Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights Author(S): Tom Regan Source: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol

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Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights Author(s): Tom Regan Source: Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer, 1980), pp. 305-324 Published by: Blackwell Publishing Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265001 . Accessed: 26/02/2011 05:22

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http://www.jstor.org TOM REGAN Utilitarianism,Vegetarianism, and AnimalRights

Philosophyis notoriousfor its disagreements.Give two philosophers the same premisesand we are not surprisedthat they disagree over the conclusion they thinkfollows from them. Give them the same conclusion and we expect them to disagree about the correctpremises. My remarksin this essay fall mainly in this latter category.Peter Singer and I both agree that we have a moral obligationto be vegetarians. This is our commonconclusion. We do not agree concerning why we have this obligation.Important differences exist betweenus regardingthe premisesfrom which this conclusion should be derived.' My positionimplies boththat (a) the idea of animal rightsis intelli- gible2and also that (b) the view that certain animals have certain rightsmust play a role in adequately groundingthe obligationto be

i. These differencesare broughtout most clearly in our respectivereplies to an essay critical of our views by Michael Fox. See his "Animal Liberation: A Cri- tique," Ethics, January 1978. See Singer's "The Parable of the Fox and the Un- liberated Animals," and my "Fox's Critique of Animal Liberation," in the same issue. In this regard compare the firstchapter of Singer's Animal Liberation (New York: Random House, 1975) and my "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," Canadian Journal of Philosophy,October 1975. I discuss some of the differences between us at greaterlength in my "Animal Rights,Human Wrongs," a convoca- tion address presented at MuhlenbergCollege, Allentown,PA, in March 1979, and published in the Summer I980 issue of EnvironmentalEthics. 2. On the intelligibilityof this idea see, for example, Joel Feinberg, "The Rights of Animals and Future Generations" in William Blackstone, ed., Philoso- phy and EnvironmentalCrisis (Athens: Universityof Georgia Press, 1974); Tom Regan, "Feinberg on What Sorts of Beings Can Have Rights," Southern Journal of Philosophy, Winter 1976, and "McCloskey on Why Animals Cannot Have Rights," Philosophical Quarterly,Fall 1976.

? I980 by Princeton UniversityPress Philosophy & Public Affairs9, no. 4 0048-3915/80/040305-19$00.95/ I 306 Philosophy& Public Affairs

vegetarian.I shall have more to say about my positionin the second section of this essay. To begin I shall note that Singer,for his part, mightaccept (a); that is, he mightaccept the view that the idea of animal rightsis at least logicallycoherent. Clearly, however, he does not accept (b). Readers familiarwith some of Singer'searlier writings might be for- given for thinkingotherwise. For example, in his well-knownessay "All Animals Are Equal," he quotes Bentham'sfamous passage: "the questionis not, Can they (that is, non-humananimals) reason? nor Can theytalk? but, Can theysuffer?." Singer then comments: In this passage Bentham points to the capacity for sufferingas the vital characteristicthat gives a being the rightto equal consideration.3 Here, it perhaps bears emphasizing,Singer points to a particularca- pacity-namely,the capacity for sufferingor, as he says a few lines later,the capacityfor "suffering and/or enjoyment"-asthe basis for the rightto equal consideration.No mentionis made of utilitarian considerations.On the contrary,it would not be an unnatural,even if it should turnout to be an incorrect,interpretation to say that Singer thinksthat certainbeings have the rightto equal considerationof in- terestsbecause of theirnature-because, as a matterof theirnature, theyhave the capacityto sufferor to enjoy or both. Arguably,Singer could be interpretedas thinkingthat some animals, at least, have one naturalright: the rightto equal considerationof theirinterests. Nor is thisright the onlyright Singer mentions. To avoid the prejudice which Singer,following Richard Ryder,4calls "speciesism,"we must"allow thatbeings which are similar(to humans) in all relevant respectshave a similarright to life."5At least some animals are suffi- cientlysimilar to humans in "all relevantrespects"; thus, at least some

3. "All Animals Are Equal" originally appeared in Philosophical Exchange i, no. 5 (Summer 1974). It was reprintedin Animal Rights and Human Obliga- tions, ed. Tom Regan and Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976). 4. Richard Ryder, "Experiments on Animals," in Animals, Men and Morals, ed. Stanley and Roslind Godlovitchand John Harris (London: Gollancz, 1971). See also his Victims of Science (London: Davis-Poytner) I975. 5. Animal Liberation,p. 21. 307 Utilitarianism,Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

