DOCSLIB.ORG

Suffering-Focused Ethics

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Suffering-Focused Ethics Suffering-Focused Ethics Defense and Implications Magnus Vinding Ratio Ethica Ratio Ethica, Copenhagen. Copyright © 2020 Magnus Vinding Parts of this book have previously been published elsewhere by the author. ISBN: 9798624910911 Contents Introduction .............................................. 1 Part I: The Case for Suffering-Focused Ethics 1: Asymmetries Between Happiness and Suffering ................ 13 2: Happiness as the Absence of Suffering ....................... 39 3: Creating Happiness at the Price of Suffering Is Wrong ........... 52 4: The Principle of Sympathy for Intense Suffering ................ 60 5: A Moral Realist Case for Minimizing Extreme Suffering ......... 75 6: Other Arguments for Focusing on Suffering ................... 93 7: Biases Against Focusing on Suffering ....................... 111 8: Objections Against Focusing on Suffering ................... 141 Part II: How Can We Best Reduce Suffering? 9: Uncertainty Is Big ..................................... 185 10: We Should Be Cooperative .............................. 205 11: Non-Human Animals and Expansion of the Moral Circle . 214 12: Promoting Concern for Suffering ......................... 228 13: The Abolitionist Project ................................ 239 14: Reducing S-Risks ..................................... 247 15: Donating to Reduce Suffering ........................... 256 16: Researching the Question ............................... 261 17: The Importance of Self-Investment ....................... 266 18: What You Can Do .................................... 273 Recommended Websites ................................... 277 Acknowledgments ....................................... 278 Bibliography ............................................ 280 Introduction The problem of suffering is the greatest problem of all. This is my convic- tion, and why I have set out to write this book, in which I will explore the why and how of reducing suffering. The core motivation that animates this book derives from a set of related questions widely considered among the deepest, most profound questions we can ask ourselves: What matters? What is most valuable in the world? What is the highest purpose we can pursue? I have long been obsessed with these questions, and contemplated the many answers people have provided, including the pursuit of happiness, meaning, knowledge, and love. Virtually all such common answers resonate deeply with me, as I suspect they do with most people. Yet ultimately, after a long and resistant process of examination, I have come to view one answer as standing high above all others: the reduction of extreme suffering. This was very much not the answer I wanted. Yet it is, most sincerely, what I have found. And I suspect most people would in fact, if not agree, then at least strongly sympathize with this view when confronted with real-world cases of extreme suffering. For we can indeed easily fall into the trap of approaching questions concerning value and purpose from a position of abstract philosophizing, quite detached from the reality of extreme suffering. Yet, as philosopher David Pearce notes: “An adequate theory of value should be as true in the gas chambers of Auschwitz as in the philosopher’s study.”1 And when we make an effort to consider what it 1 Pearce, 2015. 1 Introduction would in fact be like to encounter extreme suffering, it becomes difficult to deny its immense significance and urgency. If, for instance, we found ourselves walking past a house in which a person is enduring torturous suffering, and if we were in a position to alleviate this suffering at no risk to ourselves, would we not then be hard- pressed to consider anything else more important? Indeed, would saving this person from torment not likely be among the most important things we could ever do? To choose to walk by and pursue other aims instead would seem as ethically wrong as could be. And if we then further imagine a similar situation where we ourselves happen to be the one in a state of extreme suffering, the case for considering the alleviation of such suffering an overriding ethical priority seems even more compelling. Yet, in our best attempt to derive a rational theory of value and ethics, should it really matter who is enduring the suffering, or how close to us the suffering occurs? Should suffering not be equally worth preventing no matter who is experiencing it and where? If the reduction of extreme suffer- ing is of supreme importance sometimes, such as when we are confronted with it directly, then why not always? After all, we live in a world in which there are always countless beings experiencing unbearable suffering, and in which we can always do much to alleviate such suffering. 