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ILIOS An Undergraduate Journal of Political Science and Philosophy

EXAMINING GOVERNANCE

Volume 1, No. 1 Spring 2017 2

ILIOS An Undergraduate Journal of Political Science and Philosophy

Contents

Letter from the Editors 3

Can a State Govern Effectively if it Forgoes Ideology 4 ​ John Hochschild

Compatibilizing Sub-State Nationalism and Immigration Through Civic Nationalism 19 Alexandra Sakellariou

The Fateful Fifty-Two: How the American Media Sensationalized the Iran Hostage Crisis 30 Monica L. Coscia

The Salience of Masculinity in 1960 Presidential Campaign Rhetoric Joshua Ferno 48

Obligations of Law: A theory of Justification of Civil Disobedience

Jibraan Mansoor 76 3

Letter from the Editors

What is type of political obligation that is necessary of a government, and/or its people to to properly govern a state? There is no one answer to this question as evidence by the plethora of types of governments that have existed through history. In any event, continuing to relentlessly wrestle with this conundrum is imperative as times change, social norms evolve, and power continues to be at the center of how modern life is lived.

The following questions can be viewed as a guide in attempt to answer the larger aforementioned posted above. Can a state expect to govern effectively in the midst of changing its own political ideology? How much political efficacy should be expected out of those individuals who are apart of the state and those who which to join it? How do images perpetuated by the media inform the way political obligation is practiced by the public? When is it right to overthrow an unjust system?

This year’s issue of the Ilios tries to provide insight into all of the questions ​ ​ above. Together, they suggest that political obligation can manifest itself in various ways , but in the end, its validity and strength is based upon who is wielding and using their power most effectively in a given state.

The editors of Ilios would like to thank all of the authors who helped provide their ​ ​ unique insight into crafting this issue. In addition, the guidance of our academic advisor, Anthony Kammas, was an integral part into helping to bring this year’s vision to light.

Enjoy the Spring 2017 issue of The Ilios. ​ ​

Sincerely, Daniel, Ben, Giulia, and Sama

Executive Editors

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Can a State Govern Effectively if it Forgoes Ideology?

John Hochschild

Abstract:

Living in a democracy makes us prone to think that we live independently of ideology, a word with negative connotations that is usually associated with Communism or Nazism, for example. We are quick to identify and analyze ideological tools employed by these historical forms of government, but this is simply because we are removed from them. In my paper, I intend to dissect the ideology that surrounds us even in the United States, and explain why any government requires ideology to be able to govern effectively, as effective government requires the public to relinquish individual power and the only way to convince people to do this is by using ideology.

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In the big lie there is always a certain force of credibility; because the broad masses of a nation are always more easily corrupted in the deeper strata of their emotional nature than

1 consciously or voluntarily.’ Herein lies ideology, ‘the big lie,’ which carries with it credibility by virtue of peoples’ tendency to be more emotional than rational. Adolf Hitler uttered these words, and his appreciation of ‘the big lie’ led to 12 years during which a concocted ideology was adhered to with cultish fervency like never before. To the reader in modern America, the

National Socialist ideology of extreme nationalism to the point of racial classification and its consequences are clear; but, because of the very nature of ideology, we often fail to see the

2 ideologies by which we ourselves operate. The September 11th Attacks were intended to be and

3 were received as a direct attack on American ideology - specifically, that of globalized, secular, and neoliberal capitalism. The United States’ immediate response to the attacks was to rid the

4 world of ‘Islamic extremism’ by force. In the aftermath, military enlistment statistics saw an interesting trend: ‘Army recruits scored higher on qualification tests, had high school diplomas

5 more often and came from higher-income areas than in previous years.’ In this trend lies proof

1 Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Trans. James Murphy. Project Gutenberg. Sept. 2002. Web. 23 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ «http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.txt». 2 ‘There is a simple reason why [Osama bin Laden] attacked the US: American imperialism.’ Source: Laden, Osama Bin, Bruce B. Lawrence, and James Howarth. Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden. London: ​ ​ Verso, 2005. Print. 3 ‘On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.’ Source: Bush, George W. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." Washington, D.C. 20 Sept. 2001. The White ​ House. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. ​ «http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html». 4 See above note 3. ​ 5 Dao, James. "They Signed Up to Fight." The New York Times. The New York Times, 05 Sept. 2011. Web. 22 Apr. ​ ​ 2016. 6

of Hitler’s theory. Because their ideology had been directly attacked, significantly more educated

Americans were driven by emotion, upon which ideology acts, and were stirred into action, overpowering their rational sides, which ordinarily would have been less attracted to a career in warfare. I contend that historically, a state has never governed without employing ideology, and theoretically, to do so is impossible, since the state requires the mass concession of individual power that can only be obtained through the implementation of an ideology. In fact, the more a state employs ideology, the more effectively it governs. By recognizing the extent to which ideology saturates our existence, it is my hope that we can become more wary of ideology, which, if accepted without critique, can give way to unconscionable actions, as was witnessed on an unprecedented scale in the 20th century.

In order to answer the question at hand, it is necessary to clarify three terms. Specifically, what is a state, what does it mean to govern effectively, and what is ideology? For this paper, I will employ Max Weber’s definition of the state: ‘the human community that (successfully)

6 claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’. Here, legitimacy is dictated by the human community over which it governs, which must, for the most part, accept the monopoly in order for the state to succeed.

To govern effectively is subjective; a man who believes the effectiveness of government is measured by how content the constituents are and a man who believes the effectiveness of government is measured by how much territory that state conquers would greatly disagree on the effectiveness of many historic governments. However, in this paper, I will take ‘govern’ to be synonymous with ‘rule’ or ‘control’, and so the government that governs most effectively is that

6 Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation. ARC. National Science Foundation. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ «http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf». 7

which has most control over its constituents.

Ideology is by far the most difficult term to define, and as such, the bulk of my argument will be spent defining this term and explaining what its purpose is. Ideologies like communism, socialism, capitalism and fascism differ on so much that it is often difficult to see what they have in common, but to define ideology, we can only analyze their commonalities. I contend that inherent to any ideology is the belief on the part of each individual that giving up personal power will give way to a symbiosis between state and individual. The exceptions to this are of course anarchic ideologies, but these are, by definition, irrelevant to any dynamic between ideology and state since they call for the abolition of the state. Ideology is necessary for the state because to effectively govern, or control, the state requires the monopoly of physical force, and it can only possess this if individual freedom is surrendered to the state. Ideology is necessary for us because it provides us with security by aligning us with power, provides us with a sense of belonging and purpose by operating as part of a group, and alleviates our own individual responsibility.