animals have a rightto life,Singer implies. But if we ask whatthose re- spectsare in virtueof whichthe humans and animals in questionhave an equal claim to theright to life,these are thenatural capacities of the beings in question,which furthersupports interpreting Singer as be- lievingthat at least some animals have, as all or at least mosthumans do, certainnatural rights-in this case, the naturalright to life. Natural thoughthis interpretationappears, Singerhas since stated clearlythat it fails to capturehis consideredposition. In responseto a recentcritic's complaint that he has littleto say about the nature of rights,Singer writes as follows: Why is it surprisingthat I have littleto say about the nature of rights?It wouldonly be surprisingto one who assumes thatmy case for animal liberationis based upon rightsand, in particular,upon the idea of extendingrights to animals. But this is not my position at all. I have littleto say about rightsbecause rightsare not important to my argument.My argumentis based on the principleof equality,which I do have quite a lot to say about. My basic moral position (as my emphasis on pleasure and pain and my quoting Benthammight have led [readers]to suspect) is utilitarian.I make verylittle use of the word"rights" in Animal Liberation,and I could easily have dispensedwith it altogether.I thinkthat the only right I ever attributeto animals is the "right"to equal considerationof interests,and anythingthat is expressedby talkingof such a right could equally well be expressedby the assertionthat animals' interestsought to be givenequal considerationwith the like interests of humans. (With the benefitof hindsight,I regretthat I did allow the conceptof a rightto intrudeinto my workso unnecessarilyat this point; it would have avoided misunderstandingif I had not made thisconcession to popularmoral rhetoric.) To the charge of having embroiledthe animal liberationdebate in the issue of animals' rights,then, I plead not guilty.As to who the real culpritmight be....6 This passage leaves littleroom fordoubt as to what Singerthinks. His previousreferences to "animal rights,"he thinks,not only were

6. "The Parable of the Fox and the Unliberated Animals," p. 122. 308 Philosophy& Public Affairs

unnecessaryfor his utilitarianposition; they were lamentable,some- thinghe now "regrets,"a "concessionto popularmoral rhetoric" rather than a reasoned appeal. Perhaps this is so. Perhaps appeals to "therights of animals"_must bear thediagnosis Singer gives of his own earlierefforts. I do not know. But I do not thinkso. Grantedit is not uncommonfor those mounting the box for some cause or otherto gladlyinvoke the idea of rights; grantedalso thatthis appeal is part of the stock-in-tradeof the moral rhetorician,"a rhetoricaldevice," in D. G. Ritchie'swords, "for gaining a point withoutthe troubleof provingit"-(a "device"which, Ritchie goes on to observe,"may be leftto the stump-oratoror party-journalist but whichshould be discreditedin all seriouswriting").7 Nevertheless, despitethe testimonyof Ritchieand Singerto the contrary,there remains the possibilitythat we are drivento invokethe idea of rightsfor serious-minded,theoretical, non-rhetorical reasons. I believethis is true some of thetime. In particular,I believethis is truein thecase of argu- ing well forthe obligationto be vegetarian.I shall returnto this topic in the second section.However, my immediateinterest lies in paving the way forrational acceptance of thispossibility. This I proposeto do by arguingthat, shorn of appeals to the rightsof animals, Singerfails to justifythe obligationto be vegetarianor to treatanimals in a more humane manner.

Anyone writingon the topic of the treatmentof animals must ac- knowledgean enormousdebt to Singer.Because of his work,as well as the pioneeringwork of Ruth Harrison,the gruesomedetails of factory farmingare findinga place withinthe public consciousness.8All of us by now know,or at least have had the opportunityto findout, that chickens are raised in incrediblycrowded, unnatural environments; thatveal calves are intentionallyraised on an anemic diet,are unable

7. D. G. Ritchie, Natural Rights (London: Allen & Unwin, I894). Relevant passages are included in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, p. I82. 8. See Ruth Harrison, Animal Machines (London: Vincent Stuart, I964). See also her essay, "On Factory Farming," in Animals, Men and Morals. 309 Utilitarianism,Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

to move enough even to clean themselves,are kept in the dark most of theirlives; that otheranimals, includingpigs and cattle,are being raised intensivelyin increasingnumbers. Personally,I do not know how anyone pretendingto the slightestsensitivity or powers of em- pathycan look on thesepractices with benign indifference or approval. In any event,Singer's position, growing out of his professedutilitarian- ism, is thatwe have a moral obligationto stop eatingmeat, to become vegetarians.Here is theway he bringshis case to its moraldestination: Since, as I have said, none of thesepractices (of raisinganimals intensively)cater for anythingmore than our pleasures of taste,our practiceof rearingand killingother animals in orderto eat themis a clear instance of the sacrificeof the most importantinterests of other beings in order to satisfy trivial interests of our own . . . we must stop this practice,and each of us has a moral obligationto cease supportingthe practice.9 I wonderabout this. First,I wonderon what groundsSinger judges that"our pleasures of taste"are "trivialinterests." Most of the people I know, including many quite thoughtfulpersons, do not regard the situationin thisway. Most of themgo to a greatdeal of troubleto pre- pare tastyfood or to find"the best restaurants"where such foodis prepared. Singermight say thatpeople who place so much importanceon the taste of food have a warped sense of values. And maybe theydo. But thatthey do, if theydo, is somethingthat stands in need of rather elaborate argument,which will not be found in any of Singer'spub- lished writings.This is not to say that the interestwe have in eating tasty food is as importantan interestas we (or animals) have in avoidingpain or death.It is just to say thatit is unclear,and thatSing- er has givenno argumentto show,that our interestin eatingtasty food is, in his words,"trivial." Second-(and now grantingto Singer his assumptionthat our interestin eatingpleasant tastingfood is trivial)-it is unclear how, as a utilitarian,he can argue that we have a moral obligationto stop supportingthe practice of raising animals intensively(this practice is

