Iraq: UNEP Progress Report
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Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options
CASE STUDY NO. 8 COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES Basra: Strategic Dilemmas and Force Options John Hodgson The Pennsylvania State University KAREN GUTTIERI SERIES EDITOR Naval Postgraduate School COMPLEX OPERATIONS CASE STUDIES SERIES Complex operations encompass stability, security, transition and recon- struction, and counterinsurgency operations and operations consisting of irregular warfare (United States Public Law No 417, 2008). Stability opera- tions frameworks engage many disciplines to achieve their goals, including establishment of safe and secure environments, the rule of law, social well- being, stable governance, and sustainable economy. A comprehensive approach to complex operations involves many elements—governmental and nongovernmental, public and private—of the international community or a “whole of community” effort, as well as engagement by many different components of government agencies, or a “whole of government” approach. Taking note of these requirements, a number of studies called for incentives to grow the field of capable scholars and practitioners, and the development of resources for educators, students and practitioners. A 2008 United States Institute of Peace study titled “Sharing the Space” specifically noted the need for case studies and lessons. Gabriel Marcella and Stephen Fought argued for a case-based approach to teaching complex operations in the pages of Joint Forces Quarterly, noting “Case studies force students into the problem; they put a face on history and bring life to theory.” We developed -
Iraq Governance & Performance Accountability Project (Igpa/Takamul)
IRAQ GOVERNANCE & PERFORMANCE ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (IGPA/TAKAMUL) FY21 QUARTER-1 REPORT October 1, 2020 – December 31, 2020 Program Title Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability Project (IGPA/Takamul) Sponsoring USAID Office USAID Iraq Contract Number AID-267-H-17-00001 Contractor DAI Global LLC Date of publication January 30, 2021 Author IGPA/Takamul Project Team COVER: A water treatment plant subject to IGPA/Takamul’s assessment in Hilla City, Babil Province | Photo Credit: Pencils Creative for USAID IGPA/Takamul This publication, prepared by DAI, was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 1: PROJECT PROGRESS ...................................................................................................................... 3 OBJECTIVE 1: ENHANCED SERVICE DELIVERY CAPACITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ ................................................................................................................................. 3 SUCCESS STORY ...................................................................................................................................................... 21 OBJECTIVE 2: IMPROVED PROVINCIAL AND NATIONAL -
Mcallister Bradley J 201105 P
REVOLUTIONARY NETWORKS? AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN TERRORIST GROUPS by Bradley J. McAllister (Under the Direction of Sherry Lowrance) ABSTRACT This dissertation is simultaneously an exercise in theory testing and theory generation. Firstly, it is an empirical test of the means-oriented netwar theory, which asserts that distributed networks represent superior organizational designs for violent activists than do classic hierarchies. Secondly, this piece uses the ends-oriented theory of revolutionary terror to generate an alternative means-oriented theory of terrorist organization, which emphasizes the need of terrorist groups to centralize their operations. By focusing on the ends of terrorism, this study is able to generate a series of metrics of organizational performance against which the competing theories of organizational design can be measured. The findings show that terrorist groups that decentralize their operations continually lose ground, not only to government counter-terror and counter-insurgent campaigns, but also to rival organizations that are better able to take advantage of their respective operational environments. However, evidence also suggests that groups facing decline due to decentralization can offset their inability to perform complex tasks by emphasizing the material benefits of radical activism. INDEX WORDS: Terrorism, Organized Crime, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Insurgency, Networks, Netwar, Revolution, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Mahdi Army, Abu Sayyaf, Iraq, Philippines REVOLUTIONARY NETWORK0S? AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN TERRORIST GROUPS by BRADLEY J MCALLISTER B.A., Southwestern University, 1999 M.A., The University of Leeds, United Kingdom, 2003 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSPHY ATHENS, GA 2011 2011 Bradley J. -
