NEWCOL D WEAR IVIDENCENTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT ON BULLETIN 207 MAO ZEDONG’S HANDLING OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958: CHINESE RECOLLECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS

Translated and Annotated by Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson

Translators’ Note: On 23 August 1958, as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time, Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul- Chinese Communist forces in the Fujian scholars have been forced to resort to “edu- ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, area along the People’s Republic of China’s cated guesses” to answer these questions. 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Pacific Coast began an intensive artillery The materials in the following pages, Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, The bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled translated from Chinese, provide new in- Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese- Jinmen Island. In the following two months, sights for understanding Beijing’s handling British-American Relations, 1949-1958 several hundred thousand artillery shells of the Taiwan crisis. They are divided into (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, exploded on Jinmen and in the waters around two parts. The first part is a memoir by Wu 1994), 178-207; and a forthcoming study by it. At one point, a Chinese Communist Lengxi, then the director of the New China Thomas Christensen to be published by invasion of the Nationalist-controlled off- News Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin Princeton University Press.] shore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy) ribao (People’s Daily). Wu was personally Rendering Chinese- or English-lan- and Mazu (Matsu), seemed imminent. In involved in the decision-making process in guage materials into the other language is response to the rapidly escalating Commu- Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis and difficult because the two languages have no nist threat in the Taiwan Straits, the attended several Politburo Standing Com- common linguistic roots. Thus, the materi- Eisenhower Administration, in accordance mittee meetings discussing the events. His als provided below are sometimes free rather with its obligations under the 1954 Ameri- memoir provides both a chronology and an than literal translations from Chinese to can-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S. insider’s narrative of how Beijing’s leaders, English. Great care has been taken to avoid naval units in East Asia and directed U.S. Mao Zedong in particular, handled the cri- altering the substantive meaning intended naval vessels to help the Nationalists pro- sis. The second part comprises 18 docu- by the author of the documents. Material tect Jinmen’s supply lines. Even the leaders ments, including two internal speeches de- appearing in the text in brackets has been of the Soviet Union, then Beijing’s close livered by Mao explaining the Party’s exter- supplied to clarify meaning or to provide ally, feared the possible consequences of nal policies in general and its Taiwan policy missing words or information not in the Beijing’s actions, and sent Foreign Minis- in particular. The two parts together provide original text. Additional problems with in- ter Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to in- a foundation to build a scholarly under- dividual documents are discussed in the quire about China’s reasons for shelling standing of some of the key calculations notes. The notes also include explanatory Jinmen. The extremely tense situation in the underlying the Beijing leadership’s man- information to place key individual and Taiwan Straits, however, suddenly changed agement of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly events in context or to provide further infor- on October 6, when Beijing issued a “Mes- interesting is the revelation that Mao de- mation on the material being discussed. sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan” in the cided to shell Jinmen to distract American name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (it attention from, and counter American moves Part I. Memoir, “Inside Story of the was speculated by many at that time, and in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his Decision Making during the Shelling of later confirmed, that this message was extensive explanation of how China should Jinmen” drafted by Mao Zedong). The message use a “noose strategy” to fight the “U.S. By Wu Lengxi1 called for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan imperialists.” Equally important is his em- [Source: Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Lit- problem, arguing that all Chinese should phasis on the connection between the tense erature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-11]] unite to confront the “American plot” to situation in the Taiwan Straits and the mass divide China permanently. From this day mobilization in China leading to the Great In August 1958, the members of the on, the Communist forces dramatically re- Leap Forward. It should also be noted that Standing Committee of the Chinese Com- laxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, the despite the aggressive appearance of munist Party (CCP) Central Committee Po- Taiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into war Beijing’s Taiwan policy, Mao paid special litburo met at Beidaihe2 for a regular top between China and the United States. attention to avoiding a direct military con- leaders’ working conference. The meeting In analyzing the crisis, certainly one of frontation with American forces present in originally planned to focus on the nation’s the most crucial yet mysterious episodes in the Taiwan Straits throughout the crisis. industrial problems, and later the issue of the Cold War history, it is particularly impor- Although these materials are not directly people’s commune was added to the discus- tant to understand Beijing’s motives. Why from Chinese archives, they create a new sion. did it start shelling Jinmen? How did the basis for scholars to deepen their under- The Politburo convened its summit shelling relate to China’s overall domestic standing of the 1958 events. [Ed. note: For meeting on 17 August. Being very busy in and international policies? Why did the recent accounts of the 1958 crisis using Beijing at the time, I thought I could attend Beijing leadership decide to end the crisis newly available Chinese sources, see Shu the meeting several days later. On the 20th, 208 CSOLDINO WAR INTERNATIONAL-AMERICAN HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN RELATIONS however, the General Office of the Central bly had passed a resolution requesting Ameri- though Mao believed that the imperialists Committee called, urging me to go to can and British troops to withdraw from were more afraid of us, he told me that our Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21 both Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, American media and propaganda should state that first August on a scheduled flight arranged by the occupation of Taiwan became even more we were not afraid of war, and second we Central Committee. After arriving, I stayed unjust, Mao continued. Our demand was opposed war. Another point he made was with Hu Qiaomu3 in a villa in Beidaihe’s that American armed forces should with- that international tension had a favorable central district. This seaside resort area was draw from Taiwan, and Jiang’s army should aspect for the people of the world. Our used only for the leading members of the withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If they propaganda, however, should declare that Central Committee during summers. All of did not, we would attack. Taiwan was too far we must prevent the imperialists from mak- the villas in the resort area were built before away to be bombed, so we shelled Jinmen ing any international tension, and work on the liberation4 for high officials, noble lords, and Mazu. Mao emphasized that the bom- relaxing such tension. These were only and foreign millionaires. Only Chairman bardment would certainly shock the interna- some examples, he continued. There were Mao’s large, one-story house was newly tional community, not only the Americans, so many bad things happening in our world. constructed. but also Europeans and Asians. The Arab If we were too distracted with worries by At noon on 23 August, the third day world would be delighted, and African and everyday anxieties, we would soon collapse after I arrived at Beidaihe, the People’s Lib- Asian peoples would take our side. psychologically under pressure. We should eration Army’s artillery forces in Fujian Then Chairman Mao turned to me and learn how to use a dichotomous method to employed more than 10,000 artillery pieces said that [the reason for] rushing me to analyze the dual nature of bad things. Though and heavily bombed Jinmen [Quemoy], attend the meeting was to let me know about international tension was certainly a bad Mazu [Matsu], and other surrounding off- this sudden event. He directed me to instruct thing, we should see the good side of it. The shore islands occupied by the Nationalist the New China News Agency (NCNA) to tension had made many people awaken and army. collect international responses to the bom- decide to fight the imperialists to the end. In the evening of the 23rd, I attended the bardment. Important responses should be Employing such an analytical method could Politburo’s Standing Committee meeting immediately reported to Beidaihe by tele- help us achieve a liberation in our mind and chaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting I phone. Mao asked me not to publish our get rid of a heavy millstone round our necks. learned the reason [for the bombardment]. own reports and articles on the bombard- Chairman Mao said that the bombard- In mid-July, American troops invaded Leba- ment at present. We needed to wait and see ment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was our non and British troops invaded Jordan in for a couple of days. This was the rule. Mao turn to create international tension for a order to put down the Iraqi people’s armed also asked me to instruct editorial depart- purpose. We intended to teach the Ameri- rebellion. Thereafter, the Central Commit- ments of the NCNA, the People’s Daily, and cans a lesson. America had bullied us for tee decided to conduct certain military op- national radio stations that they must obey many years, so now that we had a chance, erations in the Taiwan Straits to support the these orders and instructions in all their why not give it a hard time? For the present Arabs’ anti-imperialist struggle as well as to reports. Our military troops must follow the we should first wait and see what interna- crack down on the Nationalist army’s fre- orders, as well as our media and propaganda tional responses, especially American re- quent and reckless harassment along the units, Mao emphasized. sponses, there were to our shelling, and then Fujian coast across from Jinmen and Mazu. Chairman Mao continued his talk. Sev- we could decide on our next move. Ameri- Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek] announced eral days earlier, at the beginning of the cans started a fire in the Middle East, and we on 17 July that Taiwan, Penghu [Pescadores], summit meeting, he addressed eight interna- started another in the Far East. We would Jinmen, and Mazu were all “to be on emer- tional issues. He had been thinking of these see what they would do with it. In our gency alert.” It showed that Jiang’s army issues for many years. His thinking had propaganda, however, we still need to con- was going to make some moves soon. We gradually formulated some points and opin- demn the Americans for causing tension in therefore deployed our air force in Fujian ions, and his mind thereby became clear. the Taiwan Straits. We did not put them in Province at the end of July.5 Our fighters Those viewpoints, however, could not be all the wrong. The United States has several had been fighting the Nationalist air force brought forth without considering time, thousand troops stationed on Taiwan, plus and had already taken over control of the air place, and circumstance in our public propa- two air force bases there. Their largest fleet, space along the Fujian coast. Meanwhile, ganda, Mao said to me. We had to use a the Seventh Fleet, often cruises in the Tai- our artillery reinforcement units arrived at different tone in our media work. What he wan Straits. They also have a large naval the front one after another. And mass rallies used as the first example was that at the base in Manila. The chief of staff of the and parades were organized all over the meeting a couple days earlier he predicted American navy had stated not long ago country to support the Iraqi and Arab peoples that world war would not break out. But our (around 6 August) that the American armed and to protest against the American and military should still be prepared for a total forces were ready anytime for a landing British imperialists’ invasions of the Middle war. And our media should still talk about campaign in the Taiwan Straits just as they East. the danger of world war and call for oppos- did in Lebanon. That was eloquent proof [of Chairman Mao talked first at the meet- ing the imperialists’ aggressive and war- America’s ambition], Mao said. ing of August 23. He said that the day’s provoking policies to maintain world peace. Two days later, during the afternoon of bombardment was perfectly scheduled. The next example in his explanations was 25 August, Chairman Mao held another Po- Three days earlier, the UN General Assem- which side feared the other a bit more. Al- litburo Standing Committee meeting in the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 209 lounge hall of the swimming area at bardment of Jinmen [to the America’s land- America’s responses. During these days, I Beidaihe’s beach. Mao chaired the meeting ing in Lebanon]. Our major propaganda asked NCNA to report to me every morning in his bathrobe right after swimming in the target was America’s aggressions all over by telephone about headline news from for- ocean. Among the participants were Liu the world, condemning its invasion of the eign news agencies. I reported the important Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Middle East and its occupation of our terri- news to Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou. Peng Dehuai.6 Wang Shangrong, Ye Fei, tory, Taiwan, Mao said. The People’s Daily The Central Committee’s working con- Hu Qiaomu, and I also attended the meet- could begin our propaganda campaign by ference at Beidaihe ended on 30 August. ing.7 criticizing an anti-China memorandum re- Then Chairman Mao returned to Beijing to Chairman Mao started the meeting by cently published by the U.S. State Depart- chair the Supreme State Conference. On 4 saying that while we had had a good time at ment, enumerating the crimes of America’s September, one day before the conference, this summer resort, the Americans had ex- invasion of China in the past and refuting the Mao called for another Politburo Standing tremely hectic and nervous days. Accord- memorandum’s calumny and slander against Committee meeting, which mainly discussed ing to their responses during the past days, us. We could also organize articles and the international situation after the bom- Mao said that Americans were worried not commentaries on the resolution passed by bardment of Jinmen. The meeting analyzed only by our possible landing at Jinmen and the UN General Assembly, requesting Ameri- the American responses. Both [Dwight] Mazu, but also our preparation to liberate can and British troops to withdraw from Eisenhower and [John Foster] Dulles made Taiwan. In fact, our bombardment of Jinmen Lebanon and Jordan. Then we could request public speeches. They ordered half of their with 30,000-50,000 shells was a probe. We the withdrawal of American armed forces warships in the Mediterranean to the Pacific. did not say if we were or were not going to from their military bases in many countries Meanwhile, the American government also land. We were acting as circumstances across the world, including Taiwan. Our suggested resuming Chinese-American am- dictated. We had to be doubly cautious, media should now conduct an outer-ring bassadorial talks at Warsaw.9 Seemingly, Mao emphasized. Landing on Jinmen was propaganda campaign. After we learned the the American leaders believed that we were not a small matter because it had a bearing responses and moves of America, of Jiang going to attack Taiwan. They wanted to on much more important international is- Jieshi, and of other countries, we could then keep Taiwan. However, they seemed not to sues. The problem was not the 95,000 issue announcements and publish commen- have made up their mind whether or not to Nationalist troops stationed there—this was taries on the bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu. defend Jinmen and Mazu. Both Eisenhower easy to handle. The problem was how to Mao said that at the present our media should and Dulles slurred over this matter without assess the attitude of the American govern- build up strength and store up energy—draw giving a straight answer. The participants at ment. Washington had signed a mutual the bow but not discharge the arrow. the meeting agreed that the Americans feared defense treaty with Taiwan. The treaty, Peng Dehuai suggested that the media a war with us. They might not dare to fight however, did not clearly indicate whether should write some reports and articles about us over Jinmen and Mazu. The bombard- the U.S. defense perimeter included Jinmen the heroic fighting of our commanders and ment of Jinmen-Mazu had already accom- and Mazu. Thus, we needed to see if the soldiers on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The plished our goal. We made the Americans Americans wanted to carry these two bur- participants at the meeting agreed that our very nervous and mobilized the people of dens on their backs. The main purpose of reporters on the front could prepare articles, the world to join our struggle. our bombardment was not to reconnoiter and we would decide later when they could At the Politburo’s Standing Committee Jiang’s defenses on these islands, but to publish their reports. meeting, however, the participants decided probe the attitude of the Americans in Wash- That evening I informed the editors of that our next plan was not an immediate ington, testing their determination. The the People’s Daily in Beijing, through a landing on Jinmen, but pulling the noose Chinese people had never been afraid of secured telephone line, of the Politburo’s [around America’s neck] tighter and provoking someone far superior in power instructions on how to organize our propa- tighter—putting more pressure on and strength, and they certainly had the ganda campaign. But I did not say anything America—and then looking for an opportu- courage to challenge [the Americans] on about the Politburo’s decisions, intentions, nity to act. All participants agreed with such offshore islands as Taiwan, Jinmen, and purpose for bombing Jinmen-Mazu, Premier Zhou’s suggestion of announcing a and Mazu, which had always been China’s which were a top military secret at that time. twelve-mile zone as our territorial waters so territories. For the next two days, the Politburo’s as to prevent America’s warships from reach- Mao said that we needed to grasp an Standing Committee meeting at Beidaihe ing Jinmen and Mazu.10 Chairman Mao opportunity. The bombardment of Jinmen focused its discussions upon how to double considered it righteous for us to defend our was an opportunity we seized when Ameri- steel and iron production and upon issues of territory if American ships entered our terri- can armed forces landed in Lebanon [on 15 establishing the people’s commune. Chair- torial water. Our batteries, however, might July 1958]. Our action therefore not only man Mao, however, still paid close attention not fire on them immediately. Our troops allowed us to test the Americans, but also to to the responses from all directions to our could send a warning signal first, and then support the Arab people. On the horns of a bombardment of Jinmen, especially to act accordingly. dilemma, the Americans seemed unable to America’s response. Mao’s secretary called Chairman Mao also said that we were cope with both the East and the West at the me several times checking on follow-up in- preparing another approach as well. Through same time. For our propaganda, however, formation after the NCNA’s Cangao ziliao the Chinese-American ambassadorial talks, we should not directly connect the bom- [Restricted Reference Material]8 printed which would be resumed soon in Warsaw, 210 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN we would employ diplomatic means to coor- Jinmen-Mazu]. Although their policy of People’s Daily the next day (9 September). dinate our fighting on the Fujian front. We escape was acceptable, the Americans also There was another interesting episode. now had both an action arena and a talk needed to withdraw 110,000 of Jiang’s troops Khrushchev did not have any idea about our arena. There was yet another useful means— from Jinmen and Mazu. If the Americans intentions in shelling Jinmen. Afraid of the propaganda campaign. Then Chairman continued to stay and kept Jiang’s troops being involved in a world war, he sent Mao turned to Hu Qiaomu and me and said there, the situation would not be affected as Gromyko to Beijing to find out our plans on that at present our media should give wide a whole but they would put the noose around 6 September. During the Supreme State publicity to a condemnation of America for their necks. Conference, Chairman Mao and Premier causing tension in the Taiwan Straits. We During Chairman Mao’s speech on the Zhou met with Gromyko, informing him of should request America to withdraw its armed 8th, he asked suddenly whether Wu Lengxi our decisions and explaining that we did not forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. was attending the meeting. I answered. intend to have a major war. In case a major Our propaganda should emphasize that Tai- Chairman Mao told me that his speech needed war broke out between China and America, wan and the offshore islands were Chinese to be included in that day’s news, and asked China did not intend to involve the Soviet territory, that our bombardment of Jinmen- me to prepare it immediately. I discussed Union in the war. After receiving our mes- Mazu was aimed at punishing Jiang’s army this with Hu Qiaomu. Since both of us found sage, Khrushchev wrote to Eisenhower, ask- and was purely China’s internal affair, and it difficult to decide which part of Mao’s ing the American government to be very that no foreign country would be allowed to speech should be published, we agreed even- cautious in the Taiwan Straits and warning interfere with what happened there. Our tually to write the part about the noose first. that the Soviet Union was ready to assist propaganda organs, the People’s Daily, I drafted the news and then let Hu read it. China anytime if China was invaded. NCNA, and radio stations should use a fiery When the conference adjourned, Chairman Right after the Supreme State Confer- rhetorical tone in their articles and commen- Mao and other members of the Politburo’s ence, Chairman Mao left Beijing on an in- taries. Their wording, however, must be Standing Committee gathered in the lobby spection trip of the southern provinces. From measured, and should not go beyond a cer- of Qingzheng Hall for a break. I handed over 10 to 28 September, he visited Hubei, Anhui, tain limit, Mao emphasized. the news draft to Mao for his checking and Jiangsu, and Shanghai, and other places. On From 5 to 8 September, Chairman Mao approval. While talking to the others, he 30 September, one day after Mao returned to chaired the Supreme State Conference. He went over the draft and made some changes. Beijing, his secretary called to tell me that made two speeches on the 5th and the 8th.11 Mao told me that only publishing the noose Chairman Mao wanted to see me. I immedi- Besides domestic issues, his speeches fo- issue was all right. It was not appropriate at ately went to Fengzeyuan in Zhongnanhai.13 cused on international issues similar to the that moment to publish all the issues dis- When I walked into the eastern wing of the eight issues which he had explained at the cussed because it was merely an exchange of Juixiang Study,14 Chairman Mao was read- Beidaihe meeting. When Chairman Mao opinion among the top leaders. Moreover, ing a book. He asked me to sit down and said talked about pulling the noose, he said that Mao did not want to relate the noose issue that during his trip he was impressed by the our bombardment of Jinmen-Mazu made directly to Jinmen-Mazu. This was different boundless energy of the people across the the Americans very nervous. Dulles seem- from writing articles or editorials for news- country, especially in their great efforts to ingly intended to put his neck into the noose papers. In our articles, Mao continued, we develop a steel and iron industry and to of Jinmen-Mazu by defending all of Taiwan, should not write about our policy toward mobilize massive militias. Mao had drafted Penghu, Jinmen, and Mazu. It was good for Jinmen-Mazu, which was a top military se- a news story for NCNA, which was being us to get the Americans there. Whenever we cret. Our writing, however, could clarify our typed and would be ready soon. Chairman wanted to kick them, we could do so. Thus position toward the Chinese-American am- Mao also told me that he particularly invited we had the initiative, and the Americans did bassadorial talks which would resume soon,12 General Zhang Zhizhong15 to join in the trip. not. In the past, Jiang Jieshi made troubles expressing that whatever the outcome would Besides his interests in a rapid growth of for us mainly through the breach at Fujian. It be, we placed hopes on the talks. We were industry and agriculture, Zhang showed spe- was indeed troublesome to let Jiang’s army now shelling on the one hand and talking on cial concerns during the trip about the situa- occupy Jinmen and Mazu. How could an the other—military operations combined tion in the Taiwan Straits. Zhang did not enemy be allowed to sleep beside my bed? with diplomatic efforts. Our bombardment understand why we took so long to land on We, however, did not intend to launch an was a test. Mao said that we had fired 30,000 Jinmen. His advice was that even though we immediate landing on Jinmen-Mazu. [Our shells that day in coordination with the mass were unable to liberate Taiwan at that time, bombardment] was merely aimed at testing rally at Tiananmen Square to make a great we must take over Jinmen and Mazu by all and scaring the Americans, but we would show of strength and impetus. Our talks possible means. Zhang suggested not letting land if circumstances allowed. Why should were a test through diplomacy in order to get slip an opportunity which might never come we not take over Jinmen-Mazu if there came to the bottom of American reaction. Two again. an opportunity? The Americans in fact were approaches were better than a single one. It Chairman Mao told me that in fact we afraid of having a war with us at the bottom was necessary to keep the negotiation chan- were not unwilling to take over Jinmen and of their hearts so that Eisenhower never nel open, Mao emphasized. After checking Mazu. Our decision [on the landing], how- talked publicly about an absolutely “mutual and polishing my manuscripts, Chairman ever, not only concerned Jiang Jieshi, but defense” of Jinmen-Mazu. The Americans Mao asked me to instruct NCNA to transmit also had to give special consideration to seemingly intended to shy away [from the news that evening and to publish it in the America’s position. The Americans feared COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 211 a war with us. After we announced a twelve- Zhang Zhizhong, which might mislead pub- Straits. Our test by artillery fire in August mile zone of territorial waters, American lic thinking about relations with the Nation- and September was appropriate because the warships at first refused to accept it. They alists. According to Chairman Mao’s in- Americans were forced to reconsider what invaded the boundary line of our territorial struction, the article was published as the they could do in the area. At the same time, waters many times, though they did not sail headline news on the front page of the we restricted our shelling to Jiang’s ships, into the eight-mile territorial waters which People’s Daily on that National Day (1 Oc- not American ships. Our naval and air forces they recognized. Later, after our warnings, tober 1958). all strictly observed the order not to fire on American ships did not dare to invade our After the National Day, Chairman Mao American ships and airplanes. We acted twelve-mile territorial waters. Once some held continuous meetings of the Politburo’s with caution and exercised proper restraint. American gunships escorted a Nationalist Standing Committee to discuss the situation Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] Xiaoping transportation flotilla shipping munitions in the Taiwan Straits. From 3 to 13 October, also said that we put up quite a pageant in our and supplies to Jinmen. When this joint the committee members met almost every- propaganda campaign to condemn America’s flotilla reached Jinmen’s harbor, I ordered day. The meetings of the 3rd and 4th focused occupation of our Taiwan territory and to heavy shelling. As soon as our batteries on an analysis of Dulles’s speech on 30 protest American ships and aircraft invading opened fire, the American ships turned September. In his speech, Dulles blatantly our territorial waters and air space. Our around and quickly escaped. The National- proposed a “two Chinas” policy, requesting propaganda had mobilized not only the Chi- ist ships suffered heavy losses. Apparently, that the Chinese Communists and the Tai- nese masses but also the international com- America was a paper tiger. wan government “both should renounce the munity to support the Arab peoples and put America, however, was also a real ti- employment of force” in the straits. Mean- very heavy pressure on the American gov- ger, Mao continued. At present, America while, he criticized Taiwan’s deployment of ernment. They both emphasized that this concentrated a large force in the Taiwan large numbers of troops on Jinmen and Mazu was the right thing to do. Straits, including six out of its twelve air- as unnecessary, “unwise and not cautious” Chairman Mao said at the meeting that craft carriers, three heavy cruisers, forty actions. A reporter asked him if America’s our task of probing [the American response] destroyers, and two air force divisions. Its Taiwan policy would change if the Chinese had been accomplished. The question now strength was so strong that one could not Communists made some compromises. was what we were going to do next. He underestimate it, but must consider it seri- Dulles said that “our policy in these respects pointed out that regarding Dulles’s policy ously. Thus, our current policy [toward is flexible. . . . If the situation we have to meet we shared some common viewpoints with Jinmen] was shelling without landing, and changes, our policies change with it.”16 Jiang Jieshi—both opposed the two-China cutting-off without killing (meaning that Premier Zhou pointed out at the meeting policy. Certainly Jiang insisted that he should without a landing, we would continue bomb- that Dulles’s speech indicated America’s be the only legal government, and we the ing Jinmen to blockade its communication intention to seize this opportunity to create bandits. Both, therefore, could not renounce and transportation and to cut off its rear two Chinas, and Dulles wanted us to commit the use of force. Jiang was always preoccu- support and supplies, but not to bottle up the to a non-military unification of Taiwan. Using pied with recovering the mainland; and we enemy [on the island]). this as a condition, America might ask Tai- could never agree to abandon Taiwan. The Chairman Mao also told me that the wan to give up its so-called “returning to the current situation, however, was that we were Chinese-American ambassadorial talks had mainland” plan and withdraw its troops from unable to liberate Taiwan within a certain resumed at Warsaw. After several rounds of Jinmen and Mazu. In one word, Dulles’s period; Jiang’s “returning to the mainland” talks, we could tell that the Americans were policy was designed to exchange Jinmen and also included “a very large measure of illu- certain about defending Taiwan but not sure Mazu for Taiwan and Penghu. This was the sion” as even Dulles recognized. The re- about Jinmen. Some indications suggested same hand of cards we had recently discov- maining question now was how to handle that the Americans intended to exchange ered during the Chinese-American ambassa- Jinmen and Mazu. Jiang was unwilling to their abstaining from defending Jinmen- dorial talks in Warsaw. Zhou emphasized withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, and we did Mazu for our recognition of their forcible that the American delegates even spoke more not need to land on Jinmen-Mazu. Mao occupation of Taiwan, Mao said. We needed undisguisedly at the talks than had been asked us about the proposal of leaving Jinmen to work out a policy concerning this situa- suggested in Dulles’s speech. and Mazu in the hands of Jiang Jieshi. The tion. It was not adequate for us to accept Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] advantage of this policy was that we could General Zhang Zhizhong’s advice at that Xiaoping believed that both China and maintain contact with the Nationalists point. Mao asked the People’s Daily and America were trying to find out the other’s through this channel since these islands were NCNA to suspend the ongoing propaganda real intention. The two sides did the same very close to the mainland. Whenever nec- campaign and wait for the Central thing at both Warsaw and Jinmen. By now essary, we could shell the Nationalists. Committee’s further decision. both had some ideas about the other’s bottom Whenever we needed tension, we could pull Chairman Mao asked for my comments line, they said. Americans knew that we the noose tighter. Whenever we wanted a on his news draft after it was typed out. I neither intended to liberate Taiwan in the relaxation, we could give the noose more noted that the article particularly mentioned near future nor wanted to have a head-to- slack. [The policy of] leaving these islands at its end that General Zhang had joined head clash with America. Fairly speaking, hanging there neither dead nor alive could be Mao’s inspection trip. I agreed with Mao’s both sides adopted a similar cautious policy employed as one means to deal with the manuscript except the last paragraph about toward their confrontation in the Taiwan Americans. Every time we bombed, Jiang 212 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Jieshi would ask for American help; it would Later on, our shelling could be at some formally suggested that both sides hold ne- make Americans anxious, worrying that intervals; sometimes heavy shelling, some- gotiations to search for peaceful resolutions Jiang might bring them into trouble. For us, times light; and several hundred shells fired to the Chinese civil war which had been not taking Jinmen-Mazu would have little randomly in one day. However, Mao said fought for the past 30 years. It also an- impact on our construction of a socialist that we should continue to give wide public- nounced that our forces on the Fujian front country. Jiang’s troops on Jinmen-Mazu ity to our propaganda campaign. We in- would suspend their shelling for seven days alone could not cause too much damage. On sisted in our propaganda that the question of in order to allow the [Nationalist] troops and the contrary, if we took over Jinmen-Mazu, Taiwan was China’s internal affair, that residents on Jinmen to receive supplies. Our or if we allow the Americans to force Jiang bombing Jinmen-Mazu was a continuation suspension of bombardment, however, to withdraw from Jinmen-Mazu, we would of the Chinese civil war, and that no foreign would be with the precondition of no Ameri- lose a reliable means by which we can deal country or international organization should can ships providing escort. with the Americans and Jiang. be allowed to interfere in China’s affairs. This statement drafted by Chairman Mao All the participants at the meeting agreed America’s stationing of its land and air forces was a very important turning point in our with Chairman Mao’s proposal to allow on Taiwan was an invasion of China’s terri- policy toward Jinmen. That is, our focus Jiang’s troops to stay at Jinmen-Mazu and tory and sovereignty; concentrating a large shifted from military operations to political force the American government to continue number of naval ships in the Taiwan Straits (including diplomatic) efforts. with this burden. The latter would be always revealed American attempts to cause ten- After watching the situation for two on tenterhooks since we could kick it from sions. All U.S. vessels must be withdrawn days, Chairman Mao called for another Po- time to time. from that area. We must oppose America’s litburo Standing Committee meeting at his Premier Zhou expected the Americans attempts to create two Chinas and to legalize quarters in the afternoon of 8 September. All to propose three resolutions during the Chi- its forcible occupation of Taiwan. We would the committee members noticed that the nese-American talks. Their first proposition solve the problem of Jinmen-Mazu, or even world had made magnificent and strong re- might ask us to stop shelling; in return, Jiang the problem of Taiwan and Penghu, with sponses to the “Message to the Compatriots would reduce his troops on Jinmen-Mazu Jiang Jieshi through negotiations. Chair- in Taiwan.” Some Western newspapers and and America would announce that Jinmen- man Mao emphasized that our media propa- magazines even saw the message as a straw Mazu was included in the American-Jiang ganda should explicitly address the above in the wind that augured dramatic change in mutual defense perimeter. The second pro- principles. Our delegation at the Warsaw the relations between both Chinese sides and posal might suggest our cease-fire if Jiang talks should also follow these principles between China and America. Meanwhile, reduced troops on Jinmen-Mazu, while while using some diplomatic rhetoric. All American ships stopped their escorts and no America would declare that their mutual these points would not be publicly propa- longer invaded our territorial waters around defense did not include Jinmen-Mazu. The gated until we had issued a formal govern- Jinmen. Only Jiang’s Defense Department last plan might ask for our cease-fire, Jiang’s ment statement. At the present, the People’s believed the message to be a Chinese Com- withdrawal from Jinmen-Mazu, and a com- Daily could have a “cease-fire” for a couple munist “plot.” mitment by both sides not to use force against of days to prepare and replenish munitions. Chairman Mao then asked me about each other. All three propositions were Then, Mao said, ten thousand cannons would how the People’s Daily prepared its edito- unacceptable, Zhou emphasized, because boom after our orders. rial. I answered that the paper had already they were essentially aimed at creating two After the meeting of the 4th, Chairman finished one article to attack Americans in Chinas and legalizing America’s forcible Mao issued an order to the frontal forces on particular. Mao told me to work on the occupation of Taiwan. Zhou, however, con- 5 September to suspend their bombardment Guomindang (GMD) first by writing an ar- sidered it favorable for us to continue the for two days. The same day Mao himself ticle which focused on a dialogue with Jiang Chinese-American talks, which could oc- drafted the “Message to the Compatriots in Jieshi, while at the same time posing some cupy the Americans and prevent America Taiwan,” which was published on the 6th in difficult questions for the Americans. This and the European countries from bringing the name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai. article should explain that our message was the question of the Taiwan Straits to the UN. The message began with “We are all Chi- not a crafty plot, but part of our consistent We also needed to explain clearly the situa- nese. Out of the thirty-six stratagems, the policy toward Taiwan. The message showed tion to our friends in Asia and Africa so as to best is making peace.” It pointed out that our stretching out both our arms once again, give them the truth and prevent [the crisis] both sides considered Taiwan, Penghu, Mao said. The article might try to alienate from doing us a disservice. All the partici- Jinmen, and Mazu as Chinese territories, Jiang from America, saying that Taiwan pants agreed with Premier Zhou’s sugges- and all agreed on one China, not two Chinas. suffered from depending on other people for tions. The message then suggested that Taiwan a living, and that getting a lift on an Ameri- Chairman Mao concluded at the meet- leaders should abolish the mutual defense can ship was unreliable. Then the article ing that our decision had been made—con- treaty signed with Americans. The Ameri- could criticize Dulles’s so-called cease-fire tinuation of shelling but not landing, block- cans would abandon the Taiwanese sooner and ask the Americans to meet five require- ading without bottling up and allowing or later; and one could discern certain clues ments for a cease-fire (stopping naval es- Jiang’s forces to stay at Jinmen-Mazu. Our about this in Dulles’s speech of 30 Septem- corts, stopping the invasion of China’s terri- shelling would no longer be daily, with no ber. After all, the American imperialists torial waters and air space, ending military more 30,000 or 50,000 shells each time. were our common enemy. The message provocation and war threats, ending inter- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 213 vention in China’s internal affairs, and with- Standing Committee meeting on 4 October. one more time about this particular matter. drawing all American armed forces from Zhou gave the editorial his final check and Then we wrote another editorial to re-criti- Taiwan and Penghu). Chairman Mao asked approval. Its main content was our critiques cize the Dulles-Jiang meeting. me to finish my writing that evening. He and refusal of an American request for a Chairman Mao also said at the Polit- was going to wait to read and check the cease-fire on the Jinmen-Mazu front. The buro Standing Committee meeting that there article that night. Mao told me that I could editorial clearly stated that there was no war were many problems in the relationship be- leave right now to write the article without between China and America, so where did tween America and Jiang. The Americans waiting for the end of the meeting. the cease-fire come from? It asked America wanted to make Jiang’s “Republic of China” Leaving Zhongnanhai, I rushed back to to withdraw all of its naval and air forces one of their dependencies or even a man- the People’s Daily’s building. After order- from Taiwan and surrounding areas around dated territory. But Jiang desperately sought ing a dish of fried noodles as my dinner from the Taiwan Straits. It was a perfect timing for to maintain his semi-independence. Thus a restaurant across the street, I began to draft this editorial, corresponding to the “Defense came conflicts between Jiang and America. the editorial hurriedly in my office. With Ministry’s Order,” which was issued on 13 Jiang Jieshi and his son Jiang Jingguo [Chiang Chairman Mao’s instruction, my writing October and drafted by Chairman Mao. In Ching-kuo] still had a little bit of anti-Ameri- was very smooth and fast. A little bit after that order, the Defense Ministry announced can initiative. They would resist America if the midnight, I finished my draft. It was two a continuation of the suspension of our bom- it drove them too hard. Among such cases in or three o’clock in the early morning of the bardment for two more weeks. The suspen- the past were Jiang’s condemnation of Hu 9th when the final proof of the article was sion, however, still contained the precondi- Shi [Hu Shih]17 and his dismissal of General sent to Chairman Mao for checking and tion that no American ships could be escorts. Sun Liren18—actions taken because Jiang approval. Mao read the editorial early the We would resume shelling immediately if believed that the troublemakers against him same morning and made important changes there were any American escort vessels. were supported by the Americans. Another in its last paragraph. He re-wrote the para- Two days later, Eisenhower ordered all good example of Jiang’s independence was graph as follows: “Seemingly, the problem the warships from the Sixth Fleet which had the recent smashing and looting of the Ameri- still needs to have more tests and observa- been sent as reinforcements to the Pacific to can Embassy in Taipei by Taiwanese tions. We are still very far away from the return to the Mediterranean. He also sent masses.19 Jiang permitted American armed time of solving the problem. After all, the Dulles to Taiwan to confer with Jiang Jieshi. forces stationed in Taiwan only at the regi- imperialists are the imperialists, and the The Editorial Department of the People’s mental level, while rejecting larger units at reactionaries are the reactionaries. Let us Daily, without really knowing what was go- the divisional level which America had wait and see how they will make their ing on, wrote an editorial entitled “Having planned to send to Taiwan. After our shell- moves!” Chairman Mao noted his approval Only Themselves to Blame,” saying that ing of Jinmen began, Jiang allowed only on the final proof: “Not very good, barely Dulles and Jiang played a “two-man show.” 3,000 more American marines to reinforce publishable.” The time written down below After the editorial was published on 21 Octo- Taiwan and they were stationed in Tainan [a his signature was six o’clock of 9 October. ber, Premier Zhou called us during the same city in southern Taiwan]. As Chairman Mao I received my manuscript sent back by morning and gave a pungent criticism that had pointed out two days earlier, we and Chairman Mao on the morning of 9 Octo- we were neither consistent with the facts nor Jiang Jieshi had some common points. The ber. Meanwhile, I received a telephone call with the policy made by the Central Commit- conflict at the Dulles-Jiang meeting sug- from Mao’s secretary, Lin Ke. Lin told me tee. When Chairman Mao chaired a Polit- gested that we might be able to ally with that Chairman Mao wanted to include buro Standing Committee meeting that after- Jiang to resist America in a certain way. Our Dulles’s 8 October announcement of Ameri- noon, he also criticized our editorial as book- policy of not liberating Taiwan in the near can ships stopping their escorts in the edito- ish and naive, reeling and swaggering, which future might help Jiang relax and concen- rial. Mao also suggested postponing its had a one-sided understanding of the Central trate on his fight against America’s control. publication for one day. After reading Mao’s Committee’s policy and gave an inappropri- We neither landed on Jinmen nor agreed revision and corrections, I felt that the ate emphasis to the American-Jiang solidar- with the American proposal for a “cease- editorial’s title was not a very bold headline. ity. Chairman Mao believed that Dulles’s fire.” This clearly caused problems between So, according to the changes he made in the mission to Taiwan was to persuade Jiang Americans and Jiang. In the past months, last paragraph, I changed the title to “Let’s Jieshi to withdraw his troops from Jinmen- our policy had been one of shelling without See How They Make Their Moves.” After Mazu in exchange for our commitment not to landing and blockading without driving the editorial was published on 11 October, it liberate Taiwan so that America could gain a Jiang’s troops to the wall. While continuing was thought to be Chairman Mao’s writing total control of Taiwan’s future. Disagree- the same policy, we should from now on because of its striking title and special style ing with Dulles, however, Jiang demanded implement it more flexibly in favor of sup- close to that of the “Message to the Compa- that America commit to a “mutual defense” porting Jiang Jieshi to resist America’s con- triots in Taiwan.” of Jinmen-Mazu. Jiang and Dulles had a big trol. Two days later, the People’s Daily pub- argument in which nobody gave in to the All the participants at the meeting agreed lished another editorial, “Stop Talking about other. As a result, the meeting ended in with Chairman Mao’s ideas. Premier Zhou Cease-fire; To Leave Is the Best,” on 13 discord and was not a “two-men show” of added that “shelling” was coordinated with October. This editorial was based upon solidarity. After the Politburo meeting, Chair- “blockading.” Since we relaxed our “block- Premier Zhou’s opinion at the Politburo man Mao asked Premier Zhou to talk to me ading,” we might also need to relax our 214 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