0.1 A Demanding Obligation Obscured by Omission Bias? Pointing to something that can justify creating a world with more rather than less extreme suffering is indeed not easy. For this very reason, it is also not easy to defend not making a considerable effort to reduce such suffering. Imagine, for instance, if we were offered some gain — a hun- dred dollars, say — at the price that a person will be tortured in the worst imaginable ways for a full hour. Few of us would consider it defensible to accept this deal. Next, imagine a similar case, except now we are asked to give away a hundred dollars to prevent a full hour of torture that would otherwise happen. Intuitively, the latter case seems fundamentally different, and yet the possible outcomes in these two cases are practically identical. Either we are 2 Introduction a hundred dollars richer at the price of allowing more extreme suffering in the world, or we are a hundred dollars poorer for the gain of creating a world with less extreme suffering. So if we cannot defend receiving goods to make extreme suffering happen, how can we defend not giving up goods to reduce it when the outcome is virtually the same?2 This tendency to view harms caused by acts of omission much more leniently than harms caused by acts of commission has been referred to as the “omission bias”.3 And to the extent we care about creating the best outcomes possible, we should be quite wary of this bias. After all, the suf- fering caused by an act of omission would be just as bad for the victim as if it were caused by an act of commission. It only seems differentto us, probably in large part because we can expect to be punished and judged more harshly for acts of commission than for acts of omission. Yet if our primary aim is to create ethically optimal outcomes rather than to gain approval from our peers,4 we should not view the two anywhere near as differently as we do.5 One may, of course, object that it is not realistic to think that we could prevent so much suffering by giving away a mere hundred dollars. Two things can be said in response. First, the main point here is not about the exact amount of extreme suffering prevented, but rather that there is a deep asymmetry in how we view acts of omission and commission respec- tively. This asymmetry suggests that we are intuitively underestimating how 2 A similar thought experiment is found in Moor, 2013. 3 Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca et al., 1991. For elaborate arguments against a strong moral distinction between inflicting and failing to prevent harm, see Kagan, 1989, chaps. 3-4; Bennett, 1995. 4 And we are probably self-deceived about the degree to which we care about these respective objectives, as argued in Simler & Hanson, 2018. 5 It may be objected that there is a relevant difference in the example above in that money, as well as most other goods, have diminishing marginal value, and hence not giving up some amount of money is not the same as refusing to receive the same amount. While this is true, diminishing marginal value is not a plausible explanation for why we view the two acts in this thought experiment so differently. If it were, we would consider it acceptable to receive the money if only we happened to have a hundred dollars less. Yet we do not, and least of all in the case of a person of average wealth in an affluent country of today. The difference in our evaluation in this thought experiment is probably better ex- plained by the so-called endowment effect: our tendency to ascribe greater value to things because we already own them. Yet while this tendency may help explain the difference in our evaluation, it does not help justify it. 3 Introduction important it is to take action to reduce extreme suffering, and by exten- sion, that we underestimate our obligation to do so. Second, while it is not clear how much extreme suffering a hundred dollars can be expected to reduce if spent optimally, it is by no means unthinkable that such a donation could reduce far more than a single hour of torturous suffering.6 This is a deeply humbling proposition. 0.2 The Stakes Are Astronomical We appear to be living in a unique time in the history of Earth-originating sentient life — the last moments in which such life is bound to a single planet. Provided that technological progress continues at roughly the rate we have seen over the last couple of centuries, human civilization is bound to move into the rest of the solar system within a few centuries.7 Consequently, the future could contain an astronomical number of sentient beings. Philosopher Nick Bostrom puts the “lower bound of the number of biological human life-years [that can be sustained] in the future accessible universe” at 1034, and given that human consciousness can be emulated in different substrates, he estimates that the future accessible universe could sustain 1060 such life-years.8 These astronomical numbers are almost impos- sible to appreciate. The scale of events that have hitherto only taken place on Earth — including extreme suffering — could soon be multiplied by many orders of magnitude. This renders it critical that we start considering which future outcomes are worth steering toward.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • L'antispécisme
    L'ANTISPÉCISME LA QUESTION DES DROITS DES ANIMAUX Travail de maturité Ileana CREUTZ 4H Maître accompagnant : M. Boris Ducrocq COLLÈGE VOLTAIRE GENÈVE 2020-2021 Table des matières Introduction................................................................................................................... 2 1. Les approches philosophiques antispécistes 1.1. L'utilitarisme de Peter Singer................................................................................. 4 1.2. La théorie des droits de Tom Regan....................................................................... 6 1.3. La philosophie politique de Sue Donaldson et Will Kymlicka............................... 9 2. Les mouvements citoyens pour les droits des animaux 2.1. Les différences de stratégie.................................................................................. 13 2.2. Le « Projet Grands Singes » de Paola Cavalieri et Peter Singer........................... 16 2.3. La situation des droits des animaux en Suisse...................................................... 19 Conclusion.................................................................................................................. 22 Bilan personnel........................................................................................................... 27 Interview..................................................................................................................... 28 Bibliographie.............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Exploring the Applications of Second-Generation Mindfulness-Based Interventions For
