PRISM❖ Vol. 3, no. 1 12/2011 PRISM Vol. 3, no. 1 ❖ 12/2011
www.ndu.edu A JOURNAL OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS PRISM ABOUT CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS (CCO) CCO WAS ESTABLISHED TO: PRISM is published by the National Defense University Press for the Center for ❖❖Serve as an information clearinghouse and knowledge Enhancing the U.S. Government’s Ability to manager for complex operations training and education, Publisher Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners on complex and Prepare for Complex Operations acting as a central repository for information on areas Dr. Hans Binnendijk integrated national security operations; reconstruction and nation-building; such as training and curricula, training and education pro- CCO, a center within the Institute for National Strategic relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and vider institutions, complex operations events, and subject Editor and Research Director Studies at National Defense University, links U.S. education to transform America’s security and development apparatus to meet matter experts Government education and training institutions, including Michael Miklaucic tomorrow’s challenges better while promoting freedom today. related centers of excellence, lessons learned programs, ❖❖Develop a complex operations training and education com- and academia, to foster unity of effort in reconstruction munity of practice to catalyze innovation and development Developmental Editor and stability operations, counterinsurgency, and irregular of new knowledge, connect members for networking, share Melanne A. Civic, Esq. COMMUNICATIONS warfare—collectively called “complex operations.” existing knowledge, and cultivate foundations of trust and The Department of Defense, with support from the habits of collaboration across the community Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct Managing Editor State Department and U.S. Agency for International communications to the link on the NDU Press Web site (www.ndu.edu/press) or ❖❖Serve as a feedback and information conduit to the Office Dr. Jeffrey D. Smotherman Development, established CCO as an innovative write to: of the Secretary of Defense and broader U.S. Government interagency partnership. policy leadership to support guidance and problem-solving Production Supervisor Editor, PRISM across the community of practice Tara J. Parekh National Defense University Press ❖❖Enable more effective networking, coordination, and 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) synchronization to support the preparation of Depart- Copy Editors Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319 ment of Defense and other U.S. Government personnel Dr. John J. Church for complex operations Sarah R. Frank Telephone: ❖❖Support lessons learned processes and best practices Calvin B. Kelley (202) 685-3442 compilation in the area of complex operations George C. Maerz FAX: Lisa M. Yambrick (202) 685-3581 ❖❖Identify education and training gaps in the Department of Email: [email protected] Defense and other Federal departments and agencies and PRISM online: www.ndu.edu/press facilitate efforts to fill those gaps. Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich CONTRIBUTIONS Visit the CCO Web site at: http://ccoportal.org Editorial Assistant Nicole E. 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Hoffman, USMCR (Ret.) papers, monographs, and special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, Dr. David Kilcullen national military strategy, regional security affairs, and global strategic problems. Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition ofPRISM . Any Dr. Roger B. Myerson copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without Dr. Moisés Naím permission of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever MG William L. Nash, USA (Ret.) material is quoted from or based on its content. Dr. William Reno Dr. James A. Schear Please visit NDU Press and PRISM online at www.ndu.edu/press for more on upcoming Subscriptions for individuals: http://bookstore.gpo.gov Dr. Joanna Spear issues, an electronic archive of PRISM articles, and access to other publications. Dr. Ruth Wedgwood The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department ISSN 2157–0663 of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government. TITLE
FEATURES 3 Counterinsurgency after Afghanistan: A Concept in Crisis by David H. Ucko 21 Negotiating Afghanistan: When? With Whom? About What? by Thomas R. Pickering
37 The State Department, USAID, and the Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction ndupress.ndu.edu
by Renanah Miles www.ndu.edu/press 47 The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach by Brian M. Burton 63 The Case for Nation-building: Why and How to Fix Failed States by Paul D. Miller 75 No Marshall Plan for the Middle East by Amitai Etzioni 87 Sub-Saharan African Military and Development Activities by Birame Diop 99 Enduring Interests and Partnerships: Military-to-Military Relationships in the Arab Spring by Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., and Elizabeth C. Packard FROM THE FIELD 121 War Comes to Bala Morghab: A Tragedy of Policy and Action in Three Acts by John Bessler LESSONS LEARNED 137 Iraq: A Case Study in Building Civil-Military Capacity, 2007–2010 by Bradford Baylor, Jeanne Burington, Bradford Davis, and Russell Goehring BOOK REVIEW 151 Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security Reviewed by Pauline H. Baker
PRISMPRISM 3, no. 1 FEATURES | 1 Counterinsurgency after Afghanistan A Concept in Crisis
By David H. Ucko
ix years have passed since the publication of Field Manual (FM) 3−24, Counterinsurgency. Embraced by sections of the military and civilian defense community seeking a fresh approach S to the conflict in Iraq, the new field manual gained a political significance and profile unlike previous doctrinal publications. When General David Petraeus was able to incorporate some of the manual’s core precepts into the new U.S. strategy for Iraq, and casualties and instability in Iraq declined over the following few years, both counterinsurgency doctrine and the people associated with it gained unprecedented influence. Since then, the buzz that counterinsurgency acquired has worn off—for several reasons. Most fundamentally, there is widespread frustration over the attempt to use counterinsurgency doctrine to stabilize Afghanistan. Second, there are now several counternarratives to the popular notion that U.S. counterinsurgency theory pulled Iraq back from the brink: key here is that local factors, not U.S. inputs, explain what happened during the period that Americans like to call the surge. Third, large-scale and protracted military operations to build nations, unify states, and establish legitimate and competent governments are undertakings that, even if workable, run counter to the fiscal realities facing the West today. In the end, the critics pile on, counterinsurgency is naïve in its assumptions, unworkable in its requirements, and arrogant in its unfounded claims of prior success. Based on the rise and decline of counterinsurgency over the past few years, this article seeks to assess the utility of this concept and its future as a defense priority and area of research.1 It concludes that the discussion of counterinsurgency is marred by the polarizing effects of the term itself, which have encouraged a bandwagon effect, both in favor of and now in opposition to the term. Lost in this heated and overly personalized polemic is a necessary and more careful analysis of what can and cannot be expected from this concept and its associated doctrine. By teasing out its contribution to military think- ing, its limitations, and its proper use, this article seeks to identify those aspects of counterinsurgency
Dr. David H. Ucko is an Assistant Professor in the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University.
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theory that should be retained even if the term other counterinsurgency practices—careful itself is once again cast aside. This conceptual intelligence work, close partnering with Iraqi discussion has more than mere academic import, security forces, greater attentiveness toward as it will shape the way recent counterinsurgency issues of local governance—the shift in strategy campaigns are remembered and the likelihood of produced a country-wide decline in violence. past mistakes being repeated. There have been many efforts to discredit this account, recounted here in its most thread- Contribution of Counterinsurgency bare form. One argument centers on the nature Theory in Iraq of counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and The discussion of counterinsurgency and suggests that the new approach succeeded due Iraq now tends to focus on the degree to which to increased use of violence rather than softer the new doctrine helped U.S. forces stabi- notions such as “population security” and lize the country during the so-called surge of “hearts and minds.” A second argument claims 2007–2009. The instant wisdom on this issue that U.S. forces in Iraq were peripheral to the suggested a stark discontinuity in strategy fol- change in security and that the real reason for lowing General Petraeus’s redeployment to Iraq the decline in casualties was the completion of in February 2007, this time as commander of ethnic cleansing across much of Baghdad, which Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I). Before obviated further violence. A third albeit related that, so the argument goes, most U.S. troops counternarrative ascribes the decline in violence were confined to large forward operating bases to the evolution of the civil war in Iraq: by this and left their compounds only for discrete oper- argument, the contest between al Qaeda in Iraq ations, typically to find, capture, and kill sus- (AQI), various Sunni tribes and rejectionist ele- pected insurgents. In changing course, General ments, and the Shia-dominated death squads operating out of the Ministry of the Interior had there is something febrile about the by 2007 evolved to a point where a drop-off in flurry of efforts seeking to discredit what violence was to be expected regardless of U.S. actions. In other words, U.S. forces were sim- was achieved by General Petraeus and ply bystanders, later erroneously credited with the troops under his command a trend with which they had little to do. This last argument is sometimes supported by a fourth Petraeus relied on some of the principles in the claim, namely that U.S. forces had implemented counterinsurgency manual that he had pub- the tactics and techniques apparently “intro- lished 2 months before arriving in-theater. The duced” by General Petraeus prior to his return to focus thus shifted toward providing security to Iraq, which again “proves” that it was the coin- the population, which required a dispersion of cidence of his arrival with local phenomena, not newly reinforced U.S. forces throughout their the new strategy itself, that accounts for the drop respective areas of operation, their partnering in casualties during the ensuing 2 years. Finally, with local Iraqi forces, and sustainment of sta- of course, there is the argument that the appear- bility through the establishment of a fixed and ance of stability in Iraq is illusory and that the combined presence in Iraq’s most contested country’s worst years still lie ahead—that the cities, towns, and neighborhoods. Along with counterinsurgency campaign failed.
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GEN Petraeus reenlists over 500 Servicemembers during ceremony at Al Faw Palace, Baghdad, July 2007 U.S. Army (Jon Soucy)
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There is good cause to challenge the initial aggravating here is the perceived collusion accounts of what happened during the surge, among officers, pundits, and politicians in weav- particularly as many of these paid insufficient ing a tale of success from which they all prosper. attention to the Iraqi perspective on the events The ulterior motives for revisiting the surge of this period. At the same time, there is some- do not necessarily diminish the potency of the thing febrile about the flurry of efforts seeking to overall charge. However, as with most matters discredit what was achieved by General Petraeus academic, the issue is rarely one of being right and the troops under his command. Often this or wrong but rather one of balance and con- is more than a well-meaning attempt to learn text. Take the argument that the surge relied on more about a critical period of the Iraq War and increased violence and civilian fatalities rather descends into more parochial concerns, both than any specific adherence to counterinsurgency within the American political scene and within principles. While there are statistics to support the American military. Politically, the surge is this claim, it would be premature to look at the significant for the fact that it was pushed onto spike in casualties during the initial months of the a reluctant yet ultimately compliant Democrat- surge and conclude that counterinsurgency rheto- dominated Congress by a bullish and vehemently ric about civil security is mere cant. Various esti- disliked Republican President who, to many mates from Iraq show that whereas civilian casu- observers, could do no right. To acknowledge alties, security incidents, and recovery of weapons some level of success in this endeavor, particu- all increased in 2007, they then diminished fairly larly when the benchmarks insisted upon by dramatically in the ensuing years.3 Unless all of Democratic lawmakers were so unashamedly these estimates are wrong, the notion that the ignored, would be to show political weakness; surge produced and relied on more violence is better to insist the surge had nothing to do with quite easy to counter, or at least to contextualize: it or that its results were disheartening.2 while the infusion and sustained presence of U.S. Within the U.S. military, the strategy forces in areas previously denied to them caused behind the surge was driven by a group of offi- increased casualties, the long-term effect of the cers inspired by the theory and principles of shift in strategy was undeniably stabilizing. This counterinsurgency against the backdrop of an also explains the concrete walls, barriers, check- institution resistant to such ideas. The accolades points, and other population-control measures that these officers earned during and immedi- imposed as part of the counterinsurgency cam- ately following the change of course in Iraq may paign. While these may seem repressive, specific have antagonized those who either represented case studies from particular areas of Iraq show earlier (and by association “failed”) strategies, that they were introduced and placed to prevent or who simply resented the quick ascendance armed attacks and halt cycles of violence—and of a new cabal of purported “warrior-scholars.” there is evidence that it worked. Lastly, within the think-tank circuit and aca- There is a second, deeper bone of conten- demia, the increased interest in counterinsur- tion here, namely that the authors of FM 3–24 gency has turned the field into something of a deliberately misled their readers with promises fad, which was bound to provoke dissent—par- of a “kinder, gentler war,” in which populations ticularly given the inevitably uneven quality would be secure, hearts and minds would be of much of the associated scholarship. Most won, and no one would get hurt.4 The increased
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use of force during the surge is therefore brought and intelligence-enabled operations against up to “prove” the hypocrisy of counterinsur- those adversaries deemed irreconcilable. gency theorists who prescribe one form of war If agreement can be reached that the change in their field manuals but conduct a far bloodier in U.S. strategy at least coincided with the gradual campaign on the ground. There is merit to this stabilization of Iraq, to what degree was it the U.S. charge; some counterinsurgency experts argu- military’s doing? Most efforts to downplay the U.S. ably oversold the more pleasant-sounding facets role point to local developments with supposedly of these types of operations when speaking to greater explanatory value. One intriguing hypoth- the press and civilians, perhaps to obtain the esis is that ethnic cleansing in Baghdad had come necessary buy-in for a campaign that, by 2006 sufficiently close to completion as to obviate any and 2007, was deeply unpopular.5 further violence.7 Thus, rather than signifying a More generally, the accusation against the U.S. success, the declining levels of violence actu- counterinsurgency community tends to ignore ally speak to a gross failure to prevent violence, the vital context in which the doctrine was which had simply burned itself out. It is difficult to written. The 2006 field manual was an antith- evaluate this argument fully with the information esis to the previous approach toward operations in Iraq, an approach more concerned with root- violence initially increased, but its ing out individual terrorists than with local per- ceptions of legitimacy, the preferences of the purpose was to set the conditions for population, and the deeper causes of violence. longer term civil security It was also an antithesis to previous understand- ings of counterinsurgency within the U.S. mili- available today. At the same time, adherents to tary, which emphasized a narrow range of secu- this hypothesis face some challenges. First, even rity-related tasks geared toward the destruction if ethnic cleansing had petered out by 2007, U.S. of the enemy rather than the political drivers of units deploying in 2006 witnessed sustained death instability.6 This context explains any overem- squad activity and, importantly, were able to arrest phasis in the manual on the softer or nonlethal such violence through practices that would later instruments of counterinsurgency, though it characterize the surge. Then-Colonel J.B. Burton’s should be added that the manual never refutes Dagger Brigade was based in northwest Baghdad the importance of coercive operations as part from November 2006 and witnessed a cycle of of a counterinsurgency campaign. Given this violence generated by Shia death squads infil- context, the surge did not depart from the prin- trating the Sunni community, which as a defense ciples of the field manual, but reflects its deli- mechanism sided with AQI for protection or ret- cate balance between coercion and co-option. ribution. By partnering with Sunni community Violence initially increased, but its purpose leaders, Dagger Brigade was able to interpose was to set the conditions for longer term civil itself—with concrete barriers, combined outposts, security. This is not to say that coercion did not and checkpoints—between the two communities continue to feature as an important component and thereby deny the death squads access to their of the overall strategy; reflecting the balance in would-be targets. Casualties in northwest Baghdad the field manual, the Joint Special Operations diminished as a result.8 Put simply, this specific Command (JSOC) continued to launch precise case reveals how counterinsurgency practices
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actively helped arrest ethnic cleansing rather than military in Iraq is precisely the role played by just react to its final dividend—and there are other the Anbar tribes and the predominantly Sunni similar cases to go on.9 militias (also known as Sons of Iraq) that allied Second, the ethnic cleansing argument themselves with the U.S. military against more would need to explain why this process was not extremist organizations. The argument here is in itself destabilizing, given the forced population that the Sunni groups took the fight to AQI and movements, seizure of property, and large-scale U.S. forces were acquiescing bystanders. The death toll involved. It seems odd that none of only way the United States could have done this would have provoked revanchist tenden- wrong, in other words, was by obstructing these cies. At the very least, may it be claimed that Sunni groups as they went about their business. the surge helped hold such tendencies in check? Some might argue that this in itself represents Going further, it may be conceivable that casual- something of an achievement given the U.S. ties would decline due to the forced separation active marginalization of Iraq’s Sunni political of combatants, but this phenomenon can hardly leaders in previous years.13 But there are two explain the economic, political, and security- more fundamental points to be made. related progress seen in Iraq since 2007 or the First, the notion of the U.S. military as nearly 160,000 internally displaced Baghdadis the “accidental hero” of Iraq belies the active who had returned to the city by 2009.10 measures taken by its forces to enable and con- Third, the ethnic cleansing argument fails solidate the gains made by its local allies on the to explain the stabilization of much of Anbar ground. As critics of U.S. operations in Iraq Province in 2006 and 2007, where the vast major- are often keen to point out, part of the effort ity of the population is Sunni. Here, as then- involved putting some newfound allies on the Colonel Sean MacFarland observed, the fear of a payroll so as to finance their new agenda. A Shia central government and security forces had more generous assessment would also include pushed the Sunni tribal leaders into the arms of the combined patrols, joint security stations, AQI.11 While this partnership had given these advising, and partnering—all new or enhanced tribes greater clout, the alliance was by 2005 initiatives that saw U.S. and local forces work beginning to fray given the tribes’ growing desire together toward the same end. Also important to participate in formal politics and the stark dif- in this regard are the aforementioned check- ferences between their national goals and AQI’s points, concrete barriers, and other resources transnational and extremist agenda.12 When the brought to bear by the U.S. forces, which rift led to violent attacks and clashes between helped consolidate security gains. One can tribal and AQI forces, the United States was able discuss the relative importance of local versus to partner with the former to help target a com- American forces in various parts of Iraq, but mon enemy. In other words, ethnic cleansing was it would seem tendentious to suggest that the neither a driver nor a solution to the violence in latter never had a role to play. It is in all likeli- Anbar; in contrast, the careful implementation hood, as the International Crisis Group found at of various counterinsurgency practices played a the time, that “the surge in some cases benefited major role in supporting one side against another. from, in others encouraged, and in the remain- On this point, a second factor used to der produced, a series of politico-military shifts downplay the achievements of the U.S. affecting the Sunni and Shiite communities,”
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with the geographic variation suggesting a need General Petraeus’s return to Iraq in February for greater micro-level analysis of specific towns 2007? This argument has less to do with the and areas to truly get at the root of the prob- merits of counterinsurgency as an operational lem.14 Such an analysis would also reveal the approach and instead concerns the general’s full range of U.S. actions included under the status as an innovator. Whether we speak of unfortunate rubric of the “surge,” all of which the joint security stations or the partnerships were grounded in a political strategy designed with Sunni tribes, it is true that these counter- to break the cycle of sectarian violence, move insurgency practices predate General Petraeus’s Iraq’s communities toward sustainable political arrival, but this fact does not in itself devalue accommodation, and remove their sponsorship either approach. The suggestion has been made for extremist organizations and militias. that because they had been tried before, it was There is a second and broader issue here: the not the practices themselves but the context distinction between foreign and local inputs is in which they were implemented post-2007 not only artificial but also unhelpful when seek- that made the difference. This is problematic ing to understand a counterinsurgency campaign because it is largely impossible to assess a strat- such as that conducted in Iraq, where a third- egy in isolation from the context for which it party state intervenes to help one party prevail was devised and in which it was implemented. over another. Douglas Ollivant makes the point Still, it is important not to undervalue General that in counterinsurgency, “success is deeply dependent upon the alignment of local interests 15 it is largely impossible to assess a with U.S. goals.” Indeed, partnering and rely- strategy in isolation from the context ing on political structures and forces that share one’s agenda, either in part or in full, does not for which it was devised and in which it represent an abdication of control or loss of ini- was implemented tiative; it is in fact what a third-party counterin- surgency force must do to have effect. Yet working Petraeus’s influence. As commander of MNF–I with local partners is not easy; it reflects profi- and with an additional five brigades, he was able ciency in counterinsurgency for foreign forces to to consolidate the approaches that he deemed be able to read the local environment, identify successful, integrate them as part of the MNF–I opportunities for local partnerships, and build on campaign plan, ground that campaign plan in a these opportunities to further joint objectives. political strategy that reflected the character of As emphasized in counterinsurgency doctrine, the conflict, and sustain and amplify the tenta- this requires a deep understanding of the local tive security gains enabled theretofore. environment, its people, and their fears and aspi- Finally, of course, there is the argument that rations, not least because such an understanding the appearance of stability in Iraq was illusory allows intervening troops to gauge the local legit- and that the country’s worst years still lie ahead. imacy of those actors willing and able to support Many problems remained following the surge: the stated objectives. substandard electricity output had not improved, What about the argument that many of terrorist attacks remained a regular occurrence, the counterinsurgency practices related to and, more recently, the formation of a new gov- the surge had already been adopted prior to ernment has been hugely problematic. Still, the
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outcome of the counterinsurgency campaign in commanders. It would be untrue to state that Iraq cannot be judged with rose-colored glasses. U.S. conduct of counterinsurgency operations First, it is worth noting the starting conditions in began under General Petraeus in February 2007, Iraq in 2006, a time in which insurgent attacks, but even so, his campaign plan helped consolidate roaming death squads, and military operations various operational approaches and elevate them contributed to 1,000 to 2,000 casualties per to the strategic level. Clearly, U.S. inputs were not month.16 Second, there is the hackneyed but the only or the main factor contributing to the nonetheless valuable point that counterinsurgen- decline in violence, and analysis must be sensitive cies take a long time and that the surge in Iraq to other developments on the ground. Still, the lasted merely 3 years. Third, even the relative evidence strongly suggests that the United States stability gained in these years continues to have was more than an opportunistic bystander claim- effects. U.S. security forces now play an advisory ing credit for something it did not help shape. role, yet large-scale violence has not returned. In the 2 years following the surge, the daily output Afghanistan and the Limits of electricity doubled (and the demand for elec- of Counterinsurgency tricity skyrocketed).17 And finally, even though If the introduction of counterinsurgency the situation in Iraq remains tense, the aim of principles in operational planning helped turn General Petraeus’s campaign plan was to create the tide in Iraq, why has the same process not space in which political reconciliation could led to strategic success in Afghanistan? After occur. That this process stalled can be pinned all, General Petraeus was made commander in part on inadequate political engagement fol- of U.S. Central Command partly so that his lowing the withdrawal of U.S. troops—perhaps remit would include Afghanistan and the the focus shifted too precipitously from Iraq to regional conflagration driving the conflict there. Afghanistan—but the main cause is of course the Meanwhile, General Stanley McChrystal, the Iraqi government itself, a partner over which the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) United States only has so much leverage. commander appointed in 2009, was part of the “Petraeus team,” having commanded JSOC in Iraq. The counterinsurgency guidance issued there is the argument that the by General McChrystal strongly echoed the appearance of stability in Iraq was counterinsurgency principles of FM 3–24 and illusory and that the country’s worst the guidance provided by General Petraeus in years still lie ahead Iraq. Proponents of counterinsurgency therefore face a seemingly challenging question: why did counterinsurgency apparently work in Iraq and A measured analysis of the use of counter- fail in Afghanistan? More fundamentally, what insurgency principles and doctrine in Iraq, from does this patchy track record say about counter- 2006 onward, reveals that they did inform the insurgency’s credibility as a concept? U.S. approach, which in turn helped stabilize These seemingly poignant questions belie a the country. Much relied on the opportunity to gross misunderstanding of counterinsurgency— partner with local armed groups sharing key objec- one that explains the heated polemic that the tives, an opportunity skillfully harnessed by U.S. term has provoked. Counterinsurgency offers a
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collection of insights and guidelines collected of obstructionist elements within the Afghan from past operations, which, if used and adapted government, partly due to a lack of leverage. As in a manner sensitive to local context, can a result, the central government is still seen as help in the design and execution of a specific corrupt, illegitimate, and incompetent, which campaign plan. Yet counterinsurgency is not a unsurprisingly has fueled the insurgency. strategy. To the degree that the principles and Second, the U.S. military in Iraq was practices of counterinsurgency worked in Iraq, able to make full use of the emerging rift it was because they were tied to a campaign between AQI and the Sunni tribes of Anbar. plan informed by the specific enabling factors The causes of the rift are in contention: sug- relevant to that operation. Few of these were gestions include a clash in illicit business in place in Afghanistan, yet this did not inform interests, visions for the future of Iraq, and the attempted implementation of similar tech- cultural mores; others claim the Sunni tribes niques and approaches. To put it succinctly, best designated AQI as an enemy in order to earn practice is not best strategy.18 U.S. support and establish a better position for First, the coalition in Iraq had at least a themselves politically.22 Regardless of motive, moderately cooperative host-nation partner in the coalition has found no similar partner in Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who by 2007 Afghanistan, so its counterinsurgency practices was recasting himself as a national rather than on the local level have had to be conducted in sectarian leader.19 It is true that much of what isolation. Attempts to stand up an equivalent the United States did in Anbar Province was to the Sunni Awakening and Sons of Iraq in done without the outright support of the central Afghanistan have stuttered because whereas government, resulting in a problematic reinte- the latter were based on preexisting structures, gration process for the Sunni forces that fought each with its own interests, grievances, and against AQI. Still, despite such difficulties, the aspirations, the Afghan “replicas” have had to situation in Iraq still compares favorably to that be manufactured from scratch. As such, these in Afghanistan, where Hamid Karzai proved local defense forces typically lack the neces- either unable or unwilling to move against the sary unity of command, training, and purpose, warlords and other actors who had established which has in turn resulted in poor discipline, themselves (often with coalition assistance) accountability, and effectiveness.23 during the previous years. Furthermore in Iraq, Many other divergences obtain: the level the coalition was far more invested in reforming of presidential commitment to the respec- those ministries that had been penetrated by tive campaign, financial realities underpin- Shia radical elements, transformed into fiefdoms ning each operation, regional context, and of sectarian power, and used to target and deny respective level of unity of command. On services to Sunni communities.20 Specifically, this last point, it bears noting that whereas the 2007 campaign plan stipulated working the United States controlled the vast major- with Maliki to remove or ideally prosecute ity of coalition forces in Iraq, the overall “highly sectarian and/or corrupt leaders within effort in Afghanistan has been hampered by his government’s senior ranks”—and pres- the disparate interests and commitment of sure was applied to this end.21 Until recently, various North Atlantic Treaty Organization there has been no similarly focused sidelining (NATO) partners. Similar problems expressed
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Marine with Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team offers water to Afghan boy Royal Air Force (Neil Chapman)
themselves in Iraq, with the United States ramping up in 2007 while the United Kingdom withdrew its troops. Even so, the scale of the problem in Iraq was far less serious with a mere two countries involved rather than the 47 currently contributing to ISAF. Only a handful of these 47 countries have authorized their troops to operate at an intensity appropriate for the campaign; others have imposed caveats on where and how their troops can be deployed. This in turn has further reduced the number of usable NATO forces—a number that despite substantial U.S. reinforcements has never reached the levels seen in Iraq.24 The broader point is that intervening troops need a strategy that makes full use of available means and existing opportunities in ways that help reach stated objectives. In Iraq, the objective was to stop the cycle of violence and create sufficient space for a possible process of bottom-up and top-down political accommodation, a difficult but achievable objective given the proper exploitation of the opportunities on the ground. In Afghanistan, the strategic objective has been to “disrupt, dismantle and defeat al- Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.”25 This aim is far more ambitious than that governing the surge in Iraq; it also conditions a counterterrorism operation against a transnational entity on an ambitious state-building effort based in one country. U.S. policymakers are not blind to the ensuing dilemma and have sought to downgrade the plan’s ambition by lowering the bar for how capable and accountable Afghan institutions should be before NATO troops can withdraw. Thus, in recent years, we have heard several times that there is no “objec- tive of turning Afghanistan into Switzerland” and that Afghanistan will not “be a model Jeffersonian democracy.”26 These qualifications may help shape expectations but they also raise the question of
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what indeed is being aimed for and how it will it does not provide a formulaic solution to the be achieved with the means and time available. problem of political violence. Moreover, it does Furthermore, even with ambitions officially not substitute for a comprehensible strategy with downplayed, foreign occupation of Afghanistan which to tackle insurgencies, al Qaeda, or the remains formidably challenging given the coun- threat of global terrorism. Finally, to value the try’s terrain, size, geostrategic location, and his- theory and doctrine of counterinsurgency does tory. Finally, as al Qaeda is constrained neither to not imply support for counterinsurgency cam- Afghanistan nor Pakistan, it would subsist even paigns around the world or for the use of this if the counterinsurgency campaign was successful concept wherever political instability may arise. and the region was radically transformed. For all of these reasons, counterinsurgency is often seen as an ill-suited and overly grandi- counterinsurgency doctrine does not ose response to the problem of al Qaeda and is envisage or allow for painless foreign judged accordingly as a bad policy option for interventions; it does not provide a Afghanistan, rather than as a collection of prin- formulaic solution to the problem of ciples and practices detached from any one cam- political violence paign and operating below the realm of strategy. In part, this misperception is due to a dearth of substance and thought at the strategic level, which What, then, does counterinsurgency do? has sucked the operational and tactical precepts of In general terms, its main contribution lies counterinsurgency upward to fill the gap.27 Some in its various principles, which touch on the counterinsurgency proponents and operators importance of achieving a nuanced politi- have reinforced this tendency: in the absence of cal understanding of the campaign, operating a clear strategy, the catchwords of counterinsur- under unified command, using intelligence to gency (population security, governance, legitimacy) guide operations, isolating insurgents from the are confused with strategic ends and pursued all at population, using the minimum amount of force once, with no prioritization or clear end in mind. necessary to achieve set objectives, and assur- Missed in this hurried embrace of newly rediscov- ing and maintaining the perceived legitimacy ered theory is the need to adapt its premises and of the counterinsurgency effort in the eyes of principles to meet specific political goals.28 This is the populace. Most important, perhaps, is the something far beyond the capacity of a field man- exhortation to adapt and arrive at a tailored ual or an operational concept, though these can response rather than fall back on templates.29 prove valuable in tying carefully defined strategic These principles may seem commonsensi- aims to the design of operations. cal, even trite. For instance, there is nothing controversial about linking good intelligence A Corrective Antithesis to effective strike operations, and it is also clear By scaling back the expectations of that where adversaries and civilians look alike, what counterinsurgency as a concept can obtaining good intelligence requires a special do, its value may be more fully appreciated. understanding of and with the local population. Counterinsurgency doctrine does not envis- Similarly, it is difficult to fault the notion that age or allow for painless foreign interventions; understanding the environment, its people, and
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structures presents external actors with more In the 1980s, a combination of international and better options, or that controlling and influ- incidents, operational setbacks, and congres- encing key populations first require that they sional pressure forced the military to return to are adequately isolated from the intimidation the topic of counterinsurgency. Along with the and coercion of others. As to the focus on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian legitimacy of the intervention itself and of the revolution and hostage crisis, U.S. policymakers actors it seeks to support, this is a fairly obvious noted with some alarm the ascendance of left- corollary of the need to establish political and leaning regimes in several countries: Ethiopia military control over select populations.30 in 1974, Mozambique in 1975, Angola in 1976, What then is the worth of these principles? and Grenada and Nicaragua in 1979. The con- The key lies partly in what precedes counter- clusion drawn was that the U.S. military needed insurgency dialectically: the thesis to which to master low-intensity operations, a new term for counterinsurgency provides the antithesis. In counterinsurgency and other “irregular” activi- the last half century, counterinsurgency theory ties.32 Once again, new doctrine was issued, and principles have repeatedly helped illustrate training exercises were adapted, and new cen- the complexity of intrastate violence and its ters and commands were opened (notably U.S. distinctiveness from the “conventional” types Special Operations Command). This time, the of military campaigns for which most Western new knowledge was practiced in El Salvador, a armed forces are structured and trained. In the testing-ground for a vicarious form of counter- U.S. context, this pattern is particularly clear: insurgency that was fought with U.S. advisors interest in counterinsurgency has spiked when rather than combat troops. senior civilian and/or military leaders realize The U.S. military’s most recent “counterin- the limitations of conventional military force surgency era” was also motivated by a previous in managing the security problems of the day. failure to grapple with the political complexities of In the early 1960s, President John F. war.33 Throughout the 1990s, U.S. military think- Kennedy grew concerned that the U.S. policy of ing was marked by a highly conventional and apo- “massive retaliation” was too inflexible to address litical understanding of war, epitomized by the the rising threat of political subversion. Reacting program of “defense transformation.” Resistance to the ascendance of communism in Vietnam to the peacekeeping operations of the Clinton- and Laos, the instability of decolonization in era dovetailed perfectly with a growing fascination Africa, and the communist revolution in Cuba, with information technology and precision-strike Kennedy pushed U.S. forces to learn about coun- capabilities: The future of war lay not with the terguerrilla warfare.31 In the following years, the infantry rotating in and out of seemingly end- U.S. military developed new tactics and training less peace operations, but with airstrikes, drones, exercises, expanded its special operations capac- computers, and satellites dispensing force swiftly, ity, and increased its understanding of counter- precisely, and decisively. Yet this understanding of insurgency. The most well known (but by no war provided scant preparation for the insurgency means only) application of the new knowledge created by the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In was in Vietnam, a campaign whose unhappy his- the effort to understand and respond to the esca- tory again served to relegate counterinsurgency lating violence, counterinsurgency came to experi- to the margins of military priorities. ence its most recent peak. In that sense, the study
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of counterinsurgency again brought a welcome thinking on war and peace that has tended to departure from prior false expectations; it was a dominate within Western militaries. It will be much-needed antithesis to a thesis that had not important to consider how these functions will withstood its encounter with practice. Specifically, fare should counterinsurgency, as a term and a the concept instilled the idea that while wars are priority, again be pushed off the table. easy to begin, they are difficult to end, and that Upon further review, the grouping function doing so requires a firm understanding of what can be useful but is probably dispensable. There causes violence in the first place. In reaffirming are certainly as many risks and dangers as there the political essence of war, it also forced a greater are benefits in bringing together operations from understanding of the local population and rec- different epochs and geographical settings just ognition of social and economic context, which because they share the epithet counterinsurgency, in turn brought concepts such as legitimacy and a term whose meaning has evolved over time. governance to the fore. Furthermore, the selection of operations for inclusion in this category is somewhat arbitrary “Counterinsurgency Is Dead; Long and excludes from consideration many interven- Live Counterinsurgency” tions and armed campaigns that have relevant The (re)discovery of counterinsurgency traits, but that were referred to by different terms: represents a step forward from the conventional stability operations, small wars, robust peacekeeping, narrow-mindedness that dominated American or postconflict peacebuilding. It is better to group defense thinking in the 1990s. Despite this past and current campaigns based on their shared important function as an antithesis, one that is characteristics than by what they are called. still being served, it looks almost inevitable that the term counterinsurgency will fall out of use. A main factor is the gradual drawdown of NATO the (re)discovery of counterinsurgency troops from Afghanistan, which will remove represents a step forward from the the primary impetus for studying and preparing conventional narrow-mindedness that for counterinsurgency. Those wishing to justify dominated American defense thinking in a continued focus on this form of warfare will the 1990s then need to appeal to the possibility of future counterinsurgency campaigns, which will strike most audiences, whether governments, militar- Indeed, the study of counterinsurgency may ies, or electorates, as a singularly unattractive even benefit from going beyond this one term proposition. Counterinsurgency has not been a and considering a far broader canvas of military happy experience, and there will be no desire to interventions. To date, scholarship on counter- prep for an encore. insurgency has been rather self-referential and Dropping counterinsurgency, however, inward-looking, rehashing the same case studies would be to forfeit the functions that the term or obsessing over the intricacies of theory (such plays, first in grouping nominally similar types of as the seemingly endless discussion of what is operations into one helpful category for insight, truly meant by “hearts and minds”). Indeed, it comparison, and analysis, and second in provid- would be fair to say that counterinsurgency fares ing the often-needed antithesis to the type of better as an antithesis—as a critique of what
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preceded it—than as a thesis. Partly as a result of conventional or irregular. In the American this, and because of the quick rise of counterin- experience, each reencounter with counter- surgency as a mainstream topic, outsiders often insurgency and similar missions has provoked come to view the whole field as a fad, unworthy such a dichotomy: in the 1960s, it was termed of serious academic attention. Looking beyond general versus limited war, in the 1980s, it was the confines of counterinsurgency and taking high- versus low-intensity conflicts, and in the a broader interest in the dynamics of military 1990s, perhaps most awkwardly, it was war ver- intervention would provide fresh fodder for a sus military operations other than war. While field whose scope is often too narrow. the cruder distinctions have since been aban- It is less certain whether the term’s second doned,36 it is still common to hear of irregular function, as a useful antithesis, has been fully versus what must be presumed to be regular served. For that reason, abandoning counterin- wars, and of asymmetric challenges as if there surgency would need to be done with two criti- are conventional adversaries out there who cal caveats in mind. First, this should in no way would prefer to fight wars symmetrically. signify a return to the status quo ante, that is, to At first, such distinctions are helpful, as they an understanding of war as a conventional and rightly frame stabilization and counterinsurgency decisively military confrontation occurring on an as problems that require a different mindset and isolated, unpopulated battlefield. This archetype, skills and that deserve independent study. At the entrenched in Western military thinking, stems same time, the theoretical dichotomies encourage from a grossly simplified recollection of just a few an unspoken belief that these types of operations wars that disproportionately shape our under- have rarefied equivalents in practice. In so doing, standing of this phenomenon, predominantly they suggest that states have that unlikely luxury World War II. Yet it is an understanding of war of being able to pick and choose between conven- that is blind not only to the history from which tional and irregular wars and that they can tailor it borrows, but also to the real purpose of war, their forces and interventions accordingly. Missed to wit, the consolidation of a political compact here is an appreciation for war as a complex politi- that is preferable to what came before it, and a cal phenomenon, one that typically encompasses compact that is also sustainable.34 This means both irregular and conventional challenges and that even predominantly conventional wars will whose operating environment is rarely static but usually bleed seamlessly into a less conventional instead difficult to control. phase because the gains made in combat require This gives rise to the second caveat that must consolidation through stabilization, political sup- be taken onboard if counterinsurgency were to be port, capacity-building, or reconstruction.35 pushed off the table: eschewing the term does Instead of returning to conventional war not mean that the operational challenges asso- as an alternative to counterinsurgency, the ciated with it will be avoided. Importantly, this point would be to arrive at a more integrated remains the case even if we do not see another understanding of war that is informed by the counterinsurgency campaign or stability operation experiences and campaigns of recent years, but in the near future. The bitter truth is that future dispense with the divisive and vague jargon that land-based operations, whatever character they they have provoked. Ideally, this would also may take, are likely to involve a similar range of put an end to the bifurcation of wars as either tasks as seen in today’s campaigns. With the global
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trend of urbanization, most operations will be con- what it means to understand the terrain will nat- ducted in built-up and inhabited environments urally depend on its dominant features, one of where the local population cannot be ignored but, which is the absence or presence of civilian popu- more often, must be co-opted and even protected lations. As to the requirements for effective coun- against attack. Given U.S. expeditionary ambi- terinsurgency—in terms of troops, knowledge, tions, operations will typically be conducted in and time—this has far broader validity, touching foreign polities, languages, and cultures. While upon the need to support and resource operations U.S. politicians may once more try to avoid future to meet set objectives. Finally, the emphasis on nation-building, most military operations occur the local population as a potential partner should in environments where the state’s reach and not be a concern lodged exclusively within the institutions have suffered significant damage or domain of counterinsurgency, much as the need destruction: either it is the lack of state control to adapt and learn faster than the enemy is a car- that prompts intervention (as in Afghanistan), dinal requirement for all warfare, not just wars or it is the intervention itself that removes the conducted against irregular adversaries. These are state (as in Iraq). In either case, U.S. forces will principles of war, not of counterinsurgency, but it be operating in areas with weak formal structures, has taken the rediscovery of counterinsurgency, where criminality, informal networks of patron- and difficult campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, age, proliferation of small arms, and substate poli- to give them new meaning. tics are all common and need to be understood. If The final exhortation would be that even one couples all this with the near inevitability of with this broader understanding of war, the operating within a local population with whom deployment of armed forces will lead to disap- the foreign forces will enjoy at best transient pointment unless intervening governments legitimacy, the broader relevance of experiences devote more energy and resources toward the for- in Iraq and Afghanistan becomes clear. mulation of strategy. This touches upon the seri- Critically, this type of forecasting speaks ousness and sincerity with which the states that not of conventional or of counterinsurgency engage in expeditionary operations approach operations, but relies on a broader conception of these endeavors. In turn, this raises the issue of military intervention based on political purpose whether and how convincingly foreign military and likely challenges. At the same time, what interventions are linked to the national inter- this analysis suggests is that the lessons learned est of the states involved. Further intellectual in recent counterinsurgency operations must be investment on this end may be the most useful retained even if the term falls into disuse. This first step in addressing the down-river problems would also involve exporting the principles com- of commitment, capability, and performance, monly associated with counterinsurgency to a and in transforming the armed forces and other broader realm of military scenarios where they relevant government departments accordingly. are often equally applicable.37 For example, while counterinsurgency is purportedly primarily polit- Conclusion ical, the same holds for all military operations. Counterinsurgency has experienced a rapid Similarly, the exhortation in counterinsurgency rise and an equally rapid fall. The process has theory to understand the environment is equally happened so quickly, within such a politicized critical in wars of territorial conquest—though and personalized context, that the initial reasons
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for rediscovering this approach to operations tend to be lost. Instead, there is a loud polemic as to why counterinsurgency was a bad idea to begin with. Some of these arguments have merit; others are tendentious and lacking in context. Almost all of the polemic ignores two fundamental points. First, counterinsurgency theory does not advocate ambitious interventions in foreign countries, but provides guidelines and principles that have worked in similar settings and that may again be leaned upon if and when soldiers are deployed to stabilize war-torn countries. Careful study and research is needed to determine how best to apply these principles to ongoing and future operations, and it is fair to say that the theory is better at raising the right questions than in providing the answers. Second, counterinsurgencies are not always optional and future interventions are therefore likely to occur, even after the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq draw down. This is not to say that these campaigns should be entered into carelessly, or that they would even take the form of a coun- terinsurgency or stability operation per se. Instead, given the nature of the contemporary operating environment, most land-based campaigns seem likely to reproduce many of the challenges faced in today’s counterinsurgencies: those of operating in an urban environment, in the midst of a civilian population, in a different language and culture, all while countering irregular or hybrid adversaries. In the face of this enduring complexity, the principles and doctrine of counterinsurgency still have salience and a role to play. After years of operational involvement in counterinsurgency, many of these principles may seem commonsensical if difficult to honor in practice. Even so, they still appear necessary in illustrating the logic of counterinsurgency and its distinctiveness from the types of campaigns for which most Western militaries train and prepare. This touches on the second function of counterinsurgency doctrine: its use as a powerful corrective to the unhelpful tendency not only in the U.S. military but also elsewhere in the West to divorce military affairs from political considerations. It is on these grounds that the decline of counterinsurgency would be regrettable, if through this process the associated knowledge and learning of the last few years are also forgotten. The one good reason to abandon the term, and one that merits careful consideration, would be precisely because of its divisive and distorting connotations. The aim would then be to talk more plainly about the nature of war, peace, and war-to-peace transitions. This requires a shift from a myopic focus on the mechanical aspects of fighting (warfare) and the illusion that war can be detached from politics and policy. In itself, this would be a revolutionary step away from artificial delineations between conventional and irregular operations and toward a defense posture based on the purposes and most likely character of tomorrow’s operations. It would signify the intent, at long last, to understand and study war on its own terms. PRISM Notes 1 In so doing, it builds on David H. Ucko, Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents: Assessing the Value of a Divisive Concept, SWP Research Paper 6 (April 2011). See also “Whither Counterinsurgency: The Rise and Fall of a Divisive Concept,” in The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency, ed. Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn (New York: Routledge, 2012). 2 This helps explain Nancy Pelosi’s assessment that the surge “did not accomplish its goal” and that its success resulted from “the goodwill of Iranians” who “decided in Basra when the fighting would end.” See
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“House Speaker Nancy Pelosi on the Presidential Race, Her Legislative Agenda and Iraq,” The San Francisco Chronicle, May 28, 2008. 3 From 2006 to 2009, the Brookings Institution’s Iraq Index estimates total casualties at 1,778, 3,500, 750, and 455, respectively. See Michael E. O’Hanlon and Jason H. Campbell, Iraq Index Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008), 4–5. Iraq Coalition Casualties puts the number of conflict-related civilian casualties at 3,000 per month in autumn 2006; 1,500 in April 2007; and 300 to 600 from September 2007 onward; available at
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20 ICG, The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict, Middle East Report No. 52 (Brussels: ICG, 2006), 10; Ucko, “Militias, Tribes and Insurgents,” 98–100. 21 Internal Multi-National Force–Iraq planning document, 2007. 22 Ollivant. 23 See Quil Lawrence, “Afghans Wary of Building Up Local Policing Forces,” NPR.com, January 13, 2011; Refugees International, “Afghanistan: Responsible U.S. Transition Must Address Displacement Crisis,” Field Report, June 28, 2011. 24 At its peak, the force deployed to Iraq numbered 182,668 for a population of 31 million. In Afghanistan, the peak was just below 131,000 for a population of 30 million. 25 “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Washington, DC, March 27, 2009). 26 Respectively, David Petraeus, as cited in David Jackson, “Petraeus: We’re trying to keep Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist sanctuary (again),” USA Today, August 16, 2010; Barack Obama, as cited in “Afghanistan can’t be a model democracy: Obama,” Reuters, August 2, 2010. 27 Hew Strachan, “Strategy or Alibi? Obama, McChrystal and the Operational Level of War,” Survival 52, no. 5 (2010), 168. 28 A foundation for doing so is laid out effectively in H.R. McMaster, “Effective Civilian-Military Planning at the Operational Level: The Foundation of Operational Planning,” in Commanding Heights: Strategic Lessons from Complex Operations, ed. Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009), 105–114. 29 For some enumerations of these principles, see Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1966); or Frank Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber and Faber, 1977). 30 Though cynics will point out that control can be achieved without any sense of legitimacy, the political and media environment of most Western interventions rarely allows for raw coercion. 31 Michael McClintock, Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940–1990 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1992), ch. 6. 32 See Richard Downie, Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1988). 33 For more on this, see H.R. McMaster, “On War: Lessons to Be Learned,” Survival 50, no. 1 (2008), 19–30. 34 On the reoccurrence of military governance in U.S. wars throughout history, see Nadia Schadlow, “War and the Art of Governance,” Parameters 33, no. 3 (Autumn 2003), 85–94. 35 See Nadia Schadlow, “A False Dichotomy: Critics of the Army’s COIN Focus Ignore World and War Realities,” Armed Forces Journal, September 2010. 36 U.S. doctrine now talks of a “continuum of conflict” whereby “the level of violence may jump from one point on the spectrum to another” within one campaign. See Field Manual 3–0, Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2008), ch. 2. 37 I am grateful to William F. Owen for this insight.