“shelling.” Mao agreed with him by sug- live under somebody’s thumb and lose your Part II. Documents gesting that we should announce an odd- sovereignty, you will eventually have no numbered-day shelling, with no shelling on place to call your home and be thrown out 1. Notation, Mao Zedong on Chen Geng’s even-numbered days. For the odd-num- into the sea.” The message announced that Report, 18 December 195722 bered-day shelling, our targets might be lim- we had already ordered PLA batteries on the Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji [A Col- ited only to the harbors and airport, not the Fujian front not to fire on the airport, har- lection of Mao Zedong’s Military Papers] defense works and residential buildings on bors, ships, and beaches of Jinmen on even (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993), the island. From now on, our shelling would days. On odd days, we might not bomb 6:373 be limited in scope, and, moreover, the light either, as long as there were no ships or shelling might not be on a regular basis. airplanes coming to Jinmen. Return to Comrade Peng Dehuai: Militarily it sounded like a joke, since such The same day the statement was issued, [What has been suggested in the report] policy was unknown in the history of Chi- Chairman Mao sent for Tian Jiaying20 and is absolutely necessary. You should super- nese or world warfare. However, we were me for a conversation. Besides asking us to vise and push the air force to go all out [to engaged in a political battle, which was make a survey of the current condition of fulfill the task], so that we are sure that the supposed to be fought this way. Chairman people’s communes in Henan Province, Mao invading enemy will be annihilated. Please Mao said that we only had “hand grenades” talked about the bombardment of Jinmen consider the question regarding our air force’s right now, but no atomic bombs. “Hand and Mazu. He said that during this event moving into Fujian in 1958. grenades” could be successful for us to use both we and the Americans adopted a in beating Jiang’s troops on Jin[men]-Ma[zu], brinkmanship policy. America concentrated 2. Letter, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai but not a good idea to use in fighting against many warships which invaded our territorial and Huang Kecheng, 27 July 195823 Americans, who had nuclear weapons. Later, waters and escorted Jiang’s transportation Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao when everybody had nuclear weapons, very fleets, but never fired on us. We fired 10,000 [Mao Zedong’s Manuscripts since the For- likely nobody would use them. or 20,000 shells a day, or even more when- mation of the People’s Republic] (Beijing: Comrades [Liu] Shaoqi and [Deng] ever there were American escort ships. Our The Central Press of Historical Documents, Xiaoping wondered at the end of the meet- shells, however, fell only on Jiang’s ships 1992), 7:326 ing whether we should issue a formal state- not on American ships. Some shells fell near ment announcing future shelling on odd American ships, which frightened them and Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] days only but not on even days. Chairman caused them to turn around. While confront- Kecheng: Mao believed it necessary. He also required ing each other in the Taiwan Straits, both [I] could not sleep [last night], but me to understand that the editorial men- sides continued talks in Warsaw. Ameri- thought about it again. It seems more appro- tioned early in the meeting should not be cans were on one side of the brink, and we on priate to hold our [plans] to attack Jinmen for published until our formal statement was the other. Even though both were at the several days. While holding our operations, issued. brink of war, no one ever crossed the line. [we will] observe the situational develop- On 25 October, the “Second Message to We used our brinkmanship policy to deal ment there. We will not attack whether or the Compatriots in Taiwan” drafted by Chair- with American brinkmanship. Mao contin- not the other side relieves a garrison. Until man Mao was issued in the name of Defense ued that there were many stories written in they launch a provocative attack, [we will] Minister Peng Dehuai. A result of the analy- Liaozhai Zhiyi (The Chinese Ghost Sto- then respond with a counterattack. The sis of Dulles’s speech published by the U.S. ries)21 about people without fear of ghosts. solution of the problem in the Middle East State Department on 23 October, the mes- One of the stories was titled “Qing Feng,” takes time. Since we have time, why should sage pointed out that on the one hand Dulles which talked about a bohemian scholar we be in a big hurry? We will hold our attack finally saw a “Communist China” and was named Geng Qubing. One night, Geng was plans now, but one day we will put it into willing to make contact with it. On the other reading late in a remote village house. “A implementation. If the other side invades hand, however, this American bureaucrat ghost walks into his house with long hair and Zhang[zhou], Shan[tou], Fuzhou, and still considered the so-called “Republic of black face, and stares at the scholar. Laugh- Hangzhou, a best scenario [for us to take China” in Taiwan as a “political unit which ing, dipping his fingers into the black ink, action] would emerge. How do you think was factually existing.” The American plan and painting his face black himself, Geng about this idea? Could you have a discus- was first to separate Taiwan from the main- looked directly at the ghost with keen, spar- sion about this with other comrades? It is land, and second to mandate Taiwan’s spe- kling eyes. The ghost felt embarrassed and extremely beneficial [for our decision-mak- cial status. The message read, “China’s ran away.” Chairman Mao told us that if we ing] with politics in command and going affairs must be handled by the Chinese them- were not afraid of ghosts, ghosts would be through repeated deliberations. To make a selves. For any problem unable to be solved unable to do anything to us. He said that our plan too quickly usually results in an un- at once, we can give it further thought and experience in shelling Jinmen-Mazu was the thoughtful consideration. I did such things discuss it later between us. . . . We are not case in point. quite often and sometimes had unavoidable advising you to break up with Americans I can say that what Chairman Mao told miscalculations. What is your opinion? Even right now. These sort of ideas are not prac- us here is his summary of our management if the other side attacks us, [we still] can wait tical. We simply hope that you should not of the Jinmen-Mazu crisis of 1958. for a couple of days for a clear calculation, yield to the pressure from Americans. If you and then start our counterattack. Can all of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 215 the above points be accounted as working ments] at the Military Commission’s meet- tion from now on. You can observe the out splendid plans here to defeat the enemy ing. situation for one, two, three, or four years by in battles a thousand miles away, and having using this point. You will eventually find some certainty of success that we will be Part II out whether the West fears the East a bit ever-victorious? We must persist in the Distribute them to the Fujian Military Dis- more, or the East fears the West a bit more. principle of fighting no battle we are not trict and all other military districts; the party According to my opinion, it is Dulles who sure of winning. If you agree [with the committees of all provinces, metropolises, fears us more. Britain, America, Germany, above points], telegraph this letter to Ye Fei and regions; all departments of the Central France, and other western countries fear us a and ask him to think about it very carefully. Military Commission and all special forces lot more. Why do they have more fears? Let me know his opinion. headquarters; all members of the Politburo This is an issue of strength, and an issue of Have a peaceful morning! and the Secretariat of the Central Commit- popularity. Public attitude is indeed strength. tee; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Lu There are more people on our side, and fewer Mao Zedong Dingyi;29 and Wu Lengxi. on their side. Among the three doctrines [in 10 A.M., 27 July24 today’s world]—communism, nationalism, 5. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth and imperialism, communism and national- 3. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Peng Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 5 ism are relatively closer. Nationalism domi- Dehuai, 18 August 1958, 1:00 a.m.25 September 1958 (Excerpt) nates a large part of the world, including the Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Se- three continents: Asia, Africa, and Latin 7:348 lected Diplomatic Papers of Mao Zedong] America. Even though the ruling groups of (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical some countries in these continents are pro- Comrade [Peng] Dehuai: Documents, 1994), 341-348 West, such as those in Thailand, Pakistan, [We are] preparing to shell Jinmen, the Philippines, Japan, Turkey, and Iran, dealing with Jiang [Jieshi] directly and the As far as the international situation is among the people in these countries many, Americans indirectly. Therefore, do not concerned, our view has always been opti- probably quite a few, are pro-East. Only the conduct military maneuvers in Guangdong mistic, which can be summarized as “the monopoly-capitalists and a few people who and Shengzhen, so that the British would East Wind prevails over the West Wind.” have been totally poisoned by the monopoly- not be scared. At present, America commits itself to an capitalists want a war. Except for them, the “all-round contract” policy along our coast. rest of the people, or the majority of the Mao Zedong It seems to me that the Americans will only people (not all of them) do not want a war. In 1 A.M., 18 August feel comfortable if they take complete re- northern European countries, for example, sponsibility for Jinmen and Mazu, or even the ruling classes, though belonging to the P.S.: Please call air force headquarters for such small islands as Dadan, Erdan, and capitalists, do not want a war. The balance attention to the possibility that the Taiwan Dongding. America gets into our noose. of strength is like this. The truth is in the side might counterattack us by dispatching Thereby, America’s neck is hanging in hands of the majority of the people, not in the large groups of air force (such as dozens, or China’s iron noose. Although Taiwan is [for hands of Dulles. As a result, while they feel even over one hundred, airplanes) to try to the Americans] another noose, it is a bit rather diffident, we are solid and dependable take back air control over Jin[men] and farther from [the mainland]. America now inside. We depend on the people, while they Ma[zu]. If this happens, we should prepare moves its head closer to us, since it wants to support those reactionary rulers. This is to use large groups of air force to defeat take responsibility for Jinmen and other is- what Dulles is doing right now. He special- them immediately. However, in chasing lands. Someday we will kick America, and izes in such people as “Generalissimo Jiang,” them, [our planes] should not cross the it cannot run away, because it is tied up by [South Korean leader] Syngman Rhee, and space line over Jinmen and Mazu.26 our noose. [South Vietnam leader] Ngo Dinh Diem. I would like to present some viewpoints, My viewpoint is that both sides are afraid [of 4. Instruction, Mao Zedong to Huang offering some ideas for the participants at each other], but they fear us a bit more. Kecheng, 3 September 195827 this meeting. Do not treat them as a decision, Thus, it is impossible for a war to break out. Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, or some kind of law. As law, they might not The second question is what is the na- 7:376 be changed; as opinions, they are alive and ture of the international military alliances flexible. Let us use these points to review organized by the Americans and the other Part I and analyze the current international situa- imperialists, such as the North Atlantic Comrade [Huang] Kecheng: tion. [Treaty Organization], the Baghdad [Treaty Both the instruction and the appendix28 The first question is who fears whom a Organization], and the Manila [Treaty Orga- are well written. Please send them to Com- bit more. I believe that the Americans are nization].30 We say that they are of an ag- rade Peng Dehuai immediately for his read- afraid of fighting a war. So are we. But the gressive nature. It is absolutely true that ing. Then, they should be approved by the question is which side actually fears the other these military organizations are of an ag- Central Military Commission’s meeting and a bit more. This is my point, as well as my gressive nature. However, against which issued thereafter. Please give a detailed observation. I would like to invite every- side do these organizations direct their spear- explanation of the reasons [for these docu- body here to apply this point to your observa- head? Are they attacking socialism, or na- 216 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN tionalism? It seems to me that they are supports America among so many countries again. It is advantageous when France has currently attacking the nationalist countries, in the world. Probably the Philippines can trouble with Britain and America. Domesti- such as Egypt, Lebanon, and the other weak be added to the list, but it offers only “con- cally, he would become a necessary teacher countries in the Middle East. But they will ditional support.” It is a tense situation, for who can educate the French proletarians, attack the socialist countries until, say, when example, that caused the Iraqi revolution, is just like “Generalissimo Jiang” in China. Hungary completely has failed, Poland has it not? The current tense situation is caused Without “Generalissimo Jiang,” it would collapsed, Czechoslovakia and East Ger- by the imperialists themselves, not by us. In not be enough for the Chinese Communist many have fallen down, and even the Soviet the final analysis, however, the tense situa- Party’s positive education alone to educate Union and us have encountered troubles. tion is more harmful for the imperialists. [China’s] 600 million people. Currently, de They will attack us when we are shaking and Lenin once introduced this point in his dis- Gaulle is still enjoying his reputation. If you crumbling. Why should they fail to attack cussions about war. Lenin said that a war defeat him now, people are still missing him you when you are falling down? Stable and could motivate people’s spiritual condition, as he is still alive. Let him come to power, strong, we are not falling down now, and making it tense. Although there is no war he will run no more than five, six, seven, they are unable to bite the hard bone. So they right now, a tense situation caused by the eight, or ten years. He will be finished turn to those more bitable countries, gnaw- current military confrontation can also bring sooner or later. After he is finished, no ing at Indonesia, India, Burma, and Ceylon. every positive factor into play, while at the second de Gaulle will be there and his poison They have attempted to overthrow [Gamal same time stimulating groups of backward will be completely released. You must al- Abdul] Nasser,31 undermine Iraq, and sub- people to think. low his poison to be released, just like that jugate Algeria. By now Latin America has The fourth point is about the issue of we did to our Rightists.32 You have to let made a significant progress. As [U.S.] vice withdrawing armed forces from the Middle him release the poison. If not, he always has president, [Richard] Nixon was not wel- East. American and British troops of ag- the poison. You can eliminate the poison comed in eight countries, where people spat gression must withdraw. The imperialists only after he releases it. and stoned him. When the political repre- now refuse to withdraw and intend to stay The sixth point is the embargo, that is, sentative of America was treated with saliva there. This is disadvantageous for the people, no trade with us. Is this advantageous or and rocks there, it means contempt for but it will at the same time educate the disadvantageous to us? I believe that the America’s “dignity,” and an unwillingness people. In order to fight against aggressors, embargo benefits us a lot. We do not feel it to treat it “politely.” Because you are our you need to have a target; without a target, it [to be] disadvantageous at all. It will have enemy, we therefore treat you with saliva is difficult for you to fight against the ag- tremendous beneficial impact on our [han- and rocks. Thus, we should not take the gressors. The imperialists now come up dling of] clothing, food, housing, and trans- three military organizations too seriously. there themselves to become the target, and portation, as well as on our reconstruction [We] need to analyze them. Even though refuse to leave. This arouses the people of (including the production of steel and iron). aggressive, they are not steady. the entire world to fight against the Ameri- The embargo forces us to work out all the The third point is about the tension in can aggressors. After all, it seems to me that solutions ourselves. My appreciation goes the international situation. We are calling it is not so harmful for the people when the to He Yingqin33 all the time. In 1937 when every day for relaxing international tensions aggressors put off their withdrawal. Thereby our Red Army was re-organized into the because it will benefit the people of the the people will yell at the aggressors every- Eighth Route Army under the Nationalist world. So, can we say that it must be harmful day: why do you not leave [our country]? Revolution Army, we received 400,000 yuan for us whenever there is a tense situation? I The fifth question is whether it is a good of fabi every month. After we were paid the do not think it necessarily so. A tense thing or bad thing to have [Charles] de money, we became dependent on it. In 1940, situation is not necessarily harmful for us in Gaulle in power. At present, the French however, the anti-Communist movement every circumstance; it has an advantageous Communist Party and the French people reached its peak, and the payment stopped. side. Why do I think this way? It is because should firmly oppose de Gaulle coming to No more money was paid [to us]. We had to besides its disadvantageous side, a tense power, and veto his constitution. Mean- find out our own means [to support our- situation can mobilize the population, can while, they should also be prepared for the selves] from then on. What did we find out? particularly mobilize the backward people, struggle after he takes office in case they We issued an order that as there was no more can mobilize the people in the middle, and cannot stop him. Once in power, de Gaulle fabi, each regiment had to find out its own can therefore promote the Great Leap For- will oppress the French Communist Party way of self-support. Thereafter, all [of our] ward in economic construction. Afraid of and the French people. His taking office, base areas launched a production move- fighting a nuclear war? You have to think it however, may also have advantageous ef- ment. The value yielded from the produc- over. Look, we have fired a few shells on fects in both domestic and foreign affairs. tion reached not 400,000, not 4 million, even Jinmen and Mazu, and I did not expect that Internationally, this person likes to make not 40 million yuan, but about 100 or possi- the entire world would be so deeply shocked, trouble for Britain and America. He likes to bly 200 million yuan, if we combined the and the smoke and mist is shading the sky. argue. He had some miserable experiences production of all the base areas together. We This is because people are afraid of war. in the past. In his memoirs, de Gaulle have since relied on our own efforts. Who is They are afraid that the Americans will blamed Britain and America all the time, but today’s He Yingqin? It is Dulles, a different make trouble everywhere in the world. Ex- said some nice words about the Soviet Union. name. Currently, they are carrying out an cept for Syngman Rhee, no second country It seems to me that he will make trouble embargo. We are going own way. We have COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 217 initiated the Great Leap Forward, throwing Thinking about the history of the entire uni- I am going to discuss something we away dependence and breaking down blind verse, I do not see any reason to be pessimis- have talked about before. About the noose faith. The result is good. tic about the future. I had a debate with issue we discussed at the last meeting, did The seventh is the non-recognition is- Premier [Jawarharlal] Nehru34 over this is- we not? Now I want to say that we need to sue. Is [imperialist countries’] recognition sue. He said that [as the result of a nuclear place nooses on Dulles, Eisenhower, and [of the PRC] or non-recognition relatively war] no government could remain and every- other warmongers. There are many places more advantageous to us? Same as on the thing would be destroyed. Even though where the nooses can be used on the Ameri- embargo issue, imperialist countries’ non- someone might want to seek peace, no gov- cans. In my opinion, wherever an [Ameri- recognition of us is more advantageous to us ernment would be there. I told him that it can] military base is located, [America] is than their recognition of us. So far there are would never be like that. If your government tied up by a noose. [This happens], for ex- about forty some countries which refuse to would be eliminated by atomic bombs, the ample, in the East, in South Korea, Japan, recognize us. The main reason lies in people would form another one which could the Philippines, and Taiwan; in the West, in America. For instance, France intends to work out a peace. If you fail to think about West Germany, France, Italy, and Britain; in recognize China, but it does not dare to do it things in such extreme terms, how can you the Middle East, in Turkey and Iran; and in because of America’s opposition. Many ever sleep? This is no more than a matter of Africa, in Morocco and other places. In each other countries in Central and South people being killed, and [what is reflected of these countries, America has many mili- America, Asia, Africa, and Europe, and here] is the fear of fighting a war. But if the tary bases. For instance, in Turkey there are Canada, dare not to recognize us because of imperialists definitely want to fight a war more than twenty American military bases, America. There are only nineteen capitalist and attack us first, using atomic bombs, it and it is said that in Japan there are about countries which recognize us now, plus does not matter whether you fear fighting a 800. In some other countries, although there another eleven countries in the socialist war or not; in any case they will attack you. is no [American] military base, they are camp, plus Yugoslavia, totaling thirty-one If that were the case, what should be our occupied by the troops [of the imperialists]. countries. It seems to me that we can live attitude? Is it better to fear or not to fear? It For example, American troops in Lebanon with this small number. Non-recognition is extremely dangerous [for us] to fear this and British troops in Jordan. [of us], in my opinion, is not a bad thing. and fear that every day, which will make our Here I am focusing on two of these Rather, it is relatively good. Let us produce cadres and people feel discouraged. So I nooses: one is Lebanon, the other is Taiwan. more steel. When we can produce 600 or believe that [we] should be case-hardened Taiwan is an old noose since America has 700 million tons of steel, they will recognize toward fighting a war. We will fight it if we occupied it for several years. Who ties us at last. They may still refuse to recognize have to. We will rebuild our country after the America there? The People’s Republic of us by then, but who cares? war. Therefore, we are now mobilizing the China ties it there. 600 million Chinese have The last issue is about preparations for militias. All people’s communes should a noose in their hands. This is a steel noose an anti-aggression war. I said in my first organize their militias. Everyone in our and it ties America’s neck. Who tied point that as both sides are afraid of war, war country is a soldier. We should arm the America? The noose was made by America should not break out. Everything in the people. We can distribute several million itself and tied by itself, and it throws the world, however, needs a safety factor. Since guns at the beginning. Later on we will other end of the noose to mainland China, there exists a monopoly-capitalist class in distribute several dozen million guns among letting us grasp it. [America] was tied in the world, I am afraid that it will make the people. All provinces should be able to Lebanon only recently, but the noose was trouble recklessly and abruptly. We must construct light weapons, including rifles, also made by America itself, tied by itself, therefore be prepared to fight a war. This machine guns, hand grenades, small mortars, and the other end of the noose was thrown point needs to be explained clearly to our and light mortars. Each people’s commune into the hands of Arab nations. Not only so, cadres. First, we do not want a war, and we should have a military office to supervise America also throws the [other end of the] oppose any war. So does the Soviet Union. [combat] training. Some of our participants noose into the hands of the majority of the If war comes, it will be started by the other here today are intellectuals. You need to people in the world. Everyone condemns side and we will be forced to enter the make a call for holding a pen in one hand and America, and no one gives it any sympathy. fighting. Second, however, we do not fear gripping a gun in the other. You cannot only The noose is held by the people and govern- fighting a war. We must fight it if we have have pens in your hands. You should be ments in many countries. In the Middle to. We have only grenades and potatoes in culturalized as well as militarized. East, for example, the UN held meetings [on our hands right now. A war of atomic and These eight points are my opinions. I the Lebanon issue], but [America’s] main hydrogen bombs is of course terrible since offer them to you for your observation of the problem is that it has been tied by the Arab many people will die. That is why we international situation. people and cannot escape. At present, oppose a war. Unfortunately, the decision America is caught in a dilemma—is it better will not be made by us. If the imperialists 6. Speech, Mao Zedong at the Fifteenth to withdraw earlier or later? If an early decide to fight a war, we have to be prepared Meeting of the Supreme State Council, 8 withdrawal, why did it come in the first for everything. We must fight a war if we September 1958 (Excerpt) place? If a late withdrawal, [the noose] will have to. I am saying that it is not so terrify- Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 348- be getting tighter and tighter, and will be- ing even if half of our population perishes. 352 come an encased knot. How can this be This is certainly talk in extreme terms. handled? Lebanon is different from Taiwan 218 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN with which America has signed a treaty. The made any decision yet, and that they would To make a long story short, you [Ameri- situation in Lebanon is more flexible as no make the decision in accordance with the cans] are noosed here. You may be able to treaty is involved there. It is said that one situation after the Communists landed there? get away if you take the initiative to leave issued the invitation, and the other came, The problem lies in the 110,000 Guomindang slowly and quietly. Is there not a policy for and [the noose] is hitched up. As far as troops, 95,000 men on Jinmen and 15,000 on getting away? In my view, you had a policy Taiwan is concerned, this is an encased knot Mazu. America has to pay attention to them for getting away from Korea, and now a since a treaty was signed. There is no differ- as long as these two large garrisons are on policy for getting away from Jinmen-Mazu ence between the Democrats and Republi- the islands. This concerns the interest and is being shaped. As a matter of fact, those in cans in this case. Eisenhower agreed on the feelings of their class. Why do the British your group really want to get away, and the treaty and [Harry] Truman sent the Seventh and Americans treat the governments in public opinion also asks you to do so. To get Fleet there. Truman could come and go at some countries so nicely? They cannot fold away is to extricate yourself from the noose. will since there was no treaty during his their hands and see these governments col- How can this be done? That is, the 110,000 time. Eisenhower signed the treaty. America lapse. Today the Americans and Jiang are troops should leave. Taiwan is ours, and we is tied up [in Taiwan] because of the having a joint military exercise under the will never compromise on this issue, which Guomindang’s panic and request, and also command of [Vice Admiral Wallace M.] is an issue of internal affairs. The dealing because America was willing [to be tied up Beakley, commander of the Seventh Fleet. between us and you [the Americans] is an there]. Also is there is [Roland] Smoot,35 the person international issue. These are two different Is it [America] tied up at Jinmen and who ordered the firing, which made the issues. Although you Americans have been Mazu? I think that it has also been tied up at [U.S.] State Department and Defense De- associated with Jiang Jieshi, it is possible to Jinmen and Mazu. Why do I think so? Did partment unhappy. He is there, together dissolve this chemical combination. This is not the Americans say that they had not with Beakley, to take the command. just like electrolytic aluminum or electro-

Khrushchev’s Nuclear Promise of China (PRC) would result in Soviet nuclear lishment of the PRC the previous fall, stated To Beijing During the 1958 Crisis retaliation. Researchers have assumed for that, “in the event of one of the Contracting some time that Soviet leaders were unhappy Parties being attacked by Japan or any state introduction by Vladislav M. Zubok with the new Sino-American confrontation allied with her and thus being involved in a and considered the Chinese brinkmanship as state of war, the other Contracting Party The history of the “second” Taiwan a dangerous development that interfered with shall immediately render military and other Straits crisis (August-October 1958) has Kremlin plans for “detente” with the West. assistance by all means at its disposal.”4 gotten a second wind lately, due to the emer- In their memoirs, Khrushchev and, more (The United States was not mentioned by gence of new Chinese evidence.1 While this recently, Gromyko both described how name in the text, but the implication was research has greatly illuminated Chinese puzzled and alarmed they were by Mao’s clear enough.) decision-making, scholars still have been seemingly reckless attitude toward nuclear What emerged from the Gromyko-Chi- unable to ascertain precisely what transpired war as not only possible, but actually desir- nese talks in early September 1958 and what between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships able for the communist camp.2 However, appeared to have worried the Kremlin lead- after the outbreak of the crisis. The docu- Khrushchev’s September 7 public declara- ership was not that the Chinese might pro- ment printed below, a previously secret 27 tion to Eisenhower—stating that “An attack voke a general war with the United States. September 1958 communication from the on the Chinese People’s Republic, which is Rather, as the text of the Soviet letter below Central Committee of the Communist Party a great friend, ally and neighbor of our implies, it was the general assumption of the of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) to the Cen- country, is an attack on the Soviet Union”3— Chinese Politburo that if the United States tral Committee of the Chinese Communist seems to contradict this general thesis. “should start a war against the People’s Party (CC CPC), an internally circulated The secret letter from the CC CPSU to Republic of China” and used tactical nuclear version of which is now declassified and the CC CPC printed below links the two weapons against the PRC (in response to available to researchers at the Russian For- puzzling events noted above, and helps point Chinese attacks against the offshore islands eign Ministry archives in Moscow, adds one toward possible answers to the questions or Taiwan), the Soviet Union should remain more piece of evidence to this puzzling they raise. It attests to the fact that, in spite passively on the sidelines, as a strategic story. of the genuine tension between the two com- reserve in case the Americans decided to Two episodes relating to Soviet-Chi- munist giants, the Khrushchev leadership at broaden the war by using high-yield (e.g., nese interactions during the 1958 crisis have that time still was determined to stand with thermonuclear) weapons. This interpreta- attracted particular attention: the secret visit Beijing at a moment of crisis, and took tion of the Soviet commitments diverged of Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko additional steps to prove that it remained significantly from Article I of the Treaty to Beijing and his talks with Chinese leaders loyal to the spirit and letter of the Sino- signed in Moscow eight years earlier. on September 6-7; and the letter of Soviet Soviet Treaty of February 1950. In a forthcoming book, Constantine Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev to President The first article of that treaty, concluded Pleshakov and I argue that many in the Dwight D. Eisenhower on September 7 warn- at the end of Mao Zedong’s summit meet- Soviet leadership were unhappy to see the ing that an attack on the People’s Republic ings in Moscow with Stalin after the estab- continued on page 226 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 219 lytic copper, the combination will be dis- it continues to stay, let it be noosed here. This cans. Only a few people blame us. The solved when it is electrolyzed. Jiang Jieshi will not affect the overall situation, and we Americans blame us, Jiang Jieshi blames us, is [for us] a domestic issue, and you [Ameri- can continue the Great Leap Forward. and Syngman Rhee blames us. Maybe there cans] are [for us] a diplomatic issue. [The We should strive to produce eleven mil- are some others [who blame us], but mainly two] cannot be mixed up. lion tons of steel, doubling last year’s output. these three. Britain is a vacillating element. America now attempts to dominate four Next year another twenty million tons, striv- While it will not be militarily involved, it is out of the five continents, except for Austra- ing to reach thirty million tons. The year said that it has strong sympathy politically. lia. First of all, in North America, this is after next, another twenty million tons. Is it This is because Britain faces problems in mainly America’s own place, and its armed not fifty million tons by then? Three years of Jordan. How can it handle the situation in forces are there. The next is Central and hard efforts, fifty million tons of steel. At Jordan if the Americans withdraw from Leba- South America where it intends to provide that time, we will occupy third place in the non because [the British] failed to show “protection,” although it does not have gar- world, next only to the Soviet Union and the sympathy [to the Americans]? Nehru issued risons there. Then, there are Europe, Africa, United States. The [steel] output of the a statement, which basically echoed us, sug- and Asia, to which [America] has given its Soviet Union reached fifty million [tons] last gesting that Taiwan and other [offshore] main attention, and deployed its main force year. In three years, they can make it sixty islands should be returned to us, but hoping in Europe and Asia. I do not know how it million [tons]. If we make hard efforts in the that a peaceful solution can be reached. The [America] can fight a war with a few sol- next three years, it is possible that [our steel countries in the Middle East, especially Egypt diers scattered everywhere. Thus, I believe output] may surpass fifty million tons. In and Iraq, warmly welcomed [our artillery that it focuses on occupying the intermedi- another two years, by 1962, it is possible [for bombardment] this time. They praise us ate zone. As far as the territories of our us to produce] eighty to a hundred million every day, saying that we have done the right [socialist countries] are concerned, I be- tons [of steel], approaching the level of the thing. This is because our [artillery bom- lieve that the Americans do not dare to United States (because of the impact of bardment] here has reduced the pressure the come, unless the socialist camp encounters economic recessions, America’s [steel out- Americans put on them. big trouble and they are convinced that the put] will probably only reach a hundred I think that we can tell the people of the Soviet Union and China will totally collapse million tons at that time). [At the end of] the world publicly that, in comparison, a tense as soon as they come. Except for [the second five-year plan, we will approach or situation is more disadvantageous to the countries belonging to] our camp, America even surpass America. In another two years, western countries, as well as more disadvan- is seeking hegemony everywhere in the in seven years, [we may] produce a hundred tageous to America [than to them]. Why is world, including Latin America, Europe, fifty million tons of steel, and surpass America it advantageous to them [the people of the Africa, Asia, and, also, Australia. Australia to become the number one in the world. It is world]? Does the tense situation in the has linked itself with America through a not good for us to name ourselves as the most Middle East do any good for America? Does military alliance and follows its orders. Is it superior in the world, but it is not bad to it do any good for Britain? Or is it more better for America to try to control these become the number one steel producer. [We advantageous to the Arab countries and to places by utilizing the banner of “anti-com- should also] make hard efforts in the next the peace-loving people in Asia, Africa, munism” or by fighting a real war against three years to [increase] grain production. Latin America, and other continents. To communism? To fight [a real war] against The output of this year is between three which side is the tense situation in the Tai- communism means to dispatch its troops to hundred fifty to four hundred million tons. wan [Straits] more advantageous? Let us fight us and fight the Soviet Union. I would [The output] will double next year, reaching, take our country as an example. Our country say that the Americans are not so stupid. probably, seven hundred fifty million tons. is now experiencing a nationwide mobiliza- They only have a few soldiers to be trans- We should slow down a little bit the year tion. If during the Middle East crisis about ferred here and there. After the incident in after next, for we have to find outlets for thirty to forty million people participated in Lebanon, American troops were transferred [extra] grain. Food will be grain’s main the rallies and protest parades, this time there from the Pacific. After they arrived in outlet; but we also need to find other outlets [during the Taiwan crisis] we will probably the Red Sea area, the situation changed in industry. For example, [using grain] to mobilize 300 million people [to participate unfavorably [in the Pacific], and they turned produce ethyl alcohol, and, through ethyl in rallies and parades], educating them and around quickly and landed at Malaya. They alcohol, to produce rubber, artificial fiber, toughening them. This event will also ben- announced that [the troops] were taking a plastic, and other things. efit our unity with all democratic parties36 in vacation there, and kept quiet for seventeen Let me talk a little bit more about the China because all the parties now share a days. Later, after one of their reporters tense situation. You [Americans] cause the common goal. As a result, those who in the claimed that [America] was taking charge tense situation, and you think it advanta- past had knots in their hearts, who were of the Indian Ocean, everyone in the India geous to you, do you not? You may be unhappy, and who were criticized will now Ocean [area] expressed opposition. When wrong. The tense situation can mobilize the feel a little bit more comfortable. If we can we began our artillery bombardment, people in the world, making everyone blame continue to handle the situation in this way, America came here since there were not you Americans. When a tense situation doing it again and again, we will all belong enough [of its] troops here. It will probably emerges in the Middle East, everyone blames to the working class one day. Therefore, in better serve America’s interests if it leaves the Americans. When tension comes to my view, the tense situation caused by the such places like Taiwan in an earlier time. If Taiwan everyone again blames the Ameri- imperialists eventually becomes advanta- 220 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN geous to hundreds of millions of Chinese 300 shells a day) will make the enemy changes in America’s position. Although people who oppose imperialism, to peace- panic[ky] and restless day and night. It Dulles’s talks with reporters do not clearly loving peoples all over the world, and to all seems to me that [doing this] is a big, or at indicate [America’s new position], he ex- social classes, all social ranks, and the gov- least moderate, advantage [to us]. What is pressed ambiguously that if China commits ernments [in various countries]. They now your opinion about it? On the days of heavy to a cease-fire, America can persuade Jiang’s have to believe that America, always arro- shelling we will not fire scattered shells. On troops to withdraw from the offshore islands gant and aggressive, is no good after all. the days of light shelling we will use this [under his control]. Apparently America [The U.S. government] moved six of its method. For the sake of shelling Liaoluowan intends to carry out basically a policy to help thirteen aircraft carriers [to the Taiwan at night, [we] should accurately calibrate Jiang slip away from Jinmen. Straits]. Among these carriers, there are battery emplacements during daytime, which After Dulles made this suggestion, Jiang some big ones with the size reaching 65,000 will make the shelling at night more accu- Jieshi became very upset. Jiang knew the tons. It is said that with 120 ships, it forms rate. Please seek opinions from [the people content of Dulles’s talks in advance. Thus, the strongest fleet in the world. It does not at] the front, to see if this method is workable he gave a speech on 29 September, and matter if you want to make it even stronger. or not. another on 1 October, stating that the Ameri- It does not matter if you want to concentrate As far as the Warsaw talks are con- cans had done a disservice to him. Two days all of your four fleets here. I welcome you cerned, in the next three to four days, or one later, when he talked to British reporters all. After all, what you have is useless here. week, [we] should not lay all of our cards on from The Times [of London], Jiang asked Even though you move every ship you have the table, but should test [the Americans]. It Britain to advise America not to be fooled here, you cannot land. Ships have to be in the seems that it is unlikely for the other side to [by the communists]. This is really funny. water, and cannot come to the land. You can lay all of their cards out, and that they will Last night the Indian ambassador [to do nothing but make some threatening ges- also test us. What is your opinion, Zhou Beijing] hurriedly informed me of V. K. ture here. The more you play, the more the [Enlai], Peng [Dehuai], Zhang [Wentian],40 Krishna Menon’s plan [at the United Na- people in the world will understand how and Qiao [Guanhua]41? tions].46 Menon believes that current changes unreasonable you are. Congratulations for the success from in the situation have already become a ten- the very start. dency. Thus, he is planning to make a 7. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh, general speech at the UN meeting, including 10 September 1958 9. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 19 a suggestion that Jiang’s troops withdraw Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, September 1958 from the offshore islands and a request to us 7:413 Source: Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 353 to stop fighting against Jiang. Britain at- tempted to mediate this affair in the past, but Comrade President: Comrade [Zhou] Enlai: we refused it. Dag Hammarskjold47 of the Your letter of 8 September37 has been Your letter dated the night of the 18th UN intended to talk to us through Norway, received. Thank you. has been received. It is indeed very good.42 [but] we also turned it down. Even though I believe that (1) the Americans are [I am] very happy after reading it since [we] America was not willing to invite India [to afraid of fighting a war. As far as the current have gained the initiative. Please take due mediate] before, it had no choice but to situation is concerned, it is highly unlikely actions immediately. Please also pass your invite Menon this time. Menon was unwill- that a big war will break out; and (2) it seems letter and my reply here at once to Comrades ing to come himself, if America did not send to me that the business in your country Wang Bingnan43 and Ye Fei. Make sure that an invitation to him, or if he was unsure should go on as usual. they understand [the key to] our new policy about the situation. At the present, since and new tactics is holding the initiative, Menon feels certain about the situation be- 8. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and keeping the offensive, and remaining rea- cause America has asked for his help, he is Huang Kecheng, 13 September 195838 sonable. We must conduct our diplomatic planning to deliver this proposition. Our Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong Wengao, struggle from a far-sighted perspective so assumption is as follows: after Menon makes 7:416-417 that it will develop without any difficulty. his proposition, it will be accepted by UN members, and then by most countries in the Part One Mao Zedong world. Through this approach, the UN can Premier Zhou and Comrade Huang Kecheng: 4:00 A.M., 19 September, Hefei put pressure on Jiang Jieshi and meanwhile [I] have received [the documents] you ask us to make compromises. Thereby, sent to me, including two intelligence re- 10. Minutes, Zhou Enlai’s Conversation America can maneuver between Jiang and ports on Jinmen’s situation and the order of with S.F. Antonov44 on the Taiwan Issue, us to make a bargain. our military.39 In addition to carrying out 5 October 1958 (Excerpt)45 We calculate that America has three [the operations] in accordance with the lines Source: Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, 262- cards to play: set up by the order, it is also necessary to fire 267 First, to defend Jin[men]-Ma[zu]. some scattered shells day and night around America’s proposition on 18 September re- the clock, especially at night, shelling espe- The entire situation has already changed quested our cease-fire on Jinmen, we re- cially the area within the three-mile radius of at this point. Dulles’s press conference jected it immediately. We have been ever Liaoluowan. The sporadic shelling (200 to published on 30 September reveals some since condemning America’s occupation of COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 221

Taiwan. America now attempts to expand selves. I said to him it was better not to have is extremely beneficial [to us] that Jiang its occupation to Jinmen-Mazu, we must this kind of joint statement. If the statement stays at Jinmen and Mazu, and America oppose it firmly. America dares not engage mentioned a cease-fire, it would benefit continues to intervene. It will educate the in a war merely for the sake of Jinmen, America; we had to oppose it. If the state- people of the world, especially the Chinese because the American people and its allied ment criticized both America and China, it people. We will not let America go, when it countries oppose it. Moreover, if America would be unable to tell right from wrong, we wants to get away from Jinmen and Mazu. wants a war for Jinmen, we are prepared to had to disagree as well. A just statement We demand that America withdraw its armed fight against it. In addition, the Soviet should include the following major points: to forces form Taiwan. Under this circum- Union supports us. After our rejection, recognize firmly that Taiwan is China’s ter- stance, if we need tension, we can shell America took back its first card, that is, ritory, and that no foreign countries are al- Jinmen and Mazu; if we want relaxation, we defending Jinmen and Mazu. lowed to intervene; America should with- can stop shelling. As Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi Its second card is about “two Chinas.” draw from the Taiwan Straits; no creation of said to you, [we can] have small-, or me- America’s proposition on 30 September had “two Chinas”; China and America should dium-, or large-scale shelling of Jinmen. a central point of lining up China with the continue their talks. Obviously, some coun- We can have shelling while negotiating, and Soviet Union on the one side, and Jiang tries that follow America will not agree to we can stop shelling anytime we like. This Jieshi with the United States on the other these points. Thus, if the Asian and African is advantageous for us. So we are not going side. It puts forth a “two Chinas” scheme countries cannot issue a just statement, it is to recover these offshore islands in the near and pushes us to accept the status quo. We better for them not to issue any joint state- future. We will take back them together with firmly oppose it now, and will continue to ment. the Penghus and Taiwan later. oppose it. Moreover, this morning Comrade Chen Thus, we decided to issue a “Message to The third is to freeze the Taiwan Straits. Yi49 met diplomatic envoys from eight con- the Compatriots in Taiwan” in the name of America intends to persuade Jiang’s troops cerned Asian and African countries that have our defense minister. [It indicates that] we to withdraw from the offshore islands as an diplomatic relations with China. Regarding will suspend our shelling for seven days exchange to freeze the situation in the Tai- these countries’ discussion about issuing a from 1:00 p.m. on 6 October so as to allow wan Straits, requesting our renouncing the joint statement, he clarified the above posi- Jiang’s troops to transport their logistic sup- use of force on Taiwan, or our accepting tion of the Chinese government and made plies easily. Our suspension of bombard- America’s occupation of Taiwan as legiti- further explanations. ment, however, has a precondition that no mate and “two Chinas” as “an existing fact.” I talked to you on 30 September [about American ships provide escort. Moreover, America may not play its third card at once. our policy toward Taiwan]. Originally, our [it] suggests a direct negotiation with Jiang As soon as Dulles’s meeting with press plan had two steps: the first was to recover Jieshi searching for peaceful solutions to the caused Jiang Jieshi’s big complaints, Dulles the offshore islands; the second to liberate conflicts between both sides. Since our wrote to Jiang for explanation and comfort. Taiwan. Later, after we began shelling shelling is actually a punitive operation At the same time, Eisenhower informed the Jinmen, our bombardment played a role to against Jiang’s troops, we can slow it down Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign mobilize the people of the world, especially as long as Jiang is willing to cooperate [with Relations Committee that America could the Chinese people. Thereafter, many coun- us]. If he is not, we will continue to punish not yield to force. He, however, also said tries launched and joined a new anti-Ameri- him. Therefore, we will always be in a that if Communist China ceased fire, can movement on a much larger scale than positive position. [America] could reconsider [the situation that after the Lebanon event. The situation Our purpose in publishing this “Mes- there]. It shows that America is still waver- already becomes clear. America knows that sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan” is to ing, though it wants to get away from Jinmen- we do not want to fight a war against it. deepen the conflicts between America and Mazu. When it escorted Jiang Jieshi’s ships, we did Jiang. Jiang’s current garrison on Jinmen, According to the above calculations, I not fire [on them]. We have no intention to about 80,000 men under the command of told the Indian ambassador yesterday that liberate Taiwan immediately. We know that Chen Cheng,50 is the main strength of Jiang’s we did not want Menon to deliver his propo- America does not want to fight a war against forces. Jiang Jieshi wants to defend Jinmen sition to the UN. We cannot trade a settle- us over Jinmen either. It strictly restrained its to the last and drag America down to the ment of Jinmen-Mazu for a recognition of air and naval forces from entering our terri- water. Chen Cheng, however, wants to save America’s occupation of Taiwan as legiti- torial waters between three and twelve miles these troops. If we bottle up the troops on mate and acceptance of the existence of so- from our coast. Currently America works on Jinmen, it is easier for America to encourage called “two Chinas.” how to persuade Jiang’s troops to withdraw Chen to persuade Jiang to withdraw his Meanwhile, some Asian and African from Jinmen-Mazu to prevent its forces from troops from the offshore islands. If we let countries are suggesting that the Eight-na- being pinned down in this region. these troops stay on Jinmen, Jiang and Chen tion Committee48 can draft a statement about As I said to you on 30 September, we can use them to drive a hard bargain with the Taiwan situation. I also told the Indian realized that it was better to keep Jiang Jieshi America. In our message to the compatriots ambassador yesterday that we believed that on Jinmen-Mazu. After the Central [in Taiwan], we warn them that America the Asian and African countries could hardly Committee’s discussions, we still believe will abandon them sooner or later. There is issue such a joint statement since there ex- that it is the best to keep Jiang Jieshi on no need to fight for America’s interests isted two different positions among them- Jinmen, Mazu, and other offshore islands. It between the two Chinese sides. Although 222 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN we can possibly fight for thirty more years, 8:00 A.M., 5 October it is better [for both sides] to talk for solu- P.S.: After you have handled this letter, 14. Notation, Mao Zedong on Zhou Enlai’s tions. please convey it to the Premier.52 Report, “On the Shelling of Jinmen,” 20 To be sure, [on the one hand,] Jiang October 195857 Jieshi will likely hold a press conference [as 12. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, soon as we publish our message], accusing and Peng Dehuai, 6 October 1958 7:466 us of attempting to cast a bone between him Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, and America, saying that he will never sit 7:437 Part I down with the Chinese Communists for ne- The report is approved. gotiations, and so forth. In his mind, how- Peng [Dehuai] and Huang [Kecheng]: ever, Jiang can figure out himself that there Please pass on to Han [Xianchu] and Ye Part II is a lot behind this, and that he can make a [Fei]: It is more appropriate to start shelling one further bargain with America. This is his old Yesterday I said not to issue any public hour after, or half hour after, the reading [of trick. On the other hand, Americans will statement, and to wait and see for two days. the order] is finished.58 also criticize the Chinese Communist at- Later [I] thought about this again, and con- tempt to drive a wedge between them and sidered it more appropriate to issue a state- 15. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, Jiang. But, meanwhile, they will suspect in ment first. This is the reason for [me to Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 31 October their minds that we suddenly let up pressure write] the “Message to the Compatriots in 1958 on Jinmen, almost blockaded to the death, Taiwan.”53 This statement is about to be Source: Mao Zedong Wengao, 7:479 because there might be a tacit agreement issued, please instruct the Fujian Front radio between us and Jiang. The louder Jiang station to broadcast it repeatedly. Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and yells, the more suspicious the Americans [Huang] Kecheng: will become. Mao Zedong [We] should extend the areas where no Therefore, we cause a new dilemma for 2:00 A.M., 6 October shelling is allowed on even-numbered days. America, and it does not know how to cope Send this to [Huang] Kecheng for handling That means shelling will be prohibited on with it. America is facing a very difficult immediately.54 even days on all fronts. Allow Jiang’s troops situation right now. It originally planned to to come outdoors and get some sunshine so persuade Jiang’s troops to withdraw [from 13. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, that they can continue to stay there. Only fire Jinmen]. If it again suggests withdrawal, 11 October 1958 a few shells on odd days. Instruct the Fujian Jiang Jieshi will say that America abandons Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, [front] by internal channels to carry it out. him. If America stops persuading Jiang to 7:449-450 Do not issue public statement at this point. If withdraw, we will achieve our goal. there is a need later, [we] will consider Comrade [Zhou] Enlai: making an announcement then. Please dis- 11. Letter, Mao Zedong to Huang Kecheng No hurry to reply to the letters from the cuss and decide on this matter. and Peng Dehuai, 5 October 1958 Soviets.55 Need to discuss them first. I am leaving for a southern trip this Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, Cao Juren56 has arrived. Ignore him for afternoon. 7:437 a few days, do not talk to him too soon. [I] will think about whether I need to meet him Mao Zedong Comrades [Peng] Dehuai and [Huang] or not. 2:00 A.M., 31 October Kecheng: Tell [Huang] Kecheng to double-check Our batteries should not fire a single accurate numbers of how many enemy air- 16. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, shell on 6 and 7 October, even if there are planes we shot down, and how many of our Chen Yi, Huang Kecheng, 2 November American airplanes and ships escorts. If the planes were shot down in more than fifty 1958 enemy bombs us, our forces should still not days of air engagements since the Shantou Source: Jiangguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, return fire. [We should] cease our activities, air battle on 19 August. Prepare the statistics 7:490 lie low, and wait and see for two days. Then, for the Soviets’ information. They believed we will know what to do. Although the air the enemy’s false information and do not Comrades [Zhou] Enlai, Chen Yi, and force must carry on our defense, the air- know the true story. [The Soviets] should [Huang] Kecheng: planes should not fly off the coast. One more sell ground-to-air missiles to us, and let us Suggest having a heavy all day shelling thing: do not issue any public statement control the employment of them. The Sovi- tomorrow (the 3rd, an odd day). Fire at least during these two days because we need to ets may send a few people to teach us how to 10,000 shells and bomb all the military tar- wait and see clearly how the situation will use them. I intend to adopt this policy. [We gets [on Jinmen] in order to affect America’s develop. Please carry out the above order can] discuss and decide whether it is appro- election, promoting the Democrats’ victory immediately. Or [you can] pass this letter priate tonight or tomorrow night. and the Republicans’ defeat. Meanwhile, [as an order] to Ye Fei and Han Xianchu.51 give Jiang’s troops an excuse for refusing to Mao Zedong withdraw [from Jinmen]. Please consider Mao Zedong 10:00 A.M., 11 October and decide if this is proper. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 223

