2014 CMTL Reader Published by the Center for Modern Torah Leadership All materials herein copyrighted by the authors. Please acknowledge CMTL when forwarding. 1 Table of Contents [All content is by Rabbi Aryeh Klapper unless otherwise noted] Kashrut Goes Viral Products That Are Kosher Only without A Hechksher 4 The Nature and Practice of Halakhic Authority Symposium on Partnership Minyanim and Othodoxy: 1. Are Partnership Minyanim Orthodox? 6 2. Rabbinic Authority and Public Policy by Shira Hecht-Koller, Esq. 17 3. Parsing the Partnership Minyan Debate by Dr. Yoel Finkelman 19 4. Heteronomy and Hierarchy: Partnership Minyanim and Their Relationship with Halakhic Authority by Prof. Malka Simkovich, (SBM ‘00) 21 5. Women in the Modern Orthodox Shul by Rabbi Dr. Martin Lockshin 23 Who May and Who Must, Issue Halakhic Rulings? Underlying Issues in the Partnership Minyan Debate 27 “No Beers Before Blogging”: Halakhic Democratization and Its Discontents 32 Disability and Inclusion 2014 Summer Beit Midrash Sh’eilah 34 Rabbi Klapper’s Responsum 36 May a Wheelchair-Bound Kohen Recite Birkat Kohanim? 46 The Jewish Ethics of War Putting a Price on Human Life in Times of War 49 When is Military Intervention Obligatory? 52 Is the G-d of the Book of Joshua a moral G-d? Is Joshua a moral leader? 53 Leadership and Modern Orthodoxy To What Degree Are Public Servants Genuinely Servants? 55 How Rabbis Treat Rabbis Versus Other People 59 “Good” Deeds Done in the Service of Evil 61 The Wages of Sin and the Rewards of Disobedience 64 Purim, Anti-anti-semitism, and Modern Orthodoxy 68 Seeing Voices 70 Gender and the Role of Women in Judaism The God of Rivka by Tobie Harris (SBM ‘05) 73 Gender and Tefillin: Assumptions and Consequences 75 Why A Gendered Judaism Makes Sense by Rabbi Chaim Strauchler (SBM ‘02) and Rabbi Joshua Strulowitz, (SBM ‘00) 79 Reclaiming Tzniut: Mosheh Rabbeinu, Divine Mercy, and Modesty 82 Rabbi Lamm on Women and Tefillin 85 Agunot I Signed The Post-Nup. Why Haven't You? by Maharat Rori Picker Neiss (SBM ’10) 87 2 Why We Have the Lonna Kin Situation 88 Divorce Takes a Sabbatical 90 Business Ethics How Can Choshen Mishpat be Reclaimed? 94 “Lighting Torches for the Blind”: Illuminating a Central Aspect of Halachic Business Ethics 97 Rationalism and Empiricism Does G-d want believers, or rather empiricists? 101 Ritual and Creating Ritual Blessing Our Countings: Should Ritual Be Ritualized? 105 Why I Oppose Adding Symbols to the Seder Plate 107 A Teaser for 2015 Some First Thoughts on the Procedure for Immersing Female Converts 109 3 Products That Are Kosher Only Without A Hechksher (moderntoraleadership.wordpress.com February 17, 2014) Many years ago Garelick Farms decided to market its milk all-natural, which meant that it needed a natural source of Vitamin D – and it chose shark oil. This had at least two consequences: Hood Dairy began running an ad with the tagline “There’s something fishy about Garelick Farms milk”, and the KVH (this was long before I became involved) pulled its hashgachah. Garelick Farms sued Hood, arguing that the fish was imperceptible, and won – the (non-Jewish) judge tasted the milk and agreed there was no fish taste. I therefore ruled that the milk was kosher because the KVH had pulled its hashgachah. The judge’s taste test demonstrated that the shark oil was nullified (certainly the percentage was below 1/60 anyway), so the only remaining issue was deliberate nullification (bittul lekhatchilah), which makes a product prohibited to the person or person for whose benefit the nullification occurred. R. Akiva Eiger (YD 99:5) states that a nullification done with no specific end-user in mind, but rather for “whomever will wish to buy”, is considered to be done for the benefit of all eventual purchasers. One understanding of this position is that anything consciously produced with observant Jews in mind has that issue, even if the observant Jews are a trivial percentage of the intended audience. However, by giving up its kosher certification, Garelick Farms demonstrated that it did not have any concern for observant Jews, and therefore the milk was kosher because it had lost its hekhsher. Paradoxically, had the KVH accepted this argument and sought to restore the hekhsher, the milk would have become treif. My contrarian ambition was to develop a list of products that were kosher only when unhekhshered, as many industrial koshering procedures ultimately depend on some form of nullification. (Note however that this broad interpretation of the prohibition is not obvious either in R. Akiva Eiger or in his cited source, Responsa Rivash 498, and is not followed consistently in practice today; see for example Igrot Moshe YD 1:62-63.) I thought this was a compelling but creative psak, and to make sure I really believed it, I went out and bought a quart of milk and drank a glass before paskening that anyone else could do so. But Dov