20 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 Negotiating Afghanistan When? With Whom? About What?
By Thomas R. Pickering
nder the George W. Bush administration, negotiations were not included in the strategic mix of dealing with Afghanistan or, for that matter, Iraq. One can only conjecture about U reasons. They may have included a sense that a military victory was possible; a belief that talk about negotiations was in itself a sign of weakness that should not—and could not—be conveyed to the opponent; full-blown distrust of the Taliban; a need to have a better balance of forces and more success behind us before we took on the task; a hope that a reintegration process, together with raising the military stakes, would be sufficient to win the day; and a distrust of diplomats and politicians who might be expected to conduct the negotiations—a sense that all achieved with the expenditure of so much blood and treasure would be given away if diplomats and politicians were turned loose on the problem. While the administration policy of President Barack Obama regarding Afghanistan negotiations does not represent a radical departure from that of its predecessor, there has been greater openness to debate prospects and issues, and a sense that an unofficial effort at the proper time could have a useful and positive impact on the interest in negotiations as well as setting out the problems to be undertaken and overcome to achieve success in them. To this end, last year a group sponsored and supported by The Century Foundation in New York studied this issue under the leadership of Lakhdar Brahimi, former Foreign Minister of Algeria and United Nations (UN) leader in Afghanistan after postcombat 2001–2002. I had the honor to co-chair this group. The study that the group produced looked at a number of salient questions after visiting the region and the capitals of many states interested in and likely to play important roles in the outcome of the war in Afghanistan. Many of our members had a great deal of experience in Afghanistan. Others had backgrounds in military and strategic matters. Most of us had been engaged in one time or another with negotiations both in a bilateral and multilateral framework. All of us understood that fair consideration ought to be given to this possibility. Our work paralleled
Thomas R. Pickering was U.S. Ambassador to Russia from 1993 to 1996 and retired as the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs in 2000.
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Soldiers provide security for Afghan National Security Forces U.S. Army (Cooper T. Cash) U.S. Army (Cooper T.
the efforts then being made by Richard Holbrooke on behalf of the United States to help shape and organize such a possibility. While our conclusions were completely our own and Ambassador Holbrooke tragically died before our report was finalized, we believe that a fair and open review of the possibilities inherent in a negotiating process deserves attention. The study group as a whole, and its members individually, visited the region several times, and held discussions with a wide range of interlocutors, including nearly a dozen hours of conversation with various representatives of the insurgency. They came from a number of groups representing most of the major players. In addition, senior leaders in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India met with us, as did many retired leaders and others from the fields of journalism, academia, and nongovernmental organizations, among others. Travel also included visits to Moscow, Beijing, a Central Asian con- ference in Tajikistan including representatives from Uzbekistan, and with Turks, Iranians, Saudis, senior leaders in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, and the UN. The report addresses and attempts to answer three important questions: Should negotiations be undertaken, and if so, when? The resolution of what problems should the negotiations seek to address? How should the negotiations be put in place? Within these questions are a host of others—to mention only a few: Who might participate, what specific issues would have to be addressed, and how should the various relationships among the parties and possible parties be dealt with? It was also clear that such a study would not be able to address conclusively the individual positions of the various parties, their separate strategies, and how their expected negotiating postures might play out over the longer term of a nego- tiating process. That has been left to others and indeed the process itself, should it get going, to set out.
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This article draws on the study, looks at the Taliban, in part to protect gains made in edu- possibilities today, and seeks to answer some of cation and incomes, and benefiting from the the harder questions about this effort. programs of change of the government and its supporters in the North Atlantic Treaty Should We Negotiate and, If Organization (NATO). So, When? While some see negotiations as an alter- Despite skepticism, a good case could be native to the strategy of counterinsurgency made for negotiations. This conclusion is based with its attendant aspects of counterterror- on a number of factors. Most of those inter- ism strikes, most are willing to accept that viewed from the region and beyond supported negotiations ought to be given a chance in (some very reluctantly) the idea of negotiations. the context of the present strategy, especially Admittedly, they had widely varying and not as the surge has the possibility of building a necessarily congruent views about the outcome. more positive situation in and around the But that is to be expected in any such process. battlefields. Many are prepared to accept the Indeed, over the course of our study, many notion that military action alone will not pro- of the starting positions of both sides—those duce the situation for satisfactory war termi- points that the other side had to meet before nation. That fact alone has led many to the they would start to talk—had morphed into conclusion that civilian efforts at economic something more along the lines of “these are and social development to complement the the points we have to achieve for the negotia- military surge are also not within striking tions to be successful.” distance of something which could be called Even more important are some of the victory. The Taliban also increasingly does more strategic issues. Few now see a clear mili- not see itself coming out on top. They tried tary victory in the offing for their side. War to counter with the aphorism “You have the fatigue hangs heavy over the battlefield and watch, we have the time!” Unfortunately, the even more so among the civilian population counter to that, “We have the time, you just in Afghanistan and beyond. As a result of the watch!” was also not totally convincing. financial crises of 2008, heavy expenditures on the war are widely questioned in both the United States and Europe. The U.S. election while some see negotiations as campaign of 2012 shows increasing signs that an alternative to the strategy of ending the war will be a key issue. counterinsurgency, most are willing to At a more tactical level, while the “surge” accept that negotiations ought to be might produce some readjustment on the bat- given a chance tlefield and in local control, no one sees it as a silver bullet solution to the end game for the United States and its allies. While the Taliban What might make a difference is the fact made an art form of being stiff-necked over the that all wars end with political consequences. If war, it is also clear that some of that intransi- we fail to take the opportunity to try to shape gence is breaking down, and increasingly large those consequences through negotiations, we are numbers of Afghans are pushing away from the condemned to live with the result that military
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operations offer: more uncertainty and perhaps, is clearly the central pivot around which the in the end, a withdrawal with no successful exit negotiations will have to turn. Each side—the strategy. Negotiations are not certain to deliver Taliban, government of Hamid Karzai, and a positive and helpful result, but not attempt- United States—has approached the negotia- ing to use them surely means we have set aside a tions with a series of positions. These posi- potentially useful tool. tions, which began as demands that had to On the difficult question of timing for be conceded to by the other side in order to negotiations, there are many views. At the begin talks, have now shifted more toward beginning of the study, the predominant becoming the goals they wish to achieve in view on the U.S. side was that it could not the process itself. even consider negotiations until the military For the Taliban, the goals have included situation improved. Over time, this argument the removal of all foreign forces, release of all became tempered with the realization that it prisoners, and return of the Taliban Islamic might take some time to put negotiations in Emirate as the form and substance of future gov- place, that when we are at the height of our ernance of Afghanistan. On the non-Taliban power, the other side knows that the future side, the requirements were that there should is more likely than not to be downhill for be no more use of force to resolve problems, us. Moreover, bringing in the other side also that there had to be a complete and irrevocable requires time to convince them that they may Taliban split with al Qaeda, and that the con- have something to gain from a formula that stitution of Afghanistan should be respected. In converts their military campaign into a politi- one way or another, all of these requirements cal effort based on electoral choice and fair centered around governance, and most of them rules of the game. represented areas where the resolution of differ- ences will be very hard indeed. The Taliban is, of course, not monolithic. the issue of the future governance of The Haqqani Network operating out of the Afghanistan is clearly the central pivot Federally Administered Tribal Areas is prin- around which the negotiations will have cipally focused on Afghanistan but not exclu- to turn sively. In our conversation with a representative from the network, it was made clear it would work with Quetta and Mullah Omar on negoti- The outcome was simple and straight- ating issues. The Quetta Shura is considered to forward in its recommendation: that negotia- be under the control of Mullah Omar. Gulbudin tions had more to offer than no negotiations Hekmatyar and his group have also indicated an and that it was time to start preparing for them interest in negotiations and noted a willingness now rather than wait for some elusive optimum to work with Quetta. moment which might never arrive. It appears that the greatest differences among the Taliban emerge on the field of bat- What to Negotiate About? tle in planning and executing military opera- As painful as it seems for both sides, the tions where broad autonomy is exercised. At issue of the future governance of Afghanistan the other end of the continuum of control
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is theology where large deference is paid to need to be examined. While there are no easy Mullah Omar. Politics lies somewhere along answers to these questions, the study group the continuum, perhaps now closer to theology, was strongly impressed by the interest in them since there is only at this point an opening con- among the people with whom we spoke and sideration of the issue and little practical impact their centrality to any solution. on the various groups and players. If things pro- Beyond these political issues, we identi- ceed and issues become more cogently defined, fied others that would play a role or be likely there may well surface differences of a larger and to play a role in the process of negotiations. A more apparent variety. major issue is the place of Islam in the future Some have asked whether the Taliban governance of the country. The present consti- would indeed stick together throughout the tution has put in place formulas on this point, negotiating process. The answer is unclear. which seemingly could be accepted widely. What is equally unclear is why Taliban cohe- Much more difficult will be the guarantees of siveness would or should be an interest, much civil and human rights for all Afghans and— less a priority, of their negotiating adversaries. particularly based on the past history with With regard to the key issues of gover- the Taliban—the role and place of women in nance, the following are likely to be some of Afghan society. Will they be assured that the the major points of contention, and among gains that have been made will stay in place the players in the various groups as much as and be expanded upon over time? between them. The critical points of gover- nance as they emerged from the study include, for example, what should be the future divi- much more difficult will be the sion of power in the government? Who gets guarantees of civil and human rights for what in terms of ministries and other high all Afghans and the role and place of offices? A second closely related issue has to women in Afghan society do with the future form of government—what institutions will be in place, and who gets to affect their working relationships? A key fac- In the past, more among non-Afghans tor here will be the shape and scope of an (including human rights nongovernmental orga- electoral law. Next, the issue of who makes nizations) than Afghans, the problems of justice appointments will require settlement. There and accountability for the abuses and crimes of is also the overarching question of whether the the past have been a centerpiece of interest. present, heavily centralized presidential sys- Afghans have had a tendency to want to put it tem will continue or whether, more perhaps in aside and may well try to do so again. Also, secu- keeping with Afghan tradition, there is a shift rity issues closely linked to the future include the away from a strongly centralized government questions of what will be the organization and in favor of the devolution of more authority role of an Afghan central security force that will to regional leadership. Finally, the issue as to have to carry a full share of the burden of assur- whether or not a prime ministerial and parlia- ing that any agreements are carried out. mentary system might work more effectively Other issues of more salient interest to than one dominated by a strong president will the international community will also need
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to be addressed in some form in the process. This is a full and difficult menu. There will These include the nature and continuation of undoubtedly be more vexing problems to address economic and social assistance to whatever as the issues outlined here are taken up. government emerges, along with continued security assistance to military and police How to Get to Negotiations? forces of the future Afghanistan. A related We began with some assumptions that question will be the continuing role of the helped guide our work and thinking. No one International Bank for Reconstruction and party to the conflict, including the United Development and International Monetary States, was sufficiently well placed so that it Fund in the future development of the coun- could manage to bring all of the others to the try. Capacity-building will be a continuing negotiating table, much less to a successful con- major demand in the economy if success— clusion. There are just too many differences or even a breakthrough toward progress—is between them for that to happen. to be achieved. Access to natural resources The obvious conclusion is that a neutral and the role of the new state in controlling facilitator or “facilitation mechanism” might their exploitation and sale will be issues of be a useful idea to move the conflict toward a importance. Finally, the need to begin to negotiating process. A facilitator might be an address the economic issues in particular on individual, small group, state or group of states, a regional basis will be significant. Because or international organization. Whoever takes of its geography, Afghanistan plays a critical on this role must be familiar in some detail role in the future transportation structure of with Afghanistan, its history, and its political the region. and cultural background. It would also require Beyond these issues and of real importance to a person or a group broadly acceptable to the country, region, and well beyond are the prob- the parties involved, but most particularly to lems of narcotics production and transportation. the Afghan parties that would be at the cen- Afghan political leaders will need to ter of negotiations (for example, the Karzai reach conclusions about and seek support for government, the “loyal Opposition,” the old its preferred posture regarding its future neu- Northern Alliance, civil society including trality or nonalignment. human rights and civil rights, and women’s groups, and, of course, the Taliban). Each of capacity-building will be a continuing these groups has its own internal divisions, so finding a facilitator will not be an easy task. major demand in the economy if success The facilitator might well be designated is to be achieved formally by the UN Secretary-General to give the position status in dealing with the effort. There will need to be consideration of a Some have also suggested that it might be peacekeeping organization, probably led by advantageous at an appropriate time to have the UN, but devoted principally to monitoring the facilitator approved or even appointed by and verification. The sense now is that Afghan the UN Security Council. This would help forces will have to deal with violations of the widen the basis of authority and indicate peace agreements. that the members of the council, including
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the five Permanent Members—China, France, of the parties will be close enough to provide Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United a high assurance of success. But the facilitator States—were on board with both the concept will need to make careful decisions and recom- and the personality or personalities being mendations on the basis of extensive contacts chosen for this role. The process for select- on both procedure and substance, and as a result ing the facilitator(s) would certainly require, fill a role that only he or she may be capable of at a minimum, close consultation among the carrying out. Afghan parties, Pakistan, and the United The second phase for the facilitator should States. That might precede the more formal be to work with the parties and those in the process noted above. While it is clear that various circles around them from the region a formal role for one of the major parties to and beyond to find agreement. This is a sub- the conflict is unlikely to be successful, it is stantive role of singular importance and requires equally clear that each of those major parties a facilitator who is imaginative, inventive, will have to come together around a candi- patient, willing to listen, and who commands date or candidates. significant authority among the parties engaged The role of the facilitator would be in the negotiation. Subsequently, the regional developed in two phases. The first would parties might also be encouraged by the facilita- be devoted to bringing the parties to the tor not only to take on a constructive role with table for talks and negotiations. The second the parties in helping them come together, but would be to assist the principal negotiating also to engage in putting together agreements parties—the four Afghan groups mentioned among themselves, the purpose of which is to previously—in constructing an agreement or support and strengthen any accords reached by agreements between them leading to an end the Afghan parties. of the conflict. The same facilitator may or may not be The initial work for the facilitator(s) appropriate for the entire process. The burden would be to discuss with the parties, on an will be heavy, and several persons may well have individual basis, their interest in a process of to be involved, particularly if one person is not negotiations, their ideas concerning how the fully persona grata with all of the players. process should unroll, as well as timing, par- Should the facilitator reach a positive ticipation, and so on. Also, in the first phase, conclusion on these questions, the process a facilitator(s) would explore with the parties might then be developed in a way that incor- their substantive positions—that is, what they porates the Bonn arrangements of 2001, would expect from the other parties and what which set up the present government in they would be prepared themselves to put on Afghanistan. Essentially, these arrangements the table. were based on negotiations led by and among These two elements would form the basis Afghans with outside parties in successive, for a judgment by the facilitator about the fea- concentric circles of regional and other par- sibility and possibilities for success in bringing ties around the Afghan parties playing a sup- the parties together around a table and what porting role. There are differences today: their agenda for discussions might be. In par- inclusion of the Taliban, more regional play- ticular, it is unlikely that the starting positions ers, and a greater regional interest and need
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for regional arrangements for the purpose of so with a developing area of agreement among providing stability and security. themselves. Ideally, they would support and The study group report recognizes that assist the facilitator to bring the Afghan par- there are many ways to proceed. Rather than ties into contact and help them think through spell out a series of options, it presents in detail and develop solutions to their differences. a specific negotiating framework that we believe There is no sense among Afghans or other has a good chance of succeeding. At the center interested parties that a purely institutional of our proposal is the fact that the key negotia- initiative would mechanically generate some tions must take place among Afghan parties. successful response meeting the needs of all the Others may come and assist, but the fundamen- parties. However, on the basis of past success tal arrangements for Afghanistan’s future gover- and given the special nature of the interests nance must be agreed to among Afghans if the of all the parties, as well as the possibilities future is to see success. Afghan groups would for synergy and mutual support, this construct, therefore be at the center along with the facili- based on the Bonn Conference of 2001, could tator. Among the Afghans, there are four basic offer genuine advantages. interest clusters: the present government, “loyal The Taliban made it clear that to par- opposition” (the former Northern Alliance), ticipate they would need some kind of rep- Afghan civil society groups including women resentative office at or near the negotiations, and minorities, and the insurgent groups. In the probably in a third country, and guarantees to inner ring, but just beyond them, would be the move their people securely to the talks. We parties now closest to the conflict and perhaps did not explore or seek to help resolve where most important in its resolution: Pakistan and negotiations might take place, but believed the United States. The next ring would include that would best be left for the facilitator to explore. We suspect that a Muslim country not there is no sense among Afghans engaged extensively on one side or the other in or other interested parties that a Afghanistan might well be a leading candidate purely institutional initiative would for the locus of negotiations. It would also be mechanically generate some successful necessary for the facilitator to have good rela- response meeting the needs of all tions with that country, which would also be interested in helping pursue successful negotia- the parties tions for its own reasons. Beyond the purely Afghan portion of the the major neighbors—Iran, India (a near neigh- negotiations, should these show some prom- bor), Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan— ise, the regional parties and others could and, moving out farther, China, Russia, key turn their attention first to putting together European nations, Japan, and perhaps Turkey, an agreement among themselves to support Saudi Arabia, and others. the arrangements agreed to by the Afghans. All parties would play the critically impor- Beyond that, if the Afghans agreed and tant role of working with the Afghan parties to encouraged the agreement, they might set in reach fundamental agreement on the key ques- place arrangements to ensure regional recogni- tions involving Afghans and necessarily doing tion of and support for Afghan neutrality or
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Afghan National Policeman fires weapon during training exercise U.S. Army (Daniel P. Shook) U.S. Army (Daniel P.
nonalignment. There are further subjects for regional approaches and agreement: security issues, narcotics control, transportation, trade arrangements among the states in the region, and so on. These could result in an agreement or agreements among themselves to memorialize and make permanent those arrangements. The Positions of the Parties The Taliban Quetta Shura, led by Mullah Omar, the most influential of Taliban leaders on political issues as well as theological ones, has a number of interests in negotiating:1
❖❖ the death of many subordinate leaders in drone strikes and special operations raids ❖❖ impact of attrition on attenuating command authority by the Quetta Shura over the Taliban, perhaps significantly in military operations ❖❖ fear that the United States might remain indefinitely in Afghanistan ❖❖ alternatively, fear that the United States and NATO could be ready to negotiate the terms of their exit ❖❖ anger with Pakistan and fear of being sold out by Islamabad to Kabul or Washington2 ❖❖ removal of foreign forces, perhaps with the exception of peacekeepers for a deal
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❖❖ security for themselves, neutralizing the international and Afghan threat to them and end- ing the targeting of their leaders and families ❖❖ international recognition as a legitimate political actor, removal of key leaders from UN terrorist lists, and release of prisoners ❖❖ reestablishment of Emirate of Islamic law ❖❖ purge of corrupt government leaders and prosecuting or exiling unfriendly warlords.3
The following are some of the key objectives of the Karzai government: ❖❖ Karzai remaining until 2014 (and perhaps beyond) with security for him, his family, and inner circle and immunity for some key allies ❖❖ the orderly, phased withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. forces with continued training and weapons through 2014 and beyond ❖❖ an international peacekeeping force for a limited period that provides security in place of ISAF ❖❖ power-sharing with non-Pashtun elements to forestall a civil war on sectarian lines ❖❖ a democratic Afghanistan with the current constitution largely preserved and some new minority and civil protections ❖❖ continued international financial support.4
Pakistani interests include: ❖❖ ensuring a neutral, stable Kabul government with the Afghan Taliban as a junior partner ❖❖ supporting Afghan and U.S. operations against the Pakistan Taliban ❖❖ withdrawing the United States and NATO in phases, but with continuing military and economic aid thereafter ❖❖ limiting Indian influence, including effective checks on aid to the Baloch insurgency ❖❖ expanding trade and investment in Afghanistan.5
U.S. interests include: ❖❖ preventing the resurgence of al Qaeda in Afghanistan ❖❖ assisting a reasonable stable, friendly, autonomous Afghanistan ❖❖ preventing further Afghan violence from destabilizing Pakistan ❖❖ preserving democratic and human rights in Afghanistan ❖❖ continuing credibility for NATO ❖❖ reducing illicit drug trade.6
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Indian interests include: Other states have similar objectives based on their individual goals and interests, many ❖❖ a friendly, or at least neutral, of which overlap. While an early assessment Afghanistan not dominated by the of the possible areas for agreement is possible, Taliban or other Pakistan proxies the uncertainties remain large enough at this ❖❖ eliminating al Qaeda and other Islamic stage to understand that conclusions may be extremists who target India nearer to “guesstimates” than hard judgments about real outcomes. It is useful to note that ❖❖ preserving a presence in Afghanistan, there are a number of overlapping interests, including political and military intel- and this raises prospects for a positive out- ligence capacities come without of course in any way guaran- ❖❖ expanding trade and investment, teeing such. including transit routes through Pakistan The Report Today ❖❖ ensuring basic human rights in The Century Foundation report received Afghanistan wide publicity, and many leaders and others were interested in the results.9 The team that ❖❖ strengthening growing strategic part- prepared the report briefed it widely. The tim- nership with the United States.7 ing of the report’s release in March of 2011 was appropriate, coming as it did after Secretary of Iranian interests include: State Hillary Clinton’s mid-February address on the subject to the Asia Society and follow- ❖❖ withdrawal of U.S. and ISAF military ing indications that some views among the and intelligence forces Taliban were shifting in a more positive direc- tion toward talks. Since that time, no state or ❖❖ a stable regime in Kabul, friendly to national leader, and indeed very few nonofficial Iran, and not dominated by Pakistan leaders, has criticized the report or its findings or its proxies in any specific way. Quiet assurances of interest ❖❖ protection for traditional Iranian have been received along with indications that allies in Afghanistan: Hazaras, Tajiks, a number of the ideas and approaches in the and Heratis report reflected and reinforced views already ❖❖ trade, investment, and transit trade adopted by governments or being seriously con- through Char Bahar sidered by them. Press reports, not confirmed by governments, have indicated that contacts ❖❖ return of 2 to 3 million Afghan refu- continue to take place among the various par- gees in Iran ties, including between the United States and ❖❖ reduction/elimination of narcotics- the Taliban. The latter contact has seemingly trafficking been vexed by the publicity, and we may be in ❖❖ Kabul cooperation in fight against some form of stalemate regarding opening up Jundallah, in Iranian Baluchistan the prospects for a start to negotiations, at least and beyond.8 for the moment.
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What has happened is that the pro- government of Afghanistan, as well as Mullah cess has moved from being almost entirely Omar and the Taliban, would resist the United ignored to gaining serious consideration. It States as the authority organizing negotiations. has become a process that, now in addition to They are, to borrow the old expression, neces- discussion in public, has been favorably com- sary parties, all of them, but they are not suf- mented on by a number of players, including ficient to begin, manage, or end the process on the United States. “Coming out of the closet” their own in a leadership role. might be a fair way to describe what has been However, the failure of any essential happening. Far from claiming credit, it seems party to attend the negotiations is almost by that the report may well have come at a time definition a killer. This would include the when its ideas and proposals were more open Taliban, Karzai government, and in the first to examination than previously. It seems also circle of players, Pakistan and the United to be a time—for a host of reasons, including States. Without others, there will be a seri- U.S. withdrawal, a sense of military stale- ous impairment of the process but most likely mate, a growing sense of frustration with the not a fatal one. conflict among the public, and a rapidly grow- Those on the outer rings of the process are ing concern about financial drain—when the also potential serious spoilers, including those report may continue to help move the parties that may have, as Pakistan does, some serious toward negotiations. influence with the Afghan Taliban. How they play their role and how they assist in developing positions and approaches to the other Afghan both the present government of parties can be either a spoiler or something that Afghanistan, as well as Mullah Omar can help encourage progress. and the Taliban, would resist the Other procedural and process problems can United States as the authority also serve as spoilers, sometimes absolutely, but organizing negotiations often in a limited way, and sometimes opportu- nistically where they serve as potential trading cards for other concessions of interest to the Spoilers spoiling party or parties. The first and outer ring No negotiation is without its vulnerabili- players, if they are brought on board and share ties. This one will be particularly difficult. At a number of common objectives and interests, the top of the list, there are the interests in and can be considered as possible allies in overcom- willingness of the parties to participate. This ing some of the spoiler tactics on procedures includes the central Afghan players. There is that might be deployed. One is reminded of no question that while there is a general will- “shape of the table” issues over Vietnam, which ingness to engage, there are many limitations to played such a role. that process. President Karzai has made it clear Overcoming spoiler tactics can involve at various times that he would like to supervise many techniques. These include concessions and oversee the unfolding and conduct of nego- by one of the parties or by other players outside tiations, but this will be strenuously contested the context of negotiations. The United States by the insurgent factions. Both the present and Pakistan are well placed to assist in this
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kind of approach. Other techniques involve Why should the United States negotiate the use of packages to bring a series of interre- with the Taliban? The Century Foundation lated tradeoffs to deal with concerns and inter- proposal does not suggest that it should. ests that may result in a spoiler problem. Other Instead, a process is proposed that would take ideas involve creating a series of stepwise deals place between Afghan parties, including the or agreement, parsing the negotiating land- Taliban. In any conflict, a negotiated solu- scape into small packages and steps that can tion has to include the opposing parties in help to move things forward and build confi- some fashion if it is going to be successful. dence, which is often absent at the beginning The Taliban say they want to negotiate with stages of a negotiation—a time when spoiler the United States because they believe the problems may be most intense and difficult to United States can determine what will hap- deal with. pen among those opposed to the Taliban. If Undoubtedly, there will be spoilers, both in that is the case, then we have leverage, most process and substance. The task of the facilita- likely through our relations with the non- tor, the parties, and their friends and others in Taliban Afghan, to get a deal they and we the various “rings” will be to encourage success could live with. by finding ways to overcome them. Nothing at the present stage seems to have emerged as a full and unconquerable spoiler. That gives a note of in any conflict, a negotiated solution has hope and limited optimism. But patience and to include the opposing parties in some perseverance will be required in what looks like fashion if it is going to be successful a long and complex negotiation. It is highly unlikely that no spoilers will emerge. It is par for the course that they will. The dedication and How can we get them to the table if they commitment of the players will be sorely tested. do not show interest in coming? Thus far, they seem to have shown such interest. They do not Some Remaining Key Questions like publicity because it indicates to their sup- How can we trust the Taliban in a nego- porters that they are preparing to negotiate and tiation and observe the result? There is no perhaps make a deal, which will fall short of the certainty that we can, but we will not know victory they have sought—that is, all foreign whether they will be prepared to make a deal forces out of Afghanistan and the Taliban back until we try. Some among them say that is what in control. they want. Observing a deal is critical. With What makes the present ripe for trying to or without a deal, we will have to put in place resolve the question? Is the Taliban not likely to sufficiently strong Afghan forces to assure the wait us out? Do they not perceive that their for- survival of a non-Taliban administration. It tunes are improving? The answer is not yet clear. may well be better to construct a deal to do this Some Taliban certainly seem to want to negoti- than take a chance with a purely military out- ate because even though they may see their for- come. Negotiations might even help to bring tunes improving, they do not have confidence the conflict to an end sooner and support our that they will improve to the degree necessary to exit strategy. gain full power in Afghanistan. Much depends
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on this critical question as we draw down from ❖❖ a solution that significantly alters the standing up Afghan forces that cannot only hold current Afghan constitution. the line but also keep the Taliban off balance and out of control of key regions. That remains Can Pakistan block the process or slow an uncertain proposition on both sides, but the it down? Either is possible. Pakistan is a key Taliban seem interested in testing out the negoti- player. Pakistani leaders state that they are ating possibilities. There are signals that growing interested in a process and want to see it car- numbers of Afghans are against the Taliban— ried forward. Some in Pakistan have contin- and the Taliban know this. ued to support the Afghan Taliban, but among them are those who say they do not want to see the Taliban back in charge. Members of the U.S. goals in Central Asia need to the Taliban also complain about their rela- be clarified tions with the Pakistanis, saying they do not trust them. It will be critical for the United States and Pakistan to work to define an out- What lessons can we draw from negotia- come they both can live with and even more tions with the Palestinians, North Koreans, importantly to define a Pakistan-Afghanistan Vietnamese, and so forth that might help us future relationship that both sides can accept. negotiate with the Taliban? Negotiate when Such steps should help to avoid a breakdown the other side has come to the conclusion that or breakup in the process. it cannot gain its objectives by use of military Will the United States really pull out force. Hold to key positions and make sure entirely when a relationship with Afghanistan that the U.S. public will continue to support gives it access to and a presence in Central efforts. Put in place an arrangement that makes Asia? President Barack Obama says he will it clear that we can hold our ground whether pull out all U.S. combat forces. He may leave we have negotiations or not. behind some trainers and others—such as What is the proper role for the United Special Forces—to deal with al Qaeda and their States? Support the Afghan parties that oppose leadership. The U.S. goals in Central Asia need a Taliban take over. Be prepared to agree to to be clarified. The United States went there to arrangements in which the Taliban become one be able to have access to Afghanistan. Now that among a number of political parties and factions we are in Afghanistan, we might want to stay in and where they must face popular elections to order to have access to Central Asia. Over the gain support. years, we have dealt successfully and well with What endstates could we permit? It is Central Asia without having a military presence easier to describe what we do not want or will there. Such a presence is only likely to create not support: opposition and animosity to the United States among their public. Once the United States ❖❖ an enduring connection between the has withdrawn from Afghanistan and al Qaeda Taliban and al Qaeda is kept from returning, there would seem to be ❖❖ the use of force or violence by the little reason for the United States to remain or Taliban return to Central Asia.
