DOCSLIB.ORG

Ética Animal

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Ética Animal Enciclopedia SEFA Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica Ética animal La ética animal es el campo de estudio que examina la forma en la que deberíamos considerar a los animales no humanos y actuar hacia ellos. Existe una idea, extendida de forma general, según la cual los intereses de los miembros de la especie humana son los únicos que cuentan, o cuentan siempre más que los intereses de los miembros de las demás especies. Dicha idea tiene consecuencias importantes. En el caso de los animales no humanos bajo explotación humana, se les causa unos daños que la mayoría consideraría injustificado causar a seres humanos en circunstancias similares. En el caso de los animales que viven en el medio salvaje, se rehúsa darles ayuda en circunstancias en las que consideraríamos obligatorio hacerlo si fueran seres humanos en semejante situación de necesidad. Las posturas críticas con esta posición mantienen que hay fuertes razones para considerar que la gran mayoría de animales no humanos, tanto los que son empleados como recursos como los que viven en el medio salvaje, son individuos sintientes. De aquí se sigue que, al igual que los seres humanos, pueden ser afectados por lo que les ocurre de forma positiva o negativa. Por ello, estas posiciones sostienen que los intereses de los animales en no sufrir y en disfrutar de sus vidas deben ser considerados, independientemente de la especie a la que pertenecen. Ello supondría el rechazo a participar de todas aquellas prácticas que suponen causarles un daño, así como actuar para prevenir o reducir los daños que sufren por otras razones como, por ejemplo, por motivos naturales. ¿Qué argumentos hay a favor y en contra de cada una de estas posiciones? ¿Se encuentra justificada la diferencia de consideración y trato entre seres humanos y otros animales? Es decir, ¿es correcto favorecer los intereses humanos por encima de los intereses no humanos? Y si los intereses de los demás animales cuentan ¿qué implicaciones se derivan para la forma en que hoy en día actuamos hacia ellos? Por último, además de los animales no humanos, ¿podrá haber otras entidades moralmente considerables? 1. Antropocentrismo y especismo 1/21 Enciclopedia SEFA Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica En el ámbito de la ética animal la posición que sostiene que los intereses humanos cuentan más que los de los demás animales ha sido conocida como “antropocentrismo” (Steiner, 2005). El antropocentrismo defiende, así, que los seres humanos son los únicos seres moralmente considerables, o que lo son siempre en mayor medida que las restantes entidades no humanas (no ha de confundirse este sentido del término con otros que se da al término “antropocentrismo” en ámbitos diferentes, como ocurre cuando este se define como la posición que sostiene que los únicos valores son aquellos reconocidos por los seres humanos o que solo nos es posible conocer algo desde un punto de vista humano. Quienes se han opuesto el antropocentrismo han defendido que el criterio para considerar moralmente a alguien debería ser la sintiencia, esto es, la capacidad de tener experiencias, que pueden ser positivas o negativas (en ética aplicada el término “sintiencia” es usado comúnmente como sinónimo de lo que en filosofía de la mente se conoce como “consciencia”). Y han argumentado que una gran parte de los animales son sintientes. En contraste, han sostenido que ni la mera pertenencia a la especie ni ningún otro criterio vinculado a esta justifica dar a alguien un trato mejor o peor. En consecuencia, han concluido que el antropocentrismo constituye una forma de especismo (Ryder, [1970] 2010): la consideración o trato desfavorable injustificado de quienes no pertenecen a una cierta especie (Horta, 2010). La forma de especismo más común sería la que favorece a los seres humanos, el especismo antropocéntrico, pero podría ser también especista cualquier otra distinción entre otros animales ligada a su especie que resultase injustificada (Dunayer, 2004; O’Sullivan, 2011). 2. Defensas del antropocentrismo Se ha intentado justificar el antropocentrismo de diferentes maneras. En algunas ocasiones, de forma definicional, simplemente asumiendo que la mera pertenencia a la especie humana es moralmente relevante (Diamond, 1978; Lynch y Wells, 1998). En otros casos, se ha defendido que solamente los seres humanos cumplen otros criterios moralmente relevantes que justifican un trato favorable. Estos pueden ser: (i) Atributos intrínsecos cuya posesión es susceptible de comprobación, como ciertas capacidades intelectuales complejas (Frey, 1980; Paton, 1984). (ii) Atributos intrínsecos de posesión no comprobable, como almas o un estatuto ontológico superior (Aristóteles, [ca. s. IV a.c], 2004, 1256b; Ballesteros, 2004). 