9. Singer, "All Animals Are Equal," in Animal Rights and Human Obligations, P. 155. Page citations in the text referto this version. 3IO Philosophy& Public Affairs

henceforthsymbolized as p) because of some statementabout the purposeof p. The questionthe utilitarianmust answer is not,(a) What is the purposeof p?. It is, (b) All thingsconsidered, what are the consequences of p, and how do theycompare to the value of the consequences that would resultif alternativesto p were adopted and sup- ported?Thus, when Singerobjects to p on the groundthat it does not "caterfor anything more than our pleasures of taste,"he gives us an answer to (a), not, as we should expect froma utilitarian,an answer to (b). The differencebetween the two questionsand theirrespective answersis not unimportant.For thoughthe purposeof p mightbe cor- rectlydescribed as that of cateringto our (trivial) pleasures of taste, it does not followeither that this is a utilitarianobjection one might raise againstp-it is not,so far as I understandutilitarianism-or that, when a distinctivelyutilitarian objection is fothcoming,it will dwell on Singer'scharacterization of p's purpose. His characterizationalso leaves out much which, from a utilitarianpoint of view, must be judged to be highlyrelevant to determiningthe morality of p. What I have in mind here is this. The animal industryis big business. I do not knowexactly how manypeople are involvedin it,direct- lyor indirectly,but certainlythe number must easily run intothe many tens of thousands.There are, firstand most obviously,those who ac- tuallyraise and sell the animals; but thereare many othersbesides, includingfeed producersand retailers;cage manufacturersand de- signers;the producersof growthstimulants and otherchemicals (for example, thosedesigned to ward offor to controldisease); those who butcher,package, and ship the meat or eggs or otheranimal products to which Singermight (and does, as in the case of eggs frombattery- hens) takemoral exception, and theextension personnel and veterinar- ians whose lives revolvearound the success or failure of the animal industry.Also consider all the membersof the families who are the dependentsof theseemployees or employers.Now, the interestswhich thesepersons have in "business-as-usual,"in raisinganimals intensively, go well beyondpleasures of taste and are far fromtrivial. These people have a stake in the animal industryas rudimentaryand im- portantas having a job, feedinga family,or laying aside moneyfor theirchildren's education or theirown retirement.What do these peo- 3"1 Utilitarianism,Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

ple do about a job, a means of supportingthemselves or theirdepend- ents,if we or theysee the errorof theiror our ways and become vegetarians? Certainlyit is no defenseof an immoralpractice to plead that some people profitfrom it. In the case of slavery,for example, we would not cease to condemnit merelybecause we were apprized that plantationowners found it beneficial.But Singer,as a utilitarian,cannot just appeal to our moral intuitionsor assume that our intuitions can be givena utilitarianbasis. In the particularcase of the morality of raisinganimals intensively,Singer, as a utilitarian,cannot say that the interestsof those humans involvedin this practice,those whose qualityof life presentlyis bound up in it, are irrelevant.As a utilitarian, Singer,I believe,must insist on the relevanceof theirinterests as well as the relevanceof the interestsof otherpersons who are not di- rectlyinvolved in the practicebut who mightbe adverselyaffected by its sudden or gradual cessation. For example, the shortand long term economicimplications of a sudden or gradual transitionto vegetarianism, by large numbersof persons,must seriouslybe investigatedby any utilitarian.It is not enoughto pointout, as vegetarianssometimes do, that grains not used to feed intensivelyraised animals could be used to feed the starvingmasses of humanity;a utilitarianmust have the hard data to show that this possibilityis at least probable and, judged on utilitariangrounds, desirable. The debate between Singer and GarrettHardin over the desirabilityof famine relief,judged on utilitarianprinciples, is relevanthere and pointsto the enormityof the task that confrontsanyone who would rest vegetarianismon utilitarianism.10Though the issues involvedare enormouslycomplicated and cannot receive anythingapproaching even a modest airing on this occasion, one thingis certain: It is not obviouslytrue that the consequences foreveryone affected would be better,all considered,if intensive rearingmethods were abandoned and we all (or most of us) be-

io. See Hardin, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor," Psy- chologyToday, September 1974; Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluenceand Morality," Philosophy & Public Affairsi, no. 3 (Spring 1972). Both are reprintedin W. Aiken and H. LaFollette, eds., World Hunger and Moral Obligation (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1977). For a discussion of both views see Onora O'Neill, "The Moral Perplexities of Famine Relief," in Tom Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death (New York: Random House, 1979). 3I2 Philosophy& Public Affairs

