to ra le ," Le Progre*s de l 1 E s t, May 20, 1898.

^ " E le c tio n s le g is la tiv e s ," Le Temps, May 23, 1 8 9 8 .

'’'’Barres, Mes Cahiers, II, 22.

^56 Maurice Barrds, "Un temoignage a rectifier," ' Le Journal, December 22, 1899. strength of clericalism, and added that the Opportunists turned to

Gervaize on the second ballot, for fear that Barres would turn Nancy into a nationalist stronghold just as he had turned it into a Boulangist one.^ Houdaille added that the intervention of Deroulede to rally the voters to uphold the republic against the clerical peril only acted to 58 drive the Right into the arms of Gervaize. The elections almost defy analysis. On the surface it appeared that almost all of Nicolas's votes went to Gervaize and B arres, because Demenge-Cremel picked up only

100 votes on the second ballot. Yet, considering the Dreyfusard position of Nicolas and the fact that there were hardly any absentions, it would appear more likely that the voters completely reshuffled themselves.

Perhaps, many of the original voters for Barres shifted to Gervaize whose chances suddenly proved to be good, while the voters of Nicolas shifted to Barr£s as the lesser of two evils, and at least one who would vote for social reforms. At any rate, the results showed the difficulty of the

Barresian political position: He had tried to build victory, like

Boulangism, based on a disgusted Left and Right. The Left might support his social reforms which were as advanced as those of Nicolas, but it distrusted the authoritarian politicsoof a presidential republic which would abandon anti-clericalism. The Right might support his politics and anti-Semitism, but it distrusted his social reforms and refusal to embrace clericalism. He could satisfy neither side. In earlier

58 Houdaille to Philippe Barrds, Mes Cahiers, II, 309. campaigns this had been blurred by the weakness of Barres as a cam­ paigner. In 1898 , however, he ran in a field of weak candidates. The

1898 campaign served to sharpen the dilemma. How could he build a vehicle capable of bringing victory for "nationalist socialism," if

Barres wanted to call it that, or at least for a nationalist social re­ public? CHAPTER VII

BARR&S AND THE NATIONALIST AND ANTI-DREYFUSARD LEAGUES (1898-1906)

In the period immediately following the 1898 campaign two things became clear about the political career of Barres. First, his political

ideas had become fairly-well fixed. They included his varied political

heritage: the presidential republic of Boulangisra, the Girondin Soc­

ialism of La Cocarde, the decentralization of the federalist campaign of

1895, and the nationalism of the 1898 campaign of Nancy. Second, his

view of how to win success for this program changed considerably. His

defeat of 1898, in which he was attacked from both Left and Right,

appeared to convince him that France was not ready for such a program. In

the years 1898-1901 he saw as his mission the building of a national con­

census for his program which would bridge the discontented of I

Right. The Dreyfus Affair in 1898-1899 at first appeared to provide

an opportunity for building such a concensus, because the A££alr spawned

a welter of nationalist and anti-Dreyfusard leagues. Unfortunately for

Barres, these leagues were often mutually antagonistic, even though their

members included old Boulangists. They had in common only their opposition

to the revision of the Dreyfus case. let, Barres moved among them,

especially the League of the Patrie franchise, the ■L'eague of Patriots,

and the Action fran^aise. hoping to find among them the vehicle for edu­

cating France to his position. His efforts, however, were doomed from

the beginning. While he eschewed politics in favor of education as the

prerequisite for electoral victory, the leagues wanted either immediate

political victory or education for a different program. Thus, the leagues 231 232 either rejected the Barresian program in favor of immediate purely anti- ministerial politics, or they twis ted the Barresian program to fit ends which Barres repudiated. By 1901, Barres was so disgusted with these manuvers that he retired from politics, even refusing to run for what would have been almost certain victory in 1902. In 1903 he did return to the political arena as a reluctant candidate in a Paris by-election.

Even then the leagues chose him only because they could find no other candidate capable of uniting them. In short, the yeats 1898-1903 saw

Barres trying to build a new Boulangism out of the Dreyfus Affair. But, there was no Boulanger. There were only Boulangists who operated in an environment which was different from the one of 1889*

I

By autumn, 1898, when Barres returned to Paris from a post-election trip to the south of France, the Dreyfus Affair was rapidly moving to its climax. This climax would encourage the formation of nationalist leagues and shppe.the direction of the politics of Barres and these leagues between 1898 and 1903. In August, 1898, the General Staff discovered that one of the major documents against Dreyfus, the very one that Godefroy

Cavaignac, the war minister, had read to the Chamber of Deputies in July to "prove" that Dreyfus was guilty, was a forgery. Its author, Major

Henry, was arrested and committed suicide in jail on August 31. Key figures in the War Office, including Cavaignac, whose Chamber speech was s till posted in every commune in France, promptly resigned. Revision now seemed inevitable. The Dreyfusard forces stepped up their campaign with 233 ever more frequent demonstrations, especially when the government moved troops into Paris to put down an outbreak of strikes. The Chamber re­ convened in October amid tumultous demonstrations. The Henri Brisson government was replaced by one headed by Charles Dupuy. On November 28,

Raymond Poincar^ told the Chamber that in 1894 the government had known only about the bordereau. By December, this announcement of Poincar^ had rallied many moderates to the cause of Dreyfus and Jaiures had won over most of the s o c ia lis ts . By e a rly 1899 the government ordered a new coufct martial for Dreyfus, which was held at Rennes in August and September, 1899.

As these developments unfolded, Barres was convinced that Dreyfus had become only a symbol for the Dreyfusard leaders to use for their own ends: for Joseph Reinach, to strike at anti-Semitism; for Francis de

Pressens^, to end military justice; for Jean Jaures, to destroy the array.

Kven with the declaration of Poincarl, Barres believed, the innocence of

Dreyfus was still only a hypothesis. Built or innocence be hanged, national interest was the only criterion and national interest demanded that the army be upheld.^ In such a state of mind, Barres willingly donated to the fund established by La Libre Parole to help Madame Henry sue Reinach 2 for accusing her husband of being the real traitor in the Dreyfus case.

Throughout 1899 Barres persisted in believing Dreyfus guilty and worried that a vast conspiracy was trying to free him. There was not one

^Maurice Barres, Scenes et doctrines du nationalisms (Paris, 1945)> I, 32-42 (Originally: "L'Etat de la question," Le Journal, October 4 j 1898 and "La raiso n nat:lonale," Le Journal. December 9, 1898.

^Joseph Reinach, Histoire de l 1 Affaire Dreyfus (Paris, 1901), IV, 442. piece of "evidence" against Dreyfus thao Barres mistrusted nor any testi­ mony in favor of Dreyfus that he accepted. At the cout martial in Rennes, for example, Barres was completely taken in by the testimony of Bertillon that the bordereau was Dreyfus1 , that of Lebrun-Renaud that Dreyfus had confessed at his degradation in 1894* and that of Cernusky that Dreyfus 3 was one of four spies in 1891. At the same time his blindness to the facts even made him dismiss all the testimony in favor of Dreyfus and be­ lieve that a "great plot" had been attempted by the Syndicate, led by

Joseph Reinach, to get samples of Esterhazy1s handwriting and frame him by getting him a position in the War Office.^ He was even victimized by the pseudo-scientific racism of his friend Jules Soury, a professor at 5 the Sorbonne who came to Rennes to advise him. Even after ©reyfus was freed, Barres contined to believe him guilty: He appeared innocent only because the War Office could not reveal all the proofs without risking war.

At the same time Dreyfus was only a "pretext" to divide and weaken France, to attack the army.^ When Dreyfus was finally exonerated in 1906, Barres told the Chamber of Deputies, "For twelve yeats.Dreyfus has been a traitor through a judicial truth. For twenty-four hours, through a new judicial truth, he is innocent. That is a great lesson, not of scepticism, but

■^Maurice Barres, "La Seizierae audience," "La Vingtieme audience," and "La Vingt-troisieme audience," Le Journal. August 26, September laand 5, 1899. ^Maurice B arres, "Le Cas de Georges G rosjean," ib id . (March 17, 1899) and exchange of letters between Barres and Reinach, ibid. (March 19, 1899).

^Maurice BarrSs, Mes Cahiers (Paris, 1929-1957), II, 117-121, 141-142. See also Jules Soury, Une Campagne nationalists (Paris, 1902), passim.

^"Interview de Maurice BarrSs," La Liberty (December 2, 1903), re­ printed in Barres, mes Cahiers. Ill, 155-159 and "Maurice Barres et l1affaire Dreyfus," L1Avant-Garde (December 6, 1903). 235 7 of relativism.... ”

As these events began after the discovery of the forgeries of Major

Henry, the anti-Dreyfusards became alarmed. To offset the rising tide in favor of revision, many groups and leagues were formed in late 1898 which would eventually attract Barres. One of these was the League of Patriots, that old Boulangist troop, which was revived by Paul Deroulede in September,

1898. To his voters in Gharente, who elected him to the Chamber in 1898, and to his leaguers, Dlroulede promised a revolution if necessary to re­ vise the constitution and stop the Dreyfusards. He assured his follewers

g that "the army will be our ally" to these ends. By October his forces were turning Dreyfusard rallies into riots and on October 25, when the

Chamber reconvened, his forces massed in the Place de la Concorde, with the intention of driving Brisson from office. In this effort Deroulede was accompanied by such old Boulangists as Georges Thi^baud, Lucien o Millevoye, Albert Gauthier de Clagny, and C£sar Paulin-M£ry. At the s a lle Chaynes on the avenue Wagram on December 10, leaguers and anarch ists scuffled outside while Deroulede went inside to argue against Anatole

France, Francis de Pressene^, and Paul Reclus. By this time the leaguer

Henri Galli' was convinced that Paris was in a "revolutionary fever,” but

"^Barres, Mes C ahiers, IV, 185.