    Exploring the Applications of Second-Generation Mindfulness-Based Interventions for Improving Health and Human Functioning: A Mixed-Methods Investigation William Van Gordon, BSc, MSc Psychology Department, Nottingham Trent University, Nottinghamshire, UK, NG1 4BU A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctorate of Psychology December 2017 1 © William Van Gordon, 2017 This work is the intellectual property of the author. You may copy up to 5% of this work for private study, or personal non-commercial research. Any re-use of the information contained within this document should be fully referenced, quoting the author, title, university, degree level, and pagination. Queries or requests for any other use, or if a more substantial copy is required, should be directed to the owner of the Intellectual Property Rights. Recommended citation: Van Gordon, W. (2017). Exploring the Applications of Second-Generation Mindfulness-Based Interventions for Improving Health and Human Functioning: A Mixed-Methods Investigation [PhD Thesis]. Nottingham: Nottingham Trent University. Keywords: Mindfulness, Second-Generation Mindfulness-based Interventions, Meditation, Meditation Awareness Training, Buddhist-Derived Interventions, Mindfulness-Based Interventions, Emptiness, Ontological Addiction, Buddhism, Workaholism, Work Addiction, Sex Addiction, Fibromyalgia, Psychopathology, Job Performance, Civic Engagement, Stress, Anxiety, Randomised Controlled Trial Aspects of this doctoral project
    [Show full text]
  • Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks
    Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks © Steven J. Bartlett 8 Animal L. 143 (2002) Publish Date: 2002 Place of Publication: http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arussbartlett2002.htm Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks Animal law has focused attention on such interconnected issues as the property status of nonhuman animals, juristic personhood, and standing. These subjects are undeniably central concerns that dominate discussions of animal rights, but they do not relate to the most fundamental factors that are responsible both for human resistance to animal rights and for our species' well-entrenched, cruel, and self-righteous exploitation and destruction of nonhuman animals. In this comment, the author reviews recent advocacy of animal rights and offers the first study of human psychological and conceptual blocks that stand in the way of efforts on behalf of animal law and legislation. Paying long overdue attention to these obstacles provides a realistic framework for evaluating the effectiveness of attempts to initiate meaningful change. I am in favour of animal rights as well as human rights. That is the way of a whole human being. -- Abraham Lincoln I. INTRODUCTION: ANIMALS AS PROPERTY--IS THIS THE PROBLEM? Animals are property. These three words--and their legal implications and practical ramifications--define the most significant doctrines and cases . and the realities for current practitioners of animal law. [FN1] For many people in our society, the concept of legal rights for other animals is quite "unthinkable." That is because our relationship with the majority of animals is one in which we exploit them: we eat them, hunt them and use them in a variety of ways that are harmful to the animals.
    [Show full text]
  • Antinatalism and Moral Particularism Gerald K
    Essays in Philosophy Volume 20 Article 5 Issue 1 Is Procreation Immoral? 1-22-2019 Antinatalism and Moral Particularism Gerald K. Harrison Massey University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.pacificu.edu/eip Recommended Citation Harrison, Gerald K. () "Antinatalism and Moral Particularism," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 20: Iss. 1, Article 5. https://doi.org/10.7710/ 1526-0569.1629 Essays in Philosophy is a biannual journal published by Pacific nivU ersity Library | ISSN 1526-0569 | http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/ Essays in Philosophy ISSN 1526-0569 | Essays in Philosophy is published by the Pacific University Libraries Volume 20, Issue 1 (2019) Antinatalism and Moral Particularism Gerald K. Harrison Massey University Abstract I believe most acts of human procreation are immoral, and I believe this despite also believing in the truth of moral particularism. In this paper I explain why. I argue that procreative acts possess numerous features that, in other contexts, seem typically to operate with negative moral valences. Other things being equal this gives us reason to believe they will operate negatively in the context of procreative acts as well. However, most people’s intuitions represent procreative acts to be morally permissible in most circumstances. Given moral particularism, this would normally be good evidence that procreative acts are indeed morally permissible and that the features that operate negatively elsewhere, simply do not do so in the context of procreative acts in particular. But I argue that we have no good reason to think our intuitions about the ethics of human procreation are accurate.