Iraq: U.S. Military Operations
Order Code RL31701 Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Updated July 15, 2007 Steve Bowman Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Summary Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development and support for Al Qaeda terrorism, were the primary justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003, President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. There was no use of chemical or biological (CB) weapons, and no CB or nuclear weapons stockpiles or production facilities have been found. The major challenges to coalition forces are now quelling a persistent Iraqi resistance movement and training/retaining sufficient Iraqi security forces to assume responsibility for the nations domestic security. Though initially denying that there was an organized resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is regional/local organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding. CENTCOM has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “a classical guerrilla-type campaign.” DOD initially believed the resistance to consist primarily of former regime supporters and foreign fighters; however, it has now acknowledged that growing resentment of coalition forces and an increase in sectarian conflicts, independent of connections with the earlier regime, are contributing to the insurgency. -
Iraq Blobby Map 14 JUL 2016
Iraq Control of Terrain Map: July 14, 2016 Iraqi Kurdish Map Legend KDP Peshmerga Control Zone Dahuk Populated areas under KDP Peshmerga control Rabia Mosul Dam PUK Peshmerga Control Zone Sinjar Qandil Populated areas under PUK Mosul Arbil Peshmerga control Tal Afar Gwer Iraqi Kurdistan regions under Qayyarah Makhmur Peshmerga control Qayyarah Aireld West Populated areas under PKK/YPG control Kirkuk Suleimaniyah Sharqat Hawija Populated areas under KDP Peshmerga/PKK/YPG control Baiji Bashir Populated areas under ISF control Tuz Khurmato with KDP Peshmerga and Sunni Camp Speicher Tikrit tribal ghters PUK Peshmerga-held location Khanaqin KDP Peshmerga-held location Samarra Qaim Haditha Joint ISF-KDP Peshmerga-held location Baghdadi Muqdadiyah Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Balad Base Headquarters Site Asad Base Baqubah Camp Taji Mixed PUK Peshmerga-Militia Hit Garma Waleed Balad Ruz Controlled Location Rutba Ramadi Mixed KDP Peshmerga/ PKK/YPG- Baghdad held location Fallujah Taqadum Base Trebil Jurf al-Sakhr al-Kut Karbala al-Hillah Nukhaib al-Diwaniyah al-Najaf al-Amarah al-Samawah al-Nasriyah Basra Iraq Map Legend ISF Control Zone ISF and heavy presence of Iraqi Shi’a militias Joint ISF - Sunni Tribal Fighters Control Zone Populated areas under ISF control ISIS Control Zone ISF-held location ISIS-held location 100km Content: Emily Anagnostos and ISW Iraq Team ISF-held military base Graphics: Emily Anagnostos ©2016 by the Institute for the Study of War e Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Popular Mobilization completed the operation to recapture Fallujah on June 26, securing the city and its environs from ISIS control. e operation, which began on May 23, breached the city limits on June 8 and secured the government complex on June 17. -
Iraq SITREP 2016-09-19
Iraq Situation Report: September 7-19, 2016 1 Coalition partners extend and expand mission in Iraq. e Netherlands announced 2 ISIS attacks Peshmerga positions east of Mosul, resulting in casualties. ISIS on September 10 that it will extend its mission in Iraq until the end of 2017, past its current launched attacks against Peshmerga positions in Bashiqa, Gwer, and Khazar, in Ninewa end date of October 1. e Netherlands will continue to train ISF and Peshmerga units and Province, on September 18. e Peshmerga repelled the attacks, however an ISIS member provide aircraft fueling and security for Belgian ghter jets. Belgium announced on September detonated a Suicide Vest (SVEST) in Zahra Khatoon on the Khazar axis, east of Mosul, 12 that it will deploy an additional 30 troops to Mosul in support of the operation before the killing two Peshmerga soldiers and injuring three others. end of the year. Meanwhile, Finland announced on September 15 that it would send an additional 50 advisors to the Kurdistan region to train the Peshmerga, for a total of 100, after a 3 U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. delegation meets with senior Iraqi ocials. On visit from a Peshmerga delegation. September 14, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken along with Presiden- tial Envoy Brett McGurk, U.S. State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for 10 U.S. forces arrive to Qayyarah airbase. Four hundred of the 560 Dohuk Iraq Joseph Pennington, new U.S. Ambassador Douglas Silliman, and U.S. forces announced by U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter on July 11 CJTF-OIR commander General Townsend, met with Prime Minister Haidar arrived at Qayyarah airbase on September 17 to provide logistical Mosul Dam al-Abadi to discuss the ght against ISIS and the Mosul operation. -
