DOCSLIB.ORG

Coalition Cooperation

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Coalition Cooperation Coverage Inside www.mnci.centcom.mil/Chronicle Phantom Strike THE COALITION HRONICL CVolume 2, Issue 9 SeptemberE 2007 Coalition Indirect fires in Diyala • Cooperation U.S., Estonian troops team with ISF to clear Sab Al Bor Citizens stand up to insurgents THE COALITION CHRONICLE What’s The Official Magazine of Multi-National Corps-Iraq Inside September 2007 Volume 2, Issue 9 MNC-I Commander Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno Coalition MNC-I Public Affairs Officer Lt. Col. James Hutton Cooperation MNC-I Command Information Chief Americans, Estonians, Sgt. 1st Class VeShannah Lovelace Editor Iraqis team up to clear Staff Sgt. Jacob Boyer Sab Al Bor Staff Writers Sgt. D. A. Dickinson Sgt. Abel Trevino Cpl. Darhonda Rodela Page 5 Spc. Laura M. Bigenho Spc. Beatrice Florescu Spc. Stephanie Homan Coverage Inside Kicking Roll Grasping Phantom Strike onicle www.mnci.centcom.mil/Chr Things Off Out! Ramadan THE COALITION SeptemberE 2007 Indirect fires spark Tanks punish enemy Muslim holy month Lightning Hammer in Anbar explained HRONICL CVolume 2, Issue 9 Page 18 Page 19 Page 21 Coalition Indirect fires in Diyala in fires Indirect Cooperation • U.S., Estonian troops team with The Road A Better Citizens ISF to clear Back Tomorrow Stand Up Sab Al Bor Soldiers aid Baghdad School educates Aiding the Coalition district’s recovery juvenile detainees in Jurf as Sakhr Page 22 Page 24 Page 26 Citizens stand up to insurgents insurgents to up stand Citizens Departments This month’s covers Up front: Estonian Soldiers from Estonian Platoon 15 search for hidden weapons Commander’s Voice Coalition News Briefs with Staff Sgt. Erich Heinig, section Page 1 Page 4 sergeant, for 1/7 Cav., 1st Bde., 1st Cav. Div., during a joint operation in Sab Al Bor. Photo by Army Staff Sgt. Jon Cupp CSM’s Corner Freedom’s Focal Point On the back: Iraqi civilians travel to Page 2 Page 8 Imam Moussa al-Kadhim’s shrine in Khadamiyah Aug. 9. Photo by Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Summer M. Anderson. In Remembrance Page 28 Questions, comments and concerns about The Coalition Chronicle can be addressed via email at [email protected]. The Chronicle The Coalition Chronicle is an authorized monthly publication for members of the Department of Defense. accepts articles, photos and letters for submission. Contents of this monthly publication are not necessarily the official views of or endorsed by the U.S. Send submissions to veshannah.lovelace@iraq. Government or the Department of Defense. The editorial content of this publication is the responsibility centcom.mil. The Chronicle reserves the right to edit of the Public Affairs Office of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq. for security, accuracy, propriety, clarity and space. COMMANDER’S VOICE ood and bad, remarkable could be built. and mundane, through The Soldiers of 2nd Brigade, 1st two tours as a com- Infantry Division have experienced Gmander and dozens of their own shift in local senti- visits in other capacities, I’ve seen ments. The citizens of Baghdad’s a great deal here in Iraq. Though Ghazaliya district began to become my experiences are numerous, I familiar with Coalition and Iraqi continue to be amazed at things I Security Forces as joint security see every day: troops soldiering stations were constructed, safe through an arduous patrol on a neighborhood barriers began to blistering day, doctors and nurses go up, and the frequency of dis- working through relentless fatigue mounted patrols began to increase. to save the life of another Soldier, As they saw this effort to ensure and the adaptability of so many their safety, their trust and confi- troops carrying out missions or dence in Coalition Soldiers began tasks that aren’t in a manual or to rise as well. Though Ghazaliya part of their normal skill set. But Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno still lacks any substantial police MNC-I Commander most recently, I was amazed by support, the “Ghazaliya Guard- the uncommon bond that has been turned against extremists. The tide ians” have stepped into the breech, formed between former insurgents started to turn in this small town jointly manning checkpoints with the and Coalition troops. when a patrol from 2nd Brigade, 10th Iraqi Army to keep al-Qaida and other Many of these former insurgents Mountain Division discovered and extremists out