CATIA FARIA Law Department, Philosophy of Law Group Pompeu Fabra University Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain Ca[email protected]

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CATIA FARIA Law Department, Philosophy of Law Group Pompeu Fabra University Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain Ca�Axfaria@Gmail.Com Ca#a Faria’s CV, September 2015 CATIA FARIA Law Department, Philosophy of Law Group Pompeu Fabra University Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain ca#[email protected] O AREAS OF RESEARCH AOS: Bioethics, Applied Philosophy, Moral Philosophy AOC: Poli#cal Philosophy, Philosophy of Law, Meta-ethics O ACTUAL POSITION PhD Candidate, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain (2011 – present) Associate researcher, CEHUM, University of Minho, Portugal (2011 – present) O EDUCATION Master’s in Cogni#ve Sciences and Language, LOGOS – Grup de Recerca en Lògica, Llenguatge i Cognició, University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain BA in Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, University of Porto, Portugal O RESEARCH STAYS Uehiro Centre for Prac#cal Ethics, University of Oxford, United Kingdom (Nov-Dec 2014). Logic and Moral Philosophy Department, Faculty of Philosophy, University of San#ago de Compostela, Spain (July 2010- Sept 2011). 2 PARTICIPATION IN SUMMER SCHOOLS Summer School in Applied Philosophy: Issues, Method and Nature. Central European University, Hungary (07-20/07/14). O PRIZES, SCHOLARSHIPS AND AWARDS CEU SUN Scholarship, awarded by the Central European University and the Society of Applied Philosophy for the Summer School in Applied Philosophy, Budapest, Hungary (07-20/07/14). !1 Ca#a Faria’s CV, September 2015 Doctorate Scholarship, Founda#on for Science and Technology, Ministry of Educa#on and Science of the Portuguese Government (2011-2015). Master’s Scholarship, Ministry of Science, Culture and Sports of the Spanish Government (2009-2010). O ACADEMIC PUBLICATIONS Faria, C. (2015) “Igualdad, prioridad y animales no humanos” [Equality, priority and nonhuman animals], in Gaitán, Iván Darío Ávila (ed.), Polí<ca Animal(ista), Desde Abajo Ediciones, Bogotá, forthcoming. Faria, C. (2015) “The lions and the zebras: towards a new ethics of environmental management in African na#onal parks”, in Ebert, Rainer y Roba, Anteneh (ed.), Africa and its Animals, Unisa Press, Pretoria, forthcoming. Faria, C. (2015) “Egalitarismus”, [Egalitarianism] in Ferrari, Arianna y Petrus, Klaus (ed.), Lexikon der Mensch/Tier-Beziehungen [Enciclopedia of human/animal rela#onships], Transcript, Bielefeld. Faria, C., Horta, O. (2015) “Wilde Tiere” [Wild animals], in Ferrari, Arianna y Petrus, Klaus (ed.), Lexikon der Mensch/Tier-Beziehungen [Enciclopedia of human/animal rela#onships], Transcript, Bielefeld. Faria, C. (2015) “Women, nature and nonhuman animals: natural allies?”, Review of Adams, Carol J., Gruen, Lori, Ecofeminism. Feminist Intersecons with Other Animals and the Earth (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), Ethical Perspecves 22 (3): 469-473. Faria, C. (2015) “Dinámica de poblaciones y sus implicaciones para la é#ca de la ges#ón ambiental” [Popula#on dynamics and its implica#ons for the ethics of environmental management], Actas del I Congreso Internacional de la Red Española de FilosoQa 17: 15-24. Faria, C. (2015) “Disentangling obliga#ons of assistance. A reply to Clare Palmer”, Rela<ons 3 (2), forthcoming. Faria, C. (2015) “Making a difference on behalf of animals living in the wild: interview with Jeff McMahan”, Rela<ons 3 (1): 81-84. Faria, C., Paez, E. (2014) “Anthropocentrism and speciesism: conceptual and norma#ve issues”, Revista de Bioé<ca y Derecho 32: 82-90. Faria, C. (2014) “Equality, priority and nonhuman animals”, Dilemata 14: 225-236. Faria, C. (2013) “Differen#al obliga#ons towards others in need”, Review of Palmer, Clare, Animal Ethics in Context (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), Astrolabio 15: 242-246. Faria, C. (2012) “Muerte entre las flores: el conflicto entre el ecologismo y la defensa de los animales no humanos” [Death among flowers: the conflict between environmentalism and the defense of nonhuman animals], Vientosur 125: 67-76. !2 Ca#a Faria’s CV, September 2015 Faria, C. (2011) “Sobre o bem de tudo e de todos: a conjunção impossível entre ambientalismo e libertação animal” [On the good of everything and everyone: the impossible conjunc#on between environmentalism and animal libera#on], Ágora 30 (2): 27-41. Faria, C. (2011) “Pessoas não humanas: a consideração moral dos grandes símios e outras criaturas” [Nonhuman persons: the moral considera#on of Great apes and other creatures], Diacrí<ca 25 (2): 35-50. Faria, C. (2010) “Especismo e libertação animal: a reconciliação possível” [Speciesism and animal libera#on: the possible reconcilia#on], review of Zamir, Tzachi, Ethics and the Beast: A Speciesist Argument for Animal Libera<on (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), Telos 18: 109-120. As editor Faria, C., Paez, E. (2015) “Animals in need. The problem of wild animal suffering and interven#on in nature”, Rela<ons 3 (1): 7-13. Faria, C., Cabrita, M. J. (2013) “Equality, Democracy and Welfare”, Diacrí<ca 27 (2): 7-14. O TALKS “La é#ca