A PUBlicAtion of the institUte for the stUdy of WAr And WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A PUBlicAtion of the institUte for the stUdy of WAr And WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM

U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, reviews a map with Capt. Eric Lawless, of the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, at Forward Operating Base Iskandariyah in Iraq on Dec. 25, 2006. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Curt Cashour)

February 14 – June 15, 2007 The Real Surge: Preparing for Operation Phantom Thunder

by KiMBerly Kagan Summary On June 15, 2007, Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno launched the largest coordinated military operation in Iraq since the initial U.S. invasion. The campaign, called Operation Phantom Thunder, aims to expel al Qaeda from its sanctuaries just outside of Baghdad. Denying al Qaeda the ability to fabricate car bombs and transport fi ghters through the rural terrain around Baghdad is a necessary prerequisite for securing the capital city, the overarching military goal for Iraq in 2007. Phantom Thunder consists of simultaneous offensives by U.S. forces throughout central Iraq. The Division north of Baghdad cleared the long-festering city of Baqubah and its outlying areas. The Division east and southeast of Baghdad is clearing the critical al Qaeda stronghold in Arab Jabour, immediately south of the capital. It is also destroying al Qaeda’s ability to transport weapons along the Tigris River and to send reinforcements from the Euphrates to the Tigris. The Division west of Baghdad is clearing al Qaeda’s sanctuaries between Fallujah and Baghdad, all the way to the shores of Lake Tharthar northwest of the capital. Meanwhile, the Division in Baghdad continues to clear important areas of the city and areas to its immediate north and west. Phantom Thunder is not a new strategy or a new plan. U.S. commanders have been preparing Phantom Thunder since the effort to secure Baghdad began in February. General Odierno, who commands Coalition combat forces in Iraq, has been carefully positioning the additional brigades that the President sent to Iraq. General Odierno has, brigade by brigade, encircled Baghdad. U.S. troops have not, literally, cordoned off the city. Rather, General Odierno has stationed Coalition forces on every major supply line, river, or road in a circle around Baghdad. Much of the fi ghting outside of Baghdad between February 15 and June 15 has aimed at positioning U.S. troops in these areas and reconnoitering them. Many of these areas received little or no attention from U.S. combat forces in 2006. Coalition and Iraqi forces have also been securing Baghdad’s vital and unstable neighborhoods before and during Phantom Thunder. General Odierno’s careful disposition of forces inside of Baghdad from February to June has restricted insurgent movement within the city, and has squeezed the enemy into ever smaller operating areas within the capital. As the offensive outside the city continues, it is increasingly diffi cult for the enemy inside the city to receive supplies or reinforcements.

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Mission: Securing the Population population. General Petraeus has interpreted this of Baghdad doctrine in Iraq to mean stationing U.S. troops in Baghdad’s neighborhoods in order to pro- n January 2007, President Bush changed the tect the population constantly. But car bombs, mission of U.S. forces in Iraq to securing the weapons, and fighters often originate outside population of Baghdad from sectarian vio- of Baghdad, rather than in the city itself. Gen- lence. He reinforced American eral Odierno, the commander I of Multi-National Corps-Iraq troops in Iraq and appointed Gen- n As General Odierno eral David Petraeus to command explained: “The areas (MNC-I), therefore considered them. According to Lieutenant surrounding Baghdad, two methods of securing Bagh- General Ray Odierno, who works dad with military forces: “do directly for General Petraeus, the which we refer to as we cut [the enemy] off outside primary goal of military operations the ‘Baghdad belts,’ are of Baghdad, or do we provide in Iraq is: “to create stability and also key to its security.” more security inside?”3 In other security to protect the Iraqi people, Establishing security words, should U.S. forces at- first and foremost in Baghdad. The inside of Baghdad, tempt to establish security by clearing and patrolling the city’s population and the government therefore, also depends of Iraq are the center of gravity.1 neighborhoods? Or should they Creating a stable environment in on preventing enemies secure the capital by eliminat- Baghdad should provide time and from infiltrating into the ing the enemy from safe havens space for the Iraqi government to city. just outside Baghdad? Provid- continue to mature as a govern- ing security within Baghdad ment and continue to build its directly supports the mission of capacity.”2 Establishing security in Baghdad is the protecting its population from sectarian violence, primary military objective for military operations but as General Odierno explained: “The areas in 2007. surrounding Baghdad, which we refer to as the ‘Baghdad belts,’ are also key to its security.”4 Es- tablishing security inside of Baghdad, therefore, The Operational Concept: also depends on preventing enemies from infil- The City and Its Belts trating into the city. The Baghdad belts are residential, agricul- In order to execute this mission, Generals tural, and industrial areas that encircle the city, Petraeus and Odierno had to determine the best and networks of roadways, rivers, and other lines way to use military forces to secure Baghdad. of communication that lie within a twenty or The new counterinsurgency doctrine, written un- thirty mile radius of Baghdad. The enemy, both der the direction of General Petraeus in his previ- al Qaeda and rogue Shia militias, controlled lo- ous role as commander of the Combined Arms cations in the Baghdad belts between 2004 and Center at Fort Leavenworth, emphasizes the 2006. U.S. forces did not contest the enemy’s need to establish and maintain the security of the occupation of the belts in 2006, as General George Casey, then the overall commander of Kimberly Kagan is a military historian who has taught at Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), prioritized the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale University, training the Iraqi Security Forces, rather than us- Georgetown University, and American University. She ing U.S. forces to establish security. As a result of is an affiliate of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies this approach, the enemies of the Coalition and at Harvard University. She is the author of The Eye of the Iraqi government were able to use the ter- Command (University of Michigan Press, 2006), and the rain around Baghdad to project forces and fun- founder and executive director of the new Institute for the nel supplies into the capital, and to move freely Study of War, www.understandingwar.org. around the city into the provinces. As General

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Odierno explained, “Attacks occurring in Bagh- doctrine, maintaining a constant presence in the dad often originate in these outerlying regions. neighborhoods to provide security for the people Sectarian lines begin to blur in these belts, creat- living there. General Odierno established Joint ing a flashpoint for extremists looking to assert Security Stations and Combat Outposts in Bagh- their control over Baghdad. Al Qaeda in Iraq and dad to improve security within the city’s borders. Shi’a extremists want to control these areas.”5 “This continuous presence is making the Iraqi The Iraq Report has already documented the people feel safer and has greatly increased the movement of fighters, weapons, and car bombs amount of information provided to the Iraqi through the southern and northern belts.6 army, police and coalition forces by the public.”8 In addition, General Odierno de- ployed brigades throughout the Bagh- TURKEY dad belts in order to interdict the flow of fighters into the capital. T ig r By the beginning of June, General is R IRAN i Mosul Odierno had encircled Baghdad with v Tal e Afar r Coalition Forces—not literally, with an SYRIA unbroken chain of forces, but rather by placing brigades on every main

IRAQ r e road to and from the city. On June Euphra iv te s R 15, 2007, General Odierno launched R la i a v y e i multiple, simultaneous, offensive op- r D erations around Baghdad in order to Ramadi Falluja disrupt enemies surrounding the city. Baghdad This Corps offensive is called Opera- tion Phantom Thunder.

SAUDI Najaf SettingJORDAN the Conditions ARABIA for a Corps Offensive

The Corps (Multi-National Corps- Iraq) is theEXPAND largest PROGRESS, military unit that DEFEAT AL QAEDA fights in Iraq, and General Odierno 100 miles commands it. The Corps consists of Persianmultiple divisions of U.S. and allied forces. Gulf The Corps offensive comprises KUWAIT

THE WEEKLY STANDARD WEEKLY THE a set of coordinated military opera- tions by all the forces that fight in Iraq. These different operations are General Odierno therefore developed a plan conducted throughout Iraq, but they all aim to improve Baghdad’s security in both the belts at the same overarching goal—in the current and in the city using all of the forces available to case, eliminating the enemy from the belts sur- him as the Corps commander.7 Inside Baghdad, rounding Baghdad and preventing them from U.S. forces flowed from their Forward Operat- re-establishing themselves in or near the city. ing Bases into the neighborhoods, where they A Corps offensive requires months of planning occupied Joint Security Stations and Combat and preparations because so many troops are Outposts, creating a net of small units in the involved, the mission is complex, and different city. They followed the new counterinsurgency Divisions must coordinate their plans and op-