Weinstein shows me that in the current issue of Tradition my teacher Rabbi J. David Bleich makes the same argument. Here is his quote. “Paradoxically, according to R. Akiva Eger, a product that otherwise would be permitted may become forbidden by virtue of the fact that it is certified as kosher. Products produced for the mass market are not produced for the benefit of Jews. Accordingly, if some small quantity of a non-kosher ingredient is 4 present, but nullified, the product is permissible. The same product, if produced for a Jew, according to the opinion of R. Akiva Eger, even for an unspecified, anonymous Jew, is prohibited. Kosher certification is sought by a producer precisely because he wishes to market his product to the Jewish consumer. Targeting the Jewish consumer as a potential customer creates a situation in which nullification is carried out expressly for the benefit of a Jew and hence, according to R. Akiva Eger, a Jew may not benefit from such nullification. Accordingly, stem-cell burgers might be produced that are indeed kosher but they would become prohibited if labeled as such!” Barukh shekivanti ledaat mori! 5 Are Partnership Minyanim Orthodox? Thoughts on Half-Measures, Boundaries, and Slippery Slopes [1] (moderntoraleadership.wordpress.com November 4, 2014) Section 1: Introduction Are partnership minyanim an Orthodox phenomenon? In 1992, Rabbi Yehudah Herzl Henkin published (Bnei Banim 2:11) a responsum which stated that “forgiveness of communal honor would be effective regarding women’s aliyot, but I have already written that this is an opening for assimilationists, and I will begin and end with this, that a congregation which brings women up for the Reading of the Torah should be separated from the community of the Diaspora.” In 2001, Rabbi Mendel Shapiro made essentially the same argument regarding communal honor in the Edah Journal (1:2), but he concluded that the practice should be instituted. Rabbi Henkin responded in the same issue by criticizing some of the places in which Rabbi Shapiro’s exposition differed from his own, and repeating his evaluation that: “women’s aliyot remain outside the consensus, and a congregation that institutes them is not Orthodox in name and will not long remain Orthodox in practice. In my judgment, this is an accurate statement now and for the foreseeable future, and I see no point in arguing about it.” In light of Rabbi Henkin’s articles, it seems to me reasonable to concede from the outset that an intellectually plausible argument can be made for the practice of giving women aliyot.[2] My analysis will therefore focus on his contention that any congregation that institutes that practice “is not Orthodox in name and will not long remain Orthodox in practice.” Has the experience of the last 13 years verified this judgment?[3] Can practices be halakhically legitimate only if they fall within Orthodoxy? How should Orthodoxy respond to the reality of minyanim that institute women’s aliyot, and of individuals who attend those minyanim regularly or occasionally, and nonetheless see themselves, and wish to continue to identify themselves, as constituents of Orthodoxy? One premise of mine should be clear – the existence of an intellectually plausible argument for a halakhic position does not ipso facto legitimate that position as an option for practice. If that were so, my initial concession would obviate everything that follows. Rather, I believe that arguments generally confer legitimacy only in the company of authority. Another premise may be less clear. There is no magic in the word “Orthodoxy”. Practices are not necessarily religiously legitimate just because they are descriptively or prescriptively “Orthodox”, and I can certainly envision scenarios in which practices are religiously legitimate despite being descriptively or prescriptively non-Orthodox. Inclusion within Orthodoxy is a sine qua non for halakhic legitimacy only so long as Orthodoxy remains a faithful conduit of the Tradition and so long as it does not exclude other legitimate conduits of the Tradition. There is an evident tension between these two premises – if Orthodoxy is not by definition the arbiter of halakhic legitimacy, on what other basis do I delegitimate intellectually plausible positions? The answer to this question is fraught, and not necessarily rigorously definable, at least not yet for me. But here is an attempt that I think will shed important light on what follows: To be legitimate, Halakhic 6 positions must be advanced by authorities, and embraced by communities that genuinely relate to Halakhah as Divine law, and to the Jewish people as a political community Divinely bound by that law. Relating to Halakhah as law means that one is open to heteronomy, to being commanded-by-another. This is true not only with regard to G-d, but also with regard to the human beings empowered by any system His Torah sets up.