^J£rome and Jean Tharaud, La Vie et la Mort de Deroulede (P a ris, 1925)> pp. 100-103j Barres, Mes Cahier3 . I , 260. Q "La Manifestation populaire,” Le Gaulois. October 26, 1898j Reinach, iv , 300- 302j 309 - 3 1 0, 330-334. the army would not go along.^ Barres participated in none of these ac­ tivities, but he did give them publicity in Le Journal. By February,

1899* however, Barres agreed that the coup d1£tat which the League of Pa­ triots wanted was possible because the people were really fed up. Yet, he did not think it probable.^ Moreover, revolution simply did. not whet his political appetite, at least not yet.

While few anti-Dreyfusards could agree with the way the League of

Patriots sought solutions in the street and in a coup, many like Barres did see that something was needed. In December, 1898, a "respectable" al­ ternative to the raucous, semi-revolutionary League of Patriots presented itself. Several young universitaires. led by Louis Dausset, Gabriel Syve- ton, and Henri Vaugeois, encouraged Barres, Franyois Copp6e, the poet, and Jules Lemaitre, the critic, to organize anti-Dreyfusard intellectuals against the Dreyfusard ones. Out of the discussions came the League of 12 the Patrie Francaise. These men, like Barres, had come to their posi­ tions, in spite of their attachment to Zola, when the Dreyfusards began attacking the army.^ By the first week of January, 1899, the new league issued a manifesto, eventually signed by several thousand, in support of the army, Franch traditions, and reconciliation. The point of the new league was to show that the Dreyfusards had no monopoly on intellectuals.^

^Barres, Scenes. I, 231-242 (Originally: "L'Anarchie de l'Estade Le Jo u rn al. December 23, 1898); Henri G a lli, "La P o litiq u e ," Le Drapeau. June 17, 1901; "Les M anifestations d 'h ie r ," Le G aulois. December 11, 1898.

^Maurice Barrfes, "Les Trois 6tapes," Le Journal. February 10, 1899 l^Barres, Scenes, I, 69-71 (Originally: "La Patrie Franyaise," Le Journal. January 2, &899); Reinach, IV, 500-505. ■^See, e sp ec ially the p o sitio n of Coppee in A rthur Meyer, Ge que .je peux d ire (P a ris, 1912), 246-247. ^"La Ligue de la Patrie Franyaise," Le Gaulois. January 4, 1899* 237 Moreover, the league made it quite clear that it was not like D£roul?de's organization. "It is not a group of revolutionaries,11 wrote Barres, 1 c "nor is it a herd of sheep which offer their necks to a gang of thieves."

Barres insisted that the members of the new league were "men of good will" and he welcomed all who would come to the league's support of the army.^^

The first rally of the "Patrie Francaise"on January 19 found Barres sharing the stage with such luminaries as Vincent d1 Indy, Albert borell, Arthur

Meyer, Jean Loui3 Forain, Fragois Coppfe, and Jules Lerna^tre in front of an audience which, in the words of Le Gaulois. was "correct"—no anar­

chists in caps, no long-haired estheses; rather a majority wearing the 17 red ribbons of the Legion of Honor. In the chief speech, Lema^tre insisted that the league believed in justice and would rather see a guilty man at large than an innocent one in jail, but that the nation should support the two courts martial and five war ministers who said Dreyfus was fuilty. Lemal^re argued that the league was against Dreyfus because it believed him guilty, * not because it was anti-Semitic or undemocratic. 18

However, the speech of Lema!ftre and the manifesto disquieted Barres. The part supporting the army was all right. As to the part supporting French traditions he asked, with Ernest Lavisse, "what traditions?" If it meant

reaction, Barres would have none of it: "No 'clericalism .1 Anti-clerical

15 Barres, Scenes. I, 72(0riginally: "La premiere * manifestation de la 'Patrie Franjaise'," ^e Journal, January 20, 1899)*

^Ibid. . I, 75 (Originally: "Ce que nous entendons par conciliation," Le Journal. February 3j 1899). 17 "La conference de M. Jules Lema$tre," La Oaulois, January 20, 1899.

13Ibid. and "La Ligue de la Patrie Franpaise," Le Temps. January 21, 1899. 238 and m ilitarist is what our government ought bo he.” 19 The worst of it was that the program of the "Patrie Francaise" was so vague. No one would spell out what was meant by tradition and reconciliation.

Although he was one.of the founders of the League of the "Patrie

Frangajse"and served on its steering committee, the vagueness of its pro­ gram caused Barres to turn to the League of Patriots when events shifted with the death of President Felix Faure in February, although a coup d1etat had been in the air for some time, Barres greeted Faure'a death 20 as a time for renewal, not revolution. On the day of the election of a successor to Faure, Barres wrote:

I do not speak of the more ardent who...treat the death of M. Faure as a "coup d1 etat by chance" and wish that it be the signal for the nomination of a "provisional government," evidently made up of a general, a popular for­ mer war minister, and several men designated by national clamor. I mention this as a sign of the times. I am not stopped by it. But, I confirm the unanimous desire that the future president, in order to p'ut an end to a woeful plot, be a man willing £(j> use the widest powers that the Constitution gives him.

As Barres wrote those lines, however, Deroulede had decided to use the death of Faure to overthrow the republic, and he won the support of

Barres for his scheme. Barres had not been an associate of the League of

Patriots, He had not been in Paris during the disturbances of the pre­ vious autumn, when the league hoped to convince the army that it was its

^Barres, Mes Cahiers, II, 91-92.

20 Maurice Barres, "A demain la Politique," La Journal. February 17* 1899. “^Maurice Barres, "Ce qu'on attend," ibid. > February 18, 1899 and "Commentaire sur une Declaration de la 'Patrie Franyaise*," ibid., February 20, 1899* 239 civilian arm* Nor had Barres attended the big rally of the League of 22 Patriots at Saint-Cloud on January 22, However, he did have a great friendship for tf&roulede and supported D^rbm-tede' s desire for a presiden­ tial republic, if not his willingness to use force to attain that goal.

With the death of Faure, Deroulede returned to Paris amid the frenzied cries of his leaguers, "A la ^lys£e!" "That says nothing to you?,"

Georges Thiebaud asked Deroulede. On January IB, after his leaguers had hooted the new President Emile Loubet through:the streets of Paris with cries of "Panama," Deroulede promised action for the 23rd, the day of the fu n era l o f Faure. The b asic plan o f Deroulede was to g et the army to lead the League of Patriots to the Llysle and the Hotel de Ville, overthrow the regime, and establish a provisional government. Deroulede was convinced that he had the support of the royalist General Pellieux 23 and, perhaps, several members of the Dupuy government. Yet, hardly any of this plan was firm. Placards, in the fashion of December 2, 1851, were printed to proclaim the overthrow of the parliamentary republic, pi but the place for the official signatures remained blank, A royalist

"plot" operated simultaeously, but Marcel Habert, the chief lientenant of Ddroul&de, swore that he personally would arrest the Count of Paris if he showed up, while Deroulede insisted that his conspiratorial general

Op "Les C£r£monies d'hier," Le Gauiois, January 23, 1899*

^Tharaud, pp. 114-117, Barres, Scenes. I, 242—262j "Les Manifestations d*hier," Le Temps, February 25, 1899» In Mes Cahiers. II, 96, Barres presented at the time and without comment this list of real or imagined plotters: "[General] Chanoine (60,000). (Formellement) [General] Pellieux (D€toum6par Cavaignac) [General] Roget. [General] Jamontj [Paul] Des- chanel, [ex-war minister, Godefory] Cavaignac, Deroulede."

^ B arres, Scenes. I, 259 • 240 had to be a Cromwell* not a Monk. 25 The plot was virtually a public affair with the leaguers being notified of their rendezvous by cartes pneumaticiues, many of which fell into the handsjo’fl.fche police.^0

However, the p lo t was firm enough to win the support of Barres who believed now that the -league of Patriots’ action of the past six months had really won the allegience of the army. After a rally on February 21, the day of the funeral came. ^Barres had lunch with Deroulede and his leaguers. Together they want to the Place de la Nation where they were to intercept the troops returning from the Fere Lachaise cemetary. As they went, Deroulede assured Barres that victory would be theirs. "What

convinces me to join your attempt,11 replied Barres,i"is my certainty that 27 if we do not succeed, we will begin it again." When the troops arrived, they were not led by Pellieux, who had had himself replaced, but by

General Roget. Deroulede, still flanked by Barres and others, grabbed the bridle of the general’s hose and unsuccessfully tried to engage him in

the "plot." Deroulede and Habert continued to plead with him all the way

to the barracks at Reuilly where the gates were closed behind them and

they were arrested. Other groups, both republican and royalist, waited

throughout Paris for the never-to-materialize coup, hoping to take advantage

of it for their own ends. Even Gervaize, the opponent of Barres at Nancy

in 1898, waited with old Boulangists Millevoye and Le Senne. By28 May,

^Barres, Mes Cahiers. II, 147-148. 26 Jacquep Chastenet, La Rlpublique triomphante, 1893-1906 (Paris, 1955), p. 162. ^Barres, Scenes, I, 249.

Le Temps, February 25, 1899. 241 Deroulede and Habert were tried and acquitted. They remained the toast of Parisian nationalists and continued into the summer hatching new plots.

II

As Barres saw it in 1999 these two leagues—the League of the Patrie

Francaise and the league of Patriots—were to play a complementary role.

The Patrie Francaise was "to analyse the deep causes of this anar.chy

[i.e. the split in France which had created so many Dreyfusards], to dis­ sipate that which mingles gloom with the ardor of patriots, to restore complete nobility and intellectual force to that spiritual state which the simpleBiinded (yes, the pedants of the demi-culture) flout under the name of chauvinism, and finally to double the enthusiasm of the masses through the affirmation of these principles." The Patrie Francaise was not to engage in politics or in street action. That was to be the role of the

League of Patriots. The league of Patriots, wrote Barres, "has an excellent political program which pursues the fortification of the Executive through the plebiscite, the renunciation of parliamentarianism while maintaining the representative system, and the erection of an expedient [i.e. a coup] for ending the existing anarchy if no regular way is able to dr^w us into 29 i t . " The P a trie Francaise was to reconcile Frenchmen to eqch other.

"After that," wrote Barres, "it is necessary to proceed through stages.