2/21 Enciclopedia SEFA Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica (iii) Relaciones de existencia comprobable, como la solidaridad o el poder (Midgley, 1983; Petrinovich, 1999). (iv) Relaciones de existencia no comprobable, como la consistente en ser la especie elegida por una divinidad (Harrison, 1989; Reichmann, 2000). Esta sería una clasificación exhaustiva. Las diferentes defensas de esta posición o bien caerían dentro de uno de estos grupos, o bien serían combinaciones de posiciones de estos tipos. Algunas posiciones defienden que solo los seres humanos son moralmente considerables porque únicamente ellos pertenecen a la misma especie que quienes poseen ciertas capacidades especiales, o son relevantemente parecidos a ellos precisamente por pertenecer a su misma especie (Scruton, 1996; Kagan, 2016). Otras perspectivas llegan a la misma conclusión sosteniendo que solo los humanos cumplen el requisito de o bien poseer ciertas capacidades o bien tener ciertas relaciones especiales con otros sujetos agentes morales (Scanlon, [1998] 2003; Cortina, 2009). 3. Argumentos contra el antropocentrismo Se han utilizado varios argumentos en contra del antropocentrismo, de los que se destacan los siguientes: (i) El argumento de la petición de principio sostiene que las posiciones definicionales y las que apelan a criterios de satisfacción no comprobable no descansan en razones que las puedan justificar. Este argumento indica que estas posiciones simplemente asumen de partida como correcta la prioridad de los intereses humanos sin ofrecer un argumento ulterior que las respalde (Cavalieri, 2001). (ii) El argumento de la superposición de especies, indica que ninguno de los criterios no definicionales de satisfacción comprobable es cumplido por todos y cada uno de los seres humanos y solo por ellos. Es decir, para cualquier criterio x, habrá seres humanos que no lo 3/21 Enciclopedia SEFA Sociedad Española de Filosofía Analítica cumplan y animales no humanos que sí lo cumplan. Así, si consideramos por ejemplo las capacidades cognitivas complejas, nos encontramos con que hay seres humanos que carecen de estas, por motivos congénitos, por enfermedad o accidente. Esto puede ocurrir de forma temporal (infancia, vejez) o permanente (diversidad funcional intelectual). Por su parte, tampoco las relaciones de solidaridad o poder son mantenidas de manera universal entre los seres humanos. Ello supone que si cumplir tales condiciones fundamentara la consideración moral, estaría justificado no considerar o dar menos importancia a los intereses de todos aquellos seres humanos que no las cumplen, lo que a la mayoría nos parecería inaceptable (Porfirio, [ca. s. III] 1984, 3, 8, 8; Horta, 2014). (Este argumento se conoce también como “el argumento de los casos marginales”, si bien esta denominación es problemática, pues los seres humanos que no poseen ciertos atributos o que no mantienen cierto tipo de relaciones son plenamente humanos y no humanos marginales.) (iv) El argumento de la relevancia descansa en la idea de que, para que un criterio justifique tratar de forma distinta a alguien, tal criterio debe basarse en una diferencia relevante para aquello que está en cuestión. Así, por ejemplo, lo relevante para recibir una pensión puede ser tener una cierta edad, lo cual en cambio no sería relevante para recibir un subsidio de desempleo. Sobre la base de esta idea, el argumento parte, en primer lugar, de que en nuestras decisiones acerca de si considerar moralmente a alguien lo que está en cuestión es si ese alguien puede sufrir daños o disfrutar de beneficios. Sostiene, por ello, que lo que deberíamos considerar relevante para considerar moralmente a alguien sería su capacidad de sufrir daños y/o disfrutar de beneficios. En segundo lugar, el argumento defiende que lo que determina esto es únicamente la sintiencia, y no los criterios de otros tipos en los que se basa la defensa del antropocentrismo. Es decir, la posesión de ciertas capacidades o de ciertas relaciones podría ser relevante para que alguien pueda sufrir ciertos tipos de daños o disfrutar de ciertos beneficios. Pero no sería lo que determina que los pueda sufrir o disfrutar como tal, de manera general. Por ello, iguales daños o beneficios deberían contar igual independientemente de a quién afecten, pues lo contrario significaría tener en cuenta criterios que no son relevantes. Así, el argumento concluiría que los intereses de humanos y no humanos deberían ser igualmente considerados (Sapontzis, 1987; Bernstein, 2015). (v) Por último, el antropocentrismo puede ser rechazado desde toda una serie de argumentos relativos a distintas teorías normativas. Se ha sostenido que no dar plena consideración a los animales no humanos implica no obtener las mejores consecuencias, actuar de maneras inherentemente incorrectas o no obrar
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Are Illegal Direct Actions by Animal Rights Activists Ethically Vigilante?