13. Zhongnanhai is the compound where top Chinese leaders live and work, and Fengzeyuan was Mao Mao Zedong 1. Wu Lengxi, a member of the CCP Central Committee, Zedong’s residence in the 1950s. served as director of Xinhua (New China) News Agency 5:00 A.M., 2 November in Zhengzhou 14. The Juixiang Study was the location of Mao’s office and editor-in-chief of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) in in Zhongnanhai. 1958. 15. General Zhang Zhizhong, who had been Jiang 17. Letter, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, 2 2. Beidaihe is a beach area located at the border of Hebei Jieshi’s subordinate, shifted to the Communist side in November 1958 and Liaoning provinces, where Chinese leaders regu- 1949 and was then vice chairman of China’s national larly take vacations and hold meetings during summer. defense commission. 3. Hu Qiaomu, a CCP theorist, was Mao Zedong’s Part One59 16. For the transcript of Dulles’s answers, see The New political secretary and a member of the CCP Central York Times, 1 October 1958, 8. Attention, Military and Civilian Compatri- Committee. 17. Hu Shi (1891-1962), a prominent Chinese scholar ots on the Jinmen Islands: 4. This refers to the Communist takeover in China in and Chinese ambassador to the United States during the 1949. Tomorrow, 3 November, is an odd- Second World War, had a pro-American reputation. He 5. In late 1957, the Beijing leadership began to plan to numbered day. You must make sure not to then served as president of the Central Academy deploy air force units in the Fujian area, so that the [Academia Sinica] in Taipei. come outside. Do be careful! Guomindang air force would no longer be able to 18. Sun Liren, a graduate of Virginia Military Institute, control the air (for more information on this matter, see commanded the Taiwan garrison in 1949, when the document 1). On 18 July 1958, the CCP Central Military Part Two Guomindang government moved from mainland China Commission held an urgent meeting attended by heads Deliver to Premier Zhou. to Taiwan. In 1955, Jiang dismissed Sun and placed him of the PLA’s different arms and branches. Peng Dehuai, under house arrest. The Xiamen Front must broadcast [the the defense minister, conveyed to the meeting Mao 19. This is also known as the “May 24th Incident.” On message] this afternoon (2 November) for Zedong’s instructions: Under the circumstances that 20 March 1957, an American army sergeant, Robert R. America and Britain continued to dispatch troops to the three times. Reynolds, shot a Chinese, Liu Zhiran, in Taipei’s Ameri- Middle East, the Guomindang planned a diversion by can military residence area. On 23 May 1957, an Ameri- causing a tense situation in the Taiwan Straits. In order can court-martial found Reynolds not guilty. The next 18. Comments, Mao Zedong, on “Huan to provide effective support to the anti-imperialist day, a riot involving tens of thousands protesters erupted Xiang on the Division within the Western struggle by the people in the Middle East, it was neces- in Taipei, with the American Embassy and other Ameri- 60 sary for China to take action. First, air force units should World,” 25 November 1958 can agencies as the target. Guomindang authorities be deployed in Fujian. Second, Jinmen islands should be Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, announced martial law in Taipei on the same evening to shelled. The air force units must enter the air bases in control the situation. 7:581-582 Fujian and eastern Guangdong by July 27. The next day, 20. Tian Jiaying (1922-1966) was Mao Zedong’s secre- the Air Force Headquarters issued the operation order. tary from October 1948 to May 1966, when he commit- After extensive preparations, on July 27, 48 MiG-17 Part I ted suicide. planes finally took position in the two air bases located Huan Xiang’s viewpoint is right. The 21. This is a collection of bizarre stories by Pu Songling respectively at Liancheng, Fujian province, and Shantou, written during Qing times. situation in the Western world is indeed Guangdong province. (See Wang Dinglie et al., Dongdai 22. Mao Zedong wrote his remarks on the 9 December disintegrating. Even though currently it is zhongguo kongjun [Contemporary Chinese Air Force] 1957 report of Chen Geng, the PLA’s deputy chief of (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 334- in the middle of a gradual disunification and staff, to Peng Dehuai. Chen Geng’s report stated: “This 336.) not yet breaking into pieces, the West is year, planes from Taiwan have frequently invaded [the 6. Liu Shaoqi, vice chairman of the CCP Central Com- air space] of important coastal cities and the inner land moving toward its inevitable final disinte- mittee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the of the mainland, dropping large numbers of reactionary gration. It will probably take a long time, People’s National Congress, was China’s second most leaflets and ‘condolence gifts,’ creating a very bad important leader; Zhou Enlai was vice chairman of the not overnight nor a single day, for this impression on the masses. Because some leading mem- CCP Central Committee and China’s premier; Deng process. The so-called united West is purely bers of our army failed to take anti-aircraft operations Xiaoping was the CCP’s general secretary seriously and their superiors failed to supervise them empty talk. There may be a kind of unity 7. Wang Shangrong headed the operations department closely, [we have been] unable to shoot down any of the that Dulles is struggling for. But [he] wants of the PLA General Staff; Ye Fei was political commis- invading planes [dispatched by] Jiang [Jieshi]. In order sar of the Fuzhou Military District. [the West] to “unite” under the control of to improve quickly this situation, we have arranged for 8. Cangao ziliao [Restricted Reference Material], an America, and asks all his partners and pup- the air force and all military regions to take every internal publication circulated among high ranking Chi- positive and effective step necessary to attack the Jiang pets to get close to America in front of its nese Communist officials, published Chinese transla- planes that are invading the mainland, trying our best to atomic bombs, paying their tributes and tions of news reports and commentaries from foreign shoot them down.” (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji, news agencies, newspapers, and journals in a timely kowtowing and bowing as America’s sub- 6:372.) Chinese air force units finally took position in fashion. jects. This is America’s so-called unity. Fujian on 27 July 1958. See note 5. 9. On 23 April 1955, Zhou Enlai stated at the Bandung 23. Mao Zedong composed this letter on the eve of the The current situation must move toward the Conference that China was willing to hold talks with the deadline previously established by the CCP leadership so-called unity’s opposite—disunity. Com- United States to discuss all questions between the two to shell Jinmen. On 15 July 1958, the Eisenhower countries. On 13 July 1955, through Britain, the U.S. rades, please take a look at today’s world administration dispatched 5,000 American marines to government proposed holding bilateral meetings at and ask which side has the real control. land in Lebanon. On July 17, the Beijing leadership Geneva, Switzerland. The Chinese-American ambassa- made the decision to bombard Jinmen, and China’s dorial talks began on 1 August 1955 at Geneva and defense minister, Peng Dehuai, conveyed the decision Mao Zedong lasted until December 1957. In September 1958, during to the General Staff. On the evening of July 18, Mao the Taiwan crisis, the Chinese-American ambassadorial Part II Zedong spoke at a decision-making meeting attended talks resumed in Warsaw, Poland. Comrade [Deng] Xiaoping: by vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission 10. On 4 September 1958, Premier Zhou Enlai formally and leading officers of the air force and navy, emphasiz- Please print and distribute this report. announced a twelve-mile zone off the Chinese coast as ing that the Arab people’s anti-imperialist struggle China’s territorial waters. needed more than moral support and China would take 11. For the minutes of these two talks, see documents 5 Mao Zedong real action. He stated that since Jinmen and Mazu were and 6. 10:00 A.M., 25 November China’s territory and the shelling of Nationalist troops 12. See note 9. there was China’s internal affair, it would be difficult 224 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN for the enemy to use this as an excuse [to attack 31. Gamal Abdul Nasser (1918-1970) was Egypt’s 44. S. F. Antonov was Soviet chargé d’affaires to mainland China) while at the same time it would play president from 1956 to 1970. China. the role in checking American actions in the Middle 32. The “Rightists” referred to by Mao were intellectu- 45. The Taiwan crisis presented a major test to the East. He believed that the shelling should last for two to als who had been criticized and purged during the alliance between Beijing and Moscow. From 31 July to three months. After the meeting, Peng Dehuai chaired “Anti-Rightist” campaign in 1957. 3 August 1958, Nikita Khrushchev visited Beijing, a Central Military Commission meeting, which sched- 33. He Yingqin (Ho Yingching, 1890-1987) was a high holding extensive discussions with Mao Zedong and uled the bombardment of Jinmen to begin on July 25. ranking Nationalist officer. During China’s War of other CCP leaders. Mao and his comrades, however, During the evening of July 25, the CMC ordered the Resistance against Japan (1937-1945), he served as did not inform the Soviet leader of their plans to artillery units concentrated on the Fujian Front to “pre- chief of the general staff and headed the Military- bombard Jinmen. On September 6, at the peak of the pare for an operational order at any moment.” At this Political Department of the Military Commission of the Taiwan crisis, the Soviet leadership sent Andrei juncture, Mao Zedong wrote this letter. Nationalist Government. Gromyko to visit Beijing, and Beijing’s leaders told the 24. After receiving this letter, Peng Dehuai ordered the 34. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was India’s premier Soviets that they had no intention to provoke a direct artillery units on the Fujian Front to postpone the from 1947 to 1964. confrontation between China and the United States, let bombardment and focus on making further prepara- 35. Admiral Roland Smoot was head of the Taiwan alone one between the Soviet Union and the United tions for the shelling. Defense Command. States. From then on, Beijing kept Moscow relatively 25. After three weeks of “waiting and seeing,” Mao 36. In China, besides the Chinese Communist Party, well informed of its handling of the Taiwan crisis. Zedong finally made up his mind to shell Jinmen. This eight “democratic parties” existed, all claiming to fol- 46. V. K. Krishna Menon (1896-1974) headed the letter demonstrates some of his concerns on the eve of low the CCP’s leadership. Indian delegation to UN from 1953 to 1962. the shelling. On August 20, Mao Zedong decided to 37. On 8 September 1958, Ho Chi Minh, president of 47 Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961), a Swedish diplo- order the artillery forces concentrated on the Fujian the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), mat, was the general secretary of the UN from 1953 to Front to begin a sudden and heavy bombardment of telegraphed to Mao Zedong: “Considering the tense 1961. Guomindang troops on Jinmen (but not those on Mazu) situation in Taiwan and the stubborn attitude of the U.S. 48. The Eight-nation Committee refers to a group to isolate them. He suggested that after a period of imperialists, could you please tell us: (A) Is it possible established by Asian and African countries at the UN to shelling, the other side might withdraw from Jinmen for a war to break out between China and the United draft a statement on the Taiwan crisis. The eight nations and Mazu. If this happened, it would be decided at that States? (B) What preparations should we make here in included Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, time if the shelling should be followed by landing Vietnam?” (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, Japan, and the Philippines. operations in accordance with the actual situation. On 7:413-414.) 49. Chen Yi (1901-1972), a member of the CCP Polit- August 21, the Central Military Commission issued the 38. Starting on September 7, American naval ships buro, was China’s vice premier and foreign minister. order to shell Jinmen on August 23. The order particu- began escorting Guomindang transport vessels deliver- 50. Chen Cheng (1898-1965) then served as vice presi- larly emphasized that the shelling should focus on the ing supplies to Jinmen. The Beijing leadership adjusted dent and prime minister in Taiwan. enemy’s headquarters, artillery emplacements, radar its strategies toward shelling Jinmen accordingly. This 51. Han Xianchu then served as commander of the facilities, and vessels in the Liaoluowan harbor. It also becomes the background of this letter and the CMC’s PLA’s Fuzhou Military District. made it clear that the initial shelling would last for three order cited in the next note. 52. The italics are Mao’s. days, and then the shelling would stop, so that the next 39. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission’s 53. The “Message to the Compatriots in Taiwan” was action could be taken in accordance with the responses order, “On the Shelling of Jinmen,” issued at 11:15 broadcast on the morning of 6 October and published in of the Taiwan authorities. (See Han Huaizhi et al., a.m., 11 September 1958, which read: “(1) If the all major newspapers in mainland China the same day. Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The American ships continue their escort today and anchor The message announced that the PLA would stop Military Affairs of Contemporary Chinese Army] three miles outside of Liaoluowan, our batteries should shelling Jinmen for seven days to allow Nationalist (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 2:394.) shell Jiang’s transport ships entering the Liaoluowan troops to receive supplies. 26. The italics are Mao’s. harbor to unload and the people working there. The 54. The italics are Mao’s. 27. After ten days of heavy shelling on Jinmen, Chinese ships not entering the harbor, be they America’s or 55. On 27 September and 4 October 1958, Nikita military planners believed that they had succeeded in Jiang’s, should not be shelled. In terms of the standard Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, twice telegraphed to cutting off Nationalist troops on the island from their for firing artillery shells, it should be set at the level Mao Zedong to inquire about Beijing’s intentions on supplies. In the meantime, Guomindang authorities needed to sink or to expel Jiang’s transport ships, while handling the Jinmen crisis. He also inquired about the repeatedly requested American assistance to support at the same time damaging the enemy positions on reliability of Beijing’s statistics on the results of air their forces on Jinmen. Under these circumstances, ground to a certain degree. (2) Our air force and anti- battles with Guomindang air force, offering to provide Mao Zedong decided on the evening of September 3 to aircraft artillery units must be well prepared to deal with China with ground-to-air missiles. stop shelling Jinmen for three days, allowing Beijing to the air raids by Jiang’s planes. The air force and anti- 56. Cao Juren, a Hong Kong-based reporter, had exten- observe the responses of the other side. aircraft units should well coordinate their operations. If sive contacts with the Guomindang. In July 1956, he 28. This refers to the CCP Central Military Commission’s enemy planes attack our positions, our fighters may visited Beijing with a commercial delegation from “Instruction on the Military Struggle against Taiwan operate in the airspace over Jinmen so as to better Singapore. On July 17, Zhou Enlai met with him, and the Offshore Islands under Jiang’s Occupation.” handle opportunities. But our bombers should not be mentioning that since the CCP and the GMD had The instruction emphasized that “because the struggle sent out today. (3) In accordance with the above cooperated twice in the past, it was certainly feasible for against Taiwan and the offshore islands under Jiang’s principles, you may make your own decisions on spe- the two parties to cooperate for a third time to bring occupation is a complicated international struggle, which cific problems such as the timing of the shelling. If the about Taiwan’s “peaceful liberation.” After returning has huge influence in various aspects, all operations and situation changes, [you] must report immediately so to Hong Kong, Cao published his interview with Zhou propaganda should follow the principles of concentra- that [we] can report it to the Central Committee to make Enlai. During the Taiwan crisis of 1958, Cao again tion and unity, and no one should be allowed to act on new decisions.” (Source: Mao Zedong junshi wenji, visited Beijing, serving as a conduit for messages his own.” (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 6:380.) between Beijing and Taipei. It is important that Mao 7:376-377) 40. Zhang Wentian, an alternate member of the CCP mentioned Cao’s name on the eve of the second “Mes- 29. Lu Dingyi, an alternate member of the CCP Polit- Politburo, was China’s first vice foreign minister. sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan,” announcing that buro, headed the CCP’s Central Propaganda Depart- 41. Qiao Guanhua was then an assistant to the foreign the PLA would stopping shelling Jinmen for another ment. minister; he later served as China’s foreign minister in two weeks, issued during the evening of October 12. 30. The Baghdad Pact Organization (CENTO), estab- the mid-1970s. 57. At 12:30 p.m., 20 October 1958, Zhou Enlai sent the lished in 1955, included Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, 42. Zhou Enlai summarized the Chinese-American following report to Mao Zedong: “The broadcasts to and Turkey. The United States was related to the ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on September 15 in warn America against using its escort vessels in the organization as an “observer.” The Manila Treaty Or- this letter, concluding that China had gained the initia- waters around Jinmen began at 12:30 p.m. today. The ganization, established in 1955 by Australia, Britain, tive at the meeting. broadcast was repeated twice in both Chinese and New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and 43. Wang Bingnan, Chinese ambassador to Poland, was English. The texts are attached to this report. The draft the United States, is better known as the Southeast Asia then engaged in the ambassadorial talks with the Ameri- of the Defense Ministry’s order has been completed. It Treaty Organization (SEATO). cans in Warsaw. is also enclosed here for your consideration. Please COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 225 return it to me right after you have read and approved KHRUSHCHEV’S NUCLEAR PROMISE year later, in the autumn of 1959. it. Then the typewritten draft of it will be sent to Comrades Deng [Xiaoping], Chen [Yi], and Huang continued from page 219 ********* [Kecheng] for their reading and checking. Everything Chinese leadership developing their own is ready on the Xiamen front. Our order [for the shelling] has already been issued [to the front] sepa- school of brinkmanship that threatened to From the CC CPSU’s letter to the rately by telephone and in writing which was signed by draw the USSR into a conflict with the United Central Committee of the CPC About [Huang] Kecheng. The order limits shelling to fortifi- States. Yet, there is no reason to believe that the USSR’s Readiness to Provide cations, defense works, and beachhead boats on the Khrushchev, the real authority behind the Jinmen islands. No shelling of civilian villages, garri- Assistance to the PRC in the Event of son camps, and command headquarters is allowed, Soviet letter, was dismayed by the Chinese an Attack on It From the Side of the particularly no shelling of any American ships. Our air position (though he may well have been USA or Japan, 27 September 1958 and naval forces will make no movement at this time. miffed that Mao failed to tip him off during The Defense Ministry’s order will be broadcast at 3:00 his summit in Beijing only a few weeks [p.m.] in Chinese and foreign languages at the same ... Comrade Gromyko informed us about time. As soon as the reading of the order is finished, before the PRC opened the crisis by shelling his conversation with Comrade Zhou Enlai [our batteries] will open fire.” (Source: Jiangguo yilai the offshore islands on August 23). which took place in Peking on 7 September. Mao Zedong wengao, 7:466-467.) Khrushchev, it appears, actually supported Comrade Zhou Enlai said that in the consid- 58. The italics are Mao’s. nuclear brinkmanship as a means of achiev- 59. Mao Zedong drafted this message for broadcast. eration of the situation in the Taiwan region 60. Huan Xiang was Chinese chargé d’affaires in ing China’s reunification, provided that the the Politburo of the Central Committee of Britain. On 18 November 1958, he wrote a report to the policy was fully coordinated with the Krem- the Communist Party of China proceeded Chinese foreign ministry. Mao Zedong entitled the 5 lin. He therefore took the Chinese position, from the fact that should the USA start a war report “Huang Xiang on the Division within the West- reported to him in an urgent cable from ern World.” The main points of the report were as against the People’s Republic of China and follows: The two-year long British-French negotiation Gromyko, as an indication that the Chinese in this event uses tactical nuclear weapons, to establish a free trade zone in Western Europe had leaders had begun to put their national inter- then the Soviet Union will make a stern recently failed, and a trade war between imperialist ests above the common interests of the “en- warning to the USA but will not take part in countries had started. The British plans to divide West tire Socialist camp.” This effective unilat- Germany and France, neutralize Belgium and Holland, the war. Only in the event that the United and sabotage the European Common Market had failed. eral Chinese revision of the Treaty signified States uses large yield nuclear weapons, and In an economic sense, this was not a big failure for an implicit challenge to the unity of the in this way risks widening the war, will the Britain. In a diplomatic sense, however, this was the communist bloc under Kremlin leadership— Soviet Union make a retaliatory strike with first serious failure Britain had suffered in its diplo- and was therefore anathema to Soviet leaders macy toward West Europe. Now Britain faced two nuclear weapons. important choices: it could take retaliatory measures on both political and ideological grounds. We carefully considered this issue and and thus destroy the political and economic coopera- Hence the letter decries the peril of disunity decided to express to you our opinion... We tions between European countries, or it could return to in the strongest terms possible: “...a crime cannot allow the illusion to be created among negotiations, searching for the basis of a temporary before the world working class ... a retreat compromise. It seemed that only one choice was fea- our enemies that if an attack will be launched sible for Britain, that is, to make a continuous effort to from the holy of holies of the Communists— against the PRC by the USA or Japan—and find ways to compromise with France and Germany, from the teaching of Marxism-Leninism.” these are the most likely adversaries,—or by and to seek the support of the United States. This failure Khrushchev evidently dictated his letter any other state, that the Soviet Union will on the part of Britain reflected the fact that Britain’s to Eisenhower immediately after he received position as the “second power” in the capitalist world stand on the sidelines as a passive observer. had been weakened further, and that the postwar Brit- the warning from Gromyko. It took him 20 Should the adversary even presume this, ish hegemony in Western Europe had been thoroughly more days to address the Chinese leadership a very dangerous situation would be created. shaken. The balance of power in continental Western through party channels. It is still unclear It would be a great calamity for the entire Europe now tilted toward France and West Germany, what happened inside the Kremlin in the and against Britain. As far as the triangular relations Socialist camp, for the Communist working between Britain, France, and Germany were concerned, interim. In effect, in turn, Mao took about the class movement, if, when atomic bombs it seemed that Britain would continue to attempt to take same time to respond to the CC CPSU’s have begun to fall on the Chinese People’s advantage of French-West German contradictions in letter. In a personal letter to Khrushchev, he Republic and China has begun to pay with order to divide the two countries, making them check thanked him “heartily” for his stand and each other. This balance of power policy would cer- the life of its sons and daughters, the Soviet tainly last a long time. The balance of power among wrote that the Chinese leadership had been Union, possessing terrible weapons which imperialist countries in West Europe was changing, “deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to could not only stop but could also devastate and the contradictions between the imperialists over the principles of Marxism-Leninism and in- our common enemy, would allow itself not West European problems had never been so sharp. ternationalism.”6 (Source: Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao, 7:582- to come to your assistance. This would be a 5823.) In sum, this episode testifies to the am- crime before the world working class, it biguous nature of the Soviet-Chinese rela- would be a retreat from the holy of holies of tionship: for the majority of the leadership on the Communists—from the teaching of Li Xiaobing is Assistant Professor of History, both sides, it continued the grim comedy of Marxism-Leninism. University of Central Oklahoma; Chen Jian is misunderstandings; only Khrushchev began Thank you for your nobility, that you Associate Professor of History, Southern Illinois to suspect what was occurring in faraway University at Carbondale, and author of China’s are ready to absorb a strike, not involving the Beijing. Behind the facade of proletarian Soviet Union. However, we believe, and are Road to the Korean War: The Making of the internationalism the Sino-Soviet rift was Sino-Soviet Confrontation (New York: Colum- convinced, that you also agree that the main deepening and would erupt in earnest only a bia University Press, 1994); David L. Wilson is thing now consists of the fact that everyone Associate Professor of History, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale. 226 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN has seen—both our friends and, especially, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 129- our enemies—that we are firm and united in 142; Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul- ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958 our understanding of the tasks, which flow (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 225-267; from Marxist-Leninist teaching, to defend Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: the camp of Socialism, that the unity of all Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1959 (Kent, brother Communist parties is unshakeable, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994), 178-207; and documents translated, annotated, and introduced by that we will visit a joint, decisive rebuff to Xiao-bing Li, Chen Jian, and David Wilson printed in the aggressor in the event of an attack on any this issue of the Cold War International History Project Socialist state. This is necessary so that no Bulletin. hopes will arise in our enemies that they will 2. Khrushchev Remembers, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1970), 469-470; Khrushchev be able to separate us, so that no cracks will Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, ed. Jerrold L. Schecter be created which the enemy could be able to with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, use to break the connection between the and Co., 1990), 147-150; “Memuari Nikiti Sergeevicha Socialist countries. Khrushcheva,” Voprosi istorii [Questions of History] 2 (1993), 90-91; Andrei A. Gromyko, Memoirs (New ...It is necessary that neither our friends York: Knopf, 1989), 251-252; see also Philip Taubman, nor our enemies have any doubts that an “Gromyko Says Mao Wanted Soviet A-Bomb Used on attack on the Chinese People’s Republic is a G.I.’s,” New York Times, 22 February 1988, 1, 6-7. war with the entire Socialist camp. For 3. Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul- ture, 255; Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the ourselves we can say that an attack on China Eagle, 198. is an attack on the Soviet Union. We are also 4. Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assis- convinced that in the event of an attack on tance Between the People’s Republic of China and the the Soviet Union the Chinese People’s Re- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 14 February 1950, reprinted in English translation as an appendix to Sergei public would fulfill its brotherly revolution- N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, Uncer- ary duty. If we in this way will build our tain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War policy on the bases of Marxism-Leninism, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 260. depending on the unity of our goals, on the 5. Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: Soviet Leaders from Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- might of our states, on our joint efforts, the versity Press, forthcoming, March 1996), 226-227. uniting of which is favored by the geo- 6. “We are deeply moved by your boundless loyalty to graphical disposition of our countries, then the principles of Marxism-Leninism and international- this will be an invincible shield against our ism. In the name of all my comrades-members of the Communist Party of China, I express to you my heart- enemies.... felt gratitude.” Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949- 1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Documents [Source: Information and Documentation and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) (Moscow: Ministry Administration, First Far Eastern Depart- of Foreign Affairs, 1985; internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33. ment, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sbornik dokumentov SSSR-KNR (1949- 1983) [USSR-PRC Relations (1949-83)], Vladislav M. Zubok, a scholar based at the Documents and Materials, Part I (1949-1963) National Security Archive, contributes fre- (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985; quently to the Bulletin. His book, Inside the internal use only, copy no. 148), 231-33. Kremlin’s Cold War: Soviet Leaders from The letter appears in a formerly classified Stalin to Khrushchev, co-authored with Soviet Foreign Ministry documentary col- Constantine Pleshakov, will be published in lection on the history of Sino-Soviet rela- March 1996 by Harvard University Press. tions, originally prepared, for internal use only, by an editorial collegium consisting of Kapitsa, M.S. (Chairman); Meliksetov, A.V.; Rogachev, I.A.; and Sevostianov, P.P. (Deputy Chairman). During his research in the Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, Vladislav M. Zubok, a senior researcher at the National Security Archive, took notes from the collection, and provided them to CWIHP; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff, National Security Archive.]

1. See Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 227

MAO ZEDONG AND DULLES’S the expense of individuals. Despite these taking effect in the Soviet Union, given “PEACEFUL EVOLUTION” drawbacks, Bo’s memoirs contain many valu- Khrushchev’s fascination with peaceful co- STRATEGY: REVELATIONS FROM able new facts, anecdotes, and insights. Es- existence with the capitalist West. Mao BO YIBO’S MEMOIRS pecially notable are Bo’s references to Mao’s wanted to prevent that from happening in statements unavailable elsewhere. Since Bo China. Here lie the roots of China’s subse- Introduction, translation, and played a major role in Chinese economic quent exchange of polemics with the Soviet annotation by Qiang Zhai decision-making during the period, his mem- Union and Mao’s decision to restructure the oirs are especially strong on this topic. He Chinese state and society in order to prevent sheds new light on such domestic events as a revisionist “change of color” of China, Born in 1905, Bo Yibo joined the Chi- the Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns, culminating in the launching of the Cultural nese Communist Party (CCP) in 1925. the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi Affair, the Anti- Revolution in 1966. Mao’s frantic response During the Anti-Japanese War, he was a Rightist Campaign, the Criticism of Opposi- to Dulles’s speeches constitutes a clear case leading member of the CCP-led resistance tion to Rush Advance, the Great Leap For- of how international events contributed to force in Shanxi Province. In 1945, he was ward, the Lushan Conference of 1959, eco- China’s domestic developments. It also elected a member of the CCP Central Com- nomic rectification in 1961-1962, and the demonstrates the effects of Dulles’s strat- mittee at the Party’s Seventh Congress. Socialist Education Campaign. Although egy of driving a wedge between China and During the Chinese Civil War in 1946- international relations in general does not the Soviet Union. 1949, he was First Secretary of the CCP receive much attention, the volumes do in- North China Bureau and Vice Chairman of clude illuminating chapters on some key * * * * * the CCP-led North China People’s Govern- foreign policy decisions.2 ment. After the establishment of the People’s The translation below is taken from To Prevent “Peaceful Evolution” and Republic of China (PRC) in October 1949, Chapter 39 of the second volume (pp. 1138- Train Successors to the Revolutionary he became Finance Minister. As a revolu- 1146). This section is very revealing about Cause tionary veteran who survived the Cultural Mao’s perception of and reaction to John Revolution, Bo Yibo is considered one of Foster Dulles’s policy toward China in 1958- by Bo Yibo the most powerful figures in China today. 1959. The CCP leader took seriously state- Between 1991 and 1993, Bo published ments by the U.S. Secretary of State about According to the general law of social- two volumes of his memoirs, Ruogan encouraging a peaceful change of the Com- ist revolution, only through the leadership of zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recol- munist system. In November 1959, accord- a proletarian political party directed by Marx- lections of Certain Major Decisions and ing to Bo, Lin Ke, Mao’s secretary, prepared ism, reliance on the working class and other Events] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang for Mao translations of three speeches by laboring masses, and waging of an armed dangxiao chubanshe, 1991, 1993). The first Dulles concerning the promotion of peaceful struggle in this or that form can a revolution volume covers the period 1949-1956 and evolution within the Communist world. Af- obtain state power. International hostile the second volume 1957-1966. In the pref- ter reading the documents, Mao commented forces to the newly born people’s govern- ace and postscript of his volumes, Bo notes on them before having them circulated among ment would always attempt to strangle it in that in preparing his memoirs he has con- a small group of Party leaders for discussion. the cradle through armed aggression, inter- sulted documents in the CCP Central Ar- Thus Bo’s memoirs not only provide fresh vention, and economic blockade. After the chives and received the cooperation of Party texts of what Mao said, but also an important victory of the October Revolution, the So- history researchers. Bo’s reminiscences window into what he read. As a result, the viet Union experienced an armed interven- represent the most important memoirs of a interactive nature of Mao’s activities—with tion by fourteen countries. In the wake of high-ranking CCP leader for the 1949-1966 his top colleagues and his secretary—is open World War II, imperialism launched a pro- period. to examination. A sense of the policy-mak- tracted “Cold War” and economic contain- As a still active senior leader, Bo is not ing process, as well as Mao’s opinions, ment of socialist countries. Immediately a disinterested writer. His arguments and emerges from Bo’s memoirs. after the triumph of the revolution in China conclusions are completely in line with the The years 1958-1959 were a crucial and the Democratic People’s Republic of 1981 Resolution on Party History.1 Mem- period in Mao’s psychological evolution. Korea, U.S. imperialists invaded Korea, oirs in China usually have a didactic pur- He began to show increasing concern with blockaded the Taiwan Strait, and imple- pose that encourages the creation of edify- the problem of succession and worried about mented an all-out embargo against China. ing stereotypes. Bo’s memoirs conform to his impending death. He feared that the All of this shows that it will take a sharp a tradition in the writing of memoirs in the political system that he had spent his life struggle with external hostile forces through PRC: didacticism. Arranged topically, Bo’s creating would betray his beliefs and values an armed conflict or other forms of contest memoirs are dry and wooden. There is little and slip out of his control. His apprehension before a newly born socialist country can description of the character and personali- about the future development of China was consolidate its power. ties of his colleagues. In this respect, Bo’s closely related to his analysis of the degen- History suggests that although the armed volumes follow another memoirs-writing eration of the Soviet system. Mao believed aggression, intervention, and economic tradition in the PRC, which tends to empha- that Dulles’s idea of inducing peaceful evo- blockade launched by Western imperialists size the role of groups and societal forces at lution within the socialist world was already against socialist countries can create enor- 228 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN mous problems for socialist countries, they a joint fleet with China in order to control In 1959, Sino-Soviet relations were even have great difficulty in realizing their goal of China militarily; he also openly opposed our more strained and Sino-Soviet differences overthrowing socialist states. Therefore, Party’s “Three Red Flags”4 and objected to even greater. In January, the Soviet Union imperialist countries are inclined to adopt a our just action of “shelling Jinmen5.” (Chair- officially notified China that it would scrap “soft” method in addition to employing man Mao once said that whether we bom- unilaterally the agreement to help China “hard” policies. In January 1953, U.S. Sec- barded Jinmen or suspended our bombard- build nuclear industry and produce nuclear retary of States Dulles emphasized the strat- ment, our main purpose was to support the bombs. In September when the Sino-Indian egy of “peaceful evolution.” He pointed out Taiwan people and the Taiwan regime to Border Incident occurred, the Soviet Union that “the enslaved people” of socialist coun- keep Taiwan [from being] invaded and an- announced neutrality, but in actuality it sup- tries should be “liberated,” and become “free nexed by foreign countries.—Bo’s note). ported India. It openly criticized China after people,” and that “liberation can be achieved The above events alerted Chairman Mao. the incident. At the Soviet-American Camp through means other than war,” and “the In the meantime, the United States ac- David Talks during the same month, means ought to be and can be peaceful.” He tively practiced its strategy of promoting a Khrushchev sought to improve relations with displayed satisfaction with the “liberaliza- “peaceful evolution” of socialist countries. the United States on the one hand and vehe- tion-demanding forces” which had emerged In 1957, the Eisenhower administration in- mently attacked China’s domestic and for- in some socialist countries and placed his troduced the “strategy of peaceful conquest,” eign policies on the other.8 All these events hope on the third and fourth generations aiming to facilitate “changes inside the So- convinced Chairman Mao that the Soviet within socialist countries, contending that if viet world,” through a “peaceful evolution.” leadership had degenerated and that the leader of a socialist regime “continues On October 24, 1958, in an interview with a Khrushchev had betrayed Marxism and the wanting to have children and these children BBC correspondent, Dulles asserted that proletarian revolutionary cause and had will produce their children, then the leader’s communism “will gradually give way to a turned revisionist. At the Lushan Confer- offsprings will obtain freedom.” He also system that pays more attention to the wel- ence held during July-August that year, when claimed that “Chinese communism is in fare of the state and people,” and that at the Peng Dehuai9 criticized the “Three Red fatal danger,” and “represents a fading phe- moment, “Russian and Chinese Commu- Flags,” Chairman Mao erroneously believed nomena,” and that the obligation of the United nists are not working for the welfare of their that this reflected the combined attack on the States and its allies was “to make every people,” and “this kind of communism will Party by internal and external enemies. Fac- effort to facilitate the disappearance of that change.” ing such a complex situation, Chairman Mao phenomena,” and “to bring about freedom in Considering the situation in both the felt deeply the danger of a “peaceful evolu- all of China by all peaceful means.”3 Soviet Union and at home, Chairman Mao tion.” Accordingly, he unequivocally raised Chairman Mao paid full attention to took very seriously Dulles’s remarks. In a the issue at the end of that year. these statements by Dulles and watched care- speech to the directors of the cooperation In November 1959, Chairman Mao con- fully the changes in strategies and tactics regions6 on November 30, 1958, Chairman vened a small-scale meeting in Hangzhou used by imperialists against socialist coun- Mao noted that Dulles was a man of schemes attended by Premier Zhou [Enlai], Peng tries. That was the time when the War to Aid and that he controlled the helm in the United Zhen,10 Wang Jiaxiang,11 Hu Qiaomu,12 Korea and Resist America had just achieved States. Dulles was very thoughtful. One had among others, to discuss and examine the victory, when the United States was con- to read his speeches word by word with the international situation at the time. Before the tinuing its blockade of the Taiwan Straits help of an English dictionary. Dulles was opening of the meeting, Chairman Mao asked and its embargo, and when our domestic really taking the helm. Provincial Party his secretary, Lin Ke, to find Dulles’s situation was stable, “the First Five-Year Committees should assign special cadres to speeches concerning “peaceful evolution” Plan” was fully under way, economic con- read Cankao ziliao.7 Chairman Mao has for him to read. Comrade Lin Ke selected struction was developing rapidly, and ev- always insisted that Party leaders at all lev- three such speeches: Dulles’s address titled erywhere was the picture of prosperity and els, especially high-ranking cadres, should “Policy for the Far East” delivered before vitality. At that moment, Chairman Mao did closely follow international events and the the California Chamber of Commerce on not immediately bring up the issue of pre- development of social contradictions on the December 4, 1958, Dulles’s testimony made venting a “peaceful evolution.” The reason world scene in order to be well informed and before the House Foreign Affairs Commit- for his later raising the question has to do prepared for sudden incidents. It is very tee on January 28, 1959, and Dulles’s speech with developments in international and do- necessary for Mao to make that demand. titled “The Role of Law in Peace” made mestic situations. Chairman Mao read Cankao ziliao every before the New York State Bar Association In 1956, at the 20th Congress of the day. For us leading cadres, we should con- on January 31, 1959. Chairman Mao had Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev at- sider not only the whole picture of domestic read these three speeches before. After re- tacked Stalin, causing an anti-Communist politics but also the whole situation of inter- reading them, he told Comrade Lin Ke of his and anti-Socialist wave in the world and national politics. Thus we can keep clear- opinions about them and asked him to write triggering incidents in Poland and Hungary. headed, deal with any challenges confidently, commentaries based on his views and insert In 1957, a tiny minority of bourgeois Right- and “sit tight in the fishing boat despite the them at the beginning of each of Dulles’s ists seized the opportunity of Party reform to rising winds and waves.” This is a very statements. After Comrade Lin Ke had attack the Party. In 1958, Khrushchev pro- important political lesson and a leadership completed the commentaries, Mao instructed posed to create a long-wave radio station and style. him to distribute Dulles’s speeches, along COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 229 with the commentaries, to the members couraging a “peaceful evolution” plication. We will only expose the attending the meeting. inside socialist countries. For ex- American deception and lay bare The three speeches by Dulles all con- ample, at his testimony before the the nature of the so-called “peace” tained the theme of promoting a “peaceful House Foreign Affairs Committee by the United States. evolution” inside socialist countries. The on January 28 Dulles remarked that three commentaries based on Chairman basically the U.S. hoped to encour- This is the first time that Chairman Mao Mao’s talks highlighted the key points in age changes within the Soviet world. clearly raised and insightfully elaborated on Dulles’s remarks and warned of the danger By the Soviet world, Dulles did not the issue of preventing a “peaceful evolu- of the American “peaceful evolution” strat- mean just the Soviet Union. He was tion.” From that time on, he would pay more egy. The first commentary pointed out: referring to the whole socialist camp. and more attention to the matter. In a series “The United States not only has no intention He was hoping to see changes in our of meetings that followed, he would repeat- to give up its policy of force, but also wants, camp so that the Soviet world would edly alert the whole party on the issue and as an addition to its policy of force, to pursue no longer be a threat to freedom on gradually unfold the struggle against the so- a ‘peaceful conquest strategy’ of infiltration the globe and would mind its own called revisionism both at home and abroad. and subversion in order to avoid the pros- business instead of thinking about From 1960 forward, differences between pect of its ‘being surrounded.’ The U.S. realizing the goal and ambition of the Chinese and Soviet Parties increased. desires to achieve the ambition of preserv- communizing the world.... On April 22, an editorial titled “Long Live ing itself (capitalism) and gradually defeat- Leninism” published by the journal Hongqi13 ing the enemy (socialism).” After noting In commenting on Dulles’s statement of denounced Comrade Tito of Yugoslavia by the main theme of Dulles’s testimony, the January 31, 1959, Chairman Mao asserted: name and criticized Khrushchev of the So- second commentary contended: Dulles’s viet Union without mentioning his name. words “demonstrate that U.S. imperialists Dulles said that justice and law On internal occasions, we unequivocally are attempting to restore capitalism in the should replace violence and that war pointed out that the Soviet Union had be- Soviet Union by the method of corrupting it should be abandoned, and law and come revisionist and that we should learn so as to realize their aggressive goal, which justice should be emphasized. Dulles the Soviet lesson. We also felt that “revi- they have failed to achieve through war.” also argued that the abandonment of sionists” already existed in China and that The third commentary first took note of force under the circumstances did Peng Dehuai and some other comrades were Dulles’s insistence on “the substitution of not mean the “maintenance of the examples. We warned against the emer- justice and law for force” and his contention status quo,” but meant a peaceful gence of revisionism in order to prevent a that the abandonment of force did not mean “change.” (laughter) Change whom “peaceful evolution.” In his meeting with the “maintenance of the status quo,” but peacefully? Dulles wants to change Jespersen,14 Chairman of the Danish Com- meant a peaceful “change.” Then it went on countries like ours. He wants to sub- munist Party, on May 28, 1960, Chairman to argue that “Dulles’s words showed that vert and change us to follow his Mao said: “There are also revisionists in our because of the growing strength of the so- ideas.... Therefore, the United States country. Led by Peng Dehuai, a Politburo cialist force throughout the world and be- is attempting to carry out its aggres- member, they launched an attack on the cause of the increasing isolation and diffi- sion and expansion with a much more Party last summer. We condemned and culties of the international imperialist force, deceptive tactic.... In other words, it defeated him. Seven full and alternate mem- the United States does not dare to start a wants to keep its order and change bers of our Central Committee followed world war at the moment. Therefore, the our system. It wants to corrupt us by Peng. Including Peng, there are eight revi- United States has adopted a more deceptive a peaceful evolution. sionists. The total number of full and alter- tactic to pursue its aggression and expan- nate members in our Central Committee is sion. While advocating peace, the United Chairman Mao believed that 192. Eight people are merely a minority.” States is at the same time speeding up the Khrushchev’s speeches reflected the “peace- At the “Seven Thousand Cadres Con- implementation of its plots of infiltration, ful evolution” advocated by Dulles and that ference”15 held in January 1962, Comrade corruption, and subversion in order to re- our principle should be: [Liu] Shaoqi delivered a “written report” on verse the decline of imperialism and to behalf of the Party Central Committee. He fulfill its objective of aggression.” Under the existing complex interna- made a special reference to the question of At the meeting on November 12, Chair- tional conditions, our policy is to opposing contemporary revisionism. In his man Mao further analyzed and elaborated resist the pressures head-on—pres- remarks concerning the issue of practicing on Dulles’s speeches and the commentar- sures from two directions, democratic centralism, Chairman Mao ies. He said: Khrushchev and Eisenhower. We stated: “Without a highly developed democ- will resist for five to ten years. To- racy, there cannot be a high level of central- Comrade Lin Ke has prepared for ward the United States, we should ism. Without a high level of centralism, we me three documents—three do our best to expose it with facts cannot establish a socialist economy. What speeches by Dulles during 1958- and we should do so persuasively. will happen then to our country if we cannot 1959. All three documents have to We will not criticize Khrushchev, create a socialist economy? China will be- do with Dulles’s talks about en- nor will we attack him through im- come a revisionist country, a bourgeois coun- 230 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN try in fact. The proletarian dictatorship will last to July 1964, our Party used the name of 13. Hongqi (Red Flag) is the official journal of the CCP become not only a bourgeois dictatorship the editorial boards of the Renmin ribao and Central Committee. 14. Knud Jespersen, leader of the Danish communist but also a reactionary and fascist dictator- Hongqi to issue nine articles, refuting the Party. ship. This is an issue that deserves full Soviet open letter and condemning 15. The conference was held between January and attention. I hope our comrades will consider “Khrushchev Revisionism” by name. Thus February, 1962 to review methods of Party leadership it carefully.” (Selected Readings of Chair- the Sino-Soviet polemics reached a high and examine problems caused by the Great Leap For- ward. man Mao’s Works, Vol. II, pp. 822-823.) point. In the meantime, the struggle to op- 16. Hysni Kapo, a leader of the Albanian Labor (Com- Here Chairman Mao officially sounded an pose “revisionism” and to prevent a “peace- munist) Party. alarm bell for the whole party. In his meeting ful evolution” was accelerated at home. 17. Bequir Balluku, Defense Minister and a Politburo with Kapo16 and Balluku17 of Albania on member of the Albanian Communist Party. 18. Palmiro Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist February 3, 1967, Mao contended: At the Party. “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference” in 1. The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History 19. Maurice Thorez, leader of the French Communist 1962, “I made a speech. I said that revision- of Our Party since the Founding of the People’s Repub- Party. ism wanted to overthrow us. If we paid no lic of China was adopted by the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981. While attention and conducted no struggle, China affirming the historical role of Mao Zedong, the resolu- Qiang Zhai teaches history at Auburn Uni- would become a fascist dictatorship in either tion also blames him for the Cultural Revolution. After versity at Montgomery (Alabama) and is the a few or a dozen years at the earliest or in an analysis of all the crimes and errors in the Cultural author of The Dragon, the Lion, and the several decades at the latest. This address Revolution the resolution describes it as, after all, “the error of a proletarian revolutionary.” It concludes that Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, was not published openly. It was circulated although Mao has made “gross mistakes” during the 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State Univer- internally. We wanted to watch subsequent Cultural Revolution, “if we judge his activities as a sity Press, 1994). developments to see whether any words in whole, his contribution to the Chinese revolution far the speech required revision. But at that time outweighs his mistakes.” For the text of the resolution, see Resolution on CPC History (1949-1981) (Beijing: we already detected the problem.” Foreign Languages Press, 1981). At the Beidaihe Meeting and the Tenth 2. I have previously translated the chapter in the first Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee volume concerning Mao’s decision to make an alliance during August and September, 1962, Chair- with the Soviet Union in 1949-1950. It was first pub- lished in Chinese Historians 5 (Spring 1992), 57-62, man Mao reemphasized class struggle in and later in Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill, order to prevent the emergence of revision- eds., Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: ism. On August 9, he clearly pointed out the Volume II: Since 1914, 4th ed. (Lexington, MA: D.C. necessity of educating cadres and training Heath, 1995), 332-34. 3. Bo does not mention precisely when and where them in rotation. Otherwise, he feared that Dulles made those remarks about Chinese communism. he had devoted his whole life to revolution, I have not been able to identify Dulles’s speech to which only to produce capitalism and revisionism. Bo is referring. On September 24, he again urged the party to 4. The “Three Red Flags” refer to the General Line of Socialism, the Great Leap Forward, and the People’s heighten vigilance to prevent the country Commune. from going “the opposite direction.” The 5. Jinman (Quemoy). communiqué of the Tenth Plenum published 6. These refer to the economic cooperation regions on September 27 reiterated the gist of Chair- established during the Great Leap Forward. China was divided into seven such regions. man Mao’s remarks and stressed that 7. Cankao ziliao (Reference Material) is an internally “whether at present or in the future, our Party circulated reading material, which provided Party lead- must always heighten its vigilance and cor- ers with translations and summaries of international rectly carry out the struggle on two fronts: news from foreign news agencies and press. 8. According to the U.S records of the Camp David against both revisionism and dogmatism.” talks, in his discussions with President Eisenhower, From the end of 1962 to the spring of Khrushchev actually defended China’s position on 1963, our Party published seven articles in Taiwan. See memorandum of conversation between succession, condemning such so-called “con- Eisenhower and Khrushchev, 26 and 27 September 1959, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958- 18 temporary revisionists” as Togliatti of Italy, 1960, Vol. X, Part I: Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Thorez of France,19 and the American Com- Union; Cyprus (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government munist Party. On June 14, 1963, the CCP Printing Office, 1993), 477-482. Central Committee issued “A Proposal for a 9. Peng Dehuai, Defense Minister and a Politburo member. General Line of the International Commu- 10. Peng Zhen, Party Secretary of Beijing and a nist Movement.” On July 14, the Central Politburo member. Committee of the Communist Party of the 11. Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the CCP International Soviet Union (CPSU) published “An Open Liaison Department and a Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Secretariat. Letter to Party Units at All Levels and to All 12. Hu Qiaomu, Mao’s political secretary and an Alter- Members of the CPSU,” bringing the Sino- nate Secretary of the CCP Central Committee Secre- Soviet dispute to the open. From September tariat. NEW COLED WARVIDENC INTERNATIONAL HISTOREY PROJECTON BULLETIN 231

