Professional Hubris: Chinese Officers, the United States and a Failure of Army Building, 1942-1955 by Eric Setzekorn M.A. in International Affairs, May 2005, Troy University B.A. in History, August 2001, University of California, Berkeley B.A. in Political Science, August 2001, University of California, Berkeley A Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of the Columbian College of Arts and Sciences of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy January 31, 2014 Dissertation directed by Edward McCord Associate Professor of History and International Affairs The Columbian College of Arts and Sciences certifies the Eric Setzekorn has passed the Final Examination for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy as of August 27, 2013. This is the final and approved form of the dissertation. Professional Hubris: Chinese Officers, the United States and a Failure of Army Building, 1942-1955 Eric Setzekorn Dissertation Research Committee: Edward A. McCord, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Dissertation Director C. Thomas Long, Assistant Professor of History, Committee Member Gregg A. Brazinsky, Associate Professor of History and International Affairs, Committee Member ii © Copyright 2013 by Eric Setzekorn All Rights Reserved iii Acknowledgments It is a great pleasure to recognize some of the special people who have helped, supported and assisted with my research over the past several years. The George Washington history department has been a wonderful place to work and study. My dissertation committee has been exceedingly helpful throughout the research, writing and revision process. My primary advisor, Edward McCord, has been a pillar of wisdom and reviewed draft after draft of my work. Since beginning my studies at George Washington University in the spring of 2009, Professor McCord has overseen every aspect of my academic progress and supplied encouragement or kick in the pants as necessary. Professor Thomas Long helped piece together an approach to military history that aligned with my research interests and his perpetually high spirits were a great help during the long writing process. Professor Gregg Brazinsky’s use of diplomatic history in East Asia to develop a bilingual, multi-national history is a model of scholarship that underpinned much of my own research. The U.S. Army Center for Military History (CMH) and the Smith-Richardson Foundation both generously supported my research. The CMH’s support was vital to accelerating the dissertation by at least a year and my contact with several distinguished historians at the center such as Richard Stewart and Brian Neumann was incredibly valuable. Lastly, I want to thank Janice for her understanding of the baffling existence that is graduate school. My absence on long trips to dusty archives and numerous beautiful weekends spent indoors poring over forgotten books is at best eccentric behavior. Her patience and support made this project a reality. iv Abstract Professional Hubris: Chinese Officers, the United States and a Failure of Army Building, 1942-1955 The core historical argument presented in this dissertation is that Chinese military officers within the GMD military were able to create a depoliticized military institution, develop foreign partnerships and define a distinct military officer identity to create a true “national” army for the first time in Chinese history during the years 1942-1955. These normative ideas, expressed most articulately by General Sun Liren, were able to achieve many of the status objectives of military officers. The process by which Chinese military officers selectively adopted ideas that supported their professional claims to jurisdiction over the management of violence strongly supports the conception of normative isomorphism where change is driven by desires for status and respect. Chinese military officers built on fifty years of Chinese military thought and foreign ideas to develop a conception of a Chinese Army that was structured to represent aspirations of China as a world power. The aspirations of Chinese officers align closely with models of organizational theory that highlight enduring patterns of professional development and global military trends. Throughout this process, the Unites States played a key role in introducing concepts and providing support to military officers but was never able to decisively shape the GMD/ROC military. The failure of the Chinese “army-building” project was not due to a lack of organizational, intellectual or professional development but because of a renewed politicization of military forces and a purge of key military leaders in 1955. Ultimately, the power of ideas, be it ideas of professional competence articulated by Sun Liren or political loyalty developed by v Chiang Ching-kuo, and the ability to mobilize supporters of these ideas mattered far more than foreign advice or equipment. vi Table of Contents Ackowledgements iv Abstract v Table of Contents vii List of Figures viii Introduction 9 Chapter 1: 1850-1924, The Development of the Chinese Army 25 Chapter 2: 1924-1942, Whampoa Academy and “Party Armies” 52 Chapter 3: 1942-1945, Americans and Ideas 96 Chapter 4: 1945-1949, A National Army 131 Chapter 5: 1950-1953, Professional High Tide 188 Chapter 6: 1953-1955, Restoring Political Officers 225 Epilogue and Conclusion 261 Bibliography 276 vii List of Figures Figure 1: Diagram of the Military School System in Qing China (1910) 45 Figure 2: Diagram of Atomic Bomb Attack (Three Bombs) on Washington D.C. 158 viii Introduction During the twentieth century, China was wracked by civil war, foreign invasion and the repeated use of military power against civilians by authoritarian governments. In spite of this bloody history, the study of the military as an institution and its role in Chinese history has been extremely narrow. This is surprising because contemporary China is a military anomaly in that it is the only large country in the world that does not possess a “national” military, instead relying on a military, which is by law and practice responsible only to a political party. In contrast to other parts of the world, where to quote Charles Tilly, “the state made war and war made the state,” in China the “Party” made war and the Party made the state. While this statement might suggest that the Party is the dominant actor, both the state and “war” i.e. military forces do have agency. The subject of this dissertation is the officer corps of the “Chinese” military from 1942-1955 and the development of ideas of military professionalism. The core historical argument presented is that Chinese military officers within the Kuomintang (GMD, guomindang 國民黨) were able to leverage political rhetoric favoring a depoliticized military, foreign partnerships and technical expertise to create a true “national” army for the first time in Chinese history during the period from 1942-1955. Between the years of 1942-1955 a professional, apolitical military force was created in China by a cadre of highly trained, nationalistic and cosmopolitan officers. This group built on fifty years of Chinese military thought and foreign ideas to develop a 1 conception of a Chinese Army that was structured to represent aspirations of China as a world power. The aspirations of Chinese officers align closely with models of organizational theory that highlight enduring patterns of professional development and global military trends. The failure of this “army-building” project was not due to a lack of organizational, intellectual or professional development but because of a renewed politicization of military forces and a purge of key military leaders in 1955. Embedded within the narrative of military development from 1942-1955 is an exploration of military change that reaches a conclusion that military change was not ‘pushed’ on China by foreigners or developed as the result of policies from senior GMD political leaders. The most prominent factor driving the re-orientation of the GMD army away from its role as a hybrid military/political force towards a professional national army was the desires and attitudes of the military officers. Throughout this dissertation, professional is used to describe an organization with a high degree of administrative insulation from outside pressures, personnel assignment based on occupational efficiency, significant barriers to entry, a sense of shared identity, and a belief in a special status within society. Increased professionalization was attractive to Chinese military officers because it provided for higher social status, increased political insularity and improved organizational security. The thematic focus of this dissertation is the internal culture and norms of the GMD officer corps. Military doctrine, organizational structures and civil-military relations will be considered but my purpose is to examine the content of military culture and ideas rather than its defined forms such as organizational structures or direct policy outcomes. Until now, study of the behavior, attitudes and ideology of the Nationalist 2 officer corps has not received any systematic scholarly interest or research. The Nationalist officer corps is an ideal subject for academic research because their organizational role places them in a power-brokerage position between high level political policy-makers and the common soldiers or the Chinese civilian population. In addition, the power and influence of the Nationalist officer corps was especially