    [Show full text]
  • MEMORY BIASES and DEPRESSIVE REALISM a Dissertation Submitted
    MEMORY BIASES AND DEPRESSIVE REALISM A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Michael T. Moore August 2009 Dissertation written by Michael T. Moore B.A., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2000 M.A., Kent State University, 2005 Ph.D., Kent State University, 2009 Approved by __________________________________, David M. Fresco, Ph.D., Co-Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee __________________________________, T. John Akamatsu, Ph.D., Co-Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee __________________________________, Maria S. Zaragoza, Ph. D., Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee __________________________________, Barbara L. Drew, Ph.D., R.N., Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee __________________________________, Richard Adams, Ph. D., College of Arts & Sciences Graduate Faculty Representative Accepted by __________________________________, Doug L. Delahanty, Ph.D., Interim Chair, Department of Psychology __________________________________, Timothy S. Moerland, Ph.D., Dean, College of Arts and Sciences ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………...………………iv INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………1 Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………………….17 METHOD………………………………………………………………………………………...18 Participants and Procedure……………………………………………………………….18 Power Analysis…………………………………………………………………………..19 Measures…………………………………………………………………………………20 RESULTS………………………………………………………………………………………...26 DISCUSSION…………………………………………………………………………………….35
    [Show full text]
  • What​​Can​​Nuclear​​Power​​Teach​​Us
    What can nuclear power teach us about the ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ institutional adoption of clean meat? ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ December 28, 2017 ​ ​ ​ ​ Author: J. Mohorčich ​ ​ ​ ​ © 2017 Sentience Institute ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ Edited by Jacy Reese. External review pending. ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ Abstract Studies on clean meat adoption have mostly focused on consumer acceptance, but institutional ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ choices by governments, industries, and news media can also delay or accelerate the adoption of ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ new technologies. This report examines the factors that contributed to nuclear power’s ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ widespread adoption in France and applies those findings to the question of how to advance the ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ adoption of clean meat. Among other conclusions, this report finds that supply constraints on a ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ competing good can accelerate the adoption of a new technology, that technical explanations ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ about why a new product is safe are likely to backfire, that safety incidents that appear to confirm ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ preexisting concerns are especially damaging to a new technology, and that states reliant on ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ imports to meet their needs for a good or service are more promising targets
    [Show full text]
  • John Stuart Mill's Sanction Utilitarianism
    JOHN STUART MILL’S SANCTION UTILITARIANISM: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION A Dissertation by DAVID EUGENE WRIGHT Submitted to the Office of Graduate and Professional Studies of Texas A&M University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Chair of Committee, Linda Radzik Committee Members, Clare Palmer Scott Austin R.J.Q. Adams Head of Department, Gary Varner May 2014 Major Subject: Philosophy Copyright 2014 David Eugene Wright ABSTRACT This dissertation argues for a particular interpretation of John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism, namely that Mill is best read as a sanction utilitarian. In general, scholars commonly interpret Mill as some type of act or rule utilitarian. In making their case for these interpretations, it is also common for scholars to use large portions of Mill’s Utilitarianism as the chief source of insight into his moral theory. By contrast, I argue that Utilitarianism is best read as an ecumenical text where Mill explains and defends the general tenets of utilitarianism rather than setting out his own preferred theory. The exception to this ecumenical approach to the text comes in the fifth chapter on justice which, I argue on textual and historical grounds, outlines the central features of Mill’s utilitarianism. With this understanding of Utilitarianism in place, many of the passages commonly cited in favor of the previous interpretations are rendered less plausible, and interpretations emphasizing Mill’s other writings are strengthened. Using this methodology, I critique four of the most prominent act or rule utilitarian interpretations of Mill’s moral theory. I then provide an interpretation of Mill’s theory of moral obligation and utilitarianism.
