The Ethical Consistency of Animal Equality

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The Ethical Consistency of Animal Equality 1 The ethical consistency of animal equality Stijn Bruers, Sept 2013, DRAFT 2 Contents 0. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................ 5 0.1 SUMMARY: TOWARDS A COHERENT THEORY OF ANIMAL EQUALITY ........................................................................ 9 1. PART ONE: ETHICAL CONSISTENCY ......................................................................................................... 18 1.1 THE BASIC ELEMENTS ................................................................................................................................. 18 a) The input data: moral intuitions .......................................................................................................... 18 b) The method: rule universalism............................................................................................................. 20 1.2 THE GOAL: CONSISTENCY AND COHERENCE ..................................................................................................... 27 1.3 THE PROBLEM: MORAL ILLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 30 a) Optical illusions .................................................................................................................................... 30 b) Moral illusions ..................................................................................................................................... 34 c) An example of moral illusions in the trolley dilemma .......................................................................... 36 d) Is the deontological right a moral illusion?.......................................................................................... 40 e) Heuristics in thought experiments ....................................................................................................... 42 1.4 SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................... 43 2. PART TWO: THEORIES OF EQUALITY ...................................................................................................... 47 2.1 IMPARTIALITY AND PRIORITARIAN EQUALITY ................................................................................................... 47 a) Contractarianism universalized ........................................................................................................... 47 b) From feelings and well-being to the value of life ................................................................................. 48 c) The maximin principle .......................................................................................................................... 55 d) The quasi-maximin principle and prioritarianism ................................................................................ 57 e) Applications of the quasi-maximin theory ........................................................................................... 58 f) Aversions behind the veil of ignorance: a mathematical description for a theory of justice ............... 62 g) Democratic impartial preferences of moral agents ............................................................................. 88 h) Summary .............................................................................................................................................. 91 2.2 PARTIALITY AND TOLERATED CHOICE EQUALITY ............................................................................................... 92 a) Tolerated choice equality ..................................................................................................................... 92 b) To whom applies the tolerated choice equality? ................................................................................. 93 c) Tolerated choice equality and equality of opportunity ........................................................................ 94 2.3 BASIC RIGHT EQUALITY ............................................................................................................................... 96 a) Moral dilemmas and strong moral intuitions ...................................................................................... 96 b) The basic right and the mere means principle ..................................................................................... 98 c) When is the basic right violated? ....................................................................................................... 101 d) Who gets the basic right? .................................................................................................................. 106 e) How strong is the basic right? ........................................................................................................... 109 f) The extended mere means principle .................................................................................................. 112 g) Application: the least harm principle and vegetarianism .................................................................. 115 2.4 SUMMARY: FOUR PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY .................................................................................................. 116 a) Equality and veganism ....................................................................................................................... 117 b) Ideal and non-ideal theory: applying the universalist imperative ..................................................... 118 c) Formal equality, discrimination and hierarchic dualism .................................................................... 125 3. PART THREE: ANIMAL ETHICS .............................................................................................................. 127 3.1 SPECIESISM AS A MORAL ILLUSION .............................................................................................................. 127 a) The current situation: patho-anthropocentrism ................................................................................ 127 b) Moral illusions and discrimination ..................................................................................................... 128 3 c) How do we know whether speciesism is a moral illusion? ................................................................ 129 d) Five arguments against the species boundary ................................................................................... 131 e) Five arguments in favor of sentience ................................................................................................. 134 f) Speciesism and cognitive impenetrability .......................................................................................... 136 g) Human prejudices and essentialism .................................................................................................. 137 h) Speciesism as a moral heuristic ......................................................................................................... 139 i) Summary ............................................................................................................................................ 147 3.2 THE SENTIENCE PROBLEM ......................................................................................................................... 149 a) The scientific problem ........................................................................................................................ 149 b) The ethical problem ........................................................................................................................... 151 3.3 THE PREDATION PROBLEM ........................................................................................................................ 152 c) Invalid solutions to the prey problem ................................................................................................ 153 d) A hypothetical solution to the prey problem ..................................................................................... 153 e) Invalid solutions to the difference problem ....................................................................................... 154 f) A first hypothetical solution to the difference problem: the 3-N-principle ........................................ 158 g) The value of biodiversity .................................................................................................................... 159 h) Some further tests for the 3-N principle ............................................................................................ 162 i) A second hypothetical solution to the difference problem: behavioral fairness ................................ 165 j) Summary ............................................................................................................................................ 166 4. EPILOGUE ............................................................................................................................................. 168 4.1 THE MORAL HAND OF NORMATIVE ETHICS: FIVE PRINCIPLES OF A COMPLETE AND COHERENT ETHIC ......................... 168 4.2 FIVE PRINCIPLES OF EQUALITY .................................................................................................................... 169 4.3 APPLICATIONS OF THE FIVE FINGERS ...........................................................................................................
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