Page  • February 14, 2007 – June 15, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM erations. Planning and preparations for General to follow. These preliminary operations aim to Odierno’s June 15 Corps offensive began in reconnoiter terrain, map enemy behavior, pre- January, when President Bush announced the pare our forces, seize key positions, establish ba- “surge” of troops into Iraq. sic trust relationships with the population, and weaken the enemy where possible. Positioning New Troops Discussions of the “surge” to date have of- ten mistaken preparatory operations (aimed at President Bush committed five more U.S. setting the conditions for a decisive campaign Army brigades and two additional Marine bat- against the enemy) for the decisive operations talions to Iraq in January 2007. The brigades themselves (aimed at accomplishing a larger arrived at the rate of one each month from objective, such as expelling fighters from the February to June. In addition, Baghdad belts or securing the a Marine Expeditionary Unit n Discussions of the population of the capital). The (MEU) arrived in June. “surge” to date have often flow of troops into Baghdad As new forces arrived in mistaken preparatory in February and March; the Iraq during the first half of this fight for Diyala province, the year, General Odierno carefully operations (aimed at southern belt, and eastern An- prepared for “the battle for the setting the conditions for a bar; and the continued clearing belts.” He incorporated each decisive campaign against operations in Baghdad in April new brigade and the MEU into the enemy) for the decisive and May have been preliminary operations as it arrived. He de- operations themselves operations to set the conditions ployed two of the new brigades for one or more major Corps to Baghdad and three to the (aimed at accomplishing offensives. As the Iraq Report belts around the city. During a larger objective, such as has noted in the past, major this deployment, General Odi- expelling fighters from the clearing operations did not erno began preliminary opera- Baghdad belts or securing begin throughout Baghdad in tions to encircle Baghdad and the population of the February, even though brigades to establish U.S. forces within capital). inside Baghdad cleared some the city. These operations set neighborhoods. Rather, many the conditions for the Corps of- operations between mid-Febru- fensive that began on June 15— ary and mid-May set the condi- the coherent operation using all of the resources tions for subsequent clearing operations in and at General Odierno’s command. around Iraq’s capital. Commanders “set the conditions” for deci- General Petraeus described this process as he sive operations by deploying their forces to the discussed the beginning of the Corps offensive theater, establishing bases for the forces, sup- on June 16: “We have been doing what we might plying them, organizing command structures, call shaping operations in a lot of these different reconnoitering the terrain, developing intelli- areas. We’ve been feeling their edges, if you will, gence about the enemy, and creating maneuver doing intelligence gathering, putting in some corridors, for example. These tasks often involve special operators, going in but then coming out. units in combat. Forces moving into areas that And now for the first time we’re really going into the enemy had controlled must often fight to es- a couple of the really key areas in the belt from tablish their new bases. When scouts reconnoiter which, again, al Qaeda has sallied forth with car the new areas, they make contact with the en- bombs, additional fighters and so forth. ...[S]o emy and fight skirmishes. In each case, the pur- we think we can build on what has been done pose of operations is not to fight and eliminate — if you will, the foundation of intelligence and the enemy from an area, but rather to create the base structure and all the rest that has been put preconditions for successful, decisive operations in place over the last several months.”9

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Overview of Preparatory Operations tional troops reinforced the southwestern belt that runs from Sadr al-Yusifiyah to Mahmudiyah. The From January to June 2007, General Odierno new Marine Expeditionary Unit began operating used military forces to set the conditions for deci- northeast of Fallujah and northwest of Baghdad, sive operations in Baghdad and the belts. along the southern shore of Lake Tharthar. Fi- Before Operation Enforcing the Law began in nally, General Odierno re-positioned U.S. forces February, General Odierno used American troops north and west of Baghdad so that they operated to disrupt al Qaeda strongholds in and around as seamlessly as possible through that terrain. Baghdad. U.S. forces fought to enter violent ter- General Odierno’s placement of the additional rain that the enemy had firmly controlled in 2006, brigades secured the particular area in which each such as Haifa Street (Baghdad), Balad Ruz (Di- was located. More importantly, General Odierno yala), and Yusifiyah (southwest of Baghdad). Iraq deployed each brigade with an eye to securing Report I described these initial operations. Baghdad as a whole. If we zoom out and examine General Odierno and his Iraqi counterparts where General Odierno placed all the brigades then began Operation Enforcing the Law. He from February to June, a distinct pattern emerges. moved U.S. forces from their Forward Operat- General Odierno concentrated U.S. forces in ing Bases near the capital to more dispersed Joint two rings around Baghdad, one fifteen to thirty Security Stations in Baghdad. As the new bri- miles outside the city, and the other along the gades arrived, he sent some to Baghdad. He sent city’s circumference. The outer ring runs from the first “surge” brigade, the 2nd Brigade of the Taji (north of Baghdad between the 11 or 12 82nd Airborne Division, rapidly toward Sadr City. o’clock position), clockwise to Tarmiyah (one), (Iraq Report II described these operations.) U.S. Buhriz (two), Besmaya (three), Salman Pak (five), forces within Baghdad reconnoitered their areas Mahmudiyah (six), Sadr al Yusifiyah (eight), Fal- from their Joint Security Stations and cleared the lujah (nine) and Karmah (ten). An inner ring took enemy from key positions that U.S. units needed shape along the circumference of Baghdad itself, to occupy or transverse in order to continue their as troops moved off the FOBs that surround the counterinsurgency operations. They laid the city: Adhamiyah (one-two), Rashid (four-seven), groundwork for conducting future counterinsur- western Mansour (nine-eleven). In addition, gency operations by patrolling neighborhoods troops have fanned out into the central areas of regularly. Baghdad, particularly into Karkh. Finally, they From February through June, U.S. brigades have operated on the southeastern fringes of the continued to fight within the city to expand their city, such as Kamiliyah. territorial control. General Odierno re-concen- General Odierno’s deployment constitutes a trated and re-positioned troops in western and deep encirclement of Baghdad that aims to pre- southern Baghdad in April to counter the enemy vent the enemy from moving freely around Iraq or and to prepare for further clearing operations. Ex- from sector to sector around the city during the tensive clearing operations in southern Baghdad, offensive. General Odierno’s disposition of forces where al Qaeda established strong defensive posi- also concentrated troops in volatile areas. Many tions in 2006, began in mid-May. of these areas, inside and outside of Baghdad, lie While operations in Baghdad continued, Gen- along sectarian fault lines where al Qaeda and eral Odierno deployed additional troops into rogue Jaysh al Mahdi have fought one another the belts around Baghdad. He reinforced Diyala and terrorized local populations. Province, northeast of Baghdad, in March and In addition to encircling the city, Generals in May. (Iraq Report IV describes these opera- Petraeus and Odierno made other preparations tions.) In April, he deployed a new surge brigade for the Corps offensive, Phantom Thunder. For in Besmaya, east of Sadr City, and these new example, U.S. forces captured and killed al Qaeda U.S. forces began to maneuver in the eastern and leaders and operatives, especially in Baghdad’s southeastern belts of the capital in May. Addi- belts, Karmah, Balad, and the northern city of

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January, 2007: THE DISPOSITION OF U.S. FORCES IN IRAQ BEFORE THE SURGE

Balad 10 miles

R E Khalis V I R

S

I

R

G I Lake T Tharthar Baquba Tarmiya Buhriz

Jadidah

Bani Sa’ad Taji

R E V I

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Sadr A L Habbaniya Fallujah Karmah City A Y BAGHDAD I D Abu Ghraib

Besmaya

Jisr Arab Jabour

Amiriyah E Sadr al-Yusufiya UP HR Salman Pak AT ES Yusufiya R I VE R Mahmudiya

KEY TO SYMBOLS Light cavalry squadron Light infantry battalion Marine battalion Airborne infantry battalion Stryker battalion Iskandariya Heavy infantry battalion (Bradleys) Marine reconnaissance battalion Armored battalion (Abrams tanks) Stryker cavalry squadron Armored cavalry battalion or squadron Airborne cavalry squadron THE WEEKLY STANDARD WEEKLY THE

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June, 2007: THE CURRENT DISPOSITION OF U.S. FORCES IN IRAQ

10 miles

R E Khalis V I R

S

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G I Lake T Tharthar The Baghdad Belts (Outer Cordon) Tarmiya Baquba Buhriz Inner Cordon Jadidah Taji Bani Sa’ad

R E V I

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Karmah Sadr A Fallujah L Habbaniya City A BAGHDAD Y I

D Abu Ghraib

Besmaya

Jisr

Arab Jabour Amiriyah Sadr al-Yusufiya EU PH Salman Pak R A TE Yusufiya S R Mahmudiya IV E R