    260 BETWEEN THE SPECIES Is the Radical Animal Rights Movement Ethically Vigilante? ABSTRACT Following contentious debates around the status and justifiability of illegal direct actions by animal rights activists, we introduce a here- tofore unexplored perspective that argues they are neither terrorist nor civilly disobedient but ethically vigilante. Radical animal rights movement (RARM) activists are vigilantes for vulnerable animals and their rights. Hence, draconian measures by the constitutional state against RARM vigilantes are both disproportionate and ille- gitimate. The state owes standing and toleration to such principled vigilantes, even though they are self-avowed anarchists and anti-stat- ists—unlike civil disobedients—repudiating allegiance to the con- stitutional order. This requires the state to acknowledge the ethical nature of challenges to its present regime of toleration, which assigns special standing to illegal actions in defense of human equality, but not equality and justice between humans and animals. Michael Allen East Tennessee State University Erica von Essen Environmental Communications Division Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences Volume 22, Issue 1 Fall 2018 http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ 261 Michael Allen and Erica von Essen Introduction We explore the normative status of illegal actions under- taken by the Radical Animal Rights Movement (RARM), such as animal rescue, trespass, and sabotage as well as confronta- tion and intimidation. RARM typically characterizes these ac- tions as examples of direct action rather than civil disobedience (Milligan 2015, Pellow 2014). Moreover, many RARM activ- ists position themselves as politically anarchist, anti-statist, and anti-capitalist (Best 2014, Pellow 2014). Indeed, the US and UK take these self-presentations at face value, responding to RARM by introducing increasingly draconian legislation that treats them as terrorists (Best 2014, McCausland, O’Sullivan and Brenton 2013, O’Sullivan 2011, Pellow 2014).
    [Show full text]
  • "Go Veg" Campaigns of US Animal Rights Organizations
    Society and Animals 18 (2010) 163-182 brill.nl/soan Framing Animal Rights in the “Go Veg” Campaigns of U.S. Animal Rights Organizations Carrie Packwood Freeman Georgia State University [email protected] Abstract How much do animal rights activists talk about animal rights when they attempt to persuade America’s meat-lovers to stop eating nonhuman animals? Th is study serves as the basis for a unique evaluation and categorization of problems and solutions as framed by fi ve major U.S. animal rights organizations in their vegan/food campaigns. Th e fi ndings reveal that the organiza- tions framed the problems as: cruelty and suff ering; commodifi cation; harm to humans and the environment; and needless killing. To solve problems largely blamed on factory farming, activists asked consumers to become “vegetarian” (meaning vegan) or to reduce animal product con- sumption, some requesting “humane” reforms. While certain messages supported animal rights, promoting veganism and respect for animals’ subject status, many frames used animal welfare ideology to achieve rights solutions, conservatively avoiding a direct challenge to the dominant human/animal dualism. In support of ideological authenticity, this paper recommends that vegan campaigns emphasize justice, respect, life, freedom, environmental responsibility, and a shared animality. Keywords animal rights, campaigns, farm animal, framing, ideology, vegan, vegetarian How much do or should animal rights activists talk about animal rights when they attempt to persuade America’s meat-lovers to stop eating animals? As participants in a counterhegemonic social movement, animal rights organiza- tions are faced with the discursive challenge of redefi ning accepted practices, such as farming and eating nonhuman animals, as socially unacceptable practices.