THE VIETNAM WAR AND SOVIET- his research into a far broader study of Soviet DRV and PRC. All those interconnected AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1964-1973: involvement in the Vietnam conflict, utiliz- relations crucially influenced the relevant NEW RUSSIAN EVIDENCE ing sources in both Russian and American Soviet policies. archives (the latter during a CWIHP fellow- The escalation of the conflict in Viet- by Ilya V. Gaiduk ship for research in the United States); that nam after the Tonkin Gulf incident in Au- study, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam gust 1964 and the February 1965 attack by The Vietnam War stands out among War, is scheduled for publication by Ivan R. armed units of the National Front for the Cold War crises for its scale, length, inten- Dee (Chicago) in Spring 1996. Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV, also sity, and global repercussions. The litera- The SCCD archives contain materials known as the NLF) on the base of American ture on the war and the American role in it related to a broad range of the former CPSU military advisers in Pleiku (triggering U.S. encompasses thousands of volumes, from CC’s work, primarily correspondence with a aerial bombardment of North Vietnam in political memoirs to soldiers’ eyewitness wide range of Soviet organizations and es- retaliation), coincided with a certain cooling accounts to historical and journalistic stud- tablishments dealing with various socio-eco- in Soviet-North Vietnamese relations. This ies, to novels and political science trea- nomic, domestic, and foreign policy issues. chill between Moscow and Hanoi, in turn, tises.1 With the passage of time, ever more The archive collections (fondy) include a documents have been declassified, enabling considerable number of documents on the more thorough and comprehensive analy- subject of the Vietnam War and Soviet- This section of the Bulletin presents ses. Now that there is substantial access to American relations which were sent to the new evidence from Russian, Chinese, and archives in the former USSR, researchers CPSU CC—mostly to the CC International Polish sources on one of the Cold War’s have at their disposal a whole set of previ- Department and the CC Socialist Countries’ most costly conflicts: the Vietnam War, which ously unavailable materials which shed new Communist and Workers’ Parties Depart- consumed more than 58,000 American lives light on unresolved issues as well as on ment—by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign and, according to recent estimates, more problems which have either escaped the Affairs, Defense Ministry, and Committee than 3.2 million Vietnamese lives. Pre- attention of Western scholars or have not of State Security (KGB). Considerably less sented here are articles by Ilya V. Gaiduk yet been analyzed in detail. frequently encountered, alas, is documenta- (Institute of Universal History, Russian Acad- One of those problems relates to the tion illuminating recommendations, draft emy of Sciences, Moscow), who employs Soviet Union’s participation in the Vietnam decisions, and top-level decision-making. documents from the CPSU Central Commit- conflict, particularly the nature of Soviet- Thus, the top leadership’s decisions and the tee archives to illuminate Soviet policy to- American relations during the war and mechanism of decision-making on this level ward the Vietnam conflict (in a foretaste of Moscow’s role as a potential mediator. are only indirectly reflected in the SCCD his soon-to-be published book on the sub- Although many U.S. researchers have stud- materials. This unfortunate gap, naturally, ject), and by Zhai Qiang (Auburn University ied these problems and, on the basis of the creates problems for historians trying to de- at Montgomery), who uses newly released documents analyzed, drawn certain conclu- termine how policy was actually made by the Chinese sources to explore Beijing’s han- sions, their analyses of the subject were far top Soviet leadership on important foreign dling of the escalation of the war in 1964-65; from exhaustive and quite often insuffi- policy questions, and necessitates continued and a precis of a secretly-prepared memoir ciently corroborated by the necessary archi- efforts to increase access to materials in by Jerzy Michalowski, a Polish diplomat val sources. Russian archives that remain off-limits, par- who was deeply involved in secret mediation The present article assesses Soviet ticularly the so-called Kremlin or Presiden- efforts between the United States and North policy toward Vietnam and the war’s im- tial Archives, known officially as the Archive Vietnam in the mid-1960s. pact on U.S.-Soviet relations from 1964 to of the President of the Russian Federation However, recognizing that the most the early 1970s on the basis of materials (APRF). important “other side” for Americans dur- bearing on this subject in the archive of the At the same time, the SCCD materials ing the Vietnam War was, of course, the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union enable historians not only to reconstruct many Vietnamese themselves, the Cold War Inter- Central Committee (CPSU CC)—a reposi- events related to the Vietnam War during the national History Project has launched an tory now known as the Storage Center for period in question, and to present matters Contemporary Documents (SCCD, or which were previously interpreted only in- was partly attributable to the growing differ- TsKhSD, in its Russian acronym)—located ferentially, but also to assess the develop- ences between the USSR and the PRC, the in the CC’s former headquarters in Staraya ment of U.S.-Soviet relations in close inter- two chief patrons and supporters of the Viet- Ploschad’ (Old Square) in Moscow. This connection with the conflict in Southeast namese struggle against the Saigon regime.2 report was originally prepared for presenta- Asia. This last factor is of obvious import, Besides the impact of the Sino-Soviet split, tion at the January 1993 Moscow Confer- for one can hardly study U.S.-Soviet rela- the tension in Soviet-North Vietnamese re- ence on New Evidence on Cold War His- tions during the Vietnam War in isolation lations during this stretch was also tied to the tory, organized by the Cold War Interna- from an understanding of relations between relatively moderate stand adopted by the tional History Project (CWIHP) in coopera- the Soviet Union and North Vietnam (the then Soviet government, under the leader- tion with the Institute of General History of Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or DRV), ship of Nikita S. Khrushchev prior to his the Russian Academy of Sciences and between the Soviet Union and the People’s downfall in October 1964. Owing to the SCCD. Subsequently, the author expanded Republic of China (PRC), and between the continued on page 250 232 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

BEIJING AND THE VIETNAM Hanoi? How and why did a close relation- does not explain why Giap had to make a CONFLICT, 1964-1965: ship between Beijing and Hanoi turn sour second visit to China shortly after his first NEW CHINESE EVIDENCE during the fight against a common foe? tour and why the Soviet participants at the Drawing upon recently available Chinese talks changed. Perhaps disagreement by Qiang Zhai materials, this paper will address these ques- emerged during the discussions of Giap’s tions.1 The first half of the article is prima- first trip, leaving some issues unresolved. In The years 1964-1965 marked a crucial rily narrative, while the second half provides fact, according to the study by the research- period in the Vietnam War. The Gulf of an analysis of the factors that contributed to ers at the Guangxi Academy of Social Sci- Tonkin Incident and subsequent U.S. esca- China’s decision to commit itself to Hanoi, ences, the Chinese and the Russians differed lation of war against North Vietnam repre- placing Chinese actions in their domestic over strategies to reunify Vietnam. The sented a major turning point in the American and international context. Soviet advisors favored peaceful coexist- approach to Indochina, as the Johnson Ad- ence between North and South Vietnam, ministration shifted its focus from Saigon to China’s Role in Vietnam, 1954-1963 urging Hanoi to “reunify the country through Hanoi as the best way to reverse the deterio- peaceful means on the basis of indepen- China played an important role in help- dence and democracy.” The Chinese Com- ing Ho Chi Minh win the Anti-French War munists, conversely, contended that because effort to organize collaborative research and in concluding the Geneva Accords in of imperialist sabotage it was impossible to with Vietnamese scholars and to collect Viet- 1954.2 In the decade after the Geneva Con- reunify Vietnam through a general election namese sources on the international history ference, Beijing continued to exert influence in accordance with the Geneva Accords, and of the Vietnam and Indochina conflicts. To over developments in Vietnam. At the time that consequently North Vietnam should this end, CWIHP has begun contacts with of the Geneva Conference, the Vietnamese prepare for a protracted struggle.6 the Institute of International Relations (IIR) Communists asked the Chinese Communist On 24 December 1955, the Chinese in Hanoi on the possibility of organizing an Party (CCP) to help them consolidate peace government decided to withdraw the CMAG international scholarly conference on the in the North, build the army, conduct land from Vietnam; Peng Dehuai notified Vo history of U.S.-Vietnam relations since World reform, rectify the Party, strengthen diplo- Nguyen Giap of this decision. By mid- War II. CWIHP, along with the National matic work, administer cities, and restore March 1956, the last members of the CMAG Security Archive at George Washington the economy.3 Accordingly, Beijing sent had left the DRV. To replace the formal University, is also collecting declassified Fang Yi to head a team of Chinese economic CMAG, Beijing appointed a smaller team of archival evidence from Vietnamese, Ameri- experts to North Vietnam.4 military experts headed by Wang Yanquan can, and other sources in connection with an According to the official history of the to assist the Vietnamese.7 oral history conference of senior former Chinese Military Advisory Group (CMAG), These developments coincided with a Vietnamese and American decision-makers on 27 June 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap headed a major debate within the Vietnamese Com- (including Kennedy and Johnson Adminis- Vietnamese military delegation on a secret munist leadership in 1956 over who should tration Defense Secretary Robert S. visit to Beijing accompanied by Wei bear responsibility for mistakes committed McNamara), to be organized by the Council Guoqing, head of the CMAG in Vietnam. during a land reform campaign which had on Foreign Relations, the Center for For- The Vietnamese visitors held discussions been instituted since 1953 in an imitation of eign Policy at Brown University, and the with Chinese Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, the Chinese model. Truong Chinh, General IIR. (Agreement in principle to hold the and General Petroshevskii, a senior Soviet Secretary of the Vietnamese Workers’ Party conference was reached during discussions military advisor in China, regarding the (VWP), who was in charge of the land re- in Hanoi in November 1995.) Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s recon- form program, was removed from his posi- CWIHP also plans to devote a special struction of the army and the war plan for the tion at a Central Committee Plenum held in issue of the Bulletin to new evidence on the future. The DRV delegation visited the September. Le Duan, who became General war, primarily from Vietnamese sources. Chinese North Sea Fleet before returning to Secretary later in the year, accused Truong --Jim Hershberg, Editor Hanoi in mid-July. That fall, on 15 October Chinh of applying China’s land reform ex- 1955, Vo Nguyen Giap led another secret perience in Vietnam without considering the 8 rating trend in South Vietnam and to per- military delegation to China, where he talked Vietnamese reality. suade the North Vietnamese leadership to with Peng Dehuai and Soviet General Gushev The failure of the land-reform program desist from their increasing involvement in again about the DRV’s military develop- in the DRV dovetailed with a growing real- the South. How did Beijing react to ment and war planning. The Vietnamese ization that the reunification of the whole of Washington’s escalation of the conflict in inspected Chinese military facilities and Vietnam, as promised by the Geneva Ac- Vietnam? How did Mao Zedong perceive academies and watched a Chinese military cords, would not materialize, primarily as a U.S. intentions? Was there a “strategic exercise before traveling back to North Viet- result of U.S. support for the anti-Commu- 5 debate” within the Chinese leadership over nam on December 11. nist South Vietnamese regime of Ngo Dinh the American threat and over strategies that The official CMAG history states that Diem, who refused to hold elections in 1956. China should adopt in dealing with the United during both of Giap’s journeys to Beijing, he As hopes for an early reunification dimmed, States? What was in Mao’s mind when he “reached agreement” with the Chinese and the DRV had to face its own economic decided to commit China’s resources to the Russians “on principal issues.” But it difficulties. The rice supply became a major COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 233 problem as Hanoi, no longer able to count fundamental, the most crucial, and the most strategy but simply stated that disintegration on incorporating the rice-producing South urgent task” for the Vietnamese revolution was replacing stability in the South. To take into its economy, was forced to seek alterna- was to carry out socialist revolution and advantage of this new situation, the Con- tive food sources for the North and to pre- socialist construction in the North. As to the gress urged the party to carry out both politi- pare the groundwork for a self-supporting South, the Chinese reply continued, Hanoi’s cal and military struggle in the South and economy. In this regard, leaders in Hanoi task should be to promote “a national and called for an increase of support from the continued to seek Chinese advice despite democratic revolution.” But since it was North.15 This emphasis on a combination of the memory of the poorly-implemented land- impossible to realize such a revolution at the political and military struggle in the South reform program. There are indications that moment, the Chinese concluded, the VWP reflected to some degree the Chinese sug- the Chinese themselves had drawn lessons should “conduct a long-term underground gestion of caution. from the debacle of the Vietnamese land work, accumulate strength, establish contact In the spring of 1961, U.S President reform and had become more sensitive to with the masses, and wait for opportuni- John F. Kennedy approved an increase in the Vietnamese realities when offering sugges- ties.”12 Clearly, Beijing did not wish to see Military Assistance and Advisory Group tions. In April 1956, Deputy Premier Chen the situation in Vietnam escalate into a major (MAAG) of 100 advisers and sent to Viet- Yun, an economic specialist within the CCP, confrontation with the United States. Judg- nam 400 Special Forces troops to train the paid an unpublicized visit to Hanoi. At the ing by subsequent developments, the VWP South Vietnamese in counterinsurgency tech- request of Ho Chi Minh, Chen proposed the did not ignore the Chinese advice, for be- niques. This escalation of U.S. involvement principle of “agriculture preceding industry tween 1958 and 1960 Hanoi concentrated on in Indochina aroused Chinese leaders’ con- and light industry ahead of heavy industry” economic construction in the North, imple- cern. During DRV Premier Pham Van in developing the Vietnamese economy. menting the “Three-Year Plan” of a socialist Dong’s visit to Beijing in June 1961, Mao The Vietnamese leadership adopted Chen’s transformation of the economy and society. expressed a general support for the waging advice.9 Given the fact that the CCP was The policy of returning to revolutionary of an armed struggle by the South Vietnam- putting a high premium on the development war adopted by the VWP Central Committee ese people while Zhou Enlai continued to of heavy industry at home during its First in May 1959 did not outline any specific stress flexibility in tactics and the impor- Five-Year Plan at this time, Chen’s empha- strategy to follow. The resolution had merely tance of “blending legal and illegal struggle sis on agriculture and light industry was mentioned that a blend of political and mili- and combining political and military ap- very unusual, and demonstrated that the tary struggle would be required. During the proaches.”16 Chinese were paying more attention to Viet- next two years, debates over strategy and 1962 saw a major turning point in both namese conditions in their assistance to the tactics continued within the Hanoi leader- U.S. involvement in Vietnam and in Chinese DRV. Zhou Enlai echoed Chen’s counsel of ship.13 Ho Chi Minh continued to consult the attitudes toward the conflict. In February, caution in economic planning during his Chinese. In May 1960, North Vietnamese Washington established in Saigon the Mili- tour of Hanoi on 18-22 November 1956, and Chinese leaders held discussions in both tary Assistance Command, Vietnam when he told Ho Chi Minh to refrain from Hanoi and Beijing over strategies to pursue (MAC,V), to replace the MAAG. The haste in collectivizing agriculture: “Such in South Vietnam. Zhou Enlai and Deng Kennedy Administration coupled this move changes must come step by step.”10 Xiaoping argued that in general political with a drastic increase in the number of Donald S. Zagoria argues in his book struggle should be combined with armed American “advisers” and the amount of mili- Vietnam Triangle that between 1957 and conflict and that since specific conditions tary hardware it was sending to the Diem 1960, the DRV shifted its loyalties from varied between the city and the countryside regime, marking a new level of U.S. inter- Beijing to Moscow in order to obtain Soviet in South Vietnam, a flexible strategy of vention in Vietnam. assistance for its economic development.11 struggle should be adopted. In the city, the That spring, an important debate broke In reality, the Hanoi leadership continued to Chinese advised, political struggle would out within the Chinese leadership over the consult the CCP closely on such major is- generally be recommended, but to deliver a estimation of a world war, the possibility of sues as economic consolidation in the North final blow on the Diem regime, armed force peaceful coexistence with capitalist coun- and the revolutionary struggle in the South. would be necessary. Since there was an tries, and the degree of China’s support for With the completion of its economic recov- extensive mass base in the countryside, mili- national liberation movements. On Febru- ery in 1958, the VWP began to pay more tary struggle should be conducted there, but ary 27, Wang Jiaxiang, Director of the CCP attention to strengthening the revolutionary military struggle should include political Foreign Liaison Department, sent a letter to movement in the South. It sought Chinese struggle.14 The Chinese policymakers, pre- Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yi advice. In the summer of 1958, the VWP occupied with recovery from the economic (the three PRC officials directly in charge of presented to the CCP for comment two disasters caused by the Great Leap Forward, foreign policy), in which he criticized the documents entitled “Our View on the Basic clearly did not encourage a major commit- tendency to overrate the danger of world war Tasks for Vietnam during the New Stage” ment of resources from the North in support and to underestimate the possibility of peace- and “Certain Opinions Concerning the Uni- of a general offensive in the South at this ful coexistence with imperialism. In terms fication Line and the Revolutionary Line in juncture. of support for national liberation movements, the South.” After a careful study, the Chi- In September 1960, the VWP convened Wang emphasized restraint, calling atten- nese leadership responded with a written its Third National Congress, which made no tion to China’s own economic problems and reply, which pointed out that “the most major recommendations affecting existing limitations in resources. On the issue of 234 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Vietnam, he asked the party to “guard against North Vietnamese officials discussed ing covert operations in North Vietnam, a Korea-style war created by American im- Beijing’s assistance in constructing defense including intelligence overflights, the drop- perialists,” and warned of the danger of works and naval bases in the northeastern ping of propaganda leaflets, and OPLAN “Khrushchev and his associates dragging us part of the DRV.22 According to a Chinese 34A commando raids along the North Viet- into the trap of war.” Wang proposed that in source, in 1963 China and the DRV made an namese coast, the Johnson Administration order to adjust and restore the economy and agreement under which Beijing would send also conveyed to Pham Van Dong through a win time to tide over difficulties, China combat troops into North Vietnam if Ameri- Canadian diplomat on June 17 the message should adopt a policy of peace and concilia- can soldiers crossed the Seventeenth Paral- that the United States was ready to exert tion in foreign affairs, and that in the area of lel to attack the North. The Chinese soldiers increasingly heavy military pressure on the foreign aid China should not do what it would stay and fight in the North to free the DRV to force it to reduce or terminate its cannot afford.17 But Mao rejected Wang’s North Vietnamese troops to march to the encouragement of guerrilla activities in South proposal, condemning Wang as promoting a South.23 But the precise date and details of Vietnam. But the North Vietnamese leader “revisionist” foreign policy of “three ap- this agreement remain unclear. refused to yield to the American pressure, peasements and one reduction” (appease- In sum, between 1954 and 1963 China declaring that Hanoi would not stop its sup- ment of imperialism, revisionism, and inter- was closely involved in the development of port for the struggle of liberation in the national reactionaries, and reduction of as- Hanoi’s policy. The CCP urged Ho Chi South.25 sistance to national liberation movements).18 Minh to concentrate on consolidating the Mao watched these developments The outcome of the debate had major DRV and to combine political and military closely. Anticipating new trouble, the chair- implications for China’s policy toward Viet- struggles in the South. Although before man told General Van Tien Dung, Chief of nam. If Wang’s moderate suggestions had 1962 Beijing policy makers were not eager Staff of the (North) Vietnamese People’s been adopted, it would have meant a limited to see a rapid intensification of the revolu- Army, in June: “Our two parties and two Chinese role in Indochina. But Mao had tionary war in South Vietnam, neither did countries must cooperate and fight the en- switched to a militant line, choosing con- they discourage their comrades in Hanoi emy together. Your business is my business frontation with the United States. This turn from increasing military operations there. and my business is your business. In other to the left in foreign policy accorded with Between 1956 and 1963, China provided the words, our two sides must deal with the Mao’s reemphasis on class struggle and radi- DRV with 270,000 guns, over 10,000 pieces enemy together without conditions.”26 Be- cal politics in Chinese domestic affairs in of artillery, nearly 200 million bullets, 2.02 tween July 5 and 8, Zhou Enlai led a CCP 1962. It also anticipated an active Chinese million artillery shells, 15,000 wire trans- delegation to Hanoi, where he discussed role in the unfolding crisis in Vietnam. With mitters, 5,000 radio transmitters, over 1,000 with leaders from the DRV and Pathet Lao the rejection of Wang’s proposal, an oppor- trucks, 15 aircraft, 28 war ships, and 1.18 the situations in South Vietnam and Laos.27 tunity to avert the later Sino-American hos- million sets of uniforms. The total value of Although the details of these talks are un- tility over Indochina was missed. China’s assistance to Hanoi during this pe- known, clearly the three Communist parties In the summer of 1962, Ho Chi Minh riod amounted to 320 million yuan.24 1962 were stepping up their coordination to con- and Nguyen Chi Thanh came to Beijing to was a crucial year in the evolution of China’s front the increasing threat from the United discuss with Chinese leaders the serious attitudes toward Vietnam. Abandoning the States. situation created by the U.S. intervention in cautious approach, Mao opted for confron- Immediately after the Gulf of Tonkin Vietnam and the possibility of an American tation with the United States and decided to Incident, Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing sent a attack against North Vietnam. Ho asked the commit China’s resources to Hanoi. cable on August 5 to Ho Chi Minh, Pham Chinese to provide support for the guerrilla Beijing’s massive supply of weapons to the Van Dong, and Van Tien Dung, asking them movement in South Vietnam. Beijing satis- DRV in 1962 helped Ho Chi Minh to inten- to “investigate the situation, work out coun- fied Ho’s demand by agreeing to give the sify guerrilla warfare in the South, trigger- termeasures, and be prepared to fight.”28 In DRV free of charge 90,000 rifles and guns ing greater U.S. intervention. By the end of the meantime, Beijing instructed the that could equip 230 infantry battalions. 1963, Chinese leaders had become very ner- Kunming and Guangzhou Military Regions These weapons would be used to support vous about American intentions in Vietnam and the air force and naval units stationed in guerrilla warfare in the South.19 In March but were ready to provide full support for the south and south-west China to assume a 1963, Luo Ruiqing, Chief of Staff of the DRV in confronting the United States. state of combat-readiness. Four air divi- Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), sions and one anti-aircraft division were visited the DRV and discussed with his hosts China’s Reaction to U.S. Escalation dispatched into areas adjoining Vietnam and how China might support Hanoi if the United put on a heightened alert status.29 In August, States attacked North Vietnam.20 Two In the first half of 1964, the attention of China also sent approximately 15 MiG-15 months later, Liu Shaoqi, Chairman of the U.S. officials was shifting increasingly from and MiG-17 jets to Hanoi, agreed to train PRC, traveled to Hanoi, where he told Ho South Vietnam toward Hanoi. This trend North Vietnamese pilots, and started to con- Chi Minh: “We are standing by your side, reflected mounting concern over the infiltra- struct new airfields in areas adjacent to the and if war broke out, you can regard China as tion of men and supplies from the North and Vietnamese border which would serve as your rear.”21 Clearly Beijing was making a a growing dissatisfaction with a policy that sanctuary and repair and maintenance facili- major commitment to Hanoi in early 1963. allowed Hanoi to encourage the insurgency ties for Hanoi’s jet fighters.30 By moving Toward the end of the year, Chinese and without punishment. In addition to expand- new air force units to the border area and COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 235 building new airfields there, Beijing in- means war. The war can not have In discussions with Luo Ruiqing and tended to deter further U.S. expansion of boundaries. It is impossible for the Yang Chengwu, Zhou said: “According to war in South Vietnam and bombardment United States to finish the war sim- Pham Van Dong, U.S. blockade and bomb- against the DRV. Between August and ply by relying on a policy of bomb- ing has reduced supplies to South Vietnam September 1964, the PLA also sent an in- ing.33 through sea shipment and road transporta- spection team to the DRV to investigate the tion. While trying to resume sea transporta- situation in case China later needed to dis- This was the most serious warning issued by tion, the DRV is also expanding the corridor patch support troops to Vietnam.31 the Chinese government to the United States, in Lower Laos and roads in the South. Their The first months of 1965 witnessed a and given the caution exercised by President troops would go to the South to build roads. significant escalation of the American war Johnson in carrying out the “Rolling Thun- Therefore they need our support to construct in Vietnam. On February 7, 9 and 11, U.S. der” operations against the DRV, it was one roads in the North.” Zhou decided that the aircraft struck North Vietnamese military that Washington did not overlook. Clearly, Chinese military should be responsible for installations just across the 17th Parallel, U.S. leaders had drawn a lesson from the road repair and construction in North Viet- ostensibly in retaliation for Vietcong at- Korean War, when the Truman nam. Yang suggested that since assistance tacks on American barracks near Pleiku and Administration’s failure to heed Beijing to the DRV involved many military and in Qui Nhon. On March 1, the Johnson warning against crossing the 38th parallel government departments, a special leader- Administration stopped claiming that its air led to a bloody confrontation between the ship group should be created to coordinate attacks on North Vietnam were reprisals for United States and China. the work of various agencies. Approving the specific Communist assaults in South Viet- The U.S. escalation in early 1965 made proposal, Zhou immediately announced the nam and began a continuous air bombing the DRV desperate for help. Le Duan and Vo establishment of the “Central Committee campaign against the DRV. On March 8, Nguyen Giap rushed to Beijing in early April and State Council Aid Vietnam Group” with two battalions of Marines armed with tanks to ask China to increase its aid and send Yang and Li Tianyou (Deputy Chief of Staff) and 8-inch howitzers landed at Danang.32 troops to Vietnam. Le Duan told Chinese as Director and Vice Director.39 This epi- Worried about the increasing U.S. in- leaders that Hanoi needed “volunteer pilots, sode demonstrates Zhou’s characteristic ef- volvement in Vietnam, Zhou Enlai on April volunteer soldiers as well as other necessary fectiveness in organization and efficiency in 2 asked Pakistani President Ayub Khan to personnel, including road and bridge engi- administration. convey to President Johnson a four-point neers.” The Vietnamese envoys expected In early June, Van Tien Dung held dis- message: Chinese volunteer pilots to perform four cussions with Luo Ruiqing in Beijing to functions: to limit U.S. bombing to the south flesh out the general Chinese plan to assist (1) China will not take the initiative of the 20th or 19th parallel, to defend Hanoi, Vietnam. According to their agreement, if to provoke a war with the United to protect several major transportation lines, the war remained in the current conditions, States. (2) The Chinese mean what and to boost morale.34 On behalf of the the DRV would fight the war by itself and they say. In other words, if any Chinese leadership, Liu Shaoqi replied to the China would provide various kinds of sup- country in Asia, Africa, or else- Vietnamese visitors on April 8 that “it is the port as the Vietnamese needed. If the United where meets with aggression by the obligation of the Chinese people and party” States used its navy and air force to support imperialists headed by the United to support the Vietnamese struggle against a South Vietnamese attack on the North, States, the Chinese government and the United States. “Our principle is,” Liu China would also provide naval and air force people will definitely give it sup- continued, “that we will do our best to pro- support to the DRV. If U.S. ground forces port and assistance. Should such vide you with whatever you need and what- were directly used to attack the North, China just action bring on American ag- ever we have. If you do not invite us, we will would use its land forces as strategic re- gression against China, we will not go to your place. We will send whatever serves for the DRV and conduct military unhesitatingly rise in resistance and part [of our troops] that you request.You operations whenever necessary. As to the fight to the end. (3) China is pre- have the complete initiative.”35 forms of Sino-Vietnamese air force coop- pared. Should the United States In April, China signed several agree- eration, Dung and Luo agreed that China impose a war on China, it can be ments with the DRV concerning the dispatch could send volunteer pilots to Vietnam to said with certainty that, once in of Chinese support troops to North Viet- operate Vietnamese aircraft, station both China, the United States will not be nam.36 Between April 21 and 22, Giap dis- pilots and aircraft in Vietnam airfields, or fly able to pull out, however many men cussed with Luo Ruiqing and First Deputy aircraft from bases in China to join combat it may send over and whatever weap- Chief of Staff Yang Chengwu the arrange- in Vietnam and only land on Vietnamese ons it may use, nuclear weapons ments for sending Chinese troops.37 In May, bases temporarily for refueling. The third included. (4) Once the war breaks Ho Chi Minh paid a secret visit to Mao in option was known as the “Andong model” (a out, it will have no boundaries. If Changsha, the chairman’s home province, reference to the pattern of Chinese air force the American madmen bombard where he asked Mao to help the DRV repair operations during the Korean War). In terms China without constraints, China and build twelve roads in the area north of of the methods of employing PRC ground will not sit there waiting to die. If Hanoi. The Chinese leader accepted Ho’s troops, the two military leaders agreed that they come from the sky, we will request and instructed Zhou Enlai to see to the Chinese forces would either help to fight back on the ground. Bombing the matter.38 strengthen the defensive position of the DRV 236 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN troops to prepare for a North Vietnamese nicated to U.S. intelligence through aerial that will determine the final victory of the counter offensive or launch an offensive photography and electronic intercepts. This war.”47 At first Mao did not expect that the themselves to disrupt the enemy’s deploy- evidence, along with the large base complex United States would attack North Vietnam ment and win the strategic initiative.40 that China built at Yen Bai in northwest directly.48 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident But despite Liu Shaoqi’s April promise Vietnam, provided credible and successful came as a surprise to him. In the wake of the to Le Duan and Luo Ruiqing’s agreement deterrence against an American invasion of incident, Mao pointed out on October 22 that with Van Tien Dung, China in the end failed North Vietnam.45 China must base its plans on war and make to provide pilots to Hanoi. According to the The specter of a Chinese intervention in active preparations for an early, large-scale, Vietnamese “White Paper” of 1979, the a manner similar to the Korean War was a and nuclear war.49 Chinese General Staff on 16 July 1965 noti- major factor in shaping President Johnson’s To deal with what he perceived as U.S. fied its Vietnamese counterpart that “the gradual approach to the Vietnam War. military threats, Mao took several domestic time was not appropriate” to send Chinese Johnson wanted to forestall Chinese inter- measures in 1964, the most important of pilots to Vietnam.41 The PRC’s limited air vention by keeping the level of military which was the launching of the massive force capacity may have caused Beijing to actions against North Vietnam controlled, Third Front project. This program called for have second thoughts, perhaps reinforcing exact, and below the threshold that would heavy investment in the remote provinces of Beijing’s desire to avoid a direct confronta- provoke direct Chinese entry. This China- southwestern and western China and envi- tion with the United States. Whatever the induced U.S. strategy of gradual escalation sioned the creation of a huge self-sustaining reasons for China’s decision, the failure to was a great help for Hanoi, for it gave the industrial base area to serve as a strategic satisfy Hanoi’s demand must have greatly Vietnamese communists time to adjust to reserve in the event China became involved disappointed the Vietnamese since the con- U.S. bombing and to develop strategies to in war. The project had a strong military trol of the air was so crucial for the DRV’s frustrate American moves. As John Garver orientation and was directly triggered by the effort to protect itself from the ferocious has aptly put it, “By helping to induce Wash- U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam.50 U.S. bombing, and undoubtedly contributed ington to adopt this particular strategy, On 25 April 1964, the War Department to North Vietnam’s decision in 1965 to rely Beijing contributed substantially to Hanoi’s of the PLA General Staff drafted a report for more on the Soviet Union for air defense. eventual victory over the United States.”46 Yang Chengwu on how to prevent an enemy Beginning in June 1965, China sent surprise attack on China’s economic con- ground-to-air missile, anti-aircraft artillery, Explaining PRC Support for the DRV struction. The report listed four areas vul- railroad, engineering, mine-sweeping, and nerable to such an attack: (1) China’s indus- logistical units into North Vietnam to help Mao’s decision to aid Hanoi was closely try was over-concentrated. About 60 per- Hanoi. The total number of Chinese troops linked to his perception of U.S. threats to cent of the civil machinery industry, 50 in North Vietnam between June 1965 and China’s security, his commitment to na- percent of the chemical industry, and 52 March 1973 amounted to over 320,000.42 tional liberation movements, his criticism of percent of the national defense industry were To facilitate supplies into South Vietnam, Soviet revisionist foreign policy, and his concentrated in 14 major cities with over one China created a secret coastal transportation domestic need to transform the Chinese state million people. (2) Too many people lived in line to ship goods to several islands off and society. These four factors were mutu- cities. According to the 1962 census, in Central Vietnam for transit to the South. A ally related and reinforcing. addition to 14 cities of above one million, 20 secret harbor on China’s Hainan Island was Sense of Insecurity: cities had a population between 500,000 and constructed to serve this transportation route. Between 1964 and 1965, Mao worried one million. Most of these cities were lo- Beijing also operated a costly transportation about the increasing American involvement cated in the coastal areas and very vulner- line through Cambodia to send weapons, in Vietnam and perceived the United States able to air strikes. No effective mechanisms munitions, food, and medical supplies into as posing a serious threat to China’s secu- existed at the moment to organize anti-air South Vietnam.43 When the last Chinese rity. For him, support for North Vietnam works, evacuate urban populations, continue troops withdrew from Vietnam in August was a way of countering the U.S. strategy of production, and eliminate the damages of an 1973, 1,100 soldiers had lost their lives and containment of China. The Communist suc- air strike, especially a nuclear strike. (3) 4,200 had been wounded.44 cess in South Vietnam would prevent the Principal railroad junctions, bridges, and The new materials from China indicate United States from moving closer to the harbors were situated near big and medium- that Beijing provided extensive support (short Chinese southern border. size cities and could easily be destroyed of volunteer pilots) for Hanoi during the On several occasions in 1964, Mao when the enemy attacked the cities. No Vietnam War and risked war with the United talked about U.S. threats to China and the measures had been taken to protect these States in helping the Vietnamese. As Allen need for China to prepare for war. During a transportation points against an enemy at- S. Whiting has perceptively observed, the Central Committee conference held between tack. In the early stage of war, they could deployment of Chinese troops in Vietnam May 15 and June 17, the chairman con- become paralyzed. (4) All of China’s reser- was not carried out under maximum security tended that “so long as imperialism exists, voirs had a limited capacity to release water against detection by Washington. The Chi- the danger of war is there. We are not the in an emergency. Among the country’s 232 nese troops wore regular uniforms and did chief of staff for imperialism and have no large reservoirs, 52 were located near major not disguise themselves as civilians. The idea when it will launch a war. It is the transportation lines and 17 close to impor- Chinese presence was intentionally commu- conventional weapon, not the atomic bomb, tant cities. In conclusion, the report made it COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 237 clear that “the problems mentioned above While emphasizing the “big Third Front” that intruded into Chinese airspace in order are directly related to the whole armed forces, plan on the national level, Mao also ordered to avoid a direct military clash with the to the whole people, and to the process of a provinces to proceed with their “small Third United States.59 national defense war.” It asked the State Front” projects. The chairman wanted each In April, however, Mao rescinded the Council “to organize a special committee to province to develop its own light armament “Six Point Directive.” Between April 8 and study and adopt, in accordance with the industry capable of producing rifles, ma- 9, U.S. aircraft flew into China’s airspace possible conditions of the national economy, chine guns, canons, and munitions.55 The over Hainan Island. On April 9, Yang practical and effective measures to guard Third Five-Year Plan was revised to meet the Chengwu reported the incidents to Mao, against an enemy surprise attack.”51 strategic contingency of war preparation. In suggesting that the order not to attack invad- Yang Chengwu presented the report to the modified plan, a total of three billion ing U.S. airplanes be lifted and that the air Mao, who returned it to Luo Ruiqing and yuan was appropriated for small Third Front force command take control of the naval air Yang on August 12 with the following com- projects. This was a substantial figure, but units stationed on Hainan Island. Approv- ment: “It is an excellent report. It should be less than 5 percent of the amount set aside for ing both of Yang’s requests, Mao said that carefully studied and gradually imple- the big Third Front in this period.56 In sum, China “should resolutely strike American mented.” Mao urged the newly established the Third Front was a major strategic action aircraft that overfly Hainan Island.”60 It is State Council Special Committee in charge designed to provide an alternative industrial quite possible that the further U.S. escala- of the Third Front to begin its work imme- base that would enable China to continue tion of war in Vietnam in the intervening diately.52 Mao’s approval of the report production in the event of an attack on its months caused Mao to abandon his earlier marked the beginning of the Third Front large urban centers. restrictions against engaging U.S. aircraft. project to relocate China’s industrial re- In addition to his apprehension about a It is important to point out that the entire sources to the interior. It is important to note strike on China’s urban and coastal areas, Chinese leadership, not just Mao, took the the timing of Mao’s reaction to the report— Mao also feared that the enemy might deploy strategic threat from the United States very right after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The paratroop assault forces deep inside China. seriously during this period. Zhou Enlai told U.S. expansion of the war to North Vietnam In a meeting with He Long, Deputy Chair- Spiro Koleka, First Deputy Chairman of the had confirmed Mao’s worst suspicions about man of the Central Military Commission, Council of Ministers of Albania, on 9 May American intentions. Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Chengwu on 28 1965 in Beijing that China was mobilizing Deputy Prime Minister Li Fuchun be- April 1965, Mao called their attention to its population for war. Although it seemed came Director, Deputy Prime Minister Bo such a danger. He ordered them to prepare that the United States had not made up its Yibo and Luo Ruiqing became Vice Direc- for the landing of enemy paratroopers in mind to expand the war to China, the Chi- tors of the Special Committee. On August every interior region. The enemy might use nese premier continued, war had its own law 19, they submitted to Mao a detailed pro- paratroops, Mao contended, “to disrupt our of development, usually in a way contrary to posal on how to implement the Third Front rear areas, and to coordinate with a frontal the wishes of people. Therefore China had ideas.53 In the meantime, the CCP Secre- assault. The number of paratroops may not to be prepared.61 Zhou’s remarks indicated tariat met to discuss the issue. Mao made be many. It may involve one or two divisions that he was familiar with a common pattern two speeches at the meetings on August 17 in each region, or it may involve a smaller in warfare: accidents and miscalculations and 20. He asserted that China should be on unit. In all interior regions, we should build rather than deliberate planning often lead to guard against an aggressive war launched caves in mountains. If no mountain is around, war between reluctant opponents. by imperialism. At present, factories were hills should be created to construct defense In an address to a Central Military Com- concentrated around big cities and coastal works. We should be on guard against en- mission war planning meeting on 19 May regions, a situation deleterious to war prepa- emy paratroops deep inside our country and 1965, Liu Shaoqi stated: ration. Factories should be broken into two prevent the enemy from marching unstopped parts. One part should be relocated to inte- into China.”57 If our preparations are faster and rior areas as early as possible. Every prov- It appears that Mao’s attitudes toward better, war can be delayed.... If we ince should establish its own strategic rear the United States hardened between January make excellent preparations, the base. Departments of industry and trans- and April 1965. In an interview with Edgar enemy may even dare not to in- portation should move, so should schools, Snow on January 9, Mao had expressed con- vade.... We must build the big Third science academies, and Beijing University. fidence that Washington would not expand Front and the small Third Front The three railroad lines between Chengdu the war to North Vietnam because Secretary and do a good job on every front, and Kunming, Sichuan and Yunnan, and of State Dean Rusk had said so. He told including the atomic bomb, the hy- Yunnan and Guizhou should be completed Snow that there would be no war between drogen bomb, and long-distance as quickly as possible. If there were a China and the United States if Washington missiles. Under such circum- shortage of rails, the chairman insisted, rails did not send troops to attack China.58 Two stances, even if the United States on other lines could be dismantled. To days later, the CCP Central Military Com- has bases in Japan, Taiwan, and the implement Mao’s instructions, the meet- mission issued a “Six-Point Directive on the Philippines, its ships are big tar- ings decided to concentrate China’s finan- Struggle against U.S. Ships and Aircraft in gets out on the sea and it is easy for cial, material, and human resources on the the South China Sea,” in which it instructed us to strike them. We should de- construction of the Third Front.54 the military not to attack American airplanes velop as early as possible new tech- 238 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