    [Show full text]
  • Buddhism and Non-Violent World: Examining a Buddhist Contribution to Promoting the Principle of Non-Violence and a Culture of Peace
    Volume 8 Number 2 (2014): 122-149 http://www.infactispax.org/journal Buddhism and Non-Violent World: Examining a Buddhist Contribution to Promoting the Principle of Non-Violence and a Culture of Peace Juichiro Tanabe Coventry University [email protected] Introduction This paper examines a Buddhist contribution to promoting the principle of non-violence and culture of peace. The opposition to violence has been one of the cardinal principles of Buddhism, which is stated in the Dhamapada1: “All tremble at violence; all fear death. Seeing others as being like yourself, do not kill or cause others to kill. All tremble at violence; life is dear for all. Seeing others as being like yourself, do not kill or cause others to kill.”2 Further, Buddhism since its beginning has developed the analysis of psychologically-oriented suffering including violence by means of eradication of its cause and achievement of internal serenity3 and this paper 1 Dhamapada is a collection of sayings of the Buddha. 2 Fronsdal, G. (2005). The Dhammapada: A New Translation of the Buddhist Classic with Annotations. Boston: Shambala: 35. 3 Burton, D. (2002). Knowledge and Liberation: Philosophical Ruminations on a Buddhist Conundrum. 122 In Factis Pax Volume 8 Number 2 (2014): 122-146 http://www.infactispax.org/journal explores how the Buddhist analysis of human mind deepens the psychological dynamics of violence and unfolds internal dimension of peace for more humane world. To this end, three sections constitute this paper. The first section expounds the Four Noble Truths doctrine that is the core of Buddhist teaching. Based on the analysis, the second section examines a Buddhist view of dynamics of violence.
    [Show full text]
  • Sensocentrismo.-Ciencia-Y-Ética.Pdf
    SENSOCENTRISMO CIENCIA Y ÉTICA Edición: 14/08/2018 “La experiencia viene a demostrarnos, desgraciadamente, cuán largo tiempo transcurrió antes de que miráramos como semejantes a los hombres que difieren considerablemente de nosotros por su apariencia y por sus hábitos. Una de las últimas adquisiciones morales parece ser la simpatía, extendiéndose más allá de los límites de la humanidad. [...] Esta virtud, una de las más nobles con que el hombre está dotado, parece surgir incidentalmente de nuestras simpatías volviéndose más sensibles y más ampliamente difundidas, hasta que se extienden a todos los seres sintientes.” — Charles Robert Darwin - 1 - Agradecimientos Agradezco la influencia inspiradora que me brindaron a largo de la conformación del libro a Jeremías, Carlos, Pedro, Ricardo, Steven, Jesús (el filósofo, no el carpintero), Carl e Isaac. Como así también la contribución intelectual y el apoyo de Iván, David, Facundo, María B., María F., Damián, Gonzalo y tantos otros. - 2 - Prólogo Como su tapa lo indica, este es un libro sobre sensocentrismo, la consideración moral centrada en la sintiencia. Para empezar, deberemos tratar la mente, conduciéndonos a la evolución. Hace 600 millones de años aparecen las mentes en nuestro planeta. Hasta antes no había nadie al que le importara, sufriera o disfrutara, lo que sucedía, no había «punto de vista», ni emoción ni cognición. Hace 2 millones de años, un linaje de monos originarios de África comenzaría gradualmente a comunicarse oralmente, compartir información mediante ondas mecánicas, sonidos, propagables en la atmósfera gaseosa (previamente producida por primitivos organismos fotosintéticos). Adquirirían cultura, información copiándose, sobreviviendo y evolucionando a través de las sucesivas generaciones parlanchinas, desde la prehistoria, y luego también escritoras.
    [Show full text]
  • Global Journal of Animal Law
    GLOBAL JOURNAL OF ANIMAL LAW A journal to promote human understanding of nonhumans’ legal status Volume 5, Issue 1, 2017 (September 5, 2017) Special Issue Based on the “Talking Animals, Law and Philosophy” Talk Series Organised at the University of Cambridge Publisher: Åbo Akademi University/Department of Law Editor-in-Chief: Visa AJ Kurki; Special Issue Editor: Raffael N Fasel Advisory Board: Professor Markku Suksi, Åbo Akademi University; Professor Anne Kumpula, University of Turku; Professor Matti Niemivuo, University of Lapland; Professor Matti J Tolvanen, University of Eastern Finland; Professor Teresa Giménez-Candela, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; Professor David Bilchitz, University of Johannesburg; Professor Peter Sankoff, University of Alberta; Professor Joan E Schaffner, The George Washington University; Mr Jan-Harm de Villiers, University of South Africa Table of Contents TALKING ANIMALS, LAW, PHILOSOPHY – AND BEYOND (Raffael N Fasel) 3 1. Introduction 3 2. Talking Animals, Law and Philosophy 5 3. Overview of this special issue 7 SUFFERING IN NON-HUMAN ANIMALS: Perspectives from Animal Welfare Science and Animal Welfare Law (Peter Fordyce) 12 1. Introduction 13 2. The legal recognition of sentience in animals 16 3. What really matters to animals – Motivational research and ethograms 20 4. Welfare, sentience, emotions and feelings 29 1 Global Journal of Animal Law, Vol 5, No 1 (2017) 5. Freedoms, needs and welfare assessment systems 33 6. Conclusions and summary 39 Glossary of terms 41 References 47 FROM INSIDE THE CAGE TO OUTSIDE THE BOX: Natural Resources as a Platform for Nonhuman Animal Personhood in the U.S. and Australia (Randall S Abate and Jonathan Crowe) 54 1.