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Will the Karzai government be able to survive after 2014 without a peace deal? Any answer involves significant speculation. U.S. strategy seems designed to provide for the survival of a non-Tal- iban government in Afghanistan after 2014 with or without a negotiated deal with them. President Karzai will have to face new elections to stay beyond his current term. A deal with the Taliban may well provide for greater stability and continuity in a non-Taliban government, representing the majority in Afghanistan, staying in office beyond 2014. Of course it should be up to the people of Afghanistan to decide who will lead them after 2014. Conclusion No one is able to predict whether negotiations will take place or succeed. It appears on bal- ance that now is the right time to determine whether that can happen. The risk in negotiation is far outweighed by the potential for gain, even if the situation remains uncertain. There are clearly ways forward. Negotiations provide the best chance for success and must be part of an overall strategy that puts in place a stable and secure Afghanistan. We just do not know if negotia- tions can succeed unless we try. We have the capacity to make a serious effort in this direction. Because the situation on the ground cannot and does not support a military victory, the chances are increasing that a negotiation can happen, and is likely to work. Military stalemate, war fatigue, financial difficulties, domestic support for withdrawal, and Afghan interest in finding a negotiated solution all make this prospect more useful and potentially attractive. U.S. leadership in this process is essential. Pakistan and the Afghan parties are all key players. Others in the region and beyond with interests and influence in Afghanistan and the region are also key players. Getting a process started will be as hard as keeping it together and bringing it to a useful and successful conclusion. With the growing interest in negotiation in the region and beyond, now is the time to develop this option and see if it can be put in place and made useful. All wars end with political consequences. It is in the interest of the United States to attempt to shape those political outcomes in ways that are favorable to its interests, including facilitating its exit strategy. Negotiation is a key way to attempt to do this. PRISM Notes 1 While the report itself did not examine in detail the positions of the various key players, a subsequent report for RAND by two of our participants did so. See James Shinn and James Dobbins, Afghan Peace Talks: A Primer (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, August 2011). I have drawn heavily on their work for this section of my article and thank them for it. 2 Ibid., 7. 3 Ibid., 24. 4 Ibid., 36. 5 Ibid., 42. 6 Ibid., 48. 7 Ibid., 54. 8 Ibid., 58.
PRISM 3, no. 1 Features | 35 Pickering
9 See Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas R. Pickering, Co-Chairs, International Task Force on Afghanistan in Its Regional and Multilateral Dimensions, Afghanistan: Negotiating Peace, Report of The Century Foundation Task Force (New York: The Century Foundation, 2011).
36 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 The State Department, USAID, and the Flawed Mandate for Stabilization and Reconstruction
By Renanah Miles
anfare as the last combat brigade departed, a prime-time Oval Office address, and an official ceremony in Baghdad marked the end of combat operations in Iraq in August 2010. Less scruti- Fnized, but no less significant, is the December 31, 2011, deadline when the last U.S. troops plan to exit the stage, leaving operations completely in civilian hands. Concerns have centered on security and logistics, areas where the Department of State relies heavily on the military.1 Beyond the ability to physically maneuver, there is a pressing question over State’s ability to execute the mission: does the State Department have the capacity to finish the reconstruction mission and manage the transition to long-term diplomacy and development? Given the lessons of the past 10 years, the answer is no. When glaring civilian inadequacies and the flawed strategy in Iraq became apparent by 2004, legislative and executive pressure prompted the State Department to move out in developing planning and operational capabilities to conduct stabilization and reconstruction. National Security Presidential Directive 44 designated the State Department as the lead for such operations, and it in turn established
Renanah Miles is a student in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University.
PRISM 3, no. 1 Features | 37 Miles
the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction we are asking other countries to radically trans- and Stabilization (S/CRS) to coordinate opera- form their governmental norms and structures.”3 tions. Last year, the first Quadrennial Diplomacy The first order of business is to embark on the and Development Review (QDDR) reaffirmed changes needed to get the State Department the mandate, calling it a “core State mis- and USAID houses in order. As the final transi- sion” to be supported by the U.S. Agency for tion in Iraq nears, the State Department faces an International Development (USAID).2 However uphill battle securing the resources and authori- significant these commitments may be, the status ties needed from Congress. Without reconcil- quo continues to be marked by an inability to ing internal disconnects, State and USAID will field a viable response capable of managing in remain unable to do the job or present a credible the absence of the military or leading an inte- case to Congress justifying the support they des- grated civil-military effort. The QDDR outlines perately need. reforms to close this capacity gap, but even if implemented, it is unlikely that these will be External Considerations: The State- sufficient to address the root problems or timely Defense Resource Gap enough to ensure a seamless transition in Iraq. Stabilization and reconstruction are hardly new endeavors for the U.S. Government; despite numerous undertakings, lessons are typically for State and USAID, the stabilization observed rather than learned, and with each and reconstruction mission has crisis, agencies scramble to reinvent coordina- been marked by indecision, tion and execution processes. Political indecision preventing prioritization over how much weight to give threats emanating from failed states and attention spans too short for long-term commitments of reconstruction There is a temptation, to which the QDDR have contributed to a government-wide failure occasionally succumbs, to blame current fail- to institutionalize the mission. Although the ures on limited resources. While resources are a events of September 11 spawned a proliferation critical component of capacity, priorities drive of offices and capabilities for stabilization, it is allocation of resources; external considerations unclear whether buyer’s remorse over the price combine with internal influences to determine of rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan will reduce capacity development. For State and USAID, incentives to resource standing capabilities for the stabilization and reconstruction mission has such efforts moving forward.4 been marked by indecision, preventing priori- It was against this background of politi- tization. Internecine conflict, indetermination cal uncertainty and inattention that the State over the mission itself, and aspects of each orga- Department and Department of Defense (DOD) nization’s culture have choked capacity-building fell short in postconflict planning for Iraq. As efforts internally. instability spiraled, the Pentagon was able to Writing on U.S. organization for postcon- move out faster in developing response capa- flict reconstruction, Samuel Farr observes, “It is bilities due to its resources. This resource gap ironic that as we struggle to make only the small- between State and Defense has serious implica- est changes in our own systems and institutions, tions for the former’s efforts to build a stabilization
38 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 state department, usaid, and the flawed Mandate
Soldier from Provincial Reconstruction Team Paktika distributes reading material to shopkeepers U.S. Air Force (Dallas Edwards)
and reconstruction capacity. It has helped create a cycle in which the military is the only entity resourced to act, thus becoming the default responder. The longer this lead role persists, the greater the gravita- tional pull on resources and authorities toward DOD, widening the capacity gap. An equation wherein the civilian mission owner is armed with intentions but no assets results in a serious imbalance of power.5 The risks are twofold: a realignment of authorities from State to DOD, and the corollary to defense expansion, which is a State failure to take ownership of stabilization and reconstruction, delaying capac- ity development and creating an unsustainable reliance on a military presence.6 The latter is the reality rapidly bearing down on the Embassy in Baghdad as December approaches. State and USAID risk being overwhelmed by their military counterparts in the fight for resources against the Washington backdrop of two colliding budget cycles and increasing fiscal con- straints. These are inescapable external considerations. Insomuch as Congress withholds authorities and resources, resource starvation is a cause of capacity problems. But internal to the department, failure to prioritize and make the tough tradeoffs necessary to ground the mission makes resource scarcity a symptom. This failure is rooted in bureaucratic and cultural challenges, and until these are resolved, no budget increase will ensure that the right resources target the right gaps. Internal Influences: State House in Disorder Bureaucratic rivalries and infighting have systemically choked State’s efforts to build capacity. This conflict is part of the broader “strife between State and USAID over the priorities and direction of U.S. foreign assistance,”7 and acutely manifests in stabilization and reconstruction due to their operational
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Kindergarten students in Shikhan, Iraq, perform song for USAID personnel U.S. Navy (Rufus Hucks)
demands and the overlapping capabilities that reside across the two agencies. The QDDR attempts to rectify issues by outlining an approach that gives the State Department the lead in political crises and USAID the lead in humanitarian crises. This leaves unanswered questions: demarcation lines are often hazy, and the lead agency approach does not confer operational control over the other agency. The abbreviated history of S/CRS illustrates the challenge of establishing a cross-cutting capability that infringes on powerful bureaucratic turfs. Stood up in 2004 as a result of legislative pressure over Iraq shortcomings, S/CRS met intense internal opposition from the beginning. USAID, while opposed to short-term reconstruction work at the expense of longer term development objectives, took the tendentious view that if such a mission were to exist at all, it should belong to USAID with its orienta- tion toward fieldwork.8 Meanwhile, State’s regional bureaus were suspicious of the underempowered, undermanned office that wanted to weigh in on areas under their purview.9 As part of the S/CRS mandate to lead and coordinate U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent and respond to con- flict,10 the office developed a crisis response framework for the interagency to follow—the Interagency Management System (IMS). Although the National Security Council approved the system in 2007, it foundered and was never implemented; a Government Accountability Office report revealed that the drive against the IMS originated in USAID and State offices that mutinied against it.11 These internal constraints reinforced the initial S/CRS decision not to focus on either Iraq or Afghanistan. Severely marginalized and underfunded, the first coordinators chose instead to focus on building up capability, in anticipation of using it in the next crisis.12 Coming under fire for this decision, the office attempted to turn matters around in 2007. Despite an effort to deploy
40 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 state department, usaid, and the flawed Mandate
its fledgling capabilities to Afghanistan, S/CRS and resources will flow its way.16 But without sup- was sidelined into nominal advisory roles. The port or assets to begin with, what is there even to QDDR tackles this problem in its primary rec- use? This conundrum stems in part from failure ommendation for reform, which is to create a new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization State and USAID both suffer cultural Operations led by an Assistant Secretary who disconnects between their agency values will closely cooperate with the USAID Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian and mindsets and those needed for Assistance. This bureau would subsume S/CRS stabilization and reconstruction and “build upon but go beyond the mandate and capabilities of S/CRS.”13 Although the mission to clearly define the scale and scope of the mis- and new organization have the imprimatur of sion. Laura Hall states, “Left unclear, however, is the current administration and State leadership, whether this role is a boutique, ‘niche’ operation the test will come down to whether the new or whether it represents the ‘new normal.’ This bureau is actually given an opportunity to lead, is an important distinction that affects recruiting, and what resolution is reached concerning over- training, staffing, and organization.”17 In other lapping—and occasionally duplicative—capa- words, this is a distinction that will drive culture bilities between S/CRS and USAID offices.14 change, as organizational culture is a key deter- Although turf rivalries contributed to the S/ minant of management styles, incentives, train- CRS decision to opt out of Iraq and Afghanistan, ing, and institutional perspective. there was another factor at play, which remains State and USAID both suffer cultural dis- similarly unresolved: defining the mandate. connects between their agency values and mind- Reorganization may tamp down bureaucratic sets and those needed for stabilization and recon- rivalries by endowing the new bureau with struction. Within any organization, structures hierarchal status, but ambiguity remains. State crop up to address specific requirements, while and USAID understanding of what activities cultures mold around enduring needs, promoting stabilization and reconstruction comprise is evi- certain behaviors based on the organization’s pri- denced in the QDDR, but left undetermined orities over time. For the State Department, this are how much of a response capability is needed has traditionally meant an emphasis on analytical and where it might actually be used. The main reporting skills over action or management. James indication as to size is that whatever capacity Dobbins unsparingly summed up the distinction is developed will target models other than Iraq between operator and diplomat in a 2004 Senate or Afghanistan, which are deemed outliers.15 hearing: “We have a Foreign Service of farmers, Whether these conflicts should be dismissed as in which cowboys are regarded with suspicion.”18 sui generis is debatable, but the broader question Conversely, USAID has an action-oriented, field- is how the State Department intends to plan focused culture; however, it mirrors the develop- without a clear sense of scale. ment community’s culture and rejects missions The current approach is marked by the closely aligned with political agendas, such as somewhat circular logic that as the stabilization stabilization and reconstruction. While USAID’s and reconstruction capacity housed in S/CRS is longer term development goals arguably serve used, it will be appreciated and more recognition U.S. interests, the culture inside the agency at
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times seems bent on distancing itself from any- reconstruction is splintered across eight different thing perceived as militarizing development.19 committees and subcommittees.22 These norms and values that comprise orga- The State Department suffers a “chronic nizational culture have a significant impact on gap” between its ends and means.23 If anything, whether capacity is institutionalized and the this gap was widened by the ambitious goals laid speed at which it happens. Cultural values drive out in the QDDR. Although State and USAID incentives and to date, little has changed to cannot change their external focus, which by incentivize State and USAID personnel for the nature is divorced from domestic politics and stabilization and reconstruction mission. A new constituencies, or the fact that budget treatments generation of Foreign Service Officers has gained disadvantage them compared to DOD, they miss operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, important opportunities that are within reach but without incentive structures and processes in due to structural and cultural liabilities. As dis- place to capture lessons learned, their newfound organized as Congress’s budgetary treatment of skills will disappear. Perhaps most significantly, foreign assistance is, part of the problem is the a devalued, or undervalued, mission that lacks stovepiped nature of foreign assistance itself. internal interest or support has a slim chance of More than two dozen agencies administer foreign garnering external support from Congress. aid. With some falling under State’s purview and others not, the result is institutional incoherence Congress: A Bridge Too Far? that undermines the Department’s ability to plan All roads on State’s quest for authorities and and present budget requests in the “competition resources to build capacity will at some point end for the national security dollar.”24 Lack of author- at Congress. The legislative relationship is sec- ity is coupled with lack of consensus; USAID’s ond in importance only to State’s relationship cultural aversion to security agendas impedes its with USAID, yet is typically the most strained. willingness to appeal to national security immu- Stacking the odds against the State Department, nity in the budget process. Moreover, internal Congress is historically skeptical and even hostile rivalries preclude State and USAID from pre- toward the department and foreign assistance writ senting a unified front. large. Foreign aid is an easy target for lawmakers, In addition to these structural and cultural given the lack of a domestic constituency and the disadvantages, State and USAID face the dif- less tangible link to national security than the ficulty of hard-to-quantify programs. Even the military institutions.20 The different treatments counterpart to conflict response—conflict pre- Congress reserves for State and Defense is pal- vention—is exceptionally difficult to quantify. pable; in just one instance, the House Republican Even if funds are secured, how do you measure Study Committee recently put forward a proposal effectiveness of dollars spent on conflict pre- to defund USAID.21 If congressional antipathy vention? Additionally, State and USAID face toward foreign aid were not enough to overcome, liabilities in planning and failure to emphasize budget treatments compound State and USAID management. The tendency to plan on a yearly, challenges. The House and Senate Foreign rather than multiyear, basis hurts State’s efforts. Relations Committees have not issued authori- While the QDDR tackles this issue, it does not zation bills for foreign assistance in more than as fully address the management deficit. This two decades, and funding for stabilization and deficit creates a vicious cycle in which Congress
42 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 state department, usaid, and the flawed Mandate
balks at funding requirements without a robust operational control over the other agency’s or justification, but the State Department lacks office’s assets to enable effectiveness. If State the people to justify the requirements.25 Not and USAID will not work together, they will only are management capabilities enervated, be immediately and perpetually disadvantaged but State and USAID numbers have shrunk trying to persuade a recalcitrant Congress or while congressional staffs have expanded. The behemoth military apparatus. State Department has no excess personnel to The second step is to clearly define the dedicate to program management or training mandate, articulate a strategic framework for and doctrine,26 let alone relationship-building developing and applying capacity, and then on the Hill. demonstrate that capacity. The circular rea- soning that an underfunded, distrusted capac- Moving Forward ity will be allowed to lead, after which addi- The State Department must ask two ques- tional resources will flow in its direction, must tions before committing to the long and diffi- give way to new logic. State leadership must cult process of reform and reorganization for a define the scale on which existing capabili- new mission: is the need for this mission ongo- ties can be leveraged and provide opportuni- ing, and is addressing it a priority for the U.S. ties to demonstrate those abilities. If Iraq and Government? As Dobbins points out, “In the Afghanistan are not the model, but Sudan long run agencies will sustain investment only is, then that fact should be made explicit. in capabilities that they know will be used.”27 Moreover, it is not too late to revisit the S/ If the answer to both of these questions is yes, CRS decision to opt out of Iraq. As violence then State and USAID must take calculated subsides and Iraq begins the critical transition steps to address the underlying bureaucratic, from reconstruction to recovery, operations cultural, and structural considerations that may now be at an acceptable scale for S/CRS undermine implementation of the reforms to demonstrate its skills. The office deployed outlined in the QDDR. just one person there in 2010;29 with the S/ The first step is to minimize bureaucratic CRS emphasis on planning and assessment, strife and its ability to affect the mission. To they have an opportunity to augment—or remove the sources of contention, the State even lead—planning efforts for the transition Department must clarify roles and responsibili- on the ground. ties as well as consolidate redundant or over- lapping capabilities. This must go further than the State Department has no excess the lead agency approach put forward in the personnel to dedicate to program QDDR, which even admits that its division of management or training and doctrine, let labor between the two agencies is “arbitrary.”28 So long as duplicative capabilities exist, alone relationship-building on the Hill infighting will continue. Moreover, having capabilities spread across two agencies makes Defining the mandate and its future is a pre- assigning credit or blame difficult and impedes requisite to drive culture change. The question evaluation of combined performance. At a is not whether culture can change, but whether minimum, any matrixed approach must confer it should. The answer depends on the future of
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State’s and USAID’s mandate for stabilization measures such as overseas contingency opera- and reconstruction. While culture forms around tions supplemental accounts and pooled funding enduring needs, it also influences whether mis- with DOD. These fill short-term gaps and are sions are institutionalized. State and USAID necessary measures in the face of budget cuts but leadership have an opportunity to guide culture are unlikely to last beyond today’s contingencies, changes to enhance the mission. For the State thus failing to meet the requirements for main- Department, the lessons learned in Iraq and taining capacity. Afghanistan must be institutionalized. Incentive Asking for more money and more people in a structures must be changed to ground operational time of fiscal constraint is a hard sell, not least in experience as enhancing for career advancement, light of congressional announcements such as the linking promotion and hiring decisions to the House Appropriations Committee’s intent to cut skills needed for the mission. For USAID, cultural nearly a quarter of the State Department and for- ties must be strengthened with the diplomatic and eign operations budget request for 2012.31 But the defense arms of foreign policy. This may come at reality is that the alternative is much more costly, the expense of ties with the development world and State’s time to make the case is running out. and will require sustained leadership commitment. The mission in Iraq needs strong civilian leader- ship, the military needs a partner in the field in the U.S. Government “can no longer Afghanistan, and the U.S. Government “can no longer afford to face every task with nothing but a afford to face every task with nothing hammer at its disposal.”32 Building a robust State but a hammer at its disposal” and USAID capacity for stabilization and recon- struction ultimately enhances both efficiency and The final step is to refocus State’s and effectiveness; this is the case that must be made. USAID’s approach to Congress. The State Budget austerity and resource constraints Department and USAID together must improve will dominate Washington in the near future, the case for the mission and the cost of maintain- and in lobbying for resources to build civilian ing a standing capability. However appealing the capacity, the price of not having it must be idea might be, the concept of a unified national clearly illustrated. An inability to prevent or security budget that the QDDR nods to remains mitigate conflict before it is full-blown results beyond reach for the immediate future. It will in large-scale crises that necessitate military require significant realignment within Congress involvement, along with its much higher and a comprehensive reexamination of inter- price tag. Recognizing and funding State and agency structures, authorities, and resources.30 USAID as part of the national security para- Nonetheless, State and USAID can take steps digm, as State’s Director for Policy Planning, now to present an integrated, cross-department Jake Sullivan, said recently, will yield “huge front and to strengthen the ties between stabili- savings for what we’d have to spend on military zation and reconstruction and national security action down the road.”33 As the costs of Iraq objectives. The QDDR demonstrates new and and Afghanistan have demonstrated, a lighter, creative thought on the budget process, but a less costly civilian capability is needed for the number of the measures put forward are work- Sudans and East Timors of the world. Not only arounds at best that create reliance on temporary is this the less expensive solution, it is the more
44 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 state department, usaid, and the flawed Mandate
effective one. While the military is remarkable in its ability to adapt and adopt new capabilities, the requirements of stabilization and reconstruction are largely the political, governance, and economic skills that reside in the civilian arms of foreign policy. PRISM Notes 1 For an overview of these concerns, see Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Inspector General, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Transition in Iraq: Is the State Department Prepared to Take the Lead?” testimony to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S. House of Representatives, September 23, 2010, available at
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16 See John Herbst’s comments in Naveed Bandali, “Coordinating Reconstruction and Stabilization: An interview with Ambassador John E. Herbst (Ret.),” Journal of International Peace Operations 19, no. 4 (January– February 2011), 19–22. 17 Laura A. Hall, “S/CRS 2.0: QDDR Upgrade Provides More Operating Capacity but May Not Have Eliminated all the Bugs,” The Will and the Wallet blog, December 16, 2010, available at
46 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 The Promise and Peril of the Indirect Approach
By Brian M. Burton
ince the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has pursued a wide range of military activities abroad intended to degrade, dismantle, and defeat the al Qaeda organiza- S tion and its network of loosely affiliated Islamist extremist groups. A disproportionate number of these efforts—in terms of manpower, materiel, money, and media attention—focus on two coun- tries: Afghanistan and Iraq. In both instances, the United States toppled existing hostile regimes and is attempting to rebuild institutions of security and governance from the ground up. However, these intensive and expensive efforts at state-building are not necessarily the most important from the standpoint of understanding the future direction of U.S. strategy against violent Islamist extremist groups. Instead, U.S. strategy against transnational terrorist groups abroad is increasingly focused on a concept commonly referred to as the indirect approach. As first publicly elaborated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the indirect approach in the campaign against al Qaeda and its affiliates emphasizes “working with . . . and through partners” using “persistent but low-visibility presence” to build up the security and governance capacity of at-risk partner states.1 The United States has long used various forms of security assistance as a key instrument of its foreign policy, but the new emphasis for counterterrorism-oriented assistance is on building partner capacity: improving the security and governance capabilities of partner states to defeat al Qaeda–affili- ated groups and to stabilize weakly governed areas to prevent their being used as safe havens by militants. This indirect approach to building partner capacity against al Qaeda–affiliated groups has been implemented in various places as part of the broader war on terror since 2002. Despite the Barack Obama administration’s repudiation of the “global war on terror” as an organizing principle for U.S. national security strategy, the indirect approach to building partner capacity through security force assistance has
Brian M. Burton is a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
PRISM 3, no. 1 Features | 47 burton
been elevated to new prominence in American countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those defense policy over the past 4 years based on argu- countries’ forces in becoming more proficient at ments that it is more effective and sustainable in providing security to their populations and pro- the long run than a strategy of large-scale, direct tecting their resources and territories”—as a key U.S. intervention. The Department of Defense means to improve the capacity of partner states.4 (DOD) 2008 National Defense Strategy stated, It continued, “For reasons of political legitimacy as well as sheer economic necessity, there is no substitute for professional, motivated local security through the indirect approach, the forces. . . . By emphasizing host nation leadership United States is effective in building the and employing modest numbers of U.S. forces, the capacity of partner states to counter United States can sometimes obviate the need for terrorist groups and improve their ability larger-scale counterinsurgency campaigns.”5 to secure and govern themselves The key assumption behind this prefer- ence is that through the indirect approach, the United States is effective in building the capac- “Arguably the most important military compo- ity of partner states to counter terrorist groups nent of the struggle against violent extremists is and improve their ability to secure and govern not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we themselves. It is necessary to test this assump- help prepare our partners to defend and govern tion through an analytical framework to assess themselves.”2 It continued: the broad outcomes of U.S. efforts. It is critical that outcomes are not confused with input or Working with and through local actors when- outputs. Inputs are simply the resources used to ever possible to confront common security execute a program, while outputs are the direct challenges is the best and most sustainable products of a given event, such as the number approach to combat violent extremism. Often of foreign troops who have been through a U.S. our partners are better positioned to handle a military training program. Outcomes are best given problem because they understand the defined as “the effect of outputs” on participant local geography, social structures, and cul- countries or “changes in program participants’ ture better than we do or ever could. . . . behavior, knowledge, skills, status, and/or level [W]e will help build the internal capacities of functioning.”6 Success can only be deter- of countries at risk. We will work with and mined through the examination of outcomes. through like-minded states to help shrink the Determination of cost-effectiveness weighs out- ungoverned areas of the world and thereby comes against inputs, but the aim of this article deny extremists and other hostile parties sanc- is simply to determine whether successful out- tuary. By helping others to police themselves comes have been achieved through this strategy. and their regions, we will collectively address Of course, success in these cases is not easy threats to the broader international system.3 to judge. There are few agreed-upon metrics to evaluate progress, and even definitions of The 2010 QDR highlighted similar themes. what constitutes a successful outcome are open It emphasized security force assistance—that is, to debate. Furthermore, the building partner “‘hands-on’ efforts, conducted primarily in host capacity framework can overstate the ambitions
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of U.S. military security cooperation abroad. American security force assistance in the indi- Security force assistance may be intended to rect approach framework should produce two serve simpler means, such as establishing rela- key outcomes: a clear degradation of the tar- tionships between the U.S. military and members geted terrorist and insurgent group’s manpower of the security forces in developing countries. and capabilities, and a demonstrable improve- Should future U.S. military operations become ment of the security capabilities of the host necessary in or around any given country, close nation force to counter militant forces. These ties to local security forces could facilitate easy outcomes are best measured by assessing the access to basing and supply facilities and other ability of the host nation to conduct and sus- services. The cultivation of military-to-military tain security operations in contested areas and or military-to-government ties in countries where degrade militant control, influence, and activ- none previously existed might therefore be con- ity over these areas. Where there is a clearly sidered something of a success in and of itself.7 identifiable organization that is the target of U.S. security assistance also has a track U.S. and host nation efforts—such as the Abu record of establishing some forms of dependency Sayyaf Group (ASG), an Islamist militant group in partner countries, arguably by design in order in the Philippines—improved security capabili- to ensure that the partner states have strong ties should have some demonstrable effect on incentives to maintain the favor of the United the group, such as attrition of personnel through States. The maintenance of U.S.-provided secu- combat deaths or defections and a reduction in rity capabilities tends to require a persistent or militant attacks. In cases where building partner recurrent American support presence, which in capacity is conducted mainly as a preventive turn serves to produce strong relations between measure, improved security force capabilities the U.S. military and local security forces. The should deter the formation of militant groups quality and capabilities of host nation security and the execution of attacks. forces (particularly the Sahel states of Africa, which range among the poorest and least devel- oped in the world) are so low in some cases that host nations are expected to seek to even the most basic and minimal training con- extend their sovereignty throughout stitutes an improvement, even if it is temporary their territories and combat terrorists and sustainable only with persistent American and insurgents on their soil assistance. Simply preventing a deterioration of host nation security and governance capacity might then be considered a successful outcome.8 In addition to the development of secu- While acknowledging these nuances, this rity force capabilities, another key outcome article proceeds from the assumption that U.S. the United States seeks through the indirect efforts to build partner capacity intend to mea- approach is the strengthening of the host surably improve the ability of partner states nation’s political governance capacity to com- to secure and govern their territories. Every bat insurgents and terrorists both through secu- engagement must be judged in accordance rity operations and undertaking reform measures with its own stated objectives, but these objec- designed to undercut popular support for mili- tives can be generalized across cases. Militarily, tants. A key assumption in U.S. policy toward
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states to which it provides security assistance is entrenchment of unjust preexisting governance that improving security capacity will increase and judicial structures that help drive resistance the willingness of these states to act in ways to the duly constituted government.12 that serve American objectives. Specifically, This framework can be tested against two host nations are expected to seek to extend cases where the indirect approach has been imple- their sovereignty throughout their territories mented since 9/11—in the Philippines and the and combat terrorists and insurgents on their African Trans-Sahel “core countries”13—to assess soil. They should not passively allow militants the broad outcomes relevant to host nation secu- to establish safe havens through inaction, nor rity and governance capacity and effectiveness. should they be willing to reach political accom- These cases represent examples of the indirect modation with the most extreme al Qaeda– approach that have been ongoing in some form linked factions of an insurgent group, though since the early days of the war on terror. They partnerships of convenience with less radical also represent somewhat different applications of elements may be productive. At the same time, the indirect approach. The Philippine effort is a they must govern in a sufficiently “good” way as focused, sustained effort in one country that is now to “win the population” rather than alienate it. regarded as something of a success in countering a The development of effective, responsive specific al Qaeda–affiliated militant group despite host nation governments that provide reli- early troubles. The Trans-Sahel effort is a regional- able services and decisive leadership has long level program that has yielded more ambiguous been identified as a key element to success- results in a preventive action against a more amor- ful counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns.9 phous potential terrorist threat. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates acknowledged, “The United States . . . recog- The Philippines nizes that the security sectors of at-risk coun- Since February 2002, hundreds of U.S. tries are really systems of systems tying together troops have been persistently engaged in provid- the military, the police, the justice system, and ing training, advice, and noncombat assistance to other governance and oversight mechanisms” the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) that and institutions.10 While all U.S. allies against is mainly intended to counter the ASG, which is al Qaeda cannot be expected to function as linked to the regional al Qaeda affiliate organiza- models of liberal democracy, the third and final tion Jemaah Islamiyah on the southern Philippine necessary outcome from U.S. efforts should island of Mindanao and several smaller islands. be that host nations improve their capacities Today, the U.S. security force assistance effort in for effective and responsive governance. This the Philippines is widely regarded as a success- will enhance their legitimacy and reduce popu- ful application of the indirect approach.14 The lar support for militant terrorist or insurgent Philippine example was even held up as a model groups.11 Concretely, this entails reducing cor- in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: ruption within security forces and local gov- ernance institutions and undertaking political [S]ince 2002 U.S. forces have trained and and economic reforms that target underlying advised elements of the Philippine armed drivers of internal conflict. Counterproductive forces working to secure areas of the south- trends include increasing corruption and further ern Philippines that had been a haven for
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the Abu Sayyaf terrorist organization and and intelligence support, and engaging in civil- other terrorist elements. Over the past eight military and information operations intended years, U.S. forces and their Philippine to wean the population from sympathies for counterparts have trained together. . . . As the militants.17 As one participant described it, their equipment and skills have improved, “The heart of the strategy is based on building Philippine forces have patrolled more widely relationships, reinforcing legitimate institu- and more frequently, bringing security to tions, building security force capabilities, shar- previously contested areas. ing intelligence and information, developing focused civil-military programs and aggressively This model is being applied elsewhere to promoting local acts of good governance.”18 good effect.15 Following the surge of troops for the Yet even in this apparently successful case, Balikatan 2002 exercise, the American pres- U.S. forces are slated to remain indefinitely, ence has comprised approximately 600 U.S. and the southern Philippines remains a trou- Army Special Forces conducting counterterror- ble spot for militancy and poor governance in ism training and civil-military operations, along Southeast Asia. with an influx of approximately $1.6 billion in The Philippines has long been wracked military and economic support funding.19 The by insurgency and terrorism, but after the 9/11 basic model for U.S. training and advising is attacks, the presence of an al Qaeda–linked ter- through small-unit interaction with dozen-man rorist group spurred more active U.S. security U.S. Special Forces Operational Detachment force assistance programs. The core American Alphas (ODAs). Approximately nine ODAs objectives in the Philippines are to neutralize were deployed to Basilan Island in 2002 with a the ASG and other al Qaeda–linked militants focus on developing Philippine Light Reaction on Philippine soil while extending the reach Companies as rapid-response units for counter- of the Philippine government to prevent these terrorism. In particular, there was an emphasis militants from exploiting ungoverned territory on promoting proactive small-unit patrolling and to plan attacks against U.S. interests. The U.S. intelligence-gathering among the Philippine unit approach since 2002 has emphasized three main skills that were previously not well developed.20 lines of operations: building the capacity of the One notable feature of OEF–P has been AFP to secure its territory by providing training, the emphasis on civil-military action intended assistance, and support; civil-military operations to alleviate local deprivations and improve the to improve humanitarian conditions and gov- legitimacy of the government. U.S. military per- ernance; and information operations intended sonnel have carried out many of these activities to play on the success of the first two activi- on Basilan and areas of Mindanao where lack of ties to help enhance the population’s percep- effective governance facilitated militant sanctu- tion of government legitimacy.16 In what has aries. One of the most visible civic actions that become widely known as Operation Enduring U.S. troops participate in is the medical civic- Freedom–Philippines (OEF–P), U.S. Special action program (MEDCAP), in which American Forces numbering in the hundreds have focused medics treat maladies afflicting the local popu- on training Philippine units in counterterrorism lace. One OEF–P commander asserted, “The and COIN tactics, providing communications medical programs were vital [as was] gaining the
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confidence of the local people as well as enhanc- high-profile bombing attacks against civilian tar- ing force protection as the local residents would gets. These attacks include the involvement in often provide information about potentially dan- the 2002 Bali bombing and a ferry attack in 2004 gerous areas.” Also, American forces participated that killed 194 people and remains the deadliest in numerous small-scale building projects such act of maritime terrorism to date. Another trou- as “repairing a mosque, repairing schools, repair- bling development has been the strengthening ing small bridges [and] establishing a water sup- of ASG linkages to factions of the Moro Islamic ply.”21 However, while U.S. forces have generally Liberation Front (MILF), Indonesian Jemaah perceived these types of operations as effective, Islamiyah, and Manila-based Rajah Solaiman some observers have noted that they tend to be Movement terror group despite U.S. efforts to directed from the top down with relatively little bolster AFP capabilities to secure its territory understanding of or input from the local popula- and patrol the sea lanes between the Philippines tions who are the targets, with the result that and Indonesia. The ASG was driven from Basilan critical infrastructure and health needs go unful- Island in the wake of the 2002 Balikatan exercise, filled despite American good intentions.22 but it moved into territory held by sympathetic factions of the MILF on Mindanao and Jolo. Several MILF bases are believed to be sites used the ASG has demonstrated that it is by the ASG to plot attacks in collaboration with still capable of carrying out attacks and these other militant organizations.24 The ASG maintaining a climate of fear across the has demonstrated that it is still capable of car- southern Philippines rying out attacks and maintaining a climate of fear across the southern Philippines.25 Examples include an April 2010 raid on the city of Isabela U.S. security force assistance to the AFP on Basilan that involved coordinated bombings has substantially degraded ASG manpower and and shooting attacks by apparent Abu Sayyaf military capability; thus, it is unlikely that these members dressed in police uniforms.26 pose a strategic threat to the Philippine gov- The indirect approach in the Philippines ernment. ASG strength declined from approxi- does appear to have achieved some success in mately 1,000 men in 2002 to between 200 and reshaping the way the AFP approaches coun- 400 by 2006.23 Its significance as an indepen- terterrorism and counterinsurgency. A RAND dent guerrilla organization has sharply deterio- study found that: rated. Concerted, localized security efforts such as the Basilan operations in the Balikatan 2002 [The Balikatan exercises] underscored exercise appear to have had the most significant to participating officers that development effect in rooting out concealed ASG cells. assistance often goes hand-in-hand with The ASG has not been eliminated, however, military operations, especially in terms of and remains able to perpetrate acts of terrorism the potential favorable impact on the atti- and facilitate transnational al Qaeda influence in tudes of the local population. . . . [T]he the region. Under new leadership in the middle of military has now created a new division the decade, ASG appeared “to have gained new that is specifically dedicated to CMO effectiveness as a terrorist organization” through [civil-military operations] efforts—the
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National Development Support Command. larger insurgent groups, such as the MILF and The rationale behind the unit is that the the Communist New People’s Army, which best way to defeat a terrorist insurgency it views as posing more significant threats.29 is to provide people with what the rebels Additionally, despite the apparently positive cannot: roads, bridges, businesses, houses, reception U.S. troops have received in the areas schools, electricity, medical centers, and where they are actually assisting, their presence medicines—in short, better governance.27 is politically controversial among citizens and some lawmakers in Manila, generating scattered These “hearts and minds” efforts by the protests that Philippine politicians can exploit.30 AFP to produce more effective and responsive governance, with American support, appear to have some effect in increasing local intelligence corruption within the military and tip-offs, which enable more effective security government remains a pervasive force operations to eliminate ASG leaders and problem that undermines both effective cadres. Civil-military operations are conducted governance and legitimacy in the eyes of in conjunction with sweeps and other offensive local populations actions that have apparently been effective in degrading ASG’s manpower, if not its ability to carry out periodic bombing attacks.28 The government as a whole is still rela- The effects of U.S. security assistance on tively weak and fearful of a coup attempt by the AFP, however, have been somewhat lim- military commanders, which is not unreason- ited. ODAs focus mainly on training smaller able given military leaders’ treatment of the units deployed to Mindanao and Basilan, and force as personal power bases and fiefdoms substantial U.S. security assistance funding and the precedents for military intervention has not addressed problems in AFP supply and in politics.31 Corruption within the military logistics capabilities. Despite the improvement and at all levels of government remains a per- in individual units’ combat abilities, the over- vasive problem that undermines both effec- all sustainability of AFP operations is question- tive governance and legitimacy in the eyes of able. Philippine troops are rarely well equipped, local populations who are targeted by mili- and the country’s defense spending is limited. tant groups and the government for support.32 Additionally, the AFP has significant issues with Despite the military’s improved understand- corruption and lack of professionalism within ing of the necessity for better governance to the ranks. These factors have contributed to an counter militants, follow-on civilian author- environment in which the organizational reforms ities assigned to hold and control the areas necessary to institutionalize lessons learned from cleared by AFP operations “fail to discharge U.S. training and assistance are rarely taken. their responsibilities in a meaningful and From a broader political standpoint, the decisive manner.”33 The penetration of the results of U.S. assistance have been mixed. The central government’s writ (particularly the Philippine government has willingly accepted legal justice system) and infrastructure into American support, but it is widely believed that the Muslim areas of Mindanao and the south- it is less interested in targeting ASG than the ern islands therefore remains fairly minimal.