The obvious counter-claim to this characterization of ideology is that whilst the state may possess the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force, it does not necessarily obtain this through the removal of personal freedoms. Such an argument reflects the general consensus that modern democratic nations bring more freedom to their constituents than has ever existed in the

7 world. This is generally accepted because people living in the developed world tend to live long lives, are able to travel (most) of the world freely, have little fear of displacement due to war, and so on. However, on scrutinizing the legislative and social confinements under which we, even in

7 Goldberg, Jonah. "Americans Enjoy More Freedom Today than Ever." Townhall. Townhall Media, 20 Nov. 2002. ​ ​ Web. 23 Apr. 2016. «http://townhall.com/columnists/jonahgoldberg/2002/11/20/americans_enjoy_more_freedom_today_than_ever». 8

the ‘democratic’ West, operate, one finds that we actually have little freedom. In the United

States, in which freedom is held as perhaps the most sacred of all virtues, ironically almost everything we do is regulated and controlled by the government: from a young age, most of us attend schools that are operated by or under license from the state; the food and drugs we consume are regulated by the state; in Los Angeles, we cannot even cross the road unless the state tells us we may. The U.S. government holds the power over our bodies, shown by the fact

8 that it is illegal to sell ones’ organs or engage in prostitution. Philosopher Michel Foucault argues that in the modern penal society, the state even controls our thoughts by defining

9 acceptable behavior and incarcerating those who fall outside the norms.

We accept our lack of freedom because we believe that the state controls these things for the greater good of the people. If you return to my list of the myriad ways in which we lack freedom, you can find a rationalization for each: for example, the reason why the drug Ecstasy is illegal in most developed countries is because governments and the scientists they employ know more about the drug’s harmful effects than most civilians. If you are guilty of this kind of reasoning, you are under the influence of ideology. Despite the drug’s illegality, David Nutt, a professor of pharmacology and former chairman of the U.K. government’s Advisory Council on

10 the Misuse of Drugs, claimed that Ecstasy is ‘no more dangerous than horse riding’, and that

11 his research demonstrated that alcohol ‘is the most damaging drug to the brain’. Nevertheless,

8 Nevada is the only exception to this, but even this is regulated. 9 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage, 1995. 182-83. Print. ​ ​ 10 Hope, Christopher. "Ecstasy 'no More Dangerous than Horse Riding'" The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group ​ ​ Ltd, 7 Feb. 2009. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. 11 Praetorius, Dean. "David Nutt: "Alcohol Is The Most Damaging Drug To The Brain"" Brain Decoder. ​ VaynerPublishing, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. 9

12 under 6% of American adults have tried Ecstasy, whilst 88% of American adults have

13 consumed alcohol. I would suggest that if you were to present people with Nutt’s empirical evidence, their respective inclinations towards consuming Ecstasy and alcohol would not change very much, since our belief in the sanctity of government control is largely impervious to rational thought. This belief is the cornerstone of ideology. Ideology does not stem from proof of government’s effectiveness but from faith in government’s effectiveness, which is exactly why ​ ​ Hitler dubs ideology ‘the big lie’ and Eric Hoffer states that ‘Stalinism is as much an opium of

14 the people as are the established religions.’

When this faith is lacking there is no mechanism in place to prevent the individual from believing that he will not benefit from handing over individual power to the state, thus ​ ​ challenging the state’s monopoly of power. Only violence can ensue from such thought. There are numerous examples of this, and one such example lies in the anti-government uprising that occurred in Oregon earlier this year. Ammon Bundy, leader of a militia group known as

‘Citizens for Constitutional Freedom’, proclaimed that “the people have been abused long enough, their lands and their resources have been taken away from them to the point that it is

15 putting them literally into poverty,” and on January 2nd, Bundy forcefully took control of a

«https://braindecoder.com/post/david-nutt-alcohol-most-dangerous-drug-1092506767». 12 Maldonado, Lizmarie. "Ecstasy Statistics." Rehabs.com. Ed. Jennifer Hinners. Sober Media Group, n.d. Web. 22 ​ ​ Apr. 2016. «http://luxury.rehabs.com/ecstasy-abuse/statistics/». 13 "Alcohol Facts and Statistics." National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. NIH, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. «http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcohol-consumption/alcohol-facts-and-statistics». 14 Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: Harper Collins, 2011. ​ ​ 30. Print. 15 Wolf, Carissa, Peter Holley, and Wesley Lowery. "Armed Activists in Oregon Touch off Unpredictable Chapter in Land-use Feud." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 3 Jan. 2016. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ 10

wildlife refuge owned by the federal government. The standoff lasted 40 days, at the end of which the militia members were placed into federal custody, with the exception of one, who was

16 fatally shot. Whether or not Bundy is correct about the federal government inflicting poverty on individuals, he is correct that the government takes away personal freedoms. However, Bundy and his fellow anarchists’ abnormal actions reflect how they objected to the ‘big lie’ of freedom and the sanctity of government, which most of us readily accept. Without ideology, the seizure of individual liberties is no longer seen as a necessity for the greater good, but as a move of aggression on the part of the state, which is naturally to be countered with aggression. The state would be unable to function if it were in a constant state of battle, and so ideology is necessary.

Ideology must provide us with something in return, a reward for our disciplined behavior, as it were, or else we would all be constantly clashing with the government like the Oregon militia. The most important consequence of handing over power to the state is that we align ourselves with the most powerful, and so we have the greatest chance of survival when aligned

17 as such. This logic is illustrated in the film, Paradise Now, in which Suha tries to dissuade ​ ​ Khaled from detonating his suicide bomb not out of moral consideration, but because she recognizes that the Israeli government is far stronger than the Palestinian resistance could ever be. She acquiesces not because she sees the Israeli government as legitimate, but because she recognizes that she and her fellow Palestinians have a greater chance of survival through negotiation, which keeps them aligned with government, as opposed to violence, which pits them directly against the state.

16 Jamieson, Alastair et al. "Oregon Occupation Leaders Arrested, One Dead in Shooting." NBC News. National ​ ​ Broadcasting Company, 27 Jan. 2016. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. 17 Paradise Now. Dir. Hany Abu-Assad. Warner Independent Pictures, 2005. DVD. ​ ​ 11

As well as aligning us with power, ideology provides a sense of identity, purpose and belonging that comes with being a part of a group. For example, various implementations of communism have commonly emphasized brotherhood and belonging through the use of the word

‘comrade.’ Hoffer writes that an ideology ‘attracts and holds a following not by its doctrine and promises but by the refuge it offers from the anxieties, barrenness and meaninglessness of an

18 individual existence.’ This explains why extremist ideologies, such as communism and fascism, are likely to take hold of a country when it is vulnerable, or rife with anxiety, such as after a war or in the midst of widespread poverty or decline.

