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Iraq IV Report For IRAQ THE WAY AHEAD Phase Iv Report FREDERICK W. K AGAN A REPORT OF THE IRAQ PLANNING GROUP AT THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE IRAQ The Way Ahead Phase IV Report Frederick W. Kagan A Report of the Iraq Planning Group at the American Enterprise Institute Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 INTRODUCTION 3 CHAPTER 1: THE SECURITY SITUATION 5 Ethno-Sectarian Conflict 6 Drivers of Sectarian Violence 6 Breaking the Cycle of Sectarian Violence 8 Sectarian Cleansing 9 Foundations for a Peaceful, Mixed-Sect Baghdad and Iraq 11 Local Stability 11 Provincial Stability 13 National Stability 14 Insurgency and Terrorism 17 Al Qaeda in Iraq 17 Al Qaeda’s Reaction 18 Sunni Arab Insurgents 21 Shia Militias, Insurgents, and Terrorist Groups 22 Jaysh al Mahdi 22 Badr Corps 25 Fadhila 25 Special Groups 26 Iraqi Security Forces 28 The Iraqi Army 28 Size and Structure of the Iraqi Army 29 Anbar 30 Ninewah 30 Kirkuk/Salah ad Din 31 Diyala 31 Baghdad 31 Five Cities Area 32 Basra and Environs 33 Command Structures 33 Logistics 34 Iraqi Police 35 Iraqi National Police 35 Detainees 36 iiiiii IRAQ: THE WAY AHEAD CHAPTER 2: THE POLITICAL SITUATION 39 Major Political Parties 39 Sunni Parties 40 Shiite Parties 42 Central Government 45 The Presidency Council and the Council of Representatives 45 CHAPTER 3: PLANS AND PROSPECTS FOR 2008 48 Likely Developments, March–July 2008 48 Security 48 Politics 54 July–December 2008 55 Significant Events 55 Security and Politics 56 Fifteen Brigades—Bottom Line 60 The Risk in Additional Force Reductions in 2008 61 CHAPTER 4: THE WAY AHEAD: A PATH TO SUCCESS IN IRAQ 66 Key Tasks 66 Resources Required 75 APPENDIX A: DESTINATIONS AND INTERVIEWS IN IRAQ, FEBRUARY 1–11, 2008 77 Provinces Visited 77 Coalition Units Visited 77 Meetings with Iraqi Commanders and Officials 77 APPENDIX B: BENCHMARKS 78 APPENDIX C: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 80 NOTES 81 ABOUT THE IRAQ PLANNING GROUP AT AEI 84 Tables and Figures Table 1 Iraqi Progress on Political Benchmarks 15 Figure 1 Coalition Forces and Enemy Safe Havens and Transit Routes, Late 2006 (Fifteen U.S. Brigades) 50 Figure 2 Coalition Forces and Enemy Safe Havens and Transit Routes, January 2008 (Nineteen U.S. Brigades) 51 Figure 3 Possible Configuration of Fifteen Brigades by July 2008 52 Figure 4 Possible Configuration of Thirteen Brigades by December 2008 62 Figure 5 Possible Configuration of Ten Brigades by December 2008 63 iv Executive Summary he United States now has the opportunity to targeting their leaders and support Tachieve its fundamental objectives in Iraq bases and interdicting their lines of through the establishment of a peaceful, stable, secu- communication with Iran lar, democratic state and a reliable ally in the struggle ❍ Continuing to fragment the Jaysh al against both Sunni and Shiite terrorism. Such an Mahdi and prevent its reconstitution as accomplishment would allow the United States to an organized, cohesive fighting force begin to reorient its position in the Middle East from one that relies on antidemocratic states like Egypt • Mediating between hostile and discon- and Saudi Arabia to one based on a strong demo- nected groups: cratic partner whose citizens have explicitly rejected ❍ Sustaining local volunteers and al Qaeda and terrorism in general. The growth of anti- working with them and the Iraqi Iranian sentiment in both Sunni and Shiite Arab com- government to reintegrate them into munities in Iraq holds out the possibility that Iraq can Iraqi society and political life become a bulwark against Iranian aims in the region, ❍ Supporting the United Nations (UN) and that Iraq can, with American support, return to special envoy in negotiating a reso- its role of balancing Iranian power without being the lution of the Article 140 dispute regional threat it had become under Saddam Hussein. between the Kurds and the Arabs Coalition operations in 2007 have already dealt a ❍ Helping connect local, provincial, devastating blow to al Qaeda, and that success—and and national governments through the reaction of Iraqis to it—has opened the door to Provincial Reconstruction Teams achieving positive and important objectives in Iraq (PRTs), embedded PRTs, and the U.S. and throughout the region. military command structure as the Seizing this opportunity requires: Iraqis develop their own governmen- tal links • Winning the fight against terrorists and ❍ Overseeing the release of detainees, insurgents: particularly Sunni Arab detainees, and ❍ Continuing to protect the Iraqi popu- their reintegration into Iraqi society lation and helping the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) control both ethno- • Encouraging the growth of representative sectarian and terrorist violence and inclusive democracy that is already ❍ Defeating al Qaeda in Iraq and the underway: Sunni insurgency in their last strong- ❍ Supporting and helping to secure holds and preventing them from provincial elections in 2008 and reestablishing themselves in areas that Council of Representatives elections