of their community. felt alienated and disillusioned after cleared a VBIED that was set to deto- The vast majority of volunteers they were cast aside and lumped with nate in the center of the town. Soon like the “Ghazaliya Guardians” are former regime elements as we purged after, the nephew of Harith al-Dari, a looking to become a part of the Iraqi former Ba’athists from almost every local leader, was assassinated and the Security Forces. ISF leaders are still level of Iraq’s govern- citizens of Yusufiya wary of these new volunteers, mainly mental framework. decided they had because they have received little to However, these same We are now seen enough. They no guidance regarding these new citizens have recently felt compelled to volunteers and are unsure what to come to realize the pursuing our stop the indiscrimi- expect. Despite their reservations, this real evil in this coun- enemies into nant murder of their is truly an amazing development that try is not the Coalition friends and family has taken place, largely because of presence, but extrem- ever-shrinking members by al-Qaida the vigilance and diplomacy of young ist exploitation. As and they wanted our leaders like Phillips. Junior leaders the surge continues, pockets. help. and Soldiers on the ground are driv- the citizens of Iraq are One of the com- ing our success. They are meeting citi- sensing an ever in- pany commanders zens in their areas, gaining their trust creasing level of security. As they feel in the area, Capt. Palmer Phillips, and confidence, and helping change more comfortable in their homes and and the Soldiers of CompanyB, 2nd the course of Iraqi history. see the faces of Iraqi Security Forces Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, e want to continue to and Coalition troops in their neigh- introduced me to many of these com- capitalize on the mo- borhood every day, they also begin to munity leaders. Some were former mentum we’ve created trust those faces, which is now leading members of the Iraqi Army, others Wwith efforts like those to their cooperation. They are provid- were tribal leaders. All were united I’ve described. Building on our recent ing valuable intelligence to Iraqi and in their fight against al-Qaida. They offensive operations, we launched Op- Coalition forces, and they are joining spoke of the community’s seven tribes eration Phantom Strike. This opera- the fight against al-Qaida in Iraq by coming together to drive extremists tion consists of a series of targeted op- volunteering to be a part of the Iraqi from their homes and described how erations designed to intensify pursuit Security Forces in droves. scores of volunteers wished to join of extremists across Iraq. Extremist I saw a striking example of this sea the fight by joining the Iraqi Security support zones and safe havens were change recently in Yusufiya. Once Forces. One of the local Sheiks told us largely eliminated through Operation an al-Qaida stronghold just south of how he was so committed to securing Phantom Thunder, and we are now Baghdad, it has become another in a his community that he donated his pursuing our enemies into ever- long line of communities that have own land so a new Iraqi Police station shrinking pockets. Through quick The Coalition Chronicle 1 strike raids, the precision targeting of extremist leader- to reduce the capability of our enemies, as we have thus far ship, and a focus on the extremist’s most lethal accelerants during Phantom Strike, I believe we can continue to buy of violence — the IED and VBIED — we will continue to the Iraqis the time and space they so desperately need. diminish extremist influence throughout Iraq. By neutral- You are all doing exceptional work. If you would have izing the groups that foment the indiscriminant violence told most people just a year ago that al-Qaida would be that has gripped Iraq for far too long, we will continue on the run, the vast majority of the ISF would be carry- buying time for the Iraqi political process to negotiate the ing out their own missions, and former insurgents would solutions for a peaceful future. be standing beside us fighting extremists they probably ur enemy is ruthless and will no doubt attempt wouldn’t believe you, but that is exactly what you have to exploit the Ramadan season and influence done. Each of you has taken the initiative and helped to the debate back home by increasing their at- turn the tide. Without your hard work, dedication, and Otacks. So far we have