    [Show full text]
  • An Inquiry Into Animal Rights Vegan Activists' Perception and Practice of Persuasion
    An Inquiry into Animal Rights Vegan Activists’ Perception and Practice of Persuasion by Angela Gunther B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2006 Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the School of Communication ! Angela Gunther 2012 SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY Summer 2012 All rights reserved. However, in accordance with the Copyright Act of Canada, this work may be reproduced, without authorization, under the conditions for “Fair Dealing.” Therefore, limited reproduction of this work for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review and news reporting is likely to be in accordance with the law, particularly if cited appropriately. Approval Name: Angela Gunther Degree: Master of Arts Title of Thesis: An Inquiry into Animal Rights Vegan Activists’ Perception and Practice of Persuasion Examining Committee: Chair: Kathi Cross Gary McCarron Senior Supervisor Associate Professor Robert Anderson Supervisor Professor Michael Kenny External Examiner Professor, Anthropology SFU Date Defended/Approved: June 28, 2012 ii Partial Copyright Licence iii Abstract This thesis interrogates the persuasive practices of Animal Rights Vegan Activists (ARVAs) in order to determine why and how ARVAs fail to convince people to become and stay veg*n, and what they might do to succeed. While ARVAs and ARVAism are the focus of this inquiry, the approaches, concepts and theories used are broadly applicable and therefore this investigation is potentially useful for any activist or group of activists wishing to interrogate and improve their persuasive practices. Keywords: Persuasion; Communication for Social Change; Animal Rights; Veg*nism; Activism iv Table of Contents Approval ............................................................................................................................. ii! Partial Copyright Licence .................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Animals Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal Volume 5, Issue 1
    AAnniimmaallss LLiibbeerraattiioonn PPhhiilloossoopphhyy aanndd PPoolliiccyy JJoouurrnnaall VVoolluummee 55,, IIssssuuee 11 -- 22000077 Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal Volume 5, Issue 1 2007 Edited By: Steven Best, Chief Editor ____________________________________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Steven Best, Chief Editor Pg. 2-3 Introducing Critical Animal Studies Steven Best, Anthony J. Nocella II, Richard Kahn, Carol Gigliotti, and Lisa Kemmerer Pg. 4-5 Extrinsic and Intrinsic Arguments: Strategies for Promoting Animal Rights Katherine Perlo Pg. 6-19 Animal Rights Law: Fundamentalism versus Pragmatism David Sztybel Pg. 20-54 Unmasking the Animal Liberation Front Using Critical Pedagogy: Seeing the ALF for Who They Really Are Anthony J. Nocella II Pg. 55-64 The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: New, Improved, and ACLU-Approved Steven Best Pg. 65-81 BOOK REVIEWS _________________ In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave, by Peter Singer ed. (2005) Reviewed by Matthew Calarco Pg. 82-87 Dominion: The Power of Man, the Suffering of Animals, and the Call to Mercy, by Matthew Scully (2003) Reviewed by Lisa Kemmerer Pg. 88-91 Terrorists or Freedom Fighters?: Reflections on the Liberation of Animals, by Steven Best and Anthony J. Nocella, II, eds. (2004) Reviewed by Lauren E. Eastwood Pg. 92 Introduction Welcome to the sixth issue of our journal. You’ll first notice that our journal and site has undergone a name change. The Center on Animal Liberation Affairs is now the Institute for Critical Animal Studies, and the Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal is now the Journal for Critical Animal Studies. The name changes, decided through discussion among our board members, were prompted by both philosophical and pragmatic motivations.
