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''L'impuissance De La Puissance?'': L'action Des Militaires Américains En Irak

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''L'impuissance De La Puissance?'': L'action Des Militaires Américains En Irak ”L’impuissance de la puissance ?” : l’action des militaires américains en Irak (2003-2008) Stéphane Taillat To cite this version: Stéphane Taillat. ”L’impuissance de la puissance ?” : l’action des militaires américains en Irak (2003- 2008). Histoire. Université Paul Valéry - Montpellier III, 2013. Français. NNT : 2013MON30003. tel-00834637 HAL Id: tel-00834637 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00834637 Submitted on 17 Jun 2013 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. UNIVERSITE MONTPELLIER III- PAUL VALERY ECOLE DOCTORALE LANGUES, LITTERATURES, CULTURES, CIVILISATIONS DOCTORAT D’HISTOIRE MILITAIRE Stéphane TAILLAT « L’impuissance de la puissance ? » : l’action des militaires américains en Irak (2003-2008) Thèse dirigée par monsieur Jacques ABEN, Professeur des universités, Montpellier I Soutenue le 15 février 2013 Jury : (par ordre alphabétique) Monsieur Jacques ABEN, professeur des universités, Montpellier I Monsieur le général d’armée (2S) Elrick IRASTORZA, ancien CEMAT (expert) Monsieur Michel-Louis MARTIN, professeur des universités, Toulouse I-Capitole, (rapporteur) Monsieur Frédéric RAMEL, professeur des universités, Paris XI-Sud (rapporteur) Monsieur Frédéric ROUSSEAU, professeur des universités, Montpellier III-Paul Valery 1 « L’impuissance de la puissance ? » l’action des militaires américains en Irak (2003- 2008) : L’invasion et l’occupation de l’Irak ont montré les capacités des Etats-Unis de renverser un ordre politique, et les difficultés d’en construire un à leur profit. Le postulat de départ de la présente recherche consiste à s’interroger sur les effets produits par la présence américaine en Irak. Ceux-ci ne peuvent être analysés indépendamment des logiques qui en sont à l’origine ni de l’interaction avec de multiples acteurs. C’est donc à une analyse stratégique que cette interrogation invite : analyse du raisonnement, de l’articulation entre fins, voies et moyens, mais aussi de l’interdépendance entre les actions américaines et celles des acteurs irakiens. A cette aune, l’histoire militaire devient l’occasion d’une étude sociologique de l’utilisation de la force ainsi que des rapports entre sphères politiques et militaires. D’autre part, l’inscription des actions militaires dans un contexte sociopolitique dynamique porte à se poser la question du rôle joué par la coercition dans l’établissement d’un ordre politique au niveau local. Plus largement enfin, cette thèse interroge les prétentions des Etats occidentaux et de la communauté internationale à promouvoir un ordre libéral dans un contexte de consolidation de l’Etat. Mots clés : contre-insurrection, insurrection, Etats-Unis, puissance, Opération Iraqi Freedom (2003-2011), coercition, maintien de la paix, imposition de la paix, consolidation de l’Etat, réforme du secteur de la sécurité, relations civilo-militaire, George W. Bush. « Is power powerless ? » US military actions in Iraq (2003-2008): The US invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq seem to highlight the capability of the United States to overthrow a given political order as well as the difficulties in building another order more favorable to their interests. That research is premised on the analytical necessity to interrogate the effects produced by the American presence in Iraq. Indeed, the effects of military actions cannot be studied independently from their underlying logic. In addition, one has to take into account the dialectical interaction between US military actions and those of the various actors at play in Iraq. Hence a strategic analysis, drawing on the Clausewitzian strategic theory and encompassing the reasoning, the articulation between ends, ways and means, and the interplay between the US and Iraqi actors. In the light of this analysis, military history gives way to a more sociological study of the use of force and of the civil-military relations. Furthermore, as military actions are inscribed in a broader and dynamic sociopolitical context, it is necessary to question the role of coercion in building a political order at the local level. At a higher level, this study questions Western States’ and international community’s claims to promote a liberal order in a context of state consolidation. Keywords: counterinsurgency, insurgency, United States, power, Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2011), coercion, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, state building, security sector reform, civil-military