Furthermore, since ideology is the set of beliefs that align us with the dominant authority, it eliminates not only personal freedom but also personal responsibility. This phenomenon can be seen in the Milgram Experiment, in which an experimenter told a volunteer, who had been assigned the role of ‘teacher,’ to administer electric shocks of increasing intensity to the

‘learner,’ who the teacher thought was a fellow volunteer but was really an actor faking reactions to the shocks. In almost all cases, the teacher became nervous, as he came to believe that he was inflicting physical harm on the learner, shown by nervous laughter and the refusal to continue.

After each teacher was reassured by the authority figure that he is not culpable should something go wrong, most continued. Of the participants, 65% obeyed the experimenter’s commands to the

19 letter, despite the fact they heard cries of agony and then eventually silence from the learner. In

Milgram’s experiment, the subjects were reassured by their lack of responsibility, as we are in an ideologically-driven society. Franz Stangl, Commandant of the Sobibor and Treblinka

18 See above note 15. 41. ​ ​ 19 Milgram, Stanley. "Behavioral Study of Obedience." The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 67.4 ​ ​ (1963): 371-78. 376. Print. 12

extermination camps in Nazi Germany, who was tried and found guilty for the murder of

20 900,000 people, plainly stated at his trial, “My conscience is clear. I was simply doing my

21 duty.” Gitta Sereny, a biographer of Stangl, believes ‘the [Nazi] uniform has a lot to do with

22 how they are, how they behave. It gives them more certainty than they have.’ The certainty that accompanies the uniform, an important symbol of the Nazi ideology of strength and superiority, absolves them of responsibility for mass murder by turning it into a mere duty to the state.

It is not just that we ‘enjoy’ our ideology because of the benefits it brings us, as Slavoj

23 Zizek says, but that obtaining these benefits is evolutionarily favorable. In other words, we do not merely enjoy them, but we require them in order to have a better chance of survival. ​ ​ Sigmund Freud was an essentialist, believing that we are each born with nothing but two carnal instincts: the ‘libido’ and the ‘death drive’. Freud believed that the ‘ego ideal’, the ‘internal authority’ erected in the psyche by society, is an expression of our aggressive instinct, which is

24 ‘the derivative […] of the death instinct’. Because this internal authority, which Freud argues gives way to the conscience, is what keeps us obedient to the group that possesses authority, our tendency towards obedience to the state is essentially an expression of our natural instincts. In

Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud, expanding on Wilfred Trotter’s analysis, ​ claims that the four natural instincts are ‘of self-preservation, of nutrition, of sex,’ and of ‘the

20 Sereny, Gitta. The German Trauma: Experiences and Reflections, 1938-2001. London: Penguin, 2001. 89. Print. ​ ​ 21 Stevenson, William. The Bormann Brotherhood. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973. 182. Print. ​ ​ 22 "The Banality of Evil - Gitta Sereny." Web of Stories. YouTube, 19 Sept. 2011. 1:33. Web. 23 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ «https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=117&v=ATYFIWVaaBo». 23 The Pervert's Guide to Ideology. Dir. Sophie Fiennes. Perf. Slavoj Zizek. BFI, Blinder Films, Film4, 2012. 5:35. ​ ​ Web. 23 Apr. 2016. 24 Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. Trans. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton, 1962. 111. ​ ​ Print. 13

25 horde’, or group mentality. However, I would argue that all of these can be seen as facets of just one of the listed instincts: that of self-preservation. This argument is essentially that of

Charles Darwin’s: we have been evolutionarily successful because we have an instinct for self-preservation, and without it, we would have died out long ago. Intuitively, the notion of the evolutionary favorability of forming groups or tribes, of which the state is the modern equivalent, makes sense through the concept of ‘safety in numbers.’ This reasoning also provides an explanation as to why the concession of power to authority always feels like the natural thing to do. Ultimately, because we require the protection that ideology brings us, if the state were not to ​ ​ provide it, we would simply obtain security and a sense of belonging from another group, which would undermine the state’s authority. Thus, the state that forgoes ideology is bound to fail.

The inverse of this is also true: the more a state employs ideology, the more effective it is. Nazi Germany was so effective because Hitler saturated German society with National

Socialist ideology. In Mein Kampf, Hitler writes that the ‘success in the use of this spiritual ​ ​ 26 weapon consists in the mass employment of it.’ In Nazi Germany, one of the ways in which propaganda was mass employed was to encourage ‘Aryan’ Germans to reproduce in order to create a larger Übermensch and a stronger military force that would prove necessary in the war ​ ​ for Lebensraum [living space] in the East. One such example of this message is ‘The Cross of ​ ​ ​ ​ Honor for the German Mother’, created in 1938 to be awarded to mothers with four or more

27 children. Between 1932 and 1934, the birth rate in Germany increased from 15.1% to 18%, a

25 Freud, Sigmund. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Trans. James Strachey. New York: W. W. ​ ​ Norton, 1959. 64. Print. 26 See above note 1. ​ 27 Whelpton, P. K. “Why the Large Rise in the German Birth-rate?”. American Journal of Sociology 41.3 (1935): ​ ​ 299–313. Print. 14

significant change compared to most European countries, whose birth rates changed by, at most, half of a percent. Hitler could not force Germans to have children, so the increased birth rate illustrates a genuine belief in the National Socialist cause amongst the general public and thus the effectiveness of the state. In a mere 12 years, Hitler managed to employ ideology to such an extent that numerous soldiers and politicians believed it was better to commit suicide than live without National Socialism. Towards the end of the Second World War, 53 Wehrmacht generals ​ ​ (who would most likely not have been punished for crimes against humanity, since the SS were

28 responsible for running the death camps) committed suicide, and Joseph and Magda Goebbels fed their six children cyanide in Hitler’s bunker. The belief of the German population under

Nazism in the absolute sanctity of the state demonstrates that the more a state employs ideology, the more effective it is in controlling its subjects.