came (all at once or gradually) vegetarians.Some nice calculations are necessaryto show this.Without them, a utilitarian-basedvegetar- ianism cannot command our rational assent. Even the most sympa- theticreader, even a "fellowtraveler" like myselfwill fail to findthe necessarycalculations in Singer'swork. They simplyare not there. Singer,or a defenderof his position,can be expectedto protestat thispoint by notingthat utilitarianism,as he understandsit, involves acceptance of a principleof equality.There is some unclarityconcern- ing how we should interpretSinger's understanding of this principle. Sometimeshe writesas thoughthis principle applies to interests;sometimeshe writesas thoughit applies to treatment.I shall considerthe latteralternative below. For the presentI shall considerhow this principle is thoughtby him to applyto interests. At one point Singer explains the principleof equality as follows: "The interestsof everybeing affectedby an action are to be takeninto account and given the same weightas the like interestsof any other being" ("All Animals Are Equal," p. I52). I propose to call this "the equality of interestsprinciple." Abstractly, this principlestates that equal interestsare (and ought to be considered) equal in value, no matterwhose intereststhey are, and thatthe interestsof all affected partiesare to be takeninto account. Thus, if a human's interestin avoidingpain is a non-trivial,important interest, then, given this principle,the like interestof a non-humananimal also is (and oughtto be considered) non-trivialand important. Suppose this principleis accepted and is conjoined with the principle of utility.Have we thenbeen givena utilitarianbasis forthe obligationto be vegetarian?I do not believe so. The problemwith the equalityof interestsprinciple is thatit does not tell us what we ought to do, once we have taken the interestsof all affectedparties into account and counted equal interestsequally. All that it tells us is that thisis somethingwe must do. If, in additionto this principle,we are also supplied with the principleof utility,we are still some distance fromthe obligationto be vegetarian.For what we would have to be shown,and what Singerfails to show, as I have argued in the above, is that the consequences of all or most persons adoptinga vegetarian 3I3 Utilitarianism,Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

way of life would be better,all considered,than if we did not. That is not shownmerely by insistingthat equal interestsare equal. A defenderof Singer mightobject that I have overlookedan im- portantargument. On a numberof occasions (for example, "All Ani- mals Are Equal," p. I56) Singerargues thatwe would not allow to be done to human imbecileswhat we allow to be done to moreintelligent, more self-consciousanimals; forexample, we would not allow trivial, painfulexperiments to be conductedupon these humans,whereas we do allow themto be conductedon primates.Thus, we are guiltyof a gross formof prejudice ("speciesism"): we are grosslyinconsistent fromthe moral pointof view. This view of Singer'sis not withoutconsiderable moral weight.But how does it strengthenhis avowedlyutilitarian basis forvegetarianism or,more generally, for more humane treatmentof animals? Not at all, so far as I understandthe issues. In orderfor this argumentfor moral consistencyto providea utilitarianbasis formore humane treatment of animals, Singerwould have to show thatit would be just as wrong, on utilitariangrounds, to treatanimals in certainways as it is to treat humans in comparable ways. Singer,however, does not show, first, that, on utilitariangrounds, it would be wrong to treat humans in the ways described(here he merelyappeals to our settledconviction thatit would be wrongto do this) and, second,that it would be wrong at all, on utilitariangrounds, to treat animals in certain ways, let alone, again on utilitariangrounds, that it would be just as wrong to treatthem in these ways as it would be to treathumans. In short, Singerfails to give anythingresembling a utilitarianbasis for the argumentfor moral consistency. Nor will it do, as a defense of Singer,merely to assume that the equalityof interestsprinciple must be violatedby the differentialtreat- mentof the humans and animals in question.That would have to be shown,not assumed,on utilitariangrounds, since, a priori,the following seems possible. The interestsof animals raised intensivelyare counted as equal to the interestsof human imbeciles who mightbe raised as a food source under similar circumstances,but the consequences of treatingthe animals in this way are optimificwhereas 3I4 Philosophy& Public Affairs

those resultingfrom raising imbeciles intensively would not be. More generally,dissimilar treatment of beings with equal interestsmight well have greatlyvarying consequences. So, even grantingthat we would not approveof treatingimbecilic humans in the ways animals are routinelytreated, and even assumingthat the humans and animals themselveshave an equal interestin avoidingpain or death, it does notfollow that we have been givena utilitarianbasis forvegetarianism or the cause of morehumane treatmentof animals generally.If by the prinicipleof equalitySinger means what I have called the equalityof interestsprinciple, we must conclude thathe has failed to groundthe obligationto be vegetarianon utilitarianism. As mentionedearlier, Singer, in additionto arguingthat equality applies to interests,also sometimeswrites as if equalityapplies to treatment.Thus, forexample, we findhim at one pointsaying that the principle of equality,as it applies to humans, "is a prescriptionof how we shouldtreat humans" ("All AnimalsAre Equal," p. I 52, myemphasis). It is possible, therefore,that, in additionto the equality of interests principle,Singer also recognizesanother principle of equality,what I shall call the equalityof treatmentprinciple. Abstractly this principle mightbe formulatedthus: beings with equal interestsought to be treatedequally. This principlehas an advantage over the equalityof interestsprinciple, in that it does professto tell us how we ought to act: we oughtto treatbeings withequal interestsequally. This principle,however, suffers from a certaindegree of vagueness,in that,by itself,it does not tellus how to determinewhat constitutesequal treatment.Certainly it cannotbe interpretedto mean (and I do notmean to suggestthat Singer thinksthat it means) that beings with equal interestsought to be treatedidentically; that, for example, we oughtto give dancing lessons to pigs if we give them to little girls on the groundsthat pigs and littlegirls both enjoy dancing. Still,what counts as equal treatmentis far fromclear. Nevertheless,whatever the ap- propriatecriteria are, I thinkit is fairto say that Singerwould agree to the following-namely,that if we thinkit wrongto inflictunnecessary pain on humans who have an interestin avoidingit, then we mustalso thinkit just as wrongto inflictunnecessary pain on non-humananimals who have an equal interestin avoidingit. Not to thinkit just as 3I5 Utilitarianism,Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

