Through Their Paces Operation New Blue Puts Locals

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Through Their Paces Operation New Blue Puts Locals Volume 2, Issue 8 August 2007 Paratroopers capture insurgent • Through Their Paces Operation New Blue puts locals Brits aid in training in charge of police stations THE COALITION CHRONICLE What’s The Official Magazine of Multi-National Corps-Iraq Inside August 2007 Volume 2, Issue 8 MNC-I Commander Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno MNC-I Public Affairs Officer Lt. Col. James Hutton MNC-I Command Information Chief Veshannah J. Lovelace Editor Staff Sgt. Jacob Boyer New Blue Staff Writers Iraqi communities get Sgt. Abel Trevino Cpl. Darhonda Rodela local policing under new Spc. Laura M. Bigenho recruiting program Spc. D. A. Dickinson Spc. Beatrice Florescu Page 3 Spc. Stephanie Homan Working Laying a August 2007 Together Nest Volume 2, Issue 8 Brits help 10th Mountain troops Airmen help Marines prepare for train Iraqi soldiers Ospreys’ arrival Page 18 Page 20 Paratroopers capture insurgent capture Paratroopers Nowhere Helping Rogue • to Hide Their Own Thunder Through their paces Air assault leads to Iraqi Army conducts Coalition Forces Operation New Blue puts locals in charge of their police stations capture of insurgent humanitarian ops reclaim Jamea’a training in aid Brits Page 22 Page 25 Page 26 This month’s covers Up front: Spc. James Boyd, a Task Force Marne military policeman in the 23rd Military Police Company runs with an Iraqi Departments Police recruit during Operation New Blue. Photo by Army Staf Sgt. Tony M. Lindback. On the back: Two Iraqi Army Soldiers Commander’s Voice Freedom’s Focal Point prepare to assault an enemy position Page 1 Page 6 during a mission near Khan Bani Sa’ad July 12 Photo by Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Scott Taylor. Coalition News Briefs In Remembrance Page 2 Page 28 Questions, comments and concerns about The Coalition Chronicle can be addressed via email at [email protected]. The Chronicle The Coalition Chronicle is an authorized monthly publication for members of the Department of Defense. accepts articles, photos and letters for submission. Contents of this monthly publication are not necessarily the official views of or endorsed by the U.S. Send submissions to veshannah.lovelace@iraq. Government or the Department of Defense. The editorial content of this publication is the responsibility centcom.mil. The Chronicle reserves the right to edit of the Public Affairs Office of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq. for security, accuracy, propriety, clarity and space. COMMANDER’S VOICE e ask a lot of each and thing of the past. The Iraqi Security every member of the Forces are now courageously stand- Coalition on a daily ing their ground, and absorbing basis. This is manifest- casualties for the cause of freedom. Wed in Operation Phantom Thunder, ll of this is coming to- which we began in mid-June, and in gether to yield some very our engagement with tribal leaders tangible progress. Not that want to cooperate with the gov- only are sectarian attacks ernment of Iraq and Coalition Forces Adown, cache finds up, and more to rid their neighborhoods of terror- extremist leaders eliminated, but the ism and extremism. It also includes people of Iraq are beginning to feel the establishment of joint security safe. Iraqi citizens are expressing the stations and combat outposts among fact that they feel an increased sense the population, which is gaining the of security and are thanking Coali- confidence of Iraqi citizens while tion Forces. We are also beginning simultaneously facilitating the con- to see those who previously left are Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno tinued growth and development of now returning to their homes. These MNC-I Commander Iraqi Security Forces. We are now are all positive trends and indicative seeing initial indicators of success caches, 1,300 found and cleared IEDs, of our focus on protecting the Iraqi due to your hard work and dedication as well as many VBIEDs and associated population. in these important tasks. factories neutralized since the begin- Our progress since Phantom Thun- In the past, when we focused opera- ning of Operation Phantom Thunder. der began is significant and has not tions in one area, some of the enemy The bottom gone un- would attempt to avoid Coalition line is we noticed. Forces and find a new “home.” How- are ready The Iraqi people are Recently we ever, due to your diligence and tireless and willing have had a efforts, as well as that of Iraqi Security to talk with clearly rejecting the large number Forces, there are fewer and fewer places leaders of of influential for al-Qaida in Iraq and other extrem- any groups Taliban-like mentality individuals ists to find safe haven. From al-Qaim, opposing and groups Haditha, Hit, Ramadi, and Fallujah to AQI or other of extremist groups visit Iraq to Habbaniyah, from Abu Ghraib to Arab extremist like al-Qaida. see for them- Jabour and to Baqubah, major popula- groups who selves what is tion centers in Iraq have been liberated want to work “really going from al-Qaida during the past six to the Coalition on.” Many seven months. Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, and the of them are surprised at what they The Iraqi people are clearly rejecting government of Iraq. find. They come over expecting to see the Taliban-like mentality of extremist nder the tutelage of our tran- a country in utter chaos, but most have groups like al-Qaida that offer no hope sition teams and partnered left with a much different perspective. for Iraq or its people. They are rejecting units, Iraqi Security Forces They see a country moving in the right these groups because they’re not only have made tremendous direction and beginning to take advan- tired of being exploited, intimidated Ustrides over the last six months. With tage of the opportunities provided by and terrorized by these rogue extrem- thousands of volunteers eager to sign the Coalition. We are still a long way ists, but also because they have come to up for army or police forces, manning from where we want to be, but we have understand that we are here to protect levels have increased. The most encour- taken significant steps to allow this the Iraqi people and help them along aging part is that not only do they have country to become a peaceful, produc- the path to a more peaceful future. more people to carry out their mis- tive, and stable member of the global The “Awakening Movement” that sions, but they are also demonstrating community. Quite simply, this would started in Anbar is now spreading to vastly improved technical and tactical not have been possible without all of more diverse provinces such as Diyala, proficiency which has increased the you. As one of our country’s leading Salah ad Din, Ninawa and North Babil. quantity and quality of ISF independent strategic thinkers, Dr. Anthony Cordes- Across Iraq, both Sunni and Shia are operations. They are fighting their own man, told me recently, “You have a raising their hand to join in the fight fights, and they are fighting hard. At remarkable team at every level.” I could against foreign and extremist influ- times when previously faced with an not agree more with his assessment, ences. intense fight, some soldiers and police- and I thank each and everyone of you Tips all over the country have led men of the Iraqi Security Forces would for your continued dedication and ser- to the discovery of over 600 weapons abandon their posts. That is truly a vice. CC The Coalition Chronicle 1 COALITION NEWS BRIEFS Operation Bastogne IA soldiers repel attack breaks up IED ring on Jamea’a outpost Speed, stealth and surprise are key ingredients to Coalition Outpost Lion was targeted in an insurgent any successful combat operation and the Paratroopers attack with two car bombs, rocket-propelled grenade and Soldiers from Task Force Steel are perfecting that and machine gun fire two days after it was established recipe day in and day out in North Babil. in the western Baghdad neighborhood of Jamea’a July The Steel task force of the 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry 26. Division put those assets to use in the early morning Members of 3rd Battalion, 5th Brigade, 6th Iraqi hours of July 1 during Operation Bastogne, a raid near Army Division repelled the attack on the unit’s newest the Chaka III area of North Babil. COP. “Operation Bastogne was designed to capture mem- An observation post in the neighborhood was at- bers of an improvised explosive device cell operating tacked with RPG and small-arms fire shortly after along Highway 1 and other roads in the north Babil noon. The Iraqi soldiers rushed to the scene to assist province,” said Capt. Stew Lindsay, a native of Freport after a car bomb detonated seven blocks away. Two Penn., and commander of Company C, 3rd Battalion, Iraqi Army vehicles in the convoy suffered damage 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment. and four Iraqis suffered light wounds in the attack. In addition to capturing the IED cell members, the A second car bomb exploded 15 minutes later two operation captured hundreds of rounds of 7.62mm blocks south of the outpost. Two IA vehicles were sniper ammunition, IED making materials and an in- damaged and two soldiers received minor wounds in struction manual on how to construct IEDs.CC that attack. No IA or Coalition Forces were killed dur- ing the incident. The attacks were believed to be in response to the Anbar Marines step up extablishment of COP Lion earlier in the week. Iraqi Army soldiers man the outpost with the help of Coali- urban operations tion Forces.
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