experienced an astonishing selfless service there is absolutely no way we would be downward trend in the amount of IED incidents carried where we are today. Our course was set to secure Baghdad out just prior to Ramadan. Over the past three years, IED and its surrounding belts to buy the Government of Iraq attacks have peaked each year leading up to the Islamic and the Security Forces time to develop, and you have holy season, but this year the trend has been a reduction done that. You are accomplishing a mission most thought due to your recent hard work and dedication. We all must was impossible. You are all truly the heroes of our next remain vigilant and aggressive. If our operations continue greatest generation.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Army Press January 2017 Blythe
    Pfc. Brandie Leon, 4th Infantry Division, holds security while on patrol in a local neighborhood to help maintain peace after recent attacks on mosques in the area, East Baghdad, Iraq, 3 March 2006. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Jason Ragucci, U.S. Army) III Corps during the Surge: A Study in Operational Art Maj. Wilson C. Blythe Jr., U.S. Army he role of Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno’s III (MNF–I) while using tactical actions within Iraq in an Corps as Multinational Corps–Iraq (MNC–I) illustrative manner. As a result, the campaign waged by has failed to receive sufficient attention from III Corps, the operational headquarters, is overlooked Tstudies of the 2007 surge in Iraq. By far the most in this key work. comprehensive account of the 2007–2008 campaign The III Corps campaign is also neglected in other is found in Michael Gordon and Lt. Gen. Bernard prominent works on the topic. In The Gamble: General Trainor’s The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama, which fo- 2006-2008, Thomas Ricks emphasizes the same levels cuses on the formulation and execution of strategy and as Gordon and Trainor. However, while Ricks plac- policy.1 It frequently moves between Washington D.C., es a greater emphasis on the role of III Corps than is U.S Central Command, and Multinational Force–Iraq found in other accounts, he fails to offer a thorough 2 13 January 2017 Army Press Online Journal 17-1 III Corps during the Surge examination of the operational campaign waged by III creating room for political progress such as the February 2 Corps.
    [Show full text]
  • Counterinsurgency in the Iraq Surge
    A NEW WAY FORWARD OR THE OLD WAY BACK? COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE IRAQ SURGE. A thesis presented to the faculty of the Graduate School of Western Carolina University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in US History. By Matthew T. Buchanan Director: Dr. Richard Starnes Associate Professor of History, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. Committee Members: Dr. David Dorondo, History, Dr. Alexander Macaulay, History. April, 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Abbreviations . iii Abstract . iv Introduction . 1 Chapter One: Perceptions of the Iraq War: Early Origins of the Surge . 17 Chapter Two: Winning the Iraq Home Front: The Political Strategy of the Surge. 38 Chapter Three: A Change in Approach: The Military Strategy of the Surge . 62 Conclusion . 82 Bibliography . 94 ii ABBREVIATIONS ACU - Army Combat Uniform ALICE - All-purpose Lightweight Individual Carrying Equipment BDU - Battle Dress Uniform BFV - Bradley Fighting Vehicle CENTCOM - Central Command COIN - Counterinsurgency COP - Combat Outpost CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority CROWS- Common Remote Operated Weapon System CRS- Congressional Research Service DBDU - Desert Battle Dress Uniform HMMWV - High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle ICAF - Industrial College of the Armed Forces IED - Improvised Explosive Device ISG - Iraq Study Group JSS - Joint Security Station MNC-I - Multi-National-Corps-Iraq MNF- I - Multi-National Force – Iraq Commander MOLLE - Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment MRAP - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) QRF - Quick Reaction Forces RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade SOI - Sons of Iraq UNICEF - United Nations International Children’s Fund VBIED - Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device iii ABSTRACT A NEW WAY FORWARD OR THE OLD WAY BACK? COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE IRAQ SURGE.