^Barres, Scenes. I, 106-107. This is a combination of two articles in Le Jo u rn al! "Les deux ligues" o f July 29, 1899 and "L1 Oeuvre des ligues of December 8, 1899. 242 Fortify the executive. Renounce parliamentarianism. Accept an expedient

(Caesar)."^

In other words, Barres saw these two leagues as the complementary agents for winning France to his brand of nationalism. By the end of

1901, however, this hope had been shattered, and Barres withdrew from politics. The trouble was that the League of the Patrie Francaise could not convert its enormous membership from anti-Dreyl'ussardism to anything as precise and narrow as the nationalism of Barr&s. Inevitably the league turned to the only action its amirpjious membership, would support, namely, mere opposition to the Waldeck-housseau ministry which freed Dreyfus and attacked the anti-Dreyfusard sentiment in the army and church. Moreover, the action was political, which Barres had not wanted, and antiministerial when Barres wanted anti-parliamentaianism. In its turn, the antiparliam mentary regime with either a coup or a popular outcry. In his disappoint­ ment with the failure of these two leagues to achive his aims, Barres toyed with other leagues between 1899 and 1901 only to be still further disappointed.

The association of Barres with the League of the Patrie Francaise bore thi3 out. For Barres, the anti-Dreyfusard orientation of the league was not enough, and he sought to win it to his own nationalist program of decentralization. In a speech he intended to make to the league on

March 10, 1899, Barres insisted that the furor over Dreyfus only illustrated that France was Qlssoci^e and d£o£rdbr£e» had become so divided that it

■^Barres, Mes Cahiers 1 II, 92. 243 had lost its sense of direction. The trouble was that men had come to

study problems from a position of abstract philosophical systems. By so

doing, they had become uprooted. To find their roots, they needed to

abandon metaphysics in favor of histoiy, seek answers in their peculiar

traditions and localities, substitute the relative for the abstract. The

job of the League of the ^atrie Franchise, Barres believed, was to bring

France together again and help her find her sense of direction. Barres

paw this as a process of reconciliation. He believed it was already at

work in the league’s membership, itself, a membership which had been able

to bring together such diverse men as Deroulede and Lema'itre, He also

urged the league to sponser religious reconciliation and, most particularly,

to reconcile Frenchmen with their dead and their soil. By the dead, he meant the restoration of man’s sense of their history, the uniqueness of

their nation and its traditions, the recognition that "truth," like

everything else, was relative. This last meant that men needed to look

for French truth rather than absolute truth or German or Bnglish tx-uth. To

facilitate this, Barres asked for stiffer naturalization laws, for only

the second or third generation immigrant was rooted enough in the French

dead to be trusted with full citizenship. By the soil, Bari’es meant a

regionalist organization for France. *'he dead could transmit their her­

itage only by being rooted in a particular piece of France. Both a feeling

of ancestry and place were necessary to give men roots. A centralized

France had destroyed the ability of localities to do this. A man could

never learn loyalty to the nation without first learning a regional loyalty.

The regions needed to be strengthened so that men would have some reason to 2LL be loyal to them. In particular, Bqrres urged enough autonomy for regions

to cope with the educational and social problems peculiar to them, be

made it quite cleqr that by regionalism and traditionalism he did not mean

the monarchical tradition. He was aware that "the conditions of democratic

(alas, plutocratic) and industrial France differ from the conditions of

monarchical France." His very need to say such words revealed how Rightist

hi3 former socialist nationalism had become.31

Barres further rounded out his "Patrie Francaisenpror.ram with a con­

ference on Alsace-Lorraine on December 12, 1899. In it, he insisted that

in Alsace-Lorraine there were persistent undercurrents of hostility to

Germany and love fo r France. Germany, he argued, had had tro u b le with

the pro-French church and deputies elected to the Reichstag. French culture

persisted. French continued to be spoken privately and taught to children.

However, the argument of Barres was not belicosely revanchist. He simply

urged that France continue to view the lost provinces as part of France, 32 so as not to betray their trust for France.

However, the efforts of Barres to win the Patrie Frangaise to his

_ ^-program came to nothing. At its rallies Lema'Jtre consistantly made the

vague pronouncements he had expressed at the initial meeting: the nation

Barres, Scenes. I, 71-99• This is an Altered form of an article, "Ce que nous entendons par conciliation," Le Journal. February 3> 1899* and a speech Barres had intended to deliver to the "Patrie Francaise11 on March 10, 1899. ~^Ibid. « II, 3-29 and Tallemont, "Conference de Maurice Barres alia •Patrie Fran?aise’ ," Le Journal, December 12, 1899. a brief summary of BarrSfe'8 views, see: "L1 Actuality, Alsace-Lorraine," fae Drapeau, July 12, 1901. 245 needed to be strong, love the array, and respect dissent, but the league should not become political. 33 The league retained the same wide member­ ship, extending from the followers of Rochefort and D£roul63e to respect­ able Progressistes and royalists. Barres was exasperated at this lack of O. doctrine. He was particularly put out when his conference on the "dead and the Soil," scheduled for March 10, 1899* was cancelled by Lema£tre for fear of the governmental crackdowns which followed the attempted coup of D^roulede. In public letters Barres admitted he did not enjoy making speeches, but he scolded Lemaftre for making the league appear weak after having told it in January that it would be an organization of action. Dausset and Lenaiitre replied, in letters just as sharp afc that of Barres, that the conference had been cancelled out of prudence, not tim id ity .^

The League of the Patrie Francaise did persevere, but with a shift to political action which Barres, who had wanted the league to stay out of politics, at first supported. By autumn, 1899* Barres thought that the adhesion of General Mercier to nationalist politics, in a successful senatorial campaign, might bring new life to nationalism.' In January,

33 "Une conference de M. Jules Lemaftre," Le Temps. November 15 > 1899; "Le banquet de la Patrie Franpaise," ibid., January 16, 1900 ; Henry Jar- zuel, "L*Anniversaire de la Patrie Franpaise," Le Gaulois. January 15, 1900.

^Barres, Mes Cahiers, II, 93-94*

■^"A la Ligue de la Patrie Franpaise," Le Gaulois. March 11, 1899; "Les A ffaires des lig u e s," Le Temps, March 12, 1899; "La Ligue de la Patrie Franpaise," ibid., March 13* 1899*

■^Maurice Barres, "La Candidature du General Mercier," Le Journal, December 7* 1899. 246

1900, Barres, Galli, and Syyeton toured eastern France to establish local chapters of the Patrie Francaise. They were greeted by large crowds, but as usual their nets caught a great variety of fish, Barres even wrote a 'Vriendly letter to his old energy, L£on Goulette, asking for his adhesion to the Nancy chapter. The crowd at Saint Di^,chaired by the brother of General Mercier, cheered both Jules Ferry and D^roulede. At

Saint-Di£ Syveton, who was closer to the ideas of Barres than were most of the league's leaders, urged the formation of a Nationalist Party which would work for constitutional revision. 37 Indeed, the Patrie Francaise did materialize as a political party after the municipal elections of

Paris in 1900, Barres participated with Lema^tre, Rochefort, Drumont,

Dausset, Syveton, and Galli in a meeting on May 1, 1901, to draw up a list of candidates for the legislative elections of 1902 at Paris# Barres was to get the first arrondissement. but the list ran from conservatives to

Radicals to socialists. It included old Boulangists like Paulin-M^ry,

Gabriel, Millevoye, and Ernest Roche, but not Goussot or Pierre Richard, two old Boulangists who still represented Parisian constituencies. Yet,39 for the most part, Barres remained silent on this transformation of the

League of the Patrie Francaise into a political party, for it ran so obviously against his original intentions for the league. He grew most

■^Barres, Mes Cahiers. II, 164-165; "En Province: La 'Patrie Francaise' en Lorraine," Le Gaulois. January 30> 1900; Maurice Barres "une nouvelle £tape de la 'Patrie Franpaise'," Le Journal. February 1, 1900.

■^D.R. Watson, "The Nationalist Movement in Paris, 1900-1906," St. ftnthony's Papers Number 13: The Right in France. 1890-1919 (Carbondale, Illinois, 1962), pp. 6l-76.

•^Barres, Mes Cahiers. II, 207-208. exasperated with the lack of nationalist fervor shown by his fellow leaguers.

On the way to a league rally at Dombasle, Franpois de Mahy, a very res­ pectable republican deputy on the Fatrie Franpaise central committee* s4£d::.

to him, "What I will never forgive in Ddroulede is that he was not successful.

Yet, an hour later at the rally, he aittacked illegal methods. A year later Barrfee wrote, "Will it come about that our Nationalists v.'ill do the

same thing as our Opportunists? In fact, r^y friend Dausset is a M ^linist."^

The Patrie Francaise was obviously too flabby in doctrine, and the efforts of Barres to give it one had failed. Even Lema^tre admitted that the league was united only by sentiment, only an anti-Dreyfusard one at that, and not by a program which did not exist.

As the League of the Patrie Francaise increasingly failed to meet his expectations, Barres veered closer to the League of Patriots. At the end of May, 1899, he testified at the trial of Deroulede for his attempted

coup at Reuilly, sang his praises after the acquital, and joined in the victory dinner with members of the League of Patriots, Copple, and j 2 Syveton.4 When the new V/aldeck-Rousseau ministry re-arrested Deroulede

in August for continuing his conspiracies and brought him before the

Senate as a High Court, Barres again leaped to his defense. The Senate wanted to send Deroulede to Noumea, barr£5 cried, so that the kaiser could

come to the Exposition of 1900 "in ail tranquility." "Yes, we are all

^°Ib ld . . I I , 200 and 250.

^Jarzuel, "l1 Anniversaire," Le Paulo is. January 15, 1900.

