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CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

International security studies

Master thesis

2020 James Iocovozzi 2

CHARLES UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

International security studies

James Iocovozzi

Structural Violence and Great Power Competition: The Effects of Sino-U.S. Geopolitical Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific

Master thesis

Prague 2020 3

Author: BA. James Iocovozzi

Supervisor: Mgr. Michal Kolmaš, Ph.D.

Academic Year: 2019/2020

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Bibliographic note

IOCOVOZZI, James, H. Structural Violence and Great Power Competition: The Effects of Sino- U.S. Geopolitical Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. Mater thesis. Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, International Security Studies. Supervisor Mgr. Michal Kolmaš, Ph.D.

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of the ongoing strategic rivalry between China and the United States for influence over the Indo-Pacific in order to demonstrate the negative impacts upon structural violence within the region. Using an amalgamation from various authors, this paper establishes a definition and set of criteria for the presence of structural violence which are then applied to the cases of Vietnam, Myanmar, and Japan. By correlating the mechanisms with which China and the United States garner influence with the specific consequences for the prevalence and severity of structural violence, this paper illustrates that the ongoing geopolitical rivalry poses considerable threats to all Indo-Pacific nations regardless of their development status or social, political, economic, and geographic characteristics. Results indicate that the extent of each country’s structural violence was directly or indirectly affected by the presence of foreign involvement, and that different levels of alignment or independence can serve to reduce or exacerbate these effects. Furthermore, evidence indicated that China’s methods pose a more immediate threat to induvial countries, but that the United States is by no means inculpable. It has been determined, therefore, that the continued development of Indo-Pacific countries faces critical concerns as the self-interested nature of China and the United States’ rivalry shows no signs of subsiding.

Keywords: Structural Violence, Globalization, Spheres of Influence, Geopolitics, Indo- Pacific, Regional Competition, Great Power Rivalry.

Range of thesis: 80 pages, 199 241 characters

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Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague, 31 July 2020 James Iocovozzi

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank my girlfriend Alex for all of her emotional support throughout this process and for being patient with me even during the most stressful of times. I would also like to thank my flat mate Connor who has been going through the process with me and who has been a valuable source of both assistance and distraction during much needed breaks.

I would like to thank my parents, Kim and Helen for their endless support and encouragement throughout these past two years as well as my sisters, Chamberlain, Emily, Sarah, and Nelle for their reassurance and positivity.

I would like to thank the entire MISS department for all of its work in providing its students with a great education even through these recent times of uncertainty.

Finally, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Michal Kolmaš for inspiring my interest in Asian security and for all of his valuable guidance and assistance throughout the writing process. 8

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Contents

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….. 10 Globalization and Structural Violence…………………………….……………………….11 Sino-U.S. Strategic Rivalry…………………………………………………………….…….14 The New Great Game…………………………………………………………………………14 Rivalry and Structural Violence …………………………………………………………….20 Data and Literature …………………………………………………………………………………….23 Methods …………………………………………………………………………………………………24 Case Selection………………………………………………………………………………….24 Method of Analysis ……………………………………………………………………………26 Case Studies …………………………………………………………………………………………….27 Vietnam …………………………………………………………………………………………27 Myanmar ………………………………………………………………………………………..45 Japan……………………………………………………………………………………………..63 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………81 Final Remarks …………………………………………………………………………………………..85

Bibliography …………………………………………………………………………………………….92

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Introduction

Contemporary globalizations has facilitated a level of interconnectedness which permeates nearly ever aspect of domestic and international relations by tying disparate countries together through mutual economic, cultural, and political exchange. In doing so, globalization has transformed the international landscape and augmented the ways in which nations interact with one another. Interconnectedness has produced numerous beneficial outcomes such as the permeation of technological advancements, global improvements in living standards through poverty reduction, and lower costs for goods and services through specialization. However, globalization has the simultaneous effect of exacerbating certain negative trends such as global inequality and unemployment and can pose considerable challenges for developing nations under the influence of foreign economic investment and diplomatic interference.

This dichotomy is particularly evident within the Indo-Pacific which encompasses counties within Southeast and East Asia as well as those adjacent to the Indian and Pacific oceans. Due to its position along vital shipping routes, the abundance of natural resources, and its rapid economic growth, the Indo-Pacific is now considered to be of significant strategic value. International investment has spurred rapid development and considerable socio-political advancements within the region as major powers vie for influence through various economic and diplomatic mechanisms. Yet, rising levels of foreign involvement also pose major threats to Indo-Pacific states as the region becomes the new center point for Sino-U.S. geopolitical maneuvering.

Increasing competition between China and the United States for supremacy over the Indo-Pacific has created or exacerbated various forms of structural violence within the region as the two major powers implement diverse methods for garnering economic and political influence. By acting upon self-interest and ignoring the resulting consequences, the Sino-U.S. rivalry has served to support Indo-Pacific governments whose policies and regulations have caused inequality and human insecurity among their individual citizens and ethnic minority groups. By offering support without criticism, the United States and China have effectively routinized certain forms of structural violence while simultaneously hindering natural social development. Because little work has been done towards elucidating the immediate and specific consequences of ongoing competition between China and the United States for influence over 11 the Indo-pacific, this paper seeks to demonstrate that such competition has a direct impact on the presence and severity of structural violence within the region. In order to present an accurate representation of the region as a whole, the countries under consideration include Japan, Vietnam and Myanmar, as each display ongoing forms of human insecurity which are likely sustained, exacerbated or created by the presence of foreign investment and competition. Furthermore, each country is currently experiencing various stages of development and dependence with diverse social, political, economic, and geographic characteristics which will allow for individual findings to be applied to similar countries within the region.

What follows is an analysis of the general effects of globalization on structural violence, an evaluation of the Sino-U.S. rivalry, a description of the so called ‘New Great Game’ within the Indo-Pacific, and a characterization of the specific consequences this rivalry poses on the presence and severity of structural violence within the region. Next, individual case studies are conducted for each selected country in which the presence of structural violence is established and links between specific forms of structural violence and foreign involvement are determined. Finally, each country’s relationship with China and the United States is examined in order to establish their alignment status along a continuum of U.S.-allegiance, Chinese-allegiance, or relative independence.

By doing so, this paper seeks to demonstrate the direct and indirect consequences which foreign influence entails for structural violence through the reinforcement of institutional mechanisms and customs by way of financial and political incentives which subsequently serve to sustain the ongoing political and economic status quo. Findings from this work will contribute to the field of human security as it relates to broader trends in contemporary globalization and competing spheres of influence, as well as the specific case of the United States’ efforts to maintain political and economic parity with a rising China.

Globalization and Structural Violence

Many authors have stressed the human costs of globalization and international development, noting serious risks to individuals’ physical and psychological health and wellbeing (Pilisuk, 2001, p. 3) as well as growing threats to the natural environment (Pilisuk 2001, p. 4). Arno Tausch (2010) argues that foreign investment increases inequality and unemployment while contributing to a number of negative factors such as high tertiary 12 emigration rates and infant mortality rates as well as lower Environmental Performance Indexes and a lower Human Development Index (Tausch, 2010, p. 95). Still others note foreign aid’s propensity to corrode self-sufficiency and fuel corruption while simultaneously acknowledging the moral obligation to assist these developing countries (Dickerson, 2016, p. 23).

In addition to building upon past theories of foreign investment and human security risks, this work will center around the concept of structural violence as it relates to the ongoing geopolitical maneuvering between China and the United States. The notion of structural violence was popularized by Johan Galtung in 1969 but has since been further developed by numerous authors. The definition of structural violence devised for this project is the culmination of various interpretations beginning with Kenneth A. Parsons’ (2007) idea that subordinate groups are subjected to physical and psychological harm “as a result of routinized relations and practices designed to benefit dominant groups” (Parsons, 2007). Raymond J. Webb (2019) describes structural violence as “a condition in which groups of persons and even nations are harmed by ongoing general situations not of their own choosing, from which most have no real way of escaping”, claiming that such violence is generally unavoidable in its effects and is therefore difficult to detect despite the fact that it may be greatly diminishing the potential of certain groups (Webb, 2019, p. 53). Finally, criteria From Theresa L. Armstead’s (2019) work concerning structural and social determinants of inequalities were utilized, including the presence of income inequality, discriminatory social environments, population density, racial or ethnic heterogeneity, institutional racism, economic opportunities, education, employment, residential segregation and mobility, and community interaction.

Using the above concepts and Ideas, a working definition and set of criteria for the existence of structural violence has been developed, describing this phenomenon as the intangible risks to certain groups often under an unjust organization of power relations and social arrangement which exclude or marginalize the group through both latent and manifest sociopolitical and economic restraints serving to normalize certain forms of harm as well as the impairment of an individual’s ability to actualize their potential. Structural violence can be intentional or unintentional, but both forms prevent individuals from meeting their basic needs and actualizing their full potential. 13

Below is the list of established criteria which will determine the presence of structural violence. Though not all aspects are directly affected by foreign involvement, a precursory analysis of each country based upon these determinants will establish the presence of structural violence and serve as the basis for correlating specific forms of structural violence with particular forms of Chinese and U.S. influence.

1. Racial or Ethnic Heterogeneity - The existence of numerous distinct racial or ethnic groups within a country. 2. Discriminatory Social Environments - Typically characterized by physical separations and inequality between distinct social groups. 3. Institutional Racism, Policies and Regulations - Regional or racially specific legislature which is designed to target a particular group within the country. 4. Linear Ranking Order and Acyclical Interaction Pattern - A domestic political system characterized by rigid hierarchies and limited mobility which place disadvantaged group members below their majority counterparts. 5. Income Inequality - Characterized by significant disparities between the incomes of certain ethnicities or regions. 6. Education - To be qualified as perpetuating structural violence, there must be evidence of inequality between certain ethnicities or regions, or a general lack of funding for education as a whole. 7. Residential Mobility, Instability, and Racial Segregation - The physical, racially based separation of citizens, unequal access to public goods and facilities, unequal protection from encroaching industry, unequal access to adequate housing, and restricted access to travel. 8. Population Density - High population density has been correlated with increased pollution and decreased access to public goods as well as lower quality of life and increases in physical violence. However, heightened population density does not always signify a threat to human security as some major urban cities can maintain a higher quality of life than their rural counterparts. Danger arises when cities cannot cope with large influxes of foreign or rural-urban migrants and they are forced to live in underdeveloped, confined quarters. 9. Gender Equity – Equity entails equality between men and women both in the domestic and professional sphere. This criterion will be met if women are found to be under employed, under paid, or given unequal access to public goods. 10. Economic Opportunities – a lack of economic opportunities results in stagnation for a large portion of the population. Economic opportunities can be limited by a number of things such as 14

state ownership of major economic sectors, private monopolization, foreign monopolization, a lack of support for traditional work such as agriculture, and insufficient investment into new economic sectors.

Sino-U.S. Strategic Rivalry

The links between competing spheres of influence, foreign involvement, and structural violence are evident and well supported by the literature. Southeast Asia in particular has experienced considerable economic growth in recent decades and is gradually becoming a significant export destination. The region’s geographical importance lies in its proximity to sea passages between East Asia and the Middle Eastern-Mediterranean as well as its proximity to China and its self-claimed South China Sea. For these reasons, both the United States and China have ample motivation to extend their influence into Southeast Asia and the greater Indo-Pacific for economic gain as well as geographic maneuvering.

By developing close allies so near to China, the U.S. is asserting itself within a region which has been traditionally dominated by Chinese influence. Furthermore, close strategic partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries allows the United State to counterbalance against China’s recent Nine-Dashed-Line claims as well as Belt-and-Road development projects. China, meanwhile, seeks to gain regional partners in order to bolster its current position of power and to justify their territorial claims, doing so through numerous mechanisms including diplomatic favoritism, economic incentives, and so called ‘debt traps’ created from large-scale public works projects.

The New Great Game

The Indo-Pacific has become the center for the “New Great Game” in ongoing competition for strategic influence between The United States and China. Kevin Rudd, former Australian Prime Minister and President of the Asia Society Policy Institute characterized the region’s uncertain position in his 2018 address to the foreign policy community of Indonesia. According to him, the region serves “as the principal terrain in which the political, economic and diplomatic battle is being fought for the next quarter century for strategic dominance… as the increasingly binary nature of the U.S.-China relationship” places the region under threat of division and socioeconomic instability (ASPI, 2020). 15

China’s continued economic growth and corresponding spread of political influence has allowed for large-scale regional financing projects, robust military expansion, and continuously bold territorial claims. With an increasingly tenuis hold over maritime superiority as well as a steady decrease in their share of global GDP (Allison, 2020), the United States has shifted from a position of strategic engagement to one of strategic rivalry.

In coordination with its claim over the ‘South China Seas,’ significant investments have been made towards naval capabilities designed to “present a significant operational challenge for US and allied forces” (Schreer, 2017, p. 507) which operate near the fringes of China’s territorial waters. For example, shortly after President Xi Jinping offered assurances that China would not militarize the contested waters, J-11 aircraft, HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles, and YJ-62 anti-ship missiles were covertly deployed on the Spratly Islands (Schreer, 2017, p. 509).

China’s assertive strategy includes the beforementioned defense spending and maritime militarization as well as development projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Many authors claim that the BRI’s true intentions lie not in the altruistic development of China’s neighbors, but in the desire to increase involvement in “the domestic economics and politics of interested nations” as well as China’s desires to “preposition itself for military bases in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia” (Alatas, 2020). In bolstering what it calls “peripheral diplomacy,” China intends to foster Sino-centric networks of cultural, political, economic and security relations through seemingly inclusive and ‘win-win’ cooperation. Chinese activities have typically been divided into three categories including education operations in the form of Confucius institutes, media operations intended to expand the state’s ideology, and diplomatic operations designed to coerce political leaders through a myriad of inducements (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 3).

Thus far, Chinese efforts towards regional influence have included substantial increases in defense spending totaling to nearly eight percent of the latest national budget (Alatas, 2020), the establishment of think tank networks among Lancang-Mekong Cooperation countries (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 3), the construction and militarization of artificial islands (Murphy, 2017, p. 172), as well as the expansion of financial aid mechanisms such as the Asian infrastructure Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative, and foreign direct investment from state-owned enterprises (Murphy, 2017, p. 172). Additionally, China’s governance model 16 appeals to “leaders seeking economic growth opportunities without commensurate political liberties or constraints on their power” (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 3) and has effectively shielded countries such as Myanmar from international criticism, thereby increasing their own political influence at the expense of humanitarian rights and democratic erosion (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 7). As Stromseth and Marston (2020) argue, China’s assistance to authoritarian regimes is predicated upon their usefulness as economic and strategic partners, demonstrating the primacy of their own self-interest over the transformation and development of these country’s domestic political structures (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 7). With its geographic advantages, its propensity to reward countries which publicize their friendly Chinese relations (Liao, 2018, p. 9), its position as the top trading partner with nearly every major East Asian country (Allison, 2020), as well as its willingness to protect and finance authoritarian leaders and corrupt officials, Beijing has placed immense pressure upon the United States.

The Obama Administration’s response to China’s militaristic, economic, and political expansion was the so called ‘Pivot to Asia’ which was intended to strengthen military ties, increase aid, and bolster economic cooperation between the U.S. and ASEAN countries. In doing so, Obama reinforced Chinese notions of United States interference and compounded the already growing friction between the overlapping spheres of influence within the first and second island chains (Schreer, 2017, p. 517). Obama’s rebalance policy consisted of economic, institutional and security components. The TPP was Pivot to Asia’s economic spearhead and promised “a comprehensive, high standard, free trade agreement” (Murphy, 2017, p. 173) in the hopes of rebalancing Southeast Asia’s economic landscape. In support of economic measures such as the TPP, Obama pledged increased commitment to “ASEAN-led multilateral institutions,” joining the East Asia Summit in 2010. Finally, Obama’s Pivot to Asia avowed to deploy sixty percent of the U.S. navy within Asia while reinforcing its regional alliances and partnerships (Murphy, 2017, p. 173).

Though the promise of increased regional naval capabilities was upheld, most of Pivot to Asia’s initiatives have been rescinded or reduced by the current administration. The Trans- Pacific Partnership has been terminated, U.S. participation in the East Asia Summit has been downgraded (Panda, 2019), there has been a distinct lack of bilateral preferential trade deals and no US-ASEAN trade partnership (Cook, 2020). Much of the United States’ current backpedaling 17 is the result of significant budgetary constraints placed upon the State Department, the dismemberment of USAID, and the inability to compete with the BRI. Such deficiencies “represent a fundamental gap in US strategy” and result in the “diminution of its diplomatic footprint” (ASPI, 2020).

Under the Trump Administration, a number of alternative actions have been taken such as “the ‘routine patrol’ of an aircraft carrier strike group through parts of the South China Sea (Schreer, 2017, p. 517), the creation of a new Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy (FOIP) (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 2), and the establishment of a new financial institution with a $60 million budget christened the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 4). Additionally, during a 2018 Indo-Pacific Business Forum, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo announced new economic incentives amounting to $113.5 million in order to improve “digital connectivity and cybersecurity, strengthen energy security and access, and promote sustainable infrastructure development” (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 4). In December of the same year, President Trump ratified the Asia reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) which authorized an annual budget of $1.5 billion for the maintenance and development of various programs supporting “a long-term strategic vision and comprehensive, multifaceted, and principled United States policy for the Indo-Pacific region” (Tan, 2020, p. 144).

Despite the seemingly good intentions of President Trump’s policies, many are self- interested by design. With FOIP, for instance, the U.S. hopes to achieve what Trump has called ‘fairer trade’ for America as all ASEAN nations save for Singapore currently benefit from trade surpluses (Tan, 2020, p. 143). While expecting ASEAN nations to acquiesce easier access to their domestic markets, the U.S. has demonstrated that measures such as FOIP are tools to challenge China’s growing influence. According to See Seng Tan (2020), a recent hardening of America’s position towards China risks narrowing FOIP even further “into an exclusive and comprehensive counterbalance against the Chinese” (Tan, 2020, 134).

The United States and China have demonstrated their desire for influence by way of mechanisms and incentives such as FOIP, the BRI, the BUILD program, the AIIB, the ARIA, and general increases in foreign direct investment. Traditionally, the United States’ emphasis on democracy and human rights tended to strain U.S. ties with target countries who viewed such 18 pressure as “the primary source of unwarranted foreign intervention.” (Murphy, 2017, p. 178). Similarly, target countries typically view Chinese efforts towards mutual partnership as a mechanism for promulgating their own model of governance as well as securing regional ascendancy and dominion.

However, a series of changes in strategy under the Trump Administration as well as progressively bellicose territorial claims and political intrusions under Xi Jinping have transformed the traditional landscape from a fairly consistent and transparent two-sided competition to one of uncertainty characterized by mixed messages, unclear policies and uncertain alignments. Where ASEAN countries once had the decision between authoritarian China and democratic United States, they now face nuanced decisions as both the U.S. and China vie for influence with bilateral agreements and individualized incentives.

This obscured dichotomy is not only threatening ASEAN cohesion, but creating opportunities for the United States and China to “intervene in domestic politics directly to ensure that likeminded leaders prevail in political battles” (Murphy, 2017, p. 171). Thus, by targeting countries individually for self-interested purposes, China and the United States are willing to ignore or even reinforce the target country’s negative behavior and compound the existing causes of structural violence.

