Headed the Wrong Way: the British Army's Painful

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Headed the Wrong Way: the British Army's Painful HEADED THE WRONG WAY: THE BRITISH ARMY‘S PAINFUL RE-ACQUAINTANCE WITH ITS OWN COIN DOCTRINE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE Art of War by THOMAS E. WALTON SR., MAJOR, US ARMY RESERVE M.A., Texas Tech University, Lubbock, Texas, 1998 B.A., Wayland Baptist University, Plainview, Texas, 1991 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2011-01 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 10-06-2011 Master‘s Thesis AUG 2010 – JUN 2011 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Headed the Wrong Way: The British Army‘s Painful Re- 5b. GRANT NUMBER Acquaintance with Its Own COIN Doctrine in Southern Iraq 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER Major Thomas E. Walton Sr. 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT U.S. Army Command and General Staff College NUMBER ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT The purpose of this research was to obtain a historically rooted understanding of the development, application, and adaptation of the British COIN approach—one from which the US has borrowed heavily. It focuses upon those factors which interfere with timely, adaptive application of current COIN doctrine as soon as the warning signs of insurgency present themselves. The price of failing to do so in terms of blood and treasure has been widely proclaimed daily in the news media during the past decade of American and British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Authors on both sides of the Atlantic have already made much of the US Army‘s failure to capture COIN lessons from Vietnam and its abandonment of COIN education in its schools after the 1970s. For this reason, most American commanders went into Iraq with no doctrinal guide for COIN, a deficiency corrected only after painful reflection on the characteristics of the environment and the inefficacy of the conventional methods they initially employed. The British Army, on the other hand, went into Iraq with a COIN doctrine revised five times since the completion of its successful operations in Malaya, 1948-1960, including a version published only two years prior to entry into Iraq. Why did the British Army struggle with identifying insurgency and application of its own corresponding doctrine? 15. SUBJECT TERMS Doctrine, Application, Learning, Adaptation 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code) (U) (U) (U) (U) 194 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 ii MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate: Major Thomas E. Walton Sr. Thesis Title: Headed the Wrong Way: The British Army‘s Painful Re-Acquaintance with Its Own COIN Doctrine in Southern Iraq Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chair Daniel P. Marston, DPhil., FRHistS , Member Mark M. Hull, DPhil., J.D., FRHistS , Member Nicholas A. Murray, DPhil. Accepted this 10th day of June 2011 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) iii ABSTRACT HEADED THE WRONG WAY: THE BRITISH ARMY‘S PAINFUL RE- ACQUAINTANCE WITH ITS OWN COIN DOCTRINE IN SOUTHERN IRAQ, by Major Thomas E. Walton Sr., 194 pages. The purpose of this research was to obtain a historically rooted understanding of the development, application, and adaptation of the British COIN approach—one from which the US has borrowed heavily. It focuses upon those factors which interfere with timely, adaptive application of current COIN doctrine as soon as the warning signs of insurgency present themselves. The price of failing to do so in terms of blood and treasure has been widely proclaimed daily in the news media during the past decade of American and British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. Authors on both sides of the Atlantic have already made much of the US Army‘s failure to capture COIN lessons from Vietnam and its abandonment of COIN education in its schools after the 1970s. For this reason, most American commanders went into Iraq with no doctrinal guide for COIN, a deficiency corrected only after painful reflection on the characteristics of the environment and the inefficacy of the conventional methods they initially employed. The British Army, on the other hand, went into Iraq with a COIN doctrine revised five times since the completion of its successful operations in Malaya, 1948-1960, including a version published only two years prior to entry into Iraq. Why did the British Army struggle with identifying insurgency and application of its own corresponding doctrine? iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am indebted to the leadership and staff of the Command and General Staff College for including the COIN Scholars Program (now titled the Art of War Scholars program) as an alternative track within Intermediate Level Education. This program went far beyond anything in my previous military experience in driving home the distinction between training and education, as well as the pre-eminent importance of the latter. Furthermore, it made me an avid reader of military history and helped me understand its importance as a component of any aspiring leader‘s education. I am tremendously indebted to Doctor Daniel Marston for the manner by which he engaged me and my fellow scholars in every seminar, making it nigh impossible not to read the vast volumes of material provided to read ahead. It was at times painful, but rich with many illuminating moments. I am also extremely grateful for his guidance and encouragement in ensuring I completed this thesis. Doctors Mark Hull and Charles Heller aided and abetted him in instilling an appreciation and understanding for military history. Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War and avid historian, Mr. Wilburn Meador, also inspired me. The opportunity to speak with others who actively participated in epic periods of military history, such as Medal of Honor recipient Roger H. C. Donolon, further served to breath life into previous campaigns and drive home there relevance to current conflicts. The opportunity to speak to British veterans of campaigns in Malaya and Oman while conducting research in the Britain greatly aided in illuminating those campaigns along with the COIN principles that emerged and evolved within them. v Others worthy of heartfelt appreciation include the incredible assembly of military leaders, policy makers, and academics from both sides of the Atlantic who deemed the accurate preservation of their experience for future histories of current conflicts important enough to take time from their busy schedules to participate in oral history interviews. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to British Colonel Alexander Alderson for providing me the benefit of his in-depth analysis of British COIN doctrine, including its frank assessment of both British and American foibles in Iraq, contained in the doctoral dissertation he completed for Cranfield University in 2009. His willingness to discuss his research and experiences with me during my visit to the United Kingdom in March/April 2011 was invaluable as well. Finally, by no means least among those to whom I am indebted is my wife, Michiyo, my most devoted critique, who cheers me in success, consoles me in failure, and never allows me to dwell too long on either one. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS Page MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............ iii ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...................................................................................................v TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. vii ACRONYMS ....................................................................................................................
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