THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: AN ASSESSMENT Robert C. Martinage Thinking Center for Strategic Smarter and Budgetary Assessments About Defense CSBA CSBAonline.org The Global War On Terrorism: An Assessment Robert C. Martinage 2008 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent, non-partisan policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking and debate about national security strategy and investment options. CSBA’s goal is to enable policymakers to make informed deci- sions in matters of strategy, security policy, and resource allocation. CSBA provides timely, impartial and insightful analyses to senior decision makers in the executive and legislative branches, as well as to the media and the broader national security establishment. CSBA encourages thoughtful participation in the development of national security strategy and policy, and in the allocation of scarce human and capital resources. CSBA’s analysis and outreach focuses on key ques- tions related to existing and emerging threats to US national security. Meeting these challenges will require transforming the national secu- rity establishment, and we are devoted to helping achieve this end. CSBA is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich and funded by foundation, corporate and individual grants and contributions, and gov- ernment contracts. 1667 K Street, NW Suite 900 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 331-7990 http://www.CSBAonline.org Contents I. The War on Violent Islamic Radicalism—Key Judgments ..............................1 II. The Sunni-Based, Salafi-Jihadi Threat ............11 Ideological Roots ........................................................12 Ibn Taymiyya ..........................................................14 Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab .................................16 Sayyid Qutb............................................................17 Key Actors in the Salafi-Jihadi “Movement” .....................18 The Al Qaeda Core ..................................................19 Independently Operated “Franchises” ........................23 Individuals and Small Cells Inspired by Al Qaeda .........28 Goals, Strategy, and Lines of Operation .........................31 The Evolution of AQAM Goals ....................................32 Al Qaeda’s Strategy .................................................36 Lines of Operation ...................................................42 Capabilities ................................................................62 Leadership .............................................................63 Command, Control, and Communications (C3) ............69 Fundraising ...........................................................73 Recruitment, Indoctrination, and Training ...................78 Current Operations ..................................................84 III. Violent Shi’a Extremists — “Khomeinism” .......89 Ideological Roots ........................................................91 The Shi’a-Sunni Schism ............................................91 Revolutionary Shi’a Ideology: The Innovation of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ...............................94 Key Actors in the “Khomeinist” Branch of Global Terrorism....................................................97 The Islamic Republic of Iran ......................................98 Hezbollah (Party of God) ........................................ 101 Goals, Strategy, and Lines of Operation ....................... 105 Goals ................................................................... 105 Strategy ............................................................... 106 Lines of Operation ................................................. 108 Capabilities .............................................................. 122 Leadership ........................................................... 122 Military and Intelligence ......................................... 123 Recruitment, Indoctrination, and Training ................. 126 Current Operations ................................................ 127 IV. Regional Assessments ...................................131 Africa ...................................................................... 134 The Maghreb and Pan-Sahel ................................... 136 Somalia and the Horn of Africa ................................ 140 Russia and Central Asia ............................................. 145 Russia .................................................................. 145 Central Asia .......................................................... 147 Southeast Asia ......................................................... 150 Indonesia ............................................................. 151 The Philippines ...................................................... 156 The Americas ........................................................... 161 Southwest Asia and the Levant ................................... 165 Saudi Arabia ......................................................... 166 Lebanon ............................................................... 172 Iraq ..................................................................... 173 South Asia ............................................................... 190 Afghanistan .......................................................... 191 Pakistan ............................................................... 209 Europe ....................................................................230 V. Strategy and Capabilities for the “Long War” ........................................237 Sustain a Global Smother Campaign on Radical Islamic Terrorists ..................................... 240 Build Partner Capacity ........................................... 242 Generate Persistent Air and Maritime Surveillance-Strike Coverage ................................ 245 Conduct Clandestine and Covert Operations Globally ............................................. 249 Employ UW and Covert Action against State Sponsors of Terrorism and Transnational Terrorist Groups Globally ...................... 251 Defend and Hold the “Key Terrain” of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan .................................... 253 Maintain a “Surge” Capability for Protracted COIN and State-Failure Contingencies ....................... 256 Create and Exploit Fissures Among and Within Salafi-Jihadi Groups ................................ 259 Discredit Salafist-Jihadi and Khomeinist ideology and Promote Alternative Islamic Voices ......... 265 Isolate Islamic Extremists and Avoid Legitimizing the Call to Defensive Jihad ...................... 272 VI. Conclusion .....................................................277 I. The War on Violent Islamic Radicalism—Key Judgments Our enemies have fought relentlessly these past five years, and they have a record of their own. Bin Laden and his deputy Zawahiri are still in hiding. Al Qaeda has continued its campaign of terror with deadly attacks that have targeted the innocent, including large num- bers of fellow Muslims. The terrorists and insurgents in Iraq have killed American troops and thousands of Iraqis. Syria and Iran have continued their support for terror and extremism. Hezbollah has taken innocent life in Israel, and succeeded briefly in undermining Lebanon’s democratic government. Hamas is stand- ing in the way of peace with Israel. And the extremists have led an aggressive propaganda campaign to spread lies about America and incite Muslim radicalism. The enemies of freedom are skilled and sophisticated, and they are waging a long and determined war.1 —President George W. Bush, September 7, 2006 In some ways the violent radicalism that is wracking the Muslim world today is nothing new. Since the death of Muhammad in 632, Islamic history has been punctuated by many periods in which various heterodox sects have emerged and clashed violently with mainstream Muslims, as well as with the West. Indeed, as will be detailed in Chapter II, the ideological roots of today’s Salafi-Jihadi movement reach back to the Islamic scholar, Ibn Taymiyyah, who wrote at the dawn of the 14th Century. The practice of takfir, declaring fellow Muslims to be apostates deserving death for failing to adhere to specific interpretations of the 1 President George W. Bush, “President Bush Discusses Progress in the Global War on Terror,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, September 7, 2006. 1 Quran and hadith, is frequently invoked by al Qaeda and other terrorist groups today in much the same way as it was by the kharijites in the late 7th Century.2 What makes contemporary violent Islamic radicalism threatening to the West is the following: • Deep-seated, popular frustration across much of the Muslim world stemming from five centuries of civilizational decline fused with resentment and anger toward the West for its economic, scientific/technological, and military success, exacerbated by lingering hostility engendered by European colonization and exploitation of Muslim lands and, more recently, the creation and support of Israel;3 2 Mary R. Habeck, Knowing the Enemy—Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 175. 3 Assuming that Islamic radicalism is indeed fueled by frustration and anger stemming from the failure of the Islamic world to compete effectively against the West over the past half millennia, it is almost certain to remain a long- term problem because ongoing demographic and economic trends strongly suggest that the downward