Pfc. Brandie Leon, 4th Infantry Division, holds security while on patrol in a local neighborhood to help maintain peace after recent attacks on mosques in the area, East , , 3 March 2006. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Jason Ragucci, U.S. Army) III during the Surge: A Study in Operational Art Maj. Wilson C. Blythe Jr., U.S. Army

he role of Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno’s III (MNF–I) while using tactical actions within Iraq in an Corps as Multinational Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) illustrative manner. As a result, the campaign waged by has failed to receive sufficient attention from III Corps, the operational headquarters, is overlooked Tstudies of the 2007 surge in Iraq. By far the most in this key work. comprehensive account of the 2007–2008 campaign The III Corps campaign is also neglected in other is found in Michael Gordon and Lt. Gen. Bernard prominent works on the topic. In The Gamble: General Trainor’s The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, Iraq, from George W. Bush to , which fo- 2006-2008, Thomas Ricks emphasizes the same levels cuses on the formulation and execution of strategy and as Gordon and Trainor. However, while Ricks plac- policy.1 It frequently moves between Washington D.C., es a greater emphasis on the role of III Corps than is U.S Central Command, and Multinational Force–Iraq found in other accounts, he fails to offer a thorough

2 13 January 2017 Army Press Online Journal 17-1 III Corps during the Surge examination of the operational campaign waged by III creating room for political progress such as the February 2 Corps. ’s The Surge: A Military History 2008 “trifecta” package of legislation, which included delivers a predominately tactical portrait of the cam- the Provincial Powers Law, limited amnesty, and the paign, focusing on various brigade operations.3 2008 budget.6 Odierno’s command laid the groundwork A more personality-focused account is offered in for successful campaigns in 2007 and 2008. Given the ’s The Insurgents: and the Plot to attention garnered by COIN doctrine and the Army’s Change the American Way of War; it recounts the Army’s purported focus on the “graduate level of war,” what is most striking about III Corps’s TURKEY operations was Odierno’s use of DAHŪK concepts and terminology firmly

Dahūk rooted in conventional campaigns. IRAN III Corps’s achievements as an ERBĪL operational headquarters were SYRIA Erbil rooted in the successful application of operational art. NĪNAWÁ KIRKŪK is a way to con- Kirkuk As Sulaymānīyah Operational art AS SULAYMĀNĪYAH ceptualize how to fight wars using campaigns of multiple, simulta- neous, and successive operations ŞALĀḨ AD DĪN across a theater of operations to 7 Sāmarrā’ achieve a unifying goal. While

E u p h neither downplaying nor minimiz- ra t es Ba‘qūbah R ing the importance of Army COIN DIYĀLÁ Ar Ramādī BAGHDAD principles, a study of MNC–I’s

BAGHDĀD

N 2007 campaign in Iraq through

A D AL ANBĀR

R T the neglected prism of operational ig ri O BĀBIL s R Al Kūt

J

Karbalā’ art suggests that the campaign’s Al Ḩillah KARBALĀ WĀSIŢ success was due to the successful AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ Ad Dīwānīyah application of already established December 2006 An Najaf AL QĀDISĪYAH operational principles rather than Al-Qaeda Lines of Communications from a revolution in the profession

HĪ QĀR 8 As Samāwah D Al-Qaeda Concentrations AN NAJAF of arms.

0 100 Miles In December 2006, Odierno’s SAUDI Kilometers AL MUTHANNÁ 0 100 ARABIA III Corps assumed responsibility

(Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History) for MNC–I from Lt. Gen. Pete Figure 1. Al-Qaida in Iraq, December 2006 Chiarelli’s V Corps. The security situation in Iraq had deteriorated adoption of (COIN) doctrine rather throughout 2006 (see figure 1). The 22 February 2006 than the surge campaign.4 And, because of his position as bombing of Samara’s Shia Askariya shrine, also known the executive officer to the MNF–I commanding gen- as the Golden Mosque, caused the nascent ethno-sec- eral, Col. Peter Mansoor’s Surge: My Journey with General tarian tensions to explode into open conflict. The David Petraeus and the Remaking of the naturally bombings spurred large and violent protests through- gravitates toward Gen. David H. Petraeus.5 None of these out Shia neighborhoods in and around Baghdad as well accounts examine the critical role that Odierno’s head- as in other predominantly Shia cities such as Najaf, quarters played in the 2007–2008 surge campaign. Karbala, and Basra. With this attack, the conflict de- During its second tour in Iraq, III Corps achieved volved from an insurgency to a sectarian civil war that, success in reducing the level of violence in Iraq and in November 2006 alone, would claim 3,462 Iraqi lives.9