More generally, any army provides a palpable reasoning of this concept. Because the soldier’s extreme abdication of personal freedom and acceptance of servitude to the state relies on the vehement employment of ideology, the correlation between ideology and state control is further demonstrated. In the U.S., the ideology that ceding personal power to the state brings

‘freedom’ to the masses is especially pronounced in the military. For evidence of this saturation of ideology, look no further than the U.S. military’s mission names: Operations ‘Just Cause’

(invasion of Panama), ‘Enduring Freedom’ (War on Terror), and ‘Valiant Guardian’ (part of the

Iraq War). But this makes sense, since the government understands that if one truly believes in the cause he fights for, he will fight much more effectively. Osama bin Laden writes, quoting the

29 Qur’an, that ‘if you are true believers you will have the upper hand’. In the military we also see

28 Goeschel, Christian. Suicide in Nazi Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 127. Print. ​ ​ 29 See above note 2. 62. ​ ​ 15

the lack of responsibility and sense of belonging that ideology brings. The lack of individual responsibility among most ranks is made inherent by the ‘chain of command’, and in The True ​ 30 Believer, Hoffer describes how a ‘disintegrating army […] is fertile ground’ for a mass ​ movement, since they find it difficult to adjust to civilian life, where less ideology means a lack of brotherhood and increased necessity for autonomy.

Ideology, with the rationalization that it is beneficial for us to relinquish personal power to authority at its core, serves to align us with the group in possession of power. We make this rationalization because when we co-operate, we can achieve more and have a higher chance of survival. We also readily accept ideology because we prefer being a member of a group, which supplies us with a sense of identity, purpose and belonging, and significantly diminishes our personal responsibilities. In fact, as Freud explains, we have evolved to enjoy the benefits that accompany ideology precisely because doing so strengthens the authority of the tribe or state, which in turn increases our chances of self-preservation. If this much is understood about ideology, it is clear that no state can maintain control over its people if it forgoes it for two key reasons. The first is that without the belief that we are better off without personal power but rather if we are aligned with the state’s immense power, there is nothing stopping the state from being constantly challenged and rapidly overthrown. The second reason is that ideology gives people existential reassurance, and if the state did not supply it, another party would, thus threatening the state’s monopoly of power. It is important to understand that a state must employ ​ ​ ideology in order to realize that every state that exists today heavily relies on ideology. Zizek

31 states that we, in the West, believe we live in a ‘post-ideological society’, but I would take

30 See above note 15. 45. ​ ​ 31 See above note 24. 3:10. ​ ​ 16

Zizek’s statement further in saying that every society believes that their actions are not founded ​ ​ on ideology but on rationality. Marx and Engels believed that communism was so rational that it was inevitable: ‘The Communist Manifesto had, as its object, the proclamation of the inevitable

32 impending dissolution of modern bourgeois property.’ Hitler, not a universalist like Marx but a particularist, believed that it was perfectly rational to advance the German people, the ‘chosen

33 34 race’ through the exploitation and eradication of what he genuinely saw as ‘inferior races’. If we are aware of the prevalence of ideology even today, we can be prompted to critically analyze the ideology that is presented as rationality in order to avoid repeating some of the horrors that have been inflicted on the World by Nazism, communism, and indeed capitalism.

32 Marx, Karl, Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. "Preface to the 1882 Russian Edition." Trans. ​ ​ Samuel Moore. Marxists.org. Web. 23 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ «https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf». 33 See above note 1. II. ​ ​ 34 See above note 1. XIV. ​ ​ 17

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Bin Laden, Osama, Bruce B. Lawrence, and James Howarth. Messages to the World: The ​ Statements of Osama Bin Laden. London: Verso, 2005. Print. ​ Bush, George W. "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People." Washington, D.C. 20 Sept. 2001. The White House. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. ​ ​ «http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html».

Dao, James. "They Signed Up to Fight." The New York Times. The New York Times, 05 Sept. ​ ​ 2011. Web. 22 Apr. 2016.

Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage, 1995. ​ ​ Print.

Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. Trans. James Strachey. New York: W.W. ​ ​ Norton, 1962. Print.

Freud, Sigmund. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Trans. James Strachey. New ​ ​ York: W. W. Norton, 1959. Print.

Goeschel, Christian. Suicide in Nazi Germany. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 127. ​ ​ Print.

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Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. Trans. James Murphy. Project Gutenberg. Sept. 2002. Web. 23 Apr. ​ ​ 2016. «http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.txt».

Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements. New York: Harper ​ ​ Collins, 2011. Print.

Hope, Christopher. "Ecstasy 'no More Dangerous than Horse Riding'" The Telegraph. Telegraph ​ ​ Media Group Ltd, 7 Feb. 2009. Web. 22 Apr. 2016.

Jamieson, Alastair, Alex Johnson, Erin Calabrese, Giselle Lamarre, and Pete Williams. "Oregon Occupation Leaders Arrested, One Dead in Shooting." NBC News. National Broadcasting ​ ​ Company, 27 Jan. 2016. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. 18

Maldonado, Lizmarie. "Ecstasy Statistics." Rehabs.com. Ed. Jennifer Hinners. Sober Media ​ ​ Group, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. «http://luxury.rehabs.com/ecstasy-abuse/statistics/».

Marx, Karl, Frederick Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party. Trans. Samuel Moore. ​ ​ Marxists.org. Web. 23 Apr. 2016. ​ «https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf».

Milgram, Stanley. "Behavioral Study of Obedience." The Journal of Abnormal and Social ​ Psychology 67.4 (1963): 371-78. Print. ​ Paradise Now. Dir. Hany Abu-Assad. Warner Independent Pictures, 2005. DVD. ​ Praetorius, Dean. "David Nutt: "Alcohol Is The Most Damaging Drug To The Brain"" Brain ​ Decoder. VaynerPublishing, n.d. Web. 22 Apr. 2016. ​ «https://braindecoder.com/post/david-nutt-alcohol-most-dangerous-drug-1092506767».

Sereny, Gitta. The German Trauma: Experiences and Reflections, 1938-2001. London: Penguin, ​ ​ 2001. Print.

Stevenson, William. The Bormann Brotherhood. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973. ​ ​ Print.

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Whelpton, P. K. “Why the Large Rise in the German Birth-rate?”. American Journal of ​ Sociology 41.3 (1935): 299–313. Print. ​ Wolf, Carissa, Peter Holley, and Wesley Lowery. "Armed Activists in Oregon Touch off Unpredictable Chapter in Land-use Feud." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 3 Jan. ​ ​ 2016. Web. 22 Apr. 2016.