Iskandariya THE WEEKLY STANDARD WEEKLY THE

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Mosul. They likewise killed and captured rogue district of western Baghdad. Then, the Dagger militia leaders and arms smugglers in Baghdad Brigade constructed additional JSSs and COPs in and in southern Iraq. The Iraqi Security Forces the west. planned and conducted a counterinsurgency cam- To improve Dagger Brigade’s capacity, General paign to quell militia violence in the southern city Odierno reinforced the Dagger Brigade with bat- of Diwaniyah. All of these mili- talions from the “surge” brigades tary operations occurred between n The encirclement of (before March 15).12 As the JSSs January and June. U.S. forces also and COPs were ready, Dagger’s assisted in the growth of provin- Baghdad by U.S. forces subordinate battalions then for- cial government and the Iraqi is the most complex mally assumed responsibility for Security Forces during this same and significant military areas within the brigade’s sec- period. development of the past tor.13 Dagger Brigade moved This encirclement of the city six months. from west to east, disrupting al by U.S. forces is the most com- Qaeda’s movement along Route plex and significant military de- Irish, the highway connecting velopment of the past six months. Baghdad International Airport This edition of the Iraq Report, therefore, will ex- with the city center. (This highway also leads from amine how the encirclement of the city occurred, the al Qaeda stronghold of Fallujah to Baghdad, so that its full significance can be understood. via Abu Ghraib, and is a major conduit for vehicle bombs.) Dagger Brigade cleared Ghazaliyah, just north of Route Irish. The brigade then moved Preparing the Inner Cordon and Net from the residential neighborhoods north and east of those places toward the Shi’a neighborhood Reinforcing Baghdad during the Deployment of Khadimiyah and the mixed neighborhood of of Surge Brigades Amiriyah. The 2nd Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Divi- General Odierno added two new, “surge” sion was the first fresh brigade to enter Baghdad brigades (twelve battalions and two brigade as part of the troop increase. Iraq Report II docu- headquarters) to increase the troop density in mented that brigade’s movements into northeast- Baghdad to protect the population.10 He also ern Baghdad in February, when the 82nd entered generated combat forces for Baghdad by chang- the capital’s Adhamiyah district. There, it pa- ing the deployment and tasks of the U.S. forces trolled the Sha’ab, Ur, and Bayda neighborhoods that had been situated on Forward Operating on the northwestern borders of Sadr City. By the Bases (FOBs) since fall 2006. He dispersed the first week of March, 2/82 ABN had established a pre-surge troops from Forward Operating Bases Joint Security Station just inside Sadr City.14 (FOBs) to Joint Security Stations (JSSs) and The 4th Brigade Combat Team, First Infan- Combat Outposts (COPs) in Baghdad’s neigh- try Division, arrived next. The 4th BCT/1st ID borhoods. began operations in Iraq on March 1, 2007.15 For example, the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, General Odierno and Major General Joseph Fil, 1st Infantry Division (the Dagger Brigade) as- commander of Multi-National Division-Baghdad, sumed command of its area of operations in west- assigned the brigade to Baghdad’s West and East ern Baghdad in November 2006. At that time, Rashid Security Districts. Rashid has a population Dagger’s headquarters took command of several of about 700,000 and occupies an area the size of units already stationed in that area.11 The recon- San Francisco. It contains Sunni neighborhoods, solidated brigade prepared to move off of its FOB Shia neighborhoods, and a small neighborhood of in January 2007. To do so, one of its units began Christians; the area was a focal point of the sectar- constructing and operating from combat outposts ian conflict in fall 2006.16 in Ghazaliya, a neighborhood in the Mansour General Odierno effectively doubled the

Page  • February 14, 2007 – June 15, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM number of troops in Rashid between March and These are the areas where we’re seeing the major- May.17 The 4/1 ID incorporated elements of ity of violence inside of Baghdad. These are areas seven different battalions, some of which were where sectarian fault lines exist, [a] convergence already stationed in Baghdad when it arrived. To- of AQI and Shi’a extremists.”19 U.S. forces delib- gether, these forces comprise a brigade-sized for- erately attacked some of the largest concentrations mation of roughly 4,000 soldiers, of al Qaeda in the city, particularly and they called themselves “Task n General Fil stated at in Ghazaliya and Rashid, before 18 Force Dragon.” the end of June that all and during Operation Phantom The five brigades in Baghdad Thunder. proper increased their ability surge forces that would Task Force Dragon began to maneuver in the first four reinforce Baghdad had clearing Rashid in early May. months of Operation Enforc- arrived. As a result, he During the clearing operations, ing the Law. They established was “now able to really “Operation Dragon Fire,” the 3rd combat outposts, reconnoitered touch all parts of the city Stryker Brigade Combat Team, routes, tracked the enemy, and 2nd Infantry Division, reinforced destroyed weapons caches. with coalition forces.” It the 4/1 ID, creating extra troop Discrete operations to secure is thus possible to speak, density.20 In the first three weeks neighborhoods accompanied metaphorically, of a net of Operation Dragon Fire, Colo- the ink-like spread of troops of U.S. and Iraqi forces nel Gibbs and the 4/1 ID cleared into Baghdad. From February within Baghdad’s inner 45 mahalas, or small neighbor- through June, the five brigades hoods (like postal ZIP Code areas in the capital hardened markets, cordon. in U.S. cities), in Rashid. In that protected residential areas, and time, his units discovered enough established safe neighborhoods as models. This explosives to make 3,000 IEDs and detained two edition of the Iraq Report cannot review brigade hundred insurgent leaders.21 operations in Baghdad in March, April, and May. The brigades in western Baghdad moved to- Rather, these operations will be addressed in fu- ward one another during reinforcing and clearing ture reports or supplements. operations, creating a cordon in Baghdad’s inte- rior sometime in May. The clearing in Ghazaliyah Spreading the Net, Tightening the Inner Cordon, drove fighters from that area—perhaps to south- and Preparing the Belts ern Baghdad—while preventing enemy reinforce- ments from arriving from the west. The clearing in Phantom Thunder, the current campaign to Rashid killed, captured, and pushed fighters into control the belts, began after U.S. forces within a tighter area in Doura, a collection of mahallas in Baghdad achieved a certain level of security in that southern district. parts of the capital and disrupted the enemy’s The operations in Rashid laid the groundwork movements in the city. General Odierno gave a for the clearing of the southern belt by limiting general disposition of troops and situation report the movement of al Qaeda into and out of the on Baghdad as Operation Phantom Thunder southern section of the capital. As U.S. troops began: “In Multinational Division-Baghdad, we squeezed al Qaeda in Ghazaliya, southern Karkh, have five brigade combat teams operating inside and western Rashid, the fighters in Doura could Baghdad proper, and a sixth brigade combat team not easily move north or west. As importantly, operating in Taji north of the city. Some parts of the preparation and beginning of the campaign in Baghdad are doing well and seeing progress while the belts prevented al Qaeda from escaping from others still have high levels of violence. Our cur- Doura to Arab Jabour, or from reinforcing Doura rent focus is clearing and controlling the security from the south. districts of Adhamiya in northeast, Rashid in the General Fil stated at the end of June that all south, and portions of Mansour in the northwest. surge forces that would reinforce Baghdad had ar-

Page  • February 14, 2007 – June 15, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM rived. As a result, he was “now able to really touch rupting the enemy’s freedom to move through all parts of the city with coalition forces.”22 It is the belts around Baghdad, rather than expelling thus possible to speak, metaphorically, of a net of them from any one safe haven. U.S. and Iraqi forces within Baghdad’s inner cor- don. Trapping Insurgents Expelled from Baghdad

As U.S. troops moved into Baghdad in force, Preparing Baghdad’s Outer Cordon some of the enemy predictably tried to take refuge in safe-havens in the belts, as they had in the past. General Odierno placed units in the belts in General Petraeus noted in April: “[W]e expected, late December and early January. Those units frankly, that as the pressure was exerted in Bagh- began reconnoitering the Euphrates River and dad on al Qaeda in particular, but also [on] some Arab Jabour in January with the aid of a cavalry of the extremist militia elements, that they would squadron (1-40 Cavalry) already in theater. In migrate north and south respectively, and that has addition, the 2-10 Mountain operated in Yusi- been the case.”24 fiyah and elements of the 4-25 in Iskandariyah. General Odierno’s consistent deployment of This relatively small force was technically re- forces into the Baghdad belts since January, how- sponsible for large swaths of terrain, but they by ever, prevented insurgents from escaping in large no means operated throughout the large area numbers. General Petraeus explained, “We have that encircled the city. chased them in some cases. As you may know, General Odierno deployed the next three bri- we deployed a Stryker battalion from Baghdad to gades that arrived to the belts around the capi- Diyala Province just north of Baghdad—northeast tal. By placing three fresh brigades around the Baqubah, which is a city in the so-called fault line city of Baghdad, General Odierno prepared to areas between both sects and ethnic groups. We contest the enemy’s occupation of the Baghdad have reinforced with some special operations ele- belts. ments the areas in Mosul and Nineveh Province. Operations around Baghdad in February, So we do believe...that we are keeping the pres- March, April, and May aimed to “interdict ac- sure on, in fact, in those areas as those elements, celerants” into Baghdad. In other words, Coali- in a sense, squirt or move out of Baghdad, and we tion forces tried to prevent the flow of weapons are also going after them in the Baghdad belts. In and people who were supplying weapons, money, fact, as these additional forces come in, they are fighters, car or truck bombs, or otherwise making not just going to the interior of Baghdad. In some it possible for armed groups to fight one another cases they’re going to the so-called belts around and terrorize the population of Baghdad.23 Baghdad—so-called throat of Baghdad—that have often been battle zones in which we have gener- Insurgent Movement in the Belts ally not dominated in the past but do need to dominate if we’re to provide improved security in Al Qaeda’s capabilities in Iraq, and particu- Baghdad proper.”25 U.S. forces did not squeeze al larly in Baghdad, depended on its ability to Qaeda out of the city into new areas. Some fight- move around the capital, as well as through it. ers remained in the city, and other fighters fled to The strong links around the city made it pos- the established safe-havens in the belts.26 sible for al Qaeda to transport weapons and General Odierno’s troop disposition thus en- fighters, finance their activities, run kidnapping circled or pinched many insurgents who operated rings that terrorized locals and used victims to between the belts and Baghdad. In order to dis- emplace vehicle bombs, and run vehicle-bomb- rupt the flow of fighters back into Baghdad, Gen- making factories; all of which were necessary for erals Petraeus and Odierno planned a Corps-level the vehicle bomb network to operate. Disrupting offensive consisting of many operations conducted al Qaeda’s operations in Baghdad required dis- simultaneously around the ring.