Army Press Online Journal 17-1 13 January 2017 3 Sāmarrā’ X Odierno was charged by the MNF–I 3 82 commander at the time, Gen. George DIYĀLÁ

Tig ris R Casey, with breaking the cycle of sectarian Balad violence. The incoming corps’s operational approach was different than its predeces- Khāliş sor’s. The focus of Chiarelli’s V Corps was ŞALĀḨ AD DĪN to consolidate the coalition footprint. As

Chiarelli later recalled, “I was told that my Ba‘qūbah X job was to get us down to fifty FOBs [for- 3 1 ward operating bases] by the end of 2006.

My instructions were pretty clear. You At Tājī

R

X a l will not have 110 FOBs. There were 110 ā 1 1 y i FOBs when I went in 2006.”10 The reduced D III 5 BAGHDAD X 13 U.S. Bns U.S. presence would be accompanied by Madīnat X 2 2 assigned to USMC Sec Districts al Ḩabbānīyah X 2 1 Al Fallūjah a rapid transition to the Iraqi Security 3 2 X Forces as the shifted to an OPRES 2 1 overwatch role. This operational focus X 2 10 contributed to the V Corps campaign Salmān Pāk BAGHDĀD E devolving into a series of disjointed and u p h ra Al Maḩmūdīyah te AL ANBĀR s X unconnected tactical actions. Tactically, R T ig 4 25 ris the result was a failure to retain terrain, R

WĀSIŢ and it amounted to U.S. forces being DISPOSITION OF U.S. FORCES Al Iskandarīyah forced to retake the same ground each CENTRAL IRAQ Early January 2007 day after surrendering it the previous 11 U.S. Unit evening (see figure 2). K ARBALĀ Inner Cordon Odierno defined his first priority as BĀBIL securing the Iraqi people, which to him Karbalā’ Miles meant defeating an insurgency composed 0 30 0 30 Kilometers Al Ḩillah of Sunni and Shia extremists, most nota- (Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History) bly al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and Iranian- Figure 2. Disposition of U.S. Forces Central backed Shia Special Groups. The MNC–I operational concept now focused on how Iraq, Early January 2007 to seize and retain the initiative so that the onto fewer and fewer bases and allowed tactical units coalition could defeat extremists. Though transition to to live on small bases among the population as they Iraqi control and responsibility for security was still the had done in the early days of the war. III Corps took a eventual goal, MNC–I no longer emphasized it.12 traditional approach to its campaign in 2007 and the While the difference may seem minor or semantic, first two months of 2008.14 the change in emphasis was profound, since it indicated Even prior to the announced surge of five additional that III Corps would no longer measure its progress brigades to Iraq, Odierno planned to conduct multiple through the reduction of the coalition footprint in Iraq simultaneous operations throughout the country.15 Past resulting from the closure of bases; the off-ramping corps offensives had focused on a single problem area of unit deployments to Iraq; or the usage of sewage, at a time, such as Fallujah or Najaf, and were in reality water, electricity, and trash removal metrics. Though it tactical battles rather than operations. These battles continued to use logical lines of effort, under Odierno, lacked a pursuit or exploitation phase, the absence of MNC-I placed an increased emphasis on physical lines which allowed the enemy to retreat along its physical of operation.13 At the tactical level, the change in em- lines of operation in order to regroup in the safety of its phasis alleviated the perceived pressure to concentrate support zones. In keeping with its objective of defeating

4 13 January 2017 Army Press Online Journal 17-1 III Corps during the Surge

clearing and retaining terrain Sāmarrā’ X 3 82 throughout Baghdad and its

DIYĀLÁ surrounding belts—those

Tig ris R provinces encircling the Balad city and controlling access to the capital. Supporting divisional operations in the Khāliş ŞALĀḨ AD DĪN belts interdicted the flow X 3 1 of accelerants—III Corps’s term for the fighters, weapons, Ba‘qūbah X (-) III 3 2 and explosives necessary to 13 USMC carry out the attacks and thus trigger the subsequent repri-