Chinese efforts have encompassed a wide range of strategies ranging from physical and political coercion to so called ‘friendship visits’ and diplomatic protection. Myanmar, for example, has been under China’s protection from international prosecution throughout the country’s ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya Muslims (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 7). In a move to reinforce their good neighbor status, China has welcome between 1,000 to 2,000 Burmese citizens to take part in exposure trips, study tours, and capacity-building training programs since 2013, and has initiated numerous development projects under BRI (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 7). Similarly, China secured Cambodian support for its South China Sea position by “becoming an indispensable ally of Hun Sen and the CPP” (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 7).

Chinese coercive measures are often equally effective, having successfully taken control of the Scarborough Shoal by physically ousting Philippine fisherman and likewise preventing Vietnam from accessing their traditional fishing grounds and deploying an oil exploration rig 19 within Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone by responding forcibly to Vietnamese ships sent to protect their waters (Murphy, 2017, p. 172). Moreover, when the Philippines expanded its security cooperation with the United States as a response, China reciprocated by limiting Philippine exports, discouraging tourism in the Philippines, and restricting diplomatic contact (Murphy, 2017, 174).

Likewise, the United States deploys numerous methods of influence ranging from joint military exercises to harsh political and economic sanctions. Similar to China, the United States routinely rewards countries which openly express their friendly relations and punish those which violate their democratic ideals and international law. Vietnam, for instance, has enjoyed annual Naval Engagement Activities since 2010 whereas Myanmar has been under a series of sanctions since 2003. Under the current administration, however, U.S. responses are no longer uniform and diplomatic relations seem to be based primarily on President Trump’s personal prerogative.

For example, during a formal meeting with Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte in 2017, Trump avoided discussing human rights despite Duterte’s ongoing ‘war on drugs’ which had already claimed nearly 4,000 lives (Gutierrez and Gavilan, 2017). Furthermore, Trump’s public criticism of the media and claims of ‘fake news’ were echoed among several Southeast Asian leaders, sending increasingly mixed messaged about America’s position on democratic rights such as freedom of speech (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 4). While some country’s leaders appreciate President Trumps authoritarian behavior (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 8), others are concerned for his apparent “lack of appreciation for the importance of U.S. alliances in defending U.S. interests, and the U.S. president’s emphasis on narrowing bilateral trade deficits” (Glaser, 2019).

In addition to the president’s seemingly unpredictable behavior, Vice President Pence has used highly accusatory rhetoric towards China, claiming Beijing has mounted “an all-out effort to advance its own interests at the expense of America and other countries,” accusing China of “interfering in America’s domestic politics” and “pursuing unfair trade practices.” He also addressed China’s Belt and Road Initiative, claiming the use of “’debt diplomacy’ to undermine the sovereignty” of participating countries, as well as targeting China’s aggression in the South China Sea and its internal intolerance of religion. (Tan, 2020, p. 135) Open and derogatory 20 language such as this serves only to heighten the already strained Sino-U.S. relations, entailing an escalation of efforts on both sides.

Rivalry and Structural Violence

ASEAN’s position within the Sino-U.S. rivalry poses a number of critical concerns for the group’s internal cohesion. Various authors have noted this precarious position and have forewarned an “evolution towards a latent geography of friction and conflict” (Schreer, 2017, p. 517) One of ASEAN’s most substantial strengths has been its ability to maintain internal cohesion. Though its individual members are unable to contest encroachments from the United States and China, ASEAN members are able to use their organization as a tool for engagement. By forming alignments with multiple states, ASEAN counties can diversify risks while entangling the United States and China within a “web of interdependent economic and diplomatic relations.” (Murphy, 2017, p. 170) This strategy, termed ‘omni-enmeshment,’ has remained effective until the recent escalation of Sino-U.S. competition and the implementation of new mechanisms such as the FOIP which Kevin Rudd has warned will pose a “deeper problem for ASEAN centrality” (Tan, 2020, p. 145) than acts of diplomatic indifference such as President Trump’s absence from EAS and the US-ASEAN Summit (Tan, 2020, p. 145).

Contemporary shifts in great power alignment within the Indo-Pacific are spurring geopolitical uncertainty within the region as political maneuvering coalesces with the ongoing trade war. (Alatas, 2020) Such uncertainty, when combined with various forms of foreign involvement, has the potential to cause irreparable damage to a state’s political and financial institutions. For instance, unfettered aid can generate or compound national corruption by supporting unscrupulous leaders whose influence negatively affects the development of effective governance, the rule of law, private domestic enterprises, and small, independent business. (Dickerson, 2016, p. 7) Aid and foreign loans have the potential to inhibit economic growth and compound poverty by enabling governments to “violate the rule of law and the protection of civil liberties,” thus decreasing the likelihood of genuine foreign investment and perpetuating the cycle by reinforcing the need for additional aid donations (Dickerson, 2016, p. 8). Not only do aid and loans reinforce bad political actors, they have the effect of encouraging recipients to spend new inflows of cash instead of investing or setting it aside, thus reducing domestic savings rates and contributing to inflation. (Dickerson, 2016, p. 8) 21

In a study which applied classical dependency theory to contemporary trends in globalization and development, it was concluded that multinational corporation penetration causes negative effects within the development of equality, life expectancy, employment, tertiary emigration rates, and infant mortality. (Tausch, 2010) Negative effects were also discovered within social security expenditure per GDP, environmental performance indexes, tertiary enrollment, and human development indexes. Finally, dependency also has the potential to compound existing issues found in countries experiencing unequal change as well as countries with educational gender gaps. (Tausch, 2010)

Reinforcement of negative effects such as these poses a particularly salient threat to many countries in Southeast Asia due to the history and character of their democratic systems. As Stromseth and Marston argue, chronic problems which can be exacerbated by foreign dependency such as political corruption, inequality, and weak electoral and judicial systems can cause “regression to authoritarianism” even within countries which have enjoyed relative democratic freedom. (Stromseth and Marston, 2020, p. 2) Southeast Asia’s turbulent history of democratic transition, however, is more threatened by the “strength of durable authoritarianism in the non-democracies” (Stromseth and Marston,2020, p. 2) than the threat of contemporary reversal. In essence, because countries such as Myanmar and Vietnam have more experience governing though authoritarian and autocratic rule, the threat of regression is all the more salient.

In order to determine which forms of structural violence have the potential to be influenced by foreign involvement, the above conceptual review will be applied to the established list of determinants. One of the most prolific problems seems to be inadequate mechanisms for the prevention of corruption upon delivery of financial assistance as it can result in a myriad of adverse consequences. First, Institutional racism, policies and regulations have the potential to be fostered or reinforced by national corruption, which in turn can be perpetuated by foreign aid’s tendency to reward those in power regardless of their moral character. Financial assistance to venal officials enables them to continue infringing upon the rule of law and citizen’s civil liberties, allowing for the maintenance of discriminatory institutional policies.

The same process of positive reinforcement for negative governance can reinforce linear governmental ranking orders, inhibit economic growth and exacerbate poverty. By creating a cycle wherein misuse of foreign aid leads to the need for additional aid, corruption, 22 misappropriation, and embezzlement are compounded and rewarded. Such a cycle results in a loss of economic opportunities as well as growth in income inequality as little to none of the incoming financial assistance reaches individual citizens. Furthermore, continued issuances of aid serve to keep corrupt officials in power, thus maintaining political exclusivity and rigid hierarchies as well as prevailing discriminatory social environments.

Preservation of discriminatory social environments and political exclusionism have far reaching affects beyond financial and governmental constraints. They also pose unfavorable effects on crucial development trends such as social equality, life expectancy, employment, social security expenditure, and general human development. These trends also correlate to the criteria of economic opportunities, income inequality, institutional racism, and discriminatory social environments. Furthermore, they have the potential to regress progress towards gender equity, residential stability, and education rates by contributing to the preservation of social and political domestic prejudices.

Even when inflows of capital trickle down to average consumers, it often leads to an increase in spending rather than investments or personal savings. Rapid increases in domestic spending not only causes inflation by adding unsustainable amounts of capital to the economic system but can also greatly diminish a country’s domestic savings rates. Unregulated spending and the corresponding loss of federal reserves therefore pose severe ramifications for a country’s future economic opportunities as well as its income inequality. Moreover, rapid urbanization often follows economic progress and can result in residential instability and unmanageable population densities. Rapid urbanization can also lead to increased instances of discrimination as ethnic groups which would otherwise not interact coalesce in major urban centers.

Following the above analysis, the criteria which are most likely to have tangible correlations to foreign involvement seem to be: discriminatory social environments, institutional racism, policies and regulations, linear ranking order and acyclical interaction pattern, income inequality, education, residential mobility, instability, and segregation, gender equity, and economic opportunities.

With the above forms of foreign involvement linked to the specific set of established criteria, this paper seeks to demonstrate that competition over regional influence between the United States and China has a direct impact on the presence and severity of structural violence 23 within the Indo-Pacific. The countries studied; Japan, Vietnam and Myanmar, each have ongoing forms of human insecurity which are likely sustained, exacerbated or created by the presence of foreign investment and competition by way of reinforcing institutional mechanisms and customs with financial and diplomatic incentives, thereby sustaining the current political and economic status quo. The analysis below will seek to determine which criteria are directly or indirectly linked to foreign involvement and competition, which mechanism for garnering influence are the most detrimental, if close alignment or relative neutrality are beneficial, and if either China or the United States poses a more significant threat to the presence and severity of structural violence.

Data and Literature

Facts and figures have been gathered from a wide array of empirical and analytical sources in order to characterize each country’s general level of economic, political, and social freedom and to demonstrate the hypothesized link between such freedoms and the presence of foreign involvement. First is the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report which provides each country’s human development index (HDI), inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI), internal divisions of wealth, and Gini coefficients. The IHDI was of particular interest as it takes distribution into consideration, rendering a more precise depiction of each country’s actual development status (UNDP, 2019).

The Center for Systemic Peace’s 2018 State Fragility Index was utilized in order to asses each country’s security, political, economic, and social effectiveness and legitimacy. This index is composed of multiple determinants for each category which are then scored on a scale of 0 to 25 wherein 0 represents no fragility and 25 represents extreme fragility. A measure of fragility is important as it reflects the strength of a given country’s regime beyond mere political and judicial authority. Low scores in categories such as social legitimacy demonstrate that while a country’s government may be politically effective, they are not completely supported by their citizens (Center for Strategic Peace, 2018).

Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Index is also used in order to characterize each country’s political rights and civil liberties. Countries are awarded a score of zero to four points for each of ten political rights indicators and fifteen civil liberties indicators. Political rights are divided into the following categories: electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and 24 functioning of the government. Additionally, there is a discretionary question which addresses forced demographic change which subtracts from the other scores. Civil liberties are grouped into four categories; freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House, 2020).

The Heritage Foundation’s 2020 Index of Economic Freedom is utilized in order to discern each country’s financial landscape. This index covers four broad topics composed of three subcategories. Rule of Law is calculated with property rights, judicial effectiveness and government integrity while Government Size is measured through tax burdens, government spending, and fiscal health. Regulatory Efficiency is gauged through business, labor, and monetary freedom, and Open Markets are measured through trade, investment, and financial freedom. Each of the twelve economic freedoms within these categories is graded on a scale of 0 to 100. A country’s overall score is derived by averaging these twelve economic freedoms, with equal weight being given to each (Heritage Foundation, 2020)

CATO Institute’s 2019 Human Freedom Index serves as an additional measure of each country’s individual liberties. The index is composed of average scores from seven major categories comprised of several subcategories. The primary indicators include rule of law, security and safety, movement, religious freedom, freedom of association, assembly and civil society, expression and information, as well as identity and relationships (CATO Institute 2019).

Finally, UN Women’s Gender Inequality Index and Global Gender Gap Index are employed in order to apply a quantifiable measurement of inequality to each country’s gender equity analysis. The Gender Inequality Index measures inequality between women and men within the areas of reproductive health, empowerment, and labor market participation. The Global Gender Gap Index measures national gender gaps based upon economic, political, education and health criteria.

Methods

Case Selection

Though much of the discussion thus far has centered around ASEAN nations, growing Sino-U.S. competition affects nearly all countries within the Indo-Pacific. Southeast Asia serves as a clear example due to the overt nature of U.S. and Chinese involvement, but this rivalry has 25 permeated into the domestic affairs of even the most developed Indo-Pacific nations. In order to illustrate the ubiquity of Sino-U.S. geopolitical maneuvering and to demonstrate how, and to what extent the rivalry affect dissimilar Indo-Pacific nations, this study incorporates three highly distinct countries at various stages of development and dependence with diverse social, political, economic, and geographic characteristics.

Vietnam will serve as the first case study in order to represent countries which have thus far exercised relative independence from both China and the United states. Vietnam has been selected for a number of additional reasons. It, like many countries in the region, has a long history of violence and conflict with both major powers. Vietnam has also received large amounts of foreign aid and assistance throughout its post-war development. It’s position along the Chinese border and proximity to China’s nine-dashed-line have caused numerous territorial disputes, and its mixed relations with the United States and China are representative of many other Indo-Pacific nations. Vietnam is also an example of an authoritarian, communist government system which has adapted well to the contemporary socio-economic climate. Vietnam will thus represent a number of relatively unaligned nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia.

Myanmar will be the second country under consideration. Where Vietnam represents a neutral middle country on the Sino-U.S. alignment scale, Myanmar will serve as an example of close relations with China. Myanmar’s financial and political dependence upon China, its history of ethnic violence, and its vulnerability to Chinese debt make it a great example for less developed countries within the region. Furthermore, its position along China’s border and the Indian Ocean pose alternative geographic challenges for consideration. A study of Myanmar should result in conclusions which can be applied to countries experiencing similar levels of underdevelopment such as Cambodia and Laos.

Last under consideration is Japan. Recognized as a developed nation with a strong economy, Japan has little in common with the other countries under analysis. However, this analysis will focus on one of Japan’s least developed prefecture, Okinawa. Okinawa serves as an excellent example of the impact foreign involvement can have on otherwise advanced countries and exemplifies the physical consequences of Sino-U.S. tensions in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, Okinawa’s position near Taiwan and the Senkaku islands places it in one of the 26 most contested regions outside of the South China Sea. Because of Okinawa’s relative development, it serves as a strong representative for countries such as Singapore. Furthermore, due to its strategic location, it also represents islands nations such as and Philippines.

Method of analysis

Each country was first examined in order to determine the presence and severity of structural violence. Because not all forms of structural violence are directly linked to the ongoing geopolitical competition, certain criteria will not be discussed in detail and will therefore be mentioned in brief along with findings from four freedom indexes intended to present a general overview of each country. In the next section, each determinant of structural violence which was found to have an indirect or direct correlation with ongoing Sino-U.S. competition is discussed at length with specific cases pertaining to each country’s unique experience with China and the United States.

Following an analysis of applicable criteria, each country’s relationship with both competing powers is examined in order to demonstrate the strength and direction of their connections. This section will consist of four categories covering a brief historical overview, as well as current political, military, and economic relations. In order to form the foundation for establishing the level of influence and strength of the relationships, the first section contains a brief overview of the given country’s historical experiences with China and the United States. Next, political relations are measured by counting the number of official state visits made by Chinese or American presidents since 2000, the number of international organizations of which both countries are party to, and by analyzing the prominent bilateral agreements and partnerships made between the two countries.

In the third section, military relations are measured by accounting for formal talks between defense ministries, various memorandums of understanding and cooperation, joint operations and training, direct funding and aid, equipment donations, and specific security-oriented partnerships and alliances. For the fourth section, trade relations are measured based upon each country’s annual volume of import or export trade to China and the United States as well as an analysis of yearly growth and any bilateral economic trade deals or partnerships. 27

Following the individual case studies, findings will be compared and contrasted in order to determine if close relations or increased influence from either China or the United States has a correlation with the prevalence or severity of structural violence. This review will collate and contrast the three countries under consideration by comparing both the presence and severity of each structural violence determinant as well as each country’s influence from, and relationship with the United States and China. Findings from this section will then be used within a final reflection for the purpose of discussing the various links and correlations between foreign investment and influence on the presence of structural violence as well as the specific human security threats imposed from close relations with both China and the United States.

Case Studies

Vietnam

Defined as ‘not free’ by the Freedom House Index, Vietnam’s low score of 20 of the 100 possible points derives from its limited political rights which scored a mere 3 out of the possible 40 points and a similarly poor score of 17 of the possible 60 points awarded for civil liberties. Such scores reflect the restrictive nature of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s one-party system (Freedom House, 2020).

Perhaps because of the CPV’s tight control, Vietnam scored moderately well in the Sate Fragility Index with a total value of 7 from scores of 4 and 3 in effectiveness and legitimacy placing the country within the second highest category. Vietnam scored highly in Security effectiveness as well as economic and social legitimacy but scored somewhat lower in security legitimacy as well as political and social effectiveness. Vietnam scored poorly in political legitimacy and economic effectiveness and is currently listed as Autocratic (Center for Strategic Peace, 2018).

CATO Institute’s Human Freedom Index places Vietnam at the rank of 117 of the 162 countries with the combined scores of 6.27 and 6.31 in economic and personal freedom respectively, averaging to 6.88 of the possible 10 points. This score again is indicative of an autocratic state with limited political freedom (CATO, 2019).

The Heritage Index of economic freedom gave Vietnam the rank of 105 of the 171 countries with an overall score of 58.8 of the possible 100 points. Trade Freedom, Tax Burden 28 and Government Spending were Vietnam’s highest scoring indicators of economic freedom, and the country showed a promising increase of 3.5 points over the past year. However, while Vietnam is improving, they have experienced decreases in judicial effectiveness, government integrity, labor freedom, monetary freedom, and tax burdens (Heritage, 2020).

Vietnam Heterogeneity Education Discriminatory Social Environments Residential Mobility, Instability, and Racial Segregation Institutional Racism, Policies and Population Density Regulations Linear Ranking Order Gender Equity Income Inequality Economic Opportunities

Extensive research has indicated that Vietnam satisfies eight of the ten criteria for establishing the presence of structural violence. Of these, six criteria can be correlated to the impacts of foreign involvement while the remaining two seem to be consequences of domestic characteristics. The analysis below will discuss the six criteria along with corresponding evidence of foreign interference, but first a brief overview of the two independent determinants is needed in order to demonstrate their existence and impact.

First of the two is heterogeneity. Vietnam is home to fifty-three minority groups. The Kihn, or Viet, account for 85.7% of the population, making them a clear majority among the remaining groups which account for 2% or less individually (Sawe, 2019). Groups such as the Tay and Muong, which account for 2% and 1.9% respectively, have been present in Vietnam for thousands of years and speak distinct languages (Sawe, 2019). Groups such as the Khmer Krom, whose origins date to the Khmer Empire of 802 CE, have cultural and linguistic ties to neighboring countries (Sawe, 2019). The Khmer Krom inhabit Southern Vietnam in historical Cambodia and are acknowledged as an indigenous group despite instances of targeted discrimination. The presence of these groups as well as other such as the Jarai, Ede and Bahnar which inhabit the central highlands demonstrate that Vietnam’s society, while exhibiting the presence a clear majority ethnicity, contains numerous and diverse groups of people. 29

Second of the two is education. Vietnam boasts a literacy rate of over 95% and has a long tradition of education and scholarship dating back to the early period of Chinese domination and the later era of French rule (Hays, 2014). Though literacy rates are high, many students fail to complete the fifth grade. Much of this is due to the necessary tuition, books, and uniforms which are often too expensive, causing a substantial disparity between urban and rural regions. In some cases, only ten to fifteen percent of children living in rural areas continue after the third grade, marking a significant imbalance between these regions and Ho Chi Minh City where nearly 96% of students completed the fifth grade (Hays, 2014).