    [Show full text]
  • Equality, Priority and Nonhuman Animals*
    Equality, Priority and Catia Faria Nonhuman Animals* Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Law [email protected] http://upf.academia.edu/catiafaria Igualdad, prioridad y animales no humanos ABSTRACT: This paper assesses the implications of egali- RESUMEN: Este artículo analiza las implicaciones del iguali- tarianism and prioritarianism for the consideration of tarismo y del prioritarismo en lo que refiere a la conside- nonhuman animals. These implications have been often ración de los animales no humanos. Estas implicaciones overlooked. The paper argues that neither egalitarianism han sido comúnmente pasadas por alto. Este artículo de- nor prioritarianism can consistently deprive nonhuman fenderá que ni el igualitarismo ni el prioritarismo pueden animals of moral consideration. If you really are an egali- privar de forma consistente de consideración moral a los tarian (or a prioritarian) you are necessarily committed animales no humanos. Si realmente alguien es igualitaris- both to the rejection of speciesism and to assigning prior- ta (o prioritarista) ha de tener necesariamente una posi- ity to the interests of nonhuman animals, since they are ción de rechazo del especismo, y estar a favor de asignar the worst-off. From this, important practical consequen- prioridad a los intereses de los animales no humanos, ces follow for the improvement of the current situation of dado que estos son los que están peor. De aquí se siguen nonhuman animals. importantes consecuencias prácticas para la mejora de la situación actual de los animales no humanos. KEYWORDS: egalitarianism, prioritarianism, nonhuman ani- PALABRAS-CLAVE: igualitarismo, prioritarismo, animales no hu- mals, speciesism, equality manos, especismo, igualdad 1. Introduction It is commonly assumed that human beings should be given preferential moral consideration, if not absolute priority, over the members of other species.
    [Show full text]
  • The Ethical Consistency of Animal Equality
    1 The ethical consistency of animal equality Stijn Bruers, Sept 2013, DRAFT 2 Contents 0. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................ 5 0.1 SUMMARY: TOWARDS A COHERENT THEORY OF ANIMAL EQUALITY ........................................................................ 9 1. PART ONE: ETHICAL CONSISTENCY ......................................................................................................... 18 1.1 THE BASIC ELEMENTS ................................................................................................................................. 18 a) The input data: moral intuitions .......................................................................................................... 18 b) The method: rule universalism............................................................................................................. 20 1.2 THE GOAL: CONSISTENCY AND COHERENCE ..................................................................................................... 27 1.3 THE PROBLEM: MORAL ILLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 30 a) Optical illusions .................................................................................................................................... 30 b) Moral illusions ....................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Animal Rights
    Book Review Animal Rights Richard A. Posner' Rattling the Cage: Toward Legal Rightsfor Animals. By Steven M. Wise. Cambridge,Mass.: PerseusBooks, 2000. Pp. 362. $25.00. The "animal rights" movement is gathering steam, and Steven Wise is one of the pistons. A lawyer whose practice is the protection of animals, he has now written a book in which he urges courts in the exercise of their common-law powers of legal rulemaking to confer legally enforceable rights on animals, beginning with chimpanzees and bonobos (the two most intelligent primate species).' Although Wise is well-informed about his subject-the biological as well as legal aspects-this is not an intellectually exciting book. I do not say this in criticism. Remember who Wise is: a practicing lawyer who wants to persuade the legal profession that courts should do much more to protect animals. Judicial innovation proceeds incrementally; as Holmes put it, the courts, in their legislative capacity, "are confined from molar to molecular motions."2 Wise's practitioner's perspective is, as we shall see, both the strength and the weakness of the book. f Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School. I thank Michael Boudin, Richard Epstein, Lawrence Lessig, Martha Nussbaum, Charlene Posner, and Cass Sunstein for their very helpful comments on a previous draft of this Review. * Adjunct Professor, John Marshall Law School; Adjunct Professor, Vermont Law School; President, Center for the Expansion of Fundamental Rights; Partner, Wise & Slater-Wise, Boston. 1. These are closely related species, and Wise discusses them more or less interchangeably.