nology to attack aircraft and war- revisionism). Although the article included tries in Europe, Asia, and Africa,” and that it ships so that we can knock out one some of Lin Biao’s previous statements, Lin was difficult for “the U.S. reactionaries to enemy ship with a single missile. himself was not involved in its writing. When attack the Soviet Union before they could The enemy’s strength is in its navy, Luo Ruiqing asked Lin for his instructions subjugate these countries.”71 In the late air force, atomic bombs, and mis- about the composition of the article, the 1940s and throughout the greater part of the siles, but the strength in navy and Defense Minister said nothing. Zhou Enlai 1950s, Mao leaned to the side of the Soviet air force has its limits. If the enemy and other standing Politburo members read Union to balance against the perceived sends ground troops to invade the piece before its publication.67 The ar- American threat. But beginning in the late China, we are not afraid. There- ticle was approved by the Chinese leader- 1950s, with the emergence of Sino-Soviet fore, on the one hand we should be ship as a whole and was merely published in differences, Mao came to revise his charac- prepared for the enemy to come Lin Biao’s name. Luo Ruiqing was purged terization of the international situation. He from all directions, including a joint in December 1965 primarily because of his saw China confronting two opponents: the invasion against China by many dispute with Lin Biao over domestic mili- United States and the Soviet Union. To countries. On the other, we should tary organization rather than over foreign oppose these two foes and break China’s realize that the enemy lacks justifi- policy issues.68 Luo did not oppose Mao on international isolation, Mao proposed the cation in sending troops.... This Vietnam policy. In fact he carried out loy- formation of an international united front. will decide the difference between ally every Vietnam-related order issued by Operating from the principle of making a just and an unjust war.62 the chairman. Mao completely dominated friends with countries in the “Two Interme- the decision making. The origins of the diate Zones,” Mao promoted such anti- Zhu De remarked at the same meeting that “People’s War” article point to the danger of American tendencies as French President “so long as we have made good preparations relying on public pronouncements to gauge De Gaulle’s break with the United States in on every front, the enemy may not dare to inner-party calculations and cast doubts on the first zone and championed national lib- come. We must defend our offshore islands. the utility of the faction model in explaining eration movements in the second zone. For With these islands in our hands, the enemy Chinese foreign policy making.69 Mao, the Vietnam conflict constituted a part will find it difficult to land. If the enemy of a broader movement across Asia, Africa, should launch an attack, we will lure them Commitment to National Liberation and Latin America, which together repre- inside China and then wipe them out com- Movements: sented a challenge to imperialism as a whole. pletely.”63 The second factor that shaped Mao’s China reached out to anti-colonial guerrillas Scholars have argued over Beijing’s decision to support the DRV was his desire in Angola and Mozambique, to the “pro- reaction to the threat posed by U.S. interven- to form a broad international united front gressive” Sihanouk in Cambodia, to the left- tion in Vietnam. Much of this argument against both the United States and the Soviet ist regime under Sukarno in Indonesia, and focuses on the hypothesis of a “strategic Union. To Mao, national liberation move- to the anti-U.S. Castro in Cuba.72 Toward debate” in 1965 between Luo Ruiqing and ments in the Third World were the most the former socialist camp dominated by the Lin Biao. Various interpretations of this important potential allies in the coalition Soviet Union, Mao encouraged Albania to “debate” exist, but most contend that Luo that he wanted to establish. In the early persuade other East European countries to was more sensitive to American actions in 1960s, the chairman developed the concept separate from Moscow.73 Indochina than either Lin or Mao, and that of “Two Intermediate Zones.” The first zone During this increasingly radical period Luo demanded greater military preparations referred to developed countries, including of Chinese foreign policy, Mao singled out to deal with the threat, including accepting capitalist states in Europe, Canada, Japan, three anti-imperialist heroes for emulation the Soviet proposal of a “united front.”64 Australia, and New Zealand. The second by Third World liberation movements: Ho However, there is nothing in the re- zone referred to underdeveloped nations in Chi Minh, Castro, and Ben Bella, the Alge- cently available Chinese materials to con- Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These two rian nationalist leader. In a speech to a firm the existence of the “strategic debate” zones existed between the two superpowers. delegation of Chilean journalists on 23 June in 1965.65 The often cited evidence to sup- Mao believed that countries in these two 1964, Mao remarked: “We oppose war, but port the hypothesis of a strategic debate is zones had contradictions with the United we support the anti-imperialist war waged the two articles supposedly written by Luo States and the Soviet Union and that China by oppressed peoples. We support the revo- Ruiqing and Lin Biao on the occasion of the should make friends with them to create an lutionary war in Cuba and Algeria. We also commemoration of V-J day in September international united front against Washing- support the anti-U.S.-imperialist war con- 1965.66 In fact, the same writing group ton and Moscow.70 ducted by the South Vietnamese people.”74 organized by Luo Ruiqing in the General Mao initially developed the idea of the In another address to a group of visitors from Staff was responsible for the preparation of “intermediate zone” during the early years Asia, Africa, and Oceania on July 9, Mao both articles. The final version of the of the Cold War. In a discussion with Anna again mentioned the names of Ho Chi Minh, “People’s War” article also incorporated Louise Strong in 1946, the CCP leader first Castro, and Ben Bella as models of anti- opinions from the writing team led by Kang broached the idea. He claimed that the colonial and anti-imperialist struggle.75 Sheng. (Operating in the Diaoyutai National United States and the Soviet Union were Envisioning China as a spokesman for Guest House, Kang’s team was famous for “separated by a vast zone including many the Third World independence cause, Mao writing the nine polemics against Soviet capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial coun- believed that the Chinese revolutionary ex- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 239 perience was relevant to the struggle of the October Revolution celebrations. Beijing Hanoi on 7-10 February 1965, Kosygin called liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and dispatched Zhou Enlai and He Long to Mos- for a total U.S. withdrawal from South Viet- Latin America. By firmly backing the Viet- cow for the primary purpose of sounding out nam and promised Soviet material aid for namese struggle against the United States, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin on the Ho Chi Minh’s struggle. The fact that a he wanted to demonstrate to Third World many issues in dispute: Khrushchev’s long- group of missile experts accompanied countries and movements that China was postponed plan to convene an international Kosygin indicated that the Kremlin was pro- their true friend. Victory for North Communist meeting, support for revolution- viding support in that crucial area. The two Vietnam’s war of national unification with ary movements, peaceful coexistence with sides concluded formal military and eco- China’s support would show the political the United States, attitudes toward Tito, and nomic agreements on February 10.81 Clearly correctness of Mao’s more militant strategy “revisionist” domestic policies within the the Soviets were competing with the Chi- for coping with U.S. imperialism and the Soviet Union. The Chinese discovered dur- nese to win the allegiance of the Vietnamese incorrectness of Khrushchev’s policy of ing their tour on November 5-13 that nothing Communists. Through its new gestures to peaceful coexistence. basic had changed in the Soviet position: the Hanoi, Moscow wanted to offset Chinese A number of Chinese anti-imperialist new leaders in Moscow desired an improve- influence and demonstrate its ideological initiatives, however, ended in a debacle in ment in Sino-Soviet relations on the condi- rectitude on issues of national liberation. 1965. First Ben Bella was overthrown in tion that Beijing stopped its criticisms and The new solidarity with Hanoi, however, Algeria in June, leading the Afro-Asian limited competition in foreign policy, prob- complicated Soviet relations with the United movement to lean in a more pro-Soviet ably in return for the resumption of Soviet States, and after 1965, the Soviet Union direction due to the influence of Nehru in economic aid.77 found itself at loggerheads with Washing- India and Tito in Yugoslavia. The fall of Instead of finding an opportunity to im- ton. While Moscow gained greater influ- Ben Bella frustrated Mao’s bid for leader- prove mutual understanding, the Chinese ence in Hanoi because of the North Viet- ship in the Third World through the holding visitors found their stay in Moscow unpleas- namese need for Soviet material assistance of a “second Bandung” conference of Afro- ant and the relationship with the Soviet Union against U.S. bombing, it at the same time lost Asian leaders. Then in September, Sukarno even worse. During a Soviet reception, flexibility because of the impossibility of was toppled in a right-wing counter-coup, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky suggested to retreat from the commitment to a brother derailing Beijing’s plan to promote a mili- Zhou Enlai and He Long that just like the Communist state under attack by imperial- tant “united front” between Sukarno and the Russians had ousted Khrushchev, the Chi- ism. Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The nese should overthrow Mao. The Chinese Before 1964, Hanoi was virtually on Chinese behavior, nevertheless, did con- indignantly rejected this proposal: Zhou even China’s side in the bifurcated international vince leaders in Washington that Beijing registered a strong protest with the Soviet communist movement. After the fall of was a dangerous gambler in international leadership, calling Malinovsky’s remarks “a Khrushchev and the appearance of a more politics and that American intervention in serious political incident.”78 Zhou Enlai told interventionist position under Kosygin and Vietnam was necessary to undermine a the Cuban Communist delegation during a Brezhnev, however, Hanoi adopted a more Chinese plot of global subversion by proxy.76 breakfast meeting in the Chinese Embassy balanced stand. Leaders in Beijing were on November 9 that Malinovsky “insulted nervous about the increase of Soviet influ- Criticism of Soviet Revisionism: Comrade Mao Zedong, the Chinese people, ence in Vietnam. According to a Vietnam- Mao’s firm commitment to North Viet- the Chinese party, and myself,” and that the ese source, Deng Xiaoping, Secretary Gen- nam also needs to be considered in the current leadership in the Kremlin inherited eral of the CCP, paid a secret visit to Hanoi context of the unfolding Sino-Soviet split. “Khrushchev’s working and thought style.”79 shortly after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in By 1963, Beijing and Moscow had com- Before Zhou’s journey to Moscow, the an attempt to wean the Vietnamese away pletely broken apart after three years of Chinese leadership had suggested to the Viet- from Moscow with the promise of US$1 increasingly abusive polemics. The conclu- namese Communists that they also send billion aid per year.82 China’s strategy to sion of the Soviet-American partial Nuclear people to travel with Zhou to Moscow to see discredit the Soviet Union was to emphasize Test Ban Treaty in July 1963 was a major whether there were changes in the new So- the “plot” of Soviet-American collaboration turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. There- viet leaders’ policy. Zhou told Ho Chi Minh at the expense of Vietnam. During his visit after the Beijing leadership publicly de- and Le Duan later in Hanoi, on 1 March to Beijing on 11 February 1965, Kosygin nounced any suggestion that China was 1965, that he was “disappointed” with what asked the Chinese to help the United States subject to any degree of Soviet protection he had seen in Moscow, and that “the new to “find a way out of Vietnam.” Chinese and directly criticized Moscow for collabo- Soviet leaders are following nothing but leaders warned the Russians not to use the rating with Washington against China. The Khrushchevism.”80 Clearly Zhou wanted Vietnam issue to bargain with the Ameri- effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Vietnam the Hanoi leadership to side with the PRC in cans.83 Immediately after his return to Mos- soon manifested itself as Beijing and Mos- the continuing Sino-Soviet dispute, and cow, Kosygin proposed an international con- cow wooed Hanoi to take sides in their Beijing’s extensive aid to the DRV was de- ference on Indochina. The Chinese con- ideological dispute. signed to draw Hanoi to China’s orbit. demned the Soviet move, asserting that the After the ouster of Khrushchev in Oc- The collective leadership which suc- Russians wanted negotiation rather than con- tober 1964, the new leadership in the Krem- ceeded Khrushchev was more forthcoming tinued struggle in Vietnam and were con- lin invited the CCP to send a delegation to in support of the DRV. During his visit to spiring with the Americans to sell out Viet- 240 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN nam. But as R.B. Smith has observed, the because of China’s objection.85 happening in China. Chinese “may have oversimplified a Soviet The problem of succession preoccupied strategy which was... more subtle.... Domestic Need to Transform the Chinese Mao throughout the first half of the 1960s. Moscow’s diplomatic initiative of mid-Feb- State and Society: His acute awareness of impending death ruary may in fact have been timed to coin- Beginning in the late 1950s, Mao be- contributed to his sense of urgency. The cide with—rather than to constrain—the came increasingly apprehensive about the U.S. escalation of war in Vietnam made him Communist offensive in South Vietnam.”84 potential development of the Chinese revo- all the more eager to the put his own house in The Chinese criticism of the Soviet peace lution. He feared that his life work had order. He was afraid that if he did not nip in initiative must have confirmed the Ameri- created a political structure that would even- the bud what he perceived to be revisionist can image of China as a warmonger. tually betray his principles and values and tendencies and if he did not choose a proper The Sino-Soviet rivalry over Vietnam become as exploitative as the one it had successor, after his death China would fall certainly provided leaders in Hanoi an op- replaced. His worry about the future of into the hands of Soviet-like revisionists, portunity to obtain maximum support from China’s development was closely related to who would “change the color” of China, their two Communist allies, but we should his diagnosis of the degeneration of the abandon support for national liberation not overstate the case. Sometimes the ben- Soviet political system and to his fear about struggles, and appease U.S. imperialism. efits of the Sino-Soviet split for the DRV the effects of U.S. Secretary of State John Mao was a man who believed in dialectics. could be limited. For example, the Hanoi Foster Dulles’ strategy of “peaceful evolu- Negative things could be turned into posi- leadership sought a communist international tion.”86 Mao believed that Dulles’ approach tive matters. The American presence in united front to assist their war effort. They to induce a peaceful evolution within the Indochina was a threat to the Chinese revo- wanted Moscow and Beijing to agree on socialist world was taking effect in the So- lution. But on the other hand, Mao found common support actions, particularly on a viet Union, given Khrushchev’s fascination that he could turn the U.S. threat into an single integrated logistical system. They with peaceful coexistence with the capitalist advantage, namely, he could use it to inten- failed to achieve this objective primarily West. Mao wanted to prevent that from sify domestic anti-imperialist feelings and

POLISH SECRET PEACE career as ambassador to Great Britain, the was simply to end the bloodshed in Indochina INITIATIVES IN VIETNAM United Nations and the United States, by moving the conflict from the battlefield Michalowski found himself out of favor to the negotiating table. Poland’s peace by Jerzy Michalowski with the government of Communist Party proposals did not attempt to specify the boss Edward Gierek. Removed from posi- terms of any final settlement. The focus was This summary was prepared by the author’s tions of responsibility, he was nonetheless on defining the principles and conditions son, Stefan Michalowski. given access to secret Ministry archives, and that would being the two sides together. In was able to prepare this 120-page report. the end, even this limited goal could not be This is the story of peace initiatives Eventually, after being expelled from the achieved. The author’s analysis of this fail- undertaken by Polish diplomats during the Party, he retired from the foreign service. ure constitutes perhaps the most interesting height of the Vietnam war. It was written by The manuscript was brought to the United and instructive part of the narrative. Both one of the main participants, Jerzy States shortly before his death in March of sides were committed to the military struggle. Michalowski, who was, at the time, a senior 1993. The Vietnamese had an almost absolute be- official in the Polish Foreign Ministry, and a Polish Secret Police Initiatives in Viet- lief in final victory. They were convinced of close friend and colleague of Foreign Minis- nam is terse, honest, and highly readable. the similarity of their situation to the previ- ter Adam Rapacki. The events took place The author describes events that he actually ous conflict with the French, and were will- during the years 1963-1966, when Poland took part in. Whenever possible, he supplies ing to absorb even the most horrendous was in a unique position to act as broker references from the Foreign Ministry ar- blows that the United States could inflict. between the U.S. and North Vietnam. While chives or from published material. He pro- Michalowski reserves his most critical com- formally allied with the latter, and subject to vides accounts of personal meetings with ments, however, for the Johnson Adminis- Soviet domination in numerous ways, Po- Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Leonid Brezhnev, tration. America’s “carrot and stick” policy land was able to steer a course of limited Ho Chi Minh, Phan Van Dong, Lyndon of cautious peace feelers combined with a independence in its internal and interna- Johnson, Averell Harriman, Dean Rusk and campaign of savage bombing raids was di- tional affairs. Polish diplomats were liked others. Whenever he feels that the historical sastrous, for it served only to strengthen the and respected in the West, where they main- record has been distorted, he does not hesi- enemy’s resolve, and deepened suspicions tained many useful contacts. Jerzy tate to put forth his own version. He takes about America’s true motives and inten- Michalowski, for instance, had been a mem- strong issue, for example, with the published tions. Time and again, during the most ber of the UN Control and Monitoring Com- memoirs of Henry Cabot Lodge. critical and sensitive diplomatic maneuvers, mission that was set up under the 1954 Michalowski’s perspective, both as the bombing raids turned the diplomats’ Geneva Accords following the French de- peace-maker and author, is that of a profes- carefully crafted arrangements into rubble. feat in Indochina. sional diplomat, rather than an official rep- In the late 1970s, after a distinguished resentative of a Soviet Bloc nation. His goal continuied on page 258 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 241 mobilize the population against revision- upon against the West. Thus Ho Chi Minh Soviet Union to support Vietnam. Miyamoto ists. Mao had successfully employed that avidly sought advice and weapons from first discussed the idea with a CCP delega- strategy during the Civil War against Jiang China. But sentiments of distrust were never tion led by Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]. Now he could far below the surface. Friction emerged Peng Zhen in Beijing. The two sides worked apply it again to prepare the masses for the between Chinese military advisers and Viet- out a communiqué that went part of the way Great Cultural Revolution that he was going namese commanders during the war against toward the “united action” proposal. But to launch. Accordingly, in the wake of the the French in the early 1950s.88 Vietnamese when Miyamoto, accompanied by Deng, Gulf of Tonkin Incident, Mao unleashed a distrust of the Chinese also manifested itself came to see Mao in Conghua, Guangdong, massive “Aid Vietnam and Resist America” when Chinese support troops entered Viet- the chairman burst into a rage, insisting that campaign across China.87 nam in the mid 1960s. the communiqué must stress a united front When Chinese troops went to Vietnam against both the United States and the Soviet Sino-Vietnamese Discord in 1965, they found themselves in an awk- Union. Miyamoto disagreed, so the Beijing ward position. On the one hand, the Viet- communiqué was torn up.93 Clearly, Mao In its heyday the Sino-Vietnamese namese leadership wanted their service in by this time had connected the criticism of friendship was described as “comrades plus fighting U.S. aircraft and in building and Soviet revisionism with the domestic struggle brothers,” but shortly after the conclusion of repairing roads, bridges, and rail lines. On against top party leaders headed by Liu, the Vietnam War the two communist states the other hand, the Vietnamese authorities Deng, and Peng. It was no wonder that these went to war with each other in 1979. How tried to minimize their influence by restrict- officials soon became leading targets for did it happen? In fact signs of differences ing their contact with the local population. attack when the Cultural Revolution swept had already emerged in the early days of When a Chinese medical team offered medi- across China a few months later. China’s intervention in the Vietnam con- cal service to save the life of a Vietnamese In the meantime the Vietnamese made flict. Two major factors complicated Sino- woman, Vietnamese officials blocked the their different attitude toward Moscow clear Vietnamese relations. One was the histori- effort.89 Informed of incidents like this, Mao by deciding to send a delegation to attend the cal pride and cultural sensitivity that the urged the Chinese troops in Vietnam to “re- 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnamese carried with them in dealing frain from being too eager” to help the Viet- the Soviet Union (CPSU), which was to be with the Chinese. The other was the effect namese.90 While the Chinese soldiers were held between March 29 and April 8 and of the Sino-Soviet split. in Vietnam, the Vietnamese media reminded which the Chinese had already decided to Throughout their history, the Vietnam- the public that in the past China had invaded boycott. The Vietnamese were walking a ese have had a love-hate attitude toward Vietnam: the journal Historical Studies pub- tightrope at this time. On the one hand they their big northern neighbor. On the one lished articles in 1965 describing Vietnam- relied on the vital support of Soviet weap- hand, they were eager to borrow advanced ese resistance against Chinese imperial dy- ons; on the other hand, they did not want to institutions and technologies from China; nasties.91 damage their ties with China. Thus Le Duan on the other hand, they wanted to preserve The increasing animosity between and Nguyen Duy Trinh traveled from Hanoi their independence and cultural heritage. Beijing and Moscow and their efforts to win to Beijing on March 22, on their way to When they were internally weak and facing Hanoi’s allegiance put the Vietnamese in a Moscow. Although no sign of differences external aggression, they sought China’s dilemma. On the one hand, the change of appeared in public during Duan’s talks with help and intervention. When they were Soviet attitudes toward Vietnam from reluc- Zhou Enlai, China’s unhappiness about the unified and free from foreign threats, they tant to active assistance in late 1964 and early Vietnamese participation in the 23rd Con- tended to resent China’s influence. A pat- 1965 made the Vietnamese more unwilling gress can be imagined.94 tern seems to characterize Sino-Vietnamese to echo China’s criticisms of revisionism. In sum, the Beijing-Hanoi relationship relations: the Vietnamese would downplay On the other hand, they still needed China’s included both converging and diverging in- their inherent differences with the Chinese assistance and deterrence. Mao’s rejection terests. The two countries shared a common when they needed China’s assistance to of the Soviet proposal of a “united action” to ideological outlook and a common concern balance against a foreign menace; they would support Vietnam alienated leaders in Hanoi. over American intervention in Indochina, pay more attention to problems in the bilat- During Kosygin’s visit to Beijing in Febru- but leaders in Hanoi wanted to avoid the eral relations with China when they were ary 1965, he proposed to Mao and Zhou that danger of submitting to a dependent rela- strong and no longer facing an external Beijing and Moscow end their mutual criti- tionship with China. So long as policymakers threat. cisms and cooperate on the Vietnam issue. in Hanoi and Beijing shared the common This pattern certainly applies to the But Mao dismissed Kosygin’s suggestion, goal of ending the U.S. presence in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship during the asserting that China’s argument with the region, such divergent interests could be 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. The Soviet Union would continue for another subordinated to their points of agreement. Vietnamese Communists during this period 9,000 years.92 But the turning point came in 1968, when confronted formidable enemies, the French During February and March, 1966, a Sino-Soviet relations took a decisive turn for and the Americans, in their quest for na- Japanese Communist Party delegation led by the worse just as Washington made its first tional unification. When the Soviet Union Secretary General Miyamoto Kenji, visited tentative moves toward disengagement from was reluctant to help, China was the only China and the DRV, with the purpose of South Vietnam. In the new situation, source of support that Hanoi could count encouraging “joint action” by China and the Beijing’s strategic interests began to differ 242 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN fundamentally from those of Hanoi. Whereas supply of weapons to Hanoi in 1962, had population between 500,000 and one mil- the Chinese now regarded the United States helped precipitate the U.S. escalation of the lion. Most of these cities are located in the as a potential counterbalance against the war) and adopted significant measures at coastal areas and are very vulnerable to air Soviet Union, their Vietnamese comrades home to prepare for war. China’s assistance strikes. No effective mechanisms exist at continued to see Washington as the most to the DRV, to use John Garver’s words, the moment to organize anti-air works, evacu- dangerous enemy. After the withdrawal of “was Mao’s way of rolling back U.S. con- ate urban population, guarantee the continu- U.S. troops from Vietnam and the unifica- tainment in Asia.”96 From the viewpoint of ation of production, and eliminate the dam- tion of the country, Hanoi’s bilateral dis- ideology, China’s support for North Viet- ages of an air strike, especially the fallout of putes with Beijing over Cambodia, a territo- nam served Mao’s purposes of demonstrat- a nuclear strike. rial disagreement in the South China Sea, ing to the Third World that Beijing was a (3) Principal railroad junctions, bridges, and the treatment of Chinese nationals in spokesman for national liberation struggles and harbors are situated near big and me- Vietnam came to the fore, culminating in a and of competing with Moscow for leader- dium-size cities and can easily be destroyed direct clash in 1979. ship in the international communist move- when the enemy attacks cities. No measures ment. have been taken to protect these transporta- Was China Bluffing During the War? If the actions recommended by Sum- tion points against an enemy attack. In the mers had been taken by Washington in Viet- early stage of war, they can become para- The fact that Beijing did not openly nam, there would have been a real danger of lyzed. acknowledge its sizable presence in North a Sino-American war with dire consequences (4) All reservoirs have a limited capac- Vietnam raised questions about the justifi- for the world. In retrospect, it appears that ity to release water in an emergency. Among cation for Washington’s restraint in U.S. Johnson had drawn the correct lesson from the country’s 232 large reservoirs with a conduct of war, both at the time and in later the Korean War and had been prudent in his water holding capacity between 100 million years. Harry G. Summers, the most promi- approach to the Vietnam conflict. and 350 billion cubic meter, 52 are located nent of revisionist critics of President near major transportation lines and 17 close Johnson’s Vietnam policy, asserts that the * * * * * to important cities. There are also many United States drew a wrong lesson from the small and medium-size reservoirs located Korean War: “Instead of seeing that it was NEW CHINESE DOCUMENTS ON near important political, economic, and mili- possible to fight and win a limited war in THE VIETNAM WAR tary areas and key transportation lines. Asia regardless of Chinese intervention, We believe that the problems mentioned we...took counsel of our fears and accepted Translated by above are important ones directly related to as an article of faith the proposition that we Qiang Zhai the whole armed forces, to the whole people, should never again become involved in a and to the process of a national defense war. land war in Asia. In so doing we allowed our Document 1: Report by the War Depart- We propose that the State Council organize fears to become a kind of self-imposed de- ment of the General Staff, 25 April 1964. a special committee to study and adopt, in terrent and surrendered the initiative to our accordance with the possible conditions of enemies.” Summers contends that “whether Deputy Chief of Staff Yang97: the national economy, practical and feasible the Soviets or the Chinese ever intended measures to guard against an enemy surprise intervention is a matter of conjecture,” and According to your instruction, we have attack. that the United States allowed itself “to be made a special investigation on the question Please tell us whether our report is ap- bluffed by China throughout most of the of how our country’s economic construction propriate. war.” He cites Mao’s rejection of the Soviet should prepare itself for a surprise attack by 1965 proposal for a joint action to support the enemy. From the several areas that we The War Department of the General Staff, Vietnam and Mao’s suspicions of Moscow’s have looked at, many problems emerge, and April 25, 1964. plot to draw China into a war with the United some of them are very serious. States as evidence for the conclusion that (1) The industry is over concentrated. [Source: Dangde wenxian98 (Party Docu- Mao was more fearful of Moscow than Wash- About 60 percent of the civil machinery ments) 3 (1995), 34-35.] ington and, by implication, he was not seri- industry, 50 percent of the chemical indus- ous about China’s threats to intervene to try, and 52 percent of the national defense help Hanoi.95 industry (including 72.7 percent of the air- Document 2: Mao Zedong’s Comments Was China not serious in its threats to craft industry, 77.8 percent of the warship on the War Department’s April 25 Re- go to war with the United States in Indochina? industry, 59 percent of the radio industry, port, 12 August 1964. As the preceding discussion has shown, and 44 percent of the weapons industry) are Beijing perceived substantial security and concentrated in 14 major cities with over one To Comrades Luo Ruiqing99 and Yang ideological interests in Vietnam. From the million population. Chengwu: security perspective, Mao and his associates (2) Too many people live in cities. were genuinely concerned about the Ameri- According to the census conducted at the This report is excellent. We must care- can threat from Vietnam (although they did end of 1962, 14 cities in the country have a fully study and gradually implement it. The not realize that their own actions, such as the population over one million, and 20 cities a State Council has established a special com- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 243 mittee on this question. Has it started its million population. (g) Comrade Zhou Rongxin will be re- work? (b) For those currently on-going con- sponsible for the protection of city buildings struction projects in the First Front and par- and government departments and institu- Mao Zedong ticularly in the fifteen big cities, except those tions. August 12. that can be completed and put into effective We will spend the months of September operation next year or the year after, all the and October investigating the various as- [Source: Ibid., 33.] rest must be reduced in size, undergo no pects and produce detailed plans that can be expansion, and be concluded as soon as pos- implemented gradually. The special com- sible. mittee will synthesize the plans before sub- Document 3: “Report on How Our (c) For existing old enterprises, espe- mitting them to the Central Committee for Country’s Economic Construction cially those in cities with high industrial inclusion in the general plan for the next year Should Prepare Itself Against an Enemy concentration, we must remove them or some and in the Third Five-Year Plan. Surprise Attack” by Li Fuchun100, Bo of their workshops. Particularly for military (3) We propose to revive the People’s Yibo101, and Luo Ruiqing102, 19 August and machinery enterprises, we must break Anti-Air Committee. Premier104 should 1964. them in two parts if possible, and shift one still serve as Director and Comrade Xie part to the Third and Second Fronts. If we Fuzhi as Secretary General (Comrade Luo Chairman103 and the Central Committee: can remove them as a whole, we must do that Ruiqing was Secretary General originally). with careful planning and in steps. The Ministry of Public Safety will be re- In accordance with Chairman’s com- (d) Beginning in next year, no new large sponsible for the daily work of the commit- ments on the General Staff War and medium-size reservoirs will be built. tee. Department’s report of how our country’s (e) For key national universities and We should restore the Planning Office economic construction should prepare itself colleges, scientific research and planning for the Construction of Underground Rail- for a surprise attack by the enemy, we have institutes in the First Front, if they can be way in Beijing and carry out an active prepa- gathered comrades with responsibility in removed, we must relocate them to the Third ration for the building of underground rail- these areas for a meeting. All of us agree and Second Fronts with careful planning. If way in Beijing. In the meantime, we should that Chairman’s comments and the War they can not be removed, we must break consider the construction of underground Department’s report are extremely impor- them into two parts. railway in Shanghai and Shenyang. The tant. We must pay serious attention to and (f) From now on, all new projects, in Ministry of Railway will be responsible for do our best on such an important issue whatever Front they will be located, must this task. concerning our country’s strategic defense. comply with the principle of dispersion, close- (4) If the central leadership approves The meeting has decided: ness to mountains, and concealment. They the above suggestions, we propose to dis- must not be concentrated in certain cities or tribute our report along with the General (1) To establish a special committee on areas. Staff War Department report as well as this case within the State Council. We We have divided labor to deal with the Chairman’s comments as guidelines to all suggest that the committee consist of thir- above work: Party Bureaus, to all provincial, municipal, teen people including Li Fuchun, Li (a) The State Economic Commission and district Party committees, and to all Xiannian, Tan Zhenlin, Bo Yibo, Luo and the State Planning Commission will be Party committees within government minis- Ruiqing, Xie Fuzhi, Yang Chengwu, Zhang responsible for the arrangement of the indus- tries. Jichun, Zhao Erlu, Cheng Zihua, Gu Mu, trial and transportation systems. Please inform us whether our report is Han Guang, and Zhou Rongxin. Li Fuchun (b) The Ministry of Railway will be correct. serves as Director, and Bo Yibo and Luo responsible for preparation measures con- Ruiqing Deputy Directors. cerning railroad junctions. Li Fuchun, Bo Yibo, Luo (2) In addition to the four areas men- (c) The Office of National Defense In- Ruiqing tioned by the War Department, our prepara- dustry will be responsible for the arrange- August 19, 1964. tion measures also need to include universi- ment of national defense industry. ties and colleges, scientific research and (d) The General Staff will be respon- [Source: Ibid., 33-34.] planning institutions, warehouses, govern- sible for the division of the First, Second, and ment departments and institutions as well as Third Fronts on the national level and for the civil shelters in cities and mines. We must arrangement of national defense fortifica- Document 4: Zhou Enlai’s Conversation follow Chairman’s principle of “careful tions and war preparation mobilizations. with Ayub Khan, President of Pakistan, 2 study and gradual implementation” in con- (e) Comrade Tan Zhenlin will be re- April 1965. ducting our investigation into various areas sponsible for preparation measures concern- as early as possible and pay attention to the ing reservoirs. (1) China will not take the initiative to pro- following issues. (f) Comrades Zhang Jichun and Han voke a war (with the United States). (2) (a) All new construction projects will Guang will be responsible for the arrange- China means what it says and will honor the not be placed in the First Front, especially ment of universities and colleges, scientific international obligations it has undertaken. not in the fifteen big cities with over a research and planning institutes. (3) China is prepared. China’s policies are 244 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN both prudent and prepared.... (4) If the Ameri- the other hand we should realize that the number of enemy troops invades China and can madmen carry out an extensive bomb- enemy lacks reasons and justifications in cuts us into parts will the leadership go to the ing, China will not sit still and wait to be sending troops. If the enemy invades us mountains. It will not do that when China is killed. If they come from the sky, we will without our attacking it first, the enemy’s not cut into parts. For instance, if the enemy take action on the ground. Bombing means morale cannot be high. This will decide the does not occupy cities like Xian and war, and war will have no boundaries. It is difference between a just and an unjust war. Tongguan, Shaanxi109 will not create a impossible for the United States to resolve In addition, there is the issue of increas- Shaanan Military region and a Shaanbei the issue of war simply by relying on a policy ing the size of troops. In order to build military region. The leadership will decide of bombing. fortifications, we can organize some engi- on this matter after the enemy has invaded, neer units. After working for a period and and there is time to do that. There is also time [Source: The Diplomatic History Research completing fortifications, they can be dis- to mobilize troops. At present, we can begin Office of the People’s Republic of China missed. Troops engaged in agricultural pro- the organization of the militia....(the rest of Foreign Ministry, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao duction and divisions on semi war alert the speech is about how to organize the huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 (Chronology should also construct fortifications. Produc- militia). of Zhou Enlai’s Major Diplomatic Activi- tion troops are busy with agricultural work, ties, 1949-1975) (Beijing: World Knowl- but during slack seasons they should spend [Source: Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 40.] edge Press, 1993), 445.] most of their time building fortifications. This means that they can work on fortifica- tions for half a year in North China and for Document 6: Mao’s Conversation with Document 5: Liu Shaoqi’s Speech to the four to five months in the Yangtze valley. If the Party and Government Delegation of Central Military Commission war plan- war begins and we have to expand troops, we the Democratic Republic of Vietnam110 , ning meeting on 19 May 1965. just need a mobilization. This matter will be 20 October 1965. easy. At the moment, we need to do a good The enemy has many contradictions, job in organizing militia forces. You are fighting an excellent war. Both weaknesses, and difficulties. Its problems What we cannot have time to prepare the South and the North are fighting well. are no less than ours. If our preparations are when war begins includes fortification con- The people of the whole world, including faster and better, war can be delayed. The struction, third fronts, bases as well as com- those who have already awakened and those enemy will find it difficult to invade. If we munications, a reconnaissance network, and who have not awakened, are supporting you. make excellent preparations, the enemy may new technology. We must pay attention to The current world is not a peaceful one. It is even dare not to invade. If it does not invade, these issues. We should start work on the big not you Vietnamese who are invading the we will not fight out. Such a prospect is not Third Front, the small Third Front, material United States, neither are the Chinese who impossible. But we must work hard to storage, state-of-the-art technology, scien- are waging an aggressive war against the achieve this goal. We must build the big tific investigation, and research on new weap- United States. Third Front and the small Third Front and do ons. If we delay work on these matters, we Not long ago the Japanese Asahi a good job on every front, including the will find ourselves unprepared later. To do Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun published atomic bomb, the hydrogen bomb, and long- these things needs time. several reports filed by Japanese correspon- distance missiles. Under such circumstances, As to the issues of the size of troops, the dents from South Vietnam. U.S. newspa- even if the United States has bases in Japan, number of military regions, and a unified pers described these reports as unfair, thus Taiwan, and the Philippines, its ships are big leadership between the local civilian gov- provoking a debate. I am not referring to the targets out on the sea and are easy for us to ernment and the military, we can have time Japanese Communist newspaper, Akahata. strike. We should develop as early as pos- to deal with them when war begins. Some of I am talking about Japanese bourgeois news- sible new technology to attack aircraft and the issues will be dealt with only after the papers. This shows that the direction of the warships so that we can knock out one en- enemy has invaded our country. In case that media is not favorable to the United States. emy ship with a single missile. Our Red Flag the enemy occupies the Longhai Railroad,106 Recently the demonstration by the Ameri- 1 and Red Flag 2105 can shoot down the or the Yangtze valley, or the Jinghan Rail- can people against the American enemy’s high-altitude airplanes. If we have road107, or the Jinpu Railroad108, our coun- government’s Vietnam policy has devel- assurance to shoot down high-altitude air- try will then be divided into sections. If that oped. At the moment it is primarily Ameri- planes, we can have more assurance to knock happens, we have to practice a unified lead- can intellectuals who are making trouble. down low-altitude ones. The enemy’s ership of the party, the government and the But all this are external conditions. In strength lies in its navy, air force, atomic army. But this will be decided at that time, fact what will solve the problem is the war bombs, and missiles, but the strength in navy not now. With trains and airplanes at its you are fighting. Of course you can conduct and air force has its limits. If the enemy disposal, the enemy will not do things ac- negotiations. In the past you held negotia- sends ground troops to invade China, we are cording to our methods. Only when that tions in Geneva. But the American did not not afraid. Therefore, on the one hand we time comes will our leadership go to moun- honor their promise after the negotiations. should be prepared for the enemy to come tains. At present, the leadership must live in We have had negotiations with both Chiang from all directions, including a joint inva- the city because it will be inconvenient if it Kai-shek and the United States. Rusk said sion against China by many countries. On does not live in the city. Only when a large that the United States has had most negotia- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 245 tions with China. But we stick to one point: naval bases. The Algerian revolution is a (Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong) the United States must withdraw from Tai- national democratic revolution led by the (Beijing: Central Documentary Press and wan, and after that all other problems can be bourgeoisie. Our two parties are Commu- World Knowledge Press, 1994), 570-573.] easily resolved. The United States does not nist. In terms of mobilizing the masses and accept this point. China and the United carrying out people’s war, our two parties are States have been negotiating for ten years different from Algeria. Document 7: Mao’s Conversation with and we are still repeating the same old I talked about people’s war in my article. Pham Van Dong, 17 November 1968. words. We will not give up that point. The Some of the statements refer to specific prob- United States once wanted to exchange press lems of ten to twenty years ago. Now you Because there has been no battle to fight delegations with us. They argued that when have encountered some new conditions. recently, you want to negotiate with the we began with minor issues, we could better Many of your methods are different from our United States. It is all right to negotiate, but settle major problems later. We contended methods in the past. We should have differ- it is difficult to get the United States to that only by starting from major issues could ences. We also learn about war gradually. At withdraw through negotiations. The United minor problems be easily resolved. the beginning we lost battles. We have not States also wants to negotiate with you be- You withdrew your armed forces from done as smoothly as you have. cause it is in a dilemma. It has to deal with the South in accordance with the Geneva I have not noticed what issues you have problems of three regions: the first is the Accords. As a result, the enemy began to negotiated with the United States. I only pay Americas—the United States, the second is kill people in the South, and you revived attention to how you fight the Americans and Europe, and the third is Asia. In the last few armed struggle. At first you adopted politi- how you drive the Americans out. You can years the United States has stationed its cal struggle as a priority supplemented by have negotiations at certain time[s], but you major forces in Asia and has created an armed struggle. We supported you. In the should not lower your tones. You should imbalance. In this regard American capital- second stage when you were carrying out raise your tones a little higher. Be prepared ists who have investments in Europe are political and armed struggles simulta- that the enemy may deceive you. dissatisfied. Also throughout its history the neously, we again supported you. In the We will support you until your final United States has always let other countries third stage when you are pursuing armed victory. The confidence in victory comes fight first before it jumps in at halfway. It is struggle as a priority supplemented by po- from the fighting you have done and from the only after World War Two that the United litical struggle, we still support you. In my struggle you have made. For instance, one States has begun to take the lead in fighting, view, the enemy is gradually escalating the experience we have is that the Americans can first in the Korean War and then in the war; so are you. In the next two and three be fought. We obtained this experience only Vietnam War. In Vietnam the United States years you may encounter difficulties. But it after fighting the Americans. The Ameri- is taking the lead, but it is followed by only is hard to say, and it may not be so. We need cans can be fought and can be defeated. We a small number of other countries. Whether to take this possibility into consideration. should demolish the myth that the Ameri- the war is a special war or a limited war, the So long as you have made all kinds of cans cannot be fought and cannot be de- United States is totally devoted to it. Now it preparations, even if the most difficult situ- feated. Both of our two parties have many cannot afford to pay attention to other coun- ation emerges, you will not find it too far experiences. Both of us have fought the tries. Its troops in Europe, for example, are from your initial considerations. Isn’t this a Japanese. You have also fought the French. complaining, saying that there is a shortage good argument? Therefore there are two At the moment you are fighting the Ameri- of manpower and that experienced soldiers essential points: the first is to strive for the cans. and commanders have been removed and most favorable situation, and the second to The Americans have trained and edu- better equipment has been relocated. The prepare for the worst. cated the Vietnamese people. They have United States has also redeployed its troops The Algerian experience can serve as a educated us and the people of the whole from Japan, Korea and other areas of Asia. reference for you. Possibly in the fourth or world. In my opinion it is not good without Did not the United States claim that it has a fifth year of their war, some Algerian lead- the Americans. Such an educator is indis- population of two hundred million? But it ers became worried. At that time, their pensable. In order to defeat the Americans, cannot endure the war. It has dispatched Prime Minister Arbas came to talk with us. we must learn from the Americans. Marx’s only several hundred thousand troops. There They said that Algeria had a very small works do not teach us how to fight the Ameri- is a limit to its troops. population of ten million. A million had cans. Nor do Lenin’s books write about how After fighting for over a dozen years already died. While the enemy had an army to fight the Americans. We primarily learn you should not think about only your own of 800,000, their own regular forces pos- from the Americans. difficulties. You should look at the enemy’s sessed only about 30,000 to 40,000 troops. The Chinese people and the people of difficulties. It has been twenty-three years To add the guerrillas, their total forces were the whole world support you. The more since Japan’s surrender in 1945, but your less than 100,000. I told them at the time that friends you have, the better you are. country still exists. Three imperialist coun- the enemy was bound to defeat and that their tries have committed aggression against you: population would increase. Later, after ne- [Source: The People’s Republic of China Japan, France, and the United States. But gotiations France began to withdraw its Foreign Ministry and the Chinese Commu- your country has not only survived but also troops. Now it has completed the with- nist Party Central Documentary Research developed. drawal, only leaving behind a few small Office, comp., Mao Zedong Waijiao wenxuan Of course imperialism wants to fight. 246 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