Recognizing its own deficiencies, Vietnam has committed roughly fifteen to twenty percent of its public expenditure on education since 2000, amount to one of the highest rates among ASEAN nations. Despite this, Vietnam continues to struggle with talent shortages as major skill gaps persist between local graduates and higher-level positions due to chronic weakness in vocational education and training as well as higher education and university research.

Vietnam’s high literacy and urban attendance rates are promising, but a lack of developmental mechanism for supporting education among its indigenous populations indicates an inability or unwillingness to invest in rural education. Due to this major disparity, it can be concluded that Vietnam fits the criteria with its unequal access to education and underfunded university and research sectors. However, its recent progress in higher education indicates an earnest desire to improve, and Vietnam will likely no longer fit this criterion in the near future.

Discriminatory Social Environments

Vietnam’s social environment is characterized by collectivism wherein great emphasis is placed upon social interactions and networks of mutual obligations (Rozycka-Tran et al., 2017, p. 195). Setting Vietnam apart from the usual Southeast Asian collectivism is the importance placed upon maintaining undisturbed social relations and following traditions which prioritize security and conformity (Rozycka-Tran et al., 2017, p. 201). Yet, despite their relative conservatism, Vietnamese citizens seem to be generally accepting of religious differences, earning a favorably low score in social hostilities with 1.0 of the perfect 0 from the Pew Foundation. However, government restrictions are considerably higher with an index of 6.5 of 30 the possible 10. Accordingly, restrictions often come in the form of regulation-based limitations such as controlled citizenship as opposed to person-to-person discrimination.

Both China and the United States have impacted Vietnamese society through historical interactions and contemporary international relations. China’s mixed history of subjugation over Vietnam, their military assistance during the 1960s, its moral superiority following the war, and its recent aggression over the Paracel and Spratly Islands have resulted in uncertainty and discrimination. Discrimination towards the ethnic Chinese group (Hoa) living in Vietnam was particularly strong throughout the 1970s Sino-Vietnamese war, resulting in the confiscation of their businesses and mass immigration. Furthermore, China’s contemporary strategy of portraying the strength of their authoritarian government and avoiding criticism of similar regimes has allowed Vietnam’s Communist one-party system to not only avoid rebuke, but to be reinforced through trade deals and open political relations.

The United States’ role in the Vietnam war had the effect of compounding the country’s latent social divisions by wedging a clear gap between the north and south. Following the north’s capture of Saigon, southern Vietnamese officers, government workers, supporters, and citizens were placed in reeducation camps and subject to manual labor and abuse. Some officers were forced to remain in reeducation for up to seventeen years where starvation, disease and overwork resulted in many undocumented deaths. Tensions have remained as the CPV’s lack of reconciliation efforts and tight control over media have blocked open discussion of the country’s past. Additionally, the United States has recently celebrated twenty-five years of friendly diplomatic ties to Vietnam, making them equally as complicit as China in supporting Vietnam’s authoritarian rule.

Linear Ranking Order and Acyclical Interaction pattern

Under the control of the CPV, Vietnam maintains somewhat strict and limited access to government positions. Parliament members, for example, are elected by popular vote but nearly all are members of the Communist Party (Santander, 2020). Furthermore, as many of the minority groups live in rural, agrarian regions, there is little opportunity for their members to enter politics, leaving the Khin and urban Vietnamese to fill most top government positions. 31

Vietnam’s constitution guarantees its citizens equal rights and has made efforts towards the protection of minority groups but has yet to develop specific laws for their administration and conservation. Instead, minority-related issues are addressed by a ministry-level agency known as the Committee for Ethnic Minority Affairs (Open development, 2020). Though its existence demonstrates Vietnam’s attempts towards true protection, many ethnic communities remain vulnerable, “particularly to loss of their forest which forms the bases of many ethic minorities’ cultural beliefs and practices” (Open development, 2020).

In 2010, the Nationwide Representative Congress of Ethnic Minorities in Vietnam met for the first time, assembling representatives from each minority group in order to discuss a united approach to national development (Palmirani, 2010). As recent developments indicate, Vietnam seems willing to work alongside the country’s numerous ethnic groups, but limited access to government positions and the sole channel of communication through the Committee are clear examples of the linear ranking order and acyclical interaction pattern which embody autocratic rule under a one-party state.

China’s role in establishing and maintaining Vietnam’s rigid one-party system was the result of shared cultural and developmental similarities. Vietnam’s first four principles of doi moi are near exact copies of China’s four basic principles, and their modern prioritization of economics over political reform demonstrate their continued embodiment of key PRC policies and practices (Dosch and Vuving, 2008, p. 26). As Dosch and Vuving argue, “the transplantation of the Chinese model into Vietnam” resulted from “the combined employment of pressures and incentives” (Dosch and Vuving, 2008, p. 29). Vietnam’s post-Cold War strategy of ‘peace and development’ closely resembles China’s reforms under Deng Xiaoping, and Vietnamese leaders have gone so far as to seek China’s advice on matters such as “how to reform a socialist economy without losing party control” (Dosch and Vuving, 2008, p. 29). Though many similarities between China and Vietnam’s government systems are likely due to comparable socioeconomic and political conditions, it remains evident that Vietnam’s emulation of China has been one of “path imitation” (Dosch and Vuving, 2008, p. 30).

The United States, on the other hand, has historically adopted an opposite role. The war in Vietnam and general anti-communist sentiments served to alienate the CPV and may have pushed them closer to Chinese influence. Contemporary U.S. policy has drastically shifted to that 32 of economic and political partnership as opposed to ideological opposition. This reversal is likely due to U.S. desires to maintain strategic partners within Southeast Asia but has compromised America’s general aversion to authoritarian leadership. By maintaining friendly relations for a quarter of a century, the United States has demonstrated its willingness to support Vietnam’s communist one-party system for political gain at the expense of those Vietnamese citizens who have been suppressed by strict party policies and limited freedom of speech.

Income Inequality

Vietnam’s economy has undergone a dramatic transformation since the 1986 transition into a socialist-oriented market economy, marked by drastic increases in export volume and an eventual emphasis on macroeconomic stability. Yet, Despite Vietnam's exceptional economic success, the country has a number of obstacles preventing full inclusive growth.

In a study consisting of provincial data over the period of 2002 to 2012, authors Hoi and Hoi (2013) found evidence that Vietnam’s financial market expansion actually widened its domestic income inequality (Hoi and Hoi, 2013, p. 22). According to the authors, the problem stems from unequal access to finance as a result of institutional underdevelopment (Hoi and Hoi, 2013, p. 34). Moreover, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) claims that Vietnam’s growing inequality is due to the replacement of agricultural and small-scale business development by export-led industrialization. According to their data, Vietnam’s high average growth rate of 6-7% is not equally distributed, demonstrated by a growth in the country’s Palma ratio from 1.48 to 1.78 between the years 1992 and 2012 (HDR, 2019). Palma scores measure the ratio between income shares of the richest ten percent and the poorest forty percent, demonstrating that much of Vietnam’s growth remains in the hands of its elite and state-owned companies. This is even more evident when scaled to individual provinces where the income gap is up to twenty-one times that of the national average. Accordingly, poverty is increasingly “concentrated among marginalized groups in society, such as ethnic minority farmers, female-headed households, migrants and people with disabilities” (Wells-Dang and Hoa, 2019).

Finally, the United Nations Development Program gave Vietnam and inequality-adjusted development score of 0.58 from the possible perfect score of 1, placing the country at the rank of 118 of the 189 countries. The overall loss percentage after inequality adjustments amounted to 33

16.3% with the original HDI score of 0.69. The poorest 40% of Vietnam’s citizens control 18.8% of all wealth, while the top 10% control 27.1%. Vietnam’s Gini coefficient of 35.3 is close to that of Japan’s meaning inequality is evident, but not too far beyond acceptable levels (UNDP, 2019). Vietnam’s UNDP scores are somewhat promising, but its individual cases of acute inequality demonstrate that many of the country’s ethnic groups have not been included in recent economic developments. Moreover, the CPV’s failure to implement sufficient policies for distributing equal growth demonstrates that the issue of inequality is likely to linger.

Combined, China and the United States accounted for nearly 38% of all Vietnamese exports in 2018, amounting to a value of $103.3 billion with an increase of $17.34 billion between 2017 and 2018 (OEC Vietnam, 2020). While such high volumes of trade have positively impacted Vietnam’s overall GDP as well as quality of life within its Urban centers, a vast majority of incoming wealth stays in the hands of its state-owned companies and political elites. The United States has not only allowed inequality to grow by funneling large amounts of capital into the country through bilateral trade and foreign loans but has also begun to outsource labor to Vietnam from large companies such as Nortel Networks, Anheuser Bush, Sony, Cisco, and Bayer. Outsourcing labor has been shown to increase inequality between skilled and unskilled labor (Xu, 2000, p. 3), which threatens Vietnam’s otherwise promising poverty reduction. For its part, China’s strategy of working with state-owned companies and garnering internal support through unofficial channels with Vietnam’s political and social elite results in very limited profit sharing within the country. Additionally, Chinese construction companies usually bring their own workers, meaning Vietnamese laborers are deprived of a major source of employment.

Residential Mobility, Instability and Racial Segregation

Utilizing probit and OLS regression models as well as the Oaxaca decomposition technique to characterize socioeconomic and demographic factors shaping migrant-urban local housing inequality, it was revealed that migrants are far less likely to own a home than their local urban counterparts and that their standards of living are poor in comparison even when controlling for household characteristics (La, Tran and Nguyen, 2019, p. 218). According to the authors, “45% of the homeownership and housing conditions gaps are attributable to differences in family characteristics,” (La, Tran and Nguyen, 2019, p. 218) and the average hosing quality 34 rating for urban locals was more than double that of the rural migrants (La, Tran and Nguyen, 2019, p. 234).

This disparity is due to a number of physical characteristics such as age and number of children but is also due in part to the individual’s job sector. Those working for the state are more likely to own a home and to have higher living standards, but a KT1 citizenship is necessary for such positions (La, Tran and Nguyen, 2019, p. 242). Furthermore, having a KT1 ho Khau increases an individual’s access to various forms of social assistance, formal credit and more affordable social hosing (La, Tran and Nguyen, 2019, p. 241).

The United States’ role in the Vietnam war posed considerable challenges to the country’s residential mobility and stability. Excessive bombings, napalm, and agent orange devastated large swaths of agricultural land and forests with a total of seventy-two million liters of herbicides and thirteen million tons of explosives. An estimated 7,700 square miles of forest accounting for 6% of Vietnam’s total land area were destroyed by American defoliants (Ives, 2010). While these actions have little to do with contemporary U.S.-Vietnam relations, there has been a definitive lack of support from the United States for reforestation. Countries such as Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands have contributed significant financial aid and logistical assistance to Vietnam’s efforts, but the U.S. has shown little initiative in addressing their personal contribution to the country’s dramatic loss of habitable and cultivatable land.

One of Vietnam’s most immediate sources of residential instability is the prolific illegal timber trade within its central highlands. Though China has officially banned the purchasing and processing of illegally sourced timber in 2020, its demand over the past twenty years placed a severe strain on many of Vietnam’s most vulnerable indigenous groups (EIA, 2020). China is the world’s biggest market for lumber, and Interpol has estimated that nearly 15-30% of all timber has been sourced illegally. The Environmental Investigation Agency has accused China of “effectively exporting deforestation,” and this trend is particularly true for Vietnam whose natural reserves of endangered Rosewood have contributed to China’s import increase from 66,000 to 565,000 cubic meters between 2005 and 2011 (Caramel and Thibault, 2012).

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Gender Equity

When compared to many of its regional peers, Vietnam appears to be nearing equality in gender-based equity. Recent figures show that Vietnam’s gender pay gap is decreasing, and that what discrepancies do persist are primarily due to non-gender related factors such as ethnicity, education, geographic area and sector of employment. During the Vietnam War, many women began taking on traditionally male-held professions, dramatically increasing the percentage of the country’s working women. This trend continued after the war, with a large portion of women entering the self-employment sector as Vietnam’s economy shifted away from farming and towards manufacturing (Martin, 2018). Recent reports indicate that twenty-five percent of CEOs in Vietnam are women, and that women constitute a significant percentage of large companies’ board members. Furthermore, women-owned firms which submit an application for government loans are 33 to 42% more likely to receive them when compared to their male counterparts. It was also found that women pay 0.69% lower interest rates than those of male-owned firms (Pham and Talavera, 2018, p. 253).

Despite these advancements, Vietnam’s gender equity is far from perfect. Men are still preferred over women in highly professional or technical jobs, and women continue to face significant pay gaps as large as eleven percent lower than men holding similar positions (Preet, 2019). Additionally, a 2016 report revealed that untrained female workers received wages which were eight percent lower than their male counterparts, while graduate degree holders experienced a wage gap of nearly 20% (Preet, 2019).

Vietnamese women face hardship beyond the realm of employment, as is evident by the results of a survey conducted by Raghavendra, Duvvury and Ashe (2017). They found that 63.7% of the 1,053 women surveyed had experienced “at least one incident of psychological, physical, or sexual violence in that lifetime” (Raghavendra, Duvvury and Ashe, 2017, p. 66) and that nearly 40% had experienced at least one type of violence in the past twelve months (Raghavendra, Duvvury and Ashe, 2017, p. 66). Not only are these crimes abhorrent on a personal level, but violence against women also constitutes a macroeconomic loss to Vietnam’s economy constituting up to 0.82% of the GDP at market value (Raghavendra, Duvvury and Ashe, 2017, p. 82). This steady, “invisible leakage to the circular flow” has the potential to 36 subvert or counteract Vietnam’s expansionary spending, acting as an “endogenous destabilizer” for its current social welfare programs (Raghavendra, Duvvury and Ashe, 2017, p. 83).

Vietnam’s cultural differentiation between male and female roles continues to uphold gender inequalities by maintaining double standards through social sanctioning against nonconformity, making the transition away from culturally accepted gender-based attitudes and behaviors quite difficult (Nguyen and Simkin, 2015, p. 610). An example of a policy which was likely reinforced by Chinese influence and entails negative consequences for gender inequality is Vietnam’s restrictions on family size. Vietnam’s original two-to-three child policy began in 1964 and was originally limited to the country’s northern region. Soon after, China’s experimentation with contraceptive promotion which had remained voluntary since 1949 was officially formed into a formal two-child policy. Though the connection is somewhat tenuous, it is possible that China’s long-standing two-child and later one-child policies reinforced Vietnam’s own family limitations, leading to the eventual country-wide population ordinance which remains in place today.

There is a possible, yet difficult link to demonstrate between American FDI and outsourcing and gender inequality in Vietnam. Research has shown that “foreign investors may exploit the gender disparity in host countries to maximize their profit on a pool of low-skilled and compliant female labor force” (Bui, Vo and Bui, 2018, p. 394). Countries such as Vietnam can take advantage of gender-based wage discrimination in an effort make their economy more attractive to foreign investors, and such behavior is reinforced by the United States’ willingness to continue economic investment while ignoring Vietnam’s internal social disparities.

Economic Opportunities

Vietnam’s breakdown of economic sectors in 2019 consisted of 39.45% agriculture, 34.72% services, and 5.84% industry. The economy’s thirty years of continuous growth has bolstered the Vietnamese middle class, improved the national living standard, and strengthened the medical and educational services. According to the World Bank, Vietnam’s GDP per capita increased nearly three times between 2002 and 2018, amounting to nearly $3,000 in 2019 and lifting some 45 million people above the poverty line (WorldBank, 2020). 37

However, despite receiving billions of dollars in grants, concessional loans and credits through the World Bank, the economic growth has not affected all citizens equally. A significant proportion of those remaining below the poverty line are ethnic minorities (WorldBank, 2020), and foreign firms continue to employ less than 5% of the Vietnamese labor force (Nguyen et al., 2020, p. 43). Furthermore, when a domestic firm is taken over by foreign investors, an average nine of ten employees in the workforce would be cut off (Nguyen at al., 2020, p. 44).

According to Nguyen et al, foreign firms have a negative and statistically significant impact on aggregate employment, meaning “foreign competition outweighs the minimally positive impacts from FDI’s creation of new jobs” (Nguyen at al., 2020, p. 52). China and the United States both offer ample economic opportunities through investments, loans, and development projects. However, if investment benefits are limited to political elites and state- owned companies, and if interest rates on loans become unpayable, target countries are often left with severe debt to investing countries and their citizens will experience very little actual economic benefit.

While Vietnam has refrained from accepting projects under China’s belt and road, they have undertaken major development operations with Chinese companies and with official Chinese development assistance. One such project was to be Hanoi’s first elevated railway, which was intended to begin in 2008 and be completed in 2013 with an original estimated cost of $552 million supplemented by a $419 million loan from China. By 2017, however, the project was at a standstill. Costs had increased to an estimated $868 million by 2016, supported by an additional Chinese loan of $250 million. Like many China-backed projects, the railway was wracked by poor quality materials, untrained workers, and faulty installations. Work came to an indefinite pause in 2017 as China failed to issue the additional $250 million loan (Nikkei, 2017). As of 2020, the project remains uncomplete and has placed Vietnam in considerable debt to Chinese loans.

Another example of Chinese interference on economic opportunities is its recent pressure on Vietnam concerning their South China Sea oil operations. Vietnam will have to pay nearly $1 billion to foreign oil companies in “termination and compensation” arrangements following the government’s decision to cancel operations after considerable pressure from China in the form of forty naval ships just two days away from the proposed drill site (Hayton, 2020). 38

Relations with China and the United States

Vietnam has complex histories with both China and the United States, ranging from centuries of conquest and subjugation by the Han Empire starting in 111 B.C. to the bloody conflict between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and American forces that lasted for nearly twenty years. The following sections will summarize Vietnam’s relations to both China and the United States beginning with a brief historical overview before analyzing various indicators of influence organized into three separate categories for political, military and economic relations.

China

History

Vietnam’s early relations with China were characterized by subjugation and rebellion. From 111 BCE Until the Tang Dynasty’s collapse in the early 900s AD, China maintained superiority over Vietnam as a vassal state. Though a number of revolts and rebellions were staged, Vietnam nonetheless benefited from its millennia of domination because of its vital position between China and its trade routes west to India. An influx of new ideas and practices ranging from Confucianism and Buddhism, to scientific and medical procedures came in tandem with China’s advancements in agriculture and irrigation, paving the way for Vietnam’s iconic rice-paddy landscape and granting the food security which allowed for Vietnam’s eventual population and territorial expansion.

Vietnam’s next source of significant foreign interference came in the mid-1800s as France initiated its colonization efforts. China attempted to interfere with French ambitions but was ultimately rebuffed following a series of border skirmishes, leaving France to take complete control over the whole of Vietnam. In 1962, China became involved once again, providing substantial amounts of equipment as well as an estimated half a million engineering and anti- aircraft forces which were crucial in maintaining Northern Vietnam’s relative autonomy.

Chinese assistance continued to aid Vietnamese forces throughout the war, assisting in the eventual capture of Saigon and the expulsion of American forces. Nevertheless, Chinese moral superiority following the war greatly subtracted from their potential influence over post- conflict Vietnam, causing social and political disconnection and eventual unstable relations. 39

Modern Sino-Vietnamese relations have been degraded by numerous smaller-scale territorial conflicts as well as Chinese incursions into northern Vietnam during its war with Cambodia. Though relaxed tensions and normalized relations following the collapse of the Soviet Union led to economic reengagement in the early 2000s, China’s contemporary assertions over the South China Seas have rekindled tensions and provoked Vietnam’s alignment with the United States.