    [Show full text]
  • The Sexual Politics of Meat by Carol J. Adams
    THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF MEAT A FEMINISTVEGETARIAN CRITICAL THEORY Praise for The Sexual Politics of Meat and Carol J. Adams “A clearheaded scholar joins the ideas of two movements—vegetari- anism and feminism—and turns them into a single coherent and moral theory. Her argument is rational and persuasive. New ground—whole acres of it—is broken by Adams.” —Colman McCarthy, Washington Post Book World “Th e Sexual Politics of Meat examines the historical, gender, race, and class implications of meat culture, and makes the links between the prac tice of butchering/eating animals and the maintenance of male domi nance. Read this powerful new book and you may well become a vegetarian.” —Ms. “Adams’s work will almost surely become a ‘bible’ for feminist and pro gressive animal rights activists. Depiction of animal exploita- tion as one manifestation of a brutal patriarchal culture has been explored in two [of her] books, Th e Sexual Politics of Meat and Neither Man nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals. Adams argues that factory farming is part of a whole culture of oppression and insti- tutionalized violence. Th e treatment of animals as objects is parallel to and associated with patriarchal society’s objectifi cation of women, blacks, and other minorities in order to routinely exploit them. Adams excels in constructing unexpected juxtapositions by using the language of one kind of relationship to illuminate another. Employing poetic rather than rhetorical techniques, Adams makes powerful connec- tions that encourage readers to draw their own conclusions.” —Choice “A dynamic contribution toward creating a feminist/animal rights theory.” —Animals’ Agenda “A cohesive, passionate case linking meat-eating to the oppression of animals and women .
    [Show full text]
  • 4​Th​ MINDING ANIMALS CONFERENCE CIUDAD DE
    th 4 ​ MINDING ANIMALS CONFERENCE ​ CIUDAD DE MÉXICO, 17 TO 24 JANUARY, 2018 SOCIAL PROGRAMME: ROYAL PEDREGAL HOTEL ACADEMIC PROGRAMME: NATIONAL AUTONOMOUS UNIVERSITY OF MEXICO Auditorio Alfonso Caso and Anexos de la Facultad de Derecho FINAL PROGRAMME (Online version linked to abstracts. Download PDF here) 1/47 All delegates please note: ​ 1. Presentation slots may have needed to be moved by the organisers, and may appear in a different place from that of the final printed programme. Please consult the schedule located in the Conference Programme upon arrival at the Conference for your presentation time. 2. Please note that presenters have to ensure the following times for presentation to allow for adequate time for questions from the floor and smooth transition of sessions. Delegates must not stray from their allocated 20 minutes. Further, delegates are welcome to move within sessions, therefore presenters MUST limit their talk to the allocated time. Therefore, Q&A will be AFTER each talk, and NOT at the end of the three presentations. Plenary and Invited Talks – 45 min. presentation and 15 min. discussion (Q&A). 3. For panels, each panellist must stick strictly to a 10 minute time frame, before discussion with the floor commences. 4. Note that co-authors may be presenting at the conference in place of, or with the main author. For all co-authors, delegates are advised to consult the Conference Abstracts link on the Minding Animals website. Use of the term et al is provided where there is more than two authors ​ ​ of an abstract. 5. Moderator notes will be available at all front desks in tutorial rooms, along with Time Sheets (5, 3 and 1 minute Left).
    [Show full text]