^"L* Affaire Deroulede et Marcel Habert," ibid. (May 31 and June 1, 1899); Maurice Barres, "Ah! les braves gens," Le Journal, June 2, 1899* 248 criminals, and [D^roulede] in the first rank, if it is a crime to af­ firm our mistrust of parliamentary corruption and our fraternity in the national conscience." "I am not one of those," Barres concluded, "who will let his name or his task fall."^ Barres testified at the second tria l of D^roulede and Habert, after which they were exiled along with some royalist leaders. D^roulede and nabert then took up residence at

San Sebastian in northern Spain, but the back of the ^eague of Patriots was broken. Barres continued his praise of the league. He traveled to

San Sebastian in August, 1900, and February, 1901, to hear D&roulede denounce the "traitor," Pellieux, and the royalists who tried to capture control of the coup.^ In this last visit Barres served as a second in a duel between D^roulede and Andr£ Buffet, the exiled leader of the royalist conspirators.

By the time of this meeting Barres was disgusted enough frith the lack of doctrine in the League of the Pratrie Frangaise that he joined the cause of the League of Patriots. He showed his mood in this period with:

"I have still reflected that in the deepest part of my soul I approved the sinister murderers of ’93. Not at all, great God, for their acts, but for their elan. They were not moderates. And when I condemn in out

M llinist party all supporters of parliamentariansim, am I not with

Robespierre?"^ After that, it was easy for Barres to agree to take over

I Q Maurice Barres, "Une oeuvre de haine," Le Journal. September 18, 1899.

^Maurice Barres, "La haute sagesse d1 un Paul Dlroulede," ibid., March 8, 1900; Barres, Mes Cahiers. II, 147-148 and 200-201.

^Ibid.. II, 202. 249 the newspaper of the League of Patriots, Le Draueau, turn it into a daily, and act as its editor-in-chief.^* Barres offered to the readers of Le Drapeau his usual mixture of Left and {tight: old Boulangists like

Thi^baud, Le H£riss£, and Dumonteil; "Patrie Francaise11 people like Copp^e

and Quesnay de Beaurepaire who, in 1889, had headed the High Court pro­

ceedings against Boulanger and Kochefortj Rightist literary figures like

Gyp, Maurice Taimyr, and Georges d’Esparbes; and Leftists like Balliere

I r% and Foursin. The purpose of Le Drapeau. he insisted on several oc­

casions, was to be the "dais" for the twenty-two nationalist municipal

councilers of Paris and D^roulede and Habert and the voice of the League

of Patriots, which Barres called "the fever of France." This fever, he Id went on, would save France with the anti-parliamentary formula." For

the most part, the articles of Barres in Le Drapeau were only warmed-over

versions of his earlier arguments against Dreyfus, parliamentary corruption,

and sftns patrie socialism. They were in favor of stiffer naturalization

laws, Alsace-Lorraine, and the plebiscitist and presidential republic.

Although Barres and Dlroulede were as one man on policy, the League

of Patriots was not the effective instrument Barres hope it would be.

To be sure D&roul§de accepted the Barresian notion that decentralization, with its non-revolutionary and anti-collectivist social transformation,

would strengthen French nationalism by giving the people roots.^ To be

^Tharaud, 144-145 and Barres, Mes Cahiers. II, 338*

^Maurice Barres, "T.Le Drapeau1," Le Drapeau. May 11, 1901.

"Reunion des patriotes," ibid. , May 24, 1901 and Barres, Scenes, I, 286-288.

^Andre Blondet, "Contre le dlracinement," Le Drapeau, May 16, 1901. 250 sure Barres made it quite obvious that he believed the league to be the most effective nationalist troop for rallying the nation to the decen­ tralized presidential republic and greater concern for Alsace-Lorraine, even though he did not formally join the league. 50 Yet, the League of

Patriots was not really effective. The exile of D^roulede and Habert had left it rudderless. It was so much the personal vehicle for D^roulede that it could not widen its membership and absorb other nationalists.

Indeed, Le Drapeau had been founded as a daily because Deroulede could not get along with other nationalist leaders who closed their newspapers to

him. Eventually, it even had to give up its daily edition for lack of

readersThe declining appeal of the league was also illustrated by its

lack of success in its march in 1901 to the Statue of Strasbourg in the

Place de la Concorde on Bastille Day, certainly the most important annaul

demonstration of the League of Patriots. In spite of an extra-vigorous

appeal through its daily newspaper and rallies, the march was no larger

than usual with only 1000 participants. 52

In these same years, 1899-1901, Barres hedged his bets by making

contact with other leagues, principally the Action Francaise,, This league

had been founded by Maruice Pujo and Henri. Vaugeois as early as the spring

of 1898. Both men also had helped found the League of the Patrie Francaise.

although they soon concluded that it was too weak. On the other hand, the

Patrie Francaise thought that the Action Francaise was going too fast.

50See especially the speech of Barres % at the rally of the League of Patriots on July 14* 1901, reprinted in Barres, Scenes. I, 286-288.

51Tharaud, 144-145. 5?"Menus propos: A la statue de Strasbourg," Le Temps. July 14, 1901. 251 By 1899 one of its founders, Charles Maurras, won the support of Barres for an Action Francaise publication v/hich would have socialist a.nd na­ tionalist overtones. By June 20, the new league staged its first big public rally, chaired by de Mahy of the "Patrie Francaise11. but without the presence of Barres, The meeting hed all the appearances of a

Derouledist rally, Vaugeois claimed to want an organization which would be more "active" and "audacious" than the P a trie Francaise. but th is activism and the Derouledist quality disquieted de Mahy who soon disowned the new league.^

The first real association of Barres with the Action Francaise came as a result of an article he published in October, 1399* It called for the creation of a nationalist, doctrine and a publication of propaganda

similar to that of la Revue blanche! which publicized Dreyfusard doctrine.

Only by doing this, said Barres, could the nationalist movement avoid the pit.fall of Boulangism which had had power but no doctrine.^ The Action

Francaise immediately offered the services of its review to publicize the

BarrSs doctrine of "the soil and the dead" so that nationalism could unite the individual with society and bring together divergent classes with their differing religious, political, and economic views. 55 To this end, La Revue de 1*Action Francaise rep rin ted many o f the speeches and

53Eugen Weber, Action Francaise; Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth Century France (Stanford, 1962), pp. 13-23; "L1 Action Francaise," Le G aulois, June 21, 1899 j Le Temps. June 23, 1399*

^BarrSs, Scenes. I, 101-103 (Originally: "P Education national!ste," Le Journal. October 30, 1899).

^Ibid., I, 103-105. A reprint from La Revue de l1 Action Francaise. November 15, 1899» 252 writings of Barres, who occasionally v.'rote a new article for it. The league arranged two dinners in honor of Barres in 1900 and 1901 around the theme of his novel on Boulangism, L* Appel au soldat. Barres also spoke at the second anniversary of the Action Francaise on June 15* 1901.

Throughout, he hoped that the new league would serve as a "laboratory" in nationalist education and studies,, 56

The hopes of Barres for the Action Francaise proved to be ill-founded, however, and the new league was nothing but a source of embarrassment for him. A minor episode of this grew out bf a response he had made to a survey of the Action Francaise on whether or not the Protestant spirit v.'as changing French letters, politics, and morals. On the whole the responses were highly inflamatory in their anti-Protestantismo In his response

Barres was most pleased that Due "ntoine had "cut to pieces" the Protestant forces of Lorraine in 1525* "If the Protestant bands had triumphed, the destinies of Lorraine would have been oriented toward Oermany." Leon57

Bourgeois, a former friend of Barres, used these responses in a speech to show how they incited religious warfare. In an exchange of letters with

Barres he wrote, "I rose up against the writers who would like to destroy those who do not think as they dol" 58 It took Barres» two articles to admit that he really did not want to "murder the Protestants," some of whom were

^Ibid. . I, 109 and 126. For a brief account of the association of BarrSs with the Action Francaise. see W. M. Frohock, "Maurice Barres1 Collaboration with the Action Franjaise," Romanic Review. XXIX (1938), 167-169. ^ fievue de I1Action Francaise. May 15, 1900, pp. 850-852. 58 % L6on Bourgeois, "Pour M. Maurice Barres," Le Journal. J\jne 29, 1900, good nationalists and close friends. He had only wanted t.o show his thanks that Lorraine had remained French and Catholic and his fear that the

U n iversite. was too influenced by P ro testan tism . 5°

However, the greatest embarrassment of the Action Frqngaise to

Barres was its growing royalism. By December, 1900, Charles Maunras, through his Enqu^te sur la Monarchie. had won control of the league and replaced the republicans on its central committee with royalists.^ The thought that anyone in modem France could be monarchist, as both Maurras 6 1 and Bourget were, at first puzzled Barres. Finally, he looked on it as perfectly ridiculous. Maurras, Barres believed, fell into the same trap that the "intellectuals" and socialists did: they placed their faith in utopian solutions based on abstract reasoning. ~ He wrote this to

Maurras in the summer of 1900 adding that there was no royalist pretender who could win the hearts of republican France nor was there an aristocracy L q which could sustain a king. ^hen Bourget remarked to him, "What do we owe France? Nothing. Everything to the Bourbons," Barres replied: "What do we owe the royal family? Nothing. Everything to France, to its culture."^ As late as 1901 Barres still was close enough to the Action

59 Maruice B arres, "Pour M. L£on B ourgeois," and "Les Aveux de M. Leon Bourgeois," ib id . . June 28 and 30, 1900.

^W'eber, pp. 2 6 -3 0

^Barres, Mes Cahiers, II, 159—160 and 162. A p I b id ., I I , 177-178 and "Discours de -Maurice Barres pour l 1 anniver- saire de I1Action Franjaise1 (15 juin 1901)," Scenes, I, 131.

^Barres, Mes Cahiers. II, 291-293* Francaise to give it two speeches, apparently still hoping to hold it to nationalism. While he admitted that "it is not at all perfect," he added th a t the league s t i l l had some republican members. Besides, according to Barres, he was not the only republican to retain contacts with what was to all purposes a royalist league. After his June 15,

1901, speech he said to Vaugeois, "Let us dine together, I want to object to your royalist chimera," Vaugeois replied, "No, I am.,gdigg,bo dine with [Arthur] Ranc," the Dreyfusard senator. However, once the

Action Francaise turned monarchist, its break with Barres was inevitable,

Barres made no more contributions to it3 review after 1902, for the league was lost to republican nationalism. "Maurras is able to convince others,"

Barres wrote in 190p. "That does not prove that he possesses truth; 66 it only proves that he is persuasive."