Overall, Sino-Vietnamese relations are mixed and complex. Vietnam has suffered under China’s control but has also benefited from centuries of cultural exchange as well as instances of military assistance. China has gone from a position of moral superiority to one of positive relations and mutual cooperation. Recently, robust economic engagement seems to be suffering from Chinese territorial assertions, and an escalation of conflict could result in total socioeconomic disengagement.

Contemporary Political Relations

In the past two decades, Chinese leaders have visited Vietnam four times in an official state capacity. China and Vietnam currently share mutual membership in forty-two international organizations and have four prominent and active bilateral agreements between them which include: the Agreement on basic principles guiding the settlement of sea-related issues, the Agreement on education exchanges and cooperation through ASEAN, the Agreement on mutual recognition of higher education qualification and degrees, and the Agreement for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes and income.

President Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping’s predecessor, made two formal visits to Vietnam in 2005 and 2006. These visits included discussions regarding increased trade between the two nations as well as formal talks between President Jintao and his Vietnamese counterparts (Asia News, 2005). During President Xi Jinping’s first visit to Vietnam in 2015, he met with President Truong Tan Sang as well as the Chairman of the National Assembly. President Xi Jinping also delivered a speech to the Assembly concerning the China-Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of Cooperation. President Xi Jinping’s second visit in 2017 included attending the 25th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Economic Leader’s Meeting as well as formal talks with Vietnam’s General Secretary of the CPV, the Chairperson of the National Assembly, and President Tran Dai Quang (Liangyu, 2017). 40

Most of the agreements between China and Vietnam concern education and taxation and are therefore quite similar to many of China’s other bilateral arrangements. The agreement concerning settlement of sea-related issues, however, is somewhat unique and seems to demonstrate some willingness to compromise. While the ongoing dispute has been primarily limited to small-scale clashes such as attacks on fishing vessels, a working agreement seems to indicate both countries’ desire to avoid serious confrontation.

Trade Relations

Though Chinese territorial assertions have fostered animosity within Vietnam, the two countries continue to share robust economic engagement. China accounted for 19.6% of Vietnam’s total export market in 2018 with a total value of $53.8 billion. Furthermore, export volume experienced a significant increase of 45% between 2017 and 2018, increasing the total value by nearly $14 billion (OEC Vietnam, 2020).

Chinese imports to Vietnam were even more significant, accounting for 32.9% of the country’s total import market in 2018 with a value of $83.3 billion. Though import volume decreased by a smaller margin than exports, the 18% rise between 2017 and 2018 amounted to nearly $13 billion (OEC Vietnam, 2020).

Military Relations

Despite recent tensions between the two countries, Chinese and Vietnamese Defense Ministers have met several times for formal talks, and cooperation agreements between their two defense agencies facilitated the Memorandum of understanding on military cooperation, an agreement on military staff education, and a Memorandum of understanding on military education between Vietnam’s national defense academy and China’s defense university. Additionally, annual joint coast guard patrols were held from 2006 until recently, and a joint military drill was staged along the border in 2016. Finally, the two cooperated on a joint disaster relief drill along the border in 2018 (US DoS-Vietnam, 2020).

United States

United States involvement in Vietnam began in 1950 as a response to what it perceived to be the imminent threat of Maoist and Stalinist expansionism. Therefore, despite having no 41 intention of assisting the French in maintaining their colonial territories following the Second World War, The United States had nevertheless declared a full-scale war by August of 1964.

From 1950 until the war’s end in 1975, an estimated two and a half million Southern and Northern Vietnamese soldiers and civilians were killed, which, when compared to the United States’ loss of less than 60,000 (Llewellyn, Southey, and Thompson, 2019), demonstrates the asymmetric nature of either side’s capabilities. With the infamous cruelty of napalm, carpet bombings, and Agent Orange, American forces left Vietnam in an extremely fragile state racked by food shortages and disease. So, while the war came to an end following The Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s final capture and reunification of the south on April 30, 1975, tensions remained. Persisting wartime enmity coalesced with Southeast Asian regional transformations, adverse domestic politics, and the reinvigoration of the Cold War, resulting in a position of enmity from the United States which continued to deny Vietnam formal talks and normalization until 1991.

In 1994 and 1995, a reshaping of geopolitics facilitated the formal reopening of economic and diplomatic relations between the two countries. Though progress was initially slow, relations were much improved by the early 2000s (Demmer, 2018). In the second decade of the 21st century, policies such as the United States’ pivot to Asia and Vietnam’s heightened militarization and foreign relations combined in the face of China’s rise. The Memorandum of Understanding on Advancing Bilateral Defense Cooperation and the Joint Vision Statement on Defense Relations formalized US-Vietnamese security cooperation in five major areas: maritime security, high-level dialogues, search and rescue assistance, humanitarian and disaster relief assistance, and peacekeeping operations. Their relationship continues to strengthen over time as security, political and economic partnerships pave the way forward (Tu and Nguyen, 2019).

Like its relationship with China, Vietnam has mixed experiences with the United States. War and prolonged animosity kept the two countries at odds for decades, but recent developments demonstrate their current state of friendly relations and growing economic cooperation. It is likely that further pressure from China will cement Vietnam’s position as a partner to the United States, but President Trump’s unorthodox leadership may pose unforeseen complications in the near future.

Contemporary Political Relations 42

Since 2000, United States Presidents have made five official state visits to Vietnam ranging from Bill Clinton to Donald Trump. Vietnam and the U.S. are mutual members of thirty- eight international organizations and have made numerous agreements and joint statements covering areas from economic partnerships to defense pacts and cooperation on the elimination of unexploded ordinance. Since 2010, ten such agreements have been made.

President Bill Clinton’s visit in 2000 was somewhat controversial as his calls for democratic progress were met with rebuke by Communist Party leaders. However, this visit was still a milestone in many ways and paved the way for friendlier future visits (Engel, 2000). The next visit came six years later with President Bush’s attendance of the APEC summit as well as a State Banquet wherein he delivered a toast congratulating Vietnam on their rapid development. Bush’s visit was better received overall and demonstrated the rapidly improving relations between the two countries (Whitehouse Archives, 2006).

The following visit did not come for another ten years, but Obama’s 2016 visit was monumental in forming contemporary close relations by demonstrating his commitment to Pivot to Asia and by lifting a long-standing arms embargo (Jackson and Maresca, 2016). The fourth visit was made by President Trump in 2017 where he attended the APEC summit, and met with the Prime Minister, Community Pasty General Sectary, and President Tran Dai Quang. His visit also included important dialogue concerning the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership as well as the promotion of new investments and energy sales (Vnmission, 2017).

President Trump visited again in 2019 as Vietnam hosted the second North Korea-U.S. summit. During his stay, the president also met with Vietnamese President Nguyen Phu Trong and Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc for general bilateral talks wherein President Trump praised Vietnam’s economy and social development (Rosenfeld, 2019).

In addition to the previously mentioned comprehensive security agreement, the United States and Vietnam share a bilateral trade partnership as well as agreements concerning civil nuclear cooperation, a memorandum of understanding on continued unexploded ordinance cooperation, agreements on environmental protection, as well as numerous smaller partnerships.

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Trade Relations

The United States accounted for 18.1% of Vietnam’s total export market in 2018 with a total value of $49.5 billion. Between 2017 and 2018, exports rose by 7.35% with a total value increase of $3.34 billion (OEC Vietnam, 2020).

The United State’s share of Vietnamese imports is even smaller, constituting only 3.19% of total imports in 2018 with a total value of $8.09 billion. There are signs of increasing economic partnership between the U.S. and Vietnam, though, as imports rose by 64.5% between 2017 and 2018 with a value increase of $3.17 billion (OEC Vietnam, 2020).

Military Relations

The United States and Vietnam have robust security relations ranging from military financing to joint naval exercises. Between 2013 and 2018, the Foreign Military Financing program (FMF) contributed over $56 million in bilateral State Department-funded security assistance, donated a refurbished U.S. Coast Guard cutter to Vietnam, and funded the purchase of twenty-four patrol boats (UN DoS – Vietnam Security, 2020). The FMF also contributed $26.25 million between 2015 and 2018 under the Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative.

In 2011, the two countries took part in joint naval non-combat exchanges, and held their 8th annual naval engagement activity in 2017 (Rathmell, 2020). These annual engagements originated as simple port visits but have since expanded to include skill exchanges in undersea medicine, diving and salvage, ship handling, medical evaluations, and at-sea practice for the Code of Unplanned Encounters at Sea (Parameswaran. 2017). Vietnam also participated in the Rim of the Pacific military exercise in 2018 after serving observational roles in 2012 and 2016.

In an effort to assist Vietnam with the lingering effects of the war, the United States has contributed over $119 million for the removal of unexploded ordinance as well as agent orange and other dioxins. These efforts include information management, survivor’s assistance, risk education, survey and clearance operations, and capacity development for the Vietnam National Mine Action Center.

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Comparison

China and the United States share complex histories with Vietnam, both having either invaded or conquered the country while also engaging in cultural and economic exchanges over time. While the Vietnam War’s lasting effects are still evident today, Vietnamese - American relations in the past decades have improved exponentially whereas rising tensions over maritime territorial claims threaten to disrupt or end the strong economic ties between Hanoi and Beijing.

Although China shares mutual membership in four more international organizations than the United States, this difference is negligible and mostly due to membership in Asia-specific organizations. More telling are the bilateral agreements and partnerships which allude to more robust relations between Vietnam and the United States. China’s agreements cover more general areas such as education and taxation while American agreements are more comprehensive, covering a broad scope of cooperation in economics, security, and social development. Furthermore, the character of U.S. state visits are altogether friendlier than those of China which are generally more formal and limited.

Similarly, China’s military relations with Vietnam are limited to occasional formal talks and non-combat related joint drills whereas The U.S. Defensive cooperation has entailed millions of dollars in assistance as well as equipment contributions, training and annual naval engagements. Moreover, continued Chinese incursions into Vietnamese waters will likely reinforce and expand Vietnam’s ongoing security engagement with the United States.

In terms of trade volume, China’s imports to Vietnam are significantly higher than that of the United States, but the two countries’ export volumes from Vietnam are separated by a mere 1.4%. Furthermore, China’s import growth of 17.9% is much smaller than the U.S. increase by 64.5%, demonstrating that Vietnam may be gradually shifting its import market away from China. This trend seems to demonstrate worsening Sino-Vietnamese relations as well as Vietnamese concerns for the large trade deficit with China. Likewise, the rising share of imports with the U.S. are likely to continue under the current circumstances as Vietnam seeks alternative economic partnerships.

All things considered, the United States seems to have a much more robust relationship with Vietnam and shows signs of change in the one sector which China currently maintains a 45 clear advantage. A marginal difference in international organization membership is outweighed by the numerous and diverse bilateral agreements between Vietnam and the United States, and the two countries’ military bonds further demonstrate the direction of Vietnam’s alignment. Nevertheless, it must be said that Vietnam has sustained a certain level of independence from both the United States and China as it maintains its long-standing policy of unalignment. Unlike Japan, Vietnam does not host any U.S. military facilities and has been hesitant to accept too much foreign direct investment. Moreover, unlike Myanmar, Vietnam has largely abstained from substantial BRI development projects and is taking increasingly assertive actions against Chinese incursions into their territorial waters.

Myanmar

According to the Freedom House Index, Myanmar is ‘not free’ with a score of 30 from the 100 possible points. A score of 14 from the possible 40 points in political rights and the similarly low score of 16 from the possible 60 points in civil liberties reflect the authoritarian nature of Myanmar’s unitary parliamentary republic (Freedom House, 2020).

The State Fragility Index placed Myanmar in the second to last category with a total score of 18 comprised of effectiveness and legitimacy scores of 8 and 10. Myanmar scored moderately high in political effectiveness and social legitimacy but ranks poorly in economic and social effectiveness. Myanmar’s security effectiveness and legitimacy as well as its political and economic legitimacy all received the lowest score. Despite its low scores, Myanmar is currently listed as a democracy perhaps due to recent advancements in their elections. However, The Center for Systemic Peace does denote Myanmar as being involved in an ongoing war (center for Strategic Peace, 2018).

According to the CATO Institute’s Human Freedom Index, Myanmar ranks 148 of the 162 countries with a score of 5.44 from the possible 10 points averaged from their scores of 5.63 and 5.26 in economic and political freedom. Such a score aligns with the previous indexes, demonstrating further evidence of Myanmar’s limited freedoms (CATO, 2019).

The Heritage Index of Economic Freedom ranks Myanmar at 141 of the 171 countries with an overall score of 54.0 from the possible 100 points. Its highest scoring categories included tax burden, government spending, and fiscal health, while its weakest sectors included judicial 46 effectiveness, financial freedom, and investment freedom. The country exhibited a slight increase of 0.4 over the past year, yet, while, Myanmar is improving, the country still experienced decreases in property rights, judicial effectiveness and labor freedom (Heritage, 2020).

Myanmar Heterogeneity Education Discriminatory Social Environments Residential Mobility, Instability, and Racial Segregation Institutional Racism, Policies and Population Density Regulations Linear Ranking Order Gender Equity Income Inequality Economic Opportunities

Of the ten criteria, nine could be confidently detected in Myanmar. Though population density is not considered a prevalent concern as the total ratio in Myanmar is a mere eighty-three persons per square kilometer, its most populous city, Yangon has a significantly higher ratio of approximately 12,300 persons per square kilometer (World Population Review, 2020). Ultimately, one city was not enough to determine a structural problem with Myanmar’s population density, but it is worth noting due to the vast disparity between Yangon and the rest of the country.

From the nine determinates present within Myanmar, seven were found to have links to foreign influence. This includes: Discriminatory Social Environment, Institutional Racism, Policies, and Regulations, Linear Ranking Order and Acyclical Interaction Pattern, Income Inequality, Residential Mobility, instability, and Racial Segregation, Gender Equity, and Economic Opportunities.

Like Vietnam, Myanmar’s racial and ethnic heterogeneity is not due to any foreign involvement but does play a significant role in the country’s social and political environment. Myanmar is the one of the most ethnically diverse nation under consideration with 135 distinct ethnic groups officially recognized by the Burmese Government. Yet, despite widespread acknowledgement of the country’s ethnic diversity, groups such as the Rohingya as well as 47

Chinese, Indian and Pakistani Burmese have yet to receive formal recognition. Furthermore, the government has divided all accepted ethnic groups into eight major national ethnic races.

Myanmar’s official practice of organizing distinct groups together is based solely upon geography wherein language, culture and ethnic affiliation are superseded by a group’s region of inhabitance. The major ethnic group Chin, for example, comprises fifty-three distinct ethnic groups (Myanmar Travel) living in one of Myanmar’s least developed areas where poverty rates are as high as 60% (UNDP Myanmar, 2019). Nearly every one of the fifty-three groups speaks a different language, and while Christianity is the clear majority religion in the region, there are individuals and groups which practice Buddhism, Islam, and Tribal religions (Gulliway, 2012).

Though such ethnic states are underdeveloped and somewhat haphazardly organized, the alternative of non-recognition is far more troubling. As of 2019, the nearly 1.4 million Rohingya people living in Myanmar remain confined within the Rakhine state (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 70) which is another one of Myanmar’s least developed regions with the country’s second worst rate of poverty (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 76).

Myanmar’s diverse ethnic composition fits all of the requirements for heterogeneity and exhibits most of the human security risks associated with such high levels of diversity including lower social capital, lower economic development, increased poverty, heightened income inequality, increased corruption, and the escalation of ethnic conflicts (Metapedia, 2020).

Second of the independent criteria is education. Myanmar’s education system is currently divided across multiple divisions consisting of the state sector, monastic schools, and community educational programs. The state sector is the largest and administered directly by the government, consisting of over 47,000 schools ranging from primary to upper-secondary levels (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 72). Under state administration, these schools tend to enforce a singular national identity by emphasizing Burman cultural and military history (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 81). Access to formal state sector schools remains limited, particularly for lower socioeconomic minority ethnic groups located in remote regions (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 77). These groups have notably limited access to early childhood care and education (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 76), which poses considerable challenges for secondary school enrollment and completion with an approximate 53% enrolment rate and an estimated 50% completion rate (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 78). 48

Monastic education is present within every region and consists of over 1,500 schools registered under the Ministry of Religious Affairs with an estimated 300,000 students as of 2016 (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 72). Though monastic schools offer educational opportunities for students which would otherwise have very limited access to state schooling, there are a number of crucial problems concerning teacher qualifications, curriculum materials, and indoctrination agendas (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 73). Recent evidence suggests that monastic schools are often established as a direct attempt to prevent the growth of minority religious (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 73) and therefore pose serious ethical questions regarding bias and religious exclusionism. Community established educational schools are not register under the state and are therefore difficult to monitor (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 73). There are an estimated 2,420 schools located within marginalized regions serving nearly 230,000 students primarily from ethnic minority groups (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 74). Though many of these schools are operated or funded by international organizations, the curriculum often places emphasis upon identity, language and religion, which “aims to valorize the ethno-nationalist struggle against the state” (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 74).

In sum, the limited scope of attendance and majority-oriented content of state schools demonstrate prime examples of structurally inadequate education. Furthermore, the biased content and religious indoctrination found in monastic schools and a lack of regulation and reinforcement of ethnic divides found in community schools serves to exacerbate the pre-existing ethnic tensions. Additionally, chronically low government investment in education and unequal distribution of the limited available funds further demonstrate Myanmar’s educational deficiencies (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 80). Although recent progress has been made in the development of additional higher education institutions (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 79), widespread corruption and inequality in school financing prove that Myanmar meets the criteria for a structurally deficient education system.

Discriminatory Social Environments

Myanmar’s society is stratified into three highly unequal groups. The elites makeup the smallest group and consist primarily of ethnic Burmans while the overwhelming majority of the country consist of a large impoverished population as well as a much smaller middle class 49

(Advameg, 2020). Under the Buddhist majority, Myanmar’s conservative culture exerts an exclusionary collectivism which largely ostracizes non-majority religions such as Islam.

Myanmar’s conservative and collectivist orthodoxy is reflected in the country’s social hostilities and government restrictions scores produced by the Pew Foundation’s restrictions on religion index. With a score of 5.1 above the perfect 0, Myanmar’s social hostilities are considered high (Pew, 2020, 51). Similarly, the government restrictions score of 6.9 is considered very high (Pew, 2020, 51). Both scores reflect Myanmar’s social and institutional discrimination against non-Buddhist citizens and are most obvious when considering groups such as the Rohingya who have yet to receive recognition in any official capacity despite their inhabitance within the country since the 12th century (Aljazeera, 2018). There are currently nine distinct ethnic groups which remain unrecognized and therefore deprived of formal citizenship as well as numerous groups which do not meet the requirements for full citizenship, thus barring them from crucial social rights such as suffrage, mobility and adequate education. Accordingly, Myanmar satisfies the second criteria of discriminatory social environments.

One of the most obvious contributions to the maintenance of Myanmar’s discriminatory regime is China’s continued support and diplomatic protection. It is unlikely that China contributes to the average Burmese citizen’s discriminatory views, but their support of Myanmar’s authoritarian, unitary parliamentary republic throughout the eras of military- controlled governance and ethnic cleansing has no doubt allowed the regime to survive despite international condemnation. China remains Myanmar’s largest source of foreign investment and has gone so far as to urge the United Nations against taking action in response to Myanmar’s Rohingya genocide.