One purpose for its war is to put out fire. A Asia. At first I did not believe that the United tions for another two years and fails to solve fire has started in your country, and imperi- States would attack North Vietnam. Later the problem, he will have difficulties in alism wants to put out that fire. The second the United States bombed North Vietnam, winning another term of presidency. purpose is to make money through produc- proving my words wrong. Now the United One more point. It is the puppet regime ing munitions. To put out fire they must States has stopped bombing. My words are in South Vietnam who is afraid of the Na- produce fire-extinguishing machines, which correct again. Maybe the United States will tional Liberation Front of South Vietnam. will bring about profits. Every year the resume bombing, proving my words wrong Some people in the United States have United States expends over 30 billion dol- a second time. But eventually my words will pointed out that the really effective govern- lars in your country. prove correct: the United States has to stop ment popular among the South Vietnamese It has been an American custom not to bombing. Therefore I believe that it is all people is not the Saigon government but the fight a long war. The wars they have fought right for you to make several contingency Liberation Front. This is not a statement average about four to five years. The fire in plans. attributed to someone in the U.S. Congress. your country cannot be put out. On the In sum, in the past years the American It is reported by journalists, but the name of contrary, it has spreaded. Capitalists in the army has not invaded North Vietnam. The the speaker was not identified. The state- United States are divided into factions. When United States has neither blockaded ment was attributed to a so-called U.S. gov- this faction makes more profit and that fac- Haiphong nor bombed the Hanoi city itself. ernment individual. The statement raises a tion make less profit, an imbalance in booty- The United States has reserved a method. At question: Who represents the government sharing will occur and trouble will begin one point it claimed that it would practice a with real prestige in South Vietnam? Nguyen domestically. These contradictions should “hot pursuit.” But when your aircraft flew Van Thieu or Nguyen Huu Tho? Therefore be exploited. Those monopolized capital- over our country, the United States did not although the United States publicly praises ists who have made less money are unwill- carry out a “hot pursuit.” Therefore, the Nguyen Van Thieu, saying that he will not ing to continue the war. This contradiction United States has bluffed. It has never go to Paris to attend the negotiations, it in can be detected in election speeches made by mentioned the fact that your aircraft have fact realizes that problems can not be solved the two factions. Especially the American used our airfields. Take another example, if the National Liberation Front of South journalist Walter Lippmann has published China had so many people working in your Vietnam does not participate in the negotia- an article recently, warning not to fall into country. The United States knew that, but tions. another trap. He says that the United States had never mentioned it, as if such a thing did has already fallen into a trap in Vietnam and not exist. As to the remaining people sent by [Source: Ibid., 580-583.] that the current problem is how to find ways China to your country who are no longer to climb out of that trap. He is afraid that the needed, we can withdraw them. Have you 1. Using recent Chinese sources, Chen Jian’s “China’s United States may fall into other traps. There- discussed this issue? If the United States Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964-69,” The China Quarterly 142 (June 1995), 357-387, provides an infor- fore your cause is promising. comes again, we will send people to you as mative and insightful analysis of China’s decision to In 1966, I had a conversation with Chair- well. Please discuss this issue to see which assist Hanoi during the Vietnam War, but he does not man Ho Chi Minh in Hangzhou. At that Chinese units you want to keep and which address the historiographical controversy of whether time, the United States had already resumed units you do not want to keep. Keep the units there was a “strategic debate” in Beijing in 1965. Fresh materials released in China in 1994 and 1995 shed new attack on North Vietnam, but had not re- that are useful to you. We will withdraw the light on this issue. newed bombing. I said that the United States units that are of no use to you. We will send 2. See Qiang Zhai, “Transplanting the Chinese Model: might end the war that year because it was an them to you if they are needed in the future. Chinese Military Advisers and the First Vietnam War, American election year. No matter which This is like the way your airplanes have used 1950-1954,” The Journal of Military History 57 (Octo- ber 1993), 698-715; idem., “China and the Geneva president came to power, he would encoun- Chinese airfields: use them if you need and Conference of 1954,” The China Quarterly 129 (March ter the problem of whether the United States not use them if you do not need. This is the 1992), 103-122; Chen Jian, “China and the First should continue the war or withdraw now. I way to do things. Indochina War, 1950-1954,” The China Quarterly 133 believed that the difficulties that the United I am in favor of your policy of fighting (March 1993), 85-110. 3. Guo Ming, ed., Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian States faced would increase if it continued while negotiating. We have some comrades [The Evolution of Sino-Vietnamese Relations over the the war. Countries in all of Europe did not who are afraid that you may by taken in by Last Forty Years] (Nanning: Guangxi People’s Press, participate in the war. This situation was the Americans. I think you will not. Isn’t 1991), 65. The contributors in this volume are from the different from that of the Korean War. Japan this negotiation the same as fighting? We Guangxi Academy of Social Sciences, a major research center on Sino-Vietnamese relations in China. probably would not enter the war. It might can learn experience and know patterns 4. Pei Jianzhang, chief comp., Zhonghua renmin lend some help economically because it could through fighting. Sometimes one cannot gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949-1956 [A Diplomatic His- make money by producing ammunition. I avoid being taken in. Just as you have said, tory of the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1956] think the Americans overestimated their the Americans do not keep their words. (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 94; Hoang Van Hoan, Canghai yisu: Hoang Van Hoan geming strength in the past. Now the United States Johnson once said publicly that even agree- huiyilu [A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan’s is repeating its past practice by overstretch- ments sometimes could not be honored. But Revolutionary Reminiscences] (Beijing: Liberation ing its forces. It is not just us who make this things must have their laws. Take your Army Press, 1987), 267. argument. Nixon has also said so. The negotiations as an example, are you going to 5. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese Military Advisory Group, ed. Zhongguo junshi United States has stretched its forces not negotiate for a hundred years? Our Premier guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi [Histori- only in the Americas and Europe but also in has said that if Nixon continues the negotia- cal Facts about the Role of the Chinese Military Advi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 247 sory Group in the Struggle to Aid Vietnam and Resist Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, 33. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History France] (Beijing: Liberation army Press, 1990), 126- comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949- Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong 127. On 16 October 1955, Mao personally selected 1975, 313-314. Remarks by Mao and Zhou are taken dashiji, 1949-1975, 445; Xue and Pei, Dangdai Peng Dehuai, Chen Geng, and Wei Guoqing as mem- from Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67. Zhongguo waijiao, 160-161. bers of the Chinese delegation for the forthcoming 17. Cong Jin, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue [Years of Twist- 34. Han Huaizhi and Tan Jingjiao, chief comp., Dangdai discussions during Giap’s second visit. See Mao to Liu ing Development] (Zhengzhou: Henan People’s Press, zhongguo jundui de junshi gongzuo [The Military Work Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Deng Xiaoping, 16 1989), 500-502. The author is a party history researcher of the Contemporary Chinese Armed Forces] (Beijing: October 1955, in the CCP Central Documentary Re- at the Chinese National Defense University. See also Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1989), 1:539-40; Li and search Office, comp., Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao Zhu Zhongli, Liming yu wanxia: Wang Jiaxiang wenxue Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, [Mao Zedong Manuscripts since the Founding of the zhuanji [Dawn and Dusk: A Literary Biography of 415; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69-70; PRC] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1991), 5:419. Wang Jiaxiang] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, 1986), Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assis- Deputy Defense Minister Chen Geng, who had served 394-396. The author is the wife of Wang Jiaxiang. tance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31. as China’s chief military advisor to the Vietminh in 18. Ma Qibin, Chen Wenbin, et al. Zhongguo 35. Han and Tan, Dangdai zhongguo jundui de junshi 1950, was not mentioned during Giap’s first visit; gongchandang zhizheng sishinian, 1949-1989 [The Forty gongzuo, 539-540; Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 44; evidently, Mao wanted to present a stronger Chinese Years of the Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949- Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Assis- team to talk with Giap during his second trip. 1989] (Beijing: CCP Party History Material Press, 1989), tance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31. 6. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65. 213; Cong, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue, 502; Zhu, Liming yu 36. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 161. 7. The Writing Team on the History of the Chinese wanxia, 396-399. 37. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 45. Military Advisory Group, ed. Zhongguo junshi 19. Xue Mouhong and Pei Jianzhang, chief comp., 38. Ibid. 35, 44; Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong guwentuan yuanyue kangfa douzheng shishi, 142-143. Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao [Contemporary Chinese de renmin jiefangjun, 422. R. B. Smith also mentions 8. During the Vietnamese land reform, an excessive Diplomacy] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, Ho’s meeting with Mao in Changsha. He dates the persecution of so-called landlords and rich peasants 1990), 159; Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, meeting at May 16-17. His source is the diary of Ho’s occurred, creating serious resentments among the peas- 69; Wang Xiangen, Yuanyue kangmei shilu [A Factual personal secretary. See R. B. Smith, An International ant population against the party. Hoang, Canghai yisu, Record of Assistance to Vietnam against the United History of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of 279-285. Truong Chinh was often regarded by West- States] (Beijing: International Culture Press, 1990), 25. a Limited War, 1965-66 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, ern observers as a member of the “pro-Chinese” wing Wang Xiangen was a secretary at the headquarters of the 1991), 139. of the VWP. PLA Engineering Corps in the late 1970s and is cur- 39. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 46-48. According to 9. Pei, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaoshi, 1949- rently working with the PLA General Staff. His book Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, to facilitate the transporta- 1956, 94. contains much useful data on the role of Chinese army tion of materials to Vietnam, Beijing in 1965 also 10. For Zhou’s visit to Hanoi, see the PRC Foreign engineer troops in Vietnam. established a special leadership group in charge of Ministry’s Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., 20. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159. transportation to Vietnam. Luo Ruiqing was director. Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975 [A 21. Ibid. Li Xiannian, Bo Yibo, Yang Chengwu, Li Tianyou, Chronology of Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities, 22. Li Ke, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese Fang Yi, Li Qiang, and Liu Xiao were vice-directors. Li 1949-1975] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1993), Assistance to Vietnam against the United States,” Junshi and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin jiefangjun, 169-170; Huang Zheng, Hu Zhiming he Zhongguo [Ho lishi [Military History] 4 (1989), 30. This bi-monthly 413. Chi Minh and China] (Beijing: Liberation Army Press, journal is published by the Chinese People’s Revolu- 40. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin 1987), 182-183. Zhou’s quote is taken from Han tionary Military Museum in Beijing. jiefangjun, 417. Suyin, Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of 23. Interview with a Chinese military history researcher, 41. Quoted in Smith, An International History of the Modern China, 1898-1976 (New York: Hill and Wang, Beijing, 13 July 1995. Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited 1994), 260. 24. Li Ke and Hao Shengzhang, Wenhua dageming War, 1965-66, 171. According to Luu Doan Huynh, 11. Donald S. Zagoria, Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, zhong de renmin jiefangjun [The People’s Liberation from the International Relations Institute of the Minis- Peking, Hanoi (New York: Pegasus, 1967), 102-104. Army during the Cultural Revolution] (Beijing: CCP try of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, Beijing informed 12. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 65. Ac- Historical Materials Press, 1989), 409. Hanoi in June 1965 that it would not be able to defend cording to a recent study by William J. Duiker, Le 25. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The North Vietnam from U.S. air attacks. Quoted in Allen Duan as General Secretary was “a powerful advocate United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: 2nd Whiting, “China’s Role in the Vietnam War,” in Jayne of an aggressive strategy to achieve national reunifica- ed., Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 117-119. Werner and David Hunt, eds., The American War in tion with the South.” At the Fifteenth Plenum of the 26. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 159. Vietnam (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia VWP held at the end of 1958, the Central Committee 27. Present at the meetings were Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Program, 1993), 71-76. adopted a new policy which advocated a return to Wu Xiuquan, Yang Chengwu, and Tong Xiaopeng of 42. Xue and Pei, Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao, 161; Guo, revolutionary war to unify the South. But the new line the CCP; Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 70. also included the ambivalence that had shaped atti- Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Chi Thanh, Hoang 43. Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese tudes in Hanoi from the time of the Geneva Confer- Van Hoan, and Van Tien Dung of the VWP; and Assistance to Vietnam against the United States,” 31; ence. Though urging a return to revolutionary war, the Kaysone Phomvihane, Prince Souphanouvong, and Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 69. For a Central Committee report, which was not issued until Phoumi Vongvochit of the Lao People’s Revolutionary description of the Chinese use of the Cambodian port of May 1959, asserted that the “political strength of the Party. The PRC Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic History Sihanoukville to send military supplies to the National masses” would remain the principal from of struggle, Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong Liberation Front in South Vietnam between 1966- although it would now be supplemented by low-level dashiji, 1949-1975, 413. 1967, see Kang Daisha, “My Days in Cambodia,” in military operations conducted by local guerrilla forces 28. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin Cheng Xiangjun, ed., Nu waijiaoguan [Women Diplo- and village self-defense units of the type that had been jiefangjun, 408. mats] (Beijing: People’s Sports Press, 1995), 482-483. employed during the August 1945 Revolution. Will- 29. Chen, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War,” Kang Daisha is the wife of Chen Shuliang, who was the iam J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Con- 364. Chinese ambassador to Cambodia between 1962-1967. flict in Indochina (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 30. Allen S. Whiting, “How We Almost Went to War For a detailed treatment of Chinese aid to the DRV 1994), 235. It is possible that China’s advice for cau- with China,” Look, 29 April 1969, p. 76; Melvin Gurtov between 1965-1969, see Chen, “China’s Involvement tion in waging revolutionary struggle in the South and Hwang Byong-moo, China Under Threat: The in the Vietnam War,” 371-380. contributed to the ambivalence in Hanoi’s policy. Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy (Baltimore: Johns 44. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 71. 13. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict Hopkins University Press, 1980), 160-161. 45. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deter- in Indochina, 265. 31. Li, “The Indelible Mark on History of Chinese rence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: University of 14. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 67. Assistance to Vietnam against the United States,” 30. Michigan Press, 1975), 186; idem., “Forecasting Chi- 15. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict 32. Gurtov and Hwang, China Under Threat: The Poli- nese Foreign Policy: IR Theory vs. the Fortune Cookie,” in Indochina, 266. tics of Strategy and Diplomacy, 162; Herring, America’s in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds., 16. For Pham Van Dong’s visit to China, see the PRC Longest War, 128-131. Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: 248 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

Clarendon Press, 1994), 506-523. “Kremlinology and the Chinese Strategic Debate, 1965- 16. 46. John W. Garver, “The Chinese Threat in the Viet- 66,” The China Quarterly 49 (January-March 1972), 71. Mao Zedong, “Talks with the American Correspon- nam War,” Parameters 22 (Spring 1992), 73-85, quo- 32-75. dent Anna Louise Strong,” in Selected Works of Mao tation on 75. 65. Barry Naughton has made a similar criticism. Tse-tung (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 47. Sun Dongsheng, “The Great Transformation in the Naughton, “The Third Front,” 370-371. 4:99. Strategic Planning of Our Country’s Economic Con- 66. Luo Ruiqing, “The People Defeated Japanese Fas- 72. For a recent study of China’s policy toward Angola struction,” Dangde wenxian [Party Documents] 3 cism and They Can Certainly Defeat U.S. Imperialism and Mozambique, see Steven F. Jackson, “China’s (1995), 42-48. Sun’s indirect quotation of Mao’s re- Too,” Peking Review, 3 September 1965, 31-39; Lin Third World Foreign Policy: The Case of Angola and marks is on p. 44. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthly Biao, “Long Live the Victory of People’s War,” ibid., Mozambique, 1961-93,” The China Quarterly 143 (June journal published by the CCP Central Documentary 9-30. 1995), 387-422. Research Office and the Central Archives. It often 67. Xu Yan, Junshijia Mao Zedong [Military Strategist 73. On Beijing’s attempt to divide the Soviet-led bloc, contains important party documents. Sun Dongsheng is Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1995), see the putative memoirs of Enver Hoxha, Reflections a researcher at the Central Documentary Research 149; Huang Yao, Sanci danan busi de Luo Ruiqing on China, 2 vols., (Tirana: 8 Nentori, 1979). For an Office. Dajiang [Senior General Luo Ruiqing who Survived overview of Chinese-Albanian relations, see Fan 48. Mao’s conversation with Pham Van Dong, 17 Three Deaths] (Beijing: CCP Party History Press, 1994), Chengzuo, “The ‘Spring, Summer, Autumn, and Win- November 1968, in the PRC Foreign Ministry and the 263, 265, 270-271. This book is based on sources from ter’ in Chinese-Albanian Relations,” Waijiao xueyuan Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao the Central Archives, the PLA General Staff Archives, xuebao [Journal of Foreign Affairs College] 3 (1993), Zedong waijiao wenxuan [Selected Diplomatic Works and the Ministry of Public Security Archives. 50-52. of Mao Zedong] (Beijing: Central Document Press and It is possible that the two articles published in Luo 74. Mao’s conversation with the Chilean Journalist World Knowledge Press, 1994), 582. and Lin’s names were written in response to Soviet Delegation, 23 June 1964, in the PRC Foreign Ministry 49. Yuan Dejin, “The Evolution of Mao Zedong’s arguments on war and peace. On 30 January 1965, Mao and the Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Theory of War and Peace since the Founding of New asked Yang Chengwu and Lei Yingfu, Deputy Director Mao Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 529-533. China,” Junshi lishi [Military History] 4 (1994), 36. of the Combat Department of the General Staff, to find 75. Mao’s talk with delegates from Asia, Africa, and 50. For an excellent discussion of the origins, develop- a person well versed in political and military issues to Oceania on 9 July 1964, in ibid, 534-539. These del- ment and consequences of the Third Front, see Barry prepare a commentary on the book Military Strategy egates came to China after participating in Pyongyang Naughton, “The Third Front: Defence Industrialization edited by Soviet Chief of Staff V. D. Sokolovsky and in the Second Asian Economic Forum. in the Chinese Interior,” The China Quarterly 115 published by the Soviet Defense Ministry’s Military 76. For a good discussion of anti-imperialism in Chi- (September 1988), 351-386. Press in 1962. See Mao to Yang Chengwu and Lei nese foreign policy, see Edward Friedman, “Anti-Im- 51. For the complete text of the report, see Dangde Yingfu, 30 January 1965, in Mao Zedong junshi wenji, perialism in Chinese Foreign Policy,” in Samuel S. wenxian 3 (1995), 34-35. 6:402. Kim, ed., China and the World: Chinese Foreign Rela- 52. Mao to Luo and Yang, 12 August 1964, in ibid, 33. 68. For a detailed discussion of the Luo-Lin dispute, see tions in the Post Cold War Era, 3rd ed. (Boulder: 53. For the text of the Special Committee report of 19 Huang, Sanci danan busi de Luo Riqing Dajiang, Westview Press, 1994), 60-74. August 1964, see ibid., 33-34. chapters 24-34. Allen Whiting attempts to establish a 77. Gurtov and Hwang, China under Threat, 161. 54. Mao’s remarks are quoted in Sun, “The Great causal relationship between Luo’s purge and China’s 78. For a detailed, first-hand account of Zhou Enlai’s Transformation in the Strategic Planning of Our foreign policy change in mid-1965. Citing the Viet- visit to Moscow, see Yu Zhan, “An Unusual Visit: Country’s Economic Construction,” 45. namese claim that China decided in June 1965 to Remembering Zhou Enlai’s Last Visit to the Soviet 55. Sun, “The Great Transformation in the Strategic provide no air cover for North Vietnam, Whiting argues Union,” Dangde wenxian [Party Documents] 2 (1992), Planning of Our Country’s Economic Construction,” that this timing dovetails with a major personnel change 85-91. It is also included in the Foreign Ministry Dip- 44. in the Chinese leadership: “At some point between May lomatic History Research Office, comp., XinZhongguo 56. Naughton, “The Third Front,” 368. and September Luo Ruiqing fell from office, after waijiao fengyun [Episodes of New China’s Diplomacy] 57. Mao’s conversation with He Long, Luo Ruiqing, which Lin Biao published a major treatise on guerrilla (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1994), 3:14-30. Yu and Yang Chengwu, 28 April 1965, in Mao Zedong war implicitly rejecting Luo’s forward strategy and Zhan was Director of the Department of the Soviet junshi wenji [Collection of Mao Zedong’s Military with it any advanced air combat. Chinese ground sup- Union and Eastern Europe of the Chinese Foreign Writings] 6 vols. (Beijing: Military Science Press and port apparently came as a substitute form of help for Ministry in 1964 and accompanied Zhou to Moscow. Central Document Press, 1993), 6:404. Hanoi.” Whiting, “Forecasting Chinese Foreign Policy,” 79. The PRC Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic History 58. For Snow’s version of his conversation with Mao, 516. In fact, Luo did not fall from office until December Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong see Edgar Snow, The Long Revolution (New York: 1965. dashiji, 1949-1975, 428. Random House, 1971), 215-216. For the Chinese ver- 69. Michael H. Hunt has also criticized the emphasis on 80. Zhou’s conversation with Ho Chi Minh and Le sion, see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the Central factions to account for Chinese foreign policy forma- Duan, 1 March 1965, in ibid., 438. Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao Zedong tion. He poses the question sharply: “Does the factional 81. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam waijiao wenxuan, 544-562. model transpose on China the competitive ethos of War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965- 59. Li and Hao, Wenhua dageming zhong de renmin American politics and underestimate the restraining 66, 54. jiefangjun, 341. authoritarian and hierarchical qualities of China’s po- 82. The Vietnamese claim is quoted in Nayan Chanda, 60. Ibid., 341-342; Mao Zedong junshi wenji, 6:403. litical culture?” See Michael H. Hunt, “CCP Foreign “Secrets of Former Friends,” Far Eastern Economic 61. The PRC Foreign Ministry Diplomatic History Policy: ‘Normalizing the Field,’” in Michael H. Hunt Review (15 June 1979), 38-39. I have not seen any Research Office, comp., Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong and Niu Jun, eds., Toward a History of Chinese Com- Chinese material that confirms the Vietnamese claim. dashiji, 1949-1975, 455. munist Foreign Relations, 1920s-1960s: Personalities 83. Xie Yixian, ed., Zhongguo waijiao shi: Zhonghua 62. Liu Shaoqi’s speech at the war planning meeting of and Interpretive Approaches (Washington, DC: renmin gongheguo shiqi, 1949-1979 [A Diplomatic the Central Military Commission, 19 May 1965, in Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars History of China: The Period of the People’s Republic Dangde wenxian 3 (1995), 40. Asia Program, 1995), 163-191. The quotation is on p. of China, 1949-1979] (Zhengzhou: Henan People’s 63. The CCP Central Documentary Research Office, 170. Press, 1988), 344. comp., Zhu De nianpu [Chronicle of Zhu De] (Beijing: 70. For Mao’s statements on the “Two Intermediate 84. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam People’s Press, 1986), 537-538. Zones,” see the PRC Foreign Ministry and the CCP War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965- 64. Harry Harding, “The Making of Chinese Military Central Documentary Research Office, comp., Mao 66, 55. Power,” in William Whitson, ed., The Military and Zedong waijiao wenxuan, 506-509. See also Chi Aiping, 85. Douglas Pike describes Hanoi’s strategy to put the Political Power in China in the 1970s (New York: “The Evolution of Mao Zedong’s International Strate- Sino-Soviet dispute to its own use in service of its war Praeger, 1973), 361-385; Uri Ra’anan, “Peking’s For- gic Thought,” in Dangde wenxian 3 (1994), 46-52; Li as “the alternating tilt gambit.” See Douglas Pike, eign Policy ‘Debate’, 1965-1966,” in Tang Tsou, ed., Jie, “Study of Mao Zedong’s International Strategic Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance China in Crisis, vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Thought,” in the International Strategic Studies Foun- (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987), 54-55. Press, 1968), 23-71; Donald Zagoria, “The Strategic dation, ed., Huanqiu tongci liangre [All Is the Same in 86. For Mao’s reaction to Dulles’ policy, see Bo Yibo, Debate in Peking,” in ibid., 237-268; Michael Yahuda, the World] (Beijing: Central Document Press, 1993), 1- Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Recollec- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 249 tions of Certain Important Decisions and Events], vol. GAIDUK curator of relations between the CPSU and 2 (Beijing: CCP Party School Press, 1993), 1137-1157. other parties, accepted that advice.4 87. For more discussions of Mao’s attempt to use the continued from page 232 escalation of the Indochina conflict to radicalize China’s Meanwhile, faced with the Soviet political and social life, see Chen, “China’s Involve- palpable improvement in Soviet-American leadership’s unwillingness to plunge into ment in the Vietnam War,” 361-365. relations following the shared fright of the the Southeast Asian conflict, Hanoi re- 88. For a description of this problem, see Zhai, “Trans- 1962 Caribbean (Cuban missile) crisis, the doubled its efforts to improve relations with planting the Chinese Model,” 712-713. 89. Wang, Yuanyue kangmei shilu, 60-68. Kremlin sought to minimize Soviet involve- China. According to the information of the 90. Ibid., 74-75. ment in the Vietnam conflict, which was not Soviet Defense Ministry, PRC and DRV 91. Guo, Zhongyue guanxi yanbian sishinian, 102. only problematic from the viewpoint of pos- officials opened talks in 1964 on a bilateral 92. Cong, Quzhe fazhan de suiyue, 607. sible foreign-policy advantages but was also treaty of military cooperation. North Viet- 93. Kikuzo Ito and Minoru Shibata, “The Dilemma of Mao Tse-tung,” The China Quarterly 35 (July-Sep- fraught with possible new clashes between nam hosted a delegation of PRC military tember 1968), 58-77; Smith, An International History the USSR and the USA. Moreover, the leaders, led by the Defense Minister, and in of the Vietnam War, Volume III: The Making of a Soviet leaders were apprehensive of radical December 1964 a bilateral treaty was signed Limited War, 1965-66, 285-304. views held by North Vietnam’s leaders, who which provided for the introduction of PRC 94. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam 5 War, Volume III: The Making of a Limited War, 1965- had a clearly pro-Chinese orientation. troops to the DRV. Prior to that, the DRV 66, 298-299. For Zhou’s reception of the Vietnamese The extent of the difference in the posi- General Staff had informed the Soviet mili- delegation led by Le Duan, see The PRC Foreign tions held by the two countries became clear tary attaché in Hanoi that there was no longer Ministry Diplomatic History Research Office, comp., after a visit to Moscow in Jan.-Feb. 1964 by any need for Soviet military experts to stay Zhou Enlai waijiao huodong dashiji, 1949-1975, 491. 95. Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical a delegation of the Workers Party of Vietnam in the country and they should leave the Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell Publish- (WPV), led by Le Duan, the party’s First DRV without replacement by other Soviet ing Co., Inc., 1982), 93-94, 96. Secretary. The DRV Communists came out advisors as soon as they completed their 96. Garver, “The Chinese Threat in the Vietnam War,” in support of their Chinese colleagues with current business.6 The rapprochement be- 75. 97. Yang Chengwu. such zeal and expressed such radical ideas tween Hanoi and Beijing was facilitated by 98. Dangde wenxian is a bi-monthly journal published about the role of the national liberation move- common views on the need to fight against by the CCP Central Documentary Research Office and ment in Third World countries that their “U.S. imperialism.” Although the North the Central Archives. It often contains important party Moscow interlocutors were obliged to switch Vietnamese leaders never fully trusted China documents 99. Chief of Staff. from “the patient explanation of the CPSU (as later conflicts demonstrated), coolness 100. Deputy Prime Minister, Director of the State stand and the general line of the world com- in relations with the Soviet Union predeter- Council Special Committee on war preparation. munist movement” to direct warnings about mined their official position.7 101. Deputy Prime Minister, Deputy Director of the the possible consequences such views could Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964 State Council Special Committee on war preparation. 102. Luo was also named Deputy Director of the State have for “the Vietnamese friends’” relations marked a turning point in Soviet-North Viet- Council Special Committee on war preparation. with the Soviet Union.3 namese relations.8 For reasons that remain 103. Mao Zedong. Further evidence that the two sides were unclear, the Soviet Union made an about- 104. Zhou Enlai. slowly but surely drifting apart surfaced dur- face and again oriented itself toward closer 105. These are the names of Chinese missiles. 106. A major railway trunk running east and west ing a July 1964 visit to Moscow by an NLF cooperation with North Vietnam. Probably between Lianyungang and Lanzhou. delegation at the invitation of the Soviet Leonid I. Brezhnev and his entourage feared 107. A major railway trunk running north and south Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. The rep- a loss of Soviet influence in the region, between Beijing and Wuhan. resentatives of the patriotic forces of South particularly in the context of the mounting 108. A major railway trunk running north and south between Tianjin and Nanjing. Vietnam presented to the Soviet leaders a differences between Beijing and Moscow 109. A province in North China. number of requests and proposals, including which threatened to develop into an open 110. The Vietnamese delegation was led by Pham Van requests for increased supplies of arms and conflict. In that context, the consolidation of Dong. ammunition. They also expressed a desire China’s position in Southeast Asia at the that a permanent mission of the NFLSV be USSR’s expense posed a potential threat to Qiang Zhai teaches history at Auburn Uni- opened in the USSR. The CPSU CC viewed the Soviet authority in the world communist versity at Montgomery (Alabama) and is the skeptically all those requests. In his report to movement.9 Furthermore, the assassination author of The Dragon, the Lion, and the the CC about that delegation’s visit, D. of U.S. President John F. Kennedy in No- Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, Shevlyagin, deputy head of the CC Interna- vember 1963 and advent to power of Lyndon 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State Univer- tional Department, advised that no definite B. Johnson (whose election as president in sity Press, 1994). This article is adapted answer about the opening of such a mission 1964 was regarded in the USSR as an indi- from a paper prepared for presentation at be given and that all talks be held exclusively cator of greater right-wing influence in the CWI HP Conference on New Evidence via the North Vietnamese state agencies. In American politics) dimmed the hopes of on the Cold War in Asia at the University of view of this, it was decided not to receive the improvement in Soviet-American relations Hong Kong on 9-12 January 1995. delegation at the CPSU CC, for that would that had arisen in the last year of Kennedy’s have raised the awkward necessity for the life. This development offered a certain Kremlin leaders to state in clear terms their freedom of action to Moscow’s new leader- stand on the above-mentioned issues. CC ship, which had reverted to the policy of Secretary Boris Ponomarev, who was the confrontation—a policy which was, in turn, 250 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN facilitated by Johnson’s escalation of U.S. Soviet dispute, or otherwise rely exclusively and U.S. military contingents in Germany. involvement in Vietnam. on only one communist patron. Rather, after Why? Because, they explained, the Soviet From late 1964 on, Soviet policy with Moscow changed its attitude to the DRV, troops had allegedly been transferred to the respect to Vietnam pursued several goals. Hanoi took steps to secure maximum profit Soviet-Chinese border, which provoked ten- First and foremost, the USSR emphasized by exploiting its friendship with both of its sions there and diverted Beijing from North moral and political support to what it de- mighty allies—the PRC and the USSR—as Vietnamese military requirements, and the scribed as the Vietnamese people’s war they competed for influence in Southeast U.S. troops were immediately transferred to against American aggression. The Soviet Asia. Precisely this policy was pursued by South Vietnam.15 mass media now promptly and frequently the WPV Central Committee grouping which The Vietnamese side’s egoism and its carried official statements by Soviet leaders was formed in late 1964-early 1965 and desire (in the words of a Soviet Embassy denouncing U.S. aggressive actions in South- included Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and Vo political letter) “to have a monopoly on the east Asia, no longer delaying as it had with Nguyen Giap.13 This group sought to rid correct assessment and methods of solution TASS’s statement on the Tonkin Gulf inci- North Vietnam of China’s excessive ward- to the Vietnam conflict,” often verged on dent. Steps were taken to expand contacts ship, on the one hand, and, on the other, to cynicism. Indicative in this respect was a both with Hanoi and representatives of the avoid any kind of dependence on the Soviet complaint by the Soviet Ministry of Com- South Vietnamese patriotic forces, and, ac- Union. As a result, in that period reports by mercial Shipping, dated 18 July 1966, sent cordingly, the CPSU CC now approved the Soviet representatives in Vietnam, the USSR to the CPSU CC, in connection with the opening in Moscow (at the Soviet Afro- Defense Ministry, and the KGB regarding actions by the Vietnamese in Haiphong, the Asian Solidarity Committee), on 24 Decem- reduced Chinese influence in the DRV were DRV’s chief port. The port authorities, the ber 1964, of a permanent mission of the accompanied by complaints of insincerity, ministry complained, had artificially delayed NFLSV. egoism and unmanageability on the part of the unloading of Soviet vessels, evidently Second, Soviet material assistance (eco- “the Vietnamese friends.” believing that the longer they held the large- nomic and, primarily, military) to the DRV For instance, back in 1966, in his analy- tonnage vessels flying the Soviet flag in the and NLF expanded. Soviet military supplies sis of the prospects of Soviet-Vietnamese port and its vicinity, the less risk of damage in the period from 1963 to 1967 (particularly relations, Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi Ilya they would run of U.S. bombing raids. More- after 1965) exceeded one billion rubles, ac- Shcherbakov pointed out: “Just as before, over, they usually placed those Soviet ves- cording to the data of the Soviet Embassy in the Embassy believes that the process of sels in close proximity to the most danger- Hanoi.10 Prior to 1965, German models of promotion of our relations with the WPV ous areas (e.g., near anti-aircraft guns), in arms were sent to North Vietnam from the and the DRV will hardly be steady or rapid hopes of ensuring their safety during air Soviet Union, but from then on the Kremlin in view of the policy pursued by the Viet- raids. Moreover, during air raids Vietnam- provided only Soviet-made arms to the “Viet- namese comrades. This was, regrettably, ese military boats lurking behind Soviet namese friends,” including the latest de- confirmed in the past few years. Even the vessels fired at the enemy, thus making the signs of surface-to-air missiles, jet planes, manifestation of a more serious discord be- Soviet “shields” the targets of U.S. bombers rockets, and field artillery, as well as a large tween the WPV and the Communist Party of (and those vessels contained loads of car- array of especially sophisticated arms and China will not probably mean automatic or goes meant as assistance to “the embattled combat hardware for the DRV air defense proportionate Soviet-Vietnamese rapproche- Vietnamese people”). The clearly outraged system.11 And Soviet economic and mili- ment. The year 1966 showed once more that ministry officials demanded that Soviet com- tary assistance to Vietnam kept on increas- we are obliged constantly to display initia- mercial vessels be kept out of danger while ing. According to estimates of the Soviet tive and unilaterally, as it were, drag the discharging their noble mission.16 Embassy in Hanoi, by 1968 Soviet material Vietnamese comrades to greater friendship No less complicated was the situation assistance accounted for 50 percent of all aid and independence.” The ambassador then concerning Soviet-North Vietnamese mili- to the DRV, and as of 1 January 1968 the stressed the “general positive nature” of the tary cooperation. The USSR Defense Min- total value of Soviet assistance over that WPV’s tendency for independence but istry and embassy in Hanoi repeatedly in- period was in excess of 1.8 billion rubles, pointed to its negative aspects, primarily to formed Moscow about “the Vietnamese with military supplies accounting for 60 indications that the Vietnamese conducted friends’ insincere attitude” toward the So- percent.12 its foreign policy, including its relations viet Union, the Soviet people, and the Soviet Such a turnabout in Soviet policy with with Moscow, from a narrow, nationalistic Defense Ministry. They pointed out that respect to cooperation with Vietnam was viewpoint. Soviet aid was regarded by Hanoi they received slanted reports from the received with satisfaction by the Hanoi lead- exclusively from the standpoint of their ben- People’s Army of (North) Vietnam regard- ers, who increasingly stressed the impor- efit to Vietnam, rather than for the good of ing the situation in South Vietnam, belittling tance of Soviet moral, political, and material the international socialist cause.14 the role and importance of Soviet military assistance in their conversations with the This undercurrent of tension in Soviet- assistance to the DRV and discrediting the officials of the Soviet Embassy and those of North Vietnamese relations, produced by performance of Soviet arms and military other socialist countries. However, the North what Moscow viewed as Hanoi’s parochial hardware. They also reported that the North Vietnamese leaders’ appreciation for this perspective, cropped up repeatedly. In 1966, Vietnamese had raised obstacles in the way largesse by no means signified that they for example, the North Vietnamese expressed of Soviet military experts who wished to would now take the USSR’s side in the Sino- indignation at the partial reduction of Soviet inspect U.S. military hardware, and displayed COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 251 other signs of distrust and suspiciousness pendently from China was not yet pro- nam would be hard put to do without Chi- toward Soviet Defense Ministry representa- nounced, the DRV’s trust in Beijing had nese assistance in its struggle and in future tives. The Soviet leadership was informed already been undermined. However, the peaceful construction. So it would be pre- about violations of storage rules for Soviet report admitted that one could hardly hope mature to ask the Vietnamese now to state military hardware, wasteful use of missiles for the WPV leadership to display initiative their clear-cut position with respect to the and ammunition, and neglect of Soviet ex- to opt for one patron over the other, for “the USSR and China.”21 And the following fact perts’ advice on the rules of exploitation of comrades probably have not yet risen to the is quite indicative: Hanoi named Xuan Thuy, military hardware, which led to its spoilage. level of clear-cut choice.” In view of this, the well-known for his pro-Chinese views and a All this coincided with Hanoi’s requests for Soviet Embassy set itself the task “to render past president of the Vietnamese-Chinese more assistance, but the DRV leaders evi- all-round assistance to the Vietnam leader- Friendship Association, as the head of the dently saw no contradiction in this: It was ship in its adoption of an independent stand DRV delegation to the Paris talks. pointed out in the 1970 political report of the on the issues of home and foreign policy.” The details of relations among the USSR, Soviet Embassy in Hanoi that, while “at- That “independent” policy naturally was DRV, and PRC also throw light on the So- taching great importance to the Soviet mili- meant to be independent from China, for the viet Union’s relations with the USA. Soviet tary assistance, the command of the People’s report then underlined the need “to react leaders could hardly react indifferently or Army of Vietnam at the same time regarded more firmly to any action by Vietnamese simplistically to the Vietnam conflict and it exclusively as the obligatory discharge of comrades which may be directly or indi- the dramatic escalation of American mili- its internationalist duty by the Soviet rectly damaging to Soviet-Vietnamese friend- tary activity in Southeast Asia. From a Union.”17 ship.”20 purely propaganda viewpoint, the conflict All the above-mentioned facts suggest Sino-Vietnamese contradictions tended played into Soviet hands. While U.S. sup- how complicated and contradictory Soviet- to sharpen as the DRV leadership came to port for an unpopular neo-colonial regime in Vietnamese relations were, and demonstrate realize the need for a diplomatic settlement Saigon offered a ripe target for condemna- the great discrepancy between the scale of with the USA. The DRV’s consent to hold tion and undermined Washington’s interna- Soviet assistance to Vietnam and the degree talks with Washington in 1968 profoundly tional stature, the USSR could simulta- of Soviet influence on Hanoi’s policy. As a irritated Beijing, which was dead-set against neously pose as a consistent fighter for the Vietnamese journalist in his conversation any compromise settlement leading to a ces- triumph of a just cause, acting in the spirit of with M. Ilyinsky, an Izvestia correspondent, sation of hostilities. To advance its more proletarian internationalism—as evidenced put it: “Do you know,” the Vietnamese militant policy, the Chinese leaders began to by its moral-political, economic, and mili- journalist asked, “what is the Soviet Union’s expand separate contacts (bypassing Hanoi) tary assistance to North Vietnam—and also share in total assistance, received by Viet- with the NLF, urging it to carry on protracted as a potential mediator in the forging of a nam, and what is the share of Soviet political warfare. Moreover, the PRC started to ob- peaceful settlement. Furthermore, the likely influence there (if the latter can be measured struct carriages of Soviet arms and ammuni- protracted nature of the conflict promised to in percent)? The respective figures are: 75- tion delivered by rail through Chinese terri- sap the strength of the Soviet Union’s prin- 80 percent and 4-8 percent.” The Soviet tory, with the express aim of undermining cipal rivals, distracting the United States and journalist noted: “If the Vietnamese jour- Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Although the China and thereby enhancing Soviet secu- nalist has exaggerated the former figures PRC leadership’s approach to the talks issue rity interests in other regions (especially (by 15-20 percent), the share of Soviet influ- later softened, Sino-Vietnamese relations Europe and the Soviet Far East). ence is probably correct.”18 remained strained. Yet the Vietnam War also presented Sino-Vietnamese relations were no less Although discord between the Beijing long-term difficulties and dangers for Mos- complicated and contradictory. That Mos- and Hanoi leaderships affected Sino-Viet- cow, especially to the extent that there was a cow monitored their development closely is namese relations, no major conflict between real threat of its escalating from a local into testified to by the vast number of reports in the two countries threatened a complete rup- a world war, if (as was sometimes specu- the CPSU CC archives on this subject, sent ture during the course of the war. Vietnam lated) the USA were driven to desperation by the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, the KGB, still needed Chinese assistance and support, and resorted to the use of nuclear weapons. and the Military Intelligence Agency (GRU) so it took steps to reduce or contain the level In that case, the USSR could hardly have of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed of tensions. The DRV’s party and govern- kept neutral—and yet retaliating against the Forces. An early sign of the incipient dis- ment leaders, as before, regularly visited United States might have led to disastrous cord between the two countries seems to Beijing to discuss with “the Chinese friends” consequences. All the same, even if no have appeared in a still-classified 21 Febru- important foreign policy issues. No matter nuclear conflict broke out, the risk of a direct ary 1966 KGB report to the CPSU CC how riled, Hanoi carefully avoided giving clash between the two superpowers arising stating that Chinese leaders were concerned categorical assessments of Chinese policy— from the Southeast Asian crisis was too about the WPV’s increasingly independent either regarding the world communist move- great and this was precisely what the Soviet foreign policy, especially in relations with ment or Soviet-Chinese relations. “The WPV leadership wished to avoid at all costs. Plus, the PRC and the conduct of the war.19 And leaders realize full well,” the Soviet Em- to the extent Kremlin leaders genuinely de- the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi pointed out in bassy in Hanoi explained to Moscow, “that sired an improvement in relations with Wash- its 1966 report that, although the WPV China is situated quite close to Vietnam, ington, the war would inevitably serve as a tendency to settle the Vietnam issue inde- whereas the Soviet Union is far away. Viet- distraction and potential sticking point. 252 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