X At Tājī sals—into the capital through 4 2 R

a l offensive operations designed X ā y i 1 1 D to seize and hold terrain in 25 U.S. Bns III X X assigned to these enemy support zones. 6 2 82 Sec Districts Madīnat 2 1 X al Ḩabbānīyah USMC This was Odierno’s opening X Al Fallūjah 2 1 2 2 gambit in an attempt to trans- X BAGHDAD X 4 1 3 3 form the insurgent support

X X zone around Baghdad into a 2 3 2 10 coalition security zone and

Salmān Pāk push extremists away from BAGHDĀD E u 17 p h the capital (see figure 3). ra Al Maḩmūdīyah te AL ANBĀR s R In June, MNC–I followed Ti X gr is R 4 25 up Fardh al-Qanoon with another corps-level offensive WĀSIŢ DISPOSITION OF U.S. FORCES Al Iskandarīyah dubbed Operation Phantom CENTRAL IRAQ June 2007 Thunder that consisted of simultaneous operations in U.S. Unit K ARBALĀ Baghdad and the surround- Inner Cordon ing belts. Phantom Thunder BĀBIL Baghdad Belts aimed to clear extremist Karbalā’ 0 30 Miles support zones and rear areas.

0 30 Kilometers Al Ḩillah It was the first operation to (Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History) take place with all five surge Figure 3. Disposition of U.S. Forces brigades in country, and the Central Iraq, June 2007 extra combat power allowed Odierno to hold the seized ter- the insurgency, Odierno’s corps launched a series of rain, thus thickening his security zone and preventing corps offensives to eject the enemy from territory and the reestablishment of extremist support zones.18 to retain the liberated terrain by maintaining forces By August, it was clear that MNC–I’s series of there. These sustained offensives connected tactical offensive operations had produced an improvement in actions across Iraq to better attain strategic ends, a key security throughout those areas of Iraq where the co- to the successful practice of operational art.16 alition had been able to surge. Odierno was concerned III Corps’s first offensive operation, Operation that the extremists planned to draw the coalition away Fardh al-Qanoon (Enforcing the Law), focused on from the areas that MNC–I had successfully cleared

Army Press Online Journal 17-1 13 January 2017 5 and secured so they could TURKEY return and fill the vacuum left by the coalition. This Dahūk had been the fate of pre- MND-NE vious coalition offensives, Mosul Erbil where MNC–I’s failure SYRIA to conduct simultaneous As Sulaymānīyah Kirkūk operations or to pursue had MND-N allowed extremists to re- IRAN group. Odierno saw that an aggressive pursuit was the Sāmarrā’ MND-B best way to dismantle the Ba‘qūbah extremist networks.19

MNF-W Ar Ramādī BAGHDAD

In order to both dis- N A

D MND-C rupt an expected enemy R Karbalā’

O Al Kūt and J Al Ḩillah keep AQI and Special Ad Dīwānīyah Al ‘Amārah Groups off balance, MNC–I An Najaf launched Operation As Samāwah MND-CS

Phantom Strike on 15 An Nāşirīyah August 2007. Phantom Al Başrah Strike consisted of “a series MND-SE MND/F AOs of targeted operations de- June 2007 signed to intensify the pur- Military Boundary suit of extremist elements Military boundaries are approximate 20 SAUDI across Iraq.” With the de- 0 150 Miles ARABIA ployment of five additional 0 150 Kilometers brigades, a combat aviation (Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History) brigade, and division head- Figure 4. Multinational Divisions (MNDs) / Forward quarters, MNC–I possessed Areas of Operations (FAOs), June 2007 the forces necessary to both hold the already-secured areas and to conduct targeted operations through- in the few remaining areas of Iraq the coalition did out Iraq (see figure 4). The nearing end of the surge not have enough combat power to control.22 limited the time that the coalition had to take advan- Throughout all operations, a key part of MNC–I’s tage of its full combat potential.21 Operation Phantom campaign focused on stopping the movement of the Phoenix carried the pursuit deep into the upper accelerants of violence into Baghdad.23 Analysis by Diyala River Valley and sought to set the conditions coalition intelligence indicated that the extremists in for the planned battle for Mosul. However, this battle Baghdad required a constant flow of vehicle-borne did not occur after III Corps was replaced by XVIII improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other Airborne Corps in February 2008 because events in accelerants in order to maintain the average of fifty Basra necessitated a shift in focus by the government attacks per day in the city. The fight to stop the accel- of Iraq and MNC–I. Both of the exploitation and erants rested on MNC–I’s appreciation of terrain. III pursuit operations, Phantom Thunder and Phantom Corps’s understanding of the enemy’s use of terrain Phoenix, saw MNC–I take steps to extend its opera- was aided by a 19 December 2006 raid conducted tional reach in order to allow it to disrupt the enemy by the 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division in the Taji- Tarmiyah area. This action resulted in the capture of