For the United States, its use of sanctions and public rebuke, while justified by Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya, served to further alienate the country and force it to rely on China. Emphasis on democracy and human rights often has the effect of making authoritarian regimes hesitant to engage with U.S. reform efforts, leaving little room for actual domestic improvement. While the United States is not nearly as complicit as China in the maintenance of Myanmar’s authoritarianism, they did play a role in ensuring that China was the only viable source of international assistance.

Institutional Racism, Policies and Regulations 50

Myanmar has a history of limiting full rights to specific groups, as is evident by their numerous exclusionary constitutions. Myanmar’s first constitution under British Colonial rule in 1947 “simultaneously politicized and rigidified the institutional mechanisms of minority and central government relations” with its provisions which stipulated the relationship between majority and minority groups through “bipolar cultural and ethnic terms” (Parashar and Alam, 2018, p. 98). In 1974 while still under totalitarian rule following the 1962 military coup d’état, a second Constitution of the Union of Burma was drafted, defining the country as a socialist democracy while still maintaining the formalized ethnic divisions found in its predecessor (Parashar and Alam, 2018, p. 100). Seven ethnic minority states were dictated, establishing the foundation for the contemporary eight state system (Parashar and Alam, 2018, p. 100).

Further divisions were established by The Citizenship Law of 1982 which defined three distinct classes of citizens including Full, Associate, and Naturalized (Parashar and Alam, 2018, p. 101). Full citizenship was generally reserved for groups considered “national races,” meeting the requirements of settling within the country before 1823 (Parashar and Alam, 2017, p. 101). The Associate and Naturalized citizenships are not quite as stringent, but still require proof of long-term residence in Myanmar (Parashar and Alam, 2017, p. 101). All three categories are virtually unobtainable for unrecognized groups such as the Rohingya who do no classify as “national races,” and do not have access to the proper documentation required to prove long-term residence.

Still under the military junta’s twenty-three-year reign, the most recent 2008 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar once again limited citizenship by requiring individuals to prove that both of their parents are nationals or that the individual is already a citizen according to Burmese law (Parashar and Alam, 2017, p. 102). Groups such as the Rohingya struggle to meet these requirements as the majority of members do not hold the necessary documentation to prove citizenship. This provision acts much like the United States’ Grandfather Clause of the late 19th century which was designed to deny suffrage to African Americans. Because Rohingyas had not been granted natural status before the new constitution, they are effectively excluded from and future opportunities of citizenship.

Though the military’s tight grip over the country ended in 2011, Myanmar still has significant social and political concerns to address and overcome before it can be qualified as 51 institutionally inclusive. Many of its inhabitants continue to live in a state of uncertainty and social exclusion, which, similarly the above criteria, is partially due to China’s assistance in supporting Myanmar’s non-inclusive regime through decades of poor governance. It is likely that some form of democratic revolution or transition would have transpired sooner had the military- backed regimes not been supported by Chinese loans and investment. Furthermore, the new progressive National League for Democracy (NLD) which won its supermajority in 2015 faces considerable challenges in breaking away from Chinese economic subjugation. The new party needs to foster substantial internal development and social reform without relying too heavily on its traditional Chinese financing, lest it become equally subservient as previous regimes.

In maintaining sanctions and cutting diplomatic ties, the United States has effectively kept Myanmar’s economic and diplomatic options extremely limited. Because the Rohingya continue to be persecuted, it is no wonder the United States has not offered any support to the National League for Democracy. However, it may be necessary to institute some form of international assistance in order to initiate genuine reforms and free Myanmar from its exceedingly limited sources of foreign support.

Linear Ranking Order and Acyclical Interaction Pattern

Boycotts and international sanctions coerced the Burmese military government to give certain political concessions, ultimately allowing for the addition of several political parties with their own public candidates in the 2010 and 2012 elections (Pariona, 2017). The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party maintained its dominance and the elections were widely considered to be fraudulent. In 2015, however, the National League for Democracy won the majority, showing promising signs of a transition away from military rule.

Recent shifts towards free democratic elections demonstrate a promising trend, but the country’s unfair citizenship rights continue to prohibit certain groups from suffrage as well as party registration. Furthermore, a quarter of seats in both the Assembly of the Union and the House of Nationalities remain reserved for military appointments. Yet another concerning feature of Myanmar’s current system is the lack of local governance, its role instead filled by the General Administration Department which has a “long history within the military-led Ministry of Home Affairs” (Arnold, 2019). The GAD has recently transitioned from Home Affairs to 52 operation under the Ministry of the Office of the Union, but the fact remains that GAD is a directly run by the government and therefore still maintains restrictive membership policies.

Recent years show signs of progress, but the continuation of local governance through the GAD upholds a strict linear ranking order and acyclical interaction pattern by maintaining an inflexible hierarchy between the local and state governments and limited political mobility, assuring that disadvantaged groups remain under the power of Myanmar’s majority-run central government.

Myanmar’s political elite have preserved their position of power through assistance from the PRC and from Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). A study of Chinese energy and mining developing in Southeast Asia demonstrated that Chinese SOEs established informal lines of communication with politicians “who acted as intermediaries with host governments on complex BOT (build-operate-transfer) projects” (Liao, 2018, p. 10). The study showed that SOEs were more likely to engage in misconduct with governments experiencing weak rule of law (Liao 16), and that SOE misconduct was “embedded in their elite-centric business model” (Liao, 2018, p. 16). Though China may not have a direct impact upon the maintenance of GAD-controlled local governance, its support for financial and political elites left little incentive for administrative inclusiveness. Furthermore, the new NLD Party has yet to institute any substantial reforms on local governance, likely due to its prioritization of other significantly underdeveloped conditions perpetuated by Chinese financial misconduct.

Income Inequality

Following the 2011 election, Myanmar began to implement numerous reforms such as currency exchange rate regulation, foreign investment laws and taxation, and anti-corruption. Yet, despite heavy economic liberalization in 2012 and large-scale direct investment deals in 2014, the country’s proportion of population below the poverty line remained fairly high by 2017 at 24.8% (Asia Development Bank).

According to the United Nations Development Program, Myanmar ranks 145 of the 189 countries on the IHDI index with a score of 0.448. When compared to the non-inequality- adjusted score of 0.584, Myanmar experienced an overall loss of 23.2%. A mere 18.6% of Myanmar’s wealth is held by the poorest 40% of citizens while the top 10% control 31.7%. 53

Though listed as a medium development country, Myanmar’s Gini coefficient of 38.1 is approaching higher levels found within the low human development tier meaning there are somewhat substantial levels of inequality (UNDP, 2019).

By relying upon financial assistance from China, Myanmar has missed many of the opportunities which allowed Southeast Asian nations to foster their own economic development. Chinese aid has effectively eliminated incentives for change in Myanmar as those in power continue to profit from Chinese partnerships. While ASEAN has seen a rapid overall decline in poverty and countries like Malaysia are actively addressing problems of growing inequality, Myanmar has just begun to wake up from its state of suspended animation. The country’s most recent elections resulted in a promising shift in power, but it remains uncertain whether the new party will be able to make lasting changes or if they will succumb to the same trap of Chinese reliance.

Residential Mobility, Instability and Racial Segregation

According to the UN International Organization for Migration’s household survey, nearly a fourth of all households within the Rakhine and Shan states as well as the Ayeyarwady and Mandalay regions had at least one migrant member (CHIME, 2). Nearly three quarters of Myanmar’s migrant population during the study period were internal, most often relocating within their own state or region (CHIME, 2). Improved employment and higher incomes account for 50% of the respondents’ motives for internal migration (CHIME, 3). As a whole, most migrants were able to find regularly paid employment, with only 7-13% of those from Chan, Mandalay or Ayeyarwady holding irregularly paid jobs. However, the number of irregular jobs rose to 26% when including internal and international migrants from Rakhine (CHIME, 4).

With the exception of unrecognized groups, internal migrants enjoy free mobility and an absence of forced segregation. Rural populations experience instability through various sources such as the ongoing conflict against Kachin separatists along the Chinese border (Ho 2018) and indiscriminate airstrikes in Rakhine (Amnesty, 2020), natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes and storm surges (OCHA, 2016), poor socio-economic conditions (IOM, 2020), and man-made disasters such as a recent jade mine landslide which killed at least 200 (Jangma and Htun, 2020). However, most citizens are able to leave affected areas, often relocating to major cities and finding gainful employment. 54

Internal migrants are not entirely free from residential instability upon relocating to urban centers, and this form of migration is now one of Myanmar’s primary urbanization challenges (Thuzar, 2015, p. 142). As one study demonstrated, inadequate housing has given rise to the presence of slums and squatter settlements (Thuzar, 2015, p. 143) which provide little to no access to public goods or improvement in migrants’ quality of life. According to Moe Thuzar, “there is no security of tenure for a large portion of the urban population, as the government, which technically owns all land in the country, can site new venues for major development projects around major urban agglomerations” (Thuzar, 2015, p. 143). In essence, what little residential stability is granted by urban migration is offset by the government’s inability to provide adequate housing and its right to remove temporary residences for development.

The Rohingya confined within Rakhine state are under strict traveling regulations (Mushtaq, 2019, p. 76) and face major instability as the region experiences severe underdevelopment. Due to their confinement within Rakhine, Rohingya are forced to either continue living under threat of the Burmese government or flee the country. By 2018, there were an estimated 900,000 Rohingyas confined to makeshift settlements and refugee camps in Bangladesh (Alam, 2018). The Rohingya alone make clear Myanmar’s gross deficiencies in residential mobility, racial segregation, and instability, but even recognized groups with freedom of movement face numerous challenges and inadequacies in terms of urban housing availability, quality and stability.

Not only does China support Myanmar’s residential instability and segregation simply by funding the Burmese government, it also directly impacts instability with large-scale development projects within unstable regions such as Rakhine, and within regions currently experiencing ethnic conflict. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) was agreed to in 2018 and is planned to span from China’s Yunnan Province through Mandalay and Tangon to the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone in Rakhine alone the Bay of Bengal (Lwin, 2020, b). This project also includes plans for a deep seaport within Kyaukphyu which would give China access to the Indian Ocean.

Within Myanmar’s Shan State, China has been acting as mediator between the Northern Alliance and the military since 2017. The Northern Alliance, comprised of ethnic militias, has been actively engaged with government troops within Shan State since 2016. China’s desire to 55 develop BRI projects such as the Muse-Mandalay Railway have forced them to take an active role in mitigating the conflict (Lwin, 2020, c) even while discretely providing weapons to Burmese militant groups elsewhere in the country (Shukla, 2020).

Chinese loans and development projects do have the potential to provide jobs and increased mobility, but the current emphasis on economic gain over social stability it troublesome. It seems China is merely assisting Myanmar for their own economic benefit and are willing to ignore the persecution of Muslim Rohingyas while expanding their own interests in Rakhine state.

Gender Equity

Myanmar’s religious and social conservatism has resulted in “the widespread lack of awareness of the relevance of gender issues,” (Minoletti, 2016, p. 43) resulting in the continuation of antiquated gender roles. As such, female participation in Myanmar’s government continues to be “highly gender unequal,” (Minoletti, 2016, p. 43) acting “as a barrier to more effective and equitable policymaking, budgeting, and public service delivery” (Minoletti, 2016, p. 32).

Not only does Myanmar’s reinforcement of gender roles limit women’s access to careers and government position, but also contributes to instances of physical violence. According to the UNDP’s 2018 Gender inequality index, Myanmar’s overall index rank is 80 of the 162 countries. Data shows that Myanmar’s lifetime physical and or sexual intimate partner violence amounts to a rate of 17% with a rate of 11% over the course of the past twelve months. Furthermore, Myanmar has a child marriage rate of 16% (UN Women, 2016).

In a study based upon national surveys and interviews, it was revealed that Myanmar continues to hold inequitable views towards women’s rights (Htun and Jensenius, 2020, p. 478). Such gender roles are held across age groups, characterized by beliefs that “men are better leaders than women in politics and business” and that “university education is more important for a boy than a girl” (Htun and Jensenius, 2020, p. 478). Traditional and authoritarian political values contribute highly to Myanmar’s wide ranged endorsement of gender inequality (Htun and Jensenius, 2020, p. 478) and demonstrate that the country is far from obtaining gender equity. 56

Widespread gender inequality and lingering conservative gender roles contribute to a distinct lack or female representation in government and unequal access to career opportunities. China’s role in Burmese gender inequality is not as obvious as their hand in inequality and residential mobility, however, the same arguments can be applied that merely giving Myanmar economic and political support makes China culpable for the continuation of objectionable behavior. Because gender roles are reinforced by Myanmar’s conservative religious and political elite, China’s sponsorship has disincentivized sociopolitical change.

Economic Opportunities

Myanmar’s recent development of foreign trade and production of offshore natural gas (Findlay et al., 2016, p. 50) has significantly increased their total export value and seems to indicate growing opportunities for both its rural and urban populations. However, such progress has done little to mitigate the country’s local corruption as domestic elites and large, international businesses receive the majority of profits. Myanmar’s rampant corruption places it within the bottom 5% of 189 countries for ease of doing business despite the dramatic increase of foreign direct investment since 2011 (Findlay et al., 2016, p. 55). As expected, the elite- controlled economy is reinforced through liberalization investment efforts (Findlay et al., 2016, p. 58) resulting in an extremely slow trickle-down process which deprives Burmese society of most economic benefits (Findlay et al., 2016, p. 58). In Rakhine, any benefits derived from Myanmar’s economic liberalization “went almost exclusively to capital elites,” and ethnic tensions were again strained as the Rohingya became the government’s “scapegoat for unfulfilled promises” (Findlay et al., 2016, p. 65-66).

Two other developments which generate concern are the growing rate of labor migration among Burmese citizens as well as the so called “debt trap” created through Myanmar’s reliance upon Chinese finance and development projects. Strengthening diplomatic ties with ASEAN neighbors has allowed for an expansion of migratory work, and the NLD hopes to utilize a growing volume of remittances which totaled to an estimated $3.1 billion in 2014 (Ma, 2017) but has yet to finalize an effective way to benefit from this financial inflow.

In 2018, Myanmar’s foreign exchange reserve amounted to $6.35 billion with an estimated nation debt of $10 billion. More troubling, $4 billion of its total debt was owed to China, whose exorbitant interest rate of 4.5% was likely implemented in order to facilitate their 57

“grand strategic designs for Myanmar” which include gaining high-speed rail access to Kyuakphyu’s deep-sea port along the Indian Ocean (Lintner, 2019). In 2018, China and the United States accounted for just over 28% of Myanmar’s export market and nearly 41% of total imports. However, the U.S. contribution to both figures is negligible, making it clear that China controls nearly a third of all import and export trade in Myanmar.

As is clear by the unequal distribution of new wealth, the rise of migratory labor out of the country, as well as the debt trap incurred through limited borrowing options, Myanmar’s economic opportunities are suffering at the hand of malign Chinese investments. Recurring SOE misconduct and unfavorable BOT projects characterize the smaller-scale forms of Chinese economic interference while large development projects such as the Kyaukphyu deep-water seaport and the CMEC road and rail construction demonstrate the bigger issue of debt traps.

Although China has been the primary source for negative reinforcement, both they and the United States are responsible for Myanmar’s current economic underdevelopment. If the U.S. were willing to offer aid or peacekeeping assistance, Myanmar would not be forced to rely so heavily upon Chinese assistance. As it stands, there is potential for the NDL to take advantage of their recent electoral victory, but there are significant obstacles to overcome before the U.S. will consider lifting sanctions on Myanmar and reopening diplomatic relations.

Relations with China and the United States

Myanmar’s historical status as a strong and independent kingdom was maintained from the establishment of the Pagan Empire in 849 CE until the series of Anglo-Burmese wars in 1824. Following losses at the hands of the British Empire, Burma became a province of India under the British Raj and remained in a state of subjugation until after the Second World War. It’s history with China is one of successful resistance to numerous incursions, while its relations with the U.S. went from promising beginnings to a near total political severance.

China

History

Myanmar maintained a higher level of independence through its early history than its regional neighbors because of its remote distance from Chinese centers of power. Furthermore, 58 the country was long considered to be ‘barbarian’ and therefore was never included into China’s ‘civilized’ sphere (Seekins, 1997, p. 527) There were instances of Chinese incursion, but the Burman kingdom remained united until Kublai Khan’s armies invaded in the 1280s (Seekins, 1997, p. 527),

In the 18th century, war broke out between Qing China and Burma over control of the Shan Sates. Despite numerous Chinese invasions throughout the 1760s, Burmese forces were able to repel them, securing Myanmar’s position but allowing for “a de jure tribute relationship” between the Burmese Capital and Beijing (Seekins, 1997, p. 527). China’s loss is considered to have assured Burmese independence (Whiting, 2002) while creating the foundation for the present-day borders between the two countries (Giersch, 2006).

Following Mao’s rise to power and the foundation of the PRC in 1949, Chinese nationalist troops known as The Kuomintang in Burma (KMT) established bases in Myanmar’s northern Shan State in order to attack the neighboring communist-held Yunnan Province (Seekins, 1997, p. 527). With logistical support from the United States, the KMT remained in Burmese territory despite numerous incursions from the Burmese military. In 1961, however, Burmese leaders made an agreement with Beijing which allowed 20,000 PLA troops to enter Myanmar and deal with the remaining nationalists (Seekins, 1997, p. 528).

Tensions rose in the late 1960s as Chinese living in Burma were encouraged to participate in PRC cultural activities by the embassy in Rangoon. This eventually led to confrontations as the Burmese regime attempted to suppress internal Chinese nationalism. As a result of violence against their people, China began to strongly support the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) (Seekins, 1997, p. 528). Though China’s support for the BCP continued, Burmese officials were able to normalize relations with Beijing in the 1970s. The CCP-BCP ties strengthened until the mid-1980s, when China began offering ‘a comfortable retirement’ for BCP leaders, paving the way for improved relations between the two states (Seekins, 1997, p. 528). Border trade was officially opened in 1988 and major shipments of arms and ammunition as well as F7 fighter jets, naval boats, tanks and armored vehicles began in the early 1990s. Numerous visits were held by each country throughout the 2000s with a range of topics from economics to military aid and cooperation. 59

Current Sino-Burmese relations are complex and multifaceted. Myanmar has been a primary target for Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative with projects including planned special economic zones and cross border railway links (Munesuke, 2020), but the partnership is currently strained by conflict with ethnic Chinese rebels along the border. Resentment towards these China-backed militants has spurred domestic hostilities against Chinese Burmans while Chinese ‘debt traps’ continue to keep Myanmar’s economy under Beijing’s control with the high interest rate of 4.5%, possible only because of China’s position as sole major foreign donor amidst US sanctions for Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya (Lintner, 2019).

Contemporary Political Relations

Though Myanmar has only received two official state visits by Chinese Presidents since 2000, there have been numerous visits conducted by lower officials such the Premier and Vice Premier. China and Myanmar are currently mutual members of thirty-eight international organizations.

During Xi’s January 2020 visit, the two countries signed thirty-three agreements, protocols, exchange letters and MOUs covering subjects from infrastructure mega-project development to shareholders’ agreements for Special Economic Zones (Lwin, 2020, a). Additionally, the China-Myanmar Bilateral Investment Treaty of 2001 is still in effect, as are several earlier ASEAN-China investment and framework agreements (INCTAD, 2020).