Iraq SITREP 2016-03-14
Iraq Situation Report: March 8 - 14, 2016 1 Peshmerga claim that ISIS red chemical weapons shells at Sinjar. A Peshmerga 7 Military reinforcements continue deploying to Makhmur. e Ministry of Defense stated commander stated on March 10 that ISIS red 50 chemical weapon-lled rockets from that the 72nd Brigade of the 15th IA Division arrived in Makhmur to prepare for the villages south of Sinjar at Peshmerga forces in Sinjar district, west of Mosul. e report recapture of Ninewa on March 8, followed by reinforcements with heavy weapons and rocket remains unconrmed. launchers on March 11 as well as three battalions of Ninewa police and the 34th Brigade of the 9th IA Armored Division on March 13. 2 ISIS withdraws from western Anbar towns. Local sources stated on March 13 that ISIS withdrew from Hit District and Kubaisa, west of Ramadi, as well as Rutba in 8 Coalition airstrike reportedly destroys VBIEDs in western Salah al-Din western Anbar. “ousands” of civilians ed Hit and Kubaisa towards security desert. Joint Operations Command ( JOC) stated on March 10 that a forces to the north and south. ISIS forces returned to Rutba on March 14 Dahuk Coalition airstrike destroyed six Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive with armored vehicles and re-established control over the town’s Devices (VBIEDs) in al-Kasirat area southwest of Baiji. entrances. Mosul Dam 1 Mosul 3 Security forces clear areas west of Ramadi. Security Arbil 9 ISIS shells Taza District with chemical weapons. forces from the Iraqi Army (IA), Iraqi Police, and Counter ISIS red up to 40 mortar shells and rockets at Taza Terrorism Service (CTS) with tribal ghters and Coalition District, south of Kirkuk, on March 9 using airstrikes launched operations on March 8 on three axes 7 Suleimaniyah chemical weapons. -
Mapaction Powerpoint Maps - Iraq
MapAction PowerPoint Maps - Iraq Introduction The aim of this PowerPoint pack to provide you with some simple maps so that you can add your own data and information to them and use in presentations or reports. The maps are saved to the background so that your write or draw over them without touching the map itself. The PowerPoint pack provides all the tools that you would need to produce including symbols, callout boxes, legends and labels. All you need to do is copy and paste. How to guide Select the map you want to use. Add your data In the Labels and Symbology section there are ready made symbols, labels and callout boxes that can be cut and pasted onto your map. With the callout boxes, double click on them and begin typing your information. Contents Introduction and How to guide Country Map Northern Iraq Admin 1 Maps – White Admin 1 Maps – Colour Admin 1 Maps - Editable Labels and Symbology Logos Weblinks Data Collection MapAction User Guide Country Map Showing Country boundary and Department boundaries There are two types of country map: • Simple Country Reference Map – Copy and paste labels to map • Advance Country Reference Map – Admin boundaries colours can be changed. Select admin area, Right Click>>Format Shape>>Fill Contents Reference map of Iraq Reference map of Iraq This map is editable TURKEY DAHUK Dahuk Mosul Erbil ERBIL NINEWA Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk KIRKUK SULAYMANIYAH SYRIA SALAH AL-DIN Samarra DIYALA IRAN Ba`aqubah Ramadi Baghdad BAGHDAD ANBAR JORDAN Kerbala WASSIT Kut KERBALA Hilla Najaf Diwaniya MISSAN QADISSIYA Amarah -
The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq
The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq By Anthony H. Cordesman, Peter Alsis, Adam Mausner, and Charles Loi Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy Revised: December 20, 2011 Note: This draft is being circulated for comments and suggestions. Please provide them to [email protected] Chapter 6: US Strategic Competition with Iran: Competition in Iraq 2 Executive Summary "Americans planted a tree in Iraq. They watered that tree, pruned it, and cared for it. Ask your American friends why they're leaving now before the tree bears fruit." --Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.1 Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 1991 Gulf War, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since the 2003 war, both the US and Iran have competed to shape the structure of Post-Saddam Iraq’s politics, governance, economics, and security. The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling. However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US and its Gulf allies. -
Iraqi Red Crescent Organization