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January, 2007: U.S. FORCES IN BAGHDAD BEFORE THE SURGE.

ARMY To Baqubah CANAL

TIGRIS Shaab RIVER Ur CANAL ADHAMIYAH Tunis Imam Ali Street Umar bin Khalab StreetSADR CITY

Shuala

KHADIMIYAH K

h Hurriyah a Fadhil l id Baladiyat b in Doura Expressway A RUSAFA l -W a Ghazaliyah l id MANSOUR S t re KARKH e TISSA [9] t NISSAN

Yarmouk KARADAH New BAGHDAD Baghdad INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Doura

RASHID To Salman Pak

Arab Jabour DISTRICTS Important Neighborhoods Major Roads WATERWAYS

KEY TO SYMBOLS Armored cavalry battalion or squadron Light infantry battalion Light cavalry squadron Airborne infantry battalion Stryker battalion Heavy infantry battalion (Bradleys) Stryker cavalry squadron Armored battalion (Abrams tanks) Airborne cavalry squadron THE WEEKLY STANDARD WEEKLY THE

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June, 2007: CURRENT U.S. FORCES IN BAGHDAD

ARMY To Baqubah CANAL Shaab TIGRIS RIVER Ur CANAL

Tunis ADHAMIYAH SADR CITY KHADIMIYAH

Shuala Imam Ali Street K

h Umar bin Khalab Street

a l Fadhil id Hurriyah b Baladiyat in RUSAFA A Doura Expressway l -W a l Ghazaliyah id S MANSOUR t re e t TISSA [9] KARKH NISSAN

Yarmouk KARADAH New BAGHDAD Baghdad INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT Doura

RASHID To Salman Pak

Arab Jabour DISTRICTS Important Neighborhoods Major Roads WATERWAYS

KEY TO SYMBOLS Armored cavalry battalion or squadron Light infantry battalion Light cavalry squadron Airborne infantry battalion Stryker battalion Heavy infantry battalion (Bradleys) Stryker cavalry squadron Armored battalion (Abrams tanks) Airborne cavalry squadron THE WEEKLY STANDARD WEEKLY THE

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A New Division Headquarters: permitted more extensive operations south and Development of Multi-National Division-Center east of Baghdad, in terrain that now extends into Babil, Wasit, Baghdad, and Diyala provinces.32 General Odierno created a new division head- quarters in order to conduct the fight in the belts, Reconnoitering Insurgent Routes evidence of the priority and complexity of the op- through Baghdad’s Belts eration he foresaw there. Multi-National Division- Baghdad, commanded by General Joseph Fil, Understanding enemy movements is necessary controlled eight brigades, stretching from Tarmiya for understanding the necessity and the course (20 miles north of Baghdad) through Iskandari- of the Corps offensive. Al Qaeda occupied sev- yah (25 miles south of Baghdad) until April 1.27 eral strongholds around the city of Baghdad long The number of brigades assigned before Operation Enforcing the to the division, the complexity of n General Joseph Law began: Fallujah (due west of the mission inside Baghdad, and Fil spoke about the Baghdad) clockwise to Karmah, the large terrain the units covered Tarmiyah, Baqubah, Turki Village presented a span-of-control chal- plans to add a division (disrupted in January), Salman lenge for the Baghdad Division headquarters as Pak, Mahmoudiyah, and Sadr al- commander.28 As Generals Pe- early as February 16. Yusifiyah (disrupted in January). traeus and Odierno developed the He indicated at that Al Qaeda used its strongholds in campaign plan for the southern time that General the belts to move from place to belt and added forces south and Odierno would use the place. In the northern belt, U.S. east of the city, they requested a troops conducted skilful combat new division headquarters to com- division headquarters operations to expel al Qaeda fight- mand that sector of the Baghdad to manage the fight ers from Turki Village in January. belts. Third Infantry Division, in the belts. The new And in the southern belt, they es- commanded by Major Gen- division headquarters tablished a combat outpost, later eral Rick Lynch, oversaw the new would oversee an a Joint Security Station, in Sadr Multi-National Division-Center, al-Yusifiyah. From these positions, established on April 1, 2007, and outer cordon, allowing U.S. forces reconnoitered al Qae- operational soon thereafter.29 MND-Baghdad to focus da’s transit routes between January Generals Petraeus and Odierno exclusively on the and June. A description of al Qa- had considered the Baghdad belts capital city. eda’s operating areas allows us to a priority—indeed an integral part see the scope of that organization’s of the Baghdad Security Plan— movements. since Operation Enforcing the Law began on In January, Al Qaeda operatives and weapons February 14. General Fil spoke about the plans to followed the southern belt extensively. They trav- add a division headquarters as early as February eled southeast along the Euphrates River, often by 16. He indicated at that time that General Odi- boat, from Fallujah to Sadr al-Yusifiyah.33 Roads erno would use the division headquarters to man- link Sadr al-Yusifiyah, Yusifiyah, and Mahmudi- age the fight in the belts. The new division head- yah. From the latter location, al Qaeda could and quarters would oversee an outer cordon, allowing did launch attacks into mixed sectarian areas of MND-Baghdad to focus exclusively on the capital north Babil province. They could also travel from city.30 Generals Petraeus and Odierno, therefore, Mahmudiyah to Baghdad (or vice versa).34 An- had judged in February that the fight for the other al Qaeda line of supply ran up the Tigris Baghdad belts would require such extensive rein- from Salman Pak (a town southeast of Baghdad forcements that they would probably need to add on the eastern bank), up the river to Arab Jabour a new division headquarters before operations be- on the western bank, and into southern Baghdad. gan.31 The development of MND-Center in April Arab Jabour is the closest to Baghdad of these