65 Maurice Barres, "Ranc, garde&vous," 1 A Drapeau, June 17, 1901.

^Barres, Mes Cahiers. Ill, 136. 255

III

By late 1901 it became obvious to Barres that the leagues had

fai]ed to live up to his expectations* Indeed, he so completely lost his hope for the entire cause of nationalism that he retired from politics. Yet by 1902 he had changed his mind and returned to fight harder than he ever had before in one last attempt to breathe life into the nationalist move­ ment. This try saw him rise to the height of his political form only to

fail again.

Plenty of straw s in the wind indicated how weak and disun.ified the n a tio n a lis t movement was by the summer o f 1901. As e arly as February

Barres had observed that the nationalist involvement in politics, and by

implication the League of the Patrie Francaise in particular, threatened

to water down nationalist doctrine, and through ill-timed electoral de­

feats, destroy the movement's ability to do its proper job in educating the Lrj public to nationalism. In June, the flabbiness of the nationalist troops was illustrated when three Parisian municipal councilors, elected in 1900 under the auspices of the League of the Patrie Frangaise, broke vfith their

fellow nationalists and abstained in a vote which thrust the socialist

Adrien Veber into the council presidency. Barres, Deroulede, and Lemaltre

all attacked them as traito rs.^ Yet, the nationalist movement was so pa­

te n tly weak th a t i t needed every possible member, even the fa in t-h e a rte d .

Within a month the three "traitors" were back in the fold, sharing the

stage at a League of Patriots rally in preparation for the march on July 14

try Barres, Scenes, I, 126. Comment in his second "Appel au soldat" dinner (February 7> 1901). 68 Various articles, Drapeau, June 13 and 14j 1901. 256

1901 to the statue of Strasbourg.69 In July, the broadness of membership, which in the mind of Barres had curtailed the effectiveness of the league of the Patrie Francaise, was illustrated when Alfred Rambaud., an ex-minister of education who had been writing nationalist articles for Le Matin, resigned from the central committee of the league because its chapter in Saint Di£ had condemned Charles Ferry, Barres welcomed the withdrawal:

In great national crises, when the country is divided into two armies in which each obeys its faith and temperament, the vot­ ers naturally rally to the more frank and decided men. There are parliamentarians and antiparliamentarians; there are those who are enchanted with the Constitution of 1875 and those who disown it; there is France and the foreigner.

Barres concluded that the chapter of Saint Die had made a real service to 70 true nationalism by prompting the resignation of Rambaud. Another il­ lustration of nationalist disunity was the reception given the plan for constitutional revision set forth by Charles Benoist, a Progressists na­ tionalist, who wanted the 3000 councilors-general to elect the president.

Thi^baud, in a position Barres certainly shared, rejected this kind of fuzzy nationalist thinking as providing no improvement on the existing system.71

Add to this the poor showing of the League of Patriots on July 14, 1901, the

circulation difficulties of Le Drapeau, the growing anti-ministerialism of the League of the Patrie Francaise, and the emerging royalism of the Action

Francaise, it was obvious that the nationalist movement was without disci­ pline, doctrine, or numbers.

With full knowledge of this, Barres left Paris for Charmes because

^"La Reunion de la rue d'Athenes," ibid., July 12, 1901.

^Maurice Barres, "Les patriots haissent l%tuivoque,w ibid., July 24, 1901.

"^Georges Thi^baud, "Le 'Plebiscite filtr e '," ibid. , July 2't> 1901. 257 of the death of his mother, and from Charmes he suddenly announced his re­ tirement from politics. The announcement was not made through the national- ist press, not even Le Drapeau. but through Ie Figaro. In it, Barres stated that his mother had always opposed his political involvement and, in a time 72 . . of mourning for her, he had decided to return to his art. Deroulede and

Habert were thunderstruck. Deroulede even had to learn of the retirement 73 through Le Figaro. Habert argued that the stench of politics drove Barres out. When Le Drapeau was given to Barres, he added, the League of Fatriots thought that it had an “excellent captain11 for its ship, "but we had not counted on sea-sickness." Barres iust could not take the storms, the smell of gunpowder, and the pounding noise of cannonades which the "daily naviga­ tion" o f Le Drapeau demanded. "Seduced for an in stan t by the great specta­ cles and tragic scenes of national life, which he had retraced in admirable pages, he experiences dreadful nausea from smelling at too close a range the underside of politics .... He goes to find in the republic of let- 7 L ters the pure air which he can no longer breathe in the republic of men."*

The explanations of both Barres and Habert contained grains of truth.

The entries in Mes Cahiers which Barres wrote on his mother’s table, bore out his version. As he thought through her life and influence on him he got

"a vague sentiment of wasting. It was the first glimmer of what myreason a

few days later formulated for me: since I was she [i.e. his mother], I did not have the right to waste myself." That sentiment kept recurring: "Since

72 * Andr6 Maurel, "Retraite de Maurice Barres," Le Figaro, Sep­ tember, 13, 1901 .

^Paul Deroulede, "Lettre de Paul Deroulede a Maurice Barres," Le Drapeau, September 15, 1901.

"^Marcel Habert, "Tribune des Proscrits," ibid., September 18, 1901. 258

I was she, I did not have the right, to waste myself. My retirement. Retire- 75 ment from politics." On the other hand, events in 1901 and I? 02 substan­ tiated the implication of Habert that Barres retired from politics because the n a tio n a lis t movement v/as turning 3our. The nationalist withdrawals of the summer of 1901 were only a prelude to what was to come. In October, when the League of the Patrie Frangaise decided to present candidates for the legislative elections of 1902, Barres resigned from its central committee.

He did so not only because he had wanted that league to serve as a national­ ist shaper of public opinion, but because, as evinced by its candidates, the league had abandoned nationalism in favor of antiministerialism. It was fine, wrote Barres early in 1902, for the league to disown the Waldeck-

Millerand-Andre ministry, but in its desire for a Ribot-Meline ministry it was simply backing "the other side of the same coin." Instead of supporting ar.tiministerials, said Barres, the league should support, only antiparlia­ mentarians. ^

When the legislative elections of April, 1902, were over and the

League of the Patrie Francaise had, indeed, brought victory under its aegis for a group of predominately anti-ministerial Progressistes and conservatives,

Barres returned to politics with a vigor he had not shown since 1898. It was not enough for so-called nationalists to be anti-ministerial and get rid of

Waldeck-Rousseau, Barres vjrote in the first of a series of articles in La

Patrie of Lucien Millevoye, an old Boulangist.. They must also be anti-par- liaraentary. The proposed prime ministers which the anti-m inisterials pre­ ferred were just as bad as Waldeck-Rousseau:

^Barres, Mes Cahiers, II, 227 and 228. See also 221-228„ 76 % Barres, Scenes. I, 100-101. This was written in January, 1902. 259

Nationalists know that Rouvier is a chequard: that Ribot, after having tried to throttle the chqquard Rouvier, nursed him and dressed and cured h is w o u n d sjth a t Moline never had a word to condemn the embezzlers, but only words to attack the accusers. When the beast is mangy, the mange is in all the hairs. Moline, Ribot, Rouvier, and Waldeck-Rousseau are hairs of the same beast. The anti-parliamentary scoffs at the antiministeria] who wants to sort the hairs.

Barres concluded that the nationalists had to sustain the original flag of nationalism, anti-parliamentarianism, for the parliamentary system corrupted

r ir y everyone it touched. Barres singled out Lemaitre as the prime mover of the antiminister.ial turn of nationalism. By writing with the Melin.ists, Le- maitre had brought the triumph of Pro^ressistes instead of nationalists. Tfre old Opportunists had called themselves Pro;7;ressistes when Opportunism was no longer popular and had posed as nationalists when even Progressisme became bankrupt. While their conversion apjjeared to strengthen nationalism, they had only weakened i t by taking i t over and watering i t down. Had the na­ tion lists adhered to their principles, not as many would have been elected, but we "would have a group conscious of itself, inspired with its work, doc­ trine, and future." They would be a group willing to speak forcefully for the antiparliamentary principles of nationalism instead of becoming part of 78 an amorphous band of flabby antim inisterials.

Barres continued throughout the year this line of attack in La. Patrie, which, with the demise of Le. Drapeau, was the only major plebiscitist news­ paper open to him. Nor was he alone in his position. The groups around

Syveton, now virtually in control of the League of the Patrie Frangaise,

Rochefort, the League of Patriots, and Millevoye were of this opinion. These nn Maurice Barres, "Ne changeons point notre Drapeau," La Patrie, June 13, 1902.

^Maurice Barr&s, "II faut * decoller*," ibid., June 27, 1902. See also: Maurice Barres, "II y a une litterature nationalists," Le Gaulois, July 16, 1902. 260

men were ardent enough even to want a counter-demonstration on the day o f

Zola's funeral in October, but they were over-ruled by the nationalist 79 deputies. On November 13, Lemattre finally came out for the presidential BO republic in a speech which split the League of the Patrie Frangaise.

Emile Massard, the director of La Patrie and a spokesman for Deroulede,

praised the speech for beinging the Patrie Frangaise to "the program of the B 1 * League o f P atriots in what is the most e s s e n tia." l 0 Barre3 welcomed the

adhesion of the League of the Patrie Frangaise to the principle of a popu­

larly elected president and only wished that it would remove any fears of 82 caesarisra by also supporting h is decen tralization program. However, the

Lemaltre speech was not received with undivided approval by the nationalist

bloc. When it was opposed by the groups surrounding Paul Oassagnac, Cavaig-

nac, and George Grosjean, Le Temps rejoiced that the "Patrie Frangai.se" had go become a "tower of Babel."

The sharpening o f the League o f the Patrie Frangaise and the renewed

political vigor of Barres thrust him into a new electoral canifjaign. It came

with the death in December, 1902 of Daniel Cloutier, the nationalist deputy

who had represented the Parisian quarters of Saint Gervaise and Arsenal in

|tb e fourth arrondissement. Any n a tio n a list campaign there promised to be

difficult. In 1902 Cloutier, a leader in both-the League of Patriots and

the Patrie Frangaise. had beaten a formidable socialist, Gabriel Deville,

"^Barres, Mes Cahiers, III, 50-51.