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Nigerien soldiers practice field tactics during Operation Flintlock 2007, part of an interactive exchange with U.S. military and State Department’s Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership U.S. Navy (Michael Larson)
Economic development is weak at best, with poverty levels exceeding half the local population and most businesses forced to pay bribes to government officials; human rights abuses remain a significant problem across the southern Philippines; and, most concerning from a U.S. per- spective, the government does not appear to be particularly dedicated to ameliorating this situation.34 The government as a whole has not fully embraced the types of reforms recognized as necessary to consolidate improved governance in its troubled regions. In sum, OEF–P success remains at best “incomplete,” as former commander David Maxwell wrote in 2004.35 While the Philippines has been a willing counterterrorism partner to the United States for the most part, U.S. assistance has not been able to change some of the more pernicious aspects of the Philippine government and military institutions that impede more comprehensive success against ASG and more capable governance. U.S. assistance, perhaps because of its success in degrading the ASG and advancing limited improvements in the AFP, may actually enable the Philippine government to continue to avoid more significant governance reforms to address the drivers of conflict. The African Sahel The countries of the Sahel feature significant swaths of terrain that can be considered ungov- erned. State capacity is generally weak, infrastructure is undeveloped, and international borders are poorly marked and monitored. These states experience ethnic strife stemming from tensions between the settled population and traditional nomadic tribal groups such as the Tuareg that still move
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through the region. These factors combine to objective for its operations in the Sahel. Primary create conditions of insecurity and conflict that strategic goals of U.S. security force assistance can be exploited by extremist groups.36 include improving the capabilities of the secu- U.S. policymakers have become increas- rity forces of the Sahel states and improving their ingly fearful that al Qaeda could exploit ungov- ability to cooperate with one another to secure erned spaces and state weakness in the Sahel currently unguarded territory and borders.42 to establish a recruiting, training, and planning The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) was the presence in the region. In prepared testimony first significant security force assistance activ- for a 2005 House of Representatives hearing, ity that the United States launched in the Rear Admiral Hamlin Tallent, then Director region after 9/11. It was a Department of of Operations for U.S. European Command, State–funded program begun with less than asserted, “In many areas of the Sahara Desert $7 million in 2003 to promote regional anti- (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad) there is terrorism cooperation. U.S. Army Special very little military or police presence, and often Forces and Marine units rotated through no central government influence.”37 Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad to engage Terrorist attacks such as the Madrid train in small-unit training of rapid-reaction com- bombings were seen as harbingers of future mili- panies established to “stem the flow of illicit tant activities emanating from the trans-Sahara arms, goods and people across borders and to region.38 Africa was also found to be the source of preclude terrorist organizations from seeking up to one-quarter of the foreign fighters attacking or establishing sanctuaries in the Sahel.”43 As U.S. troops in Iraq.39 Militant groups participate the International Crisis Group reported, “The in sporadic attacks on local government outposts goals are ambitious but the day-to-day activi- and occasionally target Western tourists. ties are often rather mundane.” PSI sessions The most attention-grabbing shift, how- focused on training units of 130 to 150 soldiers ever, occurred in early 2007 when the Algerian in marksmanship, “communications and team- Salafist Group for Call and Combat (Groupe work,” and first aid, culminating in 2-week Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, or field exercises in the desert for each group.44 GSPC) declared itself al Qaeda in the Islamic An expansion of U.S. training efforts Mahgreb (AQIM). The GSPC had previously occurred in June 2005 as part of Exercise vowed allegiance to Osama bin Laden in 2004, Flintlock 2005, which was planned by U.S. but this action produced more consternation European Command to provide additional among U.S. policymakers because it seemed to basic training functions in skills such as marks- provide clear evidence of al Qaeda’s spreading manship, land navigation, human rights, medi- influence to affiliated regional groups.40 Despite cal skills, and small-unit tactics.45 The exer- being largely driven from Algeria, the organiza- cise marked the beginning of a new phase of tion has managed to reconstitute cells in the U.S. involvement, which was renamed the Sahel countries. AQIM continued the GSPC Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership pattern of attacking local security forces and (TSCTP). The partnership is an interagency targeting Westerners for kidnappings.41 effort of the State Department, U.S. Agency The United States has set the prevention for International Development (USAID), of al Qaeda havens in the region as the main and DOD that as of 2009 covered programs in
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Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, military trainers have little to build on.47 Key Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. enablers such as reliable transportation remain The DOD element, dubbed Operation Enduring extremely limited even in the wake of U.S. Freedom–Trans-Sahara (OEF–TS), was initially efforts to provide all-terrain trucks capable of managed by U.S. European Command and then navigating the region’s terrain and poor infra- taken over by U.S. Africa Command in 2008. structure. Transportation is particularly crucial Under OEF–TS, persistent low-level U.S. secu- given the land area and extensive borders of the rity force assistance is supposedly complemented Sahel states. The security forces’ lack of mobility by enhanced political and development aid. is one of the main factors preventing them from OEF–TS includes many of the same ele- exerting control over large swaths of territory. ments of military training as the PSI, with an This in turn points to the broader problem of added emphasis on countering militant ideolo- U.S. military efforts to build the capacity of host gies and promoting good governance and insti- nation security forces in Africa, specifically the tutional development through civil-military emphasis on training for tactical proficiency with- operations performed by specialized teams pro- out cultivation of support capabilities and institu- vided by U.S. Special Operations Command. tions necessary to sustain and advance the tactical capabilities. In one sense, this is understandable it is unclear that U.S. assistance to the given the low baseline of Sahel military capac- Sahel security forces has had much of ity. As one U.S. trainer commented in late 2008, an impact on AQIM and other affiliated “This is a long-term effort. This is crawl, walk, run, and right now, we’re still in the crawl phase.”48 militant groups in the region There have been small successes for U.S. objectives in the region, notably Malian military Military Information Support Teams consist of attacks on suspected AQIM bases in 2009 and three- to eight-person groups that support U.S. the establishment of a joint military relationship Embassy–led public diplomacy efforts through involving Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in media productions, notably radio and newspa- April 2010.49 However, the sustainability of tacti- pers, aimed at countering violent extremism. cal-level improvements is highly doubtful unless Civil-Military Support Elements provide basic equal attention is paid to developing institutional humanitarian and governance development ser- and logistical capacity. Notably, assessments of the vices, including activities such as MEDCAPs annual Flintlock exercise have not identified clear, performed in the Philippines, to help bolster lasting improvements in the security capacity of the legitimacy of the host nations. U.S. Africa the states since its inception in 2005.50 Command documents emphasize all OEF– Perhaps most significantly, it is unclear TS activities as supporting elements of State that U.S. assistance to the Sahel security forces Department and USAID governance capacity- has had much of an impact on AQIM and building and economic development efforts other affiliated militant groups in the region. under the overarching TSCTP program.46 The core American goal since the initiation Building partner capacity in the Sahel of the PSI has been to prevent the emergence countries is particularly difficult because they of an al Qaeda–linked terrorist presence in the are so lacking in resources and capabilities that Sahel, but incidents over the past year such as
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the kidnapping and killing of Westerners and emergence of Sahel-based militant groups with attacks on security forces suggest that militant more direct ties to al Qaeda came after, not activity has not been deterred by U.S. assis- before, the PSI and Flintlock 2005 exercise. As tance to this point.51 Recently, an expansion of RAND analyst Lianne Kennedy Boudali notes, attacks in northern Nigeria using remote-deto- AQIM propaganda regularly plays up U.S. nated bombs has provided further evidence of security force assistance programs as evidence the resilience of Islamist insurgent forces in the of American occupation of Islamic lands, and region and their links to al Qaeda affiliates.52 local media frequently speculate suspiciously The most positive aspect of the Sahel coun- about the purpose of U.S. activities.55 The tries has been their willingness to attempt to U.S. military is concerned about the issue of confront terrorists and militants on their soil. local perceptions of the legitimacy of the Sahel Generally, governments and security forces wel- governments and American assistance efforts come U.S. security assistance and the benefits that and has begun attempting to track public opin- come with it. Though it may not be entirely fair ion through third-party polling services.56 Yet to judge a long-term program only a few years in, some analysis already suggests that the popula- there have been few changes to the underlying tions of the Sahel do not look favorably on the political dysfunction, economic destitution, cor- American role in their countries, believing that ruption, and lack of professionalism that have typ- the militant Islamist presence in the region is ically hindered progress.53 Additionally, U.S. assis- overstated and that the United States is primar- tance has been periodically interrupted due to the ily concerned with securing its own economic occurrence of coups and other political upheavals interests. As the International Crisis Group put (as in Mauritania and Niger). The periodic move- it, the people of the Sahel “expect that military ment away from democracy by the Sahel states interventions are designed not for their benefit, indicates the limits of the U.S. ability through but for the benefit of those who intervene.”57 security-focused assistance to effectively culti- Some of these perception problems, which vate better governance among its partner states may create more sympathy for militants or antip- that focuses on providing effective services to the athy toward the United States, are supposed to people to undercut terrorist or insurgent groups’ be alleviated through State Department–led and appeal and recruitment. Some reports suggest that USAID-led counter-radicalization efforts, gover- U.S. assistance provides incentives for partner nance development, and economic development governments in the region to act irresponsibly. By initiatives. However, Government Accountability trumping up the al Qaeda threat, partner govern- Office audits have revealed an overall lack of stra- ments are able to get added American support tegic coordination to ensure that DOD, State, and when their more immediate interest is in quash- USAID programs under the TSCTP are concur- ing more legitimate opposition elements such as rent and mutually reinforcing.58 Even if the imbal- minority Tuareg nomads or Sufi Muslim groups.54 ance between civilian and military assistance was Most concerning of all, however, is the corrected, the small-scale indirect approach to fear that U.S. assistance may in some cases building partner capacity in the Sahel is likely to attract the al Qaeda presence or influence generate some level of suspicion and resentment that the United States seeks to avoid. Though within local populations, though the full implica- likely coincidental, it is worth noting that the tions of this perception problem are unclear.
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Soldiers show children how to play with yo-yos during humanitarian mission in the Philippines, September 2007 U.S. Navy (Michael Larson)
Implications for Policymakers It is difficult to argue that the indirect approach has achieved more than limited outcomes. Terrorist groups have been degraded and host nation militaries’ tactical capabilities have been improved, but more expansive and lasting defeat of militant organizations and governance develop- ment in partner states has been elusive. While the cases examined in this article could be considered in their relatively early stages, there are as yet few indications of imminent progress toward the more far-reaching objectives of this strategy. Yet the indirect approach to building partner capacity continues to hold significant appeal, and its employment in a wide variety of cases, including cases beyond the counterterrorism-focused efforts described here, is only likely to expand over time. Since the use of the indirect approach will probably continue, policymakers should have a clear understanding of its limitations. Three issues in particular stand out when examining the preceding case studies. First, political strategies to leverage security force assistance to achieve desired outcomes are insuf- ficiently emphasized by U.S. policymakers and implementers of the indirect approach. Influencing the host nation to behave in certain ways conducive to countering terrorist and insurgent forces is a neces- sary precondition to building partner governance capacity. Security force assistance has been provided in these cases, and likely other cases as well, mainly out of fear of what would happen if the United States did not support these host nations. Relatively little thought has been devoted to seeking quid pro
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quo arrangements to ensure that partner govern- A unified State, USAID, and DOD assessment ments are truly willing to reform themselves as the framework would be most desirable and in keep- United States helps develop their military capa- ing with the whole-of-government imperatives bilities. Failure to do so could risk worse outcomes of effective capacity-building. Such a framework in which American security assistance to regimes should focus on holistic outcomes, such as deg- with questionable legitimacy and unwillingness to radation of militant groups and improvement reform drives increasing support for Islamist mili- of the host nation’s ability and willingness to tancy within populations that the United States govern effectively and responsibly. Some might seeks to help. Improving integrated security and argue that it is still too early to truly determine governance capacity-building and conflict preven- success or failure in these post-9/11 efforts, but tion preparations was a high priority for Secretary an assessment framework should be useful for Gates, who proposed a “shared responsibility, detecting and tracking progress (or lack thereof) pooled resources” concept to link DOD, State, when it actually occurs. and USAID programs targeting at-risk countries Finally, while the indirect approach is and regions.59 The establishment of a pooled- intended to reduce the need for large-scale U.S. funding pilot program called the Global Security military involvement in counterterrorism and Contingency Fund is meant to serve as a proof of COIN operations in host nations, the course of concept for this proposal, but policymakers still indirect approach missions in the Philippines need to consider both the short- and long-term and trans-Sahel Africa does not suggest any easy consequences if a U.S.-backed partner govern- off-ramps to disengagement once initiated. U.S. ment did not cooperate on governance reforms or involvement has tended to surge with a major demonstrated a lack of willingness to address the exercise such as Balikatan 2002 or Flintlock underlying causes of a militant challenge. 2005, then plateau somewhat higher than the Second, rigorous assessments of outcomes pre-exercise level of effort. While these are still from efforts to build partner capacity are lack- small-scale security force assistance efforts that ing, or at least not widely available. This is are sustainable for an extended period, the overall somewhat understandable given the difficul- trend is increased levels of involvement or, more ties involved in analyzing outcomes versus fundamentally, a persistent U.S. presence that inputs and outputs and the desire to keep these never seems to depart. Secretary Gates and other operations out of the headlines. Yet senior poli- U.S. officials emphasized the importance of long- cymakers must have a clear understanding of term commitment to reassure and support partner what can reasonably be expected from indirect governments.61 Without disputing the importance approach capacity-building efforts and whether of that type of commitment, it is worth consid- they are advancing national security objec- ering possible implications for perceptions of the tives. Combatant commands and units in the United States and partner governments and for field currently conduct after-action reviews and the future of the U.S. military force structure in other assessments, including polling, to gauge a world where U.S. military engagement, even host nation government legitimacy and popular if indirect in nature, continually spreads to new views in the United States.60 However, there at-risk countries and does not eventually retract. appears to be no standard method across the Policymakers should always be cautious about U.S. Government for assessing program success. expansions of American involvement that are
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linked to open-ended objectives and underdefined outcomes, lest the small-scale indirect approach spiral into the type of large-scale direct action it is supposed to avoid. The indirect approach, then, carries both promise and peril. As its prominence in American strategy grows, there is much more work to be done to understand the effects of efforts to build the security and governance capacity of partner states and to ensure that these efforts benefit U.S. national security. PRISM Notes 1 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense [DOD], February 6, 2006), 11–12. 2 National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: DOD, June 2008), 8. 3 Ibid., 8–10. 4 QDR Report (Washington, DC: DOD, February 2010), 26. 5 Ibid., 27–28. 6 Jennifer D.P. Moroney et al., A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), xv. 7 I am indebted to Robert Kaplan for this observation. 8 I am indebted to Adam Grissom for this observation. 9 See Sir Robert G.K. Thompson, “Basic Principles and Operational Concepts of Counterinsurgency,” in American Defense Policy, ed. Mark E. Smith and Claude J. Johns (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 267–268; Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May–June 2005), 9–10. 10 Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 (May–June 2010), 4. 11 This concept figures prominently in U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. See Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006), 1-21–1-22. 12 Ibid., 1-23, 1-28–1-29. 13 The Trans-Sahel core countries are Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. 14 See, for example, Jim Michaels, “Philippines a Model for Counterinsurgency,” USA Today, March 30, 2011; Thom Shanker, “Elite U.S. Force Stays Put in Philippines,” International Herald Tribune, August 21, 2009; “Front-line Vets: Drawing Lessons from a Rare Success,” The Economist, January 28, 2010. 15 QDR Report, February 2010, 28. 16 Gregory Wilson, “Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF–Philippines and the Indirect Approach,” Military Review (November–December 2006), 6. 17 Andrew Feickert, U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia, RL32758 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 26, 2005), 15–16. 18 Brian Petit, “OEF–Philippines: Thinking COIN, Practicing FID,” Special Warfare (January–February 2010), 11. 19 See, for example, Norimitsu Onishi, “Curbed in Towns, Islamists in Philippines Take to Forests,” The New York Times, September 26, 2009. 20 David S. Maxwell, “Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines: What Would Sun Tzu Say?” Military Review (May–June 2004); and Maxwell, “Commander’s Summary of Operation OEF–P,” unpublished manu- script, May 5, 2002.
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21 See Petit, 12–15; Wilson, 7–8; David P. Fridovich and Fred T. Krawchuk, “Winning in the Pacific: The Special Operations Forces Indirect Approach,” Joint Force Quarterly (1st Quarter, 2007), 26. 22 See International Crisis Group (ICG), The Philippines: Counterinsurgency versus Counterterrorism in Mindanao, Asia Report No. 152 (Brussels: ICG, 2008), 22–23. 23 Larry Niksch, Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, RL31265 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 24, 2007), 4; Zachary Abuza, Balik-terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 2005), 27. 24 See ICG, The Philippines, 7–10; Niksch, 3–7, 14–15. 25 See, for example, John M. Glionna, “Philippine City Lives in Constant Fear,” Los Angeles Times, August 9, 2009. 26 Jim Gomez, “Nine Dead as Muslim Militants Attack Philippine City,” Associated Press, April 13, 2010; Marlon Ramos, “Eight Dead in Basilan Clashes, Bombings,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 13, 2010. 27 Peter Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009), 140–141. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Pia Lee-Brago, “RP, U.S. Renew Security Alliance,” The Philippine Star, November 13, 2009; Pia Lee-Brago, Roel Pareno, and Aurea Calica, “DFA: RP Must Continue to Reap Benefits from Visiting Forces Agreement,” The Philippine Star, August 30, 2009. 31 Chalk, 147. 32 Ibid., 147, 183. 33 Ibid., 143–144. 34 See Angel Rabasa, “Case Study: The Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc,” in Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks, ed. Angel Rabasa et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007), 117–123; Thomas Lum, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests, RL33233 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2011). 35 Maxwell, “Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines.” 36 See Lianne Kennedy-Boudali, “Examining U.S. Counterterrorism Priorities and Strategy Across Africa’s Sahel Region,” Testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs, November 17, 2009, 1; William P. Pope, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2005, 11. 37 Hamlin B. Tallent, Statement before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2005, 19. See also Jon Gambrell, “AFRICOM Commander Sees Nigeria Terror Link,” Associated Press, August 17, 2011. 38 Craig S. Smith, “U.S. Training African Forces to Uproot Terrorism,” The New York Times, May 11, 2004. 39 Eric Schmitt, “As Africans Join Iraqi Insurgency, U.S. Counters with Military Training in Their Lands,” The New York Times, June 10, 2005. 40 See, for example, Bruce Riedel, “Al-Qaeda Strikes Back,” Foreign Affairs (May–June 2007). 41 Kennedy-Boudali, 2–5.
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42 Tallent, 22–23. 43 ICG, Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction? Africa Report No. 92 (Brussels: ICG, 2005), 30. 44 Ibid. See also Phillip Ulmer, “Special Forces Support Pan-Sahel Initiative in Africa,” Armed Forces Press Service, March 8, 2004. 45 Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Pushes Anti-Terrorism in Africa,” The Washington Post, July 26, 2005. 46 U.S. Africa Command, “Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership,” n.d., available at
62 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 Haitian child carries meal distributed by Soldiers as part of humanitarian relief after January 2010 earthquake DOD (Fred W. Baker III) DOD (Fred W. The Case for Nation-building Why and How to Fix Failed States
By Paul D. Miller
ation-building has a bad reputation. The phrase conjures up images of well-meaning but hapless U.S. Soldiers or United Nations (UN) peacekeepers involved in an expensive, N complicated, and ultimately futile effort to fix other people’s problems. Worse, nation- building is often seen as both dangerous and peripheral to anyone’s vital national security interests. Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti are routinely trotted out as proof that such missions are doomed to debacle. In the post-Iraq era of softer power and tightening budgets, it seems prudent to set aside notions that the United States or UN can or should deploy force to remake countries abroad in the liberal world’s image.
Paul D. Miller is an Assistant Professor in the College of International Security Affairs at the National Defense University. Dr. Miller is also a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
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Unfortunately, the need to engage in of weakness in literally dozens of other states, nation-building is inescapable. State failure nation-building should remain an important incubates serious threats to regional and inter- and viable policy option for the UN and national order, such as insurgent movements Western powers. (West and Central Africa), organized crime and drug-trafficking networks (Southeast Europe, Why Build Nations? Central Asia), piracy (East Africa, Southeast After the terrorist attacks of September 11, Asia), pandemic disease (AIDS), and ecologi- 2001, it quickly became received wisdom that cal disaster—to say nothing of the occasional failed states are dangers to the world. In truth, global terrorist organization. Time and time few failed states generate the kind of global again, history demonstrates that state failure, menace that al Qaeda was, and some scholars, when left unaddressed, causes demonstrable including Aidan Hehir, Anna Simmons, and harm to neighbors, whole regions, and occa- David Tucker, have since argued that state fail- sionally the international order itself. ure is not a significant cause of transnational terrorist threats.1 But even if al Qaeda and Afghanistan were highly unusual, it is none- the challenges that the international theless true that weak and collapsed states community faces in the 21st century pose other dangers to their neighbors, whole provide an ideal opportunity for a timely regions, and occasionally the world. For exam- reappraisal of nation-building ple, some 20 million people, including 600,000 Americans, died of the Spanish influenza of 1918–1920, a disease that surely spread faster Happily, the popular image of nation- and lasted longer in part because of Europe’s building is largely founded on a few famous weakness and poverty following World War I. examples of dramatic failure. A closer look The disease killed more people than the war at the history and practice of nation-building itself. Today, epidemics such as AIDS or a illustrates that the international community potential bird flu outbreak could kill millions, has learned key lessons and improved its ability cripple poor states’ health care systems, and to foster stability and democracy in states con- destabilize regions as armies and governments fronted with violence, illegitimacy, poverty, lose human capital. Keeping such diseases in and institutional breakdown. The challenges check is as much a governance problem as a that the international community faces in the scientific and medical one. 21st century provide an ideal opportunity for a Some threats are more direct than disease. timely reappraisal of nation-building, its goals, The Mafia arose in the lawless regions of Sicily prospects, and uses. As the international com- in the late 19th century and became a blight munity begins to work with the new state of of organized crime and gang warfare in 20th- South Sudan; plans for a post-Qadhafi Libya; century Italy and America. The illegal opium continues reconstruction efforts in Haiti; over- trade flourished in the weak and ungoverned sees peace-building efforts in Côte d’Ivoire “Golden Triangle” border area between Laos, and Lebanon; faces persistent weakness and Burma, and Vietnam in the 20th century— violence in Afghanistan; and monitors signs until Afghanistan’s collapse created an even
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more inviting environment for global narcot- But failed states also pass costs on to their ics traffickers in Central Asia in the 1990s. neighbors, the region, and even the world. Civil The collapse of the Soviet Union and rise war and state failure typically cause neighbor- of nonstate armed groups outside the writ of ing states to increase spending on defense as a weak post-communist states led to civil unrest, precaution, which can trigger a regional arms violence, and regional instability from the race while decreasing resources available for Balkans to the Caucasus and Central Asia, social welfare and investment. War itself is killing hundreds of thousands of people in infectious. Instability in one country is an ideal the Balkans, reigniting nationalist chauvin- condition for marginalized groups from a neigh- ism in Russia, and creating a clutch of frozen boring country to take refuge and launch their conflict zones that serve as havens for crimi- own insurgencies. Refugees from failed states nals and smugglers. West Africa collapsed in are a considerable economic cost on neighbors, the 1990s as Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Côte and even more so if they are carrying infectious d’Ivoire exported lawlessness and insurgent diseases such as HIV/AIDS, as they often are. movements to each other. Central Africa saw State failure disrupts cross-border trade in the one of the most lethal wars in the continent’s region, which can be a major economic burden history from 1997 to 2003 in part because the because most countries’ largest trading part- Democratic Republic of the Congo was unable ners are their immediate neighbors. Citizens of to uphold basic law and order or protect its failed states buy fewer goods, produce less for borders. And piracy along the east coast of the world economy, create no businesses, and Africa has increased over the last two decades invent no products, but have more opportuni- since Somalia’s collapse into anarchy. ties to contribute to crime and political vio- These threats collectively take a massive lence that crosses borders.3 human toll in the states directly affected. States also grow poorer. According to Paul Collier, “During civil war countries tend to grow around failed states may eventually present 2.2 percentage points more slowly than during a systemic risk to the liberal world peace.” Per capita incomes fall and production order, of which the United States is the of food, among other goods, declines. Instability principal architect and beneficiary causes capital flight: citizens with means shift up to 10 percent of their private wealth abroad. It also causes the flight of human capital: the Failed states are sinkholes in the world. most educated and skilled citizens tend to be They contribute nothing good and positively the ones most able to emigrate, leaving the detract value from the region, much as a con- country bereft of the talent pool that it needs demned building used by criminals spreads for reconstruction. And, of course, people who blight and drags down home values throughout live in postconflict failed states are less healthy, a neighborhood. Moreover, failed states may less educated, have fewer opportunities, and die eventually present a systemic risk to the liberal younger. For example, infant mortality rises by world order, of which the United States is the an average of 13 percent during a civil war, an principal architect and beneficiary. The threats effect that lingers long after war ends.2 emanating from failed states are likely to spill
PRISM 3, no. 1 Features | 65 Author U.S. Air Force (Adrian Cadiz)
over international boundaries more frequently because globalization has reduced states’ insularity from each other. The 21st century is likely to see a steady increase in cross-border low-intensity conflict, transnational drug- and human-trafficking, piracy, international refugee flows, pandemic disease, environmental disaster, and terrorism. That is why state failure is a national security problem to be taken seriously in Washington.