19

Compatibilizing Sub-State Nationalism and Immigration Through Civic Nationalism

Alexandra Sakellariou McGill University (604) 349 6367 [email protected] 20

Many scholars believed the sweeping effects of globalization would end the existence of national minority identities based on language and culture. However, this theory has proven contrary in the modern world, where sub-state or minority nationalism is stronger than ever (Kymlicka, 2). This form of nationalism has resiliently adapted itself to the modern world, but now faces many new challenges brought on by globalization. Immigration is seen as one of the leading challenges to minority nationalism, often resulting in potentially volatile tensions between the national minorities and increasing numbers of immigrants within a state. This paper explores whether the existence of sub-state nationalism can ever be compatible with immigration. I argue that, due to an increasing acceptance of civic nationalism by national minorities, immigration has come to be seen as advantageous for sub-state nationalists, effectively compatibilizing the two. I begin by explaining the reason for the tenuous relationship between sub-state nationalism and immigration, where the latter is seen as a threat to minorities’ nationalist interests. I then present the argument as to why these two are seen as incompatible, as national minorities are believed to always adopt a violent, disastrous ethnic nationalist approach in response to the threat. I will then explain why this view is mistaken, explaining how and why many national minorities are adopting a civic nationalist approach and using immigration to their advantage, effectively reconciling the two. I provide the examples of Quebec and Catalonia to provide further explanation. In addition, I also consider the role the state must play in encouraging the adoption of civic nationalism by offering national minorities more policy control over immigration. Finally, I will consider the objection that such policies may be illiberal, but will argue that the sacrifice of some liberal norms is necessary in order to prevent dangerous ethnic nationalist sentiments from arising. I conclude by maintaining that sub-state nationalism and immigration are more than compatible and can actually help each other realize the needs and desires of the minority and immigrant groups involved.

Let us begin by understanding the definitional meanings behind sub-state nationalism and immigration as well as their tenuous relationship. Will Kymlicka describes sub-state or minority 21

nationalists as “groups [that] sees itself as a distinct and self-governing nation within a larger state, and has mobilized along nationalist lines to demand greater regional self-government and national recognition” (4). They seek to preserve and encourage their distinctive identity, which is usually founded upon a historical language and/or culture that they claim is separate from the majority. Minority nationalists mobilize using nationalist sentiments, in varying degrees of extremity, in order to achieve protection and recognition for their distinct identity both legally and politically.

Immigration is seen as a threat to the achievement of national minorities’ nationalist desires.

Rates of immigration, the permanent move of individuals to a foreign country, have dramatically increased since the beginning of globalization (Kymlicka, 3). However, immigrants do not share the same distinctive identity that minority groups have based themselves on and this is perceived as a serious threat to minority nationalist interests. Sanjay Jeram explains, “minority nations define themselves from the larger state by way of distinct cultures and languages and now they must contend with an influx of migrants that do not share those languages or cultural traits” (1). Charles Leddy-Owen also remarks that

“immigration [is] seen to be−variously and to differing extents−disturbing and undermining national ​ ​ ​ ​ borders, the national economy, culture, story, and so on” of the majority as well as minorities in a state.

Specifically, there are four ways immigration has proven to be a threat to sub-state nationalism. First, immigrants will most likely integrate into the dominant culture of the state, as this offers them greater economic opportunities and mobility (Kymlicka, 9). Resultantly, national minorities become further outnumbered and less influential politically. Secondly, many states have encouraged immigrants to settle in land held by the minority group, as a means to further disempower the national minority (Kymlicka, 9).

Canada is a prime example of this when European immigrants were historically encouraged to settle on originally held Aboriginal land, deliberately marginalizing the Aboriginal minority. Moreover, since immigrants typically integrate into dominant cultures, this influences the state to pressure minority groups to do the same (Kymlicka, 9). If immigrants can and are happy to integrate, the majority asks why 22

sub-state groups do not do the same. Finally, immigrants do not share the same ‘survival’ mentality national minorities do (Kymlicka, 9). They do not share the same historical struggle to protect their distinctive identity as minority groups do, thus are extremely unlikely to support nationalist mobilization and interests (Kymlicka, 9). There is no doubt that immigration has proven to be a threat to sub-state nationalism in various ways. As a result, most national minorities act defensively and unwelcoming towards immigrants, creating the tenuous relationship between the two groups.

This has led to the assumption that most or all national minorities resort to ethnic nationalism in ​ ​ response to the threat of immigration, leading many scholars to believe the two are always incompatible.

Ethnic nationalism is an extreme form of nationalism that is based solely on ethnicity, thus relying on immutable characteristics such as race to define group identity and membership (Jeram, 2). By depending on shared heritage to define their nation, ethnic nationalists are often deeply xenophobic, racist, and exclusionary of immigrants (Kymlicka, 10). Ethnic nationalism often runs contrary to values such as liberalism and democracy most modern states promote, consequently threatening the immigrant population as well as the stability of the state as a whole (Kymlicka, 10). It is also seen as extremely dangerous, as ethnic nationalism can and has led to violent, disastrous consequences for everyone involved. It is true that many sub-state nationalists have turned to ethnic nationalism in an effort to protect and promote their interests. But this has mistakenly led many scholars to resolve ethnic nationalism is synonymous with sub-state nationalism, which, as we shall see, is not always the case. This has led to the conclusion that immigration and sub-state nationalism will never be compatible; as long as minority nationalists resort to ethnic nationalism in response, there will always be chaos within a state. Kymlicka explains, “this connection between minority nationalism and ethnic nationalism is so strong that many commentators view minority nationalism as inherently based on ethnic exclusiveness, and as inherently opposed to ‘civic’ nationalism based on shared political principles” (10). However, simply because some minority nationalists have appealed to ethnic nationalism in response to immigration does not mean this is 23

a trend of all minority groups. Such instances are not enough to conclude sub-state nationalism and immigration as always incompatible.

Simply because immigration can be a threat to sub-state nationalism does not mean this is always the case. In fact, there has been an increasing trend of minority nationalists appealing to civic nationalism. ​ ​ Civic nationalism is the exact opposite of ethnic nationalism. Kymlicka explains, civic nationalism

“accepts shifting group boundaries, multiple and hybrid identities, and which is based on voluntary affiliations and individual rights” (10). It is compatible with modern values such as liberalism, democracy, and peace (Kymlicka, 11). Instead of basing group identification on immutable characteristics, civic nationalism accepts both shifting group boundaries and self-identification. It allows the minority group to adopt an “inclusive citizenship” to allow those into the national minority who would previously have been excluded (Jeram, 3). In this way, national minorities can be accepting of immigrants. It allows immigrants the opportunity to integrate into the minority culture and adopt their distinct identity. In turn, as we shall see in further detail, this allows the national minority to further protect and promote their nationalist interests. This change in attitude makes the existence of sub-state nationalism and immigration both harmonious and beneficial within a state. An influx of scholars, such as

Kymlicka and Jeram, are now asking us to rethink the relationship between sub-state nationalism and immigration as this demonstrates the two can be compatible with each other. As Jeram writes, the

“previously held assumption that minority nations manifest defensive and exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants may no longer be useful” (4).