There were naturally other “pros” and transferred as a gift. Soviet assistance in promise of cooperation with the United “cons” which Moscow must have taken into 1969 was planned to remain on the same States; or, better still, 3) warned it that if account in determining its policy toward the level (525 million rubles), but with the open- Soviet cooperation were not forthcoming struggle: Military factors constituted one ing of peace talks and reduction of the scale the United States might resort to rapproche- major positive incentive favoring a more of hostilities in Vietnam, part of the funds ment with China—or some optimal combi- active Soviet involvement, according to ar- originally assigned for military deliveries nation of all those approaches. When in chival documents. There were two princi- was reallocated for other purposes, so Soviet retirement, Johnson disclosed his calcula- pal, interconnected perceived opportunities: assistance to Vietnam in 1969 totaled 370 tions as president in a conversation at his Vietnam offered a live battlefield testing million rubles and in 1970, 316 million Texas ranch with Soviet citizens that was ground for Soviet military hardware, includ- rubles.25 reported to the Kremlin leadership by the ing the latest models, and also a chance to One negative factor, from the Soviet KGB in December 1969. The USSR could obtain a windfall of hard information about leaders’ viewpoint, in decision-making on be instrumental in helping the United States up-to-date U.S. weaponry, by inspecting the aid to the DRV was what they saw as the to bring the Vietnam War to a conclusion, war booty captured or obtained by the DRV Vietnamese allies’ unmanageability and Johnson argued, for “if we take Soviet stra- forces. The North Vietnamese air defense unpredictability. Hanoi’s independent course tegic, not tactical, interests, the end of the was fully equipped with modern Soviet hard- in relations with the USSR hardly inspired Vietnam War fully accords with the Soviet ware, whose effectiveness was shown by the Moscow to greater enthusiasm in its support Union’s interests,” considering that, “after fact that even the Vietnamese personnel for the war, and as time went on, those all, it is the United States, not Vietnam, managed to operate it successfully, despite a Vietnamese properties might have led to which is the main partner of the USSR.” frequent lack of training or competence. undesirable consequences—perhaps an open And Johnson rejected the argument that the Those systems were being constantly im- break. So from that standpoint, at least, Soviet Union was not in a position to exert proved, taking into account the capabilities Moscow had every reason to favor an early pressure on the DRV as groundless from the of U.S. warplanes.22 Apart from the anti- cease-fire and political solution. viewpoint of realpolitik. “It’s highly doubt- aircraft defense system, the archival docu- In fact, the hope for a peaceful settle- ful for a country supplying Vietnam with 75 ments note, the North Vietnamese used the ment was shared by both Soviet and Ameri- percent of [its] arms not to have real levers of Soviet-made Grad artillery shelling systems, can leaders, and their tactics on this issue, influence on it,” the ex-president was quoted which were highly effective in attacks on paradoxically enough, were surprisingly as saying.28 U.S. bases, airfields, ammunition depots, similar. However, the Soviet government Thus, the problem, from the U.S. per- etc.,23 as well as MiG-21 jets. backed a settlement on Hanoi’s terms, spective, consisted only in discovering how The Soviet military also relished the whereas the U.S. sought to ensure the maxi- best to approach Moscow. The United States opportunity to pore over the latest U.S. mili- mum consideration of the Saigon might have acted through official channels, tary hardware. In accordance with a Soviet- government’s interests. Moreover, of course, since although Soviet-American relations North Vietnamese agreement signed in the as a direct participant in the conflict, the were rather cool at that time, they were spring of 1965, the Vietnamese undertook to United States could not possibly play the maintained. And the United States certainly transfer to the USSR models of captured part of an arbiter, which remained a privi- probed what could be done in that direction. U.S. military hardware for inspection. All lege of the Soviet Union. For this reason, For instance, at an August 1966 meeting difficulties notwithstanding, according to with U.S. armed forces directly involved in between Colonel C.C. Fitzgerald, a military the data of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, a hostilities, the Johnson Administration was attaché of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, total of 700 models were delivered to the obliged to rely on intermediaries in its at- with officers of the Department of External USSR between May 1965 and January 1967. tempts to convince Hanoi to sit down at the Relations of the Soviet Defense Ministry, The embassy pointed out that the work done negotiating table rather than pursue a purely the American stressed the important role the was very valuable: the CPSU CC adopted a military outcome. And in this respect Wash- USSR could play in the settlement of the decision to apply in Soviet industry of a ington pinned much of its hopes on the Vietnam conflict as the initiator of and ac- number of selected and studied models.24 Soviet Union.26 tive mediator in peace negotiations. Col. However, apart from obvious assets the U.S. leaders had every reason for such Fitzgerald drew the attention of his inter- USSR gained in the course of the Vietnam hopes, for they believed that since the USSR locutors to the Johnson Administration’s War, its expenditures were likewise enor- rendered massive and ever-growing mili- constant efforts to open talks, stating that the mous, primarily in the sphere of ever in- tary and economic assistance to Vietnam (of visit to Moscow of Senator Mike Mansfield creasing material assistance to Vietnam. (See which Washington was well aware),27 so the and Averell Harriman’s appointment as a the figures cited above.) In 1966-1968 the Soviet Union could exert leverage on the special presidential advisor aimed at pre- Soviet Union undertook to render to the DRV leadership. Both Johnson and, after cisely this purpose.29 However, worried DRV economic assistance to the tune of January 1969, his successor Richard M. that a formal, top-level overture to Moscow 121.6 million rubles, but in fact the assis- Nixon were convinced that Moscow would might result in a rebuff or even denunciation tance was far greater in view of Hanoi’s press Hanoi to agree to open negotiations, by the Kremlin leaders, the White House incessant requests for additional supplies. once Washington: 1) demonstrated to the opted not to run the risk, but to first sound out In 1968 Soviet assistance to the DRV totaled Soviet Union that the Vietnam War was Soviet officials in order to ascertain their 524 million rubles, with 361 million rubles hardly in its interests; 2) seduced it by the attitudes and try to reach agreement unoffi- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 253 cially. was largely produced in accordance with Boris Ponomarev, who was in charge of the Regrettably, we do not yet have access recommendations and draft decisions sent Party’s international relations, submitted to to all the documents, including the still- by the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi—not by the the CPSU CC Secretariat a memorandum, classified “special dossiers” (osobaya papki) Politburo, the CC Secretariat, nor the For- entitled “On a Proposal to the Vietnamese at SCCD, as well as KGB, Foreign and eign Ministry—and only later were those Friends,” in which he raised the issue of Defense Ministry, and Presidential Archive recommendations and draft decisions rub- establishing and promoting relations between materials, that are necessary to reconstruct ber-stamped by the top Soviet leaders. This the CPSU and the communist parties of fully from Soviet sources all of the many conclusion, albeit preliminary, is based on several Southeast Asian countries by mak- conversations and probes connected to vari- ample documentary evidence, when, for in- ing use of the authority wielded by the WPV ous diplomatic efforts aimed at ending the stance, the Soviet Ambassador sets out a in the communist movement in the region. Vietnam conflict in 1965-67, including, per- number of ideas in his political letter to In other words, he suggested possible Soviet haps most importantly, the so-called MARI- Moscow about what should be done, and penetration of Thailand, Indonesia, Malay- GOLD and SUNFLOWER initiatives (to later the same considerations were put for- sia, and the Philippines. After inconclusive use the secret U.S. government code names), ward as the official views of the CPSU and discussion of the proposal, Ponomarev, along in both of which the Soviet Union played an Soviet government in conversations with with CC secretaries Suslov, Kirilenko, important role.30 An initial survey of the Pham Van Dong or Nguyen Duy Trinh.32 So Demichev, Katushev, and Rakhmanin, de- SCCD archives disclosed only cryptic traces Moscow obviously deemed it advisable to cided to consult the Soviet Ambassador in of Soviet contacts with potential intermedi- consult the Soviet Ambassador in Hanoi Hanoi on the matter.35 aries. For instance, documents failed to before adopting decisions. The new importance attached to the role clarify what was discussed in conversations Take the following two examples. The of ambassadors and embassies in the process with L. Mulkern (vice-president for interna- political letter33 of the Soviet Embassy in the of decision-making on foreign-policy issues tional relations of the Bank of America), DRV, entitled “Soviet-Vietnamese Relations reflected a general trend, typical of the who asked for assistance in establishing After the Talks Held in April 1968,” pre- Brezhnev era: the growing influence of the unofficial contacts between U.S. President pared for Moscow Center on 1 September bureaucratic apparatus, especially medium- Johnson and the Soviet government, or with 1968, assessed the results and significance of level officials, on policy-making. Since top Marshall D. Shulman (then an associate of the opening of the Paris peace talks. Regard- Soviet leaders had little idea of the reality in Harvard University’s Russian Research ing the situation as favorable for achieving a Vietnam, they willingly entrusted decision- Center), both of which were recorded by the settlement in the best interests of the Viet- making in the sphere of current policy to KGB (the latter with the recommendation namese people, the Ambassador, who signed experts, signing ready-made decisions or that Shulman be advised that his informa- the letter, believed that the prime task at the intervening only in extraordinary situa- tion had to be confirmed by the U.S. Presi- moment was “to help the Vietnamese com- tions.36 dent). While the documents encountered rades to put an end to the hostilities this year Thus, indirect evidence suggests that in during this early stage of research left these and switch over to a political settlement of defining its stand on the Vietnam War, Mos- and many other questions unresolved, they the Vietnamese issue.” With this aim in cow largely drew on the opinion of its diplo- certainly pointed at the high intensity of view, Shcherbakov believed, it would be matic representatives in the DRV. And in unofficial Soviet-U.S. contacts apparently advisable to invite a higher-level DRV gov- 1965-1966 the Soviet Embassy was far from related to the war (either directly or through ernment delegation to Moscow in October optimistic about the prospects for a peaceful mediators, as, for instance, through the ser- and “try once more to analyze jointly the settlement. Meetings and conversations be- vices of Austrian Ambassador in the USSR situation and convince the DRV government tween the Soviet Embassy officials and Vodak) in the summer-autumn of 1965.31 to express its opinion on the whole package members of the diplomatic corps and jour- Moscow’s seeming reluctance to meet of the Vietnamese settlement.” nalists accredited in Hanoi revealed that Washington half-way in its diplomatic ef- Soon afterward, V. Chivilev, the Soviet North Vietnam’s leaders were fully commit- forts was probably at least partly attribut- charge d’affaires in the DRV, presented Pham ted to continuing the hostilities against the able to the fact that the Kremlin was acutely Van Dong with a letter of invitation from USA. Indicative in this respect was a con- aware of its limited ability to exert influence Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin for a DRV versation at the WPV CC on 23 August 1966 on Hanoi’s policy—an awareness due in party and government delegation to visit the between Soviet charge d’affaires P. Privalov large measure to the complete and objective Soviet Union. The date of the visit was later and Nguyen Van Vinh, Chairman of the information sent to Moscow by the Soviet settled and a decision was adopted on a visit Committee for the Unification of the Coun- Embassy in the DRV, led by Ambassador to the USSR by a Vietnamese government try. Gen. Vinh firmly believed that the Shcherbakov. Perusing the great number of delegation led by Le Duan in November situation was hardly favorable for opening minutes of conversations between Soviet 1968. Though the materials on the visit North Vietnamese-U.S. talks. “Had we been Embassy officials and Vietnamese leaders, remain inaccessible, it seems highly likely defeated by the Americans,” Vinh said, “we WPV members, and Vietnamese citizens, that Soviet leaders followed the recommen- would have had no other choice than to agree as well as informational letters and reports dations of their man in Hanoi.34 to hold talks, but we are confidently dealing sent to the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the Another example of the importance of blows at the enemy and winning decisive CPSU CC, one gets the impression that the Soviet ambassador’s advice in decision- victories. What would it mean for us to hold decision-making on the Vietnamese issue making dates to early 1974. CC Secretary talks now? That would mean losing every- 254 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN thing....”37 This viewpoint was shared by information regarding the requests and of- and advising that the DRV leadership take the entire WPV top leadership. fers of U.S. representatives, conveyed dur- steps to snatch the diplomatic initiative. In That is why the Soviet Embassy’s re- ing meetings with Soviet diplomats, and order to convince Hanoi to change its intrac- port for 1966 included very cautious fore- delivered messages between the two sides. table stand on talks with Washington, the casts about possible changes in the DRV For instance, on 24 April 1967, “Vietnamese Soviet Embassy advised Moscow to inform stand. The embassy, in the belief that it was comrades” were informed about a request of the North Vietnamese at their next summit necessary to “exert and broaden, with the the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that the Soviet with Soviet leaders that the USSR could not support of all peace-loving forces and the government take the necessary steps for the afford to pursue a policy of brinkmanship socialist countries, strong political and dip- DRV government to give access to represen- with respect to the United States by getting lomatic efforts in order to bring the matter to tatives of the international commission of more deeply involved in the Vietnam con- the settlement of the conflict in the current the Red Cross to American POWs then held flict, and that therefore the best plan for both year,” suggested that the USSR might even- in North Vietnam. And on April 28, the the Soviet Union and Vietnam would be if tually have to elaborate and present its own DRV leaders learned that Johnson envoy the hostilities drew to a close in 1968.43 peace plan to the Vietnamese comrades. Averell Harriman had handed over a U.S. The fact that talks on the settlement of That supposition was made on the basis of statement on the withdrawal of U.S. troops the Vietnam issue in fact finally started in what the embassy viewed as a certain coin- from the demilitarized zone to the Soviet 1968 may be regarded as a matter of pure cidence of the CPSU and WPV “assessment charge d’affaires in the United States.41 coincidence. At the same time, the Soviet of the situation and active promotion of There is no doubt that Hanoi also received Embassy in Hanoi was farsighted in its as- politico-diplomatic struggle for Vietnam.”38 exhaustive information about the June 1967 sessments—what mattered was not that its In that contest, the USSR sought to Glassboro summit between Kosygin and forecasts had proved correct but rather the evade the issue of acting as a formal media- Johnson. factors on which those forecasts were based. tor at the U.S.-DRV talks (which was what In 1967, too, the Soviet Union failed to And in this respect, the Soviet Embassy had the USA sought). The only role the Soviet convince the Vietnamese leaders to hold every reason to hope that the pressure ex- Union was then prepared to play was that of talks with the USA on a peaceful settlement. erted by Moscow on the Vietnamese leaders a “postman,” who would carry both sides’ The Soviet Embassy in Hanoi believed that to accept a political rather than military messages, and that of “a night watchman” by the DRV leadership would accept the idea of solution, would finally bear fruit. offering an opportunity for unofficial meet- such a settlements only under the following Preliminary U.S.-North Vietnamese ings between U.S. and North Vietnamese conditions: a worsening of the military situ- talks opened on 13 May 1968, followed on embassy officials in Moscow.39 At the same ation; U.S. acceptance of North Vietnam’s 18 January 1969 by the official quadripartite time, Moscow spared no effort to convince main demands; a change in China’s attitude (U.S.-South Vietnam-North Vietnam-NLF) its “Vietnamese friends” of the need to switch to the Vietnam War; and finally, the socialist Paris negotiations. Soviet diplomats justifi- from military to political-diplomatic meth- countries’ clear declaration to the North ably regarded the event as their own success, ods to attain a settlement. Vietnamese that they could not afford to at least in part. “Without acting as an official The USSR undertook the mission of “a bear the ever growing burden of that war for mediator,” the Soviet Embassy in the DRV postman” and “a night watchman” very re- reasons of an international nature or for fear pointed out, “the Soviet Union rendered an luctantly, probably for fear of being turned of its protracted nature. So in assessing the important service for the two sides to sit into an official mediator. At least it did not results of the Soviet-Vietnamese talks in down at the negotiating table and open offi- wish to perform those functions on a perma- April 1967 and the subsequent DRV policy, cial talks. The USSR spared no effort to nent basis. So the United States had to use the Soviet Embassy drew the conclusion that convince world opinion and national gov- the services of other countries, in particular, at that juncture, “not a single [one] of the ernments to support an end to bombing raids Poland, Canada, India, etc. However, early above-mentioned situations makes the Viet- on the DRV, and exerted pressure on the in 1967 a new flurry of activity was observed namese comrades take the road of active USA. At the same time it emphasized to the in Moscow. In Jan.-Feb., DRV Foreign searching for ways to a peaceful settle- Vietnamese comrades that the year 1968 Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh received ment.”42 was most favorable for a number of reasons Shcherbakov and familiarized him with the Nevertheless, summing up the results for launching the process of the political gist of President Johnson’s letter to Ho Chi of 1967, Soviet diplomats in Hanoi reached settlement of the Vietnam issue.”44 Minh, handed over at a regular meeting in the optimistic conclusion that the year 1968 The USSR did much to organize the Moscow of representatives of the DRV and would be the most favorable for starting the Paris meeting, including influencing the the US embassies. And Ho Chi Minh’s process of settlement. They strongly de- choice of venue. The record of a conversa- reply, according to Trinh, was to be sent nounced Hanoi’s rejection of Johnson’s San tion between V. Chivilev, Soviet acting along the same channels.40 Those facts Antonio formula—so-named after a speech charge d’affaires, and Le Duan, First Secre- make it possible for us to suppose that by in the Texas city on 29 September 1967 in tary of the WPV CC, held on 2 May 1968, 1967, meetings of diplomats of the two war- which LBJ declared that Washington would suggests that on the eve of the opening of ring parties were held in Moscow on a regu- stop bombing North Vietnam when assured U.S.-DRV peace talks, the Vietnamese side lar basis. that this would “lead promptly to productive offered Paris as the venue with due regard As to its function of “a postman,” in discussions”—pointing out that that formula for the Soviet opinion. By that time Soviet 1967 Moscow regularly supplied Hanoi with could not be regarded as “insurmountable” diplomacy had already performed “a certain COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 255 amount of work with the French.” The main reasonably conclude that the USSR did its States Anatoly F. Dobrynin reported to Mos- factor behind Hanoi’s choice of the French utmost to ensure a favorable outcome of the cow: “All indications are that his [Nixon’s] capital, Le Duan told Chivilev, was “the talks, naturally with due account of its own attempts to convince the USSR to help the opportunity to maintain contacts with Mos- interests. USA in the settlement of the [Vietnam] cow from it.”45 Moscow continued to play an important conflict, will be repeated in the future, and The same factor was taken into account role at the Paris talks after Nixon came to this will probably be felt in the course of our by Moscow, which faced the task of keeping power in 1969. The Soviet leaders kept talks with this administration on other inter- the sides at the negotiating table. With this abreast of the latest developments and did national issues, if not directly, then at least in aim in mind, the Kremlin exerted constant their best to influence the Vietnamese posi- the form of procrastination in the course of pressure on North Vietnam not to disrupt tion through the services of the USSR em- such talks or in decision-making on other the process. On 13 June 1968, the CPSU CC bassies in Hanoi and Paris. At his regular issues.”50 and Soviet government sent a letter to the meetings with the leaders of the DRV and In this respect, however, former CIA WPV CC and DRV government stressing NLF delegations, the Soviet Ambassador in chief William Colby was probably right that the Paris talks were vitally important France, V. Zorin, asked the Vietnamese what when he wrote in his memoirs about his deep for achieving a settlement of the Vietnam questions they considered it necessary for skepticism with respect to the Soviet Union’s issue. The Soviet leaders also emphasized him to raise in his conversations with the ability to exert pressure on its friends, who that they were living through an important U.S. delegation. At the same time, Zorin were “stubborn and full of determination.”51 period from the viewpoint of opportunities expressed his “desire” for the Vietnamese Nevertheless, in spite of its limited opportu- for diplomatic struggle, offering to put the side to put forward some specific proposals nities, the USSR managed to make a consid- entire weight of Soviet authority in the world on military issues and for the NLF to elabo- erable contribution to the peaceful settle- in order to triumph in the political and rate a specific diplomatic program. Simulta- ment of the Vietnam conflict. So the signing diplomatic contest.46 In an effort to influ- neously, the Soviet ambassador in the DRV, of the bilateral agreement by the DRV and ence the North Vietnamese side and as a Shcherbakov, warned “the Vietnamese USA, on 27 January 1973, on the end of hedge against the DRV’s sometimes unpre- friends” against following an extremist path, hostilities and restoration of peace in Viet- dictable behavior, the Soviet Embassy in such as the temptation to pursue a purely nam, irrespective of all its weak points, was Hanoi offered to send experts on Vietnam- propagandist policy or to resort exclusively an important result of the efforts of Soviet ese affairs to the Soviet Embassy in Paris.47 to military methods in relations with the diplomacy as well. Moreover, Moscow reached an agreement USA.49 In conclusion, in assessing Soviet policy with the DRV leadership for the Vietnam- Richard Nixon’s victory in the 1968 toward the Vietnam War in the 1964-1973 ese regularly to inform Moscow on the elections marked a turning point in U.S. period, including in the sphere of Soviet- situation at the talks and their future strat- policy toward the USSR, as the incoming American ties, it may be asserted that in spite egy, tactics, and plans. In turn, the USSR administration made every effort to obtain of all the difficulties, complications, and gave the Vietnamese exhaustive informa- greater Soviet involvement and cooperation human costs associated with the conflict in tion about U.S. intentions. in the process of achieving a peaceful settle- Southeast Asia, the superpowers avoided Nevertheless, despite its promises, ment in Vietnam. The newly elected U.S. grave crises, upheavals, or direct confronta- Hanoi on several occasions confronted Mos- president and his national security adviser, tions in their bilateral relations—thus pre- cow with a fait accompli. Yet, having Henry A. Kissinger, decided that all prob- serving a degree of general international “forgotten” to inform its ally about a planned lems in Soviet-American relations were stability and paving the way toward the action, the Vietnamese leadership neverthe- linked to the Soviet stand on the Vietnam U.S.-Soviet détente of the early-mid-1970s. less insisted on Moscow’s immediate sup- issue. And if efforts in Moscow did not port. This happened, for instance, when the quickly or sufficiently pay dividends, Nixon 1. Space precludes a full listing of relevant titles here: NLF published its program of ten points and and Kissinger were prepared not to miss an for detailed references see Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, established the Provisional Revolutionary opportunity to play “the Chinese card” to forthcoming [1996]). Government of South Vietnam (RSV PRG). make the Soviet leaders more tractable. 2. According to data of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Although Le Duc Tho met with Kosygin on Like his predecessors, Nixon was con- Affairs, in the period from 1961 to 1966 the Soviet the eve of the program’s publication (during vinced that the USSR had unlimited control Union supplied the NLF via the DRV as disinterested assistance 130 recoilless weapons and mortars, 1400 a stopover in Moscow on his way to Paris), over Hanoi’s policy and that as soon as it machine guns, and 54,500 fire-arms with ammunition. the leading DRV negotiator never men- issued the appropriate orders, the Vietnam- Prior to 1965 the USSR supplied to North Vietnam tioned the planned steps.48 ese leaders would be ready, willing, and German models of arms. (Top Secret Memorandum of However, in attempting to convince obliged to conclude the talks. As a result, the Southeast Asia Department, USSR Foreign Minis- try, “Soviet Moral and Political Support of and Material Soviet leaders to exert greater pressure on each time the Paris talks reached a blind Aid to the South Vietnam Patriots,” 24 March 1966, Vietnam to achieve progress in the talks, alley, the White House turned to Moscow to SCCD, fond (f.) 5, opis (op.) 50, delo (d.) 777, listy (ll.) U.S. officials often forced an open door. help find an acceptable escape route. After a 58-59.) This aid supplemented the economic assistance Assessing the steps taken by Moscow for meeting with Kissinger on 12 June 1969, Moscow rendered to the DRV. China, in turn, in the period from 1955 to 1965, supplied the DRV with the settlement of the Vietnam conflict along- when the American openly asked the USSR economic assistance to the total value of 511.8 million side the difficulties it encountered in deal- for assistance to overcome the latest crisis in rubles, including 302.5 million rubles as gift. (Memo- ing with Hanoi’s foreign policy, one may the talks, Soviet Ambassador in the United randum of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, “CPR’s 256 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

[Chinese People’s Republic’s] Economic Assistance to SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 141, 259. 35. Memorandum from B. Ponomarev for the CPSU the Socialist Countries,” 30 March 1966, SCCD, f. 5, 21. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1970, CC, “On a Proposal to the Vietnamese Friends,” at- op. 58, d. 254, l. 172.) SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 104. tached to resolution of the CPSU CC Secretariat, SCCD, 3. Telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to France, SCCD, 22. A memo by Defense Minister Grechko to Brezhnev f. 4, op. 22, d. 1240, Art. No. 113/10, 12 February 1974. f. 4, op. 18, d. 582, St.-95/462 g., 14 February 1964. serves as testimony to this fact. Grechko wrote that on 36. Sometimes the situation looked simply ridiculous. 4. International Department of the CPSU CC to the CC, 30 March 1968 a U.S. F-111A plane was brought down Mentioned in the list of materials, included in “special 25 July 1964, SCCD, f. 4, op. 50, d. 631, l. 163-164. by an anti-aircraft Dvina complex in the area of Hanoi. dossiers,” is the draft decision on the reply to Le Duan’s 5. Memorandum from USSR Ministry of Defense to the He also mentioned measures, adopted by Soviet experts personal message to Brezhnev, presented by the CC CPSU CC, 14 July 1967, SCCD, f. 4, op. 59, d. 416, l. to improve the anti-aircraft complexes after they had Department and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs 119-120. obtained information about the use of high-speed air- on 24 December 1974. There is the following note on 6. Top Secret Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy craft (up to 3700 km per hour) by the US air forces the card of that document, written by Brezhnev’s aide, in the DRV, “On the Political Situation in South Viet- (SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 232, ll. 9-10). Alexandrov: “to C-de K.U. Chernenko. Leonid Ilyich nam and the Position of the DRV,” 19 November 1964, 23. Memorandum of Conversation between Deputy asked to hold a vote on this proposal (he has not read the SCCD, f. 4, op. 50, d. 631, l. 253. Chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Southeast Asia text).” It turns out that top Soviet leaders signed 7. See, e.g, Gabriel Kolko, Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, Department S. Nemchina and Head of the NFLSV documents either having learned the gist of the docu- the United States and the Modern Historical Experi- Permanent Mission in Moscow Dang Cuong Minh, 2 ment at best, or having read only its title. ence (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 157. September 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 416, l. 139. 37. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet 8. For further analysis of the impact of Khrushchev’s 24. Memorandum from the Soviet Embassy in the Charge d’Affaires in Hanoi P. Privalov and Chairman overthrow on Soviet policy toward Vietnam, see the DRV, 14 March 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 329, l. 43. of the Lao Dong Party’s Committee on the Unification paper presented by Ilya V. Gaiduk to the conference on 25. Memorandum from the State Committee on the of the Country Nguyen Van Minh, 23 August 1966, the Vietnam War held in October 1993 at the Lyndon B. Economic Relations (GKES), “On the Economic and SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264, ll. 173-174. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. Technical Assistance to the Democratic Republic of 38. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 9. A memo, sent to the CPSU CC by I. Shchedrov, a Vietnam,” 29 July 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, ll. 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 259. Pravda correspondent in Southeast Asia, may serve as 54-55; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political Report for 39. For details, see Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy an indirect basis for such suppositions. In it Shchedrov 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 48; Soviet Embassy of the Vietnam War, and Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and analyzes the situation in the region in the first half of the in the DRV, Political Report for 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. the Vietnam War (forthcoming). 1960s from the viewpoint of Soviet and Chinese influ- 61, d. 459, l. 123; Soviet Embassy in the DRV, Political 40. KGB Memorandum, 28 January 1967, SCCD, f. 5, ence on the events in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. He Report for 1970, SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 104. op. 60, d. 680; Memorandum of Conversation between not only criticizes the Soviet Union’s restraint, shown 26. Washington’s first attempts to reach agreement Soviet Ambassador Shcherbakov and DRV Foreign before the end of 1964, and expresses concern in view with the DRV leaders were made back in 1962, under Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, 15 February 1967, SCCD, of stepped-up activities by the PRC in those countries, President Kennedy’s administration, so we can only f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, l. 145. but also offers a series of measures to improve the suppose what could be the results of those contacts, had 41. USSR Foreign Ministry, list of questions on which situation. In their time the top CPSU leadership famil- President Kennedy been alive. A. Goodman, for in- the Vietnamese comrades were informed, SCCD, f. 5, iarized themselves with that memo, and the following stance, believes that as a result of President Kennedy’s op. 60, d. 369, l. 15. note by Boris Ponomarev testifies to this: “Please read assassination, the USA lost an opportunity to reach 42. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Letter, “So- this memo and submit proposals and measures on issues agreement with Hanoi. (A.E. Goodman, The Lost Peace: viet-North Vietnamese Talks of April 1967 and the which call for them.” (SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 264.) America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Policy of the PTV [Workers’ Party of Vietnam] on the 10. Political Report of the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi for Vietnam War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, Settlement of the Vietnamese Problem,” August 1967, 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 148. 1978), 14.) SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 327, l. 263. 11. Memorandum, “Soviet Moral and Political Sup- 27. To this testifies the KGB information of President 43. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for port,” SCCD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 773, l. 59; Soviet Embassy Johnson’s talks with Italian Foreign Minister A. Fanfani 1967, SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 332, l. 133-138. in Hanoi Political Report for 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, (SCCD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 690, l. 93). 44. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for d. 263, l. 148. 28. KGB Memorandum, 11 December 1969, SCCD, f. 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 30-31. 12. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1967, 5, op. 61, d. 558, l. 178-179. 45. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet SCCD, f. 5, op. 59, d. 331, l. 26. 29. Main Intelligence Administration (GRU), USSR Charge d’Affaires in the DRV V. Chivilev and Le 13. Shchedrov Memorandum, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. Ministry of Defense, to CPSU CC, 23 August 1966, Duan, 2 May 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 376, l. 47. 264, l. 96. SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 262, ll. 237-238. (For an English 46. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Letter, “So- 14. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1966, translation of this document, see CWIHP Bulletin 3 viet-North Vietnamese Relations After the April 1968 SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 130. (Fall 1993) 61-62.) Talks,” SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 109. 15. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet 30. The most complete records of these and other secret 47. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for Embassy in Hanoi interpreter M. Isaev and Ho Hai Vietnam peace efforts during the period 1964-68, based 1968, SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 375, l. 31. Thuy, 25 October 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 261, l. on classified U.S. government records, can be found in 48. Soviet Embassy to the DRV, Political Report for 167. George C. Herring, ed., The Secret Diplomacy of the 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 459, l. 117. 16. Memorandum from USSR Ministry of Commercial Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Penta- 49. Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Shipping for the CPSU CC, 18 July 1966, SCCD, f. 5, gon Papers (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, Ambassador V. Zorin and Xuan Thuy and Tranh Byu op. 58, d. 263, l. 38-41. The report by the Ministry of 1983). MARIGOLD and SUNFLOWER are covered Khiem, 21 February 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. 460, Commercial Shipping was a source of concern by the in greater detail, using additional Soviet and U.S. sources, ll. 56-60, 131-134. (For an English translation, see Soviet leadership. It was decided to make use of the in Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 62-63. information contained in it, in the course of talks with (forthcoming). 50. Memorandum of Conversation between A. Dobrynin the DRV party and government delegation to be held in 31. KGB Memoranda, 5 and 21 July 1965 and 7 October and H. Kissinger, 12 June 1969, SCCD, f. 5, op. 61, d. Moscow (SCCD, f. 5, op. 58, d. 263, l. 43). 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 6, d. 379, 389, 533. 558, l. 103. (For an English translation of this docu- 17. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1970, 32. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Demo- ment, see CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 63-67.) The SCCD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 495, l. 109. cratic Republic of Vietnam. contents of this conversation, as the note on the docu- 18. Memorandum from Izvestia correspondent M. 33. Political letters from Soviet embassies were in fact ment testifies, were reported to Brezhnev, so the top Ilyinskii for CPSU CC, 29 January 1968, SCCD, f. 5., detailed reports of the situation in the respective coun- Soviet leadership had been informed about op. 60, d. 368, l. 19. tries, their domestic and foreign policy, and usually Washington’s intentions. 19. Memorandum from Committee of State Security written in connection with particular events. 51. William Colby and James McCargar, Lost Victory: (KGB), 21 February 1966, SCCD, f. 5, op. 6, d. 511. 34. Political Letter, “Soviet-North Vietnamese Rela- A Firsthand Account of America’s Sixteen-Year In- Regrettably, this document is kept in a “special dos- tions after the April 1968 Talks,” 1 September 1968, volvement in Vietnam (Chicago, N.Y., 1989), 335. sier,” so we have had no opportunity as yet to study it. SCCD, f. 5, op. 60, d. 369, l. 114; see also SCCD, f. 5, 20. Soviet Embassy in Hanoi, Political Report for 1966, op. 60, d. 369, ll. 129, 131-132, 133. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 257