de la intervención en la naturaleza y la intuición laissez-faire.” [The ethics of interven#on in nature and the laissez-faire intui#on], I Jornada Recerca en Sostenibilitat, Faculty of Communica#on, Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona, Spain), 5/06/15. “Dinámica de poblaciones y sus implicaciones para la é#ca de la ges#ón ambiental” [Popula#on dynamics and its implica#ons for the ethics of environmental management], I Congreso Internacional de la Red Española de Filosoa, University of Valencia (Valencia, Spain), 3-5/09/14 “Humanity and domes#city. Two versions of the same prejudice” (with Eze Paez), Humanity and Animality Conference, University College London (London, UK), 15-16/09/14 “Public reason and nonhuman animals” (with Eze Paez), MANCEPT Workshops, University of Manchester (Manchester, UK), 8-10/09/14 “Animal ethics going wild: interven#on in nature on behalf of wild animals”, Seminar of the Philosophy of Law Group, Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona, Spain), 12/06/14 “If you’re an egalitarian how come are you a speciesist?”, V Mee<ngs on Ethics and Poli<cal Philosophy, University of Minho (Braga, Portugal), 15-16/05/14 “Five comments on Anomalous”, Workshop on Abor<on: Recent Developments, with Jeff Macmahan, Victor Tadros y Sonia Ramos. Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona, Spain), 27/01/14 “The ethics of environmental management: should we help the Australian horses?, Seminar of the Philosophy of Law Group, Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona, Spain), 3/07/13 “É#ca animal?” [Animal ethics?], III Jornadas de Filosofia “Filosofia, hoje”, University of Minho, (Braga, Portugal), 19/04/13 !3 Ca#a Faria’s CV, September 2015 “The problem of wild-animal suffering”, III Mee<ngs on Ethics and Poli<cal Philosophy, University of Minho (Braga, Portugal), 20-21/05/12 “Los límites de la consideración moral: oposiciones entre el ecologismo y la defensa de los animales no humanos” [The limits of moral considerability: tensions between environmentalism and the defence of nonhuman animals ] XX Congreso de Jovens Filósofos, University of Coruña, Galiza, Espanha, 26/04/12 “Resis#ng violence in nature” (with Beril Sözmen), The 2nd Annual European Conference for Crical Animal Studies, Charles University (Prague, Czech Republic), 15-16/10/ 11 “Pessoas não humanas: a consideração moral dos grandes símios e outras criaturas” [Nonhuman persons: the moral considerability of Great apes and other creatures], II Mee<ngs on Ethics and Poli<cal Philosophy, University of Minho (Braga, Portugal), 20-21/05/11 O RESEARCH PROJECTS Global constuonalism and global jusce: philosophical foundaons (DER2013-48066-C2-1-R), 2014-2016. Granted by: Spanish Ministry of Science and Innova#on. Main researcher: Josep Joan Moreso i Mateos. Posi#on: Par#cipant researcher Philosophy of Law Group (2014 SGR 626), 2014-2016. Granted by: AGAUR. Main researcher: Josep Joan Moreso i Mateos. Posi#on: Par#cipant researcher O TEACHING “The moral considera#on of nonhuman animals”, ETHICS I, Faculty of Philosophy, University of San#ago de Compostela (Spain), 8/11/12 “The Ethics of Interven#on”, Applied Ethics Seminar, University of San#ago de Compostela, (Spain), 23/11/11 O SERVICES TO THE PROFESSION Scienfic Commiee of ENFA6 (Sixth Na#onal Mee#ng In Analy#c Philosophy), University of Azores, Ponta Delgada, S. Miguel island, Azores (Portugal), 2015 Organizer (with Eze Paez) of the Simposium “Intervención en la Naturaleza: el conflito entre la consideración moral de los animales y la é#ca ambiental”, I Congreso de la Red Española de FilosoQa, University of Valencia (Spain), 2014 Organizer (with Maria João Cabrita) of the Interna#onal Conference IV Mee<ngs on Ethics and Poli<cal Philosophy, University of Minho (Portugal), 2013 Organizing Commi}ee of the III Simposio “FilosoQa y Sociedad”, University of San#ago de Compostela (Spain), 2011 !4 Ca#a Faria’s CV, September 2015 Referee work: Ramon Llull Journal of Applied Ethics Revista de Bioé<ca y Derecho Ágora Diacrí<ca O MEDIA Commissioned arcles Should we intervene in nature to prevent animal suffering? Aeon, 15 July 2015. Other arcles PraccaL Ethics BLog, University of Oxford (UK) The immorality of fox hun#ng (July 17, 2015) Why isn’t the world going vegan? (June 3, 2015) Turning 40: Animal Libera#on in perspec#ve. (April 2, 2015). Picked up by the BBC’s “best long reads in technology and science”. If you’re an egalitarian, how come you’re a speciesist? (February 3, 2015) Should we intervene in nature to help animals? (December 21, 2014) El Caballo de Nietzsche Blog, Eldiario.es (Spain) Liberación Animal, de Peter Singer: 40 años de controversia. (April 22, 2015) Daños en la naturaleza: ciencia y é#ca de la ges#ón ambiental. (December 5, 2014) Heridos, hambrientos, ateridos: ayudando a los animales en la naturaleza. (September 5, 2014) Pensata AnimaL, OLhar AnimaL & ÉJca da Intervenção, ANDA (BraziL) Ecologismo e an#especismo: discrepância cien•fica ou moral? (March 24, 2015) Deixá-los em paz? Ajudando os animais na natureza. (September 25, 2014) A rainha ferida: o caso da leoa Siena e o sofrimento dos animais selvagens (May 4, 2014) Sofrimento distante e a abordagem relacional à é#ca animal.
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