wrongin thecase of animals as in the case of humans,if I understand Singer,would be a breach of the equalityof treatmentprinciple. My questionnow is this.Suppose thatthe equality of treatmentprinciple strengthensthe case forthe obligationto be vegetarian.How, if at all, does Singerprovide this principlewith a utilitarianbasis? If I understandhim correctly,I believewe must conclude that he fails to providethis principlewith such a basis. Abstractly,there appear to be threepossibilities. ( i ) The equality of treatmentprinciple is identicalwith the principleof utility.(2) The equality of treatmentprinciple follows from the principleof utility. (3) The equalityof treatmentprinciple is presupposedby theprinciple of utility.I shall examine each alternativein its turn. (i) It is implausible to maintain that the equality of treatment principleis identicalwith the principleof utility.Utility directs us to bringabout the greatestpossible balance of non-moralgood over non- moralevil; a priori,whether treating beings with equal interestsequally would be conduciveto realizingthe utilitariangoal is an open question.In otherwords, a priori,it is at least conceivablethat systematic violationsof the principleof equalityof treatmentcould be optimific. If thisis so, thenit cannot plausiblybe maintainedthat the two prin- ciples are identical. (2) Possiblyit will be thoughtthat the equalityof treatmentprinciple followsfrom utility in two ways: (a) the equalityprinciple follows logicallyfrom (is logicallyentailed by) the principleof utility; (b) the equalityprinciple, when supplied with certain factual prem- ises, can be justifiedby an appeal to utility.As forthe firstalternative, it mustagain be said thatit is implausibleto maintainthat the equality of treatmentprinciple is entailedby the principleof utility.Certainly it appears possible that someone mightaffirm the principleof utility and, at the same time,deny the equality of treatmentprinciple without therebycontradicting himself. To put the point differently,someone mightmaintain that we oughtto act so as to bringabout the greatest possiblebalance of non-moralgood over non-moralevil and maintain that to realize this objectiveit may be necessaryto treatsome beings unequally.If thisis so, then the equalityof treatmentprinciple is not logicallyentailed by the principleof utility. 3T6 Philosophy& Public Affairs

The second argumentfor the equalityof treatmentprinciple following from utilityis that the utilitarianobjective is assisted if this principleis accepted.On thisview, we oughtto treatbeings with equal interestsequally because, as a matterof fact,this is optimific.Now, it is certainlyopen to a utilitarianto argue in this way. Indeed, what I want to emphasizeis that,if thisis how theequality of treatmentprinciple is supposedto followfrom the principle of utility,then it must be argued for. No such argumentis forthcomingfrom Singer,I believe, despite certain appearances to the contrary.There are occasions, alluded to earlier,where Singer argues thatwe are morallyinconsistent when we allow thingsto be done to animals thatwe would not allow to be done to less developedhumans. In doingthis, Singer thinks, if I understand him correctly,we violatethe equalityof treatmentprinciple. However, in orderfor this finding to strengthenhis allegedlyutilitarian basis for vegetarianismand animal liberationgenerally, Singer would firsthave to show (at least) that practiceswhich violate this principlealso violate the principleof utility.It is not adequate merelyto assume that thisis so, since one therebybegs the questionat issue-namely,whether the equalityof treatmentprinciple does followfrom the principle of utility,in the sense of "followsfrom" under discussion. By merelynot- ing thatthe way we allow animals to be treatedviolates the equalityof treatmentprinciple, assuming that it does, Singerfails to give us any argumentfor opposing this treatment of animals on distinctivelyutili- tariangrounds. How, then, mighthe argue, on utilitarianlines, against treating animals as theyare treated?The questionis enormouslycomplicated. I have already alluded to its difficultyearlier, when I mentionedthe animal industry.What Singer would have to show, I believe,is that ,theconsequences of treatinganimals as they are at presentbeing treatedare worse, all considered,than those that would resultif we treatedthem differently-forexample, if theywere not raised intensively.Possibly this could be shown. I do not know. However,Singer has not even begun to show this.And yet,if I am right,this is precisely whathe mustshow, if he is to givethe case foranimal liberationa utilitarianbasis. And thisis as much as to say that,judged on his published 317 Utilitarianism,Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

