The Darkest Red Corner Matthew James Brazil
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The Darkest Red Corner Chinese Communist Intelligence and Its Place in the Party, 1926-1945 Matthew James Brazil A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy Department of Government and International Relations Business School University of Sydney 17 December 2012 Statement of Originality This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge, the content of this thesis is my own work. This thesis has not been submitted previously, either in its entirety or substantially, for a higher degree or qualifications at any other university or institute of higher learning. I certify that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work and that all the assistance received in preparing this thesis and sources has been acknowledged. Matthew James Brazil i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Before and during this project I met a number of people who, directly or otherwise, encouraged my belief that Chinese Communist intelligence was not too difficult a subject for academic study. Michael Dutton and Scot Tanner provided invaluable direction at the very beginning. James Mulvenon requires special thanks for regular encouragement over the years and generosity with his time, guidance, and library. Richard Corsa, Monte Bullard, Tom Andrukonis, Robert W. Rice, Bill Weinstein, Roderick MacFarquhar, the late Frank Holober, Dave Small, Moray Taylor Smith, David Shambaugh, Steven Wadley, Roger Faligot, Jean Hung and the staff at the Universities Service Centre in Hong Kong, and the kind personnel at the KMT Archives in Taipei are the others who can be named. Three former US diplomats cannot, though their generosity helped my understanding of links between modern PRC intelligence operations and those before 1949. Catherine Sampson and James Miles, two of the most perceptive people I have ever met, have given valuable feedback and advice, as have Rosemary Gallant, Jan Wong, Peter Mattis and Chris Buckley. Fred Teiwes was a guiding light and tireless font of encouragement and inspiration, especially during the most difficult parts of this research. His connections and name opened many doors, and I will always be indebted to him. Words cannot express my gratitude to David Chambers. His command of Chinese Communist intelligence history is matched only by his generous willingness to share that knowledge. I could not have finished this project without them. In addition, I am grateful to Graeme Gill who made certain that I kept the Soviet aspect in mind at all times. Sherri Brazil was understanding and patient during this long project, and I wish that I could repay her love and encouragement. Mark, Esther, Matthew and Elliot Brazil, Bonnie and Ian Jacobsen, and the late Phyllis Bloom cheered me on with boundless enthusiasm. Finally, there are dozens of others in greater China whom I should thank by name, but who prefer anonymity. It is for them that I hope the discussion of this and other topics in the history of their nation will become more open and honest in future years. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Statement of Originality i Acknowledgements ii Table of Contents iii Tables and Abbreviations v Chapter One 1 Introduction Making the Past Serve the Present, Versus Straight Answers A Revisionist History of CCP Intelligence Goals and Questions of This Study Key Terms Defined: “Intelligence” and “Security” Research Methodology Structure of This Study and Its Hypotheses and Conclusions Chapter Two 17 A Survey of Available Literature on Chinese Communist Intelligence, and the Issue of Objectivity Early Accounts on CCP Intelligence, and Their Suppression in the PRC Mad Mirror Images: Works on CCP Intelligence from Taiwan, China, and Russia Mysteries of the East in Western Eyes, and the Kang Sheng Effect Closed Archives, Persistent Bias Chapter Three 33 Under Siege: Founding CCP Intelligence Comintern Tutorials in Secrecy, Difficulties of the United Front The KMT-CCP Split and the Special Operations Work Division Necessity, the Mother of CCP Intelligence CCP Underground, CCP Intelligence Early CCP Intelligence Structure and Functions The CCSO Intelligence Section: Chen Geng’s Agent Networks, 1928-1931 Building Clandestine Communications Assets How Important Was Zhou Enlai? How the Red Squads Operated The Other United Front: Shanghai Foreign Concession Police and the KMT 1931, Year of Disasters for CCP Intelligence, and the Defeat of the CCP in Shanghai Chapter Four 85 CCP Intelligence and Security in the Base Areas and on the Long March Problems in Military Intelligence for the Red Army, 1927 Purging Counter-Revolutionaries Committees, the Futian Incident, and the Founding of the State Political Protection Bureau, 1927-31 Red Army Military Intelligence, and