    [Show full text]
  • Mcallister Bradley J 201105 P
    REVOLUTIONARY NETWORKS? AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN TERRORIST GROUPS by Bradley J. McAllister (Under the Direction of Sherry Lowrance) ABSTRACT This dissertation is simultaneously an exercise in theory testing and theory generation. Firstly, it is an empirical test of the means-oriented netwar theory, which asserts that distributed networks represent superior organizational designs for violent activists than do classic hierarchies. Secondly, this piece uses the ends-oriented theory of revolutionary terror to generate an alternative means-oriented theory of terrorist organization, which emphasizes the need of terrorist groups to centralize their operations. By focusing on the ends of terrorism, this study is able to generate a series of metrics of organizational performance against which the competing theories of organizational design can be measured. The findings show that terrorist groups that decentralize their operations continually lose ground, not only to government counter-terror and counter-insurgent campaigns, but also to rival organizations that are better able to take advantage of their respective operational environments. However, evidence also suggests that groups facing decline due to decentralization can offset their inability to perform complex tasks by emphasizing the material benefits of radical activism. INDEX WORDS: Terrorism, Organized Crime, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Insurgency, Networks, Netwar, Revolution, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Mahdi Army, Abu Sayyaf, Iraq, Philippines REVOLUTIONARY NETWORK0S? AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN IN TERRORIST GROUPS by BRADLEY J MCALLISTER B.A., Southwestern University, 1999 M.A., The University of Leeds, United Kingdom, 2003 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSPHY ATHENS, GA 2011 2011 Bradley J.
    [Show full text]
  • A Compilation of Reports by Several Organisations Submitted to The
    THE HUMAN RIGHS COUNCIL The Nine Session of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Reviewing The Human Rights Record of the United States of America United Nations- Geneva- November 2010 A compilation of Reports submitted to the OHCHR by The Arab Lawyers Union (ALU), The Iraqi Association Against War (IAAW), The Indian Movement (TUPAJ AMARU), Arab Lawyers Network, Association of Victims of the American Occupation (AVAO), North-South21, Association of International Humanitarian Lawyers (AHL), The Iraqi Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), Union of Arab Jurists, The Organization for Justice and Democracy in Iraq (OJDI), the International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (EAFORD), Conservation Centre of Environmental & Reserves in Iraq - Fallujah - (CCERF), Association of Human Rights Defenders in Iraq (AHRDI), Prisoners of War and Other Detainees in Iraq (POWD), Monitoring Net of Human Rights in Iraq (MHRI), The Association of Iraqi POWs, Studies Centre of Human Rights & Democracy in Fallujah (SCHRD), The Association of Iraqi Jurists (AIJ), Human Rights Division of the Association of Muslims Scholars in Iraq (AMSI), Al-Basaer Media Association (ABMA), General Federation of Iraqi Women (GFIW), General Arab Women Federation (GAWF), Women’s Will Association (WWA), The Organization for Widows and Orphans, (OWO), International Education Development (IED), Inc The Extra-territorial violations of the United States of America United Nations- Geneva- November 2010 Report Submitted by The Iraqi Association Against War (IAAW) and The Indian Movement (TUPAJ AMARU) "To initiate a war of aggression . is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole”.