    [Show full text]
  • Against Animal Liberation? Peter Singer and His Critics
    Against Animal Liberation? Peter Singer and His Critics Gonzalo Villanueva Sophia International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions ISSN 0038-1527 SOPHIA DOI 10.1007/s11841-017-0597-6 1 23 Your article is protected by copyright and all rights are held exclusively by Springer Science +Business Media Dordrecht. This e-offprint is for personal use only and shall not be self- archived in electronic repositories. If you wish to self-archive your article, please use the accepted manuscript version for posting on your own website. You may further deposit the accepted manuscript version in any repository, provided it is only made publicly available 12 months after official publication or later and provided acknowledgement is given to the original source of publication and a link is inserted to the published article on Springer's website. The link must be accompanied by the following text: "The final publication is available at link.springer.com”. 1 23 Author's personal copy SOPHIA DOI 10.1007/s11841-017-0597-6 Against Animal Liberation? Peter Singer and His Critics Gonzalo Villanueva1 # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017 Keywords Animal ethics . Moral status of animals . Peter Singer. Animal liberation Peter Singer’s 1975 book Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals has been described as ‘the Bible’ of the modern animal movement.1 Singer’s unrhetorical and unemotional arguments radically departed from previous conceptions of animal ethics. He moved beyond the animal welfare tradition of ‘kindness’ and ‘compassion’ to articulate a non-anthropocentric utilitarian philosophy based on equal- ity and interests. After the publication of Animal Liberation, an ‘avalanche of animal rights literature’ appeared.2 A prolific amount of work focused on the moral status of animals, and the ‘animal question’ has been given serious consideration across a broad range of disciplines.
    [Show full text]
  • Legal Research Paper Series
    Legal Research Paper Series NON HUMAN ANIMALS AND THE LAW: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ANIMAL LAW RESOURCES AT THE STANFORD LAW LIBRARY By Rita K. Lomio and J. Paul Lomio Research Paper No. 6 October 2005 Robert Crown Law Library Crown Quadrangle Stanford, California 94305-8612 NON HUMAN ANIMALS AND THE LAW: A BIBLIOGRPAHY OF ANIMAL LAW RESOURCES AT THE STANFORD LAW LIBRARY I. Books II. Reports III. Law Review Articles IV. Newspaper Articles (including legal newspapers) V. Sound Recordings and Films VI. Web Resources I. Books RESEARCH GUIDES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES Hoffman, Piper, and the Harvard Student Animal Legal Defense Fund The Guide to Animal Law Resources Hollis, New Hampshire: Puritan Press, 1999 Reference KF 3841 G85 “As law students, we have found that although more resources are available and more people are involved that the case just a few years ago, locating the resource or the person we need in a particular situation remains difficult. The Guide to Animal Law Resources represents our attempt to collect in one place some of the resources a legal professional, law professor or law student might want and have a hard time finding.” Guide includes citations to organizations and internships, animal law court cases, a bibliography, law schools where animal law courses are taught, Internet resources, conferences and lawyers devoted to the cause. The International Institute for Animal Law A Bibliography of Animal Law Resources Chicago, Illinois: The International Institute for Animal Law, 2001 KF 3841 A1 B53 Kistler, John M. Animal Rights: A Subject Guide, Bibliography, and Internet Companion Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2000 HV 4708 K57 Bibliography divided into six subject areas: Animal Rights: General Works, Animal Natures, Fatal Uses of Animals, Nonfatal Uses of Animals, Animal Populations, and Animal Speculations.
