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Download the Publication NEWCOL D WEAR IVIDENCENTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT ON BULLETIN 207 MAO ZEDONG’S HANDLING OF THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS OF 1958: CHINESE RECOLLECTIONS AND DOCUMENTS Translated and Annotated by Li Xiaobing, Chen Jian, and David L. Wilson Translators’ Note: On 23 August 1958, as abruptly as it initiated it? For a long time, Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Cul- Chinese Communist forces in the Fujian scholars have been forced to resort to “edu- ture: Chinese-American Confrontations, area along the People’s Republic of China’s cated guesses” to answer these questions. 1949-1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Pacific Coast began an intensive artillery The materials in the following pages, Press, 1992), 225-267; Qiang Zhai, The bombardment of the Nationalist-controlled translated from Chinese, provide new in- Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese- Jinmen Island. In the following two months, sights for understanding Beijing’s handling British-American Relations, 1949-1958 several hundred thousand artillery shells of the Taiwan crisis. They are divided into (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, exploded on Jinmen and in the waters around two parts. The first part is a memoir by Wu 1994), 178-207; and a forthcoming study by it. At one point, a Chinese Communist Lengxi, then the director of the New China Thomas Christensen to be published by invasion of the Nationalist-controlled off- News Agency and editor-in-chief of Renmin Princeton University Press.] shore islands, especially Jinmen (Quemoy) ribao (People’s Daily). Wu was personally Rendering Chinese- or English-lan- and Mazu (Matsu), seemed imminent. In involved in the decision-making process in guage materials into the other language is response to the rapidly escalating Commu- Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan crisis and difficult because the two languages have no nist threat in the Taiwan Straits, the attended several Politburo Standing Com- common linguistic roots. Thus, the materi- Eisenhower Administration, in accordance mittee meetings discussing the events. His als provided below are sometimes free rather with its obligations under the 1954 Ameri- memoir provides both a chronology and an than literal translations from Chinese to can-Taiwan defense treaty, reinforced U.S. insider’s narrative of how Beijing’s leaders, English. Great care has been taken to avoid naval units in East Asia and directed U.S. Mao Zedong in particular, handled the cri- altering the substantive meaning intended naval vessels to help the Nationalists pro- sis. The second part comprises 18 docu- by the author of the documents. Material tect Jinmen’s supply lines. Even the leaders ments, including two internal speeches de- appearing in the text in brackets has been of the Soviet Union, then Beijing’s close livered by Mao explaining the Party’s exter- supplied to clarify meaning or to provide ally, feared the possible consequences of nal policies in general and its Taiwan policy missing words or information not in the Beijing’s actions, and sent Foreign Minis- in particular. The two parts together provide original text. Additional problems with in- ter Andrei Gromyko to visit Beijing to in- a foundation to build a scholarly under- dividual documents are discussed in the quire about China’s reasons for shelling standing of some of the key calculations notes. The notes also include explanatory Jinmen. The extremely tense situation in the underlying the Beijing leadership’s man- information to place key individual and Taiwan Straits, however, suddenly changed agement of the Taiwan crisis. Particularly events in context or to provide further infor- on October 6, when Beijing issued a “Mes- interesting is the revelation that Mao de- mation on the material being discussed. sage to the Compatriots in Taiwan” in the cided to shell Jinmen to distract American name of Defense Minister Peng Dehuai (it attention from, and counter American moves Part I. Memoir, “Inside Story of the was speculated by many at that time, and in, the Middle East. Also interesting is his Decision Making during the Shelling of later confirmed, that this message was extensive explanation of how China should Jinmen” drafted by Mao Zedong). The message use a “noose strategy” to fight the “U.S. By Wu Lengxi1 called for a peaceful solution of the Taiwan imperialists.” Equally important is his em- [Source: Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical Lit- problem, arguing that all Chinese should phasis on the connection between the tense erature, Beijing), no. 1, 1994, pp. 5-11]] unite to confront the “American plot” to situation in the Taiwan Straits and the mass divide China permanently. From this day mobilization in China leading to the Great In August 1958, the members of the on, the Communist forces dramatically re- Leap Forward. It should also