    [Show full text]
  • ''L'impuissance De La Puissance?'': L'action Des Militaires Américains En Irak
    ”L’impuissance de la puissance ?” : l’action des militaires américains en Irak (2003-2008) Stéphane Taillat To cite this version: Stéphane Taillat. ”L’impuissance de la puissance ?” : l’action des militaires américains en Irak (2003- 2008). Histoire. Université Paul Valéry - Montpellier III, 2013. Français. NNT : 2013MON30003. tel-00834637 HAL Id: tel-00834637 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-00834637 Submitted on 17 Jun 2013 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. UNIVERSITE MONTPELLIER III- PAUL VALERY ECOLE DOCTORALE LANGUES, LITTERATURES, CULTURES, CIVILISATIONS DOCTORAT D’HISTOIRE MILITAIRE Stéphane TAILLAT « L’impuissance de la puissance ? » : l’action des militaires américains en Irak (2003-2008) Thèse dirigée par monsieur Jacques ABEN, Professeur des universités, Montpellier I Soutenue le 15 février 2013 Jury : (par ordre alphabétique) Monsieur Jacques ABEN, professeur des universités, Montpellier I Monsieur le général d’armée (2S) Elrick IRASTORZA, ancien CEMAT (expert) Monsieur Michel-Louis MARTIN, professeur des universités, Toulouse I-Capitole, (rapporteur) Monsieur Frédéric RAMEL, professeur des universités, Paris XI-Sud (rapporteur) Monsieur Frédéric ROUSSEAU, professeur des universités, Montpellier III-Paul Valery 1 « L’impuissance de la puissance ? » l’action des militaires américains en Irak (2003- 2008) : L’invasion et l’occupation de l’Irak ont montré les capacités des Etats-Unis de renverser un ordre politique, et les difficultés d’en construire un à leur profit.
    [Show full text]
  • During the 2007 Iraq Troop "Surge" Luke Mccorkel
    Washington University in St. Louis Washington University Open Scholarship All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) 1-1-2012 The evelopmeD nt and Application of the "Petraeus Doctrine" During the 2007 Iraq Troop "Surge" Luke McCorkel Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd Recommended Citation McCorkel, Luke, "The eD velopment and Application of the "Petraeus Doctrine" During the 2007 Iraq Troop "Surge"" (2012). All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs). 800. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/etd/800 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY University College International Affairs The Development and Application of the “Petraeus Doctrine” During the “2007 Iraq Troop Surge” by Luke Arthur McCorkel A thesis presented to the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts May 2012 Saint Louis, Missouri TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………….........1 CHAPTER 1: 2003-2005 “HOW TO WIN A WAR, LOSE A PEACE, AND CREATE AN INSURGENCY”……………………………………………………….3 CHAPTER 2: 2006- ATROCITES, CIVIL WAR AND GAMBLES……………….27 CHAPTER 3: 2007- ALL IN………………………………………………………...52 CHAPTER 4: 2008- AN IRAQI WAR………………………………………………75 CONCLUSION………………………………………………………………………82 BIBLIOGRAPY……………………………………………………………………...89 -ii - The Development and Application of the Petraeus Doctrine in the 2007 Iraq Troop Surge Luke McCorkel, Washington University in Saint Louis Master’s Thesis Abstract: In Spring 2007 President Bush ordered additional American troops to Iraq as part of a troop Surge to wage a counter-offensive based on the tactics of the newly developed Petraeus Doctrine.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Proxy War Against the United States and the Iraqi Government
    A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A paratrooper from 1-501 Airborne escorts a rogue Jaish Al Mahdi rocket cell militant to the pickup zone after completing a precision raid to disrupt the cell on August 12. SGT. ERNEST HENRY / U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PHOTO DEFENSE OF DEPARTMENT / U.S. HENRY ERNEST SGT. May 2006 – August 20, 2007 Iran’s Proxy War against the United States and the Iraqi Government by KIMBERLY KAGAN Summary Iran, and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah, have been actively involved in supporting Shia militias and encouraging sectarian violence in Iraq since the invasion of 2003—and Iranian planning and preparation for that effort began as early as 2002. The precise purposes of this support are unclear and may have changed over time. But one thing is very clear: Iran has consistently supplied weapons, its own advisors, and Lebanese Hezbollah advisors to multiple resistance groups in Iraq, both Sunni and Shia, and has supported these groups as they have targeted Sunni Arabs, Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and the Iraqi Government itself. Their infl uence runs from Kurdistan to Basrah, and Coalition sources report that by August 2007, Iranian-backed insurgents accounted for roughly half the attacks on Coalition forces, a dramatic change from previous periods that had seen the overwhelming majority of attacks coming from the Sunni Arab insurgency and al Qaeda. The Coalition has stepped-up its efforts to combat
    [Show full text]