writings,he fails to givethis liberation movement a basis of this kind. (3) In defense of Singer one mightsay that, thoughthe equality of treatmentprinciple is not identicalto, is not entailedby and is not shown by Singer to be justifiedby the principleof utility,it remains truethat utility presupposes equality. Thus, it is by means of this pre- suppositionthat the principleof equalityof treatmentmakes its en- tranceinto utilitariantheory. And since equalityenters in this,a logically respectable way, Singer's use of the equality of treatment principlehas a utilitarianbasis afterall. I do not believe this argumentholds. What groundsthere are for thinkingthat utilitypresupposes the equality of treatmentprinciple turnon ignoringthe differencebetween this principle and the equality of interestsprinciple. It is arguablethat utilitarianism presupposes the equalityof interestsprinciple, that principlebeing, again, that equal interestsare equal-that is, have like importanceor value-and thatthe interestsof all affectedparties are to be takeninto account. Thus, the equalityof interestsprinciple idirects us, as utilitarians,not to attempt to justifytreating different beings differently on the groundsthat, for example,though A's and B's have a like interestin C, A's interestsare more importantthan B's. Like interestshave like importance.That is somethingutilitarianism must presupposeeven to get offthe ground. Suppose this is true.What, then,of the equalityof treatmentprinciple? Nothingfollows concerning its status withinutilitarian theory. Certainlyit does not followthat we ought to treatbeings with equal interestsequally just because they have equal interests.More con- spicuously,this does notfollow logically given a utilitarianbased ethic. Nor is the equalityof treatmentprinciple presupposed by utilitarianism. If it were, therewould be another,more fundamentalprinciple than utility-namely,the principleof equalityof treatment.And that, so far as I understandutilitarianism, would be inconsistentwith that theory.One cannothold boththat the principle of utilityis theone and onlyfundamental moral principleand that this principlepresupposes another,different and morefundamental principle, that of equalityof 'treatment.So, this attemptto defend Singer's utilitarianbasis for vegetarianism,and for animal liberationgenerally, just won't do. The upshot of this is as follows. If Singer actually is to give a 3I8 Philosophy& Public Affairs

utilitarianbasis forvegetarianism, he must argue in a quite different way. In particular,the equalityof treatmentprinciple must be given a solid utilitarianjustification before he can be justifiedin usingit, as a utilitarian,in supportof vegetarianism.Now, to justifythis principle on utilitariangrounds, Singer must show thataccepting it and extending its scope to the treatmentof animals would bringabout betterre- sultsthan are now obtainedby treatinganimals as thoughthey are not coveredby this principle.It is possiblethat this can be shown. But to show it would require enormous amounts of complicatedempirical data, concerning,for example, the long-termeconomic implication of Westernsociety's giving up meat eating. Singergives us no such data. Thus, if the precedingis sound, he fails to give a utilitarianjustifica- tionof theequality of treatmentprinciple, most especially of extending this principleto animals; and thus he fails to give a utilitarianbasis forhis objectionsagainst meat eating. Of course,if Singerwere to insist that,whatever the consequences of treatinganimals differently,the fact remains,that treating them as theyare treatednow is a clear violationof theirrights and so ought to be stopped-werehe to insist on this, apart from considerations about long-termconsequences, then he would have a decidedlydiffer- ent argument,one thatdid not turnout, afterall, to be utilitarian.For one can hardlyargue as a utilitarianand say, in effect,the devil take the consequences,it's the animal's rightsthat are being violated. So, Singercould dispense with the need to investigatesystematically the probableconsequences of changingour eatinghabits, but he could do this only by payinga certainprice: givingup his belief in an exclu- sivelyutilitarian basis forvegetarianism. In a word,then, the dilemma I thinkSinger must face is this: if he is a utilitarian,then he mustgive a radically differentargument than the one he has actually given; whereas,if he restshis case forvegetarianism on the argumenthe has actuallygiven, then he cannot continueto believe that he has givena utilitarianbasis forthe moral obligationto be vegetarian.Possibly the appeal to therights of animals is not a "concessionto popularrhetoric" after all. That it may not be is what I hope to explain in the next section. 319 Utilitarianism,Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

II My argumentbegins by consideringthe situationof those unfortunate humans to whom Singerdraws our attention-namely,severely men- tally enfeebled humans. (For convenience's sake I shall normally referto these humans as groupG.) Like Singer,I shall assume that thoughtfulpeople would agree thatit is wrongto treatthe humans in questionin certainways-for example, to use them in painful,trivial researchor to raise themintensively as a "gourmet"food source (again, as a matterof convenience,I shall normallyrefer to these practices as treatmentT.) So, the question that divides Singer and me is not whetherthis is wrongbut how, theoretically,its wrongnesscan most adequatelybe grounded. Now, suppose we were to concede, what is far fromcertain, that, giventhe condition of theworld at present,subjecting group G to treatment T is not optimific.The point that needs emphasis is that,even if thisshould happen to be truenow, thereis no guaranteethat it will continueto be so in the future.Thus, if the treatmentT of group G should, in the future,become optimific,as it might,then, if we accepted the principleof utilityas our sole fundamentalprinciple, we wouldhave no rationalchoice but to change our mindabout thewrong- ness of the treatmentin question. We would have to say that using the G's in painful, trivialresearch or raising them intensivelyas a gourmetfood source,although these once were wrong,had ceased to be so. And if we asked how thischange in the moralityof the practices had come to pass, what we would have to say, as utilitarians,is thatit was due to a change in the value of the consequencesof the practices. It was because practiceswhich previouslyhad not been optimifichad become so. I resistsuch a change in moraljudgment. I do notthink that persons not alreadycommitted to utilitarianismwould, on reflection,be willing to change their judgment about the wrongnessof the practices in question merely on the grounds that these practices had become optimificwhereas previouslythey were not. I thinkthose who are not alreadycommitted to utilitarianismwould want to know a good deal 320 Philosophy& Public Affairs

