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Download The A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, reviews a map with Capt. Eric Lawless, of the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, at Forward Operating Base Iskandariyah in Iraq on Dec. 25, 2006. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Curt Cashour) February 14 – June 15, 2007 The Real Surge: Preparing for Operation Phantom Thunder by KIMBERLY KAGAN Summary On June 15, 2007, Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno launched the largest coordinated military operation in Iraq since the initial U.S. invasion. The campaign, called Operation Phantom Thunder, aims to expel al Qaeda from its sanctuaries just outside of Baghdad. Denying al Qaeda the ability to fabricate car bombs and transport fi ghters through the rural terrain around Baghdad is a necessary prerequisite for securing the capital city, the overarching military goal for Iraq in 2007. Phantom Thunder consists of simultaneous offensives by U.S. forces throughout central Iraq. The Division north of Baghdad cleared the long-festering city of Baqubah and its outlying areas. The Division east and southeast of Baghdad is clearing the critical al Qaeda stronghold in Arab Jabour, immediately south of the capital. It is also destroying al Qaeda’s ability to transport weapons along the Tigris River and to send reinforcements from the Euphrates to the Tigris. The Division west of Baghdad is clearing al Qaeda’s sanctuaries between Fallujah and Baghdad, all the way to the shores of Lake Tharthar northwest of the capital. Meanwhile, the Division in Baghdad continues to clear important areas of the city and areas to its immediate north and west. Phantom Thunder is not a new strategy or a new plan. U.S. commanders have been preparing Phantom Thunder since the effort to secure Baghdad began in February. General Odierno, who commands Coalition combat forces in Iraq, has been carefully positioning the additional brigades that the President sent to Iraq. General Odierno has, brigade by brigade, encircled Baghdad. U.S. troops have not, literally, cordoned off the city. Rather, General Odierno has stationed Coalition forces on every major supply line, river, or road in a circle around Baghdad. Much of the fi ghting outside of Baghdad between February 15 and June 15 has aimed at positioning U.S. troops in these areas and reconnoitering them. Many of these areas received little or no attention from U.S. combat forces in 2006. Coalition and Iraqi forces have also been securing Baghdad’s vital and unstable neighborhoods before and during Phantom Thunder. General Odierno’s careful disposition of forces inside of Baghdad from February to June has restricted insurgent movement within the city, and has squeezed the enemy into ever smaller operating areas within the capital. As the offensive outside the city continues, it is increasingly diffi cult for the enemy inside the city to receive supplies or reinforcements. PAGE 1 • FEBRUARY 14, 2007 – JUNE 15, 2007 A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM MISSION: SECURING THE POPULATION population. General Petraeus has interpreted this OF BAGHDAD doctrine in Iraq to mean stationing U.S. troops in Baghdad’s neighborhoods in order to pro- n January 2007, President Bush changed the tect the population constantly. But car bombs, mission of U.S. forces in Iraq to securing the weapons, and fighters often originate outside population of Baghdad from sectarian vio- of Baghdad, rather than in the city itself. Gen- lence. He reinforced American eral Odierno, the commander I of Multi-National Corps-Iraq troops in Iraq and appointed Gen- n As General Odierno eral David Petraeus to command explained: “The areas (MNC-I), therefore considered them. According to Lieutenant surrounding Baghdad, two methods of securing Bagh- General Ray Odierno, who works dad with military forces: “do directly for General Petraeus, the which we refer to as we cut [the enemy] off outside primary goal of military operations the ‘Baghdad belts,’ are of Baghdad, or do we provide in Iraq is: “to create stability and also key to its security.” more security inside?”3 In other security to protect the Iraqi people, Establishing security words, should U.S. forces at- first and foremost in Baghdad. The inside of Baghdad, tempt to establish security by clearing and patrolling the city’s population and the government therefore, also depends of Iraq are the center of gravity.1 neighborhoods? Or should they Creating a stable environment in on preventing enemies secure the capital by eliminat- Baghdad should provide time and from infiltrating into the ing the enemy from safe havens space for the Iraqi government to city. just outside Baghdad? Provid- continue to mature as a govern- ing security within Baghdad ment and continue to build its directly supports