  • Download The
    A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM A PUBLICATION OF THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR AND WEEKLYSTANDARD.COM U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multi-National Corps - Iraq, reviews a map with Capt. Eric Lawless, of the 1st Battalion, 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment, at Forward Operating Base Iskandariyah in Iraq on Dec. 25, 2006. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Curt Cashour) February 14 – June 15, 2007 The Real Surge: Preparing for Operation Phantom Thunder by KIMBERLY KAGAN Summary On June 15, 2007, Generals David Petraeus and Ray Odierno launched the largest coordinated military operation in Iraq since the initial U.S. invasion. The campaign, called Operation Phantom Thunder, aims to expel al Qaeda from its sanctuaries just outside of Baghdad. Denying al Qaeda the ability to fabricate car bombs and transport fi ghters through the rural terrain around Baghdad is a necessary prerequisite for securing the capital city, the overarching military goal for Iraq in 2007. Phantom Thunder consists of simultaneous offensives by U.S. forces throughout central Iraq. The Division north of Baghdad cleared the long-festering city of Baqubah and its outlying areas. The Division east and southeast of Baghdad is clearing the critical al Qaeda stronghold in Arab Jabour, immediately south of the capital. It is also destroying al Qaeda’s ability to transport weapons along the Tigris River and to send reinforcements from the Euphrates to the Tigris. The Division west of Baghdad is clearing al Qaeda’s sanctuaries between Fallujah and Baghdad, all the way to the shores of Lake Tharthar northwest of the capital.
    [Show full text]
  • Westminsterresearch
    WestminsterResearch http://www.westminster.ac.uk/research/westminsterresearch Post-9/11 US civil-military relations and control of military strategy during Operation Iraqi Freedom Charlotte Louise Regan School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Languages This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of Westminster. © The Author, 2014. This is an exact reproduction of the paper copy held by the University of Westminster library. The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or copyright owners. Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial private study or research. Further distribution and any use of material from within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is strictly forbidden. Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: (http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e- mail [email protected] POST-9/11 US CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND CONTROL OF MILITARY STRATEGY DURING OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM CHARLOTTE LOUISE REGAN A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 2014 For Dad ABSTRACT Current understanding of the post-9/11 US civil-military power relationship is clouded by the existence of various competing propositions as to whether civilian policymakers, military leaders or a combination of both have had the greatest influence in determining military strategy in Iraq.
    [Show full text]
  • FM 3-24 Og the Surge Jahn Bjørnar Haugen
    Forsvarets stabsskole Våren 2009 Masteroppgave Opprørsbekjempelse – doktrine og praksis FM 3-24 og The Surge Jahn Bjørnar Haugen 2 3 Abstract In the new wars of today, the principle of adaption to changing situations is put to the test. The enemy of the state is no longer regular forces and mass armies of other states, but dangerous individuals and armed insurgent groups, operating against a state. The enemies are operating without making the effort to distinguish themselves from the civilian population in order to overthrow the legitimate Government. The US issued a new counterinsurgency doctrine in December 2006 to deal with the growing problems in countering insurgent movements in Iraq and Afghanistan. The new counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the need to establish and maintain the security of the population. In January 2007 President Bush changed the mission of US forces to securing the population of Baghdad from sectarian violence. This paper examines to what extent the US operations in Iraq during the Surge are corresponding with the new counterinsurgency doctrine, FM 3-24. Similarities and differences were determined by examining counterinsurgency approaches and logical lines of operations in counterinsurgency against the US operations executed. The operations executed are mostly in line with the counterinsurgency doctrine. However, the shortfall in US and Iraqi security forces advocated, the establishment of concerned local citizens, and the neglect to guard the borders, may inflict on the long-term security situation for the Iraqi people. 4 Forord Forsvaret har det siste året gitt meg muligheten til å fordype meg i et fagfelt som siden operasjonene i Afghanistan og Irak startet har blitt stadig mer aktuelt.