Page 13 • February 14, 2007 – June 15, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM southern towns and is a major al Qaeda sanc- tween February and April, when they captured tuary on the west bank of the Tigris. The area and killed the network’s leader.44 Perhaps some lies on Baghdad’s southern border, abutting the sort of supply system directly linked al Qaeda in Rashid District. Neither Iraqi nor U.S. forces were Salman Pak and Rusafa. Another, smaller road present in Arab Jabour in large numbers before network runs from Salman Pak to the disused Operation Phantom Thunder began, making it canal that borders the east side of Sadr City. possible for al Qaeda terrorists to establish their These routes suggest, but do not prove, that car organization.35 The dense date-palm groves in bombs, operatives, and weapons originated in Arab Jabour easily concealed weapons caches, Salman Pak, and made their way from there to fighter routes, safe houses, and training camps. Sadr City, a frequent target of al Qaeda’s spec- An extensive canal system runs through the area. tacular attacks. Consequently, waterways disrupt the terrain and Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad, is a third drive both enemy and friendly forces onto specific city on the southern belt near which al Qaeda roads and bridges.36 U.S. forces nevertheless con- terrorist activities regularly occurred in 2007, ducted preparatory (or “shaping”) operations in though less frequently than in the past. The city Arab Jabour for a month before Phantom Thun- itself was cleared over the winter, but al Qaeda der began.37 For example, a 5-day operation in continued to target its population. Terrorists April resulted in the capture of the al Qaeda secu- were captured north of Mahmudiyah on April rity emir, or military commander, of Arab Jabour 7.45 Soldiers of the 2-15 Field Artillery, 10th and several other terrorists.38 Because of the lo- Mountain Division, discovered a stockpile of cation’s proximity to Baghdad and its prominence new Iranian weapons in Mahmudiyah on April as a sanctuary, clearing Arab Jabour is the primary 22.46 A few days later, their Iraqi partner-unit objective of Operation Marne Torch, an offensive discovered a vehicle bomb emplaced on a high- launched by MND-C to support Operation Phan- way in northern Mahmudiyah.47 And on June 9, tom Thunder.39 an al Qaeda vehicle bomb destroyed a portion of The Tigris River flows from Arab Jabour to a highway overpass just east of Mahmudiyah.48 Salman Pak. Salman Pak, once a resort town The most spectacular recent al Qaeda attack in on the east bank of the Tigris, has been an im- Mahmudiyah was the kidnapping of three U.S. portant al Qaeda stronghold “where we [the soldiers in May.49 That event occurred while Coalition and the Iraqis] have not had a force in U.S. forces were reconnoitering and securing nearly three years.”40 The terrorist network used the area between Yusifiyah and Mahmudiyah, a that town, 15 miles south of Baghdad, to control process that has continued from January through and cross the river. June. General Odierno called Salman Pak “an area Al Qaeda operated almost freely in the south- known for producing car and truck bombs that ern arc from the Euphrates to the Tigris as late as are sent north into Baghdad.”41 U.S. forces tar- January 2007.50 The operations in Baghdad from geted car bomb factories there between January February to June did not squeeze al Qaeda ter- and May,42 and then the Third Infantry Divi- rorists into the southern sector. Rather, al Qaeda sion conducted reconnaissance operations there terrorists were already well established there, and when its subordinate units arrived.43 The roads U.S. and Iraqi forces began to whittle the organi- from Salman Pak along the river led to active zation away as the surge began.51 al Qaeda locations on the east side of Baghdad. A highway runs from Salman Pak to Rusafa, (a Iranian Support for al Qaeda: Baghdad neighborhood on the southwestern Weapons Flow along the Tigris to Baghdad border of Sadr City), a major al Qaeda strong- hold at the beginning of Operation Enforcing the Iranian arms dealers recently supplied new Law. U.S. forces worked methodically to destroy weapons to al Qaeda in Iraq. A supply of arms a car bomb factory and network in Rusafa be- flowed from Iran to Salman Pak, and then to Arab

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Jabour, presumably from the Iranian border to the outside of Baghdad, and indeed, from other areas south and east. From there, al Qaeda transported of Iraq.60 More importantly, Colonel Gibbs esti- the munitions to Baghdad.52 mated that fifteen or twenty percent of the IEDs U.S. forces conducted targeted raids on safe his troops encountered were EFPs. He stated that houses in Arab Jabour during Marne Torch, dis- the EFPs were being used in terrain controlled by covering caches of new weapons with Iranian al Qaeda, not by Shia militias. It is logical to con- markings. The weapons had been clude that the EFPs were flowing imported recently, rather than into Doura from Arab Jabour and buried and stockpiled.53 Weapons n Iranian arms became other points south along the Ti- were being stored in Arab Jabour, an important part of al gris. The Iraq Report will exam- indicating that it was a way sta- Qaeda’s arsenal recently. ine the implications of this below. tion of sorts. In addition to the From Arab Jabour, al Qaeda presence of explosively Al Qaeda West and smuggled these new Iranian Northwest of Baghdad weapons, along with the fighters formed penetrators that would use them, into Bagh- (EFPs) in al Qaeda lands, Karmah, a village twelve miles dad.54 The Tigris River was their al Qaeda promoted an northeast of Fallujah, was like- primary supply route.55 General expert with knowledge wise already a well-established al Lynch explained, “[A]s we engage of how to obtain or use Qaeda safe haven when Opera- with the local population, they tion Enforcing the Law began tell us that the only people on the EFPs in May, showing the on February 14. On February Tigris River are extremists, insur- value that they placed 20, a U.S. battalion identified a gents. So what we’ve chosen to do on that technology. fully established car bomb factory is to take out all boats.”56 Colonel U.S. forces killed that there, which had a welding shop, Wayne Grigsby, Jr., commander individual on May 25. an area for converting cars into of 3rd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Divi- car bombs, car bombs in various sion, reported that his forces had states of preparation, and chemi- targeted and destroyed 21 boats during the first cals such as fertilizer and chlorine.61 ten days of Operation Marne Torch.57 Bombing Al Qaeda activities in Karmah were linked the boats often generated secondary explosions, to those in Amiriyah, south of Fallujah. A single indicating that the rivercraft were transporting al Qaeda security emir, or military commander, munitions.58 oversaw military operations in Eastern Anbar Iranian arms became an important part of al province in the first months of 2007. U.S. intel- Qaeda’s arsenal recently. In addition to the pres- ligence indicated that he personally operated in ence of EFPs in al Qaeda lands, al Qaeda pro- Karmah and Amiriyah. He ran a vehicle bomb moted an expert with knowledge of how to obtain network that attempted to enhance its weapons or use EFPs in May, showing the value that they with chlorine, a substance with which al Qaeda placed on that technology. U.S. forces killed that experimented in February, March, and April in individual on May 25.59 operations northwest of Baghdad, in Baghdad, Evidence suggests that fighters and weapons and in Anbar Province. U.S. forces killed the emir moved from Arab Jabour into the captial’s Rashid on April 20, northwest of Baghdad.62 U.S. forces district, in particular. Arab Jabour is an easy com- exploited this discovery in subsequent operations. mute to al Qaeda-held areas of Rashid, such as They captured foreign fighter facilitators and ter- Doura, suggesting a connection between them. rorists involved with making or distributing chlo- Colonel Ricky Gibbs, the commander of 4th rine VBIEDs north of Karmah on May 2 or May Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Divsion, in 3.63 Rashid reported in late May that some enemy In April and May, al Qaeda apparently oper- fighters in his area came into the district from ated in the terrain north of the Ramadi-Fallujah-

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Karmah roadline. The rural area, hardly criss- be in place. In the coming weeks, about the next crossed by any highways or roads, extends north two weeks, 8,000 troops will begin to move into toward Lake Tharthar and along its eastern shore their assigned areas of responsibility. Second Bri- toward Salah ad Din province. Subsequent opera- gade, 3rd Infantry Division; the 13th Marine Ex- tions revealed the extent of al Qaeda activity in peditionary Unit, as well as the 3rd Combat Avia- that terrain. Marines discovered and destroyed a tion Brigade, will fill out the combat portion of truck bomb near Karmah on April 26.64 U.S. forc- the surge. And that should occur here as they take es captured an anti-aircraft training cell northeast up positions in the next couple weeks.”76 On June of Karmah on May 8,65 they detained suspected 16, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates remarked, foreign fighter facilitators there on May 14,66 and “We began the process of building up our forces they killed financiers and detained their associates some months ago, but the fifth brigade as part of on May 15.67 Subsequent raids there targeted al the surge really only entered the fight within the Qaeda senior leaders.68 U.S. forces discovered last few days.”77 hostages in a torture house, and an extensive General Petraeus indicated that some of the kidnapping and execution ring, in Karmah just a last units to arrive as part of the force increase week later.69 These Special Operations raids con- were among the most critical. They included the tinued into June.70 A few conventional operations Combat Aviation Brigade for MND-C, which ar- supported these special strikes. U.S. troops, for ex- rived in late May. The aviation brigade added im- ample, established a Joint Security Station fifteen portant capabilities, including attack helicopters kilometers northeast of Ramadi, in the rural village and Kiowa helicopters (for advanced reconnais- of Albu Bali on May 2, after noticing an increase sance missions).78 The arrival of these air assets in enemy activity there beginning in mid-April.71 allowed paratroopers from MND-C to conduct There were also links between Karmah and sophisticated reconnaissance and air assaults (the Taji, Taji and Tarmiyah, and Tarmiyah and Bagh- insertion of infantrymen by helicopter, often in dad.72 General Odierno identified the terrain order to move behind enemy positions).79 between Karmah and Tarmiyah, south of Lake General Odierno positioned the 13th Ma- Tharthar, as “a known al Qaeda transit route.”73 rine Expeditionary Unit northwest of Baghdad Operation Iron Blitz, conducted by 1st Brigade to operate south of Lake Tharthar. According Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division in June, to General Odierno, “This is a known al Qaeda rounded up twenty-five insurgents operating in transit route and possible training and support the area northwest of Baghdad, between Taji and area where we have not operated in great strength Abu Ghraib.74 recently.” He placed other Marines west of Bagh- The southern and northern belts were con- dad, to occupy the portion of Anbar province nected. Some of the same al Qaeda operatives or between Fallujah and Abu Ghraib: “Just to the couriers moved in each of the belts and through west of Baghdad, elements of the 6th Regimental Baghdad. In Samarra, north of Baghdad, U.S. Combat Team began operations against enemy forces found the identification cards of two of safe havens near Kharma, while continuing to se- those soldiers kidnapped near Mahmudiyah, in cure Fallujah. The 6th Regimental Combat Team the southern belt.75 is well into the process of establishing Iraqi police precincts in Fallujah, where violence has signifi- cantly decreased over the past few months.”80 The Final Pieces of the Surge In late May and early June, General Petraeus and General Odierno thereby closed the gaps in On May 31, General Odierno noted: “Units the belt west and northwest of Baghdad (with that are part of our surge into the theater began the Marines), and east and southeast of Baghdad deploying in January, about the middle of January. (with the maneuver elements of the 3rd Infantry However, the full impact of that surge is yet to be Division and its aviation assets). Coalition part- felt. Shortly the final pieces of the surge will soon ners are still providing the last supporting units