Ilya V. Gaiduk, a research scholar at the Institute MICHALOWSKI Michalowski was hopeful that the Vietnam- of Universal History (IUH), Russian Academy of continued from page 241 ese would eventually express a willingness Sciences, Moscow, is the author of The Soviet to negotiate. Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. After returning to Warsaw, Michalowski Dee, forthcoming). A recipient of fellowships Operation Lumbago joined his chief Adam Rapacki in efforts to from CWIHP and the Norwegian Nobel Institute, he originally presented the findings in this ar- persuade the Vietnamese that a positive sig- ticle to the January 1993 Conference on New In the early morning of 29 December nal of some kind was in their best interests. Soviet Evidence on Cold War History in Mos- 1965, Jerzy Michalowski was awakened by Working through U.S. Ambassador John cow, organized by CWIHP and IUH. The author Polish military authorities, who informed Gronouski, they made it clear that a resump- gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Oganez him that U.S. Air Force One, with ambassa- tion of bombing raids in the North would V. Marinin, then a staff archivist at SCCD (now dor Averell Harriman on board, was request- eliminate any chance for peace. Norman at the State Archive of the Russian Federation ing permission to land in Warsaw. Harriman’s Cousins, a personal friend of Lyndon [GARF]), in locating archival documents for peace mission was part of a broad diplomatic Johnson, tried to play the role of intermedi- this article. offensive that coincided with the Christmas ary in this process, but to no avail. To the bombing halt of 1965. A 14-point peace dismay of the Polish diplomats, the United plan, including immediate face-to-face ne- States resumed bombing raids on January gotiations, was presented to the Poles, with 31, and Operation Lumbago came to an the request that it be passed on to the North unsuccessful end. Vietnamese government. A meeting with Communist Party Secretary Wladislaw Operation Marigold1 RESEARCH IN MOSCOW Gomulka followed (Michalowski was not present, but he could hear Gomulka harangu- This was another attempt to bring the Scholars needing research performed ing Harriman through a thick oak door). The United States and North Vietnam together in in the Russian archives may contract next day, Michalowski departed for Hanoi, secrecy and with a minimum of precondi- with scholars at the Russian Center “Ar- with intermediate stops in Moscow and tions. This time, Polish diplomats worked chival Conversation at the Historical Beijing. Friends and co-workers were told closely with their colleagues from Italy. Archives Institute (HAI) of the Russian that his absence was due to a severe bout of Michalowski worked on the Warsaw end of State University for the Humanities in lumbago. the operation. Poland’s representative to the Moscow. For further information please In Moscow, Michalowski met with For- International Control Commission, Janusz direct inquiries to: eign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who ex- Lewandowski, Italy’s ambassador to South pressed support for the mission, but pre- Vietnam, Giovanni Orlandi, and U.S. Am- Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov dicted (correctly) that Chinese leaders would bassador Henry Cabot Lodge were the main Historical Archives Institute (HAI) try to sabotage it in any way they could. In protagonists in Saigon. Russian State University for the Hu- Beijing, Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Phase I of Marigold developed from a manities Bingnan angrily denounced any offers of discussion between Lewandowski and Pre- Moscow, Russian Federation peace and condemned Poland’s participa- mier Phan Van Dong in June of 1966 in Fax: (7-095) 432-2506 or (7-095) 964- tion in the American scheme. Michalowski Hanoi. Lewandowski learned that the North 3534 decided to terminate the meeting when Wang Vietnamese would be willing to begin peace Telephone: (7-095) 921-4169 or became abusive. This stormy session was negotiations, provided the U.S. suspended (7-095) 925-5019 followed by a lavish banquet, with many the bombing campaign. He relayed this cordial toasts and remarks. Arriving in Hanoi information to Orlandi who, in turn, notified Scholars may also address inquiries on January 4, Michalowski was met by For- U.S. ambassador Lodge. The American side regarding possible collaboration for re- eign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, whose was anxious to know whether Hanoi would search in Russian archives to: initial response to the American offers was make any overt sign of accommodation (such unenthusiastic. The Vietnamese, he claimed, as refraining from offensive military opera- Prof. Alexander O. Chubarian were doing well on the battlefield, and the tions in the South, or reducing traffic along Director time had not yet come to exploit these suc- the Ho Chi Minh Trail) in return for a bomb- Institute of Universal History cesses at the negotiating table. The same ing halt. In spite of their best efforts, Polish Leninsky prospekt 32a sentiments were echoed during the next two diplomats could obtain no assurances from 117334 Moscow, Russian Federation days by Prime Minister Phan Van Dong (less Hanoi, and the U.S. withdrew its inquiries. Fax: (7-095) 938-2288 emphatically) and Party Secretary Ho Chi Phase II was a lengthier and more com- Telephone: (7-095) 938-1009 Minh (in much stronger terms). plex operation that began when ambassador Michalowski’s account of these discussions Lodge requested that Lewandowski present makes clear that the Poles were acting as a 10-point peace plan to the North Vietnam- strong advocates of the peace process, pre- ese. This time, an unconditional bombing senting the American plan in as favorable a halt would precede the substantive negotia- light as possible. As he left Hanoi, tions. Rapacki and Michalowski under- 258 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN stood the importance of this new develop- conveyed to Phan Van Dong by Poland’s building. Following the toasts and ment, and flew to Bulgaria to brief Leonid ambassador Siedlecki. The Vietnamese, sentimental speeches I was prepar- Brezhnev, who encouraged them to pro- still smarting from the bombing raids of ing to leave, when Dean Rusk’s ceed. Vietnamese diplomat Le Duan went to early December, and under intense pressure secretary informed me that he would Beijing at about the same time, where he from China, refused to discuss the matter like to have a few words with me in received contradictory advice from Mao any further. Operation Marigold had failed. private. Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The great hopes that were raised by Rusk was subdued as he spoke Phan Van Dong’s reply to Lewandowski Marigold, and its dramatic collapse, gave at length about his upcoming aca- generated considerable excitement since it rise to many commentaries, explanations, demic work, and his retirement contained a request to arrange an unprec- and to some finger-pointing. In his report, plans. Then he said: “During my edented face-to-face meeting, in Warsaw, Jerzy Michalowski provides a detailed re- long tenure as Secretary of State, between the Americans and the North Viet- buttal of certain claims made by Henry Cabot I’m sure I made many erroneous namese. Rapacki and Michalowski began a Lodge in his memoirs. Michalowski had the judgments and bad decisions. But series of consultations with John Gronouski, opportunity to discuss Marigold with Presi- my intentions were always pure, to set the stage for these critical talks. From dent Johnson in September of 1967. LBJ did and I acted according to the dictates the beginning, however, difficulties emerged. not accept Michalowski’s interpretation of of my conscience. Thus, I have no First, the American side began to express the events, nor would he acknowledge the regrets. Except for one thing—that doubts about certain unspecified details of continuing determination of the North Viet- in 1966 we did not take advantage the 10-point plan as it had been recorded by namese to keep fighting. In time, he would of the opportunities and your role Lewandowski. Secondly, the Chinese gov- change his views. as go-between. We should have ernment, opposed to any talks, increased its After personally witnessing some of the begun a negotiating process that, pressure on the Vietnamese. Worst of all, unsuccessful attempts to end America’s en- with your help, could have ended a the tempo and brutality of American bomb- tanglement in Vietnam, after discussing the conflict that has cost us so much ing raids in the Hanoi area were stepped up. events with many of the participants, and blood and treasure, and that now On December 13 and 14, the center of the after studying many of the relevant docu- has cost us the election. I wanted to city was hit for the first time. Stunned by ments, Michalowski closes his report with a say this to you today, to thank you these attacks, the North Vietnamese with- strong indictment of U.S. policy. He is for your efforts, and to ask that you drew their offer to meet. In a dramatic convinced that Lyndon Johnson and his circle convey my words to Minister confrontation on December 19, when of hawkish advisors never understood how Rapacki.” Gronouski accused the Poles of acting in bad diplomatic efforts could lead to the resolu- faith, Rapacki’s frustration overflowed: he tion of what they saw as an essentially mili- 1. [Ed. note: For the declassified U.S. account of Opera- smashed his glasses down on the table, and tary crisis. Thus, the President’s half-hearted tion Marigold, see George C. Herring, ed., The Secret they flew into the American ambassador’s attempts to seek non-military solutions (such Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Vol- umes of the Pentagon Papers (Austin, TX: University face. Operation Marigold appeared to be as Marigold) were doomed, mocking the of Texas Press, 1983), 209-370.] dead. hard work and good will of dozens of com- The Poles continued to hope that a basis mitted professional diplomats all around the for face-to-face talks still existed, however. world. They briefed UN General Secretary U Thant, Here is what Michalowski writes on the who promised to do whatever he could. last page of his report: They also contacted Pope Paul VI (using Italian Premier Fanfani as an intermediary). Based on newly-revealed The pontiff sent a letter to Hanoi and to documents and memoirs, we now Washington, begging both sides to save the know that Secretary of State Dean peace process. Gronouski left Warsaw to Rusk was one of the chief “hawks” consult with President Johnson, while in the ornithological roster of Presi- Rapacki drafted an urgent appeal from mem- dent Johnson’s advisors. Thus, the bers of the Polish Politburo to their counter- surprising nature of the event that I parts in Hanoi, calling for a reconsideration now relate in closing this account of the American proposals. As snowstorms of Polish peace initiatives in Viet- closed down airports all over Europe, nam. Gronouski returned to Warsaw unexpect- January 19, 1969 was the eve edly, and requested a meeting with Rapacki of the inauguration of President on Christmas Eve. He announced that all Richard Nixon. The departing Sec- bombing with 10 miles of the center of retary of State met with the Wash- Hanoi had been suspended, and that he was ington diplomatic corps in a sad, ready to meet with a Vietnamese representa- but formal, ceremony on the sev- tive in Warsaw. This message was promptly enth floor of the State Department COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 259 CAMBODIA AND THE COLD WAR

THE CAMBODIAN NATIONAL SOURCES ON THE KHMER ROUGE YEARS: ARCHIVES THE CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE PROGRAM

by Kenton J. Clymer [Ed. note: Following is the First Progress Report (dated 15 September 1995) of the Cambodian Genocide Program, based at the Yale Center for International and Area Studies, On a graceful boulevard radiating out Council of Southeast Asia Studies, Yale Law School, Orvill H. Schell Jr. Center for from Wat Phnom in Cambodia’s capital, International Human Rights, Yale University.] Phnom Penh, stands the elegant, newly reno- vated National Library of Cambodia. Built Executive Summary by the French in the 1920s (it opened on 24 December 1924), the library also housed the The Cambodian Genocide Program (CGP) has made rapid progress in assembling the country’s archives. A separate archives documentation, legal expertise and historical evidence necessary to prosecute the crimes of building, located directly behind the Na- Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge regime. This is consistent with the CGP mandate to help implement tional Library (and thus not visible from the “the policy of the United States to support efforts to bring to justice members of the Khmer street) was built in 1930. Unlike the library, Rouge for their crimes against humanity committed in Cambodia between April 17, 1975 it still awaits renovation. Designed with and January 7, 1979.” [PL 103-236, Sec. 572.] Nearing the halfway mark of its two year high ceilings, large windows, and electric mandate, the program has the following major achievements to its credit: ceiling fans, both buildings incorporated the best available technology for preserving 1. Identifying Legal Options for Redress books and manuscripts in tropical climates. Until now, the international impetus has not existed to motivate the Cambodians to During the French colonial period and organize an effective process to seek legal remedies for the Pol Pot regime’s crimes. The after, until the end of the Khmer Republic in Royal Cambodian Government is now considering several options for legal redress of the 1975, the library and archives were admin- genocide, based on the findings of an international conference hosted by the Cambodian istered jointly. In 1986, however, following Genocide Program in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State. This conference, the Vietnamese model, they were separated. chaired by CGP Director Ben Kiernan, of Yale University, was held in Phnom Penh on 21 The library is controlled by the Ministry of and 22 August 1995. It was addressed by two international legal scholars commissioned by Information and Culture, while the archives the Department of State to review the legal possibilities for cases involving criminal reports to the Council of Ministries.1 violations of international humanitarian law and international criminal human rights law in During the terrible period of the Khmer Cambodia. Cambodia’s two Co-Prime Ministers also addressed the conference; both Rouge (1975-78), the library and archives praised Yale University and its CGP. The conference was attended by nearly 100 others, were home to pig keepers, who served the including six Members of the National Assembly, senior officials from the Council of Chinese advisers living in the hotel next Ministers and various ministries such as Justice and Interior, and legal officers. door. The pigs rooted in the beautiful gar- dens. All of the staff from the library and 2. Documenting the Cambodian Genocide archives, about forty people, fled. Only a Until now, no detailed picture has existed of specific atrocities, victims and perpetrators handful survived the Khmer Rouge regime, of the Cambodian genocide. The Cambodian Genocide Program has made major strides in and only two or three returned to work in the assembling the documentation necessary to prosecute the authors of the Cambodian library once the Khmer Rouge were driven genocide. A series of databases, now information, will be made accessible through the out in 1979. Internet by 1997: a) computerized maps of Khmer Rouge prisons and victim grave sites The library’s holdings today are only a across Cambodia; b) a biographic database on the Cambodian elite, many of whom fraction of what they were in 1975. But comprised victims of the Khmer Rouge; c) a second biographic database on the Khmer contrary to popular belief, the Khmer Rouge Rouge political and military leadership, including many alleged perpetrators of criminal may not have systematically destroyed books acts; d) an electronic database of photographs, including rare images taken during Pol Pot’s and documents.2 To be sure many books 1975-79 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime and 4,000 photographs taken by the Khmer were ruined, some simply pushed off the Rouge of their victims before execution; e) an imaging database of thousands of rare shelves to make room for cooking pots, documents from the Pol Pot period, many of which are being made publicly available for the others used for cooking fires or for cigarette first time; and f) a bibliographic database of literature and documents in various languages papers.3 Subsequent neglect and misman- on the Pol Pot regime. Yale’s CGP is uniquely qualified to carry out this work because of agement made matters worse, arguably much Yale’s singular combination of Cambodia area and archive studies, genocide research, legal worse. Many books that did survive the resources, information systems, and geographical expertise necessary to effectively execute Khmer Rouge years were improperly stored this complex research undertaking. and soon succumbed to insects and the ele- ments. Two Australians archivists, Helen 3. Recreating Lost Histories Until now, no detailed history of events in each region and zone of the Khmer Rouge continued on page 265 260 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN regime had been contemplated. The Cam- genocide and crimes against humanity ever contract with the U.S. Department of State, bodian Genocide Program has nine new perpetrated. While those responsible for the Mr. Jason Abrams of the Open Society Insti- histories already underway, comprising de- Nazi Holocaust in the first half of the 20th tute and Professor Steven Ratner of the Uni- tailed and original research on the fates of century were punished, there has been little versity of Texas are now completing a study various regions and population groups into effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice of options for legal redress of criminal hu- which Pol Pot’s regime divided Cambodia. for the atrocities they committed. In 1994, man rights violations during the Democratic In the process, Cambodian scholars are be- the U.S. Congress sought to address this Kampuchea (DK) regime between 17 April ing trained in both social science methods problem by enacting the Cambodian Geno- 1975 and 7 January 1979. When it is com- and computer documentation. In addition to cide Justice Act. A team of world-class pleted, the study will offer an analysis of the these nine separate studies in preparation, Cambodia scholars based at Yale was cho- most probable cases of violations of crimi- others are in the planning stage. The first sen to receive funding from the U.S. Depart- nal human rights laws under the DK regime, volume of these studies is to be published in ment of State, and subsequently, by the and the most likely avenues for redress. 1997. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs Abrams and Ratner have tentatively con- and Trade. That team has now, in three cluded that the Khmer Rouge are culpable 4. Training Cambodian Lawyers quarters of a year, made tremendous progress on several counts of violating international Until now, the legal expertise did not in remedying this omission of justice and criminal laws concerning genocide, war exist in Cambodia to support a trial of Khmer accountability. Four major problems face crimes, and crimes against humanity. They Rouge leaders utilizing due process guaran- any effort to bring the Khmer Rouge to further have concluded that there are several tees and unimpeachable evidentiary stan- justice: possible avenues for legal redress of these dards. The Cambodian Genocide Program 1) a paucity of specific documen- criminal violations, including an ad hoc in- has just graduated the first class of seventeen tary evidence linking high-level ternational tribunal, a domestic Cambodian Cambodian legal professionals, government policymakers and military person- tribunal, and/or some form of an interna- officials, and human rights workers from nel to acts of genocide and crimes tional commission of inquiry. CGP’s nine-week intensive summer school against humanity; At the Striving for Justice Conference, on international criminal law and interna- 2) insufficient training of Cambo- Abrams and Ratner presented their draft tional human rights law. The school was dian officials and lawyers with the conclusions to an invitation-only audience held in Phnom Penh from June to August political will and legal skills to bring of nearly 100 distinguished guests. The au- 1995, with the participation of the Orville H. the Khmer Rouge to justice; dience consisted of representatives from the Schell Jr. Center for International Human 3) insufficient awareness among Offices of the Co-Prime Ministers, the Rights at the Yale Law School. A second Cambodian policymakers of the op- Deputy Prime Minister, the Council of Min- summer school will be held in Cambodia in tions available for legal redress of isters, several key ministries including Inte- mid-1996. The individuals trained in the genocide and crimes against human- rior and Justice, numerous Cambodian and CGP program will be able to staff a domestic ity; and international human rights organizations, or international tribunal. 4) the lack of a permanent, indig- members of the Cambodian National As- enous Cambodian NGO tasked to sembly, a representative of the United Na- 5. Creating a Permanent Cambodian carry out independent research and tions Secretary General, a member of the Documentation Center documentation on the Cambodian U.S. Congress, and others. The conference Until now, no “center of gravity” ex- genocide. was also addressed by the First Prime Min- isted in Cambodia to provide a spark for the Yale University’s Cambodian Geno- ister, His Royal Highness Samdech Krom serious study of what happened to Cambo- cide Program is making excellent progress Preah Norodom Ranariddh, and the Second dian society during the Khmer Rouge re- toward solution of these four problems. Prime Minister, His Excellency Samdech gime. The Cambodian Genocide Program That progress is described in this First In- Hun Sen. The conference offered extensive has established an international non-gov- terim Progress Report of the Cambodian opportunities for discussion and exchange ernmental organization in Phnom Penh, Genocide Program. of ideas among the participants. Conference known as the Documentation Center of Cam- Identifying Legal Options for Redress. participants reached a clear consensus on the bodia. The Documentation Center is facili- Until now, no conference of Cambodian and need for accountability, and outlined impor- tating the field operations of the CGP, train- international observers has examined spe- tant specific next steps to be taken to bring ing Cambodians in research and investiga- cific legal options for redress of Cambodia’s the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice. tive techniques, and will enable an indig- genocide. On 21 and 22 August 1995, the Documentation Databases. The Cam- enous organization to continue the work of Cambodian Genocide Program hosted an bodian Genocide Program is assembling an the program after the conclusion of the CGP international conference under the banner, elaborate family of databases collectively mandate in January 1997. “Striving for Justice: International Criminal known as the Cambodian Genocide Data Law in the Cambodian Context.” The Striv- Base (CGDB). Using the Computerized Introduction ing for Justice Conference brought together Documentation System (CDS/ISIS) de- a wide range of interested observers and signed by UNESCO and modified to suit In Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, the decisionmakers for discussions with two CGP’s particular needs by our program- world witnessed one of the worst cases of international criminal law experts. Under a mers, CGP is making rapid progress in the COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 261 compilation of all known primary and sec- mately 1000 records representing some plished the scanning of several hundred rel- ondary material relating to the Khmer Rouge 50,000 pages of documentation had been evant documents, including a near-complete regime. The Program has already obtained entered into the bibliographical database. set of the records in Khmer from the 1979 in access to several little-known caches of The Victim Database. The Cambodian absentia genocide tribunal of Pol Pot and documents, including a DK Foreign Minis- Genocide Program has made arrangements Ieng Sary. Using custom software already try archive, archives of the DK Trade Min- to obtain and make electronically accessible designed specifically for CGP, CGDB users istry, the only known surviving archive from to an international audience Dr. Justin will be able to browse through the biblio- a DK regional prison, original maps of Corfield’s biographical database containing graphic database and, upon finding a record Khmer Rouge killing fields, and several more than 40,000 entries on the Cambodian of particular interest, “jump” to a full digital collections of rare photographs taken by the elite. We express our thanks to Dr. Corfield. image of that specific document with the DK regime itself. Another collection made We have plans to expand this database with “click” of a mouse. This capability can available to the CGP includes a set of inter- additional information obtained as a result of considerably expedite the search for incrimi- nal minutes of key meetings of the DK our original research. Given the patterns of nating evidence of genocidal intent. “Party Center” held in 1975 and 1976. CGP violence in Democratic Kampuchea, it is The Geographic Database. The Cam- currently has two missions at work in Viet- likely that a large number of the individuals bodian Genocide Program is also in the nam, in Hanoi and in Ho Chi Minh City, listed in this database became victims of the process of constructing an elaborate com- searching for relevant documentation in state Khmer Rouge. Thus this database may be- puter-based map showing the physical loca- and private archives. come useful for identifying and cross-ref- tions of facilities of the Khmer Rouge “inter- These databases will bridge a huge gap erencing victims of genocide and crimes nal security” apparatus, including prison and in the case against the Khmer Rouge. Be- against humanity. “killing field” sites. The Cambodian Mine cause these databases did not previously The Photographic Database. The Cam- Action Center established by the United exist, policymakers could not precisely iden- bodian Genocide Program is preparing to Nations Transitional Authority in Cambo- tify victims and perpetrators, nor could they scan several large collections of photographs dia has designed standardized software for establish empirical links between the two on into the CGDB. These collections contain a mapping work in Cambodia, and CGP has a national scale. Yale’s CGDB resolves this significant number of items which are likely obtained access to this system for our pur- problem. When the databases are complete, to have a high degree of evidentiary value for poses. Utilizing the Global Positioning Sys- an investigator using them could, for ex- the prosecution. Examples include a large tem to pinpoint the precise coordinates of ample, identify individual victims and per- number of photos of DK leaders, of forced locations identified by our researchers, CGP petrators of a particular atrocity, perhaps labor brigades, and the entire collection of will accurately map the Khmer Rouge terror with photographs and biographies of the prisoner photographs from the Tuol Sleng system and the resting places of its victims. individuals in question. Yale’s CGP is Genocide Museum. Most of the 4,000 pris- The resulting display is likely to constitute uniquely qualified to carry out this work oner mugshots are currently not accompa- an incriminating indictment of the scope of because of Yale’s singular combination of nied by any identification of the prisoners. Khmer Rouge terror, providing strong evi- Cambodia area and archival studies, geno- By making these photographs available on dence of widespread crimes against human- cide research, legal resources, information the internet, and adding to the database a ity. systems, and geographical expertise neces- special field for readers to key in suggested Disseminating the Databases. In addi- sary to effectively execute this complex names for each photograph, we hope to ob- tion to publishing analytical indexes of the research undertaking. tain identities for many of the victims of the databases, user access to the computer data- The Bibliographic Databases. The bib- Khmer Rouge. The names could be used to bases themselves will be enabled in several liographic database will contain records on prosecute perpetrators on charges of killing ways. First, physical copies of the database this new material and on all other known specific persons. will be deposited at several locations in the primary and secondary sources of informa- The Khmer Rouge Biographical Data- United States and Cambodia. Second, we tion pertaining to the Khmer Rouge regime, base. The Cambodian Genocide Program is hope to make the entire database available including books, articles, monographs, docu- assembling a second biographical database on CD-ROM. Finally, through the Internet, ments, reports, interviews, tapes, films and containing data on members of the Khmer the database will be made accessible to all videos, transcripts, and so forth. As noted, Rouge organization between 1975 and 1979. interested parties worldwide. The projected CGP research efforts have already led to a This database will include both political and implementation date for the online genocide dramatic increase in existing documentary military leadership, down to the srok (dis- database is early 1997. evidence through discovery of previously trict) level. Thus this database will be useful Collecting and compiling data on Cam- unknown archival sources. Rapid progress for identifying the chain of command in bodia under the Khmer Rouge will be one of has been made with the design and estab- various regions at various times, and in es- the most significant contributions of the lishment of this database. The initial pro- tablishing command responsibility for par- CGP, for both historical and legal reasons. gram timelines projected the creation of ticular atrocities. Organizing this mass of new information some three hundred records in a biblio- The Imaging Database. The Cambo- into a structured whole will enable citizens graphic database by the end of December dian Genocide Program is in the process of to fully comprehend the nightmare of what 1995. That milestone was achieved in Feb- scanning images of original DK documents happened in Cambodia under the Khmer ruary 1995. As of August 1995, approxi- into the database. We have already accom- Rouge. It will allow historians to compile a 262 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN more compelling and accurate picture of the tance in synthesizing the general and the for MA’s at Yale, in History and Interna- past. It will allow policymakers to fashion a particular in Cambodia’s genocide. Few tional Relations. Training of Khmer staff case for the necessity of accountability for detailed studies exist of particular regions and researchers in Cambodia on all aspects the Cambodian genocide. And it will pro- under the Khmer Rouge, and so up to now it of operating the Documentation Center of vide prosecutors with critical information has been impossible to assemble a complete Cambodia is also occurring on a weekly on crimes committed by specific individu- picture of what happened on a national scale. basis. als. By breaking down the research task into Until now, no one in Cambodia had the Research. Cambodian Genocide Pro- particular regions, and simultaneously se- range of legal skills required to bring the gram Director Ben Kiernan’s new book, The lecting several integrating themes such as Khmer Rouge to justice in fair and procedur- Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power and Genocide the Party Center, Cham Muslims, Buddhists ally sound trials. The CGP’s training pro- in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975- and women, the CGP studies will recon- grams have directly addressed this short- 1979, will soon be available from Yale Uni- struct the nexus between the local situation coming. This is consistent with the Cambo- versity Press. A comprehensive survey of and national policy. This will provide cru- dian Genocide Justice Act, which states that the Cambodian genocide, it provides a cial analytical evidence of the extent of it is “the policy of the United States to baseline of existing information from which national control by the Khmer Rouge, and support efforts to bring to justice members more specific research can be initiated. The the impact of this control on all the people of of the Khmer Rouge for their crimes against CGP has already begun implementing a wide Cambodia. humanity committed in Cambodia between range of new social science research on the Legal Training Project. On 18 August April 17, 1975 and January 7, 1979.” [PL Cambodian genocide. 1995, the Cambodian Genocide Program 103-236, Sec. 572.] For instance, six professional Cambo- produced its first graduates in international The Documentation Center of Cambo- dian researchers and an American have been criminal law and international human rights dia. The Documentation Center of Cambo- at work for several months on new histories law. Seventeen Cambodian legal profes- dia (“DC-Cam”) is a non-profit international of the seven geographic zones and regions of sionals successfully completed the nine-week non-governmental organization (NGO) es- the Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime: training program, including officials from tablished in January 1995 by the CGP to the Southwest Zone, the Western Zone, the the Ministries of Justice and Interior, the facilitate training and field research in Cam- Northwest Zone, the Siemreap-Oddar Council of Ministers, and three Cambodian bodia related to the CGP’s mission. With Meanchey Region, the Northern Zone, the non-governmental human rights organiza- offices in Phnom Penh, the DC-Cam serves Northeast Zone (including Kratie) and the tions. The training covered principles of as a base of operations for the documenta- Eastern Zone. One of these 70-page mono- international criminal law pertaining to geno- tion, research and training activities carried graphs is already well on the way to comple- cide, crimes against humanity and war out under the auspices of the CGP. The staff tion, and the others are expected to be com- crimes; the structure of national and interna- of DC-Cam is entirely Cambodian in com- pleted in 1996, for publication in 1997. tional legal enforcement mechanisms, in- position, and weekly staff development train- The Cambodian Genocide Program has cluding national courts, ad hoc international ing is already in progress to prepare indig- also commissioned several additional stud- tribunals, the International Court of Justice, enous personnel to assume full responsibil- ies, including one of the DK “Party Center” and truth commissions; and the requirements ity for all aspects of operations in 1997. (whose members included Pol Pot, Nuon of due process and evidentiary standards. In January 1997, at the conclusion of the Chea, Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Khieu Samphan, The Cambodian Genocide Program will CGP’s mandate, DC-Cam will be trans- Ieng Thirith, Yun Yat, Mok, Ke Pauk and build on this foundation next year to further formed into a Cambodian NGO to serve as a Vorn Vet). This monograph will examine enhance the capacity of the Cambodian legal permanent institute for the study of topics the Khmer Rouge chain of command and the system to cope with the anticipated political related to the Khmer Rouge regime, and as a degree of central authority over events in the decision to move forward with legal redress resource for Cambodians and others who zones and regions. This study will com- for crimes committed during the Pol Pot may wish to pursue legal redress for geno- mence in September 1995, and is expected regime. After consulting with the Royal cide, war crimes and crimes against human- to be completed in 1996. The CGP has Cambodian Government and other inter- ity perpetrated under that regime. The docu- commissioned a further study of the geno- ested observers as to the preferred fora for mentation and research products of the CGP cide against the Cham Muslim minority un- seeking redress, the CGP will fashion a will be deposited with the Documentation der the Pol Pot regime, and work on this second training project designed to incul- Center of Cambodia for access by the Cam- monograph will also commence in Septem- cate the skills necessary to implement those bodian people. ber 1995. In addition, the CGP plans new means of redress selected by the appropriate [For those who have access to the monographs on the Buddhist monkhood, on political authorities. internet, DC-Cam has a World Wide Web women, and on the Vietnamese, Chinese Several additional varieties of training HomePage containing more information and tribal minorities, focussing on the fate of under CGP auspices are in progress. Train- about that organization, located at http:// these population cohorts under the Pol Pot ing of Khmer researchers in Cambodia on www.pactok.net.au. The Documentation regime. We expect at least one and possibly social science methods, historiography and Center e-mail address is two collected volumes of these monographs database management has been proceeding [email protected].] to be published in 1997 and 1998. since June 1995 on a weekly basis. Two Research Collaboration. The Cambo- These studies will be of crucial impor- Cambodian scholars are currently enrolled dian Genocide Program has won strong sup- COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 263 port from the worldwide Cambodia studies Cambodians have become full partners in the Khmer Rouge violated the most central community (see “Scholars Speak out on CGP’s work. His Majesty King Norodom norms of international law and this clearly Cambodia Holocaust,” letter to the Wall Sihanouk wrote to CGP Manager Dr. Craig affected the interests of all states in general Street Journal, signed by 29 Cambodia Etcheson on 21 July 1995, “I infinitely thank and Cambodia in particular.” His Royal scholars and specialists, 13 July 1995). These the distinguished promoters of this research Highness the First Prime Minister added, scholars represent virtually the entire field program, especially Dr. Ben Kiernan and “The Royal Government is determined to of Cambodian studies. Leading Cambodian yourself, for the care that you have mani- bring those responsible for the perpetration scholars David P. Chandler, Milton E. fested, thanks to the ‘Cambodian Genocide of these heinous crimes against the Cambo- Osborne, and Michael Vickery have already Program,’ in nourishing truth and promoting dian people to face justice.” In his closing provided help in various ways. Others who and assuring respect for human rights in my address to the conference, His Excellency have responded positively to requests for country.” Samdech Hun Sen summed up the view of information on their personal archival hold- Since the earliest days of the CGP in many participants by saying of the confer- ings include Justin Corfield, Mark Dodd, January 1995, the Royal Cambodian Gov- ence, “This is not about politics, it is about Stephen Heder, Henri Locard, and Judy ernment has been unreservedly supportive of justice. If we do not bring the Khmer Rouge Ledgerwood. Additional Cambodia schol- the mandate given to Yale University by the to justice for killing millions of people, then ars like David Ashley and Jason Roberts U.S. government. The Co-Prime Ministers, there is no point in speaking about human have generously offered to work with the the Deputy Prime Minister, the Co-Ministers rights in Cambodia.” CGP on a volunteer basis. of Interior, the Minister of Justice, the Co- Large numbers of ordinary Cambodian An Australian professional working Ministers of Defense, and the President of citizens seem to concur with the Co-Prime with the CGP has also initiated a project to the National Assembly have all pledged their Ministers. Many Cambodians in Cambodia, begin the computer mapping of Khmer personal and institutional cooperation with the U.S., and other countries have volun- Rouge prison and mass grave sites. This the CGP. Enthusiasm about the goals of the teered their assistance. Since June 1995, a project has now been funded by the Austra- program transcends political affiliation, with team of Cambodian volunteers in New Ha- lian government at the level of A$24,300. support coming from the leadership of all ven, CT, has been preparing a biographical Additional funding is being sought. This is three parties represented in the government. index of Khmer Rouge political leaders and the first time anyone has attempted to con- But the cooperation of the Royal Govern- military commanders. As of September struct a comprehensive inventory of the ment has gone far beyond pledges. The 1995, Cambodian-American citizens’ terror apparatus used by the Khmer Rouge Royal Government is providing the CGP groups in New York, New Jersey, Virginia, regime to murder up to two million people. with a wide range of resources to facilitate Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, California, and In June, July, and August 1995, CGP our work in Cambodia and in the region at Texas have offered to compile witness testi- Director Ben Kiernan presented the large. mony on behalf of the CGP. The thirst for Program’s work-in-progress at the U.S. Fo- At the Striving for Justice Conference in justice is powerful among the survivors of rum on Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (in Phnom Penh on 21 and 22 August 1995, First Pol Pot’s genocide. New York), at Monash University and the Prime Minister Samdech Krom Preah Consistent with these feelings of ordi- University of New South Wales (in Austra- Norodom Ranariddh and Second Prime Min- nary Cambodians and the policy of the gov- lia), and at the Foreign Correspondents’ ister Samdech Hun Sen publicly committed ernment, the CGP has received from the Club in Phnom Penh. These occasions all the Royal Cambodian Government to bring Royal Cambodian Government significant produced new collaboration from foreign the Khmer Rouge leadership to justice for assistance to our research program. One of scholars and specialists, ranging from an their crimes against humanity. In his open- the most useful forms of this aid is the offer of a large biographic database to a ing address to the conference, the First Prime unprecedented assistance from the Royal promise of rare photographs of the Pol Pot Minister complimented the CGP, saying, Government in retrieving documentation leadership. The ability of the CGP to attract “On behalf of the Royal Government, on from Vietnam unavailable to researchers up the cooperation of Cambodia scholars, along behalf of Samdech Hun Sen, Second Prime until now. In combination with previously with legal and technical experts worldwide, Minister, and on my own behalf, I would like unexamined archives from the Cambodian is a key factor in explaining the success of to express my deepest appreciation and warm- People’s Party, Royal Government minis- the Program to date. est congratulations to the Office of Cambo- tries, and private archives now being opened Cambodian Reception of the CGP. dian Genocide Investigation and Yale Uni- to the CGP in Cambodia, a wealth of new Cambodian leaders have complained for versity for embarking on the two years data pertaining to criminal culpability dur- years that the outside world had not recog- programme of documentation, research and ing the Khmer Rouge regime seems destined nized the crimes of the Khmer Rouge and training on the Cambodian genocide. I would to come to light. It is the expressed policy of the tragedy of the Cambodian people. The also like to express my sincere thanks equally the Royal Government to assist the CGP in initiation of the Cambodian Genocide Pro- to the United States to create the Cambodian uncovering such important information. gram helped answer this complaint on an Genocide Justice Act and its appointment of Evaluation. To ensure objectivity and international scale. This measure of recog- Yale University to carry out the two year quality control, the CGP has instituted a nition sparked a new willingness among the programme.” rigorous two-tier system of program evalu- Cambodian political elite to squarely face Substantively, the First Prime Minister ation. In the first tier, the Steering Group of the darkest chapter of Cambodian history. argued, “The international crimes of the the Department of State’s Office of Cambo- 264 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN dian Genocide Investigations conducts peri- CAMBODIAN ARCHIVES very unlikely that a reply will be sent even if odic external reviews of CGP operations. continued from page 260 the letter is received), but I was able to obtain As a basis for these evaluations, in May 1995 permission in Phnom Penh without great CGP Manager Dr. Craig Etcheson produced Jarvis and Peter Arfanis, who visited the difficulty. It may, however, take a few days. a 209-page Implementation Plan outlining archives at the end of 1992 were “dismayed (The first time I applied on the Friday before the Program’s strategy for achieving its ob- at what we saw. . . . Valuable records from a holiday week. Nevertheless, permission to jectives. The first external evaluation, held the French colonial days are on the floors use the archives was received the Monday in June 1995, termed the progress of CGP and shelves rotting away. About 50% of the following the holidays.) operations “excellent” (Time Magazine, 26 records—and there are about 2000 linear The archives is open only about four or June 1995). metres of records all up—are either wrapped five hours per day. Many documents remain CGP also carries out an internal review in brown paper or still in their original boxes. wrapped in paper. The documents them- process, staffed by distinguished experts in The boxes have been constructed from acidic selves are often in very fragile condition, international law and genocide investiga- pasteboard, starch-filled cloth, and protein and insects sometimes scurry out from among tion, such as Professor Cherif Bassiouni, adhesive which has promoted insect infiltra- the pages. There is no working electricity in former Chair of the United Nations Com- tion, mainly termites and beetle larvae. Other the building, and plumbing is rudimentary. mission of Experts for the inquiry on viola- records are sitting unwrapped gathering dust, Miss Kim Ly, the archivist, is helpful, as are 4 tions of international humanitarian law in mould and also being attacked by insects.” other members of the staff. Kim Ly under- the Former Yugoslavia (predecessor to the By the end of 1994, conditions were still stands French and some English. Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal). The first far from good. During my two visits to the In May 1994, there were few research- round of internal evaluation of CGP opera- archives that year, stacks of books, most ers (often I was alone in the building), and tions began in June 1995. This evaluation beyond repair, still stood on the floor of the the rainy season added to a sense of gloom has already produced numerous useful ideas library’s storage areas and in the archives. and foreboding resulting from reports of for improving various aspects of our opera- Wrapped and unwrapped documents re- rebel Khmer Rouge gains in the countryside. tions, and yielded an overall positive ap- mained on dusty shelves in the archives, and But by December the Khmer Rough threat praisal of CGP progress. According to one insect damage was evident everywhere. Nev- seemed to have receded. Now government evaluator, “Your thoughtful and methodical ertheless, thanks to the dedication of some officials and private citizens did come by to explanations for the preparation of such a Cambodians and some foreign (mainly Aus- consult the archive’s records. School chil- project should serve as a model for the tralian) assistance, there have been improve- dren also visited. The library was heavily documentation and analysis of crimes against ments, and the archives can in any event be used, especially in December when there humanity in other countries.... The training used. There are now typescript guides to was a very well attended celebration of the program designed to support the project is some of the more important documentary library’s seventieth anniversary. Perhaps outstanding.” collections, and proper archival storage this is a hopeful sign of Cambodia’s return- Summary. In 1994 the prospect of a boxes, a gift from Australia, are increasingly ing health. trial of the Khmer Rouge leaders seemed being used. The archives contain numerous, if eclec- remote. Now, through the work of the Cam- 1. Peter Arfanis and Helen Jarvis, “Archives in Cambo- bodian Genocide Program, it has become a tic, works including official journals, the dia: Neglected Institutions,” Archives and Manuscripts strong probability. In 1994, the information United States Civil Code, Russian encyclo- [Australia] 21:2 (1993), 252-62. 2. Ibid., 255. George Smith, a librarian employed by the resources and legal evidence necessary for a pedias, and works from the French period. More significant are the collections of pub- state of Alaska, made the same point in a paper deliv- judicial accounting of the genocide had yet ered at the “Seminar on the Khmer Culture’s Revival,” to be identified or assembled, and the re- lished and unpublished documents that have Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 21 December 1994. quired legal skills did not yet exist. These survived. The bulk of the collection consists 3. Helen Jarvis, “The National Library of Cambodia: Suriving Seventy Years of Drastic Socio-Economic prerequisites are now well on the way to- of those colonial records which the French did not take with them when they left, par- Impact,” Paper delivered at CONSAL9, the Ninth Con- ward fulfillment. By the end of 1996, when gress of Southeast Asian Librarians, Bangkok, Thai- the CGP’s mandate will expire, an interna- ticularly records of the Résidence Supérieure land, 2-6 May 1993. tional Cambodian genocide tribunal may du Cambodge. Some of the manuscripts 4. Arfanis and Jarvis, “Archives in Cambodia,” 256-57. 5. For a more complete description of the archive’s have already commenced functioning. By date to the late nineteenth century and con- cern a wide range of mostly domestic mat- holdings, see Arfanis and Jarvis, “Archives in Cambo- then, the CGP will certainly have provided dia.” the scholarly and legal resources for Cambo- ters. These, along with some printed For- dians to pursue their own justice for the eign Affairs records from the 1950s and victims of the Khmer Rouge regime. In 1960s, were the documents most useful to Kenton J. Clymer, professor of history and short, the Cambodian Genocide Program me. However, other records concern the department chair at the University of Texas has taken major steps to fulfill its own three- Buddhist Institute, Norodom Sihanouk, and at El Paso, is researching a history of U.S.- 5 part mandate: to expose and document the the Khmer Rouge period. Cambodian relations. His most recent book crimes of the Khmer Rouge, and to hold the Permission is required to use the ar- is Quest for Freedom: The United States and perpetrators accountable. chives, and prospective researchers need to India’s Independence (New York: Colum- apply at the Council of Ministers. There is bia University Press, 1995). no fee. Writing ahead might be useful (it is