    [Show full text]
  • Animal Rights Movement
    Animal Rights Movement The Animal Protection Movement. Prevention of cruelty to animals became an important movement in early 19th Century England, where it grew alongside the humanitarian current that advanced human rights, including the anti-slavery movement and later the movement for woman suffrage. The first anti-cruelty bill, intended to stop bull-baiting, was introduced in Parliament in 1800. In 1822 Colonel Richard Martin succeeded in passing an act in the House of Commons preventing cruelty to such larger domestic animals as horses and cattle; two years later he organized the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) to help enforce the law. Queen Victoria commanded the addition of the prefix "Royal" to the Society in 1840. Following the British model, Henry Bergh organized the American SPCA in New York in 1866 after returning from his post in St. Petersburg as secretary to the American legation in Russia; he hoped it would become national in scope, but the ASPCA remained primarily an animal shelter program for New York City. Other SPCAs and Humane Societies were founded in the U.S. beginning in the late 1860s (often with support from abolitionists) with groups in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and San Francisco among the first. Originally concerned with enforcing anti-cruelty laws, they soon began running animal shelters along the lines of a model developed in Philadelphia. The American Humane Association (AHA), with divisions for children and animals, was founded in 1877, and emerged as the leading national advocate for animal protection and child protection services. As the scientific approach to medicine expanded, opposition grew to the use of animals in medical laboratory research -- particularly in the era before anesthetics and pain-killers became widely available.
    [Show full text]
  • Abolitionist Animal Rights: Critical Comparisons and Challenges Within the Animal Rights Movement
    WellBeing International WBI Studies Repository 11-2012 Abolitionist Animal Rights: Critical Comparisons and Challenges Within the Animal Rights Movement Corey Lee Wrenn Colorado State University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/anirmov Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Civic and Community Engagement Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons Recommended Citation Wrenn, C. (2012). Abolitionist animal rights: critical comparisons and challenges within the animal rights movement. Interface, 4(2), 438-458. This material is brought to you for free and open access by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI Studies Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Interface: a journal for and about social movements Article Volume 4 (2): 438 - 458 (November 2012) Wrenn, Abolitionist Animal Rights Abolitionist animal rights: critical comparisons and challenges within the animal rights movement Corey Wrenn Abstract The abolitionist movement is an emergent and radical approach to nonhuman animal rights. Calling for a complete cessation in nonhuman animal use through the abolishing of property status for nonhuman animals and an adoption of veganism and nonviolence, this approach stands in stark contrast to mainstream approaches such as humane production and welfare reform. This paper describes the goals and stances of abolitionism; the basic debate between abolitionism and other nonhuman animal rights movements; and the current state, challenges, and future prospects for abolitionism. It is argued that abolitionism, as developed by Francione, is the only morally consistent approach for taking the interests of nonhuman animals seriously.
    [Show full text]
  • Jusqu'où Défendre Les Animaux ?
    LES CAHIERS ANTISPÉCISTES JUSQU’OÙ DÉFENDRE LES ANIMAUX ? Tom REGAN Steven BEST David CHAUVET Bernard BAERTSCHI Estiva REUS NUMÉRO 39 MAI 2017 À propos des Cahiers antispécistes Les Cahiers antispécistes sont une revue fondée en 1991. La périodicité est irrégulière. Rédaction : Brigitte Gothière, Estiva Reus, Pierre Sigler. La rédaction choisit les textes en fonction de l’intérêt qu’elle y trouve et des débats qui peuvent en découler, mais les opinions qui y sont exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs. La revue ne fonctionne pas sur le principe de soumission spontanée de textes par des auteurs qui seraient ensuite acceptés ou refusés. Site : cahiers-antispécistes.org Mail : [email protected] FaceBook. Les Cahiers antispécistes publient quotidiennement des informations sur la question animale sur leur page Facebook. Se procurer Les Cahiers antispécistes (version papier) Le n°39 des Cahiers antispécistes (de même que le n°35) n’a pas été édité en version papier. Tous les autres numéros ont été imprimés mais certains sont épuisés. Les anciens numéros restants sont gérés par la boutique en ligne de L214. Certains peuvent être directement commandés sur https://boutique.l214.com/36-revues. Si vous cherchez des numéros plus anciens écrire à [email protected] pour savoir s’ils sont encore disponibles. Les Cahiers antispécistes n°39, mai 2017 1 Sommaire Présentation du numéro 39 3 La Rédaction Comment justifier la violence 7 Tom Regan Paralysie du pacifisme 13 Une défense de l’action directe militante et de la « violence » Steven
    [Show full text]