G. P." "Les Assises du Nationalisms," Le Gaulois, November 13, 1902.

^^Emile Massard, "Bloc contre Bloc," la P atrie, November 19+, 1902.

8 ? ■» 'Maurice Barres, "L'Histoire ne se recommence pas," ibid., November 21, 1902 and Mes Cahiers, III, 37^38.

®^"Le P arti sans nom," Le Temps, November 16, 1902 and Charles Demailly, "A travers la presse," Le Gauloia, November 14, 1902. by 450 votes only by picking up scattered socialist votes on the second ballot: On the first ballot the nationalists had 500 fewer votes than the 8/ socialist candidates. * Arsenal was a nationalist stronghold which sent

Henri Galli to the city council, but there was a heavy socialist vote in

Saint-Gervaise. On the credit side for Barres was the fact that he was the only nationalist candidate, an advantage Cloutier had not had. Barres got letters of indorsement from Lemaltre, Rochefort, Drumont ajid U&oulede and the groups they represented, principally the Patrie Francaise. the Nation­

a l i s t and S o c ia lis t Republican Committee of the arrondissement, and the

League of Patriots. Indeed, it was to preserve nationalist unity that he

even consented to run. He had turned down a candidature in 1902 to stay

with his writing. Now, a victory for nationalism seemed essential to Bar­

res. This was the first by-election since 1902 and the nationalists needed

to prove that they were still alivo, especially after the speech by lemaltre

made it appear they were split. Since Cloutier had won by a hair in 1902,

only nationalist unity could bring victory, and Barres was the only candi- 85 date able to unite the diverse nationalist leagues. This unity was re­

flected in the various rallies for Barres, chaired by leaders of the var­

ious nationalist wings—.Lemaltre, Dausset, General Mercier, and Cavaignac,

with speeches by them and Galli, Edmond Archdeacon, the nationalist deputy

from the neighboring first arrondissement, Ernest Roche, the lieutenant of

Rochefort, Paulin-M^ry, an old Bouiangist and socialist, Syveton, Millevoye,

and Maurice Spronck, a ProRressiste-nationalist.

^"Les elections legislatives," Le Temps, April 29 and May 13, 1902.

^"Maurice Barres, Candidat a Paris," L1 Avant-Garde, January 4 and 25, 1903] "Une lettre de Maurice Barres," ibid. . February 1, 1903] "La Candidature de Maurice Barres,"rjbid . j February 1 and 8 , 1903* IJAvant- Garde was a n a tio n a list weekly in Nancy, subsidized by Barres, which re­ printed articles he had written for various newspapers. 262

In these rallies Barres did not depart from his earlier views on de­ centralization, nationalism, and anti-parliamentarianism. Aside from a regu­ lar reaffirmation of them, he directed his campaign against his principal op­ ponent, Gabriel Deville, a Guesdist and translator of Marx' Das Kapital. De- ville had the distinct advantage of running in a district which had a social­ ist majority. To offset this handicap Barres had to repeat the ability of

Cloutier to pick up some socialist votes on the second ballot by breaking down voter respect for Deville. To achieve this aim Barres and the nation­ a list leaders who campaigned for him tried to show that the parliamentary

socialists both failed to deliver social reforms for the lower classes and

prejudiced the international position of France.

On the first point, Barres told the voters that the socialists were

ineffective in helping the poor: Although the collectivists talked of help­

ing the worker—"their speeches are infinitely less ardent when they have a

bourgeois public," they did not deliver on this promise at the Chamber of

Deputies even though they were "all powerful" with Jaures as a vicepresident.

Instead they supported the efforts of the government to pass new taxes on

goods consumed by the poor and placed their faith in the utopia of collect­

ivism and universal peace, which were to be achieved through the triumph

of international socialism. "The nationalists resolve, more simply," said

Barres, "to assure the economic security of each Frenchman. Of each French­

man, and not . . . each of the men who populate the universe . . . To de­

sert the cause of 'the disinherited would be to betray the cause of the na­

tion itself." Barres, then, believed that the worker had to receive justice

for the nation to be strong, and it could be strong if its deepest elements

were buttressed by decentralization and laws against foreign workers,

Maurice Barres, "Socialisms et Nationalisms," ibid., March 8, 1903. Mot for nothing did Barres claim bis love for the French -worker, because he was constantly att?ick«d as ;? reactionary. This chary'' was leveled against bin by none other than Jean Jaures, who actively campaigned for Seville. ”K. Barres,” said Jaures during speech in February, ”states that the s till very incomplete Vipd of leveling ’which the Tie volution and democracy accomplished caused old barriers, caste?-., and corporations to f a l l . Ho pretends th a t thi--- great movci-.ent o f modern so c ie ty has the deplorable effect of pulling up individual?. '’"•om the territories ’.dioee they had taken root.'’ lr'. seeking a solution to this uprootednosc, kevmvor, ’Hi. Barres would have us return to the par«tj he want:? vs to be transported by thought and habit - of ’’i**© to the old provincial -and some­ what .3 leery eai stance of thm past.” Barres replied that. he -was not * reac­

tionary, that he wanted or.ly to retain the heritage oi the past and not to return to the past, ' 1 that both he an* Jscares saw ''the disorder and anarchy o f modern s o c ie t y .” However, added Barres, the s o c ia lis t drears o f a utopian future was just as sterile as the reactionary vision o° a lost paradise.

Bach of these dreams ''changed ->c>thiiV-3 in the present. . . . L'c must live,” urn we must b e tte r co n d itio n s in the here a n ’ now."*

ilecondly, Barres and the nationalists believed that a far more telling

attack on Seville -was to identify him with the for-ign policy of Jaurcs.

In short Seville was portrayed as a member of the party which hvl disavowed

Alsace-Lorraine, supported the statement of Jaures that the Triple Alliance

•was ” the necessary counterbalance to our chauvinism and ?ranco-T?uscian fan­

tasies,” and had "efused to disown the anti-m ilitarist statements of Gustave

^M aurice u a rrc s, ’’D'abord, i l faut durer,” ibid. . ’Larch 1. 1903. 2.64 88 Herv£. 'J-'he high point of the attack came with a rally for Barres in which Godefroy Cavaignac, the nationalist ex-minister of war, reminded his audience that a speech of Jaures on disarmament and international arbitration had been translated into German and posted on the walls of 89 Metz, ' Jaures denied the charge, thinking that Cayaignac referred to a

1903 speech. Cayaignac studk to his guns, pointed out with specifics that he referred to a 1902 speech, and demanded justice on the field of honor. 90 Because this foreign policy of Jaures* was getting wide coverage and attack in the bourgeois press, the charge of Cayaignac doubtless had some effect on the voters. At any rate, Deville had difficulty keeping the various socialist committees of the Arrondissement around him.91

The results of the first balloting on March 22 gave Barres 3,974 votes to the 3,826 of Deville. Another 2000 were scattered among three 92 other candidates. The total socialist vote was 5*333* a clear mjority.

By the second ballot most of the republican committees indorsed Deville except for the committee of one socialist, Soules, which simply released its 1,098 voters. 93 In the run-off election on April 5* Deville won with

5*059 votes to the 4,327 of Barres, who obviously picked up some of the

88 Ibid. and Maurice Barres, "Plus Dreyfusard que Dreyfus," ibid., February 15* 1903i "La candidature de 4l,1aurice Barres," ib id ., February 15, 1903; Maurice Barres, "Nous sommes des usufruitiers," ibid., March 15* 1903.

^ " L a Candidature Maruice Barres, ibid., March 15* 1903*

”^"M. Cavaignac e t M. Jaures, "Le Temps. March 22, 1903.

"^"Chronique £lectorale," ibid., March 10, 1903*

^"Elections legislatives," ibid., March 23, 1903.

^"Chronique £lectorale," ibid, April 1,3* and r, 1903* votes which h^d gone on the .first ballot to the socialist rivals of Deville.

Le i'emps attributed the defeat to voter apathy: with 1500 fewer voters in

1903 than in 1902, the better-disciplined forces of Deville lost only 500 g* voters while the nationalists lost 1000, Barres agreed that the troops of Deville were better-disciplined,only because they were made up> of ”1500

Jews and 1500 Limousin Freemasons.” Moreover, he added, there was electoral fraud. The government, he insisted throughout the campaign, had originally postponed the election through the ruse of validating the election of

Cloutier, even though he was dead, in order to schedule the new election aft the March 31 revision of the voting lists. Failing to accomplish this, the government and Deville had used the old lists, which were made up of a great number o f dead or moved-ttway v o te r s, and had brought in th e ir own men to vote these ballots. Deville, charged Barres, had even brought in

A 00 to 500 by spe&ial train. ^

IV

The most significant result of the political activity of Barres in

1902 - 1903 , however, was this: it finished once and for all his attempt to build a new boulangism out of the nationalist movement. The 1903 elec­ tion was no sooner over than Barres saw that. "I had been at the baptism of nationalism,” he told Paul Acker. "Now I am at its burial. You see, a nationalist program was not applied to nationalism. I know what nation-

Flection du IV e Arrondissement,” ibid.. April 7, 1903.

95 Maurice Barr&s, "La Revision des listes electorates,” L1 Avant- Garde. January 25, 1903; Maurice barres, "Les Fraudes Electorales,11 ib id o, February 8, 1903; "Chronique e le c to r a te ," Le Temps. March 11, 1903; Paul Acker, Petites Confessions (Paris, 1903), PP« 209-210. 266 alism is, but I do not know what the Nationalist Party is, I have never 96 been shown anything but an anti-m inisterial party."