morethan just how much the value of the consequenceshad changed withthe passage of time and circumstances.But if thoughtfulpeople would not change theirjudgment on utilitariangrounds alone; and if utilitarianismrequires that they should change theirjudgment in the face of these imagined changes in consequences; then the grounds forthinking it wrongnow to treatthe humans in questionin the ways in question are not adequatelyilluminated by the principleof utility. Even granting,that is, that the practicesare not now or ever will be optimific,there is, it would appear, somethingelse involvedover and above and distinctfrom how good or bad are the consequences.11 The argumentjust sketched,I believe, spells troublefor theories otherthan utilitarianism.Ethical egoism,or what Jan Narveson calls "rationalegoism," runs into similarproblems. The groundsunderpin- ning our objectionto treatmentT of group G, Narveson argues, are that,though G's are not rationaland thus have no rightsthemselves, theynevertheless are the object of the sentimentalinterests of other human beings who, because theyare rational,do have rights,including the right to have others respect their sentimentalinterests.'2 Narveson's claims about the sentimentalinterests of people at the presenttime are, I think,highly speculative. However much we might wish to deny or conceal it, a lot of human beings would ratherhave done with groupG's, includingthose conventionally"closest" to them -for example, relatives.But even conceding that G's are the object of the sentimentalinterests of other (rational) human beings,there is no guaranteethat they will continueto be so in the future.Perhaps, rationalhumans mightall cease to have such an interest;and severely mentallyenfeebled, orphaned humans mightcome to be regardedas kin to verminor worse. Thus, if our judgmentthat we ought not to subject groupG to treatmentT were foundedon rational egoism,we should be preparedto say that it would become morallypermissible or even morallyobligatory to treat them in these ways if the future

i i. The general point argued for here and in what followshas become clearer to me throughconversations with Dale Jamieson. For some firstinklings of this line of argument,see my "Narveson on Rational Egoism and the Rights of An- imals," Canadian Journal of Philosophy,March 1977. 12. Jan Narveson, "Animal Rights," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, March '977. 32I Utilitarianism,Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

sentimentalinterests of rational egoists happened to change as described.However, I do not believe that thoughtfulpeople not already committedto the positionof rationalegoism would be preparedto say this,which leads me again to the positionthat somethingother than and distinctfrom the interestsof rationalhuman beingsunderlies our judgmentthat it would be wrongto subjectGroup G to treatmentT. Similar remarksapply to Kant's position,I believe, thoughthis is conjectural;I am not certainwhat his positionwould be. His theory, we know,places constraintson how one rationalbeing may treathim- self or herselfas well as otherrational beings: we are always to treat rationalfree beings as ends, never merelyas means. The problemis, severelymentally enfeebled humans are not rational and so, given Kant'sviews on freewill (or myunderstanding of his views), theyalso lack free will. What constraints,then, could Kant consistentlyplace on how we may treat them? I conjecturethat his positioncould be analogous to his positionon the treatmentof animals.13We oughtnot to maltreat severelymentally enfeebled humans, Kant could hold, because doing so will eventuallylead us to maltreatrational, free beings. We owe nothingto these humans themselves.Rather, we owe it to ourselves,and to otherrational free beings that we do not do those thingswhich in the futurewill lead us to treatrational free beings as meremeans. My objection to my (conjectural) interpretationof Kant is this. Even grantingthat treatingthe humans in question in certain ways now leads to the sortof futureKant supposes-(one where the perpe- tratorstreat themselves or otherrational free beings as meremeans )- thereis no reason whythis must continue to be so in the future.In the future,rational free beings mightdraw a very sharp line indeed between (say) moronicand non-moronichuman beings,and, as a con-

I3. Immanuel Kant, "Our Duties to Animals and Spirits," in Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (New York: Harper & Row, I963). Relevant portions are reprintedin Animal Rights and Human Obligations. For a critique of Kant's views on the wrongness of cruelty to animals, see my "Exploring the Idea of Animal Rights" in Animal Rights: A Symposium (London: Centaur Press, I978). See also Alexander Broadie and Elizabeth Pybus, "Kant's Treatment of Animals," Philosophy,October I974. For a defense of Kant against their line of criticism, see my "Broadie and Pybus on Kant," Philosophy,October I976. 322 Philosophy& Public Affairs

sequence of this distinction,they might have radicallydifferent atti- tudes and feelingsabout membersof the two classes. From a psycho- logical point of view it does not seem implausibleto suggestthat, if people drew a sharp enough distinctionbetween what theybelieved about and felttoward moronic and non-moronichuman beings,there would cease to be a strongor widespreadtendency (assuming it exists at present) thatleads thosewho treatmorons as mere means to treat themselvesor otherrational free beings as meremeans also. However, if this actuallywere to come to pass; and if the groundsfor judging it wrongto treatmorons in the ways in questionwere Kantian,then we should be prepared to alter our judgment accordingly:though it is wrongnow to treatthem thus, it would cease to be so in the future,if the future held the consequences we have imagined. Once more, though,I do not thinkanyone not alreadycommitted to a Kantian-type theorywould alterthe judgmentfor these reasons. This leads me once again to conjecture that there is somethingelse that underlies our presentjudgment that it is wrongto subjectgroup G to treatmentT. It is not only utilitarianism,therefore, that must face the kind of difficultyI have been tracing.But now, if I ask myselfhow to avoid this difficulty,I find that I am ineluctablydrawn to the idea that morons (even) have certainrights, that we owe it to themnot to treat themin certainways, not out of niceness, or sentimentalinterest, or because theyprovide a sortof "warm-up"for the really seriousmoral game playedbetween rational free beings,14 or because treatingthem thusis optimific-rather,we owe it to themnot to treatthem in certain ways because theythemselves have a moral rightnot to be treatedin these ways. It is only,I think,if rightsare postulatedeven in the case of moronsthat we can give a sufficientlyfirm theoretical basis forour convictionthat it is wrongto treatthem in the ways in question. For a certaintythere is much in the precedingthat is leftup in the air. For example,I have not shown that human moronsdo have any I4. See Ross' analogous observation: "If we think we ought to behave in a certain way to animals, it is out of considerationprimarily for theirfeelings that we thinkwe ought to behave so; we do not thinkof them merely as a practicing- ground for virtue."W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, I930), p. 49. Ross' groundsfor denyingrights to animals are subjected to a critical review in my "Exploring the Idea of Animal Rights." 323 Utilitarianism,Vegetarianism, and Animal Rights