Trade Relations

China is currently Myanmar’s largest trading partner and its primary source of investment. In 2019, 25% of Myanmar’s foreign investment derived from China. Chinese enterprises are interested in Myanmar’s growing oil and natural gas sectors, its hydropower and mining resources, as well as its processing and manufacturing services (CGTN, 2020). China Account for 24.7% of Myanmar’s exports in 2018 with a total value of $4.93 billion. Between 2013 and 2018, export trade value to China rose by a considerable 78.6% with a total value of $2.17 billion (OEC Myanmar, 2020). China accounted for 39.6% of Myanmar’s imports in 2018 with a total value of $10.7 billion. Between 2013 and 2018, trade value import growth rose by 46.4% with a total value of $3.41 billion (OEC Myanmar, 2020). 60

Military Relations China’s influence has diffused gradually across many facets of Burmese governance and society. It accounted for 61% of all weapons imports between 2014 and 2018, and has made itself an integral element of Myanmar’s political and military institutions by driving recent reconciliation efforts among the country’s eight combative ethnic groups (Touringbam and Pawan, 2019).

Myanmar began acquiring large quantities of arms and armaments from China during the military regime’s 1990s liberalization and expansion period (Selth, 20018, p. 6). In 2011, Myanmar’s arms imports amounted to two times their highest annual value since the expansion period, with China remaining one of its primary sources (Selth, 20018, p. 7). In 2012, Myanmar purchased two decommissioned 1,960-ton ‘Jianghu II’ class frigates from China (Selth, 20018, p. 8) and has since further bolstered their military ties to China with defense agreements covering technology transfers, licensed production, and significant arms contracts (Selth, 20018, p. 9).

United States

History

Between 1856 and 1857 King Mindon of Burma sent a series of letters to presidents Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan in hopes of securing a bilateral treaty and receiving assistance against British incursions. In response, Buchanan replied with assurances that the United States had no desire to see Myanmar’s sovereignty infringed upon (Kaung, 2011).

However, the United States did not formally recognized Myanmar’s independence until 1948, and finally began providing economic assistance until 1954. During that time, Myanmar supported the UN’s response to North Korea’s southern invasion and received Vice President Richard Nixon for a two-day visit. Aid was resumed in 1956 and maintained through 1964 until Ne Win’s 1962 coup d’état and subsequent non-alignment policy (Kaung, 2011).

Relations worsened after the 1988 suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations and all aid was officially ended in 1990 (Kaung, 2011). Poor relations continued with the United States offering strong rebuke to Myanmar’s acceptance into ASEAN and imposing a ban on all new American investments within the country in 1997. Formal sanctions were imposed under the 61

Bush administration following the 2003 attack on an NLD convoy and were expanded some four years later following the violent suppression of protests in Rangoon.

In 2009, the Obama administration began a new engagement policy which entailed opening a dialogue with Burmese military leaders while maintain the existing sanctions. President Obama and Myanmar’s PM Thein Sein met later that year at the ASEAN-US meeting, but relations were again strained following Obama’s condemnation of Burma’s fraudulent 2010 parliamentary election.

By 2011, relations began to improve once again as Myanmar showed signs of political progress, culminating in a visit from then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and the eventual lifting of sanctions and restoration of the Generalized System of Preferences trade benefits. However, following the 2017 Rohingya genocide and subsequent refugee crisis, military aid was again withdrawn with sanctions being gradually reinstituted throughout the following two years. The last move against Myanmar came in January of 2020 as the Trump Administration placed further immigration restrictions upon Myanmar as part of its wider travel ban on Muslim nations (O’Connor, 2020).

Contemporary Political Relations

Myanmar has received two official visits by U.S. presidents since 2000, and the two countries share mutual membership in 35 international organizations. Though there are currently no bilateral agreements between then, efforts were made in 2013 to establish a Myanmar-United States Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), but the agreement was never signed into action.

During President Obama’s 2012 visit, he gave a speech in Yangon and met with President Thein Sein as well as democratic activist Aung San Suu Kyi. President Obama also gave a speech on democracy at Yangon University and announced development aid to Myanmar under USAID (Fernquest, 2012). President Obama made his second visit in 2014 for the ASEAN Summit. Where the previous visit emphasized Myanmar’s great potential, the 2014 talks were much more subdued and far less optimistic as Burmese officials continued to deny citizenship to the Rohingya currently relegated to refugee camps.

Trade Relations 62

In 2018, the United States accounted for 3.35% of Myanmar’s export market with a total value of $671 million. Even with an exponential export volume increased of 2,190% between 2013 and 2018, the total trade value only increased by a mere $641 million (OEC Myanmar, 2020). The United States accounted for 1.17% of Myanmar’s 2018 imports with a total value of $319 million. Between 2013 and 2018, import trade value increased by 180%, but with a total value growth of only $205 million (OEC Myanmar, 2020).

Military Relations

Even before the 1962 coup, U.S. assistance to Myanmar came primarily in the form of development aid and training programs with very little military-to-military engagement. Since 1962, Myanmar has been under a series of sanctions as a result of their military rule and harsh treatment of minority groups. The 2015 election showed signs of progress, but continued displacement of the Rohingya Muslims led to a full reinstitution of economic and political sanctions.

New measures were under development for an increase in military-to-military engagement, but the Senate Armed Services Committee has recently removed any allowance of interaction with Myanmar from the National Defense Authorization Act, making any assistance to Myanmar illegal and blocking any transfer of U.S. military equipment or any participation in U.S. military training programs (Dias, 2017).

Comparison

Like Vietnam, Myanmar’s history with the United States and China has been varied and diverse. Myanmar was one of the few countries to maintain its independence from China, resulting in far fewer cultural similarities and less economic exchange than is usual for the region. The United States, meanwhile, was originally supportive of Myanmar’s independence following the Second World War, but relations soured following the 1962 coup d’état. Subsequent actions such as the violent suppression of democratic movements and the regime’s persecution of Rohingya Muslims cemented the U.S. position of diplomatic disengagement, restriction Myanmar’s international assistance to China. 63

Though neither the United States nor China have undertaken many formal state visits, China has sent numerous lower officials to oversee the development and endorsement of many agreements, partnerships, and memorandums, and the two countries share mutual membership in three more international organizations.

China is Myanmar’s most significant economic partner, contributing significantly to both imports and exports and likely playing a crucial role in maintaining the country’s current state of affairs. Though China’s assistance has resulted in significant debt, the severity of economic and political sanctions imposed by the United States have made China an unwelcome necessity in maintaining any sort of domestic stability in the past few decades.

Likewise, Myanmar’s military is nearly exclusively supported by Chinese arms and equipment while the United States has made any sale of weapons or military training illegal under the National Defense Authorization Act. China has also made itself an integral part of internal dispute settlement mechanisms, filling the role of mediator between The Northern Alliance and the Burmese military.

It is clear then, that Myanmar is a perfect example for an Indo-Pacific country with significantly closer ties to China than the United States. Existing tensions between the two countries over debt traps and Chinese support for a number of ethnic Burmese militias demonstrate that Myanmar is in a position characteristic of many developing countries in the region. China is both mistrusted and heavily relied upon due to the absence of any alternative sources of support, leaving Myanmar in a state of economic dependency and international isolation.

Japan

According to the Freedom House Index, Japan is ‘free’ with a total of 96 from the possible 100 points. With a perfect score of 40 in political rights and a near perfect score of 56 in civil liberties, Japan’s scores are the highest among those analyzed by a large margin (Freedom House, 2020).

According to the State Fragility Index of 2018, Japan received a total fragility score of 1 with scores of 0 and 1 in effectiveness and legitimacy respectively, placing the country within the highest tier. Japan scored highly in security effectiveness and legitimacy, economic 64 effectiveness and legitimacy, social effectiveness and legitimacy, as well as political effectiveness. However, Japan did not receive a perfect score for political legitimacy and is marked as a major net consumption country for oil (Center for Strategic Peace, 2018).

CATO Institute’s Human Freedom index gave Japan the ranking of 25 of the 162 countries with the total average of 8.28 from the possible 10 point comprised of economic and personal freedom scores of 7.86 and 8.70 respectively (CATO, 2019).

The Heritage Index of Economic Freedom gives Japan the rank of 30 of the 171 countries with an overall score of 73.3 from the possible 100 points. Japan’s highest-ranking sectors were property rights, monetary freedom, and business freedom, and their lowest ranked sectors were financial freedom, fiscal health, and tax burden. Despite decreases in labor freedom and monetary freedom, Japan’s overall increased amounted to 1.2 (Heritage, 2020).

Japan (Okinawa) Heterogeneity Education Discriminatory Social Environments Residential Mobility, Instability, and Racial Segregation Institutional Racism, Policies and Population Density Regulations Linear Ranking Order Gender Equity Income Inequality Economic Opportunities

Most of the determinants for structural violence are not prevalent enough to constitute major concerns when analyzing Japan as a whole. However, Japan was chosen in order to demonstrate that even developed countries can experience human insecurity within localized communities and regions. Okinawa exemplifies this dichotomy by exhibiting all ten determinants for structural violence. Although some criterion such as population density are not as severe as others, certain circumstances unique to Okinawa have made even seemingly tenuous factors a matter of concern. 65

Of the ten criteria, eight have been connected to the presence of foreign involvement. These include: Discriminatory Social Environments, Institutional Racism, Policies, and Regulations, Linear Ranking Order and Acyclical Integration Pattern, Income Inequality, Residential Mobility, Instability, and Racial Segregation, Population Density, Gender Equity, and Economic Opportunities.

Like Vietnam and Myanmar, Okinawa’s heterogeneity is the result of domestic Japanese circumstances and not foreign interference. Japan is one of the most homogenous countries in the world with 98% of the population identifying as Yamato. A few small groups indigenous to Japan persist with unique branches of the Japonic language as well as distinct native religions, cuisines, and cultural practices (Sousa, 2019). There are only three groups widely recognized as being native to Japan but not belonging to the Yamato majority. The Ainu people are native to Japan’s northern islands and account for the smallest indigenous population. South of Tokyo lies another series of islands native to the Ogasawara Islanders who are the multicultural descendants of island natives and the many years of European, American, Polynesian, and Kanaks who settles in the area in the 18th century. Japan’s largest ethnic groups consists of the Ryukyuan which actually encompasses several subgroups indigenous to the island chain stretching from Kyushu to Taiwan (Sousa, 2019).

Japan’s most visible minority group are the Ryukyuan people, many of which reside in Japan’s southernmost region, Okinawa Prefecture. For centuries, the islands served as tributary and vassal to China and Japan, both of which imposed their control, culture and language upon the island’s inhabitants. Since the island chain’s annexation in 1879, Okinawa remained largely subordinate to the mainland. Though Japan began formal decentralization in the 1890 with the establishment of formal prefectures, genuine devolution began in earnest following the Second World War (Ikawa, 2008). Okinawa, however, remained under United States control from 1945 until 1972.

As a formal territory of the United States following the 1951 Treaty of Peace, Okinawa was forced to accept the US dollar as its official currency, its residents required travel permits to visit the mainland, and displaying the Japanese flag was prohibited. Despite these measures, Japanese was the primary language of education and daily life, and Japan still maintained residual sovereignty over the island. Such conflicting measures placed the island in domestic 66 uncertainty as they were not considered to be U.S. or Japanese citizens, further straining Okinawans’ already tenuous relationship with Japanese identity.

Again, similar to Vietnam and Myanmar, Okinawa’s educational shortcomings are the result of domestic circumstances rather than outside influence. Average levels of education in Japan are very high. High school enrollment is over 90% while college enrollment is over 50% (JNTO). Compulsory education spans nine years encompassing six years of elementary and three years of junior high school before optional two-to-three-year junior colleges or four-year universities. At a glance, there seem to be very few flaws in Japan’s education system, but concerning trends emerge when analyzing the country by prefecture.

Okinawa hosts 271 schools, ranking it number twenty-five among the country’s forty- seven prefectures for amount of schools per student. However, Okinawa is ranked number one in elementary school students per 100 population, hosting nearly 100,000 students (Statistics Japan, 2020). This high ranking compared to Okinawa’s relatively low amount of elementary schools demonstrates the prefecture’s need for additional educational facilities. Not only is the prefecture underequipped, but a comparison of achieving test scores reveals the real-world effects of the island’s limited capacity. The national average score for Japan’s standardized achievement test amounted to 65.7% while Okinawa’s average score amounted to 62.5%. Though these scores differ by only a few points, the disparity is large enough to rank Okinawa forty-second among the forty-seven provinces (Statistics Japan, 2020). Therefore, Okinawa is below average in both the number of schools as well as in test results, marking a distinctive disadvantage from high- ranking mainland schools.

Discriminatory Social Environments

As a whole, Japan’s extreme homogeneity has resulted in pervasive racial discrimination with formal roots dating back to the Meiji restoration’s legal establishment of insiders and outsiders (Arudou, 2015, p. xviii). Such distinctions are still maintained based upon people’s origin, language and physical characteristics and have received particular attention in the form of recent anti-racist protests sparked by racial discrimination in the form of excessive force and unjust questioning against minorities (Siripala, 2020). 67

Japan’s long history of Yamato superiority has placed Okinawans and other minority groups in a subordinate position marked by limited governmental representation and widespread social discrimination. According to Article 14. of Japan’s Constitution, citizens are guaranteed protected against racial discrimination, however, there are no formal criminal or civil laws which make “discrimination my race” a prosecutable offence (Arudou, 2015, p. 3). This shortcoming in legal protection was even formally recognized by Japan’s Supreme Court in 2008, yet nothing has been done to amend the issue (Arudou, 2015, p. 3). Furthermore, nearly 500 pieces of legislation have been enacted for the decentralization of Okinawa, yet the island remains under tight administrative control as mainland officials continue to assert that the US security treaty is of the utmost importance for the nation (Masahide, 2020, p. 242).

Because of Okinawa’s atypical subordination, its citizens experience a form of discrimination unique to their situation in the form of physical and intangible separation from their American neighbors. Stark contrasts can be found between Okinawa’s densely populated city and its “American Village,” leading to local sentiments of ostracization as described by a series of interviews with Okinawan residents which revealed opinions that “the barbed wire fences around the military bases delineate the space between ‘us’ and ‘other,’ except that the ‘other was us, the non-Western, Okinawans” (Ginoza, 2016, p. 586). According to these first- hand accounts, Okinawans view the Americans’ “spacious properties, manicured lawns, and housing structures” as something apart from their own world, creating a social environment which reinforces the physical and financial disparities between the two groups (Ginoza, 2016, p. 586).

The U.S. forces in Japan would not be considered endurable if not for China’s proximity and open willingness to test the bounds of Japan’s security effectiveness. Given that Japan was not permitted to have its own military following the Second World War, it grew to depend upon the presence of U.S. forces in order to deter external threats. China’s antagonistic flights through the Miyako Straight and repeated incursions into the disputed waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands serve to reinforce the perceived necessity of the U.S. presence. As of July 22, 2020, Chinese ships were spotted near the contested islands for the 100th straight day, demonstrating the continued saliency of this territorial dispute (Kyodo, 2020).

Institutional Racism, Policies and Regulations 68

Japan’s central government maintains significant power over its prefectures through monetary leveraging as the majority of local tax revenues are often not sufficient to maintain prefectural and city governments without subsidies. The Term “30 percent autonomy” has become a popular description of the current system as all but the wealthiest prefectures remain heavily reliant upon the will of the Ministry of Home Affairs (US LOC).

Okinawa in particular is under considerable oversight as the central government frequently makes use of its ability to override prefectural decisions and control budgetary subsidies for development programs. Furthermore, institutional racism is evident within Japan’s Okinawa-specific legislature such as the law allowing forceful reclamation of private land for US base purposes. While subsidized development projects do include beneficial infrastructure such as schools and public housing, they have also included projects such as the Kaichu-Doro causeway in Uruma City which has claimed over 35% of the area’s tidal flats (Reimer, 2015, p. 2).

One of the most pronounced forms of racial institutional policies is Okinawa’s position under and between the US-Japan alliance and their corresponding unequal burden of American military bases. Okinawa hosts over 70% of all exclusive United States Forces Japan (USFJ) land, demonstrating Japan’s willingness to sacrifice the quality of life of a people it considers to be its “internal other” (Japanese MOD, 2017).

Legislative oversite, an unequal share of U.S. bases, and control over development projects demonstrate the racial and geographic regulations placed upon Okinawa. Even among other centrally dependent prefectures, Okinawa’s specific land reclamation measures and limited say in base relocation efforts demonstrate its particularly rigid subordination under mainland policies and regulations.

Clear evidence of the United States’ influence on Japanese institutional policies can be found in Okinawa-specific legislature designed to reserve the ultimate rights of land use for the development of American military bases and related infrastructure. Moreover, it seems Japan’s use of state-financed public works and considerable prefectural oversight serve to perpetuate the Ryukyu’s subordinate position by effectively blocking the development of alternative economic sectors and forcing mainland dependence. Additionally, China’s role as an external threat serves 69 to reinforce the rationale for maintaining an American military presence despite the subsequent losses of economic opportunities, valuable land, and quality of life.

Linear Ranking Order and Acyclical Interaction Pattern

A fixed, linear ranking order describes a system in which there is “no doubt as to who is higher in any pair of actors,” which translates into the central government’s general dominance over its prefectures and its particularly strict policies towards Okinawa (Galtung 176). The island’s representatives serve under the behest of the central government with a rigid system of political hierarchy reinforcing the existing power dynamics. Japan’s strict bureaucracy leaves little room for Okinawan officials to contest base-related decisions or development projects.

As in the previous criteria, the continued presence and perceived necessity of USFJ bases has a direct impact on the structure of Mainland-Okinawa interaction patterns and bureaucratic ranking order. Prefectural governors have been consistently rebuffed in their efforts to address their district’s concerns. Governor Takeshi Onaga demonstrated his discontentment by establishing the Day of Ryukyuan to celebrate the island’s unique culture and by leading protest marches against the Futenma relocation plans (Hijino and Vogt, 2019, p. 18). Similarly, Governor Yasuhiro Tamaki continues to keep anti-base sentiments at the forefront of his policy agenda by stressing both the psychological and environmental concerns associated with USFJ bases (Hijino and Vogt, 2019, p. 9). Yet, despite obvious discontentment and ample legislative efforts, Okinawan politicians remain rigidly bound beneath their mainland counterparts.

Income Inequality

Japan’s inequality-adjusted score was only 3.6% less than its HDI of 0.915, amounting to 0.882. Accordingly, Japan is ranked 19 of the 198 countries. Within Japan, the distribution of wealth goes as follows: 20.3% belongs to the poorest 40% while the richest 10% control 24.7% of the wealth. Japan’s Gini coefficient is 32.1, meaning that while there is inequality, the rate is not extremely high as even top countries such as Norway have coefficients in the 20s (UNDP, 2019).

However, despite relatively low national inequality, Okinawa remains one of the poorest prefectures in Japan even with consistent national funding. The island ranks forty-sixth of the forty-seven prefectures in average annual income, evident by numerous indicators such as a 70

2018-2019 survey which found that a quarter of all households in Okinawa with school-aged children lived in poverty (Eldridge, 2019). As of 2018, Japan’s richest region, Southern-Kanto, had a GDP per capita which was 40% higher than that of Okinawa (OECD, 2019).