Between 1903 ar*d 1906 Barres abandoned a l l hope that there could ever be a party based on real nationalist principles. As both Eugen Weber and

D. R. Watson point out, the only effective organizer of the nationalist forces was Gabriel Syveton. He had captured control o f the League of the

Patrie Francaise through the patronage afforded him as dispenser of the league’s funds in the election of 1902, his position on L’Echo de Paris, and his control of Lemaltre after the latter* s decline following his speech 97 in favor of the plebiscitist republic. In 1905, Syveton was on the verge of revitalizing the nationalist cause with his discovery that the 'War Office of General ftndr£ had e n liste d the services o f the Masonic Grand Orient in getting royalist and clerical information on army officers. Before Syve­ ton could make a full revelation of this affaire des fiches. the govern­ ment revealed that Syveton had embezzled funds from the ^eague of the

Patrie Francaise and had had sexual relations with his step-daughter. His suicide in the face of these charges left the nationalist cause leaderless0

Dlroulede and Rochefort were so old and irascible that they could get along with no one and even th e ir personal forces were dim inishing, Lemaltre, who was drifting toward royalism like the young Rightist intellectuals who had once followed Barres, would adhere to the Action Frangaise in 1908. In this decline, Barres ceased to write political articles or participate in politics to any degree. By 190/*, he saw that the "politics of the bloc"

96 Acker, pp. 208-209.

"weber, pp. 26-32 and Watson, pp. 76-79. 2&U meant no more than whether a politician supported or rejected sepaffatidn-., 9ft o f Church and S ta te , and Barres would have none o f i t . He g r e a tly admired Syveton, but he recognized that Syveton, by breaking the power of all his rivals in the nationalist movement—Copp£e, Lemaltre, Deroulede,

Cavaignac, arid ^auaset, had made it impossible for the nationalist move- ment to survive his death. 99

This co lla p se o f the n a tio n a lis t movement was a l l too evid en t when

Barres again was thrust into a politics] campaign in 1906. b’ith the death of Edmond Archdeacon, the Federation of Hepyblican, Liberal, and Patriotic

Committees of the First Arrondissement of Paris chose Barres to run for his seat, when Deroulede, Thi£baud, and Major Guignet refused the honor.

Barres promised to follow Archdeacon1s program, which had opposed every­ thing threatening French unity. This district had been oTfered Barres in 1902 and was such a nationalist stronghold that Archdeacon had been swept to office on the first ballot. It was still nationalist enough for

Barres to go in on the first ballot against a Progressiste and Radical,

•with as big a margin as Archdeacon had received.^ Although Barresi-hdd the endorsement of Deroulede, Rochefort, and a ll four municipal couneilers 102 of the arrondissementi his victory was not a party one. For the first

98 Barres, Mes Cahiers. Ill, 217-218.

" i b i d . , IV, 34-35. 100 ■’Chronique £lectorale, 11 Le Temps. March 9, 1906 and "Interview - express: M. Maurice Barres candidate,” Le Gaulois, March 9* 1906.

"E lections le g is la t iv e s du 8 mai 1 9 0 6 ,” tg Temps. May 9* 1906. The vote gave Barfes 6,51&> the Progressiste Alexis Muzet 2,462, the Radical- Socialist Paul Vibert 2,098, and the Unity-Socialist Mesnard 701.

^®^Barres, Mes Gahiers, IV, 149-156 and 304-309 and ”Les Elections de 1906,” Le Gaulois, April 24, 1906. 268 time he ran in a prosperous district and as the candidate of no party or movement. His parjsy now, in the words o f Deroulede, was that "of the Re- 103 public of honest men against the republic of coquins. 11

although victory was almost certain, Barres did conduct a vigorous

campaign in 1906 in which he spelled out his mature, but personal, polit­

ical views. He held numerous rallies in every quarter, usually chaired by the quarter's municipal coucilor, with speeches by the councilors,

Copp£e, and Oeorges Cachet, the president o f the League of the Hatrie

Franpaise. At these rallies he was applauded for his "patriotic and

social" of "patriotic and liberal" program. His name was described as

"synonymous with patriotism and lib eit-y o f conscience," and the crowds

greeted his remarks with, "Down with the Lgovernmental] Bloc! Down with the

sedtaidans! Long liv e France! and liberties! According to Paul ^cker,

Barres s till believed in the nationalism of "the soil and the dead" speech.

Barres to ld Acker that a l l questions should be solved from the "French

point of view." "Each time that a measure is proposed, I ask mys#lf; will

it serve France or not?" Barres believed, for example, that because the

anticlerical legislation of Emile Combes created civil war, it would weaken France, and should be opposed on n a tio n a listic grounds. However,

Barres had not completely forgotten social reforms, so long as they fit a

n a tio n a list framework, he to ld Acker:

It is necessary to recall that a way to reunite the poor classes with the idea of the fatherland is to make the fatherland charitable to them0 There is no reason 'at a ll

^^Barres, Mes Chhiers, IV, 306

^^"Faits du jour: La candidature de iuaurice Barres," Le Gaulois, March 27, 1906 and "Les Reunions electorales," ibid., March 27, April 25, 26, and 27, and May 4 and 5> 1906, 2 (0

to leave the initiative for social reforms with the revolu­ tionaries: on the contrary, only the men of order are able to be men of progress. It is to conservatives who are worthy of the name to bring to a good end great reforms, merely as a way to look^gfter defense and the foreign in­ terests of the country.

Even parliamentary victory did not destroy Barres disillusionment with the nationalists. Since they now stood for nothing more than anti- ministerialism, he refused to join their Nationalist Republican bloc in the Chamber, a bloc whose members included Gauthier de Clagny, Ernest

Roche, Cavaignac, and Georges Berry, Instead, Barres remained an Inde­ pendent along with other nationalists like Millevove and Andrieux who felt that the Nationalist Republicans had sold out to antr-dunisterialism.

Iro n ic a lly , then, 1906 crowned Barres with personal la u re ls , since he was elected to both the French Academy and to the Chamber of Deputies from a district he would represent until his death in 1923. Yet, 1906 also saw the defeat of the great ambition which had driven him since 1889} the formation of a political movement capable of bringing constitutional revision, social, reforms, and a nationalistic France. As a deputy after

1906 Barres ceased these endeavors. Instead, his parliamentary action

Cdncemeci itself almost exclusively with military affairs, the war effort, ahd the problem of Alsace-Lorraine, Although the antiparliamentaiy League of Patriots continued, its evolution paralleled that of Barres, On the death of Deroulede in 1914j Barres was elected its president and on his death in 1923> he was replaced by, of all people, Alexandre Millerand who had been one of the arch-foes of Barres during the Dreyfus Affair,

^^Paul Acker, ”La Candidature de Maurice Barres,'1 ibid,, *'iarch 2 4 , 1906 . CONCLUSION

Speaking to Paul Acker in 1903, Barr&s insisted that his political and literary careers were completely unified and that his ideas had not changed from the beginning:

Observers have seen an abyss between my political and literary life. Well, the one cannot be separated from the other. I am a living exertion of energy, and I seek without ceasing a field for this exertion. Since my first book, I gave to the work for which I was born only those moments I could s te a l from my p o li­ tical task .... In Un Homme libre I indicated everything which I have developed since. In Les D4racin£a. La Terre et les monts. and L1 Appel au soldat. I merely gave more complexity to the themes of my original and steadfastly held opinions. In La Cocarde. . . . I completely traced the program of nationalism, but I did not yet use that term. Un Homme libre is the book which became my central expression?^-

As much as Barr&s preferred to see an unchanging unity in his work, the fact remains that his ideas did evolve as a result of his political car­ eer. However, as Barres suggested to Acker, certain themes did run throughout his career, even though they, like Barr&s, changed as his poli­ t i c a l a ctio n moved forw ard.

One of these themes was individualism. It was the motif of the

Gulte du moi and of Barrfes'decision to enter politics because of his need to find personal self-fulfillm ent in political involvement. Likewise, his political and social ideas, even though they evolved, sprang from his concern to find a socio-political system which would allow every individ­ ual to flower. Politically, Barres originally accepted the ready-made

^Paul Acker, Petites Confessions. (Paris, 1903), pp. 211-212.

270 Boulangist solution of the presidential republic, whose strong leader

could intervene on behalf of the individual. He abandoned it in favor

of his Proudhonist federalism. Finally, through nationalism and its leagues, he combined Proudhonism and Boulangism into a political system

which he believed would promote individualism. The concern of Barrfes

with individualism caused him to see the need for social transformation.

Only by giving every individual an equal chance economically, socially,

and educationally could each man live up to his potential. This kind of

individualism caused him to accept at the beginning, the ready-made social

ideas of Alfred Gabriel. Barres then went on to the socialistic individ­

ualism of Ia Cocarde and the federalist campaign of 1894-1895* His in­

dividualism was bound to color his relationship with the socialist move­

ment when socialism committed itself to collectivism, which Barres was

convinced would thwart individual free expression, he rejected it. He

then went on to advocate individualistic social reforms within the frame­

work of nationalism. This last stage was really a kind of corporativism,

although Barres rejected most of the ideas of corporative thinkers.

Another tneme which ran through his political career and changed

as it went was nationalism. His nationalist ideas, which were noticeably

absent in his pre-1888 writings, were created and conditioned by the na­

tionalism, especially that of Paul DSroulede, which Barres found in Boul­

angism. His nationalism was further advanced, perhaps, by his background

and political campaigns in eastern France, where revanchism was particular­

ly strong. Nationalism became increasingly important in his thought and

action as evinced by his 1893 campaign at Neuilly, his editorials in Ia 272 Cocarde. and his federalist campaign of 1895. In the mid-1890's he couched his nationalism in socialistic terms. However, just as individ­ ualism took him to socialism, socialist collectivism and internationalism drove him from it. Finally, as a result of the Dreyfus Affair, he ex­ pressed all his thought in nationalistic terms: for a strong nation to exist, individuals had to be able really to fulfill and express them­ selves within a presidential republic, whose leader could act decisively in favor of all the people.

