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WestminsterResearch http://www.westminster.ac.uk/research/westminsterresearch Post-9/11 US civil-military relations and control of military strategy during Operation Iraqi Freedom Charlotte Louise Regan School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Languages This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of Westminster. © The Author, 2014. This is an exact reproduction of the paper copy held by the University of Westminster library. The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or copyright owners. Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial private study or research. Further distribution and any use of material from within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is strictly forbidden. Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: (http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e- mail [email protected] POST-9/11 US CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND CONTROL OF MILITARY STRATEGY DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM CHARLOTTE LOUISE REGAN A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 2014 For Dad ABSTRACT Current understanding of the post-9/11 US civil-military power relationship is clouded by the existence of various competing propositions as to whether civilian policymakers, military leaders or a combination of both have had the greatest influence in determining military strategy in Iraq. Motivated by the empirical and theoretical deficiencies of the post-9/11 US civil-military relations literature, this thesis traces the evolution of the shifting power relationship between civilian policymakers and military leaders in the formulation and implementation of US military strategy during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and explores the circumstances within which different balances of civil-military power occur. Using the policymaking process as an analytical framework, OIF is deconstructed into a series of decision points from 2001 to 2008 and the relative balance of civil-military power is identified at each according to one of five variations: Civilian Dominance; Shared Dominance Civilian; Shared Dominance; Shared Dominance Military; or Military Dominance. Using both qualitative and quantitative research methods, the thesis tests and explores the importance of six independent variables in explaining variations in the relative balance of civil-military power: civil-military preference divergence; civilian assertiveness; military assertiveness; civilian unity; military unity; and information advantage. In presenting a comprehensive analysis of civil- military power relations throughout OIF, the thesis offers a more nuanced response to the question of who controls US military strategy and demonstrates which independent variables hold the greatest potential for explaining variations in the relative balance of civil-military power. Analysis of the relationships between the dependent and independent variables reveals associations of varying strengths, thereby both confirming and challenging a number of the assumptions contained within the existing literature. By rooting contemporary research in the broader study of US civil-military relations, the thesis provides empirical clarity to the post- 9/11 period as well as offering theoretical insight into the civil-military relationship beyond the limits of OIF. TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Tables and Figures i Abbreviations iii Acknowledgements iv Author’s Declaration v Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 Literature Review 12 Chapter 3 Dependent and Independent Variables 34 Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology 50 Chapter 5 Control of US Military Strategy in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Dependent Variable – Analysis and Results 84 Chapter 6 Explaining Variation in the Relative Balance of Civil-Military Power: Independent Variables – Analysis and Results 107 Chapter 7 Conclusions 149 Appendix A The Six Phases of US Military Strategy in Operation Iraqi Freedom 162 Appendix B A Description of the Policymaking Model 165 Appendix C The Eighty-Nine Decision Points of Operation Iraqi Freedom 167 Appendix D Coding Data 172 Appendix E Spearman’s Rho Results: Statistics, Frequencies and Histograms 174 Bibliography 182 LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES TABLES Table 1 Summary of Hypotheses 49 Table 2 The Six Phases of US Military Strategy in Operation Iraqi Freedom 54 Table 3 A Breakdown of Decision Points for Phase One of US Military Strategy in Operation Iraqi Freedom 57 Table 4 Coding Descriptions for the Five Variations of the Dependent Variable 63 Table 5 Coding Descriptions for IV1, Civil-Military Preference Divergence 65 Table 6 Coding Descriptions for IV2, Civilian Assertiveness 69 Table 7 Coding Descriptions for IV3, Military Assertiveness 73 Table 8 Coding Descriptions for IV4, Civilian Unity 75 Table 9 Coding Descriptions for IV5, Military Unity 77 Table 10 Coding Descriptions for IV6, Information Advantage 79 Table 11 Guidance for Interpreting the Spearman’s rho Correlation Co-efficient 82 Table 12 Coding Frequencies for the Five Variations of the Dependent Variable 86 Table 13 Coding Frequencies for IV1, Civil-Military Preference Divergence 107 Table 14 Low Civil-Military Preference Divergence Decision Points and Dependent Variable Outcomes 111 Table 15 High Civil-Military Preference Divergence Decision Points and Dependent Variable Outcomes 112 Table 16 Coding Frequencies for IV2, Civilian Assertiveness 113 Table 17 Coding Frequencies for IV3, Military Assertiveness 123 Table 18 High Civilian Assertiveness and High Military Assertiveness Decision Points and Dependent Variable Outcomes 128 Table 19 Low Civilian Assertiveness and Low Military Assertiveness Decision Points and Dependent Variable Outcomes 129 Table 20 Coding Frequencies for IV4, Civilian Unity 130 Table 21 Coding Frequencies for IV5, Military Unity 134 i Table 22 High Civilian Unity and High Military Unity Decision Points and Dependent Variable Outcomes 140 Table 23 Coding Frequencies for IV6, Information Advantage 141 Table 24 Chapter Six Summary of Results 148 FIGURES Figure 1 Variations in the Relative Balance of Civil-Military Power Throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom 85 ii ABBREVIATIONS CENTCOM Central Command CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff CJTF-7 Combined Joint Task Force-7 COIN Counterinsurgency CPA Coalition Provisional Authority DP Decision Point DOD Department of Defense ICDC Iraqi Civil Defense Corps ISF Iraqi Security Forces JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq NSA National Security Advisor NSC National Security Council NSPD National Security Presidential Directive NSVI National Strategy for Victory in Iraq OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense TPFDL Time-Phased Force and Deployment List UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution VCJCS Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis would not have been possible without the generous financial support provided by the Centre for the Study of Democracy and the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Westminster. I am most grateful for the many opportunities this investment has provided. My particular thanks are due to Professor John Owens, Professor Simon Joss, and Dr. Tricia Hogwood, each of whom provided valuable guidance and encouragement as supervisors. Statistical assistance for the quantitative element of this thesis was provided by Boris Altemeyer, a fellow doctoral candidate, from the Psychology Department at the University of Westminster. My thanks to Boris for both his time and expertise. Completing the thesis would have been a much harder process without the understanding of my work colleagues, so my thanks go to the Student Funding and Scholarships team at the University of Westminster, particularly Steve Anderson and Sara Kathan. Amelia Cullern, Sam Huntley, Val Robinson, Giovanni Navarria, and my brother, Luke, each deserve special mention for always making a positive difference to the process of undertaking a PhD and to life in general. The thesis is dedicated to my dad, who was always very proud of his daughter’s academic endeavours. Although he is not here to see its completion, his support and motivation are nonetheless reflected in every page. iv Author’s Declaration I declare that all the material contained within this thesis is my own work. v CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION ‘The rift between U.S. military and civilian leaders did not start with George W. Bush, but his administration’s meddling and disregard for military expertise have made it worse. The new defense secretary must restore a division of labor that gives soldiers authority over tactics and civilians authority over strategy - or risk discrediting civilian control of the military even further.’ Michael C. Desch (2007), Bush and The Generals, Foreign Affairs, 86 (3), p97. ‘After the invasion, the pattern that seems more apparent to me . is not that Rumsfeld is running roughshod over his generals; it’s that the secretary is actually relatively passive. The dominating role is held by the generals. And so the basic dynamic between Baghdad and Washington, in