Page 16 • February 14, 2007 – June 15, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM this summer: a Georgian brigade will be based in June to defeat al Qaeda insurgents and ex- Wasit Province, the capital city of which is al Kut, tremists, deny enemy safe havens, interdict near the Iranian border and on one of the main movement, logistics and communications. It highways from that border to Baghdad, Karbala, is an open-ended operation that will extend and Najaf. through the summer and will be done in con- General Odierno stated that the troop increase junction with civil-military operations to sup- and the new disposition of forces gave him three port political and economic efforts. new capabilities: to conduct “simultaneous and It consists of carefully synchronized simul- sustained operations and to maintain pressure taneous operations at division and brigade across the entire theater on extremists. More im- level to clear al Qaeda, Sunni insurgents portantly, it allows us to operate in areas where we and Shi’a extremists in, near and around have not been in a long time.”81 General Odierno Baghdad. It also includes aggressive shaping plugged large holes in the belts around Baghdad operations by our Special Operations Forces and in lines of communication leading to Bagh- focused on al Qaeda in Iraq and other special dad. These holes—unprotected spaces in rural ar- groups. eas, unprotected river crossings, and unprotected These operations are intended to elimi- cities—had previously allowed enemies of the nate accelerants to Baghdad violence from Coalition to transport and distribute weapons and enemy support zones in the belts that ring maneuver fighters on roads and rivers without the city. In some cases this means we’re op- regularly encountering U.S. troops. erating in areas where—(audio break). (In progress following audio break)—earlier this week into an area we have not operated in The Real Surge Begins in a while, local Iraqis asked coalition forces, “Where have you been?” And, “Can our chil- In mid-June, brigades from the Multi-National dren go back to school now?” Division-North and (MND-N), Multi-National The intent of Phantom Thunder is to Division-Center (MND-C), and Multi-National protect the Iraqi population and render ir- Division-West (MND-W) began simultaneous reconcilable groups ineffective, while employ- clearing operations northeast, east, southeast, ing political and economic initiatives to buy and west of Baghdad. General Odierno began time and space for the government of Iraq to Operation Phantom Thunder, a coordinated of- move towards political accommodation.83 fensive against insurgent strongholds in the belts (the zone between the inner and outer cordon), These smaller operations in Phantom Thunder on June 15, 2007. General Petraeus explained include Arrowhead Ripper (Baqubah) and Marne the next day that, “literally in the last 24 hours Torch (Arab Jabour), along with other efforts to we have launched a number of different offensive support them. Each of these individual operations operations, in the Baghdad belts in particular, and aims not only to clear of enemy forces the par- we’re continuing a number of operations that have ticular area in which U.S. forces are operating, but been ongoing in Baghdad itself.” As a result, Gen- also to prevent movement around the Baghdad eral Odierno noted, U.S. troops “can maintain belts. security forces inside of Baghdad while we’re si- multaneously conducting operations in Baqubah, The Double Encirclement Pins Arab Jabour, Fallujah. So that allows us to keep an al Qaeda Cell in Doura pressure on [the enemy].”82 General Odierno explained that Simultaneous operations in the belts in June stemmed the flow of al Qaeda fighters and weap- Operation Phantom Thunder is a corps- ons to and from Baghdad. U.S. forces cleared level offensive operation that began on 15 most of Rashid in May, and they cleared the

Page 17 • February 14, 2007 – June 15, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM northern sector of Arab Jabour in June. As Opera- Conclusions tion Phantom Thunder began, U.S. forces pinned an al Qaeda cell in a few mahallas of Doura.84 Operation Phantom Thunder is the first co- Whereas Al Qaeda had “...previously been...elu- ordinated, offensive campaign against the insur- sive when we actually got into an area and started gency in Iraq. The campaign is hitting insurgent to clear it,” this time, “they are standing and fight- strongholds throughout central Iraq simultane- ing,” according to General Fil.85 ously. Troops are driving the enemy from the belts General Fil explained how the operations in- while continuing to clear Baghdad itself. The side and outside Baghdad achieved the synergis- surge of additional troops has allowed Generals tic effects that General Odierno had hoped for. Petraeus and Odierno to undertake this large- “...[W]e believe that we are into an area here in scale operation without drawing down forces in east Rashid, in the Dura area, where we’re seeing many other areas of the country or leaving major a very strong al Qaeda cell. And as we have gone insurgent strongholds uncovered. Al Qaeda and through the city and concentrated in a lot of areas other insurgent leaders may flee from individual where they had free reign sometime before, those operations, but they will be hard-pressed to find areas are now denied to them. And so their free- well-established safe havens near Baghdad. dom of maneuver inside of the city, their own bat- Phantom Thunder has taken the initiative from tle space, has been more and more restricted, and the enemy at the operational, and strategic, level. their support zones have been severely restricted, Enemy cells may choose their moment to con- both inside the city and also in the belts around duct suicide bombings or to plant IEDs, but they the city. And so they’re running out of maneuver are no longer in control of their own actions on a space and they are starting to fight very hard....”86 larger level. Coalition forces are deliberately driv- Doura is “...now the division’s main effort over ing them to and trapping them in narrowing areas here inside of Baghdad,” and will continue to be that can then be cleared. As the enemy is trapped, for the first two to three weeks of July, according particularly in areas like the Doura neighborhood to General Fil. This al Qaeda cell built an impres- in Baghdad that he has held for a long time, the sive defensive position in these mahallas. They fighting will become very fierce. But Coalition buried massive IEDs under roads, for example, forces are taking their time and proceeding de- that cause enormous, lethal explosions. Because liberately in these enemy strongholds in order to U.S. forces have surrounded this pocket of well- reduce risks to American soldiers. armed and well-prepared al Qaeda fighters, cut- Phantom Thunder has been greatly facilitated ting off its supply lines, the combat in Doura is by the tremendous increase in local support for especially intense. In early July, Generals Odierno Coalition operations. Commanders across the and Fil reinforced the 2-12 Infantry Battalion theater have been reporting significant growth with a total of three Stryker battalions. This con- in the number and utility of tips about the loca- centration of combat power surpasses what Major tion of enemy fighters, IEDs, and other traps and General Mixon used to clear Baqubah during caches. This increase in local cooperation suggests Operation Arrowhead Ripper.87 As the battle for that many Iraqis believe that current operations Baghdad and the belts isolates other, well-armed are likely to be successful in removing the terror- enemy groups, U.S. troops may have to clear oth- ists and insurgents from their areas and keeping er, well-defended strongholds. U.S. casualties may them away, since the terrorists have continued increase during such clearing operations. But U.S. their efforts to intimidate ordinary Iraqis, but to forces are likely to improve security in Baghdad no avail. dramatically by destroying these violent concen- Phantom Thunder is unusual in the annals of trations of enemy forces. counter-insurgency for its scale and its combina- tion of multiple, complex movements over a large area, all of which focus on essential tasks of coun- ter-insurgency. Coalition forces moved deliberate-

Page 18 • February 14, 2007 – June 15, 2007 A PUBlication of the Institute for the Study of War and WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM ly in clearing operations in order to minimize their of the new strategy, which is, after all, called the own casualties as well as collateral damage and Baghdad Security Plan. the loss of civilian life. They are working actively A war this large and complex will not end with to engage the population in the counterinsurgency a single battle or campaign. The art of military effort. The operation has been designed to avoid command in such conflicts lies in tying multiple, the pitfalls of previous approaches, denigrated by simultaneous, and successive operations together some critics as a “whack-a-mole” strategy that over time. If these operations work properly, they allows defeated insurgents to flee to safe havens will steadily improve the situation on the ground. and reconstitute. The Coalition commanders have The preparations for Operation Phantom Thun- accepted some risk in Salah-ad-Din, Kirkuk, and der have already done so. The current operation Ninewah provinces, which are lightly held by Co- aims to do more. Future Iraq Reports will de- alition forces, in order to focus on Anbar, Bagh- scribe Phantom Thunder in greater detail, as well dad, and the Baghdad belts. The focus of current as the subsequent operations that will surely fol- operations accords with the original intention low.

