Stressing Knowledge Stressing Knowledge Closed-Ness and Organisational Under Pressure Acquisition

Stressing Knowledge Stressing Knowledge Stressing Knowledge Organisational closed-ness and knowledge acquisition under pressure Organisational closed-ness and knowledge acquisition under pressure Organisations have been analytically conceptualised as being somewhat analogous to individuals for a long time. They have culture; they can learn; and they can behave in various odd ways. Mats Koraeus Mats Koraeus But how far can the simile be stretched? What other types of organisational cognition can we imagine? And what benefits can we gain by introducing new perspectives of this kind? This study shows that organisations can exhibit familiar symptoms of stress, such as closing themselves to the outside world and becoming unreceptive to external stimuli and input. They retreat to what is familiar and safe and put on blinders to hide anything that does not already fit with how they feel things should be, often in situations where they would be best served by being as open to and perceptive of these external stimuli as possible. Using a model of organisational behaviour that connects external pressure to an internal mode of operation and to specific knowledge-seeking behaviours, the study examines two case pairs—two success stories and two catastrophic failures—to examine patterns of organisational cognition. By comparing and contrasting the failure of the FBI during the 1993 Waco siege with its subsequent success during the 1996 Montana Freemen standoff, and doing the same with the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s handling of the 2004 Southeast Asian tsunami and the 2006 evacuation from the war in Lebanon, a pattern emerges where certain types of knowledge proved to be the key to staying as open-minded, responsive, and dynamic as these crises demanded. This knowledge can be used both during a crisis to resolve some of the confusion and time pressure that is endemic to such situations, as well as before a crisis to mitigate or even stave off the approaching chaos. Mats Koraeus is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands. Mats holds an MA in political science from Uppsala University in Sweden. For several years, Mats has worked at the Center for Crisis Management Research and Training (CRISMART) at the Swedish Defence University. ISBN: 978-91-86137-65-6 ISSN: 1650-3856 46 Volume 46 Stressing Knowledge Organisational closed-ness and knowledge acquisition under pressure Stressing Knowledge Organisational closed-ness and knowledge acquisition under pressure Author: Mats Koraeus Title: Stressing Knowledge — Organisational closed‑ness and knowledge acquisition under pressure. Author: Mats Koraeus ISBN: 978‑91‑86137‑65‑6 ISSN: 1650‑3856 urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva‑7079 (http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva‑7079) Printed by: Arkitektkopia AB, Bromma, Sweden 2017 Cover image courtesy of the author. Stressing Knowledge Organisational closed-ness and knowledge acquisition under pressure Proefschrift ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen op gezag van de rector magnificus prof. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken, volgens besluit van het college van decanen in het openbaar te verdedigen op maandag 4 december 2017 om 10.30 uur precis door Mats Åke Peter Koraeus geboren op 28 maart 1976 te Visby (Zweden) Promotor: Prof. dr. Bertjan Verbeek Copromotor: Dr. Fredrik Bynander, Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm, Zweden Manuscriptcommissie: Prof. dr. Kristina Lauche Prof. dr. Paul ’t Hart, Universiteit Utrecht Prof. dr. Eric K. Stern, University at Albany, New York, Verenigde Staten Stressing Knowledge Organisational closed-ness and knowledge acquisition under pressure Doctoral thesis to obtain the degree of doctor from Radboud University Nijmegen on the authority of the Rector Magnificus. dr. J.H.J.M. van Krieken, according to the decision of the Council of Deans to be defended in public on Monday, 4 December 2017 at 10.30 hours by Mats Åke Peter Koraeus born 28 March 1976 in Visby (Sweden) Supervisor: Prof. dr. Bertjan Verbeek Co-supervisor: Dr. Fredrik Bynander, Swedish Defence University, Stockholm, Sweden Members of the Doctoral Thesis Committee: Prof. dr. Kristina Lauche Prof. dr. Paul ’t Hart, Utrecht University Prof. dr. Eric K. Stern, University at Albany, New York, United States of America I confess that I have as vast contemplative ends, as“ I have moderate civil ends: for I have taken all knowledge to be my province” – Francis Bacon, Letter to William Cecil, 1st Baron Burghley (ca. 1593) Contents Acknowledgements 1 Chapter 1: Introduction 3 1.1 Aim & purpose 9 1.2 A quick note on crises 11 1.3 Closing in on a question 12 1.4 Research questions 13 1.5 Design 15 1.6 Relevance 17 1.7 Structure 18 Chapter 2: The Framework 21 2.1 Modelling the pressure on organisations 21 2.2 The black box: the organisation itself 26 2.2.1 The fundamental issue: organisational cognition 28 2.2.2 What counts as “open” and “closed”? 