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Provincial Reconstruction Team Zabul member secures area near bridge construction site
In response to these threats, the international community has few good options. On one end of the spectrum, the Western powers could simply ignore the problems, allow anarchy to consume failed states, and pay ever higher costs to isolate themselves and repair any damage after the fact. But this option is shortsighted, ignores the realities of globalization, and is sure to cost more in the long run than is necessary. On the other end of the spectrum, the international community could resurrect
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a trusteeship or mandate system under which crime). It is a pragmatic exercise of hard power regional powers assume responsibility for keep- to protect vital national interests. ing order in their respective neighborhoods. This option, too, is unrealistic because there Can It Be Done? is no political will for renewed imperialism, by But none of this matters if nation-build- whatever name, among either the great powers ing is impossible. Sometimes the best policy or the developing world. option on paper turns out to be the worst in Between these two extremes lies a moder- reality because it simply cannot be done and ate solution. The least bad alternative is for the efforts to implement it waste time and money international community to address the root while the problem gets worse. Other options, causes of state failure and foster the growth even if suboptimal, are better if they can actu- of responsible and accountable governance in ally be implemented. the places where it is most sorely lacking—in Nation-building is hard. The United other words, nation-building. The international Nations famously bungled operations in Liberia, community embraced this option quickly after Angola, and Somalia in the 1990s. The second the Cold War but abruptly grew gun-shy after UN Angola Verification Mission oversaw a poor implementation in a few early missions presidential election in 1992, the unfavorable caused policymakers to doubt its feasibility outcome of which was seized upon by Jonas and relevance. But seen in proper perspective, Savimbi’s rebel group to renew its decades-long nation-building is not international charity. civil war, suggesting that rapid elections in a It is not a superfluous, dispensable exercise in postconflict environment can exacerbate ten- appeasing Western guilt, an expensive tribute sions. The UN Observer Mission in Liberia to humanitarianism, or an act of unvarnished drove the country’s peace process toward an selflessness and goodwill. Nation-building is a election in 1997, but failed to disarm factions necessary response to the danger of failed states first. Charles Taylor, the most ruthless and well- armed warlord in Liberia, simply terrified the citizenry into electing him. In Somalia, the UN the experience in Somalia has been and United States failed to deploy anything especially influential in shaping scholars’ that country needed to impose order over frac- and policymakers’ attitudes toward tious warlords and restart the nonfunctioning nation-building government. In all three cases, the states in question ended up worse off after, and because of, outsider meddling. that threaten regional stability. It is a strate- The experience in Somalia has been espe- gic investment in weak states to increase their cially influential in shaping scholars’ and poli- capacities. It is an effort to target countries cymakers’ attitudes toward nation-building. whose weakness threatens international order The Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993, to improve specific abilities, such as their abil- the American public’s understandable confu- ity to provide public security, defend their bor- sion about why U.S. Soldiers were dying in an ders, produce and sell goods, and suppress illicit East African country with which they were activities (including terrorism and organized not at war, and the Clinton administration’s
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abrupt pullout from the country cast a long for how all nation-building interventions are shadow over future international peace-build- doomed to play out. ing deployments. In the 18 years since the Nation-building has proven to be a viable failure of the UN operation in Somalia, it is and successful option in the past because most routinely cited as evidence that some states are interventions do not have to contend with so far gone that outsiders cannot impose peace Somalian levels of anarchy, and the United and democracy on them. For example, Fareed States and UN have also learned to operate Zakaria, a Harvard-educated political scien- tist who writes widely on international affairs, the nation-building effort in Somalia saw recently wrote, “The trouble with trying to fix failed states is that it implicates the United the deployment of the most inept UN States in a vast nation building effort in coun- mission to the world’s most failed state tries where the odds of success are low and the risk of unintended consequences is very high. with a measure of greater sophistication. The Consider Somalia. [That operation] highlights failures have been big, public, and humiliat- the complexity of almost every approach to ing, but in the last two decades, the United failed states.”4 States and UN have racked up better out- But it does not. We might call this the comes in Namibia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, El Somalia Fallacy. Despite its dramatic public Salvador, Guatemala, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, impact, the mission in Somalia is not a use- Timor Leste, Liberia (the second time around), ful historical analogy to generalize about failed and Sierra Leone (which came back from the states and nation-building. To make a useful brink of failure). Few of those countries are generalization, we should start with a typi- fully rebuilt, modern, stable liberal democracies. cal failed state, or, better yet, several of them. Civil unrest still occasionally flares up. Most Somalia is not a typical failed state; it is an are not particularly nice places to live. But the extreme outlier. It has been nearly the most international interventions changed their trajec- completely failed state on Earth for almost tories. None have reverted to large-scale politi- two decades. Even more, the UN Operation cal violence. Their peace agreements have held. in Somalia (UNOSOM) in the early 1990s They have all held relatively open and competi- was not a typical UN intervention; it was a tive elections. Most have seen positive postwar singularly, uniquely inept one marred by an economic growth. A few have shown improve- inadequate mandate, poor resources, unclear ments in the quality and accountability of their command and control, and no political will. governance, according to the World Bank’s gov- The nation-building effort in Somalia (under- ernance indicators, probably the hardest task of taken by UNOSOM II, which deployed sepa- postconflict reconstruction.5 rately from and with a broader mandate than The bottom line is that these countries the prior U.S.–UN famine relief effort) saw the are better off now than they were at the nadir deployment of the most inept UN mission to of their respective wars and failures, and they the world’s most failed state. It is unsurprising are generally improving, not backsliding. This that what resulted was a famous catastrophe, is a realistic, achievable, and useful standard of but observers should not treat it as a blueprint success that policymakers can use to determine
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if an intervention is worth the cost and effort. but to varying degrees. Thus, organizations Using a sliding scale also enables us to distinguish such as the Fund for Peace measure a range between utter failures (for example, resumed of variables associated with state failure, war in Angola), middling outcomes (Cambodia, including demographics, refugee populations, which has settled on an undemocratic peace), economic decline, security incidents, and so shallow successes (Nicaragua, which enjoys peace forth, aggregate them into a single score of and political freedom but economic stagnation), failure, and rank all countries in the world, and outright victory (Sierra Leone, Germany). most failed to least, in their Failed State That makes a real difference in human lives Index.6 In 2011, Somalia topped the Fund and is typically good enough to secure whatever for Peace’s list, followed by Chad, Sudan, the regional or global interests led to the interven- Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, tion in the first place. Zimbabwe, and Afghanistan. The Failed State Index illustrates the prob- lems with this approach to state failure. Somalia nation-building is one of the most and Sudan present polar opposite problems. complex undertakings a state Somalia’s failure is one of too little government; can attempt it is literally anarchic. Sudan’s failure is one of too much government of the wrong kind; it is Understanding the Problem tyrannical and genocidal. Afghanistan, mean- while, is waging a counterinsurgency, while Nation-building is one of the most com- Zimbabwe is collapsing from incompetent klep- plex undertakings a state can attempt. There is tocracy. Putting these diverse states together on no secret to success. There is no silver bullet or a single list of “failure” does little to illuminate single variable that explains all cases of success the vast differences between them or suggest and failure—not the rule of law, availability of ways of resolving their problems. Instead, it health care, amount of paved roads, timing of encourages a cookie-cutter approach to nation- elections, gross domestic product growth rate, building that overlooks the different problems and not even the security environment. The each state faces, and therefore the different UN Mission in Haiti in 1994, for example, solutions required. ultimately failed to restore political stability not It is clear by now that different states because of violence, insurgency, or civil war, but fail in different ways. To clarify the different because of endemic political gridlock and insti- types of state failure, it is helpful to think of tutional weakness that the UN failed to address. statehood as comprising five complementary Successful nation-building requires close aspects: security, legitimacy, capacity, pros- attention and responsiveness to local condi- perity, and humanity. To put it somewhat tions. This will require a reorientation in how abstractly, states must be able to exercise coer- we think about state failure. Scholars and cion; articulate a theory of justice to legitimize policymakers tended in the past to view state their coercion; operate institutions to provide failure as an easily defined condition. State other goods and services; exchange and use failure, in this view, is a singular, monolithic goods and services; and orient their activities phenomenon; states all fail the same way, toward human flourishing. They are mediators
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of violence, justice, the social contract, eco- mandate, and political naïveté. After insur- nomic exchange, and human community. gents from the Revolutionary United Front State failure can be understood under the (RUF) took several hundred UN peacekeep- same headings. States can fail in any of these ers hostage, the United Kingdom intervened, five aspects of statehood, suggesting a typology transformed the mission from peacekeeping to of five types of failed state: anarchic, illegiti- peace enforcement, dealt the RUF several seri- mate, incompetent, unproductive, and barbaric. ous military defeats, and followed up by deploy- Anarchic states lack security as, for example, ing a long-lasting and robust training mission Iraq did in 2006. Illegitimate states cannot com- for the Sierra Leonean security forces. The UN mand the loyalty or consent of the population expanded UNAMSIL’s size and handed it a because of some perceived injustice—perhaps more aggressive mandate and the mission was including Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011. ultimately a success. Incompetent states lack functioning institu- The lesson is not that the international tions and simply cannot deliver goods and ser- community always needs to take sides against vices, such as Haiti. Unproductive states are not an insurgency, or prefer peace enforcement over simply poor; they have malformed economies peacekeeping. That strategy would be inappli- because of war, looting, smuggling, and black cable and irrelevant for the post-earthquake markets, such as West Africa in the 1990s. mission in Haiti, for example. The lesson is Barbaric states murder their own citizens on a that the UN and United Kingdom executed a large scale, such as Sudan. surprising midcourse correction to account for These different types of failure imply the realities on the ground instead of sticking different strategies of state-building. What to a rigid template. Iraq needed in 2006 was different from what Haiti needs today. The international com- munity must be able to study the situation on unproductive states are not simply poor; the ground, understand the type and degree they have malformed economies because of state failure, and tailor a nation-building of war, looting, smuggling, and strategy accordingly. Such a strategy, accord- black markets ing to Georgetown University Professor Lise Howard’s study UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Institutionalizing Success requires a culture of institutional learning, a bottom-up approach in which missions in the There are encouraging signs that the field design themselves as much as headquar- international community has recognized the ters in New York or Washington design them, need to address state failure and take nation- and more rapid decisionmaking.7 building seriously. But because of the popu- Such a strategy was on display in Sierra lar suspicion of the concept labeled nation- Leone in 2000. The United Nations Mission building, policymakers and bureaucrats call it in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) initially started by different names. The Department of State out with all the weaknesses that brought down established an Office of the Coordinator for the missions in Liberia, Angola, and Somalia, Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) including insufficient resources, a weak in 2004 and pledged to begin developing
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a deployable and expeditionary civilian deployments. In 2008, the Department of response corps for contingency operations. Peacekeeping Operations published a new The next year, the Department of Defense “Capstone Doctrine” for peace operations.9 issued Directive 3000.05, making “stabil- Despite the various labels, these efforts ity operations” a core military mission. from the United States and UN all refer The White House issued National Security to roughly the same thing: powerful liberal Presidential Directive 44 the same year, states deploying financial and (often) military updating the Clinton administration’s guid- resources to compel weak states to govern more ance (Presidential Decision Directive 56) on effectively and accountably. These moves col- interagency efforts in reconstruction and sta- lectively give cause to hope that the interna- bilization missions. In 2006, the U.S. Army tional community is slowly improving its abil- issued Field Manuel 3–24, Counterinsurgency, ity to rebuild failed states after two decades of the primary objective of which is to “foster frustrating efforts with mixed results. the development of effective governance by a legitimate government”—that is, nation- Conclusion: Learning from History building in wartime. It took the risk of failure in Iraq and The United Nations has done its own Afghanistan to overcome the legacy of Somalia soul searching, with its own lingo. The and prompt the United States to take recon- Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations struction and stabilization seriously again. Now in 2000—written during the crucible of the distaste for the decade-long efforts in those Sierra Leone mission—concluded that the countries threatens to tar nation-building at complex peace operations of the post–Cold the same time that budget constraints are put- ting new pressure on the government to cut Germany and Japan stand as irrefutable programs that are unpopular or perceived to be proof that nation-building can be needless or futile. But the United States and UN should beware that they do not continue successful and contribute to vital to overreact to the recent past. national security interests In particular, it bears remembering that nation-building was a vital and successful tool War era needed more realistic mandates, of U.S. policy long before the end of the Cold better resources, closer integration with UN War. Most famously, the United States rebuilt political operations, and new headquarters Germany and Japan after World War II. Critics capacity.8 The General Assembly formed the skeptical of nation-building often dismiss these UN Peacebuilding Commission in 2005 to examples as the exceptions that prove the rule. improve international coordination on, and However, to paraphrase Sherlock Holmes, excep- heighten attention to, postconflict peace- tions do not prove rules; they disprove them. building efforts. The United Nations designed Germany and Japan stand as irrefutable proof integrated missions, in which civilians from all that nation-building can be successful and con- of its agencies and departments serve along- tribute to vital national security interests. Japan side UN peacekeepers—equivalent to U.S. is an especially provocative example. The United whole-of-government and counterinsurgency States built a democracy in a non-Western
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society where there was no heritage of it, fostered to avoid these costs, the United States could prosperity where there was complete devastation, have abdicated responsibility for Germany and effected a fundamental shift in the Japanese and Japan altogether, effectively adopting its people’s understanding of their relationship to post–World War I strategy of isolationism government and the role of armed force. and ceding power and influence to the Soviet The nation-building missions in Germany Union. That option had its own costs: it was and Japan, and the concomitant Marshall rightly considered an unacceptable risk to U.S. Plan (nation-building on a continental scale), security. Nation-building, though costly, was clearly served vital national security goals: cheaper than either the Morgenthau Plan or enhancing the capacity of key allies was part isolationism. In short, nation-building after of the U.S. Cold War strategy and bolstered its World War II was a relatively cheap way to strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. contain the Soviet Union, demobilize the The German and Japanese economic miracles unsustainably large wartime Army, and avoid and German rearmament were vital parts of garrisoning Europe for generations. the U.S.-led alliance system that contained There are undoubtedly many unique the Soviet Union and ultimately led to the aspects to the missions in Germany and defeat of communist totalitarianism. Nation- Japan, and they offer no easy template to be building was not a luxury indulged in by the uncritically reused today. But they put beyond victor enamored of its own power and virtue; doubt the question of whether nation-building it was a strategic necessity. can be possible, useful, or cost-effective—it Finally, the postwar efforts illustrate that emphatically can be all three. The question is nation-building can be comparatively cheap. how and when to undertake nation-building The Marshall Plan cost some $120 billion (in to best effect. today’s dollars), and the military occupations The United States and the liberal world untold billions more. That is a massive sum, order do not face a monolithic threat like the but it was spread out over a decade and was Soviet Union, and so far they lack a grand strat- smaller than the costs of the other options. egy such as containment into which nation- American and British policymakers gave seri- building would fit neatly. But they do face the ous consideration to the Morgenthau Plan, challenge of growing anarchy and state failure under which the Allies would have de-indus- in much of the world, which is as much a threat trialized Germany and kept it poor and weak: to security and liberty for the average person in nation-destroying rather than nation-building. day-to-day life as communism was. Policymakers If the Allies had adopted the plan, they would who expressed concern for Haitians after the have had to foot the entire bill for Germany’s earthquake, Darfuris trapped in war, South food and defense needs and robbed themselves Sudanese seeking to build a new country, the of trillions of dollars of trade and investment global ocean-going trade menaced by piracy, or from the future German economy. It would Afghans seeking security should not neglect the have required the United States to minimize tools at their disposal to manage these problems. its postwar military demobilization and keep Policymakers may choose not to intervene in much of its World War II Army in the field, some of these crises; but if they want to retain a hugely expensive proposition. Alternately, the option to intervene at all, they need to keep
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the tools and budgets to do so in place. As U.S. policymakers review budget and force structure in coming years, they should recognize that nation-building is a pragmatic option that can meet the needs of the hour, and it can do so successfully and cost-effectively. PRISM Notes 1 Anna Simons and David Tucker, “The Misleading Problem of Failed States: a ‘socio-geography’ of ter- rorism in the post 9/11 era,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007), 387–401; Aidan Hehir, “The Myth of the Failed State and the War on Terror: A Challenge to the Conventional Wisdom,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 1, no. 3 (2007), 307–332. 2 See Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: The World Bank and Oxford University Press), chapter 1, available at
74 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 No Marshall Plan for the Middle East
By Amitai Etzioni
t first blush, the idea that the United States, working with other nations, should initi- ate, guide, and finance economic development and introduce democratic regimes to the A nations of the Middle East—just as it did in post–World War II Germany and Japan—is appealing. From a humanitarian viewpoint, one cannot help but be moved by the idealism of helping millions of people who are currently unemployed and poor—including many children and young people, and others who live under oppressive regimes—to gain the kind of life Americans cherish. From a realpolitik viewpoint, military means will not suffice when it comes to ending the terror- ism that threatens the United States and its allies, or halting the insurgencies that destabilize the Middle East. General James Jones, who served as National Security Advisor to President Barack Obama, summarized the viewpoint held by many other military leaders. He stated that there are three things needed to attain peace: “One is the security pillar, and you’ve got to have that. But accompanying that, you have to have an economic package that gives people who don’t have any hope, hope for a better future. That’s the answer to the terrorist threat, really. . . . And the third one is governance and rule of law, and I include corruption and all of those other things.”1 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates agreed. He held that “economic development, institution-building and the rule of law, pro- moting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.”2 Moreover, the defeated nations were treated differently after the World Wars. Following World War I, the nations that lost were given a raw deal, which is widely believed to be one reason that Fascism rose and in turn led to World War II. After the Second World War, the defeated nations were treated, as General Jones put it, “generously”; they were helped to rebuild their economies and reform their polities. They have since become stable, peaceful nations and allies of the United States.
Amitai Etzioni is a University Professor and Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University.
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One would have to have ice water in his is likely to have some undesirable side effects. veins, have a heart of stone, and be politically Before the reasons for this dire thesis are dis- unwise not to wish the same for the Middle cussed, one should note that even though it East. Indeed, several major public voices is not possible for the West to transform the have called for such a Marshall Plan for the economies and polities of the Middle East, or region. General Jones explained, “We learned help it to transform itself in desired ways in the that lesson after World War II—you know we foreseeable future, this does not mean that ter- rebuilt Europe, we rebuilt Japan. That was an rorism and insurgency can be dealt with only example of an enlightened view of things. The by military means. Rather, it means that the Marshall Plan, I am told, wasn’t very popular nonmilitary means will have to be rather dif- in this country, but we went ahead and did it.”3 ferent from those that were used at the end of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton believes that World War II. “as the Arab Spring unfolds across the Middle Different Sociologies. Many conditions East and North Africa, some principles of the that contributed to the success of the Marshall [Marshall] plan apply again, especially in Egypt Plan (which was applied to Germany, Italy, and other select European nations) and a there is no way to bring anything similar approach to post–World War II Japan are missing in the Middle East. Arguably, the remotely resembling the Marshall Plan to most important difference concerns security. the Middle East The nations reconstructed after World War II had surrendered after defeat and fully submit- and Tunisia. As [Secretary of State George] ted to the occupation, had been neutral dur- Marshall did in 1947, we must understand that ing the war, or were on the U.S. side and were the roots of the revolution and the problems at peace at home to begin with (such as the that it sought to address are not just political United Kingdom, France, and Turkey). That but profoundly economic as well.”4 Moreover, is, development occurred only after hostilities two professors at Columbia Business School, completely ceased and a high level of domestic Glenn Hubbard (Chairman of the Council of security was established. There were no terror- Economic Advisors under George W. Bush) ists, insurgencies, car bombs, or rocket attacks. and Bill Duggan, argued that a Middle East Therefore, the forces that took over the man- Marshall Plan would “limit the spread of Islamic agement of these nations could fully focus their extremism” in the region.5 Senator John Kerry resources on rebuilding. Security needs were argued that “we are again in desperate need of minimal compared to those in Afghanistan a Marshall Plan for the Middle East.”6 Senator and Iraq. John McCain also expressed support for such Indeed, given the experience in Iraq and a plan.7 Afghanistan, few, if any, even consider the prop- osition that the West will occupy more lands in A Bridge Too Far the Middle East and manage their transforma- Regrettably, there is no way to bring any- tion. Secretary Gates made this clear when he thing remotely resembling the Marshall Plan testified that “there will be no American boots to the Middle East, and trying to launch one on the ground in Libya. Deposing the Qadhafi
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Medical supplies are airdropped for retrieval by personnel near Forward Operating Base Todd, Afghanistan U.S. Air Force (Kevin Wallace)
regime, as welcome as that eventuality would be, is not part of the military mission.”8 Gates reaf- firmed that the United States “will provide the capabilities that others cannot provide either in kind or in scale,” but “the removal of Colonel Qadhafi will likely be achieved over time through political and economic measures and by his own people.”9 In other words, while the German and Japanese reconstructions were mostly hands-on projects, those now considered amount to long-distance social engineering with the West providing funds and advice, but with the execution largely done by locals. That is, no boots on the ground—and no managers. While transforming regimes in the Middle East are quite eager to receive financial aid and eco- nomic resources from the West, they oppose the strings attached to these funds. For instance, the Pakistani government, and especially the powerful and influential military, greatly resented the con- ditions for building the civil society that are part of the 2009 Kerry-Lugar Bill, which provides $7.5 billion in aid over 5 years.10 This resistance is one major reason why the funds have not been largely dispersed. In post-Mubarak Egypt, the government complained about Western interference when the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) “published ads in Egyptian newspapers asking for grant proposals on a $100 million program to support ‘job creation, economic development and poverty alleviation’ and a $65 million program for ‘democratic development,’ including elections, civic activism and human rights.”11 The Egyptian newspaper al Akhbar argued that USAID “dealt with Egypt as a humiliated country.”12 Fayza Aboul Naga, the minister for planning and international cooperation, stated, “I am not sure at this stage we still need somebody to tell us what is or is not good for us—or worse, to force it on us.”13 U.S. assistance in Egypt is often seen as an infringement
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on sovereignty as expressed by Hafiz Salama, an demonstrated that Protestants were more influential Muslim cleric, when he stated, “We imbued than Catholics with the values that tell America and its allies lurking in Egypt: end lead to hard work and high levels of saving, your evil interference in Egypt’s internal affairs, both essential for the rise of modern capital- interference that we condemn as a conspiracy ist economies. For decades, development in against the future of Egypt.”14 Others argue that Catholic countries (such as those in southern Western models of development are not appro- Europe and Latin America) lagged behind the priate for their countries and that they should Protestant Anglo-Saxon nations and those in follow the Chinese or some other model. northwest Europe. Similar differences have been recorded between Quebec and other provinces of Canada. These differences cultures can change, but only slowly, declined only after Catholics became more and the changes involved cannot be like Protestants.15 rushed by outsiders Weber also pointed to the difference between Confucian and Muslim values,16 thus, in effect, predicting the striking differ- Furthermore, Germany and Japan were ence between the high rates of development of strong nation-states before World War II in the the South Asian “tigers”—China, Hong Kong, sense that citizens heavily identified with the Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea—and the nation and showed their willingness to make low rates of Muslim states, especially those major sacrifices for the “fatherland.” They that adhere more strictly to sharia than oth- continued to act so during the reconstruction ers. The thesis is not that Muslim states can- period. The first loyalty of many citizens of not develop because of innate characteristics Middle Eastern nations, which are tribal soci- of the people, but because these cultures stress eties cobbled together by Western countries, is other values, especially traditional religious to their ethnic or confessional group. They tend values and communal and tribal bonds. These to look at the nation as a source of spoils for cultures can change, but, as the record shows, their tribe and fight for their share rather than only slowly, and the changes involved cannot make sacrifices for the national whole. Deep be rushed by outsiders. ethnic and confessional hostilities, such as those Preconditions. One also must take into between the Shia and Sunnis, the Pashtun and account that Germany and Japan were devel- Tajik, the Hazara and Kochi, and various tribes oped nations before World War II with strong in other nations, either gridlock the national industrial bases, infrastructure, educated popula- polities (for example, Iraq and Afghanistan), tions, and support for science and technology, lead to large-scale violence (Yemen, Bahrain, corporations, business, and commerce. Hence, and Sudan), result in massive oppression and they had mainly to be reconstructed. In con- armed conflict (Libya and Syria), or hinder eco- trast, a large number of Middle Eastern states nomic development. that lack many if not all of these assets, institu- Cultural Differences. Max Weber estab- tions, and traditions cannot be reconstructed lished the importance of culture (in the because they were not constructed in the first sense of shared normative values) when he place. This is most obvious in Afghanistan,
78 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 No Marshall Plan for the Middle east
Yemen, Sudan, and Libya. It is also a major issue irrelevant bases to cronies and supporters, and in nations that have drawn on one commod- that a good part of the funds could be wasted ity—oil—to keep their economies going, but and unaccounted for.19 Steve Knack of the have not developed the bases for modern econ- World Bank showed that “huge aid revenues omies, especially Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. may even spur further bureaucratization and Other nations, such as Tunisia, Pakistan, worsen corruption.”20 Others found that mis- Morocco, Syria, and Egypt, have better prepared management, sheer incompetence, and weak populations and resources but still score poorly government were almost as debilitating. on all of these grounds compared to Germany One way to highlight this point is to and Japan. examine the corruption perception ranking Given that Western powers are unlikely Transparency International has issued annu- to occupy and manage transformation in the ally since 1995.21 Transparency International Middle East, the help they can give basically stresses that because of the ways the rankings amounts to some type of foreign aid—that is, are constructed, they cannot be used for quan- working with the existing institutions while try- titative social science analysis. However, given ing to encourage reform. that these rankings parallel information from Germany and Japan had competent gov- other sources, they do provide a preliminary ernment personnel and relatively low levels way of assessing changes. Thus, most of the of corruption. In many nations in the Middle nations that had the lowest rankings in 1995 East, corruption is endemic, pervasive, and continue to rank low some 15 years later—for difficult to scale back to tolerable levels. A instance, New Zealand and Denmark have 2008 study by the Economist, for instance, ranked among the four least corrupt countries found that a few of the main reasons that in all these years. Likewise, many countries that Afghanistan’s development is proceeding so ranked high maintain their troubled status, such poorly are widespread corruption, cronyism as Nigeria and Venezuela. Indeed, few countries and tribalism, lack of accountability, and have improved their scores more than a few gross mismanagement.17 In 2010, it was dis- points in the half-generation that has passed covered that more than $3 billion in cash since the rankings began. had been flown out of Kabul over the course Not all waste and corruption is local. Large of 3 years. The amount is particularly star- portions of the aid budgeted for Afghanistan tling because Afghanistan’s gross domestic (and others) are handed over to nongovern- product was only $13.5 billion in 2009, and mental organizations subject to little account- more declared cash flies out of Kabul each ability. Or worse, this aid is spent on Western year than the government collects in tax and contractors and corporations for high-fee con- customs revenue nationwide. The large sum sultants. (American law requires that 100 per- is believed to have mostly come from stolen cent of food for American foreign aid be pur- foreign assistance.18 Thus, one must take into chased from American farmers, and that U.S. account that a significant proportion of what- freight carriers ship 75 percent of it.)22 ever resources are made available to Middle Champions of reconstruction ignore the Eastern nations could be siphoned off to pri- bitter lessons of foreign aid in general. An vate overseas bank accounts or allocated on extensive 2006 report on the scores of billions
PRISM 3, no. 1 Features | 79 UN (David Ohana) Libyan refugees line up for food at transit camp near Libya-Tunisia border Etzioni
of dollars the World Bank invested since seem to indicate that the West is supportive the mid-1990s in economic development rather than trying to make a serious difference. shows that despite the bank’s best efforts, However, as long as these appropriations are the “achievement of sustained increases framed and perceived as transforming, they in per capita income, essential for poverty will not generate the public relations—now reduction, continues to elude a considerable often called public diplomacy—that advocates number of countries.”23 Out of 25 recipient hope for. countries covered by the report, more than Moreover, the United States and its allies half (14) had the same or worsening rates are entering a protracted period of budget of per capita income from the mid-1990s retrenchments in which many domestic pro- to the early 2000s.24 Moreover, the nations grams will be scaled back—including aid for the unemployed and poor, and for education and the United States currently spends less health care—as well as military outlays. It is a than 1 percent of its budget on foreign context in which the kinds of funds a Marshall Plan would require are unlikely to be available. aid, and not all of it is dedicated to Amounts recently dedicated to help the new economic development regimes in Egypt and Tunisia are telling: the United States has pledged a mere $1 billion that received most of the aid (especially in in debt relief and $1 billion in loan guaran- Africa) developed least, while the nations tees for Egypt, and the Group of 8 pledged a that received little aid grew fast (especially total of $20 billion in aid for both Egypt and China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan). Tunisia. However, a timeframe for delivering Other nations found foreign aid a “poisoned these funds was not set “and the Group of 8 gift” because it promoted dependency on for- countries have in the past made commitments eigners, undermined indigenous endeavors, that they did not ultimately fulfill.”28 If the aid and disproportionately benefited those gifted package is delivered, it is unclear how big an at proposal writing and courting foundation effect it will have on an Egyptian economy los- and foreign aid representatives rather than ing $1 billion each month in the tourism sector local entrepreneurs and businessmen.25 (a 40 percent loss).29 The Marshall Plan entailed much larger Suggestions have been made that the West outlays than have been dedicated in recent could provide only part of a massive aid package decades to foreign aid that seeks to help and that rich Middle Eastern nations, especially economic development (not to be conflated Saudi Arabia, could provide large-scale funds. with military aid). In 1948, the first year of Indeed, oil-producing nations may contribute the Marshall Plan, aid to the 16 European to the costs involved. However, these nations countries involved totaled 13 percent of the are basically opposed to the new regimes, which U.S. budget.26 In comparison, the United threaten their own; moreover, they face eco- States currently spends less than 1 percent of nomic and social challenges of their own, which its budget on foreign aid, and not all of it is result in lower revenues and increased outlays at dedicated to economic development.27 Some home. Multilateral help is richer than a unilat- of these appropriations are so small that they eral approach; however, it is unlikely to suffice.
82 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 No Marshall Plan for the Middle east
What Can Be Done? in Kuwait, the 1989 intervention in Panama to Scale Ambitions and Rhetoric to Reality. oust military dictator General Manuel Noriega The repeated suggestions that the West ought to Vietnam, the occupation of Afghanistan and to launch a Marshall Plan for the Middle East— Iraq, and the 2011 intervention in Libya. which is widely understood to mean that the Local authorities are best advised to focus West could turn the nations involved into sta- on restoring basic security. The reverse argu- ble democratic regimes and Western-style econ- ment, that development is essential for security omies “just as we did in Germany and Japan,” and hence must precede it, is erroneous because and in relatively short order—have backfired. without basic security, development cannot These promises raise expectations that cannot take place. If oil pipelines laid during the day be met and lead to disappointment in the new are blown up at night, oil will not flow far. If regimes and in the West. In 2011, only months electricity stations are constructed at great costs after the autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt were but not secured, they are merely another place forced to quit, millions were already disap- where resources are wasted. If professionals fear pointed because they still did not have jobs. As terrorists, they will leave the country to work already indicated, the precept that the West will elsewhere, and so on.30 provide what the transformation requires delays Increase Trade, Decrease Aid. Dissatisfaction the point at which local populations realize that with the lack of progress made by foreign aid has they will have to make major efforts, including led several leading economists and world lead- changing their work, consumption, and govern- ers to conclude that aid may not be the most ing habits. Instead, the West should stress that effective tool for promoting development. most of the transformation will have to be done Proponents of “trade over aid” point to the by the people who seek it and who will benefit drawbacks of aid (corruption and mismanage- from it, and that they will have to find ways ment) and argue that aid can create a culture to proceed that are suitable to their conditions. of dependency in recipient countries. Rwanda’s The West should be ready to help, if asked, but president, Paul Kagame, argues, “As long as poor this help should be by necessity and limited, nations are focused on receiving aid they will and conditioned on locals taking the lead and not work to improve their economies.”31 Critics carrying most of the load. often compare the effect of aid on developing Focus Should Be on Security and Not nations’ economies to the “resource curse” Regime Change. Western interventions to experienced by countries that discover oil or stop genocides, discourage nations from invad- mineral wealth. The influx of funds eliminates ing others, and peacekeeping operations—while the need for governments to be accountable to far from universally successful—have achieved either private lenders or voters.32 Analysts also their goals much more often than attempts to point out that the infusion of cash can have a usher in new political and economic regimes. negative impact on a country’s exchange rate These achievements have been made with and can actually “inflict an economic loss even much lower levels of Western and local loss of when there is no counterpart reverse transfer of human life and economic outlays. To see the resources.”33 According to Ugandan president point, compare the Western intervention in Yoweri Museveni, “Aid is a recipe for perma- Kosovo, the 1991 pushback of Saddam’s forces nent poverty.”34
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The alternative to problematic foreign aid than channeled through the government. is trade, in the form of reducing barriers and Projects that have a high multiplier effect tariffs as well as eliminating agricultural sub- are to be preferred over those that have a low sidies in wealthy countries and encouraging multiplier effect, those that are labor-inten- local entrepreneurs. Trade proponents argue sive and not capital-intensive over those that that “developing economies are shackled by have the opposite profile, and those that use an array of internally imposed trade barriers, little energy or renewable energy over those tariffs and regulations that hamper business.”35 that have the opposite profile. In each area, Dambisa Moyo, the author of Dead Aid, an strong preference should be accorded to the influential book on the subject, argues that completion of a small number of projects over starting a large number. (This is the opposite of the way development has been approached a 2004 survey found that 64 percent of in Afghanistan and Iraq.) As a rule, old ele- all respondents believe that trade was ments should be left in place and fixed or better for developing countries than aid reformed gradually rather than replaced. This holds true for equipment and for institutions and their staffs. For instance, tribal chiefs (in removing these impediments and increasing Afghanistan) and members of the governing trade will improve governance in develop- party in public service (the Ba’ath in Iraq) ing nations; governments that wish to bor- should have been allowed to continue their row money must demonstrate prudence and leadership roles as the United States did at the accountability.36 Timothy Cox and Alec van end of World War II by leaving the emperor in Gelder of the International Policy Network, place in Japan. a nonprofit think tank, cite the economic Advocate That Humanitarian Aid Is growth of business-friendly Asian nations Justified. Large-scale foreign aid, the kind such as Singapore and China as evidence that of amounts that a new Marshall Plan would “trade is the surest known route out of pov- entail for the Middle East, cannot be pro- erty.” And President Kagame credits Rwanda’s vided given the austere regimes in the West. improved trade with an 11 percent increase in However, if there are massive numbers of refu- growth in 2008 (in the face of the global reces- gees (on a larger scale than those who escaped sion).37 Evidence indicates that trade improve- Libya to Tunisia or Syria to Turkey in 2011) ments would have much greater public support or other forms of massive human suffering as a in the West than increases in aid. A 2004 sur- result of the regime transformations, one can vey in France, Germany, Great Britain, and make a case on moral grounds that the West the United States found that 64 percent of all should grant the kind of aid it provided after respondents (and a majority in all countries) the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and 2004 tsu- believe that trade was better for developing nami in Southeast Asia. However, one should countries than aid.38 realize that such funds aim to alleviate imme- Focus Aid. Whatever foreign aid can diate suffering; the reconstruction that follows be granted is best delivered directly to those will have to be carried out largely by the local involved in the projects to be aided rather population. PRISM
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Notes 1 James L. Jones, comments at Stimson Center Chairman’s Forum on International Security Issues, June 14, 2011. 2 Robert M. Gates, comments at Kansas State University, November 26, 2007. 3 Jones. 4 Hillary Clinton, “Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s Remarks on Receiving the George C. Marshall Foundation Award,” June 2, 2011, available at
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24 Ibid. 25 World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, “Annual Review of Development Effectiveness 2006: Getting Results,” Washington, DC, 2006. 26 Representative Keith Ellison, H.Res.157.IH, 112th Cong., 1st sess, March 9, 2011. 27 Office of Management and Budget, “The President’s Budget for Fiscal Year 2012,” available at
86 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 Soldier examines patient during medical civil action project in Djibouti U.S. Air Force (Jeremy T. Lock) U.S. Air Force (Jeremy T. Sub-Saharan African Military and Development Activities
By Birame Diop
or the last two decades, African states have been facing more internal threats than external ones. In fact, the African continent is now dealing with ethnic-based conflicts, poverty, health F issues, hunger, and, most recently, radicalization and violent extremism. In summary, security challenges throughout Africa have evolved in nature and are a lot more complex. In the health domain, for example, Africa has been decimated by multiple epidemics and pandemics, notably tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS. For HIV/AIDS, sub-Saharan Africa
Colonel Birame Diop, Senegalese Air Force, is seconded as the Director of the African Institute for Security Sector Transformation based in Dakar.
PRISM 3, no. 1 Features | 87 diop
alone is home to more than 22.5 million people human trafficking are increasingly significant infected with the disease, which is two-thirds of problems. West Africa in particular has become the total for the entire planet. Not only is the a hub in international drug smuggling. In 2008, rate of infection high, but the quality of treat- the UN released a report explaining how every ment has been woefully low. In 2009, 1.3 mil- country in the region is being affected by a lion Africans died from AIDS, while another highly lucrative cocaine industry. Recent esti- 1.8 million became infected. Even though the mates suggest that $2 billion worth of cocaine rate of infection has been steadily declining in is being trafficked from South America to recent years, the situation remains dire, and its Europe through West Africa every year. This is impact is felt throughout all sectors of African a startling figure when compared with the gross life, from education and agriculture to the gen- domestic product (GDP) of countries within eral economic well-being of the African states. the region. Guinea-Bissau, one of the coun- Well publicized as the AIDS pandemic has tries most deeply affected by drug trafficking, been, it is not, of course, the only health threat has a GDP of just $304 million.1 The UN notes facing the continent. High patient-to-doctor that the problem is so severe that it poses the ratios, poor facilities, and lack of access to med- number one risk to reconstruction in countries icine are some of the most significant health such as Sierra Leone because of the corruption concerns, even though new problems are arising invited by such a lucrative trade.2 here and there. Sierra Leone has also become a central Perhaps the most troubling health threat is player in a growing arms trade on the conti- the prevalence of counterfeit drug distribution. nent, along with the Democratic Republic of Throughout West Africa, recent estimates indi- the Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and oth- cate that as much as 40 percent of the prescrip- ers. Estimates place the value of the arms trade tion medicine for sale is counterfeit. in Africa at $1 billion annually and include everything from handguns and assault rifles to people are abducted, often from rocket-propelled grenades and even antitank vulnerable places of war or other and anti-air missiles. In some countries, AK–47 automatic assault rifles are available for only $6. hardship, and forced into labor or This trade fuels conflict in many places through- sexual enslavement out the continent and has contributed to vio- lence on a dramatic scale. In South Africa, for Food security is also a major challenge. example, small arms have become the leading Shortages are commonplace in many areas, cause of unnatural deaths in the country.3 An and malnutrition runs rampant. Currently, East additional facet of this problem is the increas- Africa is suffering from a drought that is argu- ing rate of arms trafficking that originates on ably the worst in 60 years. The United Nations the continent. Some have argued that Eastern (UN) estimates that 10 to 12 million people are European arms such as the AK–47 no longer affected and could lose their lives if swift and constitute the bulk of trafficking. They point bold actions are not taken. instead to a growing arms production industry The continent is also facing a range of on the continent in countries such as Egypt, cross-border criminality issues. Drugs, arms, and Nigeria, and South Africa.4
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Unfortunately, cross-border trafficking in militaries, to fight underdevelopment. Failing Africa has not been limited to commodities to do so could worsen the security situation such as drugs, fake medicines, and weapons, of the continent for the next several years or but increasingly involves the smuggling and even decades due to the fact that the major- enslavement of human beings. These people are ity of African states, as well as their public and abducted, often from vulnerable places of war or private sectors, have not been able to create the other hardship, and forced into labor or sexual conditions for sustainable development. enslavement.5 While at least 130,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa alone have been captured State, Public, and Private and exploited in this manner, the UN Office on Sectors Cannot Solve the Drugs and Crime argues that few countries on Problems Independently the continent have begun to adopt measures to address the problem.6 The lives of millions of Africans are The increase in various forms of traf- being threatened daily by security challenges. ficking in Africa points to a larger and more Unfortunately, African states and the sec- endemic problem. Organized crime in general, tors that have typically been charged with and terrorism in particular, has become a seri- addressing these challenges are not working ous matter. The Mombasa region of Kenya and together. Whether due to operational failures neighboring Somalia have long struggled with or resource limitations, these parties have sim- connections to Middle East terrorist organiza- ply not been able to solve the challenges inde- tions such as al Qaeda. However, this problem pendently, and the gap between the needs and has now spread to other regions of the conti- what the states and sectors are able to provide nent. Nigeria, for instance, has seen a recent is too wide for the situation to greatly improve increase in attacks from the radical group Boko in the near future. Haram, which has devastated the security in After more than 50 years of independence, much of the country. The radical group has also many African states are still relatively weak. In claimed responsibility for the attack on a UN fact, the majority are largely dependent on for- office in Abuja that killed more than 20 people eign aid, with a large percentage of their budgets in August 2011. Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and emanating from the international community. Chad are also facing terrorist activities with the African states are indeed struggling with limited presence of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. resources while their challenges are exponen- This list of new challenges facing the con- tially increasing. The World Bank’s most recent tinent is unfortunately far from exhaustive. publication of Africa Development Indicators Africa is facing several other security concerns highlighted the increasingly abstract nature of such as high rates of infant mortality, urban issues facing the continent. Using the phrase violence related to youth unemployment and quiet corruption, the World Bank explored a overpopulation, desert advancement, political range of issues facing African development that divergences, and corruption. are less overt than well-publicized incidences African states need to find ways to confront of so-called big-time corruption; nonetheless, these serious threats directly and more effi- all of these issues are severely undermining the ciently, but also to mobilize resources, including continent’s development potential.