be noted that Standing Committee of the Chinese Com- laxed the siege of Jinmen. As a result, the despite the aggressive appearance of munist Party (CCP) Central Committee Po- Taiwan crisis of 1958 did not erupt into war Beijing’s Taiwan policy, Mao paid special litburo met at Beidaihe2 for a regular top between China and the United States. attention to avoiding a direct military con- leaders’ working conference. The meeting In analyzing the crisis, certainly one of frontation with American forces present in originally planned to focus on the nation’s the most crucial yet mysterious episodes in the Taiwan Straits throughout the crisis. industrial problems, and later the issue of the Cold War history, it is particularly impor- Although these materials are not directly people’s commune was added to the discus- tant to understand Beijing’s motives. Why from Chinese archives, they create a new sion. did it start shelling Jinmen? How did the basis for scholars to deepen their under- The Politburo convened its summit shelling relate to China’s overall domestic standing of the 1958 events. [Ed. note: For meeting on 17 August. Being very busy in and international policies? Why did the recent accounts of the 1958 crisis using Beijing at the time, I thought I could attend Beijing leadership decide to end the crisis newly available Chinese sources, see Shu the meeting several days later. On the 20th, 208 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS however, the General Office of the Central bly had passed a resolution requesting Ameri- though Mao believed that the imperialists Committee called, urging me to go to can and British troops to withdraw from were more afraid of us, he told me that our Beidaihe immediately. I left Beijing on 21 both Lebanon and Jordan. Thus, American media and propaganda should state that first August on a scheduled flight arranged by the occupation of Taiwan became even more we were not afraid of war, and second we Central Committee. After arriving, I stayed unjust, Mao continued. Our demand was opposed war. Another point he made was with Hu Qiaomu3 in a villa in Beidaihe’s that American armed forces should with- that international tension had a favorable central district. This seaside resort area was draw from Taiwan, and Jiang’s army should aspect for the people of the world. Our used only for the leading members of the withdraw from Jinmen and Mazu. If they propaganda, however, should declare that Central Committee during summers. All of did not, we would attack. Taiwan was too far we must prevent the imperialists from mak- the villas in the resort area were built before away to be bombed, so we shelled Jinmen ing any international tension, and work on the liberation4 for high officials, noble lords, and Mazu. Mao emphasized that the bom- relaxing such tension. These were only and foreign millionaires. Only Chairman bardment would certainly shock the interna- some examples, he continued. There were Mao’s large, one-story house was newly tional community, not only the Americans, so many bad things happening in our world. constructed. but also Europeans and Asians. The Arab If we were too distracted with worries by At noon on 23 August, the third day world would be delighted, and African and everyday anxieties, we would soon collapse after I arrived at Beidaihe, the People’s Lib- Asian peoples would take our side. psychologically under pressure. We should eration Army’s artillery forces in Fujian Then Chairman Mao turned to me and learn how to use a dichotomous method to employed more than 10,000 artillery pieces said that [the reason for] rushing me to analyze the dual nature of bad things. Though and heavily bombed Jinmen [Quemoy], attend the meeting was to let me know about international tension was certainly a bad Mazu [Matsu], and other surrounding off- this sudden event. He directed me to instruct thing, we should see the good side of it. The shore islands occupied by the Nationalist the New China News Agency (NCNA) to tension had made many people awaken and army. collect international responses to the bom- decide to fight the imperialists to the end. In the evening of the 23rd, I attended the bardment. Important responses should be Employing such an analytical method could Politburo’s Standing Committee meeting immediately reported to Beidaihe by tele- help us achieve a liberation in our mind and chaired by Chairman Mao. At the meeting I phone. Mao asked me not to publish our get rid of a heavy millstone round our necks. learned the reason [for the bombardment]. own reports and articles on the bombard- Chairman Mao said that the bombard- In mid-July, American troops invaded Leba- ment at present. We needed to wait and see ment of Jinmen, frankly speaking, was our non and British troops invaded Jordan in for a couple of days. This was the rule. Mao turn to create international tension for a order to put down the Iraqi people’s armed also asked me to instruct editorial depart- purpose.
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