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Ad ~ "' c~ . T" ts This book has been a long time in the making . Its creation has been a Widely distributed cognitive process. I wish to thank first those who provided me the opportunity to make the observations on which this work is based. I am grateful to the crews of the Palau (a pseudonym ) and all the other ships I sailed upon . The commanding officer and the navigator of the Palau merit special recognition for allowing me to work aboard their ship . I am especially grateful to ' the quartermaster chief and the men of the Palau s Navigation Department for working with me and sharing their working lives so generously . Although I will not name them here or in the text , they know who they are and I am grateful to them . James Tweedale , then Technical Director of the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, generously supported the early phases of the research as an independent research project . Additional ' support was provided by the Office of Naval Research s Division of Psychology and Personnel Training under the guidance of Susan Chipman and Michael Shatto. My supervisor and colleague at NPRDC, James Holian , provided a great working environment for me and helped me to organize my thinking in the early stages. Barbara Morris and Michael Goelier helped with the transcriptions and coding of the data. Colleen Siefert worked with me - as a postdoc , made observations on another ship , and co authored portions of the discussion of learning from error . I thank the John D. and Catherine T. Mac Arthur Foundation for a five -year foundation fellowship that permit ted me to work on this material when no suitable institutional setting existed . Perhaps more important , the fellowship gave me the courage to follow ideas that lay outside the mainstream . Over the years in which this work developed , I profited from my involvement in the cognitive science community at the University of California at San Diego. I am especially grateful to Donald Norman , who shared many ideas with me as we ran a research laboratory and taught courses together . I am also grateful to AcknowledgementsI ' Aaron Cicourel , Roy D Andrade , Rik Belew , Mike Cole, and Yrjo Engestrom for helping me think through these ideas. The preparation of the book was facilitated by the helpful comments of Bambi Schieftelin , Jacques Theureau , Everett Palmer , Nick Flor , and Christine Halverson . My greatest debt is to my wife , Dona, who provided encouragement , support , great meals, and editorial assistance throughout the project . IbtDdl ~" " The seed from which this book grew was planted in November 1980, when I spent most of a day on the navigation bridge of a u .s . Navy ship as it worked its way in from the open North Pacific , through the Straits of Juan de Fuca, and down Puget Sound to Seattle. I was aboard the ship to study what the operators of its steam propulsion plant knew and how they went about knowing it . I had spent most of the preceding week down in the bowels of the ship , observing engineering operations and talking to the boiler ' technicians and machinist s mates who inhabited that hot , wet , noisy tangle of boilers , pumps , and pipes called the engineering ' spaces. I ll admit to having felt a little claustrophobic after all that time spent below the water line , where there is no night or day and the only evidence of being at sea is the rhythmic tipping of the deck ' plates and sloshing of water in the bilge below one s feet as the ship rolls in the swell . A chief boiler technician confided to me that in 21 years on Navy ships he had never yet been on deck to experience ' either of those two most romantic seafaring events, a ship s arrival at or departure from a port . I resolved , therefore , to take my last few hours aboard this ship on the navigation bridge , where I could see out the windows or even go out on the bridge wing to get a breath of cold fresh air . My professional rationalization for being on the bridge was that there I would be able to observe the process that generates the fluxry of engine commands that always taxes the engineering crew when the ship nears the dock . And I did make a detailed record of all engine knd helm commands given in the 75 minutes from the time the - engines were first slowed until they were secured there were 61 in all . But what really captured my attention was the work of the navigation team. Three and a half years later , the project that became this book began in earnest. In the SI)mmer of 1984, I was still working for the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center in San Diego as a civilian scientist with the title Personnel Research Psychologist . - By then I had participated in two successful and well known Inb' oduction d projects . With these success es came the freedom to conduct an independent research project . I was given carte blanche to study whatever I thought was of most interest . I chose to study what I was then calling naturally situated cognition . Having a research position in a Navy laboratory made it possible for me to gain access to naval vessels, and my longtime love of navigation and experience as a racing yacht navigator made it easy for me to choose navigation as an activity to study afloat. I talked my way aboard a ship and set up shop on the navigation bridge . At the time , I really had no notion what an ideal subject navigation would turn out to be. When I began, I was thinking in terms of the naturally situated cognition of individuals . It was only after I completed my first study period at sea that I realized the importance of the fact that cognition was socially distributed . A little earlier , I had been asked to write a book describing what is in cognitive anthropology for the rest of cognitive science. I began that project , but after I became disillusioned with my field I lost interest in it . The choice of naturally situated cognition as a topic came from my sense that it is what cognitive anthropology really should have been about but largely had not been. Clifford Geertz " " (1983) called for an outdoor psychology , but cognitive anthro - pology was unable or unwilling to be that . The respondents may have been exotic , but the methods of investigation were largely borrowed from the indoor techniques of psychology and linguistics . When cognitive and symbolic anthropology split off from social anthropology , in the mid 1950s, they left society and practice behind . As part of the cognitive revolution , cognitive anthropology made two crucial steps. First , it turned away from society by looking inward to the knowledge an individual had to have to function as a " member of the culture . The question became What does a person " have to know ? The locus of knowledge was assumed to be inside the individual . The methods of research then available encouraged the analysis of language. But knowledge expressed or expressible in language tends to be declarative knowledge . It is what people can say about what they know . Skill went out the window of the " " white room . The second turn was away from practice . In the quest to learn what people know , anthropologists lost track both of how people go about knowing what they know and of the contribution of the environments in which the knowing is accomplished . Perhaps these narrowing assumptions were necessary to Introduction xl get the project of cognitive anthropology off the ground . I will argue that , now that we are underway as a discipline , we should revoke these assumptions . They have become a burden , and they prevent us from seeing the nature of human cognition . In particular , the ideational definition of culture prevents us seeing that systems of socially distributed cognition may have interesting cognitive properties of their own . In the history of an- thropology , there is scarcely a more important concept than the division of labor . In terms of the energy budget of a human group and the efficiency with which a group exploits its physical environment , social organizational factors often produce group properties that differ consider ably from the properties of individuals . Clearly , the same sorts of phenomena occur in the cognitive domain . Depending on their organization , groups must have cognitive properties that are not predictable from a knowledge of the properties of the individuals in the group . The emphasis on finding and " " " " describing knowledge structures that are somewhere inside the individual encourages us to overlook the fact that human cognition is always situated in a complex sociocultural world and cannot be unaffected by it . Similar developments in the other behavioral sciences during the cognitive revolution of the late 1950s and the 1960s left a troubled legacy in cognitive science. It is notoriously difficult to generalize laboratory findings to real-world situations . The relationship between cognition seen as a solitary mental activity and cognition seen as an activity undertaken in social settings using various kinds of tools is not at all clear . This book is about softening some boundaries that have been made rigid by previous approach es. It is about locating cognitive activity in context , where context is not a fixed set of surrounding conditions but a wider dynamical process of which the cognition of an individual is only a part . The boundaries to be softened or dissolved have been erected, primarily for analytic convenience , in social space, in physical space, and in time . Just as the construction of these boundaries was driven by a particular theoretical perspective , their dissolution or softening is driven by a different perspective - one that arose of necessity when cognition was confronted in the wild .

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