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The World Bank defines this quiet corrup- of the entire FDI in underdeveloped countries tion as occurring “when public servants fail to and decreased by 9 percent in 2010. deliver services or inputs that have been paid This conundrum highlights the nature of for by the government.” The bank highlights a many of the problems now facing Africa. The number of examples from a wide range of areas problems and solutions are often too intricately within the public sector. The Africa Development connected for the situation to improve without Indicators report explains that in several African outside assistance. Furthermore, many of these countries, between 15 and 25 percent of salaried challenges have a compounding effect: they school teachers are not showing up for work. worsen over time as they go unaddressed. Thus, This also holds true for doctor absenteeism from rather than improving, the situation is likely to primary care facilities. The bank further notes worsen and place more strain on the sectors that that a high percentage of the fertilizer avail- are already unable to keep up. There exists a able to farms is diluted of the nutrients that it is gap between the needs of the population and intended to supply. This can have severe conse- the resources that states and public and private quences on a region that already faces perennial sectors are able to provide. food shortages. The most important response to this situa- tion is to improve states’ capacities and invest in the public and private sectors in order to all sectors of African society need to build capacity to fulfill societal roles in the work collaboratively to begin solving future. In the meantime, however, filling the these problems gap that currently exists requires a response that uses all available resources. All sectors of African society need to work collaboratively to In addition to these shortcomings of begin solving these problems; it is simply not states and their administrations, the African responsible to allow any available resources to private sector is simply too stunted to fill go unused while people are suffering. the gap needed to provide the services and During times of peace, African militar- employment. Though lack of education con- ies have a great many resources available to tinues to be a major problem, students who them that can be used to help address many are able to complete a high school education of the challenges already outlined. Among or achieve higher degrees are often unable to other things, they have planes for delivering find employment. The continent is thus stuck the food, medicine, and doctors needed to in a serious catch-22. The private sector, for fight health problems, as well as manpower example, needs more educated people so it can and expertise to assist in building infrastruc- grow and develop, but cannot provide these ture. When available, these resources must be people with jobs until after it gains strength. used to contribute to the positive development Unfortunately, it is not gaining strength in of the continent and to save lives. In certain many African countries due to lack of state countries such as South Sudan and Zimbabwe, assistance as well as insufficient and decreasing the situation in the public and private sectors foreign direct investment (FDI). In fact, FDI is so delicate that for several years to come, in Africa represents no more than 10 percent the military will remain the only functioning
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organization capable of dealing with certain constituents could keep mobilizing the military national challenges. as an easy answer rather than investing time While it is clear that militaries in sub- and resources in the other sectors. Overreliance Saharan Africa have a role to play to improve on the military can lead to the withering of the the situation, many African observers are not public and private sectors rather than helping in favor of the inclusion of military personnel them to gain the strength to eventually be the in development activities and would prefer that sustainable solution. they intervene only in emergency situations. Third, this reliance on the military can The reasons these observers invoke are many. lead to its intrusion into state politics. As the military gains power within the domestic sphere Perceived Risks of Mobilizing with politicians—and as populations increas- the Military ingly depend on it to provide needed services— Despite the reality that the public and it can manipulate this dependence in order private sectors are struggling and often fail- to serve its own interests. Civilians and their ing to provide required services, some of the elected leaders run the risk of losing control of resources available to the military to assist the military, in whole or in part. in this situation are often unused because, at Unfortunately, fear of these risks does not least in part, academics and members of civil rest in the theoretical realm. Instead, it is well society have warned against augmenting the grounded in the history of the African continent. military role especially in domestic matters. Even a brief look at the history of many of the They argue that to do so exposes the civilian militaries in Africa reveals the potential conse- population, state, and possibly even the con- quences of a powerful and uncontrollable military. tinent to a variety of risks. Since independence movements began First, they argue that the military is meant in 1956, coups have been a constant prob- to address traditional security challenges to state lem throughout Africa. In less than 50 years, sovereignty. Expanding their role to deal with African countries saw an astonishing 80 suc- more abstract issues, especially those within cessful coups, to say nothing of nearly 250 addi- domestic politics, is simply not what the mili- tional coup attempts or plots.7 This trend has tary is intended for. Doing so detracts from the continued throughout the start of the 21st cen- military’s main operational goal of protecting tury, with an additional six successful coups in the state. the first 8 years of the new millennium.8 Recent Second, and perhaps more prominently, events in Burkina Faso and Guinea further scholars and members of African civil society highlight the continuing instability of some of argue that allowing the military to play a role Africa’s security sectors. in a broader range on nontraditional tasks can While the highest numbers of coups have lead to the “militarization” of society. Due to been in Francophone West Africa, the problem the relative strength of the military when com- has not been confined to any one region. Most pared with African public and private sectors, countries of the continent have been victims of it can quickly become a dominating force when coups. Indeed, a full 30 sub-Saharan African coun- it enters these other domains. Politicians look- tries were victims of successful coups by 2001, and ing for quick solutions to the grievances of their another 11 experienced unsuccessful attempts.
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Somali woman hands malnourished child to African Union Mission in Somalia medical officer for care UN (Stuart Price)
The effects of these successful and attempted coups reach beyond the physical damage and loss of life that often accompanies them. The destabilizing effect of a coup impairs a country’s economic develop- ment as domestic infrastructure is disturbed and international actors become hesitant to invest. A coup or coup attempt often impairs a country for many years following the cessation of violence. Of course, coups are far from being the only problem caused by some African security sectors. Human rights abuses by many militaries have been well documented. Many of these forces have been implicated in pillaging, rape, mutilation, and other forms of torture as well as in murder and genocide. Dictatorial regimes in the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Liberia, Nigeria South Africa, Uganda, and Zaire have used their militaries to undertake all kinds of atrocities against their people. The hesitation of many to see the role of the military expanded in any fashion is understandable. On the other hand, perhaps it is more helpful to conceive the assistance of the military in nontraditional, development-type activities as a change in rather than an expansion of the military’s role. By creating programs from this perspective, changing the practices of the military and its relationship with the civilian population can be an integral part of project design. Given the benefits (outlined below), it is simply too critical not to use the resources available to the military to alleviate suffering on the continent and move African countries toward sustainable development. Mobilizing the Military Countries such as the United States, even though they recognize that the military is not the most efficient organization to undertake certain categories of activity, plan to call upon their
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militaries when agencies are not capable of recently, but up until now, most of this capac- gathering necessary resources. For instance, ity often remains inadequately used during Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, times of peace. Failing to use these resources dated November 2005, states that the U.S. means that illnesses go untreated, and people military is ultimately responsible to prosecute lose their lives. missions when agencies are not able to do so. Apart from health challenges, Africa is Regarding food security, corruption, and facing serious youth unemployment. Figures health issues, the role for the military may often highlight the fact that 70 percent of the not be immediately evident. Ideally, address- continent’s population is under the age of 25. ing these challenges means empowering public Unfortunately, the same figures underline the and private entities that are already tasked with fact that these young Africans represent no solving these problems. Unfortunately, for a more than 25 percent of the active population. variety of reasons, the sectors that are supposed Youth idleness is far from being the only to address these concerns have been unable to potential risk of unrest throughout the conti- adequately do so. This might be due to the quiet nent but undoubtedly represents an important corruption noted by the World Bank, or it might factor that can contribute, under certain cir- simply be the result of insufficient resources or cumstances, to instability and insecurity. The lack of expertise and will. Whatever the rea- military, while being the major employer of the son, it is clear that additional measures must be public sector in many African states, is limited taken to address the gap between what is cur- in terms of job provision. Nonetheless, it can rently being done and what needs to be done for participate in the civic education of the youth African states to stabilize and prosper. many observers consider the most vulnerable Mobilizing the military to become group in African societies. involved in this new range of societal chal- lenges is not meant to replace or circumvent other sectors. On the contrary, using the youth idleness is far from being the only resources already available to the military can potential risk of unrest throughout the alleviate pressure from other entities while continent but undoubtedly represents an they reform and develop new strategies and important factor that can contribute to capacities. For reform of these sectors to take instability and insecurity place in a realistic and effective manner, care- ful planning over time is needed. The military can lighten the strain placed on these other Africa, like the other continents, is expe- groups during this period. riencing frequent natural disasters due to cli- In terms of health care, African coun- mate change, such as flooding, coastal erosion, tries nearly uniformly suffer from inadequate desert advancement, and so forth. Typically health facilities and an insufficient num- well organized, relatively easy to mobilize, ber of doctors. The military in many coun- and disciplined, militaries can play a crucial tries possesses the capacities necessary to at role in states’ efforts to tackle these issues effi- least begin addressing this problem. In many ciently. Militaries can also be mobilized to fight countries, important efforts have been made the increasing number of wildfires across the
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continent as well as the alarming deforestation established and safeguards need to be put witnessed lately. into place. Furthermore, especially in coun- Drought is currently devastating people tries where serious violations of human rights throughout eastern Africa. More than 10 million have been perpetrated by the military, recon- people are affected by what has become perhaps ciliation must take place and trust must be the worst drought in more than 60 years. Rather built. Trust can only be built if the military than waiting for the international community to communicates effectively and regularly with send assistance—while lives are lost—militaries the population. Even during crisis periods, across the region and perhaps even the continent the military ought to behave in a respectful, as a whole could have been mobilized to begin responsible, and professional way in order to relieving the strain caused by the food shortage.9 avoid deliberate violations of human rights. Finally, African countries are badly lack- The needs and interests of all relevant stake- ing sound infrastructures. Most of the conti- holders must be taken into consideration nent’s infrastructure, if it even existed, has been when creating these safeguards, ensuring that destroyed by years of conflict. African militaries the military serves to supplement rather than could help states in their efforts to build or reha- replace the sectors traditionally charged with bilitate infrastructures. responding to these challenges. In reality, mobilizing the military in this man- In pursuing this mobilization goal, the ner and in these different domains benefits civil- essential element that can help ensure success ian populations, the sectors that generally provide is maintaining civilian oversight of the military these services, and the military itself. It allows the and its projects. Doing so begins with clearly military and its resources to remain more consis- defining the military’s new role as temporary tently active while allowing the traditional public and supplemental to the public and private sec- and private sectors to reform in a more controlled tors. Projects should be designed in such a way environment instead of constantly operating that it is always clear that the military is not under crisis or emergency conditions. taking over or dominating but rather is assisting These benefits can be found in a consis- the other sectors and alleviating the pressure tent list of other areas as well. This list, even being placed on them. Having a clearly defined though not extensive, reveals the importance timetable for a military’s assistance will help of utilizing the resources of the military to help demonstrate the temporary nature of its work, address the challenges now facing the conti- so other sectors do not become overly reliant nent. However, given the risks noted above, it on it. is clear that careful planning will be critical if Realizing this oversight and creating the military mobilization is to be done in a way that environment for these expectations require the realizes these benefits, instead of tragically fall- development of a legal framework for imple- ing victim to the risks. mentation. The circumstances in which the military can be mobilized to deal with nontra- Creating Safeguards ditional security concerns need to be clearly If militaries are to be mobilized to assist outlined in the states’ national security policies in addressing the challenges now facing much and in law. In some cases, it might even make of Africa, then clear expectations need to be sense to cement these conditions within the
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framework of the state constitution in order to While it is beyond the scope of this article broadcast the expectations of both the military to examine each of these cases in depth, it is and general population. helpful to look at the Senegalese experience to Creating these safeguards is not entirely illustrate the possibilities of limited and con- a novel concept. Efforts have been made trolled mobilization of African militaries to deal over the past 20 years by those in charge of with nontraditional challenges. security sector reform to improve military practices. Thus, even if reforms have been Senegal’s Armée-Nation more focused than the proposed initiatives, In Senegal, the military has been success- they have enjoyed varying degrees of success. fully mobilized to assist the country in a wide Lessons can be learned to help shape the nec- range of activities, paying particular attention essary framework that ensures the military is to issues directly related to development. The mobilized in a manner that is beneficial to the list of areas in which the military has helped is state and its population. long: health, infrastructure development, agri- In addition to the lessons learned from culture, education, border management, and security sector reform processes, there are environmental protection, among others. recent examples in Africa that highlight the The projects the Senegalese military partici- potential for military mobilization in a supple- pates in are selected specifically for their ability mentary fashion. These examples are of par- to help the general population. The military pro- ticular importance because they demonstrate vides immediate and tangible assistance to the that this proposition is not merely a theoreti- people and participates in projects with a lon- cal possibility, but a reality that has already ger term focus such as helping in infrastructure seen some success. In Kenya, for example, the military and civil society have collaborated lessons can be learned to help shape the on environmental issues in a program that necessary framework that ensures the produced the concept of the “environmental soldier.” This program clearly participated in military is mobilized in a manner that is strengthening the national and international beneficial to the state and its population image of Wangari Maathai, an environmental and political activist. Maathai later became construction and disease prevention programs. the first African woman to win the Nobel Up to 80 percent of the curative activities Peace Prize for her work. In Guinea, now that undertaken by the military health services are the new democratically elected government for civilian populations. The Senegalese mili- is in place, the military has been called on to tary, along with the services of the ministry help fix damaged bridges and roads through- of environment and conservation, is actively out the country. In Burkina Faso, South Africa, participating in the realization of the country’s and Botswana, the military has worked collab- portion of the 7,000-kilometer great green wall oratively on civic education programs, and in that African states are committed to build to Senegal, there are many examples of how the stop desert advancement. military has been successfully mobilized in a In addition to the benefits of these pro- complementary way. grams for the Senegalese civilian population,
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the military itself and the state as a whole over Africa looking to Senegal for an example receive indirect benefits from these nontra- of how to improve their militaries. ditional activities. In part by participating in If the reasons for Senegal’s successful expe- such projects, the military enjoys a better repu- rience are many and diverse, the one most tation within Senegal than most African mili- invoked is the creation and implementation taries have in their respective countries. This of the concept Armée-Nation. In fact, the increased trust helps the military remain con- meeting between President Senghor and the nected with the general population and receive country’s second chief of defense staff, General support, and thus be better informed of security Jean Alfred Diallo, determined the Senegalese concerns. The state, for its part, greatly ben- experience. President Senghor was known as efits from the work the military does in building a peaceful leader with a clear vision for the cross-sector relationships. For example, with the country’s future, and General Diallo, a former officer in the French army corps of engineers, was known as a builder. Together, they have the United States and most European helped develop the concept Armée-Nation that countries, as well as emerging powers has been, since the early years of independence, such as China, Russia, and Brazil, are the backbone of the military’s participation in facing acute difficulties that might development activities. The Armée-Nation prevent them from supporting Africa is well known and appreciated by the civilian population and widely studied in the military. Of course, while this example has been border management commission run by the mil- largely successful and offers hope for using the itary but composed of members from all sectors military in nontraditional activities, there is of the society, Senegal has been able to promote still room for improvement. Most significantly, peaceful relations at certain parts of its borders Senegal could work more closely on the estab- with neighboring countries and thus needs to lishment of the formal legal framework sug- deploy fewer security forces to these regions, gested earlier and on clearer planning, program- therefore saving a great deal of resources. ming, and coordinating processes. In this regard, In addition to the above benefits, some the creation in the late 1990s of a civil-military scholars consider these nontraditional activities committee was an important initiative that undertaken by the Senegalese military as a key needs to be reconsidered. reason for the country’s stability. West Africa To continue to involve the military in has been one of the most unstable regions in development activities while avoiding the the world with many coups and human rights militarization of society, leaders of civil society, abuses. Senegal, however, has been an excep- the military, executive, judiciary, and legisla- tion in the region, enjoying stability and peace- ture need to work together on creating the right ful political transitions since independence in conditions for the military’s projects, notably 1960. Many argue that the country’s first presi- an efficient communication strategy, a good dent, Léopold Sédar Senghor, was a major factor financing mechanism, and measures that guar- for stability. This success is beginning to gain antee discretion. That is important not only for international attention with other countries all Senegal, but also for other countries that seek
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to emulate the Senegalese experience and in which the military does not have such a strong history of good practices. Conclusion Since the end of the Cold War, the security situation in Africa has evolved, and new nontradi- tional security challenges have emerged. In reality, the African continent is currently dealing with poverty, health issues, political-based crises, ethnic-based conflicts, food shortages, natural disasters, and radicalization. African states in general, and specifically their public administrations and private sectors, have not been able to cope with these complex security concerns. This situation is not likely to end soon given the fact that the world is facing serious economic crises that are having a negative impact on the continent. The United States and most European countries, as well as emerging powers such as China, Russia, and Brazil, are facing acute difficulties that might prevent them from supporting Africa. The continent should therefore mobilize all of its available resources to confront these new challenges. The military also needs to be mobilized to deal with these nontraditional security concerns by con- tributing its resources whenever possible. Of course, doing so is not without challenges, particularly on a continent that has experienced so many negative events as a result of the military. By carefully planning and putting the neces- sary safeguards in place, however, military assistance is largely possible and beneficial to society. Furthermore, using the military could help improve the relationship between the military and civil- ians and ultimately bolster greater cooperation among the various sectors of African society. Several countries have successfully involved their militaries in meeting the new challenges. Among them, the most noticeable are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa. Senegal, though not a perfect example, is often cited as one of the most successful cases in sub- Saharan Africa. The country has been able to keep its military professional and useful to Senegalese society. Many observers of the African security sector consider strong Senegalese civilian and mili- tary leadership in the early days of independence as the major factor. To continue its success, Senegal needs to work on a formal legal framework and focus on better planning, programming, and coordination mechanisms. The Senegalese experience, and its concept Armée-Nation, cannot be exported everywhere in Africa, but it can undoubtedly inspire many African countries that are interested in involving their militaries in development activities. PRISM Notes 1 United Nations (UN), “West Africa Drug Trade: New Transit Hub for Cocaine Trafficking Fuels Corruption,” 2008, available at
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5 UN Office on Drugs and Crime, “Human Trafficking and Eastern Africa.” 6 Ibid. 7 Patrick J. McGowan, “African Military coups d’état, 1956–2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution,” The Journal of Modern African Studies 41, no. 3 (2003), 339–370. 8 David Zounmenou, “Coups d’état in Africa between 1958 and 2008,” adapted from Issaka K. Souaré, Civil Wars and Coups d’Etat in West Africa: An Attempt to Understand the Roots and Prescribe Possible Solutions (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2006). 9 “Somalis Displaced by Drought Hit by Mogadishu Rains,” BBC News, July 15, 2011, available at
98 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 Enduring Interests and Partnerships Military-to-Military Relationships in the Arab Spring
By Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., and Elizabeth C. Packard
uring the past decade, the most visible military activities in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) have been decidedly kinetic, showcased pri- D marily through operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This year marks important transitions in both of these campaigns as Afghan National Security Forces begin to take the lead on security operations and the United States shifts to a more traditional security relationship with Baghdad. Building partner capacity in Afghan and Iraqi forces—one of USCENTCOM’s key nonkinetic activities—is a central component to success in both of these missions. Another major series of events in 2011, however, has elevated the importance of military-to- military (mil-to-mil) engagements beyond mere partner-nation capacity-building: the Arab Spring. As the dynamics in the Middle East continue to evolve in response to popular calls for reform, mil-to-mil engagements have been, and will remain, critical to supporting and advancing U.S. relationships and strategic interests in the region. As this article illustrates, mil-to-mil engagements are integral to the general purpose and activi- ties of U.S. combatant commands (COCOMs) and are particularly crucial for USCENTCOM in light of recent events in the AOR. Mil-to-mil engagements serve as vital “connective tissue” in our relationships with partners and allies as the United States seeks to respond effectively to Arab Spring reform movements while continuing to ensure regional security and stability.
Major General Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., USMC, is the Director of the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate at U.S. Central Command. Elizabeth C. Packard is a Strategic Analyst in the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate.
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Mil-to-Mil Engagements and COCOMs includes both event-based activities, such as The purpose of the six geographic COCOMs partnering with Pakistan’s military to provide is to coordinate and direct the role of the Armed humanitarian assistance and disaster relief fol- Forces in executing national-level policy guid- lowing the 2010 floods, and longer term efforts ance. COCOM theater campaign plans, which such as International Military Education and provide U.S. forces with detailed objectives, flow Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing from more expansive theater strategies. (FMF), and Foreign Military Sales.1 In all Theater strategies, in turn, stem from mil-to-mil engagements, our efforts are firmly the National Security Strategy and various nested within the policy paths laid out by the department-specific documents that originate Department of State and its role as lead admin- from it. The Guidance for the Employment of istrator of U.S. security cooperation programs. the Force outlines the parameters in which Conducting mil-to-mil engagements pro- COCOMs plan, prioritize, and operate. duces both tangible and intangible benefits for Additionally, COCOMs align their activi- all COCOMs, including a deeper understanding ties with the Quadrennial Defense Review, of the regions in which they operate. As Admiral which assesses the threat environment fac- James Stavridis, Commander of U.S. European ing the United States and organizes national Command, notes, “Understanding the history assets accordingly. of Europe helps us see our allies’ world view and why they approach problems and situations in the manner they do. Without a sense of this on all mil-to-mil engagements, our view, we are like moviegoers arriving late to a efforts are firmly nested within the film and wondering what is going on and why policy paths laid out by the Department major characters are reacting so strongly.”2 of State and its role as lead administrator This need for understanding how allies of U.S. security cooperation programs and partners—as well as adversaries—view the world, history, and their place in it is particu- larly strong in the USCENTCOM AOR and is When necessary, COCOMs execute reinforced by both current operations and U.S. kinetic operations in accordance with national- military engagements in the region. We oper- level guidance. However, a major portion of our ate in a region where the concept of history is efforts concentrates on a wide range of mil-to- markedly more circular and fluid than the often mil engagements intended to strengthen rela- rigidly linear Western way of filtering events. tionships with regional allies and to maintain a William Faulkner’s famous observation that posture that supports mutual security interests, “The past isn’t dead—it isn’t even past” offers as well as to help partner militaries build their an apt paradigm for understanding the view of capacities to face both conventional and asym- history in our AOR. The breadth and depth of metric threats. USCENTCOM’s mil-to-mil engagements, some The activities that fall under the mantle of of which date back only a few years and some of mil-to-mil engagement range from exchanges which are decades old, are serving as an impor- with key leaders, port visits, and multilateral tant foundation for understanding and reacting plans and exercises to security assistance. This to the unfolding Arab Spring.
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USS Carl Vinson (foreground) makes scheduled port visit to Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam after 6-month deployment to USCENTCOM and Western Pacific U.S. Navy (Rosa A. Arzola)
Building Mil-to-Mil Relationships in the USCENTCOM AOR
The complexity of the USCENTCOM AOR is reflected in our immense and diverse mission set. The mil-to-mil engagements that we conduct are based on both well-established security cooperation channels and some of the newer authorities granted by Congress that allow the command to more nimbly respond to the pace of changes in the region. Our overall engagement agenda as it pertains to the reform movements in the region is guided by President Barack Obama’s May 2011 speech about events in the Middle East and North Africa3 and the pillars established by the Department of State earlier this year:
❖❖ support for peaceful democratic change ❖❖ strong support for economic stabilization and modernization ❖❖ pursuit of comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace ❖❖ huge and enduring U.S. stake in regional security ❖❖ in strengthening ties to Gulf Cooperation Council states ❖❖ in fighting terrorism ❖❖ in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons and setting off a catastrophic regional arms race ❖❖ in not losing sight of Iraq’s own crucial democratic transition and reintegration into the Arab world.4
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Although the Arab Spring began in States has provided $1.3 billion in annual FMF to Tunisia, which falls in the U.S. Africa Egypt. Through FMF channels, USCENTCOM Command AOR, political and economic pro- has worked to greatly modernize Egypt’s weap- tests spread quickly to Tunisia’s neighbors, ons systems through programs such as the M1A1 including one of USCENTCOM’s most promi- Abrams battle tank joint production. On the nent regional partners, Egypt. The discussions training side, we have also maintained solid between U.S. and Egyptian military officials cooperation with Egypt, along with many other draw upon a long and robust history of mil-to- partners and allies in the region, through the mil engagements that illustrate numerous ave- IMET program. IMET enables the Department nues of cooperation, and have been integral to of Defense (DOD) to host foreign officers in U.S. our ability to remain informed and able to com- military schools where the curriculum focuses not municate as events in the region take place.5 only on operational concepts, but also on U.S. Benefits of FMF, for example—for the United doctrinal and philosophical frameworks such as States as well as recipient nations—are numerous. the ethical use of force and respect for human According to the State Department, FMF “fur- rights. Military training programs further enable thers U.S. interests around the world by ensur- foreign officers to interact with their U.S. coun- ing that Coalition partners and friendly foreign terparts, live in our communities, become familiar governments are equipped and trained to work with American culture, and form lasting personal toward common security goals and share burdens and professional relationships.7 in joint missions.” Furthermore, FMF “promotes The relationships developed between officers, and often between families, endure well beyond military training programs enable foreign just the time spent at military colleges and instal- officers to interact with their U.S. lations. In times of crisis or uncertainty, these rela- counterparts, live in our communities, tionships provide mutual points of access and lines become familiar with American of communication, in addition to shared under- standings and experience. Ambassador Jeffrey culture, and form lasting personal and Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State for Near professional relationships Eastern Affairs, summed this up to Congress, say- ing that “our assistance to Egypt was invaluable in U.S. national security by contributing to regional maintaining our relationships with Egypt’s military and global stability, strengthening military sup- and civil society during the recent events there.”8 port for democratically elected governments, and The IMET program has strengthened containing transnational threats.” Additionally, USCENTCOM’s relationships in its AOR “increased military capabilities establish and with many regional partners beyond Egypt. strengthen multilateral coalitions with the United Since 9/11, 169 senior military graduates States, and enable friends and allies to be increas- have trained in U.S. senior Service schools. ingly interoperable with the U.S., regional, and Additionally, 234 intermediate military gradu- international military forces.”6 ates in our AOR have trained in U.S. com- All of these elements are reflected in the FMF mand and staff colleges, 752 military graduates relationship with Egypt. Since 1982, in conjunc- trained in U.S. advanced equivalent officer tion with the Camp David Accords, the United courses, and 746 military graduates trained in
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Egyptian, Kuwaiti, German, Pakistani, and U.S. forces participate in coalition readiness jump during multinational exercise Bright Star U.S. Army (Lindsey M. Frazier)
U.S. basic officer courses. IMET is a strategic asset to the United States, its partners, and their mutual interests. The benefits of mil-to-mil training and equipping efforts are further augmented by bilateral and multilateral exercises. The Bright Star exercise, for example, dates back to 1980. Originally a bilat- eral exercise involving the United States and Egypt, Bright Star expanded into a multilateral effort in 1995 with the addition of participating troops and observers from numerous regional, neighbor- ing, and Western countries. This has allowed us to enhance relationships and understandings with those nations as well—relationships that have proven to be enduring and invaluable throughout the subsequent regional turmoil. In Bright Star’s most recent iteration in 2009–2010, 10 nations, including many valued regional partners, contributed personnel. Our relationships with partner nations are also fundamental to building their capacity to pro- tect mutual security interests as events proceed and potential regional instability looms large. For example, as part of our Regional Security Architecture efforts, we work with many partners in the Gulf to advance their capacity to defend their territorial waters, counter piracy, and protect critical maritime infrastructure and littoral assets. Our many years of engagements and relationship-building have also been crucial in counterterrorism efforts. These activities are centered on the “global train and equip” authorities from the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, also commonly referred to as “1206” authorities.9 While these authorities are tied to DOD, we work hand in hand with the State Department to implement them, which has enabled us to build partner capacity and mil-to-mil relationships in countries such as Yemen and Lebanon.
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The warm welcome shown earlier this relationships between officers—and, by exten- year to General James Mattis, USCENTCOM sion, between nations. As a result, when political Commander, along with Admiral Eric Olson, differences emerge, as they have and inevitably then Commander of U.S. Special Operations will continue to during the Arab Spring and Command, in Kuwait in commemoration of the other influential events, relationships established 20th anniversary of Operation Desert Storm’s suc- through mil-to-mil engagements can serve as sta- cessful conclusion is a superb illustration of the bilizing reminders of shared enduring interests. quality and depth of our regional relationships. As noted by former U.S. Secretary of Defense In many areas of Kuwait, American flags were Robert Gates, “Convincing other countries and waved alongside Kuwaiti flags, providing vis- leaders to be partners of the United States, often ible demonstration of the friendship and com- at great political and physical risk, ultimately mon commitment to security between our two depends on proving that the United States is nations and with our regional allies as a whole.10 capable of being a reliable partner over time.”12 Given attempts by some malign actors in the Maintaining Mil-to-Mil Relationships Middle East to influence the outcome of the Arab During the Arab Spring Spring, America’s credibility among its partners President Obama, in his May 2011 speech and allies is essential. Mil-to-mil engagements about events in the Middle East and North can help establish and augment U.S. credibility Africa, remarked that “it will be years before this due to their long-term and broad-scope structure, story reaches its end. Along the way, there will and U.S. and foreign officers who interact through be good days and there will be bad days. In some such engagements maintain contact as they con- places, change will be swift; in others, gradual. currently rise through the ranks. The resulting And as we’ve already seen, calls for change may relationships help prevent security vacuums in the give way, in some cases, to fierce contests for region and promote a reliable element of stability power.”11 It is precisely this uncertainty about the for regional populaces. events that lay ahead that makes maintaining New pressures in the region open renewed effective mil-to-mil engagements key to achiev- possibilities for cooperation. At the heart of the ing our national strategic objectives for three Arab Spring is a call from the affected popula- primary and interrelated reasons. tions for more representative and responsive gov- Mil-to-mil engagements serve as a steady- ernments. Reform movements are putting historic ing influence and signal of commitment. While pressure on regional leaders to consider a broader mil-to-mil engagements exist to support and definition of security, one where an atmosphere facilitate political relationships, the contours of that allows these changes to flourish is central. In the respective interactions can often be quite the political realm, for example, the people must different. Whereas diplomatic interaction often be able to express their will free of meddling from focuses on areas of negotiation and dispute countries such as Iran trying to exploit differences resolutions, mil-to-mil–based joint exercises between various groups and religious confessions. and training missions center strictly on areas Economic development, as well, will be integral of mutual concern. Common cause is thus the to building and sustaining political reforms, and hallmark of mil-to-mil engagements, allowing this requires, among other conditions, open lines for the formation of personal and professional of shipping and commerce. These challenges
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have always been hallmarks of our cooperative Conversations and visits between senior U.S. mil- efforts in the region; their importance is height- itary officials, including Secretary Gates, former ened in light of current events. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Partnership on these fronts does not mean Michael Mullen, and General Mattis, were an that we will refrain from encouraging internal important linkage between the United States reform from the armed services we work with and the new caretaker government in the form where it is necessary. We have been engaging of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. in these conversations since long before popu- Describing his March trip to Egypt, Secretary lar protest movements in the region began and Gates underscored that it was “an opportunity will continue to do so as they progress.13 As to reaffirm America’s unwavering commitment the understanding of responsive governance to our bilateral relationship and to the Egyptian as a precondition for stability takes root in the people” as well as an “opportunity to advance region, these reforms take on added urgency. our defense partnership and to provide continu- Making up for lost time in relationship- ing economic and political support as Egypt goes building is extremely difficult. Our history of through its period of transition,” both to key mil-to-mil engagements with Pakistan high- political leaders such as Prime Minister Essam lights the perils of whole-cloth reductions of Sharaf and to Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi.15 these types of exchanges. In accordance with the Pressler Amendment, enacted in 1985 and Conclusion barring U.S. economic or military assistance to No single type of mil-to-mil engagement Islamabad unless the U.S. President could cer- will be sufficient to maintain the robust and tify that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons, enduring relationships among the United States mil-to-mil exchanges between our two nations and partner nations that are always necessary were essentially cut off between 1989 and 2001. but are particularly vital during this time of The result, as General Mattis has noted, great change. USCENTCOM will continue to is a generation of “broken contacts.”14 While draw upon the full range of engagement options, some senior Pakistani officials received U.S. from working with our partners at the State professional military education (PME) in the Department to carry out FMF, IMET, and other formative years of their military careers, similar PME-related programs to conducting judiciously opportunities were not availed to the current chosen and crafted joint exercises and meeting corps of lieutenants, captains, majors, and lieu- with regional leaders to understand their per- tenant colonels. Though we are still able to find spectives first hand. The U.S. diplomatic goals areas of partnership, the relationship has been for the region are longstanding, but the dynam- negatively affected by this gap in engagements ics through which we are trying to achieve them as we continue to work through the spectrum of are more complex than ever. difficult topics facing our two nations. The unique cultures, histories, and cir- On the other hand, contacts between U.S. cumstances of the countries in the region make and Egyptian military officials during the earli- predicting individual outcomes both ill-advised est stages of the protest movements in Egypt, and impossible. To properly respond to the for example, illustrate the impact of long- dynamics of the Arab Spring, we must under- standing exchanges and relationship-building. stand them. Listening to and learning from our
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friends and allies in the region are integral parts of this strategy. Relationships facilitated through mil-to-mil engagements provide a vital channel of communications that allows for these types of open and honest exchanges. PRISM Notes 1 Department of State, Foreign Operations, vol. 2 of Congressional Budget Justification, Fiscal Year 2012 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2011), 157–160, available at
106 | Features PRISM 3, no. 1 Title
Afghan worker surveys dam project in Badghis Province that will employ local residents and provide stable water source Courtesy of U.S. Army War Comes to Bala Morghab A Tragedy of Policy and Action in Three Acts
By John Bessler
I need not here touch upon the well-known and far-reaching results of the holding of Duffer’s Drift . . . and the ensuing victory gained by our side. It is now, of course, public knowledge that this was the turning point in the war, though we, the humble instruments, did not know what vital results hung upon our action. —Lieutenant Backsight Forethought1
s challenging as conventional war is, how much more so is the ongoing operation in Afghanistan? The need for concurrent stability operations, including counterinsurgency Aand capacity-building, adds layer upon layer of complexity to warfighting. As if the terrain
Colonel John Bessler, USA, serves at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters, G3/5/7. His previous assignment was Deputy Director at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