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Endnotes Commander of Multinational Corps-Iraq Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, April 13, 2007 10:00 AM EDT. 1 The “center of gravity” is a phrase used to describe the 9 Joint Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Rob- objective in a military operation that will lead to victory. ert Gates, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and In conventional operations, the “center of gravity” is of- Multinational Force-Iraq Commander General David ten the enemy’s army, the destruction of which renders Petraeus, June 16, 2007, 9:30 A.M. EDT. an enemy willing to surrender or unable to fight. In 10 Department of Defense Special Briefing with Multina- counterinsurgency operations, the “center of gravity” is tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray the population, for whose loyalty the legitimate govern- Odierno, June 22, 2007. Two brigades would normally ment and the insurgents compete. When the population include around four-to-six battalions; General Odierno supports the government, the insurgents lack the physi- added individual battalions to brigade headquarters al- cal support that they need to continue to fight and the ready in the city as well. sympathy that they need to win the conflict. 11 The brigade thereby replaced several units that it had 2 Department of Defense Press Briefing with Multina- sent out to Ramadi and Baghdad. Department of De- tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray fense Special News Briefing with Colonel J.B. Barton, Odierno, May 31, 2007. The mission statement has not March 16, 2007, 9:33 A.M. EDT. changed since the Baghdad Security Plan began. See 12 One battalion from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, Department of Defense News Briefing with Multina- 82nd Airborne Division, and another battalion from the tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray 4th BCT, 1st ID in March; Department of Defense Spe- Odierno, February 22, 2007, 12:00 P.M. EST; Depart- cial News Briefing with Colonel J.B. Burton, March 16, ment of Defense News Briefing with Multinational 2007, 9:33 A.M. EDT. Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray Odi- 13 Multi-National Corps—Iraq, Release No. 20070319-08, erno, April 13, 2007 10:00 A.M. EDT, Department of “Fresh troops assume battle space in Baghdad,” Multi- Defense News Transcript. National Division – Baghdad PAO, March 19, 2007. 3 Department of Defense News Briefing with Multina- 14 See Kimberly Kagan, “Enforcing the Law: The Baghdad tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray Security Plan Begins, February 10 – March 5, 2007” Odierno, April 13, 2007 10:00 A.M. EDT. Iraq Report (www.weeklystandard.com), March 15, 4 Department of Defense Press Briefing with Multina- 2007. tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray 15 Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070301-01, Odierno, May 31, 2007. “4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division begins mission in 5 Department of Defense Press Briefing with Multina- Iraq,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, March 1, 2007. tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray 16 DoD News Briefing, Pentagon, Presenter: Commander, Odierno, May 31, 2007. 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division Col. 6 See Kimberly Kagan, “From ‘New Way Forward’ to Ricky Gibbs, May 25, 2007. New Commander, January 10 – February 10, 2007” 17 DoD News Briefing, Pentagon, Presenter: Commander, Iraq Report (www.weeklystandard.com), March 1, 2007; 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division Col. Kimberly Kagan, “The Battle for Diyala, February 11 Ricky Gibbs, May 25, 2007. – April 25, 2007” Iraq Report (www.weeklystandard. 18 DoD News Briefing, Pentagon, Presenter: Commander, com), May 7, 2007. 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division Col. 7 Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) has command over Ricky Gibbs, May 25, 2007. all Coalition combat forces in the theater with the ex- 19 Department of Defense Special Briefing with Multina- ception of a small number of troops engaged in training tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray and advising Iraqi military, police, and political bodies Odierno, June 22, 2007. (although military advisors embedded with Iraqi military 20 DoD News Briefing, Pentagon, Presenter: Commander, units are under General Odierno’s command). Certain 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division Col. logistics capabilities, likewise, fall under a separate com- Ricky Gibbs, May 25, 2007. mand. 21 DoD News Briefing, Pentagon, Presenter: Commander, 8 Department of Defense News Transcript, Presenter: 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division Col.

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Ricky Gibbs, May 25, 2007. battle for the belts. 22 DoD News Briefing, Pentagon, Presenter: Commanding 32 Press briefing by Major General Rick Lynch, Multina- General of Multinational Division Baghdad and 1st Cav- tional Division-Center, Topic: Operation Marne Torch, alry Division Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil, Jr., June 29, 2007. Location: The Comined Press Information Center, 23 Department of Defense Special Briefing with Multina- Baghdad, Iraq, June 24, 2007, 6:00 A.M. EDT. tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray 33 The first edition of the Iraq Report, “From New Way Odierno, June 22, 2007. Forward to New Commander,” traced the movement of 24 “The Jim Lehrer Show,” Interview with General David insurgents around the belts and from the belts into Bagh- Petraeus, U.S. Army, Commanding General, Multina- dad in early 2007. tional Force-Iraq; Subject: The Situation in Iraq; Inter- 34 It is not clear from open sources whether al Qaeda trav- viewer: Jim Lehrer; Wednesday, April 4, 2007. eled primarily in a counterclockwise movement, flowing 25 “The Jim Lehrer Show,” Interview with General David from Anbar to Salman Pak (and from there to Tarmiya), Petraeus, U.S. Army, Commanding General, Multina- or in a clockwise movement, flowing from Salman Pak to tional Force-Iraq; Subject: The Situation in Iraq; Inter- Fallujah (and from there to Tarmiya). viewer: Jim Lehrer; Wednesday, April 4, 2007. 35 Press briefing by Major General Rick Lynch, Multina- 26 “The Jim Lehrer Show,” Interview with General David tional Division-Center, Topic: Operation Marne Torch, Petraeus, U.S. Army, Commanding General, Multina- Location: The Comined Press Information Center, tional Force-Iraq; Subject: The Situation in Iraq; Inter- Baghdad, Iraq, June 24, 2007, 6:00 A.M. EDT. viewer: Jim Lehrer; Wednesday, April 4, 2007. 36 Press briefing by Major General Rick Lynch, Multina- 27 Department of Defense News Briefing with Multination- tional Division-Center, Topic: Operation Marne Torch, al Division-Baghdad Commander Major General Joseph Location: The Combined Press Information Center, Fil, February 16, 2007, 9:05 A.M. EDT. Baghdad, Iraq, June 24, 2007, 6:00 A.M. EDT. 28 “Span-of-control” is the term that the military uses 37 Press briefing by Major General Rick Lynch, Multina- to describe the number of subordinates a commander tional Division-Center, Topic: Operation Marne Torch, controls, as there is a limit to how many different subor- Location: The Combined Press Information Center, dinate units one person can command and his headquar- Baghdad, Iraq, June 24, 2007, 6:00 A.M. EDT. ters can control. As a rule of thumb, a good commander 38 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070411b, cannot effectively control more than five major subordi- “Coalition Forces Capture Al Qaeda in Iraq Security nate units engaged in active operations at a time. Emir of Arab Jabour,” Multi-National Force – Iraq 29 Multi-National Corps – Iraq Release No. 20070402-02, CPIC, April 11, 2007. “3rd Infantry Division (Headquarters) arrives in Iraq” 39 Press briefing by Major General Rick Lynch, Multina- April 2, 2007. tional Division-Center, Topic: Operation Marne Torch, 30 Department of Defense News Briefing with Multina- Location: The Comined Press Information Center, tional Division-Baghdad Commander Major General Baghdad, Iraq, June 24, 2007, 6:00 A.M. EDT. Joseph Fil, February 16, 2007, 9:05 A.M. EDT. Lieu- 40 Department of Defense Special Briefing with Multina- tenant General Odierno (not Major General Fil) would tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray have made the request for an additional Division Head- Odierno, June 22, 2007. quarters of General Petraeus, and he in turn would have 41 Department of Defense Special Briefing with Multina- asked the Army or the Joint Staff. tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray 31 General Petraeus’ and Lieutenant General Odierno’s Odierno, June 22, 2007. One indication of this connec- initial evaluation of the belts’ importance is implicit in tion between Salman Pak and Baghdad may be found in General Fil’s comments. The deployment of the Stryker the flow of “extremists” (whether al Qaeda or Shia mi- brigade to reinforce Diyala in March (which General Pe- litia) through a checkpoint on the highway near Salman traeus said was part of a chase or squirt, “The Jim Lehrer Pak, though the significance of this particular event is Show,” Interview with General David Petraeus, U.S. only conjecture. Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release Army, Commanding General, Multinational Force-Iraq; No. 20070506-07, “Iraqi National Police Coordinates Subject: The Situation in Iraq; Interviewer: Jim Lehrer; With 1-15 Infantry to Combat Extremists,” Multi-Na- Wednesday, April 4, 2007) was not the genesis of the tional Corps – Iraq PAO, May 6, 2007.

