Making Autocrats Accountable: Interests, Priorities, and Cooperation for Regime Change
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University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2016 Making Autocrats Accountable: Interests, Priorities, and Cooperation for Regime Change Başak Taraktaş University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Political Science Commons Recommended Citation Taraktaş, Başak, "Making Autocrats Accountable: Interests, Priorities, and Cooperation for Regime Change" (2016). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2050. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2050 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2050 For more information, please contact [email protected]. Making Autocrats Accountable: Interests, Priorities, and Cooperation for Regime Change Abstract In nearly all authoritarian regimes, democratization finds significant societal support and a number of organized opposition groups struggle for regime change. In some cases—such as in Iran in 1979— opposition groups are able to cooperate with one another and bring down authoritarianism. In others—such as the Assad regime in Syria—groups are not able to cooperate, and the ruler remains in place. Studies that apply cooperation theory on regimes predict that shared grievances about the current government and common interests in changing the existing regime foster cooperation among challengers. Yet, evidence suggests the contrary. This study examines the conditions under which diverse challengers, despite persistent divergence in their ideological preferences, are able to achieve a level of long-term cooperation that can transform the status quo. It uses the case studies of the Ottoman transition to constitutional monarchy (1876–1908) and the French transition to constitutional monarchy (1814–1830), paired according to the least similar systems design, in combination with network theory. Using this methodology, this study analyzes the effect of preferences on ideological issues (how the new regime should look like) and on strategic issues (how regime change should be carried out) to explain temporal dynamics of cooperation for regime change among challengers. This study conducts historiographical and archival work to identify the relevant actors and relevant issue dimensions and track preferences on these issues over time. It applies these findings on longitudinal network models (known as temporal exponential random graph models) to measure the extent to which preference alignment on an issue dimension, strategic or ideological, bring challengers to cooperate. Also, this study introduces two concepts. The first concept is de-prioritization,“ ” the process whereby challengers postpone the resolution of certain ideological disagreements to form sustainable cooperation against the regime. The second concept is “preference revision,” the process whereby challengers pragmatically replace their strategic preferences with more effective ones in response to past failures and environmental changes. Together these concepts emphasize that challengers become more likely to cooperate for regime change if they converge on a particular strategy of transition and sideline their ideological differences (if any). Convergence of preferences on strategic issues and the de-prioritization of ideological disagreements (if any) prepares the rise of a coherent oppositional coalition that is capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions form an oppositional coalition that is capable of signaling unity and coherence, hence potential to overthrow the regime if necessary or extract considerable concessions. Findings suggest that without preference-revision and de-prioritization, challengers remain divided and heterogeneous in their approach, at best achieving temporary gains that are later reversed in the course of authoritarian retrenchment. This study further shows that the oppositional coalition tends to form around a core actor who has been committed to effective strategies and attracts others (peripheral actors) who agree with the core on the strategies but not necessarily on the ideologies. The implication of these findings are twofold: By taking dynamics of cooperation among challengers into account, we can distinguish between the cases where the regime is strong enough and takes on challengers and those where the government is weak but surviving because opposition groups are unable to assume power. Also, there is a link between the rise of an oppositional coalition and the likelihood of regime change happening. Degree Type Dissertation Degree Name Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Graduate Group Political Science First Advisor Rudra Sil Second Advisor Julia Lynch Keywords Bourbon France, constitutional government, cooperation and coordination, network analysis, ottoman empire, regimes and regime change Subject Categories Political Science This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2050 MAKING AUTOCRATS ACCOUNTABLE: INTERESTS, PRIORITIES, AND COOPERATION FOR REGIME CHANGE Basak Taraktas A DISSERTATION in Political Science Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 2016 Supervisor of Dissertation Co-Supervisor of Dissertation Rudra Sil, Professor of Political Science Julia Lynch SAS Director of the Huntsman Program Associate Professor of Political Science International Studies & Business Graduate Group Chairperson Matt Levendusky , Associate Professor of Political Science Dissertation Committee Yuhua Wang, Assistant Professor Bruce Desmarais, Associate Professor MAKING AUTOCRATS ACCOUNTABLE: INTERESTS, PRIORITIES, AND COOPERATION FOR REGIME CHANGE COPYRIGHT 2016 Basak Taraktas To my mother, father, and aunt, who endured this process as much as I iii ACKNOWLEDGMENT This study would not have been possible without the people who helped me in this process. First, I would like to thank my committee for their support. My chairs, Julia Lynch and Rudra Sil, have helped me to improve my work tremendously and encouraged me along the way. Yuhua Wang has been very generous with his time, giving me feedback on my research design and job market applications, and has inspired me. Bruce Desmarais’ advice has been invaluable in designing network models. In addition, I must thank Matt Levendusky for patiently reading my work and for giving me advice on how to improve my work, but more importantly, for the moral support that he provided in this difficult process. I am also indebted to Jeff Green, who has been kind enough to discuss my theory with me; to Alex Weiseger, for his feedback on game theory and on my research more broadly; to as Ed Mansfield for believing in me and for providing departmental support that enabled me to learn network theory; to Akşin Somel for his time and invaluable help in my project (I would not be able to learn so much about the Ottoman Empire without his guidance); and Ahmet Kuyaş and Warren Breckman for helping me to conduct this research. I further would like to thank Victor Preciado, Eric Eaton, Benedict Brown, Michael Kearns, and Aaron Roth for accepting me to their classes, without which I would not be able to grasp the theory of networks and computational modeling. I thank Meltem Muftuler Bac, Sabri Sayari, Nedim Nomer, and other Sabanci faculty for their mentorship, feedback, and support. I further thank Guobin Yang, Rogers Smith, David Sorge, and Hyun Binn Cho for their feedback on my research; Omur Arslan, for his help on dynamical systems; and Selman Sakar, who gave me the idea of using dynamical systems and networks in the first place, and who also provided tremendous moral support. I should also thank Anna Gryzmala-Busse for her feedback on my research; Michael Haeney, for his advice on the job market; and Dan Gillion, for motivating and inspiring me along the way. I am most indebted to my dear friends, Kaya Aykut, Omur Arslan, Julia Cramer, Ellen Donnelly, Omer Hancer, Eda Hayriogullari, Tuba Kara, Andy Levine, Krishan Malhorta, Prakirti Nangia, Artun Ozsemerciyan, Isabel Perera, Patricia Posey, Selman Sakar, members of Gurbi Salala, Gozde Ucur, Pinar Ure, Alexandra Wiktorek, among others, for their moral support, which they offered me when I most needed it and for patiently listening to me as I bounced ideas of off them. I also would like to thank John Horn for being such a motivating and considering person (besides being a great artist), and the best instructor that I have ever had in my life, whose classes brought joy into my life and helped me to persevere in difficult process. iv Finally, I owe the greatest debt to my parents, Süheyla and Yahya Taraktas, my aunt, Mualla Yasar, and my late grandmother, Nadire Uner, for going through this process with me at every step of the way, motivating and inspiring me in my darkest hours, loving me, and believing in me. I owe special thanks to my aunt who has given me the dream of being a researcher, and has been an example of perseverance, idealism, and wisdom. It is she who taught me how to stay true to oneself, to keep the faith, and to never give up. v ABSTRACT MAKING AUTOCRATS ACCOUNTABLE: INTERESTS, PRIORITIES, AND COOPERATION FOR REGIME CHANGE Basak Taraktas Julia Lynch Rudra Sil In nearly all authoritarian regimes, democratization finds significant societal support and a number of organized opposition groups struggle for regime