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Flipside View of Chinese Disengagement

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Flipside View of Chinese Disengagement Picture Courtesy: Wikimedia Commons Flipside View of Sino-Indian Troop Disengagement: Victory or Lesson? Dr R Srinivasan 1 The Backdrop The troop buildup in the wake of the Galwan clashes in June 2020 had culminated in both sides agreeing to withdraw to ‘erstwhile’ positions. The International community as well as Indian establishment had stood the test well. The ‘pat-on-the-back’ to all Indian actors on the stage including the military top brass liberally being handed by strategic analysts across the spectrum is understandable. Reaching a climax of pumping over 100000 thousand troops each by the two sides and nearly 200 tanks at least on the Chinese side in the eight-month long stand-off was a potential explosive for which some trigger-happy local commander on either side had to just light the fuse in a momentary rush of adrenaline. Barring the Galwan clash, both the sides apparently held their head, kept their fists clenched, but withheld a punch. The diplomatic and political establishment in India went on a hyper drive soliciting international support and mobilizing counter show of strength through QUAD, PASSEX, MALABAR, and other exercises. A concerned world, more due to their own perceived threats from Chinese dominance in SCS than out of concern for protecting India’s geographical integrity or international prestige, pitched in. In the ‘who-will-blink-first’ test of will, eventually both India and China agreed to pull back their troops. On January 11th, Hindustan Times reported that Chinese pulled out over 10000 troops from the area (Singh, January 10, 2021)i. Just about a month later, on February 12th, Hindustan Times (Gupta, February 12, 2021)ii again reported that the Chinese withdrew 200 tanks and used over 100 heavy troop-carrying vehicles within 48 hours after reaching agreements with Indian authorities. The speed with which the disengagement was carried out took the Indian planners by surprise. Though approbation for diplomatic finesse and hard standing were handed to the Indian authorities, the speed of disengagement also sounded a note of caution as to Chinese capability for re- deployment. The standoff had continued through harsh Himalayan winters, which some analysts of 1962 war had predicted, was the reason for unilateral withdrawal back then. This time around, that theory did not hold any water! Also, Chinese had showed no signs of let up almost till the announcement – the offensive media attack alleging hegemonistic attitude by India continued in the same tone and tenor. Despite, many rounds of troop level to ministerial meetings, international facilitation and pressure, the mood on ground remained grim. And, suddenly, when the Himalayan snow showed similar signs, the standoff thawed, both sides blinked and troops started melting away. The Hypothesis Did the tough Indian stand do the magic by itself? We infer that it did not. We hypothesize that China had more immediate concerns to be addressed a little farther east, in Myanmar. India could be handled later for there is nothing 2 stopping them from coming back at a more suitable time. Hence, it set up the elaborate show of playing for peace, again successfully diverting the world attention from discovering its intent. Having made this hypothesis, we turn to Sino-Myanmar relations in search of facts that may prove or negate our hypothesis. Myanmar and Chinese Interests History reveals that China’s claim that Burma (Myanmar) has been a tribute paying vassal in a continuum is incorrect. Trager (Trager, 1964)iii records many historical incidents that the relationship with China varied from conciliatory to contest predominantly owing to the trade interests between both the kingdoms that spanned Yunnan province of China. While the Chinese Emperors continued to pretend Myanmar as a tribute paying vassal state, Burmese kings continued to raise, unite and at times defeat the invading Chinese armies. However, these cat and mouse relations changed in the aftermath of the second Anglo-Burmese war. The British conquest ended up annexing the Northern areas into British India solely with the purpose of promoting trade with western China and Yunan. The British went to the extent of appeasing the Chinese Emperor (even after their singular victories in the two Opium Wars) by signing the ‘O’Connor Convention Relating to Burma and Thibet’ in 1886. Under the terms of this convention, Britain appropriated the right to do whatever was proper in Burma (Article II), in return for an apparently meaningless gesture of continuing to send decennial missions to the Chinese Court (tribute paying) that suited the Chinese sensibilities (Trager, 1964, P.38)iv. Thus, Burma came to be ingrained in Chinese psyche as an essentially Chinese tribute paying vassal. When Burma, India and China attained their statehoods, Burmese anxiety over possible Chinese