6 13 January 2017 Army Press Online Journal 17-1 III Corps during the Surge

over five hundred gigabytes TURKEY of documents and a map DAHŪK that detailed AQI’s strat- Dahūk egy to control Baghdad. It depicted an AQI battlefield IRAN ERBĪL architecture that was not Mosul entirely unconventional, Erbil with a support zone in the SYRIA NĪNAWÁ AS SULAYMĀNĪYAH belt areas around Baghdad, a rear area, a forward line of Kirkuk As Sulaymānīyah troops, lines of communica- KIRKŪK tions consisting of hard-sur- faced roads or improved dirt roads, and combat ŞALĀḨ AD DĪN zones within the capital.24 Sāmarrā’

The strength of extrem- E u p h ra te ist groups within Baghdad s R Ba‘qūbah depended upon their AL ANBĀR DIYĀLÁ Ar Ramādī control of both the lines of BAGHDAD communication and sup- BAGHDĀD port zones that ran through AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ T ig December 2007 ri the belts. Often, the enemy BĀBIL s R Al Kūt Karbalā’ would construct obstacle Al Ḩillah Al-Qaeda Lines of Communications KARBALĀ belts of large buried IEDs WĀSIŢ Al-Qaeda Concentrations to deny the coalition access An Najaf Ad Dīwānīyah Miles to these areas, while others 0 100 AL QĀDISĪYAH AN NAJAF 0 100 Kilometers DHĪ QĀR had air defense systems to AL MUTHANNÁ keep out helicopters. While (Graphic courtesy of U.S. Army Center of Military History) the corps’s main effort re- Figure 5. Al-Qaida in Iraq, December 2007 mained in Baghdad, outlying divisions mounted simulta- force was not a battle-space owner but was instead neous sustained offensives throughout the enemy’s used to weight the main effort, such as during Fardh depth (i.e., into the belts). This was a radically al-Qanoon when it was used to clear neighborhoods different appreciation of terrain than had previously in order to facilitate the deployment of surge brigades existed. III Corps did not view terrain in terms of into Baghdad, or later to conduct clearing opera- what could be turned over to Iraqi control, but rath- tions in Diyala Province. The Stryker reserve added er through the prism of an operational system.25 flexibility to Odierno’s operations and allowed him to In order to successfully attack the enemy through- achieve a decisive combat power advantage wherever out its depth, MNC–I had to efficiently and effective- he chose to commit it. Another way that Odierno ly use all of the tools at its disposal. Despite the surge weighted offensive operations was by the efficient use of forces into Iraq, the coalition presence was still of enablers. III Corps effectively supported the main not large enough to secure every area of the country. effort with the limited available Army attack avia- Under Odierno, MNC–I designated a Stryker bri- tion, engineers, unmanned aerial vehicles, and intelli- gade as the operational reserve, sometimes referred gence assets.26 Likewise, the additional forces gener- to as the “above ground strike force.” Though the des- ated by the surge of the Iraqi Security Forces, along ignation of such a force originated with V Corps, it with the Sons of Iraq program, allowed MNC–I to realized its full potential under III Corps. The strike extend its operational reach and push further into