have been cleared in 2009 ❍ Continuing to attack Iranian-backed ❍ Assisting burgeoning grassroots Special Groups throughout Iraq, movements in both the Sunni and 1 IRAQ: THE WAY AHEAD Shiite Arab communities to develop ❍ Expanding the amount of reconstruc- representative political parties and tion assistance money designated for compete in elections Iraq, essential for generating leverage ❍ Deterring and containing efforts by in areas where American force pres- malign actors to intimidate or kill ence will be limited candidates or otherwise distort the ❍ Addressing legal restrictions on the use democratic process in the months of State Department funds to support leading up to elections local volunteers and establishing other meaningful demobilization, disarma- • Continuing to build the capacity of the ment, and reintegration programs ISF to fight and sustain themselves in a ❍ Continuing to identify and rapidly nonpartisan and nonsectarian way: deploy civilian experts to assist the ❍ Supporting the increase in the ISF Iraqi government and its security already underway forces in building the necessary capac- ❍ Accelerating the provision of equip- ity to function well and independently ment to the ISF under the U.S. For- eign Military Sales program or in The way ahead is clear. We must help the Iraqis other ways defeat Sunni and Shia extremists, terrorists, and ❍ Continuing to partner coalition units insurgents. This task is well underway. We must with Iraqi units in combat as the best mediate disputes between Iraqi communities at the way to improve the fighting profi- local, provincial, and national levels, in conjunction ciency of those units with the UN presence in Iraq and with Iraqi mecha- ❍ Continuing to track sectarian activ- nisms to resolve disputes. We must support those ities by ISF units, particularly the elements of Iraqi society and government whose National Police and the Iraqi Police, interests most closely align with ours, particularly the and pressing the government of Iraq Iraqi Army and grassroots movements in both Sunni to take appropriate actions to end and Shiite communities. We must commit to the such activities defense of Iraq against the interference or attack of its neighbors to encourage the rise of Iraqi nationalism • Providing the resources necessary to and of anti-Iranian sentiment already growing in accomplish these goals: Iraq. We must help guide Iraq through the forth- ❍ Keeping at least fifteen brigades in coming elections, which will be a formative period of Iraq through January 2009, with the the nascent Iraqi state. If current trends continue and possibility of brief surges in the fall if the United States plays its proper role, the elections and winter of 2008 of 2008 and 2009 can capture and capitalize on ❍ Extending and expanding the Com- social, political, and economic attitudes that may mander’s Emergency Response Pro- drive Iraq toward a close relationship with the U.S. gram funding based on common interests, threats, and objectives. 2 Introduction he civil war in Iraq is over. The overwhelming both Sunni and Shiite terrorism. Such an accom- Tmajority of Iraqis of all sects and ethnicities plishment would allow the United States to begin to have rejected al Qaeda, its ideology, and its methods. reorient its position in the Middle East from one that Al Qaeda in Iraq has been driven out of almost all of relies on antidemocratic states like Egypt and Saudi its major urban sanctuaries (with the exception of Arabia to one based on a strong democratic partner Mosul, where clearing is underway), and its ability whose citizens have explicitly rejected al Qaeda and to conduct large-scale coordinated attacks across terrorism in general. The growth of anti-Iranian senti- Iraq has been dramatically reduced. Moqtada al ment in both Sunni and Shiite Arab communities in Sadr’s Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) has been fragmented Iraq holds out the possibility that Iraq can become a and has fallen into fratricidal struggles. Iranian- bulwark against Iranian aims in the region, and that backed “Special Groups” continue their attacks Iraq can, with American support, return to its former using sophisticated weapons and techniques and role of balancing Iranian power without being the remain a concern, but they are increasingly isolated regional threat it had become under Saddam Hussein. from popular support within the Shiite community Coalition operations in 2007 have already dealt a dev- and even face tensions with “mainstream” JAM astating blow to al Qaeda, and that success—and the members. The dramatic reductions in violence, reaction of Iraqis to it—has opened the door to meet- combined with the growth of grassroots political ing positive and important objectives in Iraq and pressure, have driven the central government to throughout the region. make fundamental breakthroughs in legislation and Seizing this opportunity will not be easy. It will to increase its efforts to spend its own money on require continuing our successful counterinsur- development and reconstruction.
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