rights.To do this I would have to show that what I believe is true, actuallyis true-namely,that ( i ) it is onlyif theyhave rightsthat we can give a sufficientlyfirm theoretical basis forthe convictionin question, (2) that this convictionis true, and (3) that the adequacy of theoriesdepends on theirability to illuminateand account for such convictions.To show this,however, I wouldhave to show thatevery al- ternativetheory fails to give this convictiona sufficientlyfirm basis. I have not shownthis. I am not even sure how I mighttry. That effort, if it comes,will have to come at some laterdate.15 Moreover, I have not venturedany analysis of what rightsare (Are theyvalid claims? En- titlements?Powers?), nor have I advanced anythingapproaching a completeaccount of the range of rightsmorons can or do have, assumingthat theycan or do have some. For example, I have not en- deavoredto argue foror againstthe view thatthey have a rightto life, or to pursue happiness.1oThere are many complicatedquestions that would have to be consideredin each of these (and other) cases. I cannot explorethem here. However,while conceding (or, rather,insist- ing) that thereis much in the precedingthat is leftunsaid, the rele- vance of what has been said to the questionof animal rightscan now be broughtinto sharperfocus. For if, as I think,in our search forthe most adequate theoryto account forour settledmoral convictionswe are drivento postulatethat morons (even) have certainrights, it remains to be asked what thereis about them that could serve as the groundsor basis of the rightsthey have, if theyhave them. Singer,I believe,has arguedpersuasively that it cannotbe thefact that they are human beings, that theybelong to the species homo sapiens, which accounts for this; that is to mark moral boundariesin a way which invitescomparisons to racism and sexism. Nor can it be argued that morons have the rightsthey do, if theydo, because theyare auton- omous or veryintelligent; they are not. Nor, again, will it do to argue

I5. I have explored some of the relevant problems in my "An Examination and Defense of One Argument Concerning Animal Rights," Inquiry, Summer I979. i6. I take up this question in my "The Moral Basis of Vegetarianism," pp. 205ff. Singer subjects my views to a careful critical examination in his "Animals and the Value of Life," in Tom Regan, ed., Matters of Life and Death (New York: Random House, I980). See also my "Exploring the Idea of Animal Rights." 324 Philosophy& Public Affairs

thatthey belong to a species whosemembers normally are rationaland thelike.17 Rather, if thereis some basis fortheir having rights, it must be somethingabout the capacities of themorons themselves that forms the groundsof theirhaving them. What this is, is controversial,to be sure,but if we search roundfor the most promisingcandidates, what we findis that many,many animals will satisfythe groundsin question.18Take, forexample, Singer'smention of "the capacityto experi- ence pain and/or enjoyment."That seems to me to be a verystrong candidate for groundingrights in the case of human morons.But if thatis so, thenwe seem to be inconsistentat bestif we withholdascrib- ing any rightswhatever in the case of those animals who have the capacityin question.I do not mean to suggestthat it is a simplematter to say what the groundsare for attributingrights to human morons, or to humans generally.Far fromit. What I do mean to suggestis that the strongestarguments describing how it is thathuman moronshave rightswill rationallycompel us to ascribe similarrights to many animals, if I am correctin thinkingthat (i) it is wrongto treathuman moronsin the ways in question; (2) we would not (and should not) change thisjudgment in theways utilitarianism,egoism or Kantianism wouldrequire, if the futurehappened to change in the ways described earlier; (3) if, in our search for the most adequate moral theoryon which to groundthis belief,we are drivento postulatingthat human morons(even) have certainrights; and (4) if the groundsunderlying theirpossessing the rightsthey possess are common grounds,as it were,between them and manyother animals. If all thisis correct,then I thinkthe case for animal rightsis verystrong indeed. But even if none of it is right,this must be because my argumentsare unsound, notbecause thereare no argumentsat all. ThoughI mightbe confused in my reasoning,I thinkI can tell the differencebetween reasoning and rhetoric. I7. On this point see my reply to Fox, "Fox's Critique of Animal Liberation," pp. I29ff. i8. I examine this controversyat length in my "An Examination and Defense of One ArgumentConcerning Animal Rights."