Iraqi Red Crescent Organization The Internally Displaced People in Iraq Update 30 27 January 2008 For additional information, please contact: In Iraq: 1. Iraqi Red Crescent Organization, President- Dr. Said Hakki, email: [email protected] 2. Iraqi Red Crescent Organization, Vice President- Dr. Jamal Karboli, email: [email protected] 3. International Relation Department manager [email protected]; Mobile phone: +964 7901669159; Telephone: +964 1 5372925/24/23 4. Disaster Management Department manager [email protected]; Mobile phone: +964 7703045043; Telephone: +964 1 5372925/24/23 In Jordan: Amman Coordination Office: [email protected]; Mobile phone (manager):+962 796484058; Mobile phone (deputy manager): +962 797180940 Also, visit the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization web site: iraqiredcrescent.org The Internally Displaced People in Iraq; update 30; 27 January 2008 Table of contents BACKGROUND..................................................................................................................................... 2 REFUGEES IN IRAQ................................................................................................................................ 2 RETURNEES FROM SYRIA ...................................................................................................................... 3 THE TURKISH BOMBARDMENT IN THE NORTH OF IRAQ .......................................................................... 3 THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDP)........................................................................................ -
Emergency Assessment Displacement Due to Recent Violence (Post 22 Feb 2006) Central and Southern 15 Governorates 24 Dec
EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT DISPLACEMENT DUE TO RECENT VIOLENCE (POST 22 FEB 2006) CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN 15 GOVERNORATES 24 DEC. 2006 REPORT Following are numbers of displaced as per reports received from monitoring partners since 22 February 2006 (details per governorate further below). As displacement is ongoing, please note that this information is constantly changing. No. of Individuals (family No. of number x Origin Displaced to Families 6) Sect Needs Baghdad, Basrah, Thi-Qar, Water, food, shelter, and non-food Kerbala, Missan Anbar 6,607 39,642 Sunni items Shia, and small group Shelter, employment opportunities, Baghdad, Anbar, and Diyala Babylon 3,169 19,014 of Sunni food Shia and Baghdad, Diyala, Anbar, Salah Sunni, al-Din, Kirkuk, Babylon, some Shelter, employment opportunities, Ninewa, Wassit Baghdad 6,651 39,906 Yazidi food Food, shelter, employment Baghdad, Anbar, Salah al-Din Basrah 1,439 8,634 Shia opportunities, legal assistance Baghdad, within Diyala, and Sunni and Shelter, employment opportunities, Salah Al Din Diyala 3,600 21,600 Shia food Tameem, Baghdad, Diyala, Food and non-food items, water, Salah al-Din, Anbar Kerbala 2,060 12,360 Shia shelter, employment opportunities Ninewa, Anbar, Baghdad, Salah al Din, Diyala, Wassit Missan 2,203 13,218 Shia Water,food, and non-food items Baghdad, Anbar, Kiyala, Salah al-Din, Babylon, Wassit Muthanna 950 5,700 Shia Water, shelter, food Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Ninewa, Babylon, Shelter, employment opportunities, Kirkuk Najaf 2,069 12,414 Shia food Christian, some Sunni Shelter, -
Working Paper IRAQ United Nations
Public Disclosure Authorized Working Paper Public Disclosure Authorized IRAQ United Nations/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment Transportation & Telecommunications Public Disclosure Authorized TASK MANAGER: MOHAMMED FEGHOUL, WORLD BANK AGENCIES PARTICIPATING: UNDP & ITU Public Disclosure Authorized October 2003 Joint Iraq Needs Assessment Working Paper – Transport and Telecommunications 2 Currency Rate Currency Unit: Iraqi Dinar (ID) US$1 = ID1,500 (August 2003) TRANSPORT.................................................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 3 HIGHWAYS, ROADS, AND BRIDGES............................................................................. 4 Characteristics and Summary Status................................................................................................................. 4 Institutional Structure, Staffing, and Financing ................................................................................................ 5 Priority Needs and Funding Requirements........................................................................................................ 6 AIRPORTS AND CIVIL AVIATION ................................................................................. 9 Airport Characteristics and Summary Status................................................................................................... 9 Airline Services ..................................................................................................................................................