invasion of Burma remained credible. Thus, Burma even requested India to wait for the Burmese government to become the first nation to recognize PRC outside the Communist Bloc. India readily obliged. Burmese eagerness to please China was essentially out of the stated apprehension (FAN, 2012)v. That the Burmese question was of important to China as well as India from the early periods of their formation as nations could be seen from the recorded discussions between Mao and Nehru in 1954 cited below (Wilson Centre, n.d)vi: Mao: The Burmese government is the most suspicious of us, and that is because there is revolution in their country. They suspect that we will help the revolutionaries to overthrow the government and that we will deliver weapons to the revolutionaries. When Premier Zhou visited Burma, he discussed this matter with Prime Minister U Nu. Prime Minister U Nu will be visiting China in one-months’ time. We will discuss [this] with him again. We will clarify this matter in accordance with the Five Principles. Now there are also Guomindang troops in Burma, and we have never used 3 this as an excuse. We know that Burma faces difficulty, and this needs to be resolved gradually. But the existence of the Guomindang troops in Burma is disadvantageous to both China and Burma. But we will only tighten the defense of our borders and will not cross the border. As for how Burma will deal with the Guomindang troops, it is Burma’s own business. We understand the difficulty that Burma is facing. There are two communist parties in Burma. One is the Red Flag, and the other one is the White Flag. This is also Burma’s own business. We do not even know who they are. The two parties all developed after Japan’s occupation of Burma, and they belonged to the same alliance of which Prime Minister U Nu’s party was also a member. Nehru: In the past five to six years, it was the Karen people who have been making trouble. They have received support from American officers (but not necessarily the American government) and have also received weapons from America. American churches have also made the Karens Christians. The Karens have made troubles more than anyone else. As for the communist party, I also know that there is the difference of the Red Flag and the White Flag, but many of those who claim themselves to be communists actually know little about communism. They have no discipline and they are irresponsible. But the main trouble has come from the Karens. In order to show their discontent with America’s support to the Karens, Burma turned down America’s technological support last year. Mao: The Guomindang troops in Burma have also been supported by the United States. Aid has been delivered via Thailand. The Karens are not beneficial to Burma, and the Guomindang troops are not beneficial to Burma either, but they have received support from the United States. Probably, Britain also feels unhappy with these pro-American forces. As to the Burmese Communist Party, we have never given them a single gun, and we do not plan to give them help now. In the past, we supported Ho Chi Minh. (Italics added for emphasis) The instances covered bring out three essential Chinese interests in Burma: the alleged historical claim to sovereignty over Burmese territories (duly supported by O’Connor Convention); The Karen Question and the presence of Kuomintang in Burma that is seen as a potential security risk to western China. China’s foreign policy objectives of thwarting western imperialistic (read as capitalistic) influences in Asia at large that guided their policy options initially under Mao, also underwent a gradual but distinct change. In the next twenty years after 1949, its foreign policy tilted “toward efforts to win Asian neighbors away from alliances with the West through offers of peaceful coexistence” (Van Ness, 1970)vii. Such a tilt could possibly have been the result of anti-Chinese revolt in Burma in 1967. 4 The period 1970-1990, however kept China focused inwards during which increasing US engagements in South Asia, especially of US partnerships with Thailand in SEATO and involvement in Vietnam were viewed as attempts at containment of China. However, these developments also led to recalibration in foreign policy by CCP. There are two specific instances of almost simultaneous occurrence in China and Burma that would perhaps call for critical revision of China’s foreign policy approach towards Burma: the nationwide uprising against Ne Win regime in Burma in 1988 and the Tiananmen Square massacre in China in 1989 – both attracted swift international sanctions at the behest of USA on these countries. International whiplash perhaps set both the countries to re-evaluate their relations. As Hongwei (2012, P.24)viii observes: With China’s domestic rapid economic development and economic structure adjustment particularly after 1990s as well as western sanction on Myanmar, Beijing’s perception on Burmese geo-strategic value changed once again.
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