29 2.2.3 The ideal types of openness and closed-ness 31 2.3 The output of the black box: knowledge and the use of expertise 33 2.3.1 Tacit & explicit knowledge 37 2.3.2 Managing knowledge transfer: the SECI process 38 2.3.3 Managing knowledge discovery: MESO-knowledge 41 2.3.4 Benefits of a MESO perspective over other theories 44 2.4 Towards a hypothesis on organisational behaviour 48 2.5 Input #1: the effect of crises on organisations 50 2.5.1 Managing uncertainty: the cybernetic approach 53 2.6 Input #2: the anticipation of process. 56 Chapter 3: Methodology 63 3.1 Structured focused comparison 63 3.1.1 Theory selection & alternative interpretations 64 3.1.2 Case selection 66 3.1.3 Sources & critique 69 3.2 Operationalisation 71 3.2.1 Crisis or non-crisis 72 3.2.2 Anticipation of process 73 3.2.3 Open or closed 74 3.2.4 MESO-usage 77 3.3 Expected outcomes 79 3.4 Falsification 80 3.4.1 The identification paradox, trust feedback, and issues theory critique 81 3.5 Generalisation and limitations 82 Chapter 4: The 1993 Waco Siege 85 4.1 Background 85 4.1.1 The Branch Davidian of the Seventh-day Adventist Church 87 4.1.2 The Federal Bureau of Investigation 91 4.2 Chronology of events 95 4.2.1 February 28 – The ATF Raid 96 4.2.2 Negotiations 98 4.2.3 Stalemate 100 4.2.4 Planning the end 105 4.2.5 April 19 – The FBI raid 109 4.3 Aftermath 110 4.4 Analysis 111 4.4.1 Organisational context 117 4.4.2 The nature of the crisis 120 4.4.3 Anticipation of due process 127 4.4.4 Organisational closed-ness 129 4.4.5 MESO usage 133 4.4.6 Conclusions from Waco 138 Chapter 5: The 1996 Montana Freemen Standoff 141 5.1 Background 142 5.1.1 The Roundup and Jordan Freemen 142 5.1.2 The FBI after Waco 147 5.2 Chronology of events 150 5.2.1 The Ohs negotiations 152 5.2.2 The Gritz negotiations 154 5.2.3 Renewed tension 156 5.2.4 Increased pressure 159 5.2.5 Legal aid 161 5.3 Aftermath 162 5.4 Analysis 164 5.4.1 Organisational context 167 5.4.2 The nature of the crisis 169 5.4.3 Anticipation of due process 176 5.4.4 Organisational closed-ness 178 5.4.5 MESO usage 184 5.4.6 Conclusions from Montana 189 Chapter 6: The 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami 191 6.1 Background 192 6.1.1 The Swedish Government Offices (RK) 194 6.1.2 The national agencies 197 6.2 Chronology of events 201 6.2.1 Day one – waking up to a crisis 204 6.2.2 Days two and three – grasping the scope 211 6.2.3 The new year – structure and cool-down 217 6.3 Aftermath 219 6.4 Analysis 220 6.4.1 Organisational context 223 6.4.2 The nature of the crisis 225 6.4.3 Anticipation of due process 231 6.4.4 Organisational closed-ness 233 6.4.5 MESO usage 238 6.4.6 Conclusions from the tsunami 243 Chapter 7: The 2006 Lebanon Evacuation 245 7.1 Background 246 7.1.1 New actors in the mix 247 7.1.2 The political aftermath of the commission report 250 7.2 Chronology of Events 251 7.2.1 Responding to a crisis 252 7.2.2 Bringing people home 255 7.2.3 Success (?) 259 7.3 Aftermath 260 7.4 Analysis 261 7.4.1 Organisational context 263 7.4.2 The nature of the crisis 264 7.4.3 Anticipation of due process 271 7.4.4 Organisational closed-ness 273 7.4.5 MESO usage 278 7.4.6 Conclusions from the Lebanon evacuation 282 Chapter 8: Conclusions 285 8.1 Questions and answers 286 8.1.1 Hypothesis I: Varying degrees of crisis 286 8.1.2 Hypothesis II: varying degrees of anticipation of process 287 8.1.3 Hypothesis III: varying degrees of closed-ness 287 8.2 Qualifications on the case comparisons. 288 8.2.1 Examining Hypothesis I 289 8.2.2 Examining Hypothesis II 292 8.2.3 Examining Hypothesis III 293 8.3 Further considerations 294 8.3.1 Foreign and domestic arenas 295 8.3.2 Institutional differences 298 8.3.3 Politicisation 303 8.3.4 The learning and cybernetic aspects 308 8.3.5 Preparedness and prevention – amending the model? 312 8.4 What have we gained? 314 8.4.1 Knowledge – more than just tacit and explicit 314 8.4.2 The pressure on organisations 316 8.4.3 A measure of learning 318 8.4.4 Generalisability 319 8.4.5 Methodological improvements 321 8.4.6 Research agenda 323 References 325 Executive summary 345 Samenvatting in het Nederlands 357 List of figures Figure 1: A model of the pressure on organisations.

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