relations, George W. Bush. Université Montpellier III-Paul Valery/Site Saint Charles, 34199 Montpellier Cedex 5 France 2 Remerciements Réaliser une thèse est une expérience transformatrice, particulièrement lorsqu’on la débute à plus de trente ans. Outre l’aspect académique de ce travail, le processus de recherche, et plus encore de rédaction, s’apparente à la quête de la pierre philosophale, qui modifie davantage le chercheur que son objet d’étude. Au terme de cette recherche, je ne saurais donc mieux exprimer ma satisfaction intellectuelle, morale et personnelle sans remercier tous ceux qui l’ont rendue possible. Ma gratitude et mon admiration vont d’abord à ces officiers et civils américains déployés en Irak qui ont accepté de m’aider en me confiant leurs interrogations, leurs expériences. Certains sont devenus des amis personnels, et je garde jalousement le secret de l’anonymat de plusieurs d’entre eux. Qu’il me soit cependant permis de remercier chaleureusement Douglas Ollivant, Gian Gentile, Ahmed Hashim, Andrew Exum, John Nagl et Peter Mansoor. Je n’oublie pas non plus les conseils avisés de Franck Hoffman. Outre les militaires, j’exprime ma gratitude à tous ceux avec qui je suis entré en contact de l’autre côté de l’Atlantique et qui ont partagé mes questionnements. Nos débats ont profondément influencé ma réflexion : merci donc à Joshua Foust, Jason Fritz, Andrew Lebovich, Adam Elkus, Jacqueline Hazelton, Steven Metz et David Ucko. Même si mon ambition était d’ouvrir une voie, d’autres l’ont défrichée avant moi : je suis particulièrement redevable à Michel Goya, Christian Olsson, Georges-Henri Bricet des Vallons et Myriam Benraad, dont les travaux respectifs ont imprégné nombre de mes réflexions (respectivement sur l’adaptation tactique, la légitimation de la force, les entreprises de guerre et la société irakienne sunnite). Par ailleurs, de nombreuses discussions avec Laure Bardiès, Amaël Cattaruzza, Olivier Kempf, Antoine Roussel, Olivier Schmitt et Florent de Saint-Victor m’ont grandement aidé à préciser des points et à formuler de nouvelles approches. Nos conversations sont la preuve que la connaissance se construit en communauté. Je dois aussi beaucoup à ceux qui m’ont soutenu et permis que ce long travail s’achève enfin. En premier lieu, mes supérieurs : les colonels de Beauregard et Kopecky, messieurs Eric Ghérardi et Ronan Doaré. En second lieu, à Jacques Aben qui m’a poussé à un moment où je n’y croyais plus car il voyait bien que le cadavre bougeait encore. Enfin, à ma maman et à mes beaux-parents dont la confiance n’a jamais failli. Mais cette thèse est aussi le fruit de l’amour, du soutien et de la patience de mon épouse Cécile et de mes enfants : Pierre-Louis, Amaury, Guilhem et Maguelone. Les longues heures passées à lire, à écrire et à correspondre ont pris sur le temps que doit un père, et que doit un mari. En outre, il leur a fallu supporter mes exigences de concentration, de silence et de calme. Cette thèse témoigne de mon amour pour eux, et de mon désir de leur être rendu. 3 PLAN GENERAL INTRODUCTION GENERALE PREMIERE PARTIE : UNE GUERRE LIMITEE ? Chapitre 1 : logique de guerre, logique de paix. La formulation de la stratégie américaine en Irak Chapitre 2 : de la gestion du chaos au maintien de la paix. Stratégies et tactiques américaines en Irak SECONDE PARTIE : LA REVOLUTION IRAKIENNE Chapitre 3 : polarisation et fragmentation de la société irakienne, produits de l’occupation américaine Chapitre 4 : recompositions politiques, sociales et identitaires TROISIEME PARTIE : STABILISATION Chapitre 5 : stabilisation et processus de formation et de consolidation de l’Etat en Irak Chapitre 6 : dilemmes, contraintes et illusions d’une opération extérieure CONCLUSION GENERALE 4 Table des matières Introduction générale : ............................................................................................................................. 8 Section 1 : de l’objet au sujet : .......................................................................................................... 10 La puissance est étroitement dépendante de ses effets : ................................................................ 10 Les effets sont générés parla stratégie : ......................................................................................... 17 La puissance par ses effets : l’utilité de la force en opérations extérieures ................................... 32 Section 2 : cadrage méthodologique et théorique :............................................................................ 44 Théorisation de la recherche : .......................................................................................................
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