While a portion of Okinawa’s inequality is due to the inherent physical limitations imposed by the island’s small size and distance from the mainland, a considerable part of its disparity derives from state-imposed economic limitations. For instance, the share of tourism- generated revenue is highly unequal because of disproportionate ownership by mainland companies and limited employment opportunities for Okinawan residents. In effect, most of the financial benefits which derive from being Japan’s ‘primary vacation destination’ are in fact lost to external ownership and not distributed into the islands economy.

Further causes of inequality include rising prices for food, entertainment, and housing near U.S. bases and neighborhoods as well as the relatively small income derived from the bases themselves. Because much of the day-to-day costs associated with base maintenance are covered by Japan, base-related revenue has dropped from sixteen percent to five percent of prefectural revenue while the number of Okinawan’s employed has decreased from 40,000 to approximately 8,000 (McCormack, 2003, p. 176).

Residential Mobility, Instability and Racial Segregation

Japanese citizens as a whole enjoy freedom of mobility and a lack of segregation with the only real form of instability coming in the form of natural and man-made disasters such as the tsunami of 2011 and the 2015 Fukushima nuclear meltdown. When considering individual prefectures, however, it becomes clear that certain groups do experience several forms of restricted mobility, instability and segregation.

Due to its history of occupation and the estimated 40,000 to 150,000 citizens who lost their lives during the Battle of Okinawa (History, 2009), the island’s people have developed strong antiwar sentiments as well as a philosophy of respectful remembrance. As if in direct contradiction with their ideological preferences, Japan’s distribution of US foreign bases is extremely disproportionate towards Okinawa which continues to hosts over 70% of the country’s total base-related land area decades after the initial occupation period. Local landowners and government officials have demonstrated their discontentment through protests and formal legal 71 proceedings, but Article 29 of Japan’s Constitution allows private property to be taken for public use upon just compensation regardless of domestic sentiments (Japanese MOD, 2017). While prefectural officials usually reserve some measure of control over land acquisition, the Act on Special Measures for USFJ Land Release allows the central government to acquire property without the landowner’s approval so long as it is for the construction of US base facilities.

On Okinawa’s main island, 15% of the land is reserved for U.S. use despite the fact that the island also hosts over 90% of Okinawa’s total population (Okinawa Prefectural Gov, 2016). Bases such as the 500-hectare Futenma Air station divide cities and towns across Okinawa. They are most often constructed on flat, valuable land and therefore limit room for residential growth and increasing instability for residential construction and habitation by forcing new residential infrastructure to be constructed on less than ideal terrain. Furthermore, their placement sometimes quite literally at the center of major cities forces local Okinawans to go around the large compounds when vising other parts of the city.

American servicemen and their families are given the option to live on or off base. While few Okinawan’s would choose to live on base, the distinction is still limiting as US bases take up a substantial proportion of good urban land on the islands. Properties near the bases most often have higher rents and are accompanied by American-style shops and restaurants which are similarly more expensive than some of the local establishments. While Okinawans are not prohibited from living within these neighborhoods, their higher rents serve as a form of socioeconomic barrier similar to the ‘gentrification’ phenomenon in many US cities.

A primary example of instability comes in the form of excessive noise pollution from the base’s constant take-offs and landings. According to recent findings, “noise from the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma exceeded 100 decibels in the classrooms of the Second Futenma Elementary School” which far surpass the Ministry of Education, Culture Sports, Science and Technology’s recommended noise levels (Tokashiki 2019, p. 11). Nearly 60% of residents have reported psychological effects such as ‘feeling irritated’ while another 50% experience sleep disturbance and another 30% experience effects such as headaches and tinnitus (Tokashiki, 2019, p. 12). Finally, about 70% of residents have experienced physical influences such as vibrations in their doors and windows (Tokashiki, 2019, p. 12). 72

Also contributing to residential instability are the environmental risks imposed upon Okinawa by the US military with its pollution and relocation efforts as well as mainland Japan’s large-scale public works projects, which both entail numerous implications for the island’s public health, ecology, and economy. Instances of polluted groundwater and deforestation have tangible and immediate repercussions for Okinawan citizens, while the destruction of wetlands and mangroves leads to biodiversity depletion. Both of these in turn hurt Okinawa’s economy by dissuading tourism through the prevalence of pollution and destroying the island’s natural attractions such as coral reefs.

Population Density

Japan’s overall population density amounts to 347 persons per square kilometer (Worldometer Japan, 2020). As of 2019, Tokyo’s metropolitan Prefecture has a population density of 6,300 persons per square kilometer while Okinawa’s rural prefecture amounts to a mere 635 (JSTCD, 2020). Factors such as Okinawa’s inherently limited land availability are compounded by the presence and location of USFJ personnel and facilities. While some islands within the Ryukyu chain are not directly affected by the security alliance and therefore do not experience problems with population density, Okinawa City hosts 2,625 persons per square kilometer (JSTCD, 2020). Though its density is still much smaller than that of Tokyo, this city alone is host to six military installations including the large, central and controversial Kadena Air Base. Their presence amplifies the feeling of crowding within the city, and trends towards ‘gentrification’ threaten to restrict affordable housing into even smaller areas.

Gender Equity

Japanese women have historically lived under strict gender roles and a male-dominated social hierarchy. Like many countries during and after the Second World War, Japanese women began to fill the employment roles of men in their absence and were eventually granted more equal roles in society through legal and social reforms (Disha, 2020). Even still, Japanese women are affected by traditional values and evidence of gender inequality remain pervasive. For example, Japan ranked 110 out of 149 countries in the World Economic Forum’s 2018 Gender Gap Index, with a poor gender wage gap of 24.5%, making it the second largest gap among OECD nations (WEF, Japan). While the UNDP gave Japan the somewhat promising rank of twenty-three from the 154 countries in the 2018 gender inequality index, the World Economic 73

Forum gave Japan the rank of 121 from 153 countries in the 2020 global gender gap index, indicating a decrease in rank by eleven positions since 2018 (WEF 2020).

Inequality particularly affects those living in Okinawa, where over half of young women are irregular manual laborers, and single parent maternal households accumulate living expenses equal to 83.5% of their annual finances (UNHCR Okinawa, 2017). Such narrow margins between annual expenses and incomes has resulted in child poverty rates which are nearly 14% higher than the national average (UNHCR Okinawa, 2017). Much of Okinawan women’s inequality results from reliance upon seasonal and irregular work. Tourism in Okinawa shrinks dramatically during the winter off season, posing considerable threats to the large population of young women with irregular employment.

Compounding the issue of irregular employment is Okinawa’s history of sexual violence committed my U.S. servicemen. Initial violence was prolific, demonstrated by 29 murders and 18 rapes during one six-month period in 1949 (Wilkins, 2017). Since the island’s reversion to Japanese control in 1972, there have been 25 murders, 127 rapes, and 306 assaults committed by U.S. troops (Wilkins, 2017). One of the most notorious crimes was the 1995 rape of a 12-year- old girl which sparked prefect-wide protests. Despite the islands demonstration of their discontentment, little was done by way of reparation and sexual violence has continued. In 2001, an Air Force Staff Sargant raped 20-year-old women outside of a nightclub (Wilkins, 2017). In 2004 a 19-year-old was assaulted and raped on the ride of the road (Wilkins, 2017). In 2005, an Air Force Staff Sergeant sexually assaulted a 10-year-old gird on her way home from school. And in 2008 a marine raped a 14-year-old girl in his car (Wilkins, 2017). Sexual assaults and rapes have continued to threaten Okinawa’s women, with “nearly half of all female students at one Okinawa high school reporting having “scary experiences” with U.S. troops on the way to and from school (Wilkins, 2017).

Such abhorrent crimes and deep-seeded mistrust have prevented many women from seeking on-base employment which would offer relatively regular work compared to other industries such as tourism. Furthermore, such tangible threats make Okinawan women rightly hesitant to pursue employment which entails being close to USFJ bases at night or having to walk past the bases on their own.

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Economic Opportunities

According to WorldAtlas, Japan is the second most advanced economy in the world, the third largest by nominal GDP, and the 4th largest by purchasing power parity (Sawe, 2019). In 2018, China and the United States accounted for just over 38% of all Japanese exports with a similarly high import proportion of 35%, making it clear that both are considerable sources of trade for Japan. Though it has its challenges such as an aging population, a lack of natural resources and history with bad debt, Japan’s outlook is still widely promising (Sawe, 2019).

The same cannot be said for Okinawa, however, as mainland-financed public-works continue to make up a significant portion of its economy. An unequal reliance upon mainland finance is becoming increasingly detrimental as the island’s other primary sources of income are mostly limited to tourism and the US military presence. Aware of their vulnerability, Okinawa’s inhabitants see the necessity for the development of new industries but are aware that subsidies exploit the island’s economic weakness, “making financial stimulus and government handouts a necessary prop” (Mulgan, 2000, p. 192).

As Gavan McCormack (2003) notes, “the extraordinary level of public works dependence was thus structurally determined by the terms of the reversion, and the public works political economy quickly became entrenched alongside the base economy” (McCormack, 2003, p. 179). This development was extremely detrimental as it not only forced Okinawan’s to rely upon mainland financing, but it also established large-scale construction projects as an integral component of the island’s economy. Public works such as coastal reclamation cause irreversible damage to Okinawa’s coral reef biomes, which are essential for the island’s tourism revenue, accounting for some $1700 million per year (Omori, 2010, p. 3).

Though Okinawa’s tourism-generated revenue amounted to over six billion dollars in 2018, the industry remains largely dependent upon mainland interests as they own over 80% of Okinawa’s resort hotels and employ very few of the island’s population (McCormack, 2003, p. 96). So, despite Okinawa’s seemingly prosperous tourism economy, the island remains bound to mainland-owned companies and government subsidies.

It is evident, then, that mainland Japan’s position towards Okinawa’s economy is not merely one of control, but one of deep-seeded self-interest. As McCormack explains, 75

“Fundamental ‘Japanese polity’ does not hold Okinawa to be a vital part of the nation’s body; it is expendable, under duress, if thereby the interests of the home islands can be served advantageously” (McCormack, 2003, p. 96). This dichotomy between the mainland and Okinawa reveals itself not only through attempts to suppress Ryukyu culture and through political and economic manipulation, but also through the island’s most prevalent point of protest and salient issue: the continued presence of US bases and personnel. The island’s economic opportunities are severely limited due to its dependence upon tourism, shrinking US base-related income, and subsidy-funded public works. Their position within the US-Japan alliance forced the island to accommodate American bases while remaining under the mainland’s economic yoke. Even tourism, a primary source of income for what has come to be known as one of Japan’s primary vacation destinations, is severely limited due to mainland ownership of the island’s largest resorts and hotels.

Relations with China and the United States

Japan has a long, complex history with both the United States and China. Sino-Japanese relations have evolved from cultural exchanges to animosity and war crimes with a result of uneasy contemporary relations. Similarly, Japan’s history with the United States is one of economic exchange and First World War allies to devastating attacks on both sides during the Second World War.

China

History

Japan first came into contact with China during the Han Dynasty and their long history has resulted in numerous cultural and linguistic similarities. The countries continued predominantly friendly relations and robust cultural exchanges for centuries until Japan’s shift towards isolationism in the mid-800s BCE. Trade continued, however, with goods such as medicine, weapons, armors, silks, perfumes and spices making their way to Japan from the continent (Cartwright, 2015).

The first recorded battle between China and Japan took place in 663 AD and was part of the greater conflict between the Korean Three Kingdoms. It was a major defeat for Japanese forces who lost some 300 ships (Farris, 1996). Following the battle and the loss of Japan’s 76 trading ally, it was forced to develop its commerce with China once again and maintained these trade routes well into the 17th century when the Tokugawa Shogunate drastically limited all direct links with the foreign world.

A series of Japanese invasions into Korea came before Tokugawa’s isolationist polices between 1592 and 1598 but were the last major Japanese incursions into foreign relations until the Meiji Restoration following Commodore Perry’s forced opening. This began the rise of Japanese imperialism which culminated in Japan’s invasions of Korea, China and Southeast Asia as well as its participation in the First and Second World Wars.

Events such as The Boxer Rebellion and its victory over China in the First Sino-Japanese War characterize Japan’s ambition and ferocity. During the first World War, Japan’s Twenty- One Demands forced China to accept control over former German territories as well as 99-year leases in Manchuria as well as interests and concessions in production and transportation industries.

Japan did not cease their imperial ambitions and began increasing their incursions into Chinese territory until the Second Sino-Japanese War officially began in 1937. During their campaign, the Japanese committed countless war crimes against Chinese citizens with the most infamous example of The Rape of Nanking serving as a morbid example of their determination to spread their influence.

Japan’s treatment of China throughout the Second World War had long-lasting consequences as the two nations did not engage in any form of diplomatic relations until 1972. Following reengagement, China and Japan both prospered from robust economic exchange until the end of the Cold War and the China’s rise to regional preeminence. Political, economic and military rivalries developed as the threat of China’s increasing power coalesced with Japan’s slow decline. The two nations continue to have unstable relations with instances of territorial disputes and political disagreements preventing them from achieving any sort of solidified partnerships.

Contemporary Political Relations

China and Japan have had relatively loose relations, with only one presidential visit since 2000. The countries share mutual membership in 59 international organizations as well as an 77 assortment of agreements and memorandums. Most notable among their agreements are the 2008 joint statement for strategic mutually beneficial relations, the 2012 trilateral investment agreement with China, Japan and Korea, and the 17th round of negotiations on free trade agreement among Japan, China and Korea held in 2019.

Trade Relations

China accounted for 19.4% of all exports in 2018, making it Japan’s largest import destination. However, from 2013 to 2018, the export trade value grew by only 1.75% with a total value growth of $2.14 billion. China is also the largest supplier of Japanese imports, accounting for 23.8% in 2018 with a total value of $155 billion. Import trade volumes actually decreased, however, by -9.62% between 2013 and 2018, with a corresponding decrease in value of -$16.6 billion (OEC Japan, 2020).

Military Relations

Military relations between China and Japan are almost nonexistent due to conflict over territorial waters as well as lingering resentment of Japan’s actions in the Second World War and their unwillingness to offer any form of reparations. Furthermore, China’s mistrust of U.S. forces’ partnership with Japan has prevented any robust military exchanges or bilateral partnerships.

United States

History

Japanese-US relations began in 1853 when Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived in Edo Bay with the intent of ending Tokugawa Japan’s two centuries of isolationism. In 1854, the two nations formally recognized one another by drafting the Treaty of Peace and Amity, and an American consular was established a year later. The Treaty of Peace came into full force in 1859, establishing full diplomatic relations and paving the way for the first official US embassy in 1906 (US Office of the Historian).

Their relationship was marred by instances of racist policies within the US towards Japanese immigrants, but Japan sided with the Allies none the less at the onset of the First World War. Following its end in 1919, Japan was given Germany’s former colonial islands north of the 78 equator. Throughout Japan’s imperial operations in Manchuria, the US remained concerned over further losses of Chinese sovereignty, but still gave Japan nominal support by affirming their ‘special interests’ in Shandong, Mongolia and Manchuria (Drea and LaFeber, 1998).

The 1920s and early 30s saw an expansion of Japanese militarism and a widescale anti- colonial campaign in order to draw up support and sentiment from India and Southeast Asia. Despite rebuke from the League of Nations, Japan took control of Manchuria in 1931, followed by other major coastal cities in 1937.Following further seizures of territories throughout China and Vietnam, the United States and a number of allies boycotted Japan, drastically reducing Japan’s oil supply. Then, in 1940, faced with economic embargo and strong international opposition, Japan joined the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, worsening already strained relations and establishing themselves as an ally to both Tripartite members in the conflict to come.

Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, starting a long and bloody conflict in the south Pacific. After years of conflict, Japan officially surrendered on September 1, 1945 after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Following the war, Japan remained under occupation until the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, however control over Okinawa remained under United States military administration until 1972.

In the after-war period, Japan and the United States signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and built close relations around economic and security cooperation. The US continued to maintain bases on Okinawa and the two countries are now top trading partners with close scientific cooperation and robust people-to-people relations (US DOS Japan, 2020).

Contemporary Political Relations

United States Presidents have made ten visits to Japan since 2000. The countries are mutual members of 73 international organizations, and have an expansive list of mutual agreements, formal meetings, memorandums, and partnerships. Most notable are the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the 2019 trade tariff agreements, and the 2020 memorandum of cooperation on strengthening energy and infrastructure finance and market building. 79

Japan and the U.S. also participate in many recurring meetings such as the 7th Japan-US cyber dialogues in 2019, the 7th Japan-US non-proliferation dialogue in 2019, the 9th Japan-US- Australia trilateral strategic dialogue in 2019, the 14th Japan-US Joint high-level committee meeting in 2019, and the 5th meeting of Japan-US bilateral commission on Civil nuclear cooperation in 2018.

Trade Relations

The United States is Japan’s second largest export market accounting for 18.9% in 2018 with a total value of $135 billion. Trade value growth was quite low between 2013 and 2018, however, only increasing by 0.58% with a total value of $779 million (OEC Japan, 2020).

The United States is also Japan’s second largest source of imports accounting for 11.2% with a total value of $73.5 billion in 2018. Import trade value grew by 9.86% between 2013 and 2018 with a total value growth of $6.6 billion (OEC Japan, 2020).

Military Relations

The foundations for ongoing U.S.-Japan military relations were formed by the 1952 Mutual Security Assistance Pact and the subsequent Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in 1960. Following the Second World War, Japan was not permitted to have its own traditional military and has continued to confine its combat capabilities to defensive measures under the title of Self Defense Force (SFD). This restriction made the U.S. forces stationed within Japan one of the sole sources of security and deterrence, necessitating conditions such as those on Okinawa for Japan’s self-defense. Though Japanese forces are inherently limited, they routinely take part in joint military exercises such as the 2019 KAMANDAG 3 exercise in the Philippines (Marine Times, 2019) and are credited with being the United States’ top security partners in Asia.

Comparison

While Japan’s extensive early history of economic and cultural exchange with China was interspersed with occurrences of conflict and partnership, its modern history has been one of war crimes, territorial disputes, and diplomatic hedging. Japan’s actions throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries fostered deep-seeded animosity which continues to mar contemporary political relations. China’s rise to power and subsequent brazen territorial claims have compounded with 80

Japan’s ongoing security alliance with the United States, resulting in uneasy tensions and mutual distrust.

Though China and Japan have formed several limited agreements, concerns over China’s naval ambitions have hindered any substantial partnerships. For its part, China remains distrustful of the United States’ role in the region as well as Japan’s burgeoning relations with other major powers such as India and Australia. In addition to limited diplomatic engagement, China also shares mutual membership in fourteen fewer international organizations than the United States.

China remains Japan’s largest import and export market, but volumes of imports from China have been steadily decreasing over time while exports to China show signs of stagnating. Though export and import volumes from the United States are increasing by a very narrow margin, the trend seems to reflect a larger reorientation away from China towards alternative sources of economic partnership.

China and Japan demonstrate nominal military support by way of occasional high-level talks and loose agreements for the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, however, they two are far from strategic partners and do not share any sort of formal alliance. Japanese-U.S. security relations are rigorous by comparison, encompassing nearly seven decades of cooperation. USFJ forces have been stationed in Japan since the conclusion of the Second World War, becoming an integral part of Japanese security while providing U.S. forces with a forward base of operations in the Indo-Pacific theater.