the mission of capacity.”2 Establishing security in Baghdad is the protecting its population from sectarian violence, primary military objective for military operations but as General Odierno explained: “The areas in 2007. surrounding Baghdad, which we refer to as the ‘Baghdad belts,’ are also key to its security.”4 Es- tablishing security inside of Baghdad, therefore, THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT: also depends on preventing enemies from infil- THE CITY AND ITS BELTS trating into the city. The Baghdad belts are residential, agricul- In order to execute this mission, Generals tural, and industrial areas that encircle the city, Petraeus and Odierno had to determine the best and networks of roadways, rivers, and other lines way to use military forces to secure Baghdad. of communication that lie within a twenty or The new counterinsurgency doctrine, written un- thirty mile radius of Baghdad. The enemy, both der the direction of General Petraeus in his previ- al Qaeda and rogue Shia militias, controlled lo- ous role as commander of the Combined Arms cations in the Baghdad belts between 2004 and Center at Fort Leavenworth, emphasizes the 2006. U.S. forces did not contest the enemy’s need to establish and maintain the security of the occupation of the belts in 2006, as General George Casey, then the overall commander of Kimberly Kagan is a military historian who has taught at Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I), prioritized the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yale University, training the Iraqi Security Forces, rather than us- Georgetown University, and American University. She ing U.S. forces to establish security. As a result of is an affiliate of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies this approach, the enemies of the Coalition and at Harvard University. She is the author of The Eye of the Iraqi government were able to use the ter- Command (University of Michigan Press, 2006), and the rain around Baghdad to project forces and fun- founder and executive director of the new Institute for the nel supplies into the capital, and to move freely Study of War, www.understandingwar.org. around the city into the provinces. As General PAGE 2 • FEBRUARY 14, 2007 – JUNE 15, 2007 A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM Odierno explained, “Attacks occurring in Bagh- doctrine, maintaining a constant presence in the dad often originate in these outerlying regions. neighborhoods to provide security for the people Sectarian lines begin to blur in these belts, creat- living there. General Odierno established Joint ing a flashpoint for extremists looking to assert Security Stations and Combat Outposts in Bagh- their control over Baghdad. Al Qaeda in Iraq and dad to improve security within the city’s borders. Shi’a extremists want to control these areas.”5 “This continuous presence is making the Iraqi The Iraq Report has already documented the people feel safer and has greatly increased the movement of fighters, weapons, and car bombs amount of information provided to the Iraqi through the southern and northern belts.6 army, police and coalition forces by the public.”8 In addition, General Odierno de- ployed brigades throughout the Bagh- TURKEY dad belts in order to interdict the flow of fighters into the capital. T ig r By the beginning of June, General is R IRAN i Mosul Odierno had encircled Baghdad with v Tal e Afar r Coalition Forces—not literally, with an SYRIA unbroken chain of forces, but rather by placing brigades on every main IRAQ r e road to and from the city. On June Euphra iv te s R 15, 2007, General Odierno launched R la i a v y e i multiple, simultaneous, offensive op- r D erations around Baghdad in order to Ramadi Falluja disrupt enemies surrounding the city. Baghdad This Corps offensive is called Opera- tion Phantom Thunder. SAUDI Najaf SETTINGJORDAN THE CONDITIONS ARABIA FOR A CORPS OFFENSIVE The Corps (Multi-National Corps- Iraq) is theEXPAND largest PROGRESS, military unit that DEFEAT AL QAEDA fights in Iraq, and General Odierno 100 miles commands it. The Corps consists of Persianmultiple divisions of U.S. and allied forces. Gulf The Corps offensive comprises KUWAIT THE WEEKLY STANDARD WEEKLY THE a set of coordinated military opera- tions by all the forces that fight in Iraq. These different operations are General Odierno therefore developed a plan conducted throughout Iraq, but they all aim to improve Baghdad’s security in both the belts at the same overarching goal—in the current and in the city using all of the forces available to case, eliminating the enemy from the belts sur- him as the Corps commander.7 Inside Baghdad, rounding Baghdad and preventing them from U.S. forces flowed from their Forward Operat- re-establishing themselves in or near the city.
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