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and insurgents are not difficult enough, the poli- mountainous and comparatively temperate; win- cies that generate missions are often question- ters are characterized by heavy snows, averaging 2 able and poorly grounded in the realities on the meters annually, with much rain and fog. Badghis ground. What might seem a grand idea in the has the highest concentration of Pashto speakers Presidential Palace and to Kabul-based planners in the Northwest, transplanted there in the last can rapidly bog down in the realities of coali- century by the last Afghan king. The provincial tion warfare and the day-to-day friction associ- capital of Qala-I-Naw was noted in 2008 for its ated with surviving and building capacity in a fairly reliable electricity, some 2 kilometers of small province at the end of the policy and sup- asphalt road, teacher’s academy, hospital, and air- ply chain. And so, if the reader seeks a glimpse port. There was less violence in Badghis in com- of what the majority of military operations might parison to many other provinces, but it was far look like in the next 20 years, this view from from a quiet place. Badghis Province proves a worthy example. This Badghis is one of the poorest and most rural small operation, recounted here as a three-act of provinces in Afghanistan, and prior to 2006, play, may prove to have been one of the potential few Westerners ventured there. From Kabul, it turning points in the war. The story of Badghis was viewed as a quiet and agrarian sector. After reacquaints the military professional of all the the fall of the Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan’s tribulations and friction of coalition warfare at provisional government installed provincial gov- the tactical and operational levels, gap between ernors around the country. Badghis had the mis- policy and operations, contradictions of winning fortune of becoming the home of Governor Gul hearts and minds, and challenges of day-to-day Mohammad Arefi. Unfortunately for Badghis’s survival at an outpost of foreign policy. However, inhabitants, Arefi, and to a greater extent his if Badghis is a story of friction and chance, it is successor Mohammad Ashraf Naseri, served as also a story of military ingenuity and persever- an aloof and condescending landlord, perceived ance, as well as the Afghan people’s struggle for as attempting to leverage the coalition and the human security. No doubt there are dozens of United States for any and all perks he could gar- places like it in Afghanistan, and, as that expe- ner. Naseri was indicted on corruption charges at rienced by Lieutenant Backsight Forethought in least twice while in office. Both men were widely The Defence of Duffer’s Drift, one from which we viewed as self-serving, disconnected from the can learn. province, and even more so from the outlying dis- tricts. In particular, Naseri spent far more time in Setting the Stage Kabul “on business” than he did in his province. This story takes place in Badghis Province’s As far as it can be ascertained, in 2 years he never Bala Morghab district in 2008–2009. Badghis is once traveled to Bala Morghab district. located in the farthest northwestern region of Poor provincial governance aside, Bala Afghanistan, and is about as far as one can get Morghab’s connections to the provincial and from the day-to-day news coverage of the Western national apparatus have been tenuous for at least press. It is 3 hard days’ drive from Kandahar and one hundred years. The Pashtun majority in Bala 4 from Kabul. The province consists of seven Morghab is a recent phenomenon. They live districts, one of which is Bala Morghab, which on land that, prior to their transplanting by the abuts Turkmenistan. Most of the province is last Afghan king, belonged to local Tajiks and
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Aimaqs. The Pashtuns have now been entrenched representatives from across the country. The for more than a century, but they retain a latent assembly’s purpose was to make government devel- fear that Tajik authorities will one day reclaim the opment interventions more visible and responsive Morghab River Valley and displace them. The val- to the needs and priorities of communities at dis- ley’s residents still view the Tajik-dominated pro- trict level.4 One of the focuses of this effort was vincial government with wariness and mistrust. the district of Bala Morghab. Representatives from The Tajiks’s assimilation into the Communist Bala Morghab’s 100,000 inhabitants and 133 vil- Party during the Soviet occupation further fuels lages identified poverty, poor economic conditions, this mistrust. Any action taken by the provincial and lack of opportunity and jobs as their main government is viewed along these schisms, and problems. The agriculture and livestock sectors obtaining Pashtun “buy-in” to any effort launched suffered from several concurrent years of drought, by the provincial government is always necessary.2 and what little transportation network existed was In the fall of 2006, Spain contributed a destroyed by the Soviet invasion in 1979. Lack of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to fuel and electricity accelerated ongoing deforesta- the provincial capital of Qala-I-Naw as part tion—even prized pistachio forests were cut down of the International Security Assistance Force to provide for heat and cooking. Finally, health (ISAF) expanded mission, with the aim of fostering development and reconstruction representatives from Bala Morghab’s throughout the seven districts.3 The Spanish, as 100,000 inhabitants and 133 villages every other member of the coalition, operated identified poverty, poor economic with national caveats that constrained certain actions and activities. Moreover, the Spanish conditions, and lack of opportunity and army’s small size dictated that it rotate the PRT jobs as their main problems on a 4-month basis. The Spanish government mandated that the PRT focus efforts within a care was lacking. Many villagers in remote areas 50-kilometer radius of the provincial capital. As had to travel several days to find medical support one can imagine, the impact and reach of the in one of the four inadequate basic health clinics. PRT was minimized, given the province’s great However, what was most telling in the assessment size (20,000 square kilometers) and number of was the lack of community concerns about secu- inhabitants (500,000). Qala-I-Naw (which has a rity. Insecurity, foreign fighters, and war were not largely Tajik population) reaped the benefits from among the complaints. These observations sup- Spanish presence with a new hospital, teacher’s port an earlier 2005 Badghis survey in which only school, and some asphalted roads. However, the 1 in 214 negative incidents reported in the entire PRT had little impact beyond the capital and less province was categorized as “insecurity.”5 inclination to venture out. The Spanish PRT had Up until 2008, there was little Western no presence whatsoever in the frontier districts concern with, or intrusion into, Bala Morghab such as Bala Morghab during 2007–2008. district, and even less connection between In 2007, the Afghanistan Ministry of Rural this “Pashtun pocket” and provincial and Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) national Afghan authorities. The Spanish PRT within the Ministry of Interior (MoI) convened remained committed to its development proj- a District Development Assembly consisting of ects in and around the relative safety of the
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provincial capital, and few Westerners—and and leadership. Based on this appraisal, an fewer Afghans—paid any attention to this quiet Afghan MoI team then recruits new Afghan backwater district. Compared with the more National Police (ANP) members from that violent South and East, ISAF’s Western Region district, sends them to a regional training cen- was quiet and, as a result, last in priority for just ter for 8 weeks, and then reinserts them after about everything, from supplies and replace- graduation. The relatively well-trained Afghan ments to medical evacuation helicopters and National Civil Order Police provides the secu- unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Such was the rity and civil control during the 2 months scene in 2008, when ISAF brought the war back that the local recruits are in school. Following to Badghis through the police reform program graduation, the trained ANP members return known as Focused District Development (FDD). home equipped with new uniforms, weapons, and police vehicles—and hopefully a sense of ACT I: A Troubling Start professional ethics and responsibility. Focused District Development refers to The district selection process was sup- the ISAF police training program for Afghans. posed to be a joint recommendation from the The program began in late 2007 and systemati- provincial governor and ISAF regional com- cally sought to address security sector reform in mander, approved at the national level, based Afghanistan by focusing on key districts through- on availability of support, potential of creating out the country.6 A primary feature of this program stability, and a holistic assessment of the prob- conceived by the Combined Security Transition ability of success. In 2008–2009, however, the Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A)—endorsed selection process hinged on simply whether a by ISAF and adopted as policy by the Afghan U.S. Police Mentor Team was available, how government—was that the primary responsibility agitated or peaceful the district appeared, for determining priority districts lay squarely with and a subjective assessment of the quality of the Afghan government. A concept paper writ- the district police chief. What was definitely ten by CSTC–A planners in early 20077 described not a factor in deciding which district to the idea as a whole-of-government approach8 to select for FDD was the availability of devel- improve quality of life across the board. While opment, governance, and essential service civil security was being developed through police resources for a whole-of-government approach. reform, training district prosecutors, educating Unfortunately, the main drivers for implemen- district council members in governance, building tation soon became civilian political agendas infrastructure projects, and developing the econ- and military expediency. As a consequence, omy would be undertaken in concert with each rather than completing a jigsaw puzzle of a other. In this way, success in one sector (such as whole-of-government approach, the CSTC–A civil security) could be reinforced by concomitant plan appeared more like a single puzzle piece success in others. of military effort surrounded by emptiness. But The police reform portion of FDD begins the military is great at implementation and with a joint Afghan MoI–U.S. police mentor the CSTC–A planners went into overdrive team reviewing the law enforcement needs to execute their portion—that which focused within a particular district, taking special purely on the police training/reform process. note of deficiencies in force numbers, quality, Largely left out were the Afghan national level
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ministerial programs that should have been the Ring Road. In Badghis Province, the famous involved in such an approach. Ring Road was a potholed dirt path passable Bala Morghab was selected to be among the only to four-wheel-drive vehicles, motorcycles, first FDD districts. In spring 2008, the Afghan donkeys, and foot traffic. A modern asphalted National Security Forces (ANSF) dispatched road would open up the Northwest, allowing the an unannounced force to assess road conditions export of produce and textiles, as well as allowing as a prelude to the later police reform process. education, goods, and services to flow in. Antigovernment forces operating along the fron- The district center of Bala Morghab sits tier, to this point unforeseen, attacked this force in the middle of this future corridor, astride and bloodied the nose of the ANSF. While hardly the Morghab River. A bridge dating from the a major action, ISAF Regional Command–West 1950s routes the road directly into the town’s (RC–W) immediately requested the postpone- bazaar. Comprised of 8 to 10 sections of steel ment of the FDD, deducing correctly that the pipe laid side by side across decaying concrete district was not nearly as quiet as previously abutments and topped with sheet metal, the thought. However, as in all things military, poli- bridge sorely needed replacement. The coali- tics held ultimate sway. Not only had President tion assessed the bridge at a 14-ton capacity, but Hamid Karzai promised Minister of Interior even the Afghan police and locals ran vehicles Ahmad Moqbel Zarar that he would execute across it one at a time for safety reasons. Part of FDD in Badghis before parliamentary elections the ISAF agenda for this FDD round was to use in September, but he specifically chose Badghis the increased security to bring a new temporary because of its relative tranquility (it would be “an bridge to the town, which would allow the old easy win”), and thereby a manifestation of suc- bridge to be refurbished to Ring Road standards. cess and a ploy to garner votes from the “Pashtun It was fundamentally a good idea. Pocket.” Inopportunely, no one thought to Unfortunately, no one had involved Bala inform the people of Bala Morghab what was Morghab. It turned out that what the elders and happening and to seek their insights and support. villagers really wanted was to have their mosque So—appropriate or not, informed or not— completed. Started years before with funds from FDD in Bala Morghab got under way. Regional the U.S. Agency for International Development ANSF and ISAF forces proceeded with military (USAID), work on the mosque had ceased 2 years planning to move into the district beginning in previously with increased threats and violence June of 2008. Despite the Kabul-directed policy against the workers.10 An opportunity existed, but and subsequent military operation to enable it, no one from Kabul engaged with the elders to ISAF headquarters gave scant consideration see what they wanted and no one consulted with toward any sort of media or information campaign the District Development Committee, MRRD, nor sought to energize a whole-of-government Spanish PRT, or U.S. Department of State or effort to coincide with the military operation. No USAID representatives embedded with the PRT. evidence exists that anyone gave much thought to Come hell or high water, ISAF was bringing a the other stability operations lines of effort at all.9 bridge—and little more. Beyond the obvious political agenda of Bala By July 2008, the RC–W staff, Italian Morghab’s FDD selection was a second, more observers, mentors, and Operational Mentor and strategic motivation: the ultimate completion of Liaison Team (OMLT), U.S. Army Embedded
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Training Teams (ETTs), and U.S. hired contrac- few days. Operations not closely supervised by tors had guided the assigned Afghan National mentors tended to run out of steam because of Army (ANA) corps headquarters and one brigade food, water, and fuel issues after about 36 hours. through a cursory planning exercise and rehearsal Unfortunately, due to the isolated nature of Bala for the planned movement to Bala Morghab dis- Morghab, distance from the Afghan army home trict. However, no one worked the details of the garrison (200 kilometers), and length of time to plan to identify, much less mitigate, the whole train the new police (8 weeks), the operation mélange of friction points: the long, difficult, required a persistent presence of at least two bat- and nonsecurable route; lack of route-clearing talions of ANA in the field for nearly 60 days. equipment; lack of a coordinated communica- Chatter about enemy activity along the tions network; and many other impediments to route and in the Morghab Valley increased success. From a professional military viewpoint, exponentially as D-Day approached. As the day there was an appalling lack of attention to detail. neared, the Italian brigadier general responsible Recognizing this, newly assigned U.S. mentors for ISAF operations in the West consented to insisted on a more thorough planning effort, this commit his Spanish explosive ordnance disposal contingent to protect convoy movements. The Spanish bomb dogs and robots, in theory, would properly led and motivated, Afghan expedite the advance by searching for and clear- soldiers are terrific fighters ing anticipated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along the route, particularly in places time including the one-star Italian headquar- where mud-walled compounds on each side ters; ANA, ANP, and Border Police leadership; of the road restricted movement and limited and even attempting to bring ISAF-Kabul into maneuver room. However, the Spanish team the effort. Ultimately, however, the only energy only added to the friction. A late-discovered expended on Bala Morghab was that of the men- Spanish government caveat required 1 full tors and local Afghan army and police leader- day of vehicle maintenance for every full day ship. Consequently, the plan was simple to the of operating. The entire attack plan nearly fell extreme: move a brigade of ANA with their U.S., apart as the PRT mentors frantically searched Spanish, and Italian mentors up the single Ring for a resolution to this dilemma. The 3-day Road route into the Morghab Valley, occupy key unopposed march would take nearly a week if terrain in the valley, and conduct FDD. the Spaniards were integrated into the convoy Meanwhile, the Afghan forces planned and movement. As it turned out, during the tactical rehearsed. Properly led and motivated, Afghan road march phase from the garrison in Herat soldiers are terrific fighters. What the Western to Qala-I-Naw, two platoons’ worth of Spanish Zone Afghans were not so good at was logistical vehicles broke down and had to be recovered, planning. While they could prove themselves further complicating matters and throwing the surprisingly capable of planning and executing fragile timeline even more into disarray.11 complex brigade operations if properly moti- On August 8, 2008, the movement into the vated, their support planning and execution Morghab Valley started from Qala-I-Naw. The was typically abysmal, and they could not be movement remained uncontested until the road expected to remain in the field for more than a made a sharp 180-degree hairpin turn adjacent
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to the tactically important village of Akazai. of operations. Shaping requires a manipulation of In this turn, constrained by mud walls on one the environment to achieve effects that allow side and steep hills on the other, a fight erupted the clear, hold, and build phases to succeed. with exploding IEDs covered by ambushing In a counterinsurgency environment, shaping anti-government forces. From here, the combat includes a molding of attitudes and opinions spread into the cornfields that run south into of locals and key leaders, as well as the more the Morghab Valley. tangible kinetic effects and development proj- Insurgents contested the final 20 kilome- ects.13 Part of the shape for Bala Morghab should ters of the march with IEDs, small arms, and have included strategic communications prior rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), firing from to arrival. Military planners assumed (wrongly) the cornfields and from behind the mud walls that Afghan national- and provincial-level offi- lining the roadway. The column had no choice cials had coordinated with district leaders, when but to run the gauntlet since the adjacent hills in fact there had been no contact whatsoever. As were too steep for vehicles to climb. As ANA soon as the dust settled, the ANA commander forces and their U.S. mentors dismounted to called a meeting with district leadership. No one clear the cornfields, often the attackers would from the Afghan civil government even offered drop their weapons several rows behind them, to participate. The provincial governor had pick up farm tools, and then claim to be just flown to Kabul for another lengthy stay just as farmers in the field. It was not until well after the attack was beginning and had left no one dark that the column closed into the desig- in charge. Consequently, it was left to the local nated forward operating base, a cotton factory U.S. and ISAF commanders to engage with our compound. The casualties after the movement local “hosts” to discern their concerns and needs. amounted to two ANA and one U.S. killed and It was the coalition—not the Afghan govern- a dozen ANA and several U.S. wounded. ment—that was now forced to assume the lead- Throughout the night, sporadic small arms ing political role. and RPG fires from the surrounding cornfields The failure of Kabul planners to create an struck the cotton factory. The compound had environment for success became glaringly obvi- walls on only three sides and head-high corn ous at the first shura, when the senior villager grew alongside, making for a thoroughly sleepless opened the meeting with “We didn’t know that night. Clearing operations over the next several the Russians were coming back”; so much for weeks pushed the perimeter back several hun- efforts aimed at shaping attitudes and expectations dred meters, but the insurgents fiercely resisted it. before arrival. Thus far, the only effects the locals During these engagements, the ANA and their could ascertain were firefights and fired haystacks, U.S. mentors did the heavy lifting, while ISAF wounded and killed livestock by stray rounds, and provided perimeter security and controlled close tan and green Ford Rangers and sand-colored up- air support to the extent to which their rules of armored Humvees flattening the irrigation ditches engagement would allow, but they did not par- and driving over crops.14 Small wonder there was ticipate in offensive operations.12 no flag-waving with the coalition’s arrival. The overall ISAF strategy at the time was Further complicating matters, FDD plan- “shape, clear, hold, and build.” Of these, the ning required the construction of a headquarters activity of shaping holds primacy in these types for the district police, police mentor team, and
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ANSF, and from which coalition forces could (about 150 soldiers) in place for the winter of live, plan, and operate. In rural districts, these 2008–2009. Along with 24 U.S. partnering headquarters normally took shape initially as ETT troops and about 60 ISAF troops, they a combat outpost and later transformed into a confronted a growing challenge—mere survival. new police district headquarters. The ruins of Building a Forward Operating Base (FOB) is an old cotton factory served this function at the never easy, but doing so is far more taxing when outset. Unfortunately, even this was ill-planned. in an economy-of-force operation. U.S. forces Initially, U.S. mentors secured a right of entry remained short of everything: building material, from Kabul’s Interior Ministry—the Afghan barrier and construction material, and power equivalent of eminent domain—but within 48 generation equipment. Not only were supplies in hours of arrival in the valley, ISAF received short supply, but those which were available were word that the right of entry had not been prop- difficult to transport. Everything was made harder erly coordinated within the labyrinthine Afghan by having to rely on the single, unimproved, eas- ministry system and was invalid. The “fraudu- ily interdicted route. More than 100 kilometers lent” seizure of the cotton factory generated long, the route could not be patrolled or even at first dozens, then literally hundreds of land regularly monitored by air. To expedite resupply, claims for compensation by the valley’s farmers lighter supplies were airdropped or flown in by for crop damage, irrigation rights, and land use. helicopter, if available. Airdrops from Bagram Capitalizing on the opportunity, the locals not included everything from HESCO barriers to once referred to it as a “government land grab”— water and fuel. Troops often grappled 55-gallon in every single shura and meeting over the next fuel drums across the drop zone in 110-degree 10 months, the activities were referred to as a heat or through shin-deep mud, when the single “coalition” or “ISAF” operation, and not an small Bobcat bucket loader which supported the Afghan government operation. The ill-contrived FOB was not available. and poorly coordinated efforts in Kabul, which so However, many supplies had to be hauled negatively affected the shape phase added to the in by truck: generators, portable toilets, tents, burden on ANA and mentors’ shoulders as they plywood, fuel bladders, fuel, and gravel. Local wrestled with other issues beyond their control. U.S. logisticians tried to support the local econ- omy by contracting local truckers and laborers. ACT II: Coalition Friction Recognizing the road as the Achilles’ heel of The Afghan brigade and their mentors the operation, the regional insurgent base eas- spent August and September 2008 in the ily thwarted the coalition in a most nonkinetic Morghab Valley in foxholes. When the brigade fashion—they simply contacted the contractors, headquarters and two of the three battalions drivers, and workers and threatened them and pulled out in mid-September, it was certainly their families. In a few cases, trucks were hijacked not because the “clear” phase was concluded or burned and drivers were roughed up, or in two or security had vastly improved, but because cases killed. Military operations were required more pressing strategic missions needed to be to bring any substantial shipments into the area. met—voter registration and highway security. The single route proved extraordinarily For security in the valley, the brigade left two challenging. Every movement required good understrength companies of ANA infantry weather, robust security forces, and 2 days to
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travel from Qala-I-Naw, the last reasonably In early October 2008, the 13 trucks, with the secure waypoint on the journey. Every trip lettering still bright white on the doors, gave a along the path was a combat operation requir- sense of a new beginning to the Bala Morghab ing bounding overwatch, route clearance, and police as they completed their 8 weeks of train- deliberate IED-awareness and counterambush ing. After graduation, the trucks were loaded techniques. Tough enough for seasoned U.S. or aboard flatbed trucks as part of a combat column coalition soldiers, it was much more so for the of ANA vehicles, which would escort them into scarcely trained ANSF forces, who took losses the valley. However, once the column arrived on virtually every single convoy. Those items in Qala-I-Naw, the Italian headquarters issued that were too large to go by air either waited for an order forbidding any OMLT members from an assembled combat column to go by ground, continuing north. The order was directed at all or simply did not go at all. NATO personnel, citing the worsening security Nonetheless, the new FOB emerged over situation and anticipated road closure due to a period of months through the brute physi- winter weather.15 Even though this order violated cal efforts and force of will of the soldiers. The a CSTC–A directive stating that all ANA forces 360-degree protective walls gave the coalition would have mentor presence at all times during some breathing room, but the troops washed operations, the order held. Having no mentors their clothes in buckets until February and got meant no coalition eyes or ears to observe, sup- their first real shower in December—a full 5 port, or assist any ANA operations. No coalition months after operations had commenced. oversight preordained no redundant communica- The North Atlantic Treaty Organization tions, no overwatch or ready reserve of firepower, (NATO) side of the FOB improved slightly more and no way to ascertain the credibility of ANA rapidly than the U.S. side. Keen on improv- radio reports. ing the poor living conditions for their troops, Knowing that the Italians’ edict against fur- RC–W bent over backward to make the Alliance ther support would not curb the ANA’s desire side livable—often at the expense of the U.S. to deliver the vehicles before winter weather, priorities, routinely bumping U.S. priority-1 and understanding ANA enthusiasm far out- loads for 20-kilogram wheels of parmesan cheese weighed their capabilities, the mentors lobbied and weightlifting sets. The prevailing attitude of in vain to force the RC–W commander to pro- RC–W leadership at the time was one of “they’re vide NATO ground and air support and to pro- our helos, so we have the final say on what the vide coverage to the ANA column. When the loads are.” Unfortunately, at RC–W headquar- NATO mentors pulled out, the ANA escorting ters, there was no central air planning cell to the ANP Rangers stalled in Qala-I-Naw. After coordinate, vet, or establish priorities among the 4 weeks of resupply, reorganizing, and waiting in U.S., Italian, and Spanish needs. National sym- the vain hope that RC–W would relent, ANA pathies, unencumbered by guilt, a sense of team- leadership ordered the column to move. U.S. work, or tactical acumen, unfortunately too often forebodings materialized on Thanksgiving Day dictated what moved north, and in what priority. 2008, when the front of the unmentored ANA The FDD process also involved providing column came under heavy fire, and the ANA the newly minted ANP with equipment. This forces totally disintegrated—only 10 kilome- included brand-new Ford Ranger pickup trucks. ters from the FOB. Insurgents disabled the lead
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vehicle in a chokepoint, successfully destroyed the community’s insistent preference for comple- another several hundred meters behind the tion of the mosque. ISAF had conceived of the lead, and then swarmed the trapped column in gift of a new bridge as a potential boon to the between as the ANA fought back, ran off, or local economy and as a way to guarantee a mil- were captured or killed. itary-strength bridge across the river. Conceived The Italians, who had at least monitored without regard for local desires and concerns, the ANA radio network from Herat (200 kilo- it naïvely presumed local gratitude.16 The plan meters away), realized the ANA soldiers were in called for ISAF to divert traffic across a tempo- trouble. They scrambled two attack helicopters, rary bridge to be erected nearby while upgrading which confirmed the worst—the column had the old bridge over a period of 2 years. When completed, the reconstructed old bridge would district elders rejected every proposed accommodate heavier commercial and military site along the river as infeasible for the traffic and support the eventual completion of the simple reason that the new bridge would Ring Road. The entire drama surrounding this empower whichever landowner on whose project soon became symbolic of the futility of the half-measures by which ISAF and Kabul had property it lay approached the entire Bala Morghab operation. Just like the failure to properly shape the been broken in half and stopped. In the front area of operations, the debate over simply section, several ANA vehicles were on fire, where to site the temporary bridge became a and ANA bodies were strewn in clumps. Too subject of intense local debate and drama. The late to influence the ambush, the Italian attack old bridge exited right into the bazaar area, helicopters conducted a few strafing runs on the on public property. Since this was public prop- confirmed enemy and provided some breathing erty, no single landowner had primacy over space for consolidation and reorganization by the commercial traffic—all benefited equally. the ANA. Stragglers from the front of the con- While ISAF and RC–W planners understood voy successfully reached the FOB, and extrica- the engineering concerns of where a temporary tion of the column’s rear half was achieved. The bridge needed to be placed, they completely ANA experienced 17 killed, 20 wounded, and ignored the important cadastral (land owner- 24 captured. Of the 13 new ANP Ford Rangers, ship) issues associated with the project. Blind only 2 made it into the FOB—7 were captured to how this “gift” disrupted the power base in by antigovernment forces, and the last 4 were the district, ISAF never considered the con- sent back to Qala-I-Naw where they languished sequences of the shift of implied power and until the following spring. status to the landowner on whose property the temporary bridge would go. For the dis- ACT III: A Bridge and Policy trict elders, it was the single most important to Nowhere consideration. Unsurprisingly in hindsight, dis- Throughout the summer and into late trict elders rejected every proposed site along autumn, RC–W remained under tremendous the river as infeasible for the simple reason Afghan political (and NATO) pressure to deliver that the new bridge would empower which- on their original promise of a bridge, in spite of ever landowner on whose property it lay. ISAF
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engineers simply wanted to lay a bridge, but in the concrete to cure in good weather, which the end, the cadastral issues and local politics ended the first of November. Quality con- proved far more contentious than river speed trol personnel from the Afghan government, and depth, bank grade, and soil composition. ISAF, or other sources were not available for The entire bridge project rapidly became a sustained observation of the contractor. It was morbid joke among the professionals working for commonly believed either that the contractor the coalition staffs in RC–W, ANSF, provincial was connected to the insurgents directly, had government, and U.S. mentors as discussions paid them off in order to proceed, or that ISAF dragged on. As there had been no shaping done, had brokered a deal with intermediaries in no feeling out the elders, no discernment of their order for him to work unmolested. Regardless, real wants and needs, and no promotion of needs he completed his work about a week ahead of and advantages of a bridge over the long term, the scheduled bridge delivery. As feared, the political hubris and arrogance ruled most of the abutments proved substandard and in no way Kabul government’s decisions associated with were they ready for the floodwaters of spring; the bridge’s final location. As a result, the hard at first flood in late March, as predicted, the feelings and unresolved issues—over land tenure, bridge became unusable as floodwaters threat- the “right” of ISAF and the government to use ened its collapse. Back in October, however, land and property illegally acquired, and even when it mattered, ISAF was more concerned the occupation of Bala Morghab—remain today, about winter weather thwarting their prom- and ISAF owns the consequences. ised bridge delivery date than the risk of a sub- Eventually an agreement received accep- standard bridge; at that time it was “full steam tance from all parties. Since the bridge was ahead” with little to no concern for either the “temporary,” a 2-year arrangement was made bridge’s quality or—far more important—the to place the new bridge where ISAF engineers lasting consequences of failure. believed that it would fit. However, antigovern- One more tragedy beset the ISAF bridge ment forces still owned the elders’ sympathies. effort. Movement of the steel spans for the bridge Without popular support for the ANA and the required several contracted, all-wheel-drive, coalition, antigovernment forces would (and heavy-duty flatbed trucks. Bridge pieces were did) own the valley and approach road, and hastily loaded in Kabul as ISAF scrambled to nothing in the way of bridge supplies would get them overland to Bala Morghab before the come without antigovernment forces exacting autumn rains turned the road into a morass. a price. But what was to be done? ISAF had However, once the Kabul contractors driving the committed to building a bridge, and had to get bridge reached the Badghis border, they refused the bridge abutments poured and cured before to go any farther. It was well known among the bad weather killed any chance of completing contractors that they were on what was truly the the bridge before winter. ISAF became expedi- last 100 kilometers of bad road, and while ISAF ent rather than strategic in their thinking. was willing to pay truckers five times the going Concerns over ensuring that the abut- rate, they could not get any regular trucking ments would be poured to standard also sur- companies to accept. Desperate to get the bridge faced. October was well under way and engi- moved, and with the ever-accommodating Bala neers calculated that it would take 20 days for Morghab elders acting as intermediaries, ISAF
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Afghan National Civil Order Police member turns in weapon for maintenance during marksmanship training NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan (Julian Carroll) Training NATO
began negotiating with “local contractors” to move the bridge. A provision came back from the Bala Morghab interlocutors, which was stunning in both its simplicity and its implications: “If ISAF moves the bridge, or if a single ISAF vehicle escorts the bridge, the road will be mined and we will blow up the bridge. However, if ISAF does not escort the bridge convoy, then we will allow it to pass, but only if we bring it in ourselves.” Caught between their adversary’s demands and their own inability to act or revise an increasingly meaningless political promise, ISAF relinquished. Less than 96 hours later, amid a cloud of announcing dust and hoopla, the bridge convoy arrived, unscathed and ahead of schedule in the Bala Morghab bazaar. ISAF UAVs watched the “successful” convoy across the long frontier road. However, what the UAV could not see were the smiles on the Bala Morghab elders’ faces as they lurched into the bazaar and delivered the bridge, intact and on time, with no “help” from ISAF whatsoever. All the credibility, credit, implied power, and message ISAF so wantonly pursued went to the insurgents that day for pulling the delivery off—and there was not one person in the valley, or in ISAF, who did not know it. The official opening ceremony for the temporary bridge took place just 4 days after the disastrous Thanksgiving Day ANP convoy attack. Attended by the provincial governor, chief of staff of the Afghan army, ISAF commander, new provincial governor, and every ANSF general officer in the West, the ceremony was a somber and mechanistic affair for all but the insurgents and elders. The shot-up Afghan police trucks parked against the wall of the cotton factory and the political and strategic ramifications of 24 ANA soldiers still held as prisoners were heavy on everyone’s mind. As for the bridge itself, we already know its fate.
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The Curtain Call each other—there was no way to achieve synergy At every curtain call, actors come back to among them. Quite literally, the whole was less the stage for special recognition. Yet as in most than the sum of the parts. tragedies in plays and real life, the true value Shaping Has Primacy. Shape, clear, hold, of the curtain call is to consider the roles each and build is a sound concept, but the most impor- played and the greater lessons each of the roles tant critical aspect of this strategy in a counter- teaches about moving forward in life. The trag- insurgency environment is shaping. Shaping is edy that was Bala Morghab offers professional much more than simply softening up a target; lessons regarding how a strategy of shape, clear, it is the foundation on which all else builds. A hold, and build must be pursued. With some campaign begins with knowing, understanding, reflection, we can learn lessons that will prepare and motivating the people who are about to be us for the future. affected. Shaping starts long before an opera- Half-measures in a Whole-of-Government tion begins to ensure ownership of a plan by Context Will Fail. There have been multiple the legitimate government and local population competing layers of complexity, friction, mis- affected. It is the shaping that smoothes the path understanding, and stressors associated with the for operations and makes it difficult for the adver- entire episode at Bala Morghab. The misunder- sary to menace, disrupt, or inhibit progress on the standing and poor implementation of policy at the agreed-upon activities and projects. highest levels, failure to properly shape the envi- Unity of Purpose. Patience, compromise, ronment prior to operations, and failure to execute understanding, and negotiating skills are at least a comprehensive, whole-of-government plan led as important, and probably more so, to the coali- to a bifurcated, unsynchronized muddle on the tion leader’s repertoire as is combat savvy, tacti- ground. The surprise arrival of the FDD, FOB cal and operational intuition, and the ability to construction issues, and the entire bridge saga are read the battle. Unity of purpose is the term best only symptoms of the greater failures. There was suited to describe the goal and how a leader must no one in the national or provincial government attempt to shape any operation where disparate who knew the district and village leadership—or actors, motivations, national caveats, and coali- seemed to be concerned about what they thought. tion logistical challenges abound. Unity of purpose Government agencies did not work together at provides a common aim-point toward which dif- any level and did not take ownership for that ferent contributing factors can guide their actions portion of the enterprise that logically fell under between calls back to their national headquarters. their purview. None of the projects was locally Local Ownership. There is a social fabric requested, desired, or properly coordinated even inherent to all stability operations, and this lies though all the projects involved local land tenure/ mostly in the local networks that build resil- land rights and required local support. While it iency and structure into societies. It applies is true that at the end of the day the FOB and to what is and what can be. Local ownership bridge were in place and FDD did “happen,” it goes beyond simply understanding the his- is also true to state that all three projects were tory, motivations, and agendas of villagers. characterized more by ignorance and brute force These must be interpreted into meaningful than whole-of-government efforts. Operations constructs for understanding what people do were poorly executed and often incongruent with and can embrace as their own. The cadastral
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issues in Bala Morghab remain unresolved to and influence locals against government actions, this day. To a largely agrarian society (as most through coercion, terror, or misinformation. A of the Third World is), land is often all that lack of trustworthy government agents who work people—the “decisive terrain” in counterinsur- with and through community leaders at the vil- gency—have for their livelihoods and that of lage level enables those opposing the government their progeny; therefore, it is the single most to hold sway. By contrast, the insurgents worked important motivator among them. ISAF’s from the bottom-up, influencing the decisions of ignorance of the cadastral issues—acquisition the elders in a variety of ways. of land for the FOB, where to put the bridge, Sympathies Are a Force Multiplier. Brute military and police checkpoints—reflected no force and ignorance—the tongue-in-cheek awareness of a prime motivation of support or characterization of the old Soviet bloc style of opposition as well as missed opportunities for warfare—does not work in a 21st-century coun- early collaboration and better local solutions. terinsurgency environment. Not until the true Without proper insight of what motivated the terrain—the population—is sympathetic to the decisive terrain, the coalition sought to solve government’s plans can real progress be made. the problem (as they perceived it) the only way Only to the degree to which the government they knew how—by pouring more troops and provides acceptable rule and well-being to the treasure into more combat actions to “bring village populace will any military operation increased security.” enjoy success. The attitudes and inclinations Continuity of Governance. The national gov- of the inhabitants of the 133 villages in the ernment of Afghanistan sought to work through Morghab Valley were a “force multiplier.”17 The “the problem of Badghis” without a proper basis degree to which the people were sympathetic of understanding the local conditions. Not hav- and supportive of one side multiplied the posi- ing village and district leadership connected to tive effects of actions on that side and margin- and integrated with the provincial and national alized good or magnified the bad of the other. Where the people trust ISAF, ISAF is in charge. Where the people trust the insurgents, the not to engage with local leaders well in insurgents are in charge.18 Elders often stated, advance of policy implementation is a “We can control our sons, but only when the recipe for failure Taliban aren’t around.” The fact that the sons were used by insurgents either as fighters or as leverage against local leaders reflects the perva- governments meant that policies and operational sive influence the insurgents had in the district. plans were formed in a vacuum, neither based in To this day, it is unclear how many true local knowledge nor locally supported. Kabul fed insurgents are in the district, and how many of FDD from the top-down: policy/strategy decisions those were actually hard core as compared to co- (flavored with agendas, nepotism, and politics) opted, opportunist, or partially loyal. It is likely were forced on the locals. Not to engage with that only a hard-core cadre was in the region in local leaders well in advance of policy implemen- 2008–2009, controlling the populace in much tation is a recipe for failure. Activists opposing the same way as in classic insurgencies.19 The government initiatives can easily propagandize coalition in the Afghanistan experiment will
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continue to pour treasure and talent into these efforts. Nevertheless, until the Afghan government can address the needs of the average citizen in a way that marginalizes the current powerbrokers, and until the coalition understands how to influence the decisive terrain in the valley, there will be little progress. Unfortunately, the whole-of-government concept never made it off of the paper and into practice, at least not in 2008 or 2009. As a result, then, shape, clear, hold, and build could not work as envisioned. Rather than pulling on the multiple needs with a strong braided rope, the government offered a few strands pulling in different directions, on different problems, for different purposes. Military planners, on the other hand, charged on with implementing FDD, little realizing that their single strand of police training/reform meant little without the braided strength of all the other needed efforts. As a result, even well-intentioned efforts were expended piecemeal and ultimately consumed in the larger tragedy of Bala Morghab district and Afghanistan. PRISM Notes 1 E.D. Swinton (later Major General Sir Ernest Swinton), “The Defence of Duffer’s Drift,” Infantry Journal, April 1905, available at
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wired as an IED or not. It was all that Regional Command–West (RC–W) had at the time, and operations elsewhere in theater precluded any RCP from being transferred temporarily to RC–W. As recently as October 2010, the Italian army remains interested in acquiring a more robust route clearance capability. 12 Close air support, with a mixed ISAF–U.S. force, was at this time an entire tragi-comedy—a deba- cle—unto itself. ISAF, operating under its rules of engagement (ROE), has far more restrictive guidelines (self-defense only) than U.S. forces, which operated at that time under Operation Enduring Freedom ROEs. This created enormous friction when U.S. forces were in close combat with Afghan National Army forces against enemy forces and requesting close air support, which was (in RC–W) exclusively controlled by the ISAF tactical air controller. More than once, bombs would not drop because the controller himself did not believe he had the authority based on “self-defense,” while Embedded Training Team members were in serious danger of being overrun. 13 In the shape phase of the strategy, the United States and its allies and partners conduct reconnaissance to identify the key leaders, key infrastructure, tribal dynamics, and tribal relationship with the Afghan govern- ment, as well as the economic status of a given area. Clearly, the Afghan government and ISAF failed to realize or implement this. See Anthony H. Cordesman, “‘Shape, Clear, Hold, and Build’: The Uncertain Metrics of the Afghan War” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2009), available at
136 | From the field PRISM 3, no. 1 Iraq A Case Study in Building Civil-Military Capacity, 2007–2010
By Bradford Baylor, Jeanne Burington, Bradford Davis, and Russell Goehring
he United States is currently facing a wide range of complex threats that require a combina- tion of unique resources and responses beyond those that a single U.S. Government depart- T ment or agency can provide. Despite the wealth of capabilities and expertise spread through- out the government, its departments and agencies generally do not plan and execute together to achieve the best effect. Lessons from multiple U.S. operations point to this core deficiency, described as “the inability to apply and focus the full resources and capabilities of the [United States] in a con- certed and coherent way.”1 The combined differences in organizational structure, mandates, authori- ties, culture, and overall purpose provide collective challenges that can cause missed opportunities and disjointed efforts in operations that have an adverse impact on the Nation’s security and interests.2 Operations in Iraq from 2003 through 2006 illustrate this problem. While relationships between senior military and civilian leaders generally improved over time, the different U.S. departments and agencies struggled to bring their respective strengths and resources to bear on the counterin- surgency (COIN) challenges faced in Iraq. The historical competition for leadership between the Department of State and Department of Defense (DOD), as well as the inefficiencies, operational gaps, duplications, and conflicting efforts, were challenges. By late 2006, the coalition’s chance of success in Iraq appeared bleak. Violence against the coalition and different sectarian groups was spiraling out of control, and Iraq seemed on the brink of—or perhaps already engaged in—civil war. Introduction This case study examines the challenges faced by the United States in Iraq from 2007 to 2010 and the ways in which various departments and agencies (primarily DOD and State) learned to work as
Bradford Baylor, Jeanne Burington, Lieutenant Colonel Bradford Davis, USA, and Russell Goehring are Military Analysts in the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis Division at the Joint Staff.