Considering Japan’s past transgressions, the persisting USFJ presence, and China’s confrontational claims over the South China Seas, it is no wonder Japan remains aligned with the United States. Though the country is far from economic and political subjugation, their limited security forces as a consequence of enforced reliance upon the U.S. military presence has resulted in an unbalanced relationship which places undue pressure upon Okinawa as the primary base location. Japan and the United States remain close, but developments in Japan’s Self Defense Force capabilities as well as burgeoning relations with alternative international partners may entail a weakening of U.S.-Japanese ties. Though the U.S. presence may become less imperative in the future, it remains unlikely that Japan will pivot towards China given the current geopolitical environment. 81

Conclusion

Each country under consideration has experienced unique forms of structural violence as the result of specific forms of foreign involvement. Myanmar, for instance, has experienced negative trends in development as a result of unscrupulous financial and political support from China. Vietnam, however, has suffered economic loss from Chinese territorial claims while simultaneously receiving reinforcement for its authoritarian governance by way of diplomatic support from the United States. Moreover, U.S. security assistance to Japan has served to reinforce the subjugation of Okinawa while the threat of Chinese power emphasizes the perceived necessity for USFJ bases.

The above examples demonstrate that even seemingly beneficial forms of foreign engagement have the potential to result in negative consequences for the target country as a whole as well as for certain internal groups. Furthermore, by illustrating various mechanisms by which China and the United States garner political and economic influence as well as the individual repercussions these mechanisms have entailed, it becomes clear that the ongoing competition for predominance over the Indo-Pacific poses serious concern for the structural wellbeing of the region. Each case study will be reviewed below in order to illustrate the criteria most associated with foreign interference as well as the criterion with the least substantial link. Additionally, the most severe criteria with the strongest association with Chinese and United States involvement will be discussed in order to facilitate a comparison between each country.

Vietnam

Eight criteria for structural violence were determined to persist in Vietnam, with six probable links established to foreign involvement. Income Inequality and Linear Ranking Order are the most prominent criteria and are reinforced by both China and the United States. Extensive trade and economic investment have led to a level of development and urbanization which cannot be entirely regulated, resulting in unmanageable rural-urban migration as well as disenfranchisement of the rural economic sector through foreign imports and government-wide financial reorientation. Rural Vietnamese account for over 60% of the total population, yet they have been largely excluded from an equal share in rising GDP due to the CPV’s replacement of small business and agricultural development with export-oriented industrialization in order to attract foreign markets. 82

If unchecked, this trend will continue to exacerbate regional disparities in income and compound Vietnam’s trend of rapid urbanization. Though Vietnam’s urban centers constitute less than 40% of the total population, this proportion is expected to rise to 50% in just five years (Vietnam Net, 2017) and will pose considerable challenges to cities such as Ho Chi Minh which has already experienced difficulties in removing the estimated 20,000 homes remaining in the Xuyen Tam Canal slums (SCMP, 2018).

One criterion was determined to a have less substantial correlation to Chinese and U.S. involvement. Although recent trends indicated progress, Vietnam’s gender equity remains unequal as discrepancies in income between similarly employed men and women persisted across most levels of profession. Research has suggested that investors exploit the underpayment of women in countries such as Vietnam in order to maximize their profits, meaning the United States could be reinforcing gender inequality while simultaneously benefiting from financial and political involvement. However, the study was conducted on Southeast Asia as a whole, therefore the direct link between U.S. and Vietnam is difficult to prove.

Upon review, the most severe criteria closely correlated to foreign involvement are economic opportunities and income inequality for China and the United States respectively. Though China is one of Vietnam’s largest trading partners, recent territorial disputes and prolonged development projects have resulted in significant monetary setbacks. Closures of offshore oil rigs as a result of Chinese threats have not only cost Vietnam over $1 billion in termination fees, they have critically impaired the development of any future oil extraction operations by intimidating any potential foreign investors. Additionally, Chinese-funded large- scale development projects such as the Hanoi railway have place Vietnam under considerable debt which China then uses as political leverage to gain influence within the country.

Though the US has been integral in encouraging Vietnam’s governmental liberalization, they have also compounded income inequality by facilitating a rapid economic development and urbanization. Furthermore, US outsourcing and the nature of low Vietnamese employment in foreign firms continues to bar a significant portion of the population from gaining an equal share in the country’s growing wealth. Additionally, President’ Trumps prioritization of equal trade balances and regional influence seem to indicate a willingness to ignore Vietnam’s internal structural challenges in expense of personal gain. 83

Myanmar

Nine criteria of structural violence were determined to persist in Myanmar, six of which have been linked to foreign involvement. Of these, Institutional Racism, Linear Ranking Order, and Economic Opportunities seem to be the most prominent correlations. Myanmar’s government was directly backed by the military until 2015, but even the new NLD is culpable in ethnic cleansing as the major Rohingya crisis occurred in 2017. Throughout this time, China has continued to be the most major source of economic and political support, in effect allowing the regime to maintain its control where it might have otherwise fallen to internal unrest or international pressure. China has demonstrated its willingness to back a government which has systematically excluded sevefral groups from citizenship, practiced ethnic cleansing against a Muslim minority, and which has maintained majority Burman dominance through biased education, limited political access, and religious restrictions.

By continuing to provide Myanmar with economic assistance and diplomatic protection from UN prosecution, China has not only perpetuated racist institutional policies and regulations as well as a rigid linear ranking order but has also severely limited Myanmar’s economic opportunities. Whereas most Southeast Asian countries have experienced economic development while maintaining relative political independence, Myanmar has failed to develop new economic sectors and now owes nearly 40% of its total debt to China due to development projects, direct investments, and deals with Chinese State-Owned Enterprises. China has been known to utilize existing debts as leverage for further political gain, and it seems Myanmar is likely to remain under Chinese influence until real signs of democratization bring new sources of economic and political support.

Like Vietnam, the flimsiest correlation was with Gender Equity, as much of the gender inequality in Myanmar is due to domestic social characteristics and long-standing gender roles. Even still, Chinese support for Burmese economic and political elite serves to reinforce the current state of affairs which greatly limits the possibility for natural societal transformations. Furthermore, support has allowed the Buddhist majority to sustain its primacy which directly affects gender equity through the religion’s conservative belief in traditional gender roles.

The most severe consequences closely correlated to foreign involvement are Myanmar’s complete dependence upon China as well as the U.S.’ antithetical position of complete 84 diplomatic severance. China’s willing support serves to reinforce nearly every determinant of structural violence merely by support the country throughout its history of military control and ethnic cleansing. The United States, too, is partially to blame because of their role in severely limiting Myanmar’s options for sources of international assistance. Sanctions and public condemnations have made Myanmar an unacceptable location for direct investment but developed OECD countries should see to assist Myanmar in democratic liberalization rather than leaving the country to stagnate under authoritarian rule.

Japan

Okinawa displayed signs of all ten criteria with eight having a discernable link to Chinese and United States involvement. The most significant determinants were Discriminatory Social Environments, Linear Ranking Order, and Residential Mobility and Instability. Juxtaposed to Myanmar, Okinawa serves as an example of near exclusive American influence and the most significant determinants are linked primarily to the presence of USFJ bases.

While Residential mobility and instability are directly caused by the location, size, and number of base facilities, the other two criteria are more nuanced. Merely seeing the centrality of bases such as Kodena make it clear that U.S. bases have real, physical effects on the islands and their inhabitants. Okinawans have been denied the most pristine land and are forced to endure the noise of numerous daily takeoffs and landings. Furthermore, local residents are pushed out of central neighborhoods as properties and nearby restaurants become increasingly expensive to match the income of the Americans stationed on base.

Okinawa’s political subjugation under the mainland government is also due primarily to the islands abnormally high quantity of USFJ facilities. In order to maintain existing bases as well as guarantee the acquisition of any future land, Japan maintains Okinawa-specific legislature and heightened legislative oversight. Okinawan politicians can do little to stop mainland supported base development projects or government-financed public works construction. This level of subjugation has remained due to Japan’s discriminatory view towards Okinawans as something apart from themselves, as their ‘internal other.’ While such prejudicial treatment of their few indigenous domestic groups has persisted for centuries, the United States has done very little to encourage Japan to do otherwise. It seems both are equally willing to abuse Okinawa’s position under the central government. 85

Economic Opportunities was the criteria with the weakest association as much of Okinawa’s current economic status is due primarily to the islands inherent physical limitations as well as the seasonal nature of the tourism industry. Even still, the U.S. is partially to blame for many of the methods employed by the mainland to keep Okinawa as a base location. By centering the island’s economy around mainland-financed public works, Japan keeps Okinawa under its economic control. This has the effect of reinforcing their position as a base location because the prefecture is forced to continue relying on Japan’s financial assistance due to inadequate tax revenues and insufficient income from base-related jobs as well as the tourism industry.

The most severe consequences closely correlated to foreign involvement are the United States’ reinforcement of mainland discrimination as well as its extensive history of sexual violence committed against the population. For its part, China has reaffirmed Japan’s notion of USFJ’s necessity through increasingly aggressive demonstrations of territorial desires. China’s contentious position and the U.S. reinforcement of mainland subjugation seem to work in a cycle whereby increased pressure from China results in increased U.S. presence, which in turn entails harsher subjugation for Okinawans.

One of the most poignant sources of structural violence comes in the form of sexual crimes committed by USFJ members against Okinawan civilians. Since the island’s occupation, there have been over two dozen murders, over one hundred rapes, and several hundred sexual assaults. Prolific sexual violence has the effect of fostering distrust between the island’s American and Okinawan populations, reinforcing the psychological divide, and compounding domestic forms of gender inequality.

Final Remarks

Of the three cases studied, Vietnam displayed the fewest general determinants as well as the fewest determinants linked to foreign influence with eight and six respectively from the ten total. Linked criteria include: Discriminatory Social Environments, Linear Ranking Order and Acyclical Interaction Pattern, Income Inequality, Residential Mobility, Instability, and Racial Segregation, Gender Equity, and Economic Opportunities. Criteria which were not linked to foreign involvement are Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity as well as Education, while the two criteria not present are Institutional Racism, Policies and Regulation, and Population Density. 86

Myanmar ranks between Vietnam and Japan with nine determinants present and seven linked to foreign influence. The seven linked criteria include Discriminatory Social Environments, Institutional Racism, Policies and Regulations, Linear Ranking Order and Acyclical Interaction Pattern, Income Inequality, Residential Mobility, Instability and Racial Segregation, Gender Equity, and Economic Opportunities. Like Vietnam, Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity and Education were not found to be linked to foreign involvement. Finally, the criterion of Population Density was found not to be present within the country.

Japan, or more specifically Okinawa, displayed the presence of all ten criteria with eight linked to foreign involvement. Discriminatory Social Environments, Institutional Racism, Policies, and Regulations, Linear Ranking Order and Acyclical Integration Pattern, Income Inequality, Residential Mobility, Instability, and Racial Segregation, Population Density, Gender Equity, and Economic Opportunities were determined to correlate with foreign influence. Again, as was the case in Myanmar and Vietnam, Okinawa’s Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity and Education were not found to have links to foreign involvement.

Linear Ranking Order and Acyclical Interaction Patterns was one of the most prominent criteria in all three case studies. Myanmar and Vietnam were both negatively affected through international reinforcement of their authoritarian and autocratic governments which routinely exclude certain groups from suffrage and party participation, while Japan’s jurisdiction over Okinawa has been underpinned by the perceived necessity of USFJ bases. In all three, rigid hierarchies and limited political mobility keep disadvantaged groups below their majority counterparts, denying any possibility of natural internal political development.

China and the United States seem to share equal responsibility for the exacerbation and maintenance of structural violence both in countries under their direct influence and in those sustaining relative independence. Myanmar and Japan, both of which serve as examples for countries aligned with China and the United States respectively, each experienced more forms of structural violence than Vietnam, which represents countries without explicit political allegiance. This trend appears to indicate that countries which avoid total political alignment will experience fewer forms of structural violence as they are not bound by diplomatic leveraging or pressures associated with reliance upon foreign assistance. 87

When comparing Myanmar and Okinawa, the higher number of discernable criteria in the latter case seems to indicate that the United States is more culpable in the proliferation of structural violence. However, upon review of the actual effects of the individual determinants, it becomes clear that China’s impact on Myanmar has been far more deplorable. Whereas the United States’ role as a security provider has resulted in a limiting of Okinawan independence, China’s role as protectorate for Myanmar’s government has facilitated the deaths of thousands and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Rohingya Muslims.

Signs of China’s detrimental role in perpetuating structural violence can also been seen in Vietnam through a number of mechanisms. First, China’s willingness to use force with regards to their claims over the South China Seas has resulted not only in sever economic loss, but also the injury, disappearance, and death of thousands of Vietnamese fishermen within their own territorial waters. Furthermore, numerous instances of prolonged development projects demonstrate China’s tactic of debt accumulation as a way of garnering political leverage. Conversely, while open diplomatic and economic engagement from the United States has fostered income inequality and reinforced some negative aspects of the CPV’s government, their influence as a whole seems to be assisting in Vietnam’s gradual liberalization as the country shifts towards export-led industrialization and increased international cooperation.

Because of the above examples, it has been determined that China poses a more tangible and immediate threat to structural violence than the United States. However, the United States is by no means blameless. Both countries have demonstrated their willingness to sacrifice the wellbeing of target countries in the interest of their own personal gain, and his trend will undoubtedly continue to negatively impact Indo-Pacific countries as China and the United States carry on their efforts towards regional supremacy. With Beijing’s increasingly assertive claims over the South China Seas and equally antagonistic assertions from Washington, the ongoing conflict is likely to intensify, and structural violence within Indo-Pacific countries will continue to be exacerbated regardless of their alignment status.

In seeking to determine the effects of regional competition between the United States and China, a number of crucial findings have illustrated the far-reaching consequences which foreign influence can generate for developing countries caught within contested spheres of influence. Of the determinants discussed, all but two have been directly or indirectly correlated with foreign 88 involvement, demonstrating that great-power competition imposes serious concerns for the presence and severity of structural violence within target countries. Among these eight criteria, Linear Ranking order and Acyclical Interaction Patterns, Discriminatory Social Environments, Institutional Racism, Policies, and Regulations, Income Inequality, and Economic Opportunities seem to be the most widely and severely affected determinants, while Gender Equity and Population Density were the least pervasive and least closely related.

Though both countries are culpable, evidence indicates that Chinese influence entails more severe consequences for structural violence, as is evident through their protection of Myanmar throughout the Rohingya crisis. Additionally, it has been determined that countries in a similar state of relative independence to Vietnam are likely to experience less direct influence and will subsequently show fewer instances of structural violence as a result of economic and political interference. Yet another important finding was that even developed countries within the Indo-Pacific can experience localized forms of structural violence, as is evident through the case of Okinawa.

Of the mechanisms by which China and the United States garner influence within target countries, the most detrimental seem to be China’s use of informal connections to political elites through State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as well as the accumulation of debt for political leverage. While for the United States, the most detrimental policies have been the repurposing of regional strategies such as The Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) program and the Better Utilization of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) program, as well as the country’s emphasis on trade over sociopolitical development.

Chinese SOE misconduct serves to benefit only the political and economic elite within a country by instigating instances of corruption through unscrupulous loans and backchannel dealings. Misconduct such as this benefits only those on top while the country as a whole suffers from an unequal share of wealth and growing inequality. Similarly, China’s use of loans in large- scale developments and Belt and Road projects leads to unmanageable amounts of debt which leaves undeveloped countries such as Myanmar at their political mercy. Chinese debt can also affect countries in a higher state of development similar to Vietnam, which, though relatively politically and economically independent, are still greatly affected by the accumulation of hundreds of million dollars of debt for projects which have yet to even be completed such as 89

Hanoi’s ongoing railway construction. Both mechanisms not only increase income inequality and reduce economic opportunities, but also give China political leverage which can be used in order to gain certain concessions or to ensure that developing countries are unable to alter the status quo. Thus, China can directly and indirectly affect even independent countries’ social, economic, and political development, and can keep underdeveloped countries completely within their diplomatic control. Most obvious among the consequences of this practice has been the maintenance of Myanmar’s political elite, the results of which have not only caused numerous forms of structural violence such as Discriminatory Social Environments and Institutional Racism but have also abetted in the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya Muslims.

Under the Trump Administration, Obama’s Pivot to Asia strategy has been replaced by a number of seemingly beneficial programs designed to facilitate open trade and provide developmental investments for countries within the Indo-Pacific. However, it has become increasingly evident that the FOIP and BUILD programs are merely tools in the competition with China for influence over the region as well as a way to foster more favorable trade deals for the United States. In effect, both strategies are transforming into an exclusive counterbalancing mechanism which is threatening internal ASEAN unity by instigating divisions along an increasingly bipolar split between U.S. or Chinese alignment.

Furthermore, the United States’ prioritization of economic gain and regional influence results in little consideration for the wellbeing of the target country’s economy, its individual workers, or its society as a whole. Prioritization such as this can cause a cascade effect in developing countries wherein large financial investments cause unmitigated and unequal economic growth which then exacerbates income and gender inequality while simultaneously fueling unmanageable levels of urbanization. Rapid urbanization, in turn, has the potential to create unstable population densities as well as social discrimination as a result of the coalescence of many diverse ethnic groups. Additionally, Okinawa has demonstrated that U.S. self-interest can also deepen sources of structural violence within developed countries, as the maintenance of the United States security forces has superseded the wellbeing of Okinawa’s inhabits, evidence of which can be seen in the correlation of all but two criteria with the presence and influence of the United States within the prefecture. 90

Using the results from each case study, general assumptions can be made with regards to other countries within the Indo-Pacific region. Less developed nations such as Laos, Cambodia, and Nepal are at serious risk of exacerbating any existing forms of structural violence if they fall into the same debt-induced snare as Myanmar. Countries with promising trends in development as well as relative economic and political independence such as Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia are likely to experience less direct forms of foreign involvement-induced structural violence but are also vulnerable as their non-aligned status leaves them open to influence from both the United States and China. Finally, developed nations such as South Korea and Singapore will likely experience fewer forms of structural violence, but individual communities within these countries are still susceptible to localized forms of violence from various potential sources such as foreign military presence or income inequality as a result of financial reorientation.

Though efforts have been made in order make this analysis as comprehensive as possible, there are certain unavoidable limitations which have hindered a true holistic examination of the subject matter. First, the inclusion of additional case studies would have been greatly beneficial in order to accurately summarize the entire Indo-Pacific region, however, due to the limitations in size and scope, any further additions would have limited the amount of content within each analysis, thus preventing an accurate representation of each. Next, certain data and information is near impossible to obtain, particularly with regards to Chinese operations as specific figures are often kept secret or restricted. The United States, too, has a tendency to advertise information which denotes a positive portrayal of their international efforts while keeping questionable data and intentions confidential. Finally, this analysis was centered around a list of ten criteria for structural violence in order to operationalize the process of determining its presence, however, structural violence by its very nature is nuanced and difficult to detect. Accordingly, there are most likely many forms present within each country which went undetected or unmentioned due to the previously mentioned limitations in scope and size of this project.

Regardless of the limitations, this analysis has demonstrated that the ongoing Sino-U.S. geopolitical rivalry poses a critical threat to the presence of structural violence within the Indo- Pacific. This trend is likely to continue as there are few signs of compromise between the two nations. China’s adamant claim over the South China Seas and the United States’ unwillingness to relinquish its increasingly tenuous hold over the region will serve to perpetuate the ongoing 91 struggle, and countries within the region will undoubtedly experience the effects of competing economic, social, and political influence through physical repercussions on their own internal structural security.

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