Army Press Online Journal 17-1 13 January 2017 7 insurgent sanctuaries than would have possible with synchronize its opera- even the additional U.S. surge brigades.27 tions in space and time Maj. Wilson C. Blythe By the end of the III Corps’s deployment in was aided by Odierno’s Jr., U.S. Army, is a February 2008, the situation in Iraq was remarkably use of enablers, weight- strategist assigned to different than when it had assumed duty as MNC–I ing of the main effort the Army Capabilities in December 2006. In January 2008, III Corps’s with his Stryker re- Integration Center. last full month in country, there were six hundred serve, and extension of His service includes war-related Iraqi fatalities throughout the country MNC–I’s operational deployments to Iraq (see figure 5, page 7). This was a dramatic reduction reach through the use and . He in violence from when Odierno’s corps arrived in of Iraqi forces.28 graduated from the November 2006 a month that witnessed nearly 3,500 Despite the focus University of Mississippi Iraqis deaths in the war. This success was rooted in of much of the analy- with a BA in history. He the successful application of operational art. Under sis of U.S. operations holds an MA in history Odierno’s leadership, III Corps became an effective during the surge on from Eastern Michigan operational headquarters. It conducted a series of a supposed COIN- University. He is cur- simultaneous and sustained offensive operations dominated revolution rently pursuing his PhD throughout the enemy’s operational depth, which in the profession of in military history at fragmented enemy support zones and disrupted arms, MNC–I built its the University of North their operations. The tempo of these corps offensives operational concept Texas. Blythe is a 2013 coupled with an active exploitation and pursuit kept on a solidly tradi- recipient of the Army the enemy off balance and prevented enemy forces tional framework and Historical Foundation’s from regrouping. Despite the focus on joint secu- owed its success to the Distinguished Writing rity stations at the tactical level, at the operational effective application Award. level, both the enemy and MNC–I viewed terrain of some of the oldest, in a conventional though noncontiguous way, with most well-established support and security zones, lines of approach and principles of operational art, rather than to a communication, rear areas, etc. MNC–I’s ability to COIN-dominated leitmotif.29

Notes 1. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: federal and provincial governments had the financial resources for The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to public spending. Barack Obama (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012). 7. The elements of operational art are end state and con- 2. Thomas E. Rick,The Gamble: General Petraeus and the Amer- ditions, center of gravity, decisive points, line of operation and ican Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 (New York: Penguin, line of effort, basing, tempo, phasing and transitions, operational 2009). reach, culmination, and risk. 3. Kimberly Kagan, The Surge: A Military History (New York: 8. See, for example, Kaplan, The Insurgents. Encounter Books, 2008). 9. Michael O’Hanlon and Jason Campbell, “Iraq Index: 4. Fred Kaplan, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Change the American Way of War (New York: Simon & Schuster, Iraq,” Brookings Institute website, 28 January 2008, 5, accessed 2013). 19 December 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ 5. Peter Mansoor, Surge: My Journey with General David Petrae- uploads/2016/07/index20080131.pdf; H. R. McMaster (former us and the Remaking of the Iraq (New Haven, CT: advisor to Gen. David Petraeus on the counterinsurgency field Press, 2013). manual), interview by Steve Clay, 20 November 2009, transcript, 6. On 13 February 2008, the Iraqi Parliament passed three Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, important pieces of legislation: the Provincial Powers Law, which , KS, 6–7. defined the relationship between the federal and provincial 10. Peter Chiarelli (former commanding general of V Corps), governments; it also called for provincial elections by 1 October interview by Frank Sobchak, 6 May 2014, transcript, Chief of Staff 2008 as part of the reconciliation process a limited amnesty was of the Army (CSA) Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Study Group, given to detainees in Iraqi custody; and the 2008 budget, which 40. allotted $48 billion for capital expenditures and ensured that the