Another theme which ran throughout the career of Barres wqs his view of what his role was in politics. He thought of himself principally as an educator rather than a politician. His expression of this view be­ came more pronounced a f te r 1893. For example, he saw th a t th e purpose of

La Cocarde and, later, the League of the Patrie Frangaise was to educate the public to his views. However, he also believed that for him to find the insights necessary for being an effective political and social educa­ tor, he had to have real involvement at the center of the political activi­ ty, the Chamber of Deputies. For that reason, he persistently sought a

constituency which would take him to the Chamber, be it at Nancy, Nauilly,

or the fourth and first arrondissements of Paris. Moreover, each cam­ paign gave him new insights into politics, and by so doing, changed his

id e a s.

A f in a l theme in h is career saw Barres seeking a mass movement which would reflect his views and would be capable of coming to power. He

sought that movement first in Boulangism, then in socialism, and finally

in nationalism. In all these efforts there was a remarkably continuity 273 of personnel. Some of hiw Boulangist friends joined him on La Cocarde and again in the nationalist leagues.

Unfortunately for Barrfes all of these themes failed to be insti­ tutionalized in French life. In this period, 1888-1906, Barres did not find the mass movement which would bring his social and political ideas to power. In the 1890's, his ideas failed to win over the young men of the Left, who rejected them when Barres joined the anti-Dreyfusards. His ideas likewise failed to convince the young men of the Right, who sup­ ported his stand on iDreyfus but rejected his steadfast republicanism in favor of the royalism of Charles Maurras and the Action Frangaise. How­ ever, because Barres' ideas were rooted in his political experience and had evolved from actual political situations, both of which made him tolerantly undoctrinaire, they would remain influential, not only on the action Francaise. but on many of the men involved in the be Gaulle re p u b lic .^

^For a brief evaluation of Barr&s influence on the post - World War II world, see: Pierre Weraud de Boisdeffre, "Justice pour Barrfes," Etudes. CCEX (1949), 331-350. APPENDIX

MAJOR VOTES OF BOULANGIST ECPUTIES (1889-1893)

KEY: Footnote Number refers to the Issue footnoted with the sane num­ ber in Chat)ter 3. (P) mean# pour the issue. (C) means contra the issu e * ( a ) ne&ns abstention on the issue. (-) means deputy absent.

Number 10 19 2? > V* 2*1 27 , 2? . _a - b . 32t 33i 341 3b* A la e l C p P P p P P P p c p r c ' p p A re e lih e c p P p P P P P p g p c p P ■ B arrh e c p PPP P PP p g p g g p P , B e lle v n l c p P P P P P p g p g «• P B o rle g p P P P P P P g F g PP Boudeau c P P P P P P P P g p g g A P C a e te lln 9 P P P P P P P P c p g g P P Chiohd c P c p c c P p PP p PP p r r " P Dtfroulbde . PP P p PP • p c _ P D u a o n te il c p P P P P p g p c C P P r a rer c P PP p PP c p c p c c P P G ab riel c PPP p P P c P C p c C P P Goueeot g P PPPP P p p g p c * P Grander A PPPPPP g P c p c C A P Jo u rd e 9 p P p p P P p P G p c c P P L^fflifrra c p P p p P p p p c p g •» P I g p P p p P P p p g p g g P P Lanorte p p P PP P P p c p c c P p i Laur c p PPPP P c p c p c . - P i Le IW ries i P PP p PPP p p g p c g P p i Le Senna Q PPPPPP g p c p c g p ! La V a illtf p p PPPPP p P c p c c P p Martin g A g p P P p c A p c P A p i M arti neau p g p p P P g P A P g g ~ i M ill avanra g p p p p P P p p c P p • Naauet c p p PP P P p p P c • . p p p PP P P g p c P c p Pantoja g p p PP P P p P g P g C p p R eseat. g p p p PP P p p c P - p g p p p p P P p p c P g g p p Rnflhe A p p p p PP g p g P c g A p p p P p P P g p g g P p S aussar g A A A p PP p p c P p o P p T e rra 13 g P p p p P P p p c P C 1 c P p T urlm sr g P. p p P P P c p c P g c P p

PourI 11 31 33 33 3A 34 34 2ft 39 0 32 2 0 fsa 34 1 9 Q 9 9 19 9 3? 9 ft? & 1 9 ..1 -ft 9 - f t Q 1 .....1 9 -ft 9

• n F FVj BT’llirnifr MF74 F k HOTJI IM W yilwJ F ft Control 331305L3621 3&Al 318L1A2I3721291] 3A2ilB 0l3051 A5ilB7l32013101

274 275

Iftvb«r ?7> 67 : t* I 69i 7oI 7 ll 7 3 75 76b! 77i. 96] 97* b '--5 Aimel j c P p PC C c c r P c c p r Aritelibe F p P c C c c F P G c V Borrbe c , P p P C : c c c P- C c p p B ellav al c P p P c c c c PP c c r * B oris - f p P p A p c P . _ P , V Boudeau P P p P A ! c Q c PP c c F v C aetelln C P p A C j p Q p P P c p P Chichd c i p P P i c P p P P p c p p Ddroulhde A p p c c P c P P c p D unonteil P P p P c 1 c C c PP c c PP Farcy QP p p C ! C p c P P c c P f G abriel C i P p P P CC p C P p P P Ooussot P - P p : p p c PP c c P P , Grander c PP C I c p c P P c c P P Jourde p P p P c p c p P P c p P P L aroerre A C A A 1 p p p c P p p A LaiBant p A p P C ! p c p p P p c P P L ar»rte PPP C . p A A AP c C P P Laur P P p P p c P c G P • c . P_L - Le HArlsed p A p p ! p p p c P p p P P Le Sonne PA A p C ' g p p p P c c P P Le v # m 4 _ . QPPP p i ? p p p P c PP lia rtin g AA p p ! A c A p A c c A P MarUnoau P C P p i A p p p P p p P P M illevove . P P p c P c P c Haouet c A P P - ! • p p A C F Paulin-Mdrv g P P P P j C p p p P p p P p Fontoie g A P P p 1 A A p p P AA _ p R ev est PPPP c , c c p p P p c P P R ichard P PPP ? 1 P c p p P p c P P Roohe c PPP ? c C G c P c c P P S t . M artin P ? . ' P c 1 C c c c P c A PP Sausaav PP A P 0 A c m p - c P T e r r a il P - i - - I A a m P •— P Turifimv c P I P P p p AP P P c . • P P

Boulanfiiet r o ta ls Four 32 391 2 2 5 22 39 4 4 29 27 Contre 1 27 2 2 M 27 27 24 9 2 25 22 1 1 A batain 7 3 2 a L 5 2 1 1 1 3 2 9

« - ni ifll or\ 1 en 1 aocI rt rn ! non 1 1 1 rtr> J rt r \ Iim Inoi 1 nn 1 i m m±m

___ a31a: vote la flavor of re;)acting Moreau proposal (February 24» \09t/bl 31b: Ferroul proposal.

^Caspars with Ko. 28.

°99a: Richard ninlmtn wag* (February l6 f 1892); 99b: Raepail proposal for oospulsary arbitration (October 20 9 1892). 276

F o o tn o te I 0 0 d 102*3 Number ft b 191 A 9 9 ,198 129 A im el c c c P p P c A r s e lib e A P c A A A c A Bsrrfcs A P c C 9 A c A B e lle v a l p p c C A A c L A B o r ie p A p P P 9 c «■ B ou ieau __ p P c A P A 9 A C a s te lln P c AA A 9 A Ohloh¥ x> P c A C C c A M rou lb d e ¥ P c CC C 9 P u s o n te ll o P c A A A c A Farcy p c A A PP 9 P G a b r ie l c A 9 A P PP G oussot 9 A A A P 9 p Grander c 9 9 PPP c P Jourde 9 c c P P P c P L a fu ezre PP A A A P c P L a lsa n t 9 9 9 A P P 9 A la D o r te A A A p P 9 A Laur ...... A p C A P AA A Le Hdrlsatf P _ c P P 9 P Le Senne ? P c 9 9 A 9 A Le V e llld c AA P P p c « M artin A P f c c 9 c A M artlneau P P P P p P 9 P M llle v o y e P P A 9 9 A 9 A N aauet P A P 9 P P C P Paulln-lfdrv 9 A A A PP 9 A F o n to ls P P 9 C 9 A c A R e v e s t P A A A A A c A R ich ard P A c P • p 9 A R oche c c 9 P P c c P 3 t . M artin 9 9 A A P p 9 P S a u sea y P P Q 9 c 9 A T e r r a il P A A c c p T urianv C A A P A «» A

Bemianoint TotalLb Four 18 i ? ? 19 18 1$ 9 12 C entre 11 7 18 19 8 7 7? 9 A b sta in 5 11 11 13 8 n 1 20 Chanhar Total* Pour A ft 18? w 19? 198 182 ?29' 3ft4 f tu r ir t- ,. 27. 19. 18, 399, 289, 392, 187- 2

^GOtx Resolution supporting dmm -irreete of anarchists following April boabings (Hay 21v 1891); 100b: aid to owners of anarchist bombed businesses, but not to victim s (July 2, 1892),

e102a: rote of Hovesiber 6, 1890; 102b: vote of October 26, 1891; 102c: vote of January 19, 1893. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Bourne, Randolph* "Maurice Barr&s and the Youth of Today," Atlantic Monthly, CXIV (1914), 394-399. Brombert, Victor. "Toward a Portrait of the French Intellectual," P a rtisa n Review, XXVII, No. 3 (Summer, I960), 480-502.

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Clouard, Henri. "La 'Cocarde' de Barrls," La Revue critique des Id|es et des Livres. VIII (February 10 and 25 and March 10, 1910), 205-230, 332-358, and 397-419. Dalbert, Georges. "F^dSralisme et provincialisme," La Revue blanche, IX (July 15, 1895), 91-93. Darmesteter, Mary, "The Social Novel in France," Contemporary Review. LXXV (1899), 800-813.

Diamandy, Georges. "L'Ennemi des l o i s ," L'Ere n o u v elle. I (November 1, 1893), 421-441. Dietz, Jean, "Les..Debuts de Maurice Barr&s," La Revue de Paris. XXXV (October 1, 1928), 616-628.

______. "Les Debuts de Maurice Barr&s dans la vie politique (1888-1891)," La Revue hebdomadaire. August, 1931, 267-284.

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