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civil-military teams, progressing from a military unity of purpose, unity of effort, even if there can- lead to a partnership to a civilian lead. This study not be and will not be unity of command. And begins with the 2007 change in U.S. strategy we did set out to achieve that from the very first and leadership and discusses how, during COIN phone call that we had together . . . and then in operations, Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) all the subsequent efforts.”5 headquarters and U.S. Embassy Baghdad laid the In 2007, the vision to integrate civilian and groundwork to unify civil-military efforts. The military efforts into a comprehensive approach study then looks at the forces on the ground: how was communicated and implemented through- they further expanded civil-military partnerships out Iraq. The agreed-upon imperative was the and achieved increased unity of effort. While need to secure the population as a foundation there were many factors that complicated this for progress across all lines of operation. Security mission, success was predicated on MNF–I (later provided the basis for increased confidence, U.S. Forces–Iraq [USF–I]) and civilian-military which facilitated reconciliation, enhanced com- organizations becoming adaptive learning teams munication between the people and government, with leaders who drove change. increased training and mentoring at provincial and local levels, accelerated reconstruction prog- Laying the Groundwork to Unify ress, improved attractiveness for foreign invest- Civil-Military Efforts ment, encouraged the return of displaced persons On January 10, 2007, President George W. (including professionals who had fled the vio- Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq aimed at lence), and accelerated the growth and training of reducing sectarian violence and providing secu- the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). While a measure rity for the Iraqi population.3 In support of this, of security was a necessary foundation for progress President Bush dedicated additional resources, in capacity-building and economic development, including military forces and Provincial improvements in governance and the economy Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The decision supported the sustainment of security gains. was also made to change U.S. senior leadership Senior leaders implemented the COIN strat- in Iraq, replacing Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad egy by disseminating guidance and philosophy to with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and General lower levels. It was not enough to have a new George Casey with General David Petraeus. strategy understood by a few in the Embassy and Both Ambassador Crocker and General MNF–I headquarters—the strategy had to be Petraeus recognized that an integrated, compre- understood and implemented by the military and hensive approach was required in Iraq. This civil- civilian personnel who were on the ground, trans- military integration was not simply a suggestion; lating that strategy into operations and tactics. both senior leaders served as forcing functions to Guidance was disseminated to civilian and mili- ensure that this integration occurred. Ambassador tary staffs and organizations in several ways. One Crocker stated, “Iraq is so complex, the challenge way was through interactive sessions, such as the is so large, and the stakes are so great, that this daily battlefield update assessments and periodic effort obviously cannot be a military effort alone. Campaign Assessment Synchronization Board It cannot be a State Department effort alone. meetings. Although these briefings were both You’ve got to bring everybody in.”4 Furthermore, present prior to 2007, General Petraeus modified General Petraeus stated, “There has to be absolute them from PowerPoint marathons to sessions that
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used fewer slides and included interactive discus- each other’s information.” On the policy side, sions on important issues.6 This change allowed a Ambassador Ries also helped troubleshoot, work- “cross-pollination” of ideas, as well as facilitated ing to resolve problems that the military had dissemination of guidance for all civil-military with civilian agencies in the Iraqi government.10 efforts. Under General Petraeus and Ambassador From 2007 through 2008, MNF–I imple- Crocker, these sessions became more of a joint mented short-term development programs MNF–I and Embassy effort. Moreover, for initia- designed to provide immediate economic and tives where the military and other agencies were governance impact until more sustainable pro- involved, these would be briefed by both a civil- grams could take root. As security improved, ian and a military representative.7 MNF–I efforts became more targeted toward In 2007, the Embassy reorganized to better longer term, sustainable economic develop- coordinate and align the economic initiatives ment. MNF–I attempted to tie its projects and of the various U.S. departments and agencies. resources to larger capacity-building or provin- Prior, the different departments and agencies cial development strategies, working with the all reported individually to the Deputy Chief of Embassy to enable the development of the gov- Mission, which sometimes led to a less than ernment of Iraq, increasing legitimacy in the coordinated effort. As a result of a review by eyes of the population. As the situation stabi- the Department of State Undersecretary for lized even further and the capacity of the Iraqi Management, economic efforts were “clus- government grew, MNF–I forces intentionally tered” under the Coordinator for Economic started to withdraw their resources and “wean” Transition in Iraq (CETI) with the appoint- the Iraqis from support, thereby allowing the ment of Ambassador Charles Ries in July 2007.8 development of the Iraqis’ own capabilities. Ambassador Crocker gave CETI authority over nine U.S. economic agencies at the Embassy9 with oversight for the distribution of assistance security provided the basis for resources from the civilian budgets appropriated increased confidence, which facilitated through the Foreign Assistance Act (such as reconciliation and accelerated the growth Economic Support Funds). CETI’s priority was and training of the Iraqi Security Forces to bring coherence to the U.S. economic strat- egy in Iraq across the different funding streams, assistance activities, policy engagements, and During the summer and fall of 2008, as ministerial capacity-building. CETI facilitated demand for governance and civil services coordination between agencies and aligned the continued to grow, Multi-National Corps– civilian agencies’ efforts with the military efforts. Iraq (MNC–I) formed the civil capacity Joint Ambassador Ries was charged with “ensuring Planning Team to develop the MNC–I civil that civilian assistance implemented by PRTs capacity strategy. This team worked with the or by USAID [U.S. Agency for International Embassy’s Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) Development] was consistent with the mili- and USAID to develop the strategy. The tary programming under CERP [Commander’s objectives were integrated with those of the Emergency Response Program], and that mili- Department of State and its PRTs, stating that tary and civilian personnel benefited from State would be the supported agency for civil
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capacity development in Iraq and that coali- informed of each other’s efforts, and avoided the tion force capacity-building efforts would focus exploitation of potential seams between them. on cementing the security gains made to date.11 Subordinate leaders followed their example by In conjunction with its initial planning for making joint appearances and public statements, Operations Order 09–01, MNC–I formed the enabling a coordinated position that included Civil Capacity Synchronization Board to inte- both political and security considerations.19 grate all civil capacity-building efforts. Regular At the presentation of the Distinguished attendees at this board included U.S. depart- Service Award to both Ambassador Crocker and ments and agencies, MNF–I, OPA, and interna- General Petraeus in October 2008, Secretary of tional organizations such as the United Nations State Condoleezza Rice summarized the civil- Assistance Mission for Iraq.12 military partnership forged in Iraq:
Of course, as both Ambassador Crocker and integration of Iraqi army commanders, General Petraeus would be the first to say, local Iraqi leaders, and Western and they’ve achieved nothing alone and every- Arabic media enhanced the realism and thing together. Indeed, the seamless bond complexity of the training environment that these men have formed is emblematic of the unity of effort that has defined our Further enhancing coordination, the rela- entire civil-military partnership in Iraq dur- tionship between OPA and MNC–I was formal- ing these two years. Aside from working out ized through a Unified Common Plan. This plan of offices that are no more than 30 feet away delineated the support MNC–I would provide from one another, the partnership between OPA as “lead US government agency for civil Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus capacity development in Iraq,” providing a “civil will be studied as a model of counterinsur- capacity common operating picture, shared gency for decades to come. These two lead- expectations, synchronized guidance, and pri- ers have set the tone at the top of Baghdad.20 oritized US resources.”13 It further enabled the Multi-National Division and PRT civil capac- Expanding Civil-Military Unity of ity efforts by defining how each would develop Effort on the Ground related plans at its respective level.14 Senior leadership led by example, presenting In 2009, the USF–I Guidelines for a united front to external audiences whenever Achieving Sustainable Stability directed U.S. possible.15 Ambassador Crocker and General forces to synchronize their efforts with inter- Petraeus16 met jointly with the U.S. National agency partners to strengthen Iraqi political, Security Council, U.S. Congress and its del- economic, diplomatic, and rule of law institu- egations, and the media.17 They also met with tions while avoiding temporary “quick fixes” Iraqi leadership, including a weekly meeting that could undermine long-term institutional with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and weekly viability.21 While strategies, orders, key staff dinners with various other senior Iraqi leaders.18 organizations, and processes were developed to These combined meetings promoted the two support this at MNF–I and Embassy levels, the senior leaders as partners, helped them to be fully forces on the ground faced many challenges
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in further expanding this civil-military unity train the leadership to understand the ins and of effort. outs of border operations. . . .” We also sent U.S. forces preparing to rotate into Iraq for the collective leadership of the brigade and their third or fourth tour found it challenging the battalions to the city of Austin, Texas to to adapt their mindsets to the vastly changed a civil capacity seminar for about three days, conditions of 2009 and beyond. There were working essential services.22 two elements to this mindset change. The first involved the skill sets and understanding Joint and Service training centers adapted required for stability versus COIN operations. training to sustain foundational warfighting skills The second change was probably the hardest— while integrating civil-military operations. The U.S. forces were transitioning from “being in the Combat Training Centers (CTCs) placed an lead” during COIN to “being in support” of civil emphasis on remaining current and integrating entities during stability operations. This neces- lessons learned into rotational force training. sitated changes by unit commanders and military This was achieved through extensive dialogue training commands to physically and mentally with deployed units, routine video teleconfer- prepare forces for the new environment. The ences with senior commanders, deployment of changing training requirements, maintained teams to Iraq to observe the dynamic operating and distributed by the Center for Army Lessons environment first hand, and use of observer train- Learned, were integrated into home station, joint ers with recent combat experience. Integration and Service, and in-theater training programs, of role players, to include Iraqi army command- enabling leaders and units to tailor training to ers, local Iraqi leaders, and Western and Arabic achieve the requisite changes in mindset. media, further enhanced the realism and com- Home station training gave commanders the plexity of the training environment. These opportunity and flexibility to tailor their prede- efforts enabled the CTCs to shape training and ployment training program based on unit needs scenarios to closely reflect the current operating and specific areas of operation. Commanders environment. As one brigade commander noted, also leveraged nontraditional training partners “What we did at the NTC [National Training to assist. Local university, city resources, bor- Center]—we’re doing 90 percent of it here [in der patrol, and the Foreign Service Institute Iraq]. The training base fully supported what were used to educate staffs in understanding the we needed to do here. They were exceptionally breadth and complexity of civil-military opera- adaptable in designing the rotation to train on tions. As a brigade commander noted: what we needed.”23 In-theater training focused on understand- Knowing that we were going to Maysan ing commander’s intent, civil-military team- Province with a large chunk of the Iranian building, and updating situational awareness. border, it was very easy for us to understand The in-theater training by the COIN and we were looking at border enforcement. Stability Operations Center (COINSOC) pro- There are lots of border patrol agents that vided units with regionally focused training, to have rotated into and out of Iraq. So it was include dialects and cultural nuances, as well as easy for us to go to them and say, “Design functional training on topics such as rule of law. for me a three-week program. I can . . . Significantly, the COINSOC experience served
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as a civil-military team-building event between it work is we all have a level of professional- the Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) and ism and competence, and respect for each their respective PRTs and Stability Transition other. It’s probably the best I’ve ever seen Teams, providing a forum for standard operating between a military, certainly a DOD and procedure development and the sharing of best State operation. It’s how it should be, but practices and lessons learned. Finally, the forum it’s nice to see that. I give total credit for that provided an opportunity to receive guidance to the leadership who just insisted this will directly from senior leaders at both USF–I and happen and will be maintained. Not that we the Embassy, promoting a better understanding always agree. If we always agreed then we of the commander’s intent and greater potential probably would not be doing enough work.25 for unity of effort. Commenting on the useful- ness of the COINSOC experience, a PRT lead USF–I embedded some of its personnel stated, “I think the key area for success for us at the Embassy to reinforce planning capacity was going to the COIN Center at COINSOC, where it was critically needed. While USF–I and just getting to know the AAB commander and U.S. divisions worked with the Embassy’s and his guys before they got here. I had my OPA, divisions and brigades worked with PRTs, governance chief . . . and myself at the COIN planning together, developing coherent and Academy. . . . We got things straight right away. achievable goals, and synchronizing short- and . . . We just had to get to know each other, and long-term civil capacity development. The that is why COINSOC was crucial.”24 OPA deputy considered the support provided Finally, it is important to point out that by the military as vital to success: it was not only in the military organizations where mindsets changed. Ambassador Peter [Planning] is not an organic skill set for us Bodde, assistant chief of mission, U.S. Embassy [diplomats]. But the military brings it out Baghdad, opined in late August 2010 how here and it is superb, fantastic. In fact, they changes in both civil and military organizations did such a good job here [at OPA] and we produced a unity of effort and results that were were so proud of that work. . . . [I]t was the best he had ever seen: such a huge force enabler that we sat down with [Embassy] management and identified But now, we’re in a different phase, a tran- other problems [where we needed planning sition phase and we’re coming to a whole help]. We asked for more of these [planners]. new mindset. I think, certainly on the DOD And they [USF–I] said, “Sure, we’ll put side, the leadership that’s been here the last them on loan to you guys. . . .” I don’t know year, all of our interlocutors, they came what we would have done without them.26 here knowing that their job was to transi- tion, to come up with the Joint Campaign U.S. forces expanded the reach and rein- Plan, to come up with their part of the forced the capacity of the PRTs to enable the Strategic Framework Agreement and how development of Iraqi institutions. The civil- that’s implemented. We’re doing the same. military team of division-brigade-PRT helped But this is new stuff in government. It’s sort the Iraqi provincial governments, local govern- of a brave new world. I think what makes ments, and ISF connect with the population
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to better understand local issues and concerns. PRT capacity and enhance civil capacity-building Major General Terry Wolff, commanding general efforts.29 All of these ventures allowed Iraqis to see of U.S. Division–Center, amplified, “We call this for themselves the advantages that certain con- the ‘connective tissue effort’ where it is a . . . cepts and technologies could bring to bear. trinity, where you got the governor, military, and U.S. forces’ support of the Embassy and people, and we are in the center. And, we and PRTs strengthened American influence with the PRT are trying to connect all these pieces Iraqi officials. The AABs provided regular, together, but ultimately we want our linkage to secure transport for PRTs, which enabled fre- fade out; we want them to connect to each other quent civilian engagements with the local and and they are starting to do that now.”27 provincial leaders, helping build trust, relation- These “connective tissue” building efforts ships, and connective tissue. were catalysts for creating a demand for good Moreover, AAB expertise and resources governance from within the population. Crucial were used to complement PRT governance, eco- efforts included facilitating and building relation- nomic, and rule of law efforts, enhancing influ- ships between the Iraqis themselves (government ence with the Iraqis. As one PRT lead noted: officials, ISF, and the people) and having Iraqis work within their own framework and processes. The way we are doing the tasks now, they As one State Department official noted: can’t be solely done by civilians. Every movement, every project, every initiative [We are] creating a demand in the popu- that I do comes from the intellectual con- lation for good governance. That demand crete of the brigade. . . . We have [the mil- from the population, if we get this right, itary] in our governance suite downtown. will be a continuing influence that years of So their next-door neighbor is the governor future Iraqi governments, both local and himself. If he needs something, he walks national, is going to have to contend with. into the [PRT] governance section. . . . So what they are doing is creating an expec- That’s where the coordination needs to hap- tation in the people of Iraq for what a gov- pen, not between the PRT and [Brigade ernment does. And long after we are gone, Combat Team], but between the [Iraqi if we can get this right, governments of Iraq government] and [U.S. Government]. are going to have to satisfy that demand.28 By merging all of the [PRT and military] functions to the greatest extent possible, we Brigades and PRTs helped increase the focused all our coordination.30 capacity of Iraqi provincial governance, enabling enhanced public services and economic opportu- The use of CERP funds became more nities for the population. The use of demonstra- focused on supporting civil capacity devel- tion projects, such as greenhouses, center pivot opment. The divide narrowed between using and drip irrigation, and grain silos, achieved high these funds to sustain security gains versus return on investment in terms of civil capacity the civilian development community focus development. In addition, there were numerous on longer term, large-scale projects involving examples of division- and brigade-specific exper- improvements to national Iraqi infrastructure. tise (engineering, legal, medical) used to reinforce The Embassy and USF–I, as well as the PRTs
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Soldiers and Iraqi civilians set up donated playground equipment at school in Abraham Jaffas U.S. Navy (Michael Larson)
and brigades, achieved a balance between these two competing priorities. As security improved, forces were able to be more discriminating with CERP by funding projects tied to a long-term development strategy. U.S. forces also aligned their efforts with interagency, international, and nongovernmental orga- nizations for long-term sustainment and development. With the Embassy in the lead, USF–I supported and reinforced planning, execution, and assessment efforts. The Joint Campaign Plan (U.S. Embassy and USF–I) and Unified Common Plans (PRT and brigade or division) were the guiding documents used, all of which greatly facilitated a whole-of-government approach and unity of effort among all interagency organizations involved. In support of the United Nations, USF–I provided critical logis- tics, security, and movement of United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq personnel, enabling its humanitarian, reconstruction, development, human rights, and political assistance missions. Conclusion While conducting COIN operations during the period 2007–2008, the United States laid the groundwork necessary to better unify civil-military efforts. Relationships, orders, staff organizations,
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and processes were developed at the USF–I and Embassy levels that resulted in enhanced civil-military capacity. As Operation Iraqi Freedom transitioned from COIN to stability operations, the civilian- military teams on the ground further expanded civil-military partnerships and unity of effort. While there were many factors that complicated this mission, success was predicated on MNF–I (later USF–I) and civilian-military organizations becoming adaptive learning teams with leaders who drove change. Today, although much has been accomplished, Iraq remains a fragile state with an uncertain future. Emma Sky, the chief political advisor to General Raymond Odierno from 2008 to 2010, recently cautioned:
Under the terms of the [Strategic Framework Agreement], the United States should continue to encourage reconciliation, help build professional civil service and nonsectarian institutions, promote the establishment of checks and balances between the country’s parliament and its executive branch, and support the reintegration of displaced persons and refugees. Should Washington fail to provide such support, there is a risk that Iraq’s different groups may revert to violence to achieve their goals, and that the Iraqi government may become increasingly authoritarian rather than democratic.31
Best Practices for Unifying Civil-Military Efforts What follows is a summary of the best practices for unifying civil-military efforts from 2007– 2010. The elements described provide a framework for a whole-of-government approach for other complex contingency operations, and can point to potential ways to institutionally improve inter- agency coordination from the theater to tactical level. Civil-military coordination between MNF–I/USF–I and the U.S. Embassy was facilitated by:
❖❖ Proximity: Being physically collocated helped build relationships and understanding. ❖❖ Open communication: Honest, detailed discussions facilitated the sharing of information and helped work through any remaining friction. ❖❖ Inclusivity: Everyone was expected to participate, and efforts were made to ensure all voices were heard. ❖❖ A focus on complementary capabilities: Everyone brought his or her strengths to the endeavor to fill gaps in capability or support others’ capabilities. ❖❖ Understanding: Appreciation of and sensitivity to cultures and capabilities enabled devel- opment of innovative approaches. ❖❖ Choosing the right personnel: High-caliber, experienced personnel were aggressively recruited and then empowered for success. The planning process provided a common understanding of the direction to be taken and cemented relationships among staff and organizations. The resulting organizational agility allowed MNF–I and the Embassy to adapt to the environment, facilitate cooperation, and thicken limited resources.
U.S. efforts attempted to balance long-term development and short-term support to the popula- tion. The appropriate balance of efforts changed over time and by location, depending on the nature
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of the operating environment. Additionally, and provincial leadership. Personal engage- as host nation capacity improved, increasing ment (that is, face-to-face meetings) was used emphasis was placed on supporting the host to apply integrated, civil-military leverage in nation in its reconstruction and economic order to combat sectarianism, corruption, and development. When the environment was malign influences. Sectarian actors, policies, and kinetic, local short-term projects predominated, programs were countered by private and public trying to generate immediate jobs to provide an persuasion of the responsible leadership, enabled alternative to population support to the insur- with corroborating intelligence and information. gency. When security conditions improved, The quality of partnerships drove the effective- projects tended to support longer term growth ness and the ability to influence. and development. CERP funding was aligned MNF–I/USF–I and the U.S. Embassy lever- with PRT goals without undermining nascent aged a variety of sources to maintain situational host nation institutions. As Iraqi government awareness across the political, military, eco- capacity improved, coalition efforts focused nomic, social, information, and infrastructure more on enabling the host nation government’s domains. Ongoing assessments developed a com- economic development efforts. prehensive understanding of the changing envi- ronment. Sources contributing to these assess- when security conditions improved, ments included media, counterterrorism forces, Human Terrain Teams, key leader engagements, projects tended to support longer term routine interaction with host nation partners, growth and development bilingual bicultural advisors, and PRTs. Extensive efforts were made to strengthen Kinetic and nonkinetic activities (referred ties between the Iraqi national government and to later as nonlethal targeting) were mutually its provincial entities. Some approaches brought supporting. Securing the population provided Iraqi government representatives into the prov- a necessary foundation for other improvements inces for conferences and discussions with local in governance and economic development. leaders while other approaches enabled local Improvements in governance and economic leaders to meet face-to-face with government development sustained security gains. officials in Baghdad. While unity of command could not be Embassy and coalition representatives achieved, civil-military cooperation estab- worked with the Iraqi government to further lished unity of effort in building Iraqi govern- economic progress in the country while PRTs ment legitimacy. This unity of effort was further and lower echelon coalition forces worked enhanced by civilian and military leaders at all micro-economic initiatives to improve condi- levels appearing together before all audiences. tions in their local areas. Regular engagements, both formal and informal, While the United States wanted to help built relationships and encouraged adoption of set the conditions for economic development, it policies consistent with coalition goals. Senior recognized that it was best to let the Iraqis do as Embassy and coalition leaders regularly met with much as they could. This increased Iraqi capacity senior Iraqi leadership. Similarly, brigades and and built legitimacy in the eyes of the popula- PRT personnel regularly met with local, district, tion. In 2007, U.S. and coalition representatives
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began to take a more advisory and supporting role to the Iraqis. As capacity and capability improved, the coalition and Embassy encouraged the Iraqi government and ISF to do as much as they could, while supporting them with enabling capabilities to fill gaps. U.S. entities engaged with the Iraqi government to influence legal framework, policy, central banking, justice, and trade.32 From the beginning of the implementation of the Security Framework Agreement on January 1, 2009, through the end of combat operations on August 31, 2010, there were multiple critical transitions taking place simultaneously and sequentially. These transitions were related to the evolv- ing mission, the ever-changing operational environment, bilateral agreements between the United States and Iraq, normal rotational unit relief in place/transfer of authority events, redeployment of a significant portion of the force, consolidation of headquarters staffs, and the election and seat- ing of new Iraqi officials. While many of the transitions were time-based, USF–I and the Embassy worked diligently to create the conditions required to make the transitions seamless. The conditions and drivers of instability differed from region to region, necessitating varying transition timelines. Strategic guidance and operational orders established transition priorities. Military staffs, working jointly with the U.S. Embassy, ensured plans were detailed yet flexible enough to be adjusted in the midst of the evolving strategic environment. Each line of operation in the Joint Campaign Plan was analyzed, and the civil-military team determined whether each task, program, project, or relationship would be terminated, completed, transitioned to the Iraqi govern- ment, or transformed into a U.S. Embassy responsibility. These efforts identified more than 1,500 functions and/or activities for transfer to other entities. The civil-military team, seeking to control the narrative, aggressively managed expectations and perceptions. This was accomplished by jointly articulating intentions to U.S. forces, civilian partners, host nation partners and population, regional audiences, and the American public. U.S. forces adopted the mantra “words are weapons”—using specific, clearly defined language to avoid miscommunication. Whenever possible, civil-military teams jointly engaged host nation leadership from strategic/national levels to tactical/local levels. This produced strong, trust-based relationships with host nation partners in order to influence and work through crises. PRISM Notes 1 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA), Transition to Sovereignty, Joint Lessons Learned for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, April 2007 (not releasable to the general public). 2 For a discussion and analysis of the impediments to achieving civil-military unity of effort, see Christopher J. Lamb and Edward Marks, Chief of Mission Authority as a Model for National Security Integration, Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, No. 2 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, December 2010); and Robert Egnell, Complex Peace Operations and Civil-Military Relations: Winning the Peace (New York: Routledge, 2009). 3 President George W. Bush, “President Bush’s Address to Nation on U.S. Policy in Iraq,” transcribed in The New York Times, January 11, 2007. 4 Ryan C. Crocker, interview by JCOA, January 11, 2009. 5 David H. Petraeus, “Remarks at the Presentation of the Distinguished Service Award,” U.S. Department of State, October 6, 2008. 6 David H. Petraeus, interview by JCOA, January 11, 2009.
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7 Former executive officer to commanding general, Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I), interview by JCOA, January 30, 2009. 8 Patrick Kennedy, interview by JCOA, February 27, 2009. 9 Those agencies were State Economics Office, Iraq Transition Assistance Office, Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, Transportation, Energy, Health, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. 10 Former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, interview by JCOA, February 11, 2009. 11 Scott F. Donahue and Daniel L. Higgins, “Building Civil Capacity in Iraq,” Engineer: Professional Bulletin of Army Engineers 39, no. 2, May–August 2009. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Former executive officer to commanding general. 16 Later, General Raymond T. Odierno, when he replaced General Petraeus as MNF–I commanding general. 17 Director, CJ9, MNF–I, interview by JCOA, December 9, 2008. 18 Former executive officer to commanding general. 19 Director, CJ9, MNF–I. 20 Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks at the Presentation of the Distinguished Service Award,” U.S. Department of State, October 6, 2008. 21 Raymond T. Odierno, “Guidelines for Achieving Sustainable Stability,” May 3, 2009. 22 Peter Newell, interview by JCOA, May 11, 2010. 23 Commander, 1/3 Infantry Division Advise and Assist Brigade, interview by JCOA, August 21, 2010. 24 Mr. Stewart, PRT Team Lead, Salah ad Din Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), interview by JCOA, February 2, 2010. 25 Peter Bodde, interview by JCOA, August 18, 2010. 26 Deputy, Office of Provincial Affairs, U.S. Embassy Baghdad, interview by JCOA, August 16, 2010. 27 Terry Wolff, interview by JCOA, August 14, 2010. 28 Deputy Director, Political-Military Affairs Iraq Desk, U.S. Department of State, interview by JCOA, July 9, 2010. 29 Ms. Malzhan, North Baghdad embedded PRT Lead, interview by JCOA, February 3, 2010; and PRT Lead, Kirkuk PRT, interview by JCOA, February 4, 2010. 30 PRT Lead, Kirkuk PRT. 31 Emma Sky, “Iraq, From Surge to Sovereignty,” Foreign Affairs, March–April 2011. 32 CJ9 Economics Division, MNF–I, interview by JCOA, November 10, 2008.
150 | LEsSONS LEARNED PRISM 3, no. 1 This is an unexpected conclusion because Book Review Patrick starts off well, citing prominent foreign policy leaders on both sides who have warned of Weak Links: Fragile States, the dangers of failing states, including George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Condoleezza Rice, Robert Global Threats, and Gates, Hillary Clinton, and former Chairman of International Security the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen. By Stewart Patrick Nevertheless, Patrick thinks they are all wrong. Oxford University Press, 2011 He states, “The relationship between state fragility 352 pp., $29.95 and transnational threats is more complicated and ISBN: 978-0-19975-151-8 contingent than the conventional wisdom would suggest.” He coolly declares that “globally, most fragile states do not present significant security risks, except to their own people.” Reviewed by Pauline H. Baker Patrick is a respected foreign affairs analyst with the Council on Foreign Relations. Some years back, when he was working at the Center magine a debate erupting in the United States for Global Development, he collaborated with over how much the government should invest United Nations Ambassador Susan Rice, then Iin cancer research. (Such a debate might well with the Brookings Institution, to produce an emerge from the budget cutting that we are going Index of State Weakness in the Developing to face over the next few years.) One school of World. In his new book, Patrick uses this index thought argues that we should continue to fund to explore the relationship of state fragility and the research generously because men have about five major issues: transnational terrorism, prolif- a 1 in 2 chance of developing cancer at some point eration of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in their lives, and women have a 1 in 3 chance. transnational crime, energy security, and infec- Impressive statistics, says the other side, but while tious disease. Unfortunately, in trying to quantify millions may contract cancer, the actual num- linkages, he misses the forest for the trees, making ber of cancer deaths is estimated to be less than several conceptual and methodological mistakes. 600,000 in 2011. Millions of Americans may suffer To begin, Patrick applies an American and we should make them comfortable, but cancer yardstick to the analysis, even though he asserts is not an existential threat to America. We need that he is looking at state fragility “globally.” not continue funding the search for a cure. Repeatedly, he makes his assessments on the Stewart Patrick’s book on fragile or failing basis of how state fragility affects U.S. security states is the national security equivalent of the interests, giving little significance to its impact “it’s-not-so-bad-after-all” school of thought. on other states, regions, peoples, and world And it is equally unpersuasive. order generally.
Pauline H. Baker is President Emeritus of The Fund for Peace. She led several programs focused on state fragility, including the development of The Failed States Index, an annual global index of 177 states that has been produced by The Fund for Peace and published in Foreign Policy since 2005.
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Second, he claims that he has a new for other periods. There are no trend lines. In approach: he matches the five transnational sum, Patrick’s conclusions are based on skewed issues with the countries that have the worse evidence collected at one point in time. rankings in his index. This is a new, but not In addition, Patrick makes his judgments necessarily better, approach. Eleven others based on a single calculation: whether there is are mentioned in a brief boxed insert entitled a statistical correlation between the number “Existing Attempts to Define and Measure State of fragile states in the bottom two quintiles of Weakness,” all of which are dismissed in a page his index and the number of incidents or links and a half. It looks as if Patrick inserted this as occurring in each of the five transnational an afterthought to cover possible anticipated issues. This is quantitative analysis at its weak- criticism that his analysis ignores insights from est, for it ignores qualitative differences among other research, which, in effect, it does. the states and threats. For example, it might be Third, while his approach is original, his useful to compare aggregate criminal incidents conclusions are overly simplistic, based on of transnational crime in different states as a an index that, for these purposes, is flawed. proxy indicator of potential WMD smuggling A summary chart of the Patrick-Rice Index opportunities. However, a low correlation does (sometimes referred to as the Brookings Index) not necessarily mean a low threat potential. lists three categories of state fragility: the “truly After all, only one successful incident of signifi- failed and critically weak states,” “weak states,” cant nuclear, biological, or chemical smuggling and “states to watch.” However, the criteria by is needed for a catastrophic incident to take which Patrick matches the links between the place. To be of value to policymakers, research- three categories and the five issues are not alto- ers have to find the unexpected and unpredict- gether clear. For example, he asserts that “weak able events, not limit themselves exclusively but functioning states” are the most hospitable to the typical or frequent ones that we already and preferable environments for those who know about. want to foster disorder in the world, but he does There are also major blind spots. One typi- not say whether he means that they target the cal shortcoming is Patrick’s tendency to confuse “weak states,” the “states to watch,” or both. “strong states” with “strongman states.” Strong The lack of clarity stems in part from the states have legitimate, competent, and repre- fact that the index is selective and static— sentative institutions that can manage soci- selective in that it leaves out stable, strong, ety’s problems peacefully, without an external and well-performing states, including states administrative or military presence. Strongman from the developed world, and static in that states, on the other hand, may appear to be it was produced using data from 2008 (or the strong due to authoritarian tactics and large next closest year) and was produced only once. security forces, but they are really weak and Thus, not only is the sample too narrow, but often brittle entities, held together by corrupt the timeframe is also too short to make the kind dictators, oligarchs, or thugs who deliberately of generalizations contained in this book. The undermine institutions that are not personally index does not tell us whether there has been loyal to them. State institutions cannot govern improvement or deterioration in these states, or successfully once the strongmen are removed— whether the observations and findings are valid through revolutions, coups, assassinations,
152 | Book Review PRISM 3, no. 1 Baker
popular uprisings, invasions, or death by natu- Patrick states that “Arguably, the only ral causes. Things tend to fall apart when they weak states that could pose a direct military go. Before the Arab Spring, many would have threat to the United State are North Korea classified Egypt as a strong, albeit authoritar- and Pakistan.” Technically, this is true if one ian, state. Actually, it was a strongman state definesdirect military threat as a full-scale nuclear that was weak at the core, similar to the Soviet attack on our homeland, but that is a 20th-cen- Union, Yugoslavia, and many others. Not all tury definition. Besides 9/11—a direct military strongman states are destined to collapse or dis- attack on our homeland that originated from a integrate, but they all contain the seeds of their failed state—there are more potential threats own downfall if they do not adopt reforms or from states such as Iran and China. Although initiate fundamental change before those seeds neither is likely to launch a full-scale direct germinate. By that time, the risk of collapse will nuclear attack on the United States anytime be much greater, and the nature of the change soon, they could be dangerous adversaries in will likely be more violent. other ways and under other conditions. Then In every one of the five transnational issues there are threats that come in the form of rogue examined, Patrick concludes that the threat or complicit groups and individuals in weak and may be real, but it does not come directly from failing states, such as Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan, the weakest of the weak, as is so often assumed. who, alone or in concert with government offi- On WMD proliferation, for example, he states cials, supplied nuclear know-how and materials that it is not failing states that offer opportuni- to North Korea and Libya. In the 21st century, ties for proliferation. Rather, “the most prob- we face complex challenges including “threat lematic group of countries may be relatively convergence”—where the multiple threats of ‘strong states to watch’ that have or seek nuclear weak and fragile states, WMD proliferation, and weapons capabilities.” In his framework, states terrorism overlap. This is a difficult concept to to watch are defined as the more functional ones measure statistically, but it presents serious dan- that still perform poorly in the bottom quintile gers nonetheless. of his index in at least two areas of state perfor- Patrick observes that “weak states do have mance. This is where things get confusing. Such certain vulnerabilities that proliferators might states, he argues, may include fragile democracies attempt to exploit,” but that “globally, . . . state and authoritarian regimes, as well as regionally fragility does not uniformly correlate with prolif- or globally significant counties such as Russia, eration potential” (emphasis added). Does any China, Egypt, India, Venezuela, and Turkey. correlation apply “uniformly”? Is that sufficient There is some truth to this observation, but reason to invalidate the association entirely? On Patrick underestimates the dangers of nuclear whether weak states attract terrorists, Patrick smuggling in fragile states, which are quite real. similarly writes, “with the important exception Border guards can be bought, illicit transactions of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, weak states are common, smuggling is endemic, and terrorist do not appear to have provided disproportionally financing can be used to transfer nuclear materi- large pools of recruits or targets for recent terror- als. In ungoverned or poorly governed territories, ism operations” (emphasis added). What, exactly, there is little law enforcement and meager adher- constitutes “disproportionally large”? And why ence to international norms of nonproliferation. should Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan be seen
PRISM 3, no. 1 Book Review | 153 baker
as exceptions and not prototypes that can be imi- And so it goes with each of the five tated elsewhere? How does he know the recruits threats, including energy security, transna- who flocked to Iraq have not dispersed to other tional crime, and infectious diseases. None, areas? Patrick tries to cover himself with rhetori- in Patrick’s view, rises to the level of being cal qualifications throughout the book, stating linked to state fragility in a significant way. In that correlations are imperfect, threats are not each instance, Patrick cites situations in which disproportionally large, and conclusions about linkages might be made, and they may even be future dangers are exaggerated. serious, but then he turns around and debunks Equally thin assertions about fragile states his own initial analysis, concluding that, over- and transnational terrorism generally are based all, they are insignificant. only on al Qaeda and its affiliates, excluding The book is strongest when the focus is on all other terrorist organizations. Like his con- the qualitative description of the five transna- clusion on WMD proliferation, he finds that tional threats. Indeed, if readers were to ignore “rather than truly failed states, what terror- the simplistic correlations, subjective excep- ists [read al Qaeda] and other illicit transna- tions, selectivity of the sample, static nature tional groups find most conducive are weak of the data, and rhetorical qualifications, they but functional states,” such as Pakistan and would get a better understanding of the real Afghanistan. Putting aside the questionable world threats facing us today. Indeed, the notion that these two countries are “functional analysis of the five issues is so strong, and states,” the main problem with this view is that the linkages with state fragility so evident, it is outdated. Terrorism experts argued this that most readers would gain real value from line for years, but it appears to have grown out reading these sections that can stand on their of fashion. Experience shows that al Qaeda and own. Nevertheless, in the end, these readers its affiliates use whatever territory offers them are likely to come to very different conclusions the freedom to operate, even if they are bas- from those of the author. ket cases that provide more difficult environ- Despite downplaying the threat, Patrick ments. Somalia and Yemen, two “truly failed ends on a solid note. He maintains rightly that and critically weak states,” are regarded by the the United States should have a national strat- U.S. Government as containing the greatest egy toward weak and failing states. It would terrorist threats since the death of Osama bin have been preferable for him to have examined Laden. If that is so, then Patrick is pointing how to construct such a strategy, and what its us in the wrong direction. Al Qaeda may be central components should be, than simply call- in retreat from its traditional strongholds, but ing for one after discrediting the importance of its affiliated groups have metastasized. In any the issue. event, a blanket statement disassociating ter- Weak and failing states represent a new rorism and state fragility does not hold when class of states whose internal weaknesses so many other terrorist organizations, such as became evident after the Cold War, when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia superpowers lost interest in propping up foreign (FARC), Shining Path, Jemaah Islamiya, proxies. Their internal weaknesses had existed Hizbollah, and Lashkar-e Tayyiba, are omitted for decades, but they were suppressed by local from the analysis. leaders and papered over by external allies. “Big
154 | Book Review PRISM 3, no. 1 Baker
men” in weak states ruled as tsars for decades, surviving in a bipolar world by exploiting the wider competition between the superpowers who did not want to rock the boat by pointing out human rights abuses and exposing oppression by allies. The time for tolerating such state pathology is fast running out. The Arab Spring is but one byproduct of that trend. Others will follow, at least for the next decade or two, as the growing pressures from globalization, youth bulges, economic hardship, inequality, mass migrations, international trade, information technology, and popular discontent combine to sweep away dictatorial rule. The results of festering state fragility will be seen in many ways, from famines, natural disasters, and other humanitarian disasters that overwhelm local authori- ties, to popular uprisings, extremist movements, and regime changes that will shake the world’s power structures. To ignore or dismiss state fragility is to invite more human tragedies and violent unrest, which will affect the security and well-being of strong states as well as weak ones and transform the nature of the international political order. A U.S. global strategy toward state fragility need not require significant new resources. It simply requires smarter investment of existing resources, a shared and coordinated international response, solid early warning techniques, culturally sensitive and well-timed interventions, and, most of all, a core group of officials committed to addressing the problem with enlightened leadership. The last thing we need is an Alfred E. Neuman who says, “What, me worry?” PRISM
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