8 13 January 2017 Army Press Online Journal 17-1 11. Chiarelli, interview, 40; McMaster, interview, 13; Col. Dave of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, “DoD News Briefing with Lt. Pendall, interview by Frank Sobchak, 6 March 2014, transcript, Gen. Odierno from the Pentagon Briefing Room, Arlington, VA, CSA OIF Study Group, Hanscom Air Force Base, MA, 14. GlobalSecurity.org, 4 March 2008, accessed 20 December 2016, 12. Raymond T. Odierno, “The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2008/03/mil- The Heritage Foundation website, 5 March 2008, accessed 20 De- 080304-dod01.htm; Odierno, interview, 19 October 2007, 6; and cember 2016, http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/the-surge- Kagan, The Surge: A Military History, 135. in-iraq-one-year-later; Raymond T. Odierno (former commanding 20. Simmons, DOD Roundtable,1–2. general of III Corps), interview by Mike Visconage, 19 October 21. MNF–I CG SECDEF Weekly Update 12–18 August 07; 2007, transcript, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), MNF–I CG SECDEF Weekly Update 26 August–1 September 07; Baghdad, Iraq, 9. Odierno, interview 19 October 2007, 6; Maj. Gen. James Simmons, 13. For a discussion of lines of operation and lines of effort, DCG Support, 4 and 27 August 2007, DOD Roundtable, 1-2; see chapter III of U.S. , Joint Operation Planning, Kagan, The Surge, 135 and 152; Kagan and Kagan, “The Patton of Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 11 Counterinsurgency”; William Epley, “Surge Paper,” CMH files, 11. August 2011) or chapter 2 of Army Doctrine Reference Publica- 22. Raymond T. Odierno, interview by Mike Visconage, 7 Sep- tion 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publish- tember 2007, transcript, CMH, Baghdad, Iraq, 7; Kagan and Kagan, ing Office, 11 November 2016). “The Patton of Counterinsurgency.” 14. McMaster, interview, 11 and 14–15; Odierno, “The Surge 23. Odierno, “The Surge in Iraq.” in Iraq”; Odierno, interview, 19 October 2007, 9. 24. Nichoel Brooks, interview by Mike Visconage, 18 Septem- 15. Surge brigade combat teams (BCTs): 2nd BCT, 82nd Air- ber 2007, transcript, CMH, Baghdad, Iraq, 57–59; James Hickey, borne Division (arrived 14 February 2007); 4th BCT, 1st Infantry interview by Steve Clay, 23–24 February 2010, transcript, Contem- Division (ID) (arrived 15 March 2007); 3rd BCT, 3rd ID (arrived 15 porary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort April 2007); 4th BCT, 2nd ID (arrived 15 May 2007); 2nd BCT, 3rd Leavenworth, KS, 5; Odierno, “The Surge in Iraq”; and Andrade, (arrived 15 June 2007). Surging South of Baghdad, 152. 16. Dale Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad (Washington, 25. Andrade, Surging South of Baghdad, 17, 21; Hickey, inter- DC: CMH, 2010), 21; Lt. Col. Jeff McDougall, interview by Mike view, 6 and 26. Visconage, 7 July 2007, transcript, CMH, Baghdad, Iraq, 20–22. 26. Col. Martin Wilson, interview by Mike Visconage and Wil- 17. and Kimberly Kagan, “The Patton of liam Epley, 9 June 2007, transcript, CMH, Baghdad, Iraq, 47–48; Counterinsurgency,” Weekly Standard, 10 March 2008; Andrade, Hickey, interview, 7–8. Surging South of Baghad, 21; McDougall, interview, 20–22; Odier- 27. Col. Paul Funk and Lt. Col. Patrick Michaelis, interview by no, “The Surge in Iraq.” Steve Clay, 4 February 2010, transcript, Contemporary Operations 18. Odierno, “The Surge in Iraq”; Department of Defense Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 38. (DOD), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, “DoD Special 28. O’Hanlon and Campbell, “Iraq Index,” 28 January 2008, Briefing with Lt. Gen. Odierno from the Pentagon Briefing Room, 5; Michael O’Hanlon and Jason Campbell, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Arlington, VA,” GlobalSecurity.org, 22 June 2007, accessed 20 Institute website, 31 July 2008, 5, accessed 20 December 2016, December 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/ https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/in- news/2007/06/mil-070622-dod01.htm. dex20080731.pdf. 19. Maj. Gen. James Simmons, DOD Bloggers Roundtable Sub- 29. Kagan and Kagan, “The Patton of Counterinsurgency”; ject: , 27 August 2007, 2; DOD, Office Odierno, “The Surge in Iraq”; Lt. Col. Kent Strader, interview by Lt.

9 13 January 2017 Army Press Online Journal 17-1