    [Show full text]
  • Mitigating Munitions: the Consequences of Using Technology During Counterinsurgency Campaigns Pake L
    James Madison University JMU Scholarly Commons Masters Theses The Graduate School Spring 2017 Mitigating munitions: The consequences of using technology during counterinsurgency campaigns Pake L. Davis James Madison University Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019 Part of the Military History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Davis, Pake L., "Mitigating munitions: The onc sequences of using technology during counterinsurgency campaigns" (2017). Masters Theses. 504. https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/master201019/504 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the The Graduate School at JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized administrator of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Mitigating Munitions: The Consequences of using Technology during Counterinsurgency Campaigns Pake Levi Davis A thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree of Master of the Arts in History Department of History May 2017 FACULTY COMMITTEE Committee Chair: Steven Guerrier `Committee Members/ Readers: P. David Dillard Shah Mahmoud Hanifi Acknowledgements My thesis is a product of three professors. Dr. Jennifer Murray opened my eyes to American counterinsurgency while I was a student of hers at the University of Virginia’s College at Wise. It was in her class that I developed my interests in Vietnam and counterinsurgency, despite the collective groans that my classmates and I expressed when we discussed counterinsurgency. Dr. Murray also exposed me to the vast field that is Cold War history.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq and the Crimes of Aggressive War: the Legal Cynicism of Criminal Militarism John Hagan, Joshua Kaiser and Anna Hanson Index More Information
    Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-10453-2 - Iraq and the Crimes of Aggressive War: The Legal Cynicism of Criminal Militarism John Hagan, Joshua Kaiser and Anna Hanson Index More information Index Abu Ghraib prison, 64 – 65 legal cynicism of, 163 as source of legal cynicism, 202 – 3 modeling causes of militancy of, 177 – 79 torture scandal, 65 role of legal cynicism, 179 – 81 ad bellum circumstances, 2 , 36 Arango, Tim, 162 , 189 aggressive war. See wars of aggression attacks, civilian, preliminary fi ndings Aiken, George, 195 on, 150 – 52 Al-Qaeda, 96 Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), 96 Ba’ath Party, 17 , 97 Al-Fao effect, 23 religious groups and, 18 al-Hakim, Ayatollah Baqir, 42 Baghdad. See also Iraq al-Hashimi, Tariq, 198 , 205 about, 98 al-Jaafari, Ibrahim, 138 – 39 anticipated consequences of displacement Allawi, Ayad, 53 , 203 , 204 , 205 in, 118 – 24 al-Majid, Ali Hassan (Chemical Ali), 19 – 20 , 32 anticipation and amplifi cation of ethnic al-Maliki, Nouri, 4 , 12 , 108 , 133 , 138 – 40 cleansing in, 124 – 25 data on approval of, and Surge, 152 – 56 battle for, 107 – 8 refusal to concede 2010 election, 204 battle for, and Mahdi Army, 111 – 12 Surge and, 140 – 41 Current Violates Interview of family caught 2010 elections and, 204 in violence of, 108 – 11 U.S. relationship with, 137 Hussein regime and, 98 – 99 Al-Sadr, Muqtada, 42 , 43 , 96 – 97 , 100 , 101 – 2 , modeling ethnic cleansing in, 116 – 18 103 – 5 , 106 , 126 – 27 , 195 Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew, 97 Al-Sistani, Grand Ayatollah Ali Biden, Joe, 135 – 36 Al-Husayni, 104 Blackwater
    [Show full text]