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42 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070403b, Location: The Combined Press Information Center, “Four-Day Operation Results in Eight Terrorists Killed; Baghdad, Iraq, June 24, 2007, 6:00 A.M. EDT. Several Weapons, Explosives Caches Destroyed,” Multi- 54 “2nd Brigade Soldiers have the mission of defeating National Force – Iraq CPIC, April 3, 2007. insurgent activity, denying the enemy sanctuary and 43 Such as a reconnaissance into Dura-iyah; Multi-National preventing terrorist elements from moving accelerants Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070517-08, “1-15 Infantry from the Arab Jabour area into Baghdad,” according to Conducts Operation Beach Yellow,” Multi-National Divi- Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. 20070618-03, sion – Center PAO, May 17, 2007. “Marne Torch Commences in Areas South of Baghdad,” 44 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070414a, Multi-National Division – Center PAO, June 18, 2007. “Al-Qaeda Military Emir, 16 Other Suspects Detained See also: Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. in Raids,” Multi-National Force – Iraq CPIC, April 14, A070523b, “Four Terrorists Killed; Tied to IED Produc- 2007. tion,” Multi-National Force – Iraq CPIC, May 23, 2007. 45 Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070408-04, 55 Press briefing by Major General Rick Lynch, Multina- “Three known insurgents detained,” Multi-National Di- tional Division-Center, Topic: Operation Marne Torch, vision – Baghdad PAO, April 8. 2007. Location: The Combined Press Information Center, 46 Multi-National Corps—Iraq, Release No. 20070428-13, Baghdad, Iraq, June 24, 2007, 6:00 A.M. EDT. “US, Iraqi Raid in Mahmudiyah Nets Iranian-marked 56 Press briefing by Major General Rick Lynch, Multina- Rockets, Mortars,” Multi-National Division – Center tional Division-Center, Topic: Operation Marne Torch, PAO, April 28, 2007. Location: The Combined Press Information Center, 47 Multi-National Corps—Iraq, Release No. 20070430- Baghdad, Iraq, June 24, 2007, 6:00 A.M. EDT. 21, “Iraqi Soldiers Find VBIED in Mahmudiyah Area,” 57 “U.S. troops destroy boats and target roadside bomb Multi-National Division – Center PAO, April 30, 2007. routes south of Baghdad,” Kim Gamel, Associated Press 48 Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070611-01, Writer, Jisr Diyala, Iraq, June 26, 2007 Tuesday 8:26 AM “Coalition Checkpoint Attacked,” Multi-National Divi- GMT. sion – Center PAO, June 11, 2007. 58 “U.S. troops destroy boats and target roadside bomb 49 Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070515-09, routes south of Baghdad,” Kim Gamel, Associated Press “Search for Missing Soldiers Continues,” Multi-National Writer, Jisr Diyala, Iraq, June 26, 2007 Tuesday 8:26 AM Division – Center PAO, May 15, 2007. GMT. 50 Southwest of Baghdad, U.S. forces detained associates 59 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070525b, of a Libyan foreign fighter facilitator, suggesting that “Coalition Forces Nab 20 Suspected Al-Qaeda Terror- his network operated in that arc. Multi-National Force ists,” Multi-National Force – Iraq CPIC, May 25, 2007. – Iraq, Release No. A070525b, “Coalition Forces Nab 20 60 DoD News Briefing, Pentagon, Presenter: Commander, Suspected Al-Qaeda Terrorists,” Multi-National Force 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division Col. – Iraq CPIC, May 25, 2007. In addition, U.S. forces Ricky Gibbs, May 25, 2007. found an enormous weapons cache (a “supermarket” 61 Department of Defense News Briefing with Multina- type that usually feeds smaller, local caches) in a rural tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray area between Iskandariyah and the Euphrates River. Odierno, February 22, 2007, 12:00 P.M. EST. 51 As demonstrated above and stated in “The Jim Lehrer 62 The emir was positively identified as Muhammad Abdul- Show,” Interview with General David Petraeus, U.S. lah Abbas al-Issawi, also known as Abu Abd al-Sattar and Army, Commanding General, Multinational Force-Iraq; Abu Akram. He also used boys, twelve and thirteen Subject: The Situation in Iraq; Interviewer: Jim Lehrer; years old, as vehicle bomb drivers. Multi-National Force Wednesday, April 4, 2007. – Iraq, Release No. A070425b, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Secu- 52 Press briefing by Major General Rick Lynch, Multina- rity Emir Killed,” Multi-National Force – Iraq CPIC, tional Division-Center, Topic: Operation Marne Torch, April 25, 2007. Location: The Combined Press Information Center, 63 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070503b, “11 Baghdad, Iraq, June 24, 2007, 6:00 A.M. EDT. Suspected Terrorists Detained,” Multi-National Force 53 Press briefing by Major General Rick Lynch, Multina- – Iraq CPIC, May 3, 2007. tional Division-Center, Topic: Operation Marne Torch, 64 Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070428-12,

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“Marines Destroy Truck Bomb near Karmah,” Multi- Odierno, May 31, 2007. National Force – West PAO, April 28, 2007. 77 Joint Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Rob- 65 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070511a, ert Gates, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker, and “Coalition Interrupts Terrorist Training, Terrorists Multinational Force-Iraq Commander General David Killed,” Multi-National Force – Iraq CPIC, May 11, Petraeus, June 16, 2007, 9:30 A.M. EDT. 2007. 78 Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070528-03, 66 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070514a, “3rd Combat Aviation Brigade Arrived in Iraq 3rd CAB “Coalition Forces Detain 11 Suspects, Destroy Cache,” PAO Release,” Multi-National Division – Center PAO, Multi-National Force – Iraq CPIC, May 14, 2007. May 28, 2007. 67 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070516a, 79 Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070605-03, “Four Terrorists Killed, 30 Suspects Detained in Over- “Helicopters Conduct Air Strike,” Multi-National Divi- night Raids,” Multi-National Force – Iraq CPIC, May sion – Center PAO, June 5, 2007; Multi-National Corps 16, 2007. – Iraq, Release No. 20070606-13, “1-15 Inf. Conducts 68 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070521c, “3 Air Assault Mission, Destroys Enemy Cache,” Multi-Na- Suspected Al-Qaeda Cell Leaders, 9 Others Detained,” tional Division – Center PAO, June 6, 2007. Multi-National Force – Iraq CPIC, May 21, 2007. 80 Department of Defense Special Briefing with Multina- 69 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070522a, “12 tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray Iraqi Hostages Freed in Follow-on Operation,” Multi- Odierno, June 22, 2007. National Force – Iraq CPIC, May 22, 2007. 81 Department of Defense Special Briefing with Multina- 70 Multi-National Force – Iraq, Release No. A070604b, tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray “Terrorist Leader, Network Members Captured,” Multi- Odierno, June 22, 2007. National Force – Iraq CPIC, June 4, 2007. 82 Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, MNC-I, inter- 71 Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070504- view with John Roberts, CNN’s “American Morning,” 17, “Operation Forsythe Park Update,” Multi-National June 20, 2007. Force – West PAO, May 4, 2007. 83 Department of Defense Special Briefing with Multina- 72 For Tarmiya-Baghdad, see: Multi-National Force – Iraq, tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray Release No. A070606d, “Coalition Forces Attack VBIED Odierno, June 22, 2007. Network: 2 Killed, 10 Detained,” Multi-National Force 84 DoD News Briefing, Pentagon, Presenter: Commanding – Iraq CPIC, June 6, 2007. General of Multinational Division Baghdad and 1st Cav- 73 Department of Defense Special Briefing with Multina- alry Division Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil, Jr., June 29, 2007. tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray 85 DoD News Briefing, Pentagon, Presenter: Commanding Odierno, June 22, 2007. General of Multinational Division Baghdad and 1st Cav- 74 Release No. 20070704-21, “Operation “Iron Blitz” cap- alry Division Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil, Jr., June 29, 2007. tures 25 insurgents in June,” Maj. Randall Baucom, 1st 86 DoD News Briefing, Pentagon, Presenter: Commanding BCT, 1st Cav. Div. Public Affairs, Multi-National Divi- General of Multinational Division Baghdad and 1st Cav- sion – Baghdad PAO July 4, 2007. The operation target- alry Division Maj. Gen. Joseph Fil, Jr., June 29, 2007. ed al Qaeda-linked operatives emplacing IEDs, trying to 87 Wesley Morgan, “Backgrounder #4, Order of spark sectarian violence, and using indirect fire weapons Battle,”July 1, 2007, www.understandingwar.org. against the local population. 75 Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070603- 14, “Iraqi Army Soldiers Kill Two Insurgents, Capture Another Near Balad,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, June 3, 2007; Multi-National Corps – Iraq, Release No. 20070616-12, “Raid on Suspected Safe House Near Samarra,” Multi-National Corps – Iraq PAO, June 16, 2007. 76 Department of Defense Press Briefing with Multina- tional Corps-Iraq Commander Lieutenant General Ray

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