Militarizing CCP Intelligence The Encirclement Campaigns and CCP Intelligence The Long March and CCP Intelligence Red Army Communications and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) on the Long March iii Chen Yun’s White Area Work Attacked at Zunyi, First Steps in Restoring Urban Networks Conclusion Chapter Five 120 The Early Yan’an Period: CCP Intelligence Rebuilds, Kang Sheng Reorganizes, 1936-1941 The Setting: CCP Intelligence and Security, and Mao Zedong’s Ascendance in the Party Negotiation, Infiltration, and Charm: the Lead Up to the Xi’an Incident Kang Sheng in Russia, 1933-1937: Politics in Command of Security Work Kang Sheng and Wang Ming Return to China Purges Live On: Traitor Weeding in Liberated Areas Higher, Bigger (and Badder): Founding the Central Social Department Rebuilding, Training, Professionalization Expansion Into Denied Areas Begins: Three Different Solutions to Three Kinds of Enemy Turf Starting Up the Intelligence Stations (Qingbao zhan) Conclusion Chapter Six 166 Rectification, Rescue, and Intelligence, 1942-45 The Setting: Momentum, Binge, Opportunity, Purge CCP Intelligence Expands its Reach, and Kang Sheng Consolidates His Scope of Control The Consensus for Weeding Out Party Ranks Background Investigations: the weak defense The Yan’an Campaigns Become Intense, 1942-43 The Tragedies and Absurdities of “Salvation” Kang Sheng’s Achievements and the Limits of His Control Suiyuan and Inner Mongolia: The Curse of Proximity? Wide Influence, Limited Control: Intelligence in East and South China Pan Hannian’s Urban Networks A Review of Russian Influence, 1930-1945 Conclusion Conclusion 237 The Further Evolution of CCP Intelligence A Hidden Roll in Victory Bibliography 250 iv TABLES AND ABBREVIATIONS Table 1 Early CCSO Operations 58 Table 2 KMT Statistics on Capture of Communists, 1927-1937 82 Table 3 Three Solutions for Diverse Areas of Operations 157 AB Corps Anti-Bolshevik Corps BI Background Investigation CCP Chinese Communist Party CC Central Committee CCSO Central Committee Special Operations CIA Central Intelligence Agency CMC Central Military Commission COMINT Communications Intelligence Comintern Communist International CSB Central Statistics Bureau (Zhongtong ju) CSD Central Social Department (Zhongyang shehui bu) ECCI Executive Committee of the Communist International GMD See KMT GRU Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie) HUMINT Human Intelligence KMT Kuomintang (Guomindang) MPS Ministry of Public Security v MSB Military Statistics Bureau (Juntong ju) NKVD People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Narodny Komisariat Vnutrennikh Del) OSS Office of Strategic Services PLA People’s Liberation Army PPB Political Protection Bureau PRC People’s Republic of China PSB Public Security Bureau SAD See CSD SIGINT Signals Intelligence SIS Secret Intelligence Service vi This page intentionally left blank vii Chapter One Introduction Making the Past Serve the Present, Versus Straight Answers What was the role of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) intelligence services in achieving their movement’s 1949 victory? Why did the Party found CCP Intelligence1 as an organ of the Central Committee (CC) in 1927, and then upgrade it to Department level status in 1939? Since 1980 the Party has allowed the publication of several dozen books, some films, and numerous magazine articles discussing the history of its intelligence operations during the Chinese Communist Revolution. All are in Chinese, and seem aimed at an educated middle class domestic audience—the same people who populate China’s “blogosphere” which the PRC government seems anxious to monitor and control. These publications and films discuss CCP espionage and other intelligence collection, counterespionage, counterintelligence, security work, and covert action2 during the Chinese Communist Revolution (1927-1949). They depict CCP Intelligence as subordinate to the top political elite, while sometimes diverting blame for its setbacks and “mistakes” to other senior people. Though some materials in Chinese from Taiwan 1 The Chinese Communist Party reorganized and changed the name of its main intelligence and security service four times (by an alternative count, five) between 1927 and 1949. Sometimes the organizations had both an overt designation and a real name known only to persons inside the Party with a need to know to do their jobs. Where appropriate this study will refer to the proper names that predominate in the Chinese language literature and in existing English language studies: in mid-1927, the Special Operations Work Division (Tewu gongzuo chu), subordinate to the military department of the Party Central Committee; from November 1927 to early 1938, the Central Committee Special Operations Branch (CCSO, the Zhongyang tebie renwu gongzuo ke, or Teke);