There are various reasons why civic nationalism is becoming the best approach for national minorities to take in response to immigration. Economic reasons are definitely an influential factor, as immigrants are able to fill economic niches that are otherwise vacant and negatively impacting the local economy (Kymlicka, 14). Another factor can also be changing demographic trends, such as the need to offset declining birth rates or an aging population (Kymlicka, 15). However, the most important reason 24

for this change in attitude is the need to survive in rapidly changing and globalizing societies. Kymlicka points out that “it has become clear that migration is difficult if not impossible to fully control” and is definitely continuing (15). Traditional ethnic nationalist responses to immigration have typically led to further chaos and conflict, creating alternative challenges to the realization of nationalist interests

(Kymlicka, 15). Adopting a civic nationalist approach to immigration is a new way for national minority groups to survive in the modern day. Since they cannot control or fight back against immigration, national minorities must look how they can accept and integrate foreigners into their nation (Kymlicka, 15). As

Jeram describes, it is a way of “adapting and changing their values to obtain broad support and maintain distinctiveness from the state identity” (4). By broadening the way the minority group identifies, it allows the immigrants to integrate into the culture, effectively increasing the minority’s numbers as well as resources and power to mobilize in order to protect and promote their distinct identity (Gans, 165).

Sub-state nationalists can use immigration to their own advantage. They are able to pursue their nationalist interests while accommodating immigration, ensuring their survival into the future. Sub-state nationalism and immigration are more than compatible when a civic nationalist approach is applied.

The state must play a part in helping to motivate national minorities to adopt a civic nationalist approach. This is crucial to ensure the compatible existence of sub-state nationalism and immigration within a state as well as the overall stability of the state. Though the state may not want to encourage the development of national minorities, this is crucial to ensure its wellbeing. Charles Leddy-Owen emphasizes that “[negative] perceptions of immigration […] are contributing to an economically troubled and socially divided society, thus undermining the trust and social bonds required for a functioning, potentially progressively minded national polity” (343). Not all national minorities currently appeal to a civic nationalist approach. Salvador Cardus I Ros emphasizes the necessity of helping society view immigration as a “memory place” rather than something to fear. To allow minorities to see immigration as an opportunity, he explains the state must enable “the transformation of immigration into a ‘memory 25

place’ […] into a sort of ‘origin’ insofar as the society takes ownership of it” (42-43). He envisions the idea of immigrants as ‘foreigners’ be replaced with them as “founding members”, integrated into the minority culture that originally sees them as threats (43).

Let us look at the examples of Quebec and Catalonia to further explain. Quebec, Canada is home to a distinctive historically French minority that has long asserted and fought for their right for self-determination and to protect their culture. In recent years, they have been taking advantage of increasing immigration to further build their “distinct society” (Kymlicka, 12). In the process, Quebec has reshaped its national identity to be more inclusionary towards immigrants, thus adopting a civic nationalist approach. Jeram writes, “Quebec nationalism overcame its early ethnocentric character and redefined the boundaries of the nation to allow for the inclusion of immigrants without French ancestry”

(15). Since the 1970s, they have pursued a policy of “interculturalism” that seeks to affirm and accommodate other ethnocultural identities as long as they abide by several shared principles, such as respecting the French language and liberal values like democracy and civil rights (Kymlicka, 12). They have been successfully influencing the integration of immigrants into their minority culture through avenues such as making French the public language of Quebec, thus encouraging foreigners to learn their language. Kymlicka explains Quebec has been given substantive control over the integration of immigrants, which has been the key to the successful existence of minority nationalism and immigration within Canada. Many immigrants now consider themselves Quebecois and practice the minority culture at home, such as speaking French (Kymlicka, 14). He writes, “control over immigration is one of the powers

Quebec nationalists have sought and gained, and the province administers its own immigration programme, actively recruiting immigrants” (12). This allows the Quebec minority to grant immigrants citizenship, help immigrants easily integrate into their culture, and increases both minority and immigrant participation in public institutions−a seeming win−win for both groups (Kymlicka, 12). ​ ​ ​ ​ Catalonia has taken a similar path towards the reconciliation of immigration with sub-state 26

nationalism. Catalonia has always had a high immigration rate (Kymlicka, 13). The Catalan people, though once opposed and were hostile towards the entrance of foreigners into their state, have realized the advantages immigration offers. Immigrants are now welcomed and encouraged in an effort to modernize and allow Catalonia to progress. Salvador Cardus I Ros writes, “without immigration, Catalonia would potentially have suffered economic decadence, cultural irrelevance, and political non-existence” (38). Just like Quebec, the Catalan people have been given control over policy initiatives aimed at encouraging immigrant integration (Ros, 38). This has allowed them to protect their national culture and identity in the face of immigration (Ros, 41). Realizing immigration is an advantage not a threat has helped both national minorities and the state progress and modernize in both Quebec and Catalonia’s cases as well as countless other states.

The best way for the state to encourage this civic nationalist mindset is through policies that allow the minorities more direct control over immigration. This will help prevent radical ethnic nationalist sentiments from arising, instead encouraging the adoption of a civic nationalist approach (Kymlicka, 18).

Furthermore, as Chaim Gans reminds readers, national minorities’ right to self-determination is often already recognized within a state (174). The right to self-determination ensures the right to protect their distinctive identity however they see fit, thus they should have some say influence in controlling the influx of a foreign population that has proven to be a threat in various ways to their culture (Gans, 174).

As Kymlicka suggests, the national minority must have control over the volume of immigration (18). This ​ ​ will ensure the number of immigrants will not overwhelm the ability of the minority to successfully integrate them. It is also important to rectify historical instances where the state encouraged immigrant settlement on the land of the national minority (Kymlicka, 18). Furthermore, the national minority should have control over the terms of integration (Kymlicka, 19). Certain policies may be necessary to ensure the ​ ​ immigrants do integrate into minority culture, such as offering public services or schooling only in the minority’s language (Kymlicka, 19). For example, Quebec’s strict language laws encourage immigrants to 27

learn the minority language as it makes it clear this is the main public language. The minorities are best equipped to know which policies would be most effective and thus should have the main control over their creation and implementation. Instilling policies that allow the national minority to have direct control over immigration encourages their adoption of a civic nationalist approach as well as ensures the compatibility of immigration and sub-state nationalism within the same state.

It is worth noting that one may object that such policies may be illiberal. This may offer national minorities the opportunity to pass discriminatory policies that harm and unfairly target immigrants. Even

Kymlicka recognizes there is a dilemma, as he acknowledges “such illiberal policies may be required if national minorities are to integrate immigrants successfully” (20). For instance, in Quebec, many commentators applaud Quebec for ridding themselves of an ethnic definition of nationhood, yet they criticize their policies on education and language as being illiberal (Kymlicka, 22). But, at the end of the day, this may be the cross we must bear in order to reconcile sub-state nationalism with immigration. The alternative ethnic nationalist approach national minorities may take has historically proven to spawn further conflict and chaos. Ethnic nationalism is extremely dangerous and we should do all we can to disarm it. We may have to sacrifice the liberalness of state policies in order to prevent the unrest that will likely arise without the adoption of a civic nationalist approach, but it is worth it to prevent ethnic nationalism. With that being said, just as Kymlicka acknowledges, we must also consider to what extent a policy in question violates the liberal norms (22). Such difficult considerations should be left up to the individual state government on a case-by-case basis. As long as the sacrifice of the liberal norm is outweighed by the consequences ethnic nationalism can have, then such policies should be allowed to ensure the harmonious existence of sub-state nationalism and immigration within a state. If we accept this, then we can accept that sub-state nationalism and immigration are indeed compatible.

In conclusion, I maintain that sub-state nationalism and immigration can definitely be compatible within a sate. We have looked at the tenuous relationship between two and how immigration is seen as a 28

threat to national minority interests. I presented the view that national minorities always turn to dangerous ethnic nationalism in response to this perceived threat, making the two always incompatible with each other. However, I then explained how this view is mistaken, as many national minorities are adopting a civic nationalist approach in order to recognize and use immigration as an advantage. I presented the examples of Quebec and Catalonia to further explain. Finally, I discussed the important role the state must play in encouraging minorities’ civil nationalist approach by allowing them more direct policy control over immigration. I also briefly considered the objection that such policies may be illiberal, arguing that we must sacrifice some liberal norms in order to prevent the disastrous consequences of an ethnic nationalist approach from arising. Currently, not all sub-state nationalists take a civic nationalist approach to welcome and encourage immigration into the state. However, it is clear that the possibility to reconcile sub-state nationalism with immigration is possible. In order to prevent further chaos and destruction, fostering a civic nationalist approach is essential to ensure the wellbeing of the immigrants, national minority, and state as a whole.

Works Cited:

Kymlicka, Will. "Immigrant Integration and Minority Nationalism." Minority Nationalism and the ​ xxxxxxxChanging International Order (2001): 1-30. Print. ​ ​

Jeram, Sanjay. "Immigrants and the Basque Nation: Diversity as a New Marker of Identity." Ethnic and ​ xxxxxxxRacial Studies 36.11 (2012): 1-19. Print. ​ ​

Leddy-Owen, Charles. "Liberal Nationalism, Imagined Immigration and the Progressive Dilemma." The ​ 29

xxxxxxxPolitical Quarterly 85.3 (2014): 340-47. Print. ​ ​

Gans, Chaim. "Nationalism and Immigration." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1.2 (1998): 159-80. ​ ​ xxxxxxxPrint. ​

Ros, Salvador Cadus I. “Reflections on the Bi-Cultural Experience, Immigration, and National Identity in xxxxxxxCatalonia.” International Journal of Iberian Studies 18.1 (2005): 37-44. Print. ​ ​ ​

The Fateful Fifty-Two: How the American Media Sensationalized the Iran Hostage Crisis

30

Monica L. Coscia Boston College A&S Honors ‘17 Political Science Major, History Minor [email protected]

Abstract: This paper assesses how the American media’s coverage of the 1979 Iran Hostage Crisis irrevocably impaired Iran’s reputation in the eyes of the United States. The media’s portrayal of the hostages as hopeless victims and all Iranians as radical and violent jihadists created an us-versus-them dichotomy that colored the American public’s perception of the event. This discourse explains that Western media bias and emotional, ethnocentric coverage depicted the hostage crisis as a tragedy in which Iran was the sole perpetrator and the United States was blameless—triggering a visceral response of xenophobia and nationalism. It also analyzes how the hostage crisis was the impetus that sparked the deterioration of U.S.-Iranian diplomatic relations that persists today.

“This is an ABC News Special: The Iran Crisis,” Ted Koppel intoned ominously on

35 December 1, 1979, “America Held Hostage: Day 26.” Throughout the 444 days that fifty-two

Americans were held hostage in Iran, Koppel announced on his ABC news program Nightline ​

35“‘Nightline’ Archive: America Held Hostage,” ABC News, accessed December 5, 2015, ​ ​ http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/video/iran-crisis-america-held-hostage-9049607. 31

exactly how many days had passed since the seizure of the American embassy in Iran. For over a year, the American public fixated its eyes on the crisis in Tehran, and what was once a country that barely received a fleeting glance from the United States would become the eternal recipient of its chilling glare. During these months, the United States “existed on two calendars, with the

36 number of days in captivity superimposed over the Gregorian dates.” When it comes to the

Middle East, contemporary Americans tend to make the generalization that it is a region of conflict and controversy due to media coverage of select, isolated incidents, and view the component countries in a negative light. American public opinion has consistently and vehemently opposed Iran since 1980, with a disapproval rating that has unfailingly hovered

37 between seventy-five and ninety percent for the last few decades. Although disdain for Iran is the result of a conglomeration of events, the Iran hostage crisis of 1979-1980 is the event that sparked this undeniable display of American contempt. The brutality and obstinacy of the hostage crisis had an irreversibly damaging impact on Iran’s reputation in the United States and the rest of the international community, both in the short-term and to the present day; this discourse will analyze the causes, content, and consequences of the media coverage that triggered this damage.

Before delving into the media coverage of the complex event, it is imperative to briefly provide a background of the events surrounding the Iran hostage crisis. A long-term cause of the hostage crisis was heightened anti-American sentiment in Iran, due to the United States’ constant political, diplomatic, and economic intervention in Iranian affairs that Iran perceived as

36 Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, ​ 1945–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 208. ​ 37 “Iran.” Gallup, accessed December 5, 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116236/iran.aspx. ​ ​ 32

38 imperialistic and colonial in nature. Two specific instances of American interference that

Iranians were most livid about were the 1953 coup, in which the United States overthrew the democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadeq in favor of the monarchical Reza Shah, and the

39 acceptance of the same shah into the United States for medical treatment in 1979. The latter cause was the precise impetus for the seizure of the United States embassy, although there had

40 been anti-American demonstrations around the embassy prior to its takeover. President Carter allowed the overthrown shah to receive medical treatment for his leukemia in a New York hospital on October 22, 1979, and Iran took revenge on the United States just thirteen days later.

41 On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranian students from various universities stormed the

American embassy in Tehran, a location they perceived as “an enemy foothold behind the lines of the revolution,” and took its occupants hostage. Although the hostage-takers released thirteen women and African Americans two weeks later, fifty-two Americans remained hostages for over

42 a year. The United States attempted negotiations with Iran that proved futile, and the American

43 military enacted a rescue mission that miserably failed. On January 20, 1981, just minutes after

President Ronald Reagan was inaugurated, the hostages were released and flown back to the

44 United States. Throughout the 444 days of captivity, journalists and reporters transmitted each development of the hostage crisis to televisions, radios, and newspapers across the United States

38 Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 9. ​ ​ 39 Ibid. 40 John Skow, “The Long Ordeal of the Hostages,” Time Magazine, January 26, 1981, ​ ​ http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,954605,00.html. 41 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, “Iran Hostage Crisis,” Encyclopedia Britannica, June ​ ​ 6, 2014, http://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-hostage-crisis 42 Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran (London: Penguin Books, 2013), 172-3. ​ ​ 43 Ibid., 176. 44 Axworthy, 205. 33

and the rest of the world, thus transforming the embassy occupation into an international humanitarian crisis. As a result, the fifty-two individual hostages became what Nightline deemed ​ ​ 45 an entire nation held hostage.

The first area of analysis in the media coverage of the Iran hostage crisis is the reason why the American press was so preoccupied with the crisis and how it became the driving force of marring Iran’s reputation in the United States. Broadly speaking, the American media has a keen tendency to overgeneralize news stories, especially when dealing with emotional crises and/or situations in foreign countries; this is because generalizations make sense of complex, foreign situations that Americans could only understand by entirely immersing themselves in

46 another culture. Since the Iran hostage crisis was undoubtedly both a foreign and an emotional situation, the media generalized: it portrayed the entire country of Iran as violent based on the actions of the student hostage takers. Iran, through the eyes of the United States, was no longer a

47 nation, but a breeding ground for radicalism, extremism, Islamism, and anti-Americanism.

Another reason why the media shaped the public opinion against Iran was that there was little to no coverage in the press about Iran prior to the hostage crisis. The hostage crisis was, essentially, the only event that Americans at the time associated with Iran, because it was the only occurrence of the media extensively covering an Iranian event. Therefore, the media

48 singlehandedly filled the public’s void of ignorance about Iran with antagonism.

Perhaps the most influential reason that the American media was primed to defame Iran

45 “‘Nightline’ Archive: America Held Hostage.” 46 William A. Dorman and Mansour Farhang, The U.S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the ​ Journalism of Deference (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 196. ​ 47 Ibid., 156. 48 Ibid., 230. 34

is because any media source is necessarily informed by the ideology of its home country, and the time-honored values of the United States are deeply rooted in its media coverage. Its press coverage is inherently ethnocentric and views events in other countries through the lens of its own liberal, democratic, and free ideals. American journalists “saw Iran through an ideological and cultural haze that distorted the motives of the Iranian people and legitimized the motives and

49 behavior of the shah.” Due to the closely held American value of the separation of church and state, the fact that Americans were taken hostage as part of a radical, religious movement was harshly unpalatable to the American public. Because secularism drives American politics and the coverage thereof, American citizens were predisposed to have a visceral aversion to the leakage

50 of religious motivation into political or military endeavors. The American press exploited the dichotomy between the United States’ deeply beloved secularism and Iran’s theocracy to create an “us versus them” scheme to distance Iran from the United States and deem the latter superior

51 logically and governmentally. Furthermore, Americans did and continue to place a significant amount of trust in their media, usually accepting news articles and television reports at face

52 value. Overall, the American media’s tendencies of generalizing, failing to cover any foreign events if they do not pose a threat to the United States, covering international events through an ideologically biased lens, and status as a repository of its citizens’ trust set the stage for an irrevocable disparagement of Iran in every outlet of communication.

Consistent with the press’ tendency to generalize, the American media picked and chose

49 Ibid., 165 50 Elizabeth Shakman Burd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton: ​ ​ Princeton University Press, 2008), 102. 51 Ibid., 107. 52 David Patrick Houghton, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis (Cambridge: ​ ​ Cambridge University Press, 201), 2. 35

the most emotionally provocative tidbits of the Iran hostage crisis to characterize the entire situation as an international humanitarian debacle. This coverage, in turn, spawned a generalized image of the entire Iranian populous that will later be discussed at length. Early on in the 444 days, the mass media turned an impersonal number, fifty-two, into fifty-two humanized individuals: the hostages became “innocents abroad, caught up in the violence of a chaotic

53 revolution, simple victims of unscrupulous Islamic fanatics.” For example, in December of

1979, the New York Daily News and Newsweek published articles about each of the fifty-two ​ ​ ​ ​ 54 hostages that featured pictures of each person and a humanizing biography about him or her.

Then, as soon as the reports from the Tehran embassy rolled in, media coverage took a turn for the gruesome. Newspapers and television shows reported the everyday routines of the hostage-takers and hostages to evoke sympathy, detailing how the hostages were blindfolded,

55 beaten, handcuffed, interrogated, and isolated. The first time that the news media displayed footage of a hostage was when several American television networks broadcast “film of hostage

Jerry Miele…being led blindfolded to the front gate of the embassy, where the bloodthirsty

56 crowd vented its rage from behind the tall iron gate.” Another example of a widely publicized hostage horror story was the mock execution of Al Golacinski, John Limbert, and Rick Kupke:

“[They]were awakened in the middle of the night, forced to strip to their underwear and

marched to a room in the basement where their guards made it seem they were about to

be executed by firing squad. The guards fired their weapons, but they were not loaded.

Then the guards laughed. Why did they do it? Limbert said it was because ‘they thought

53 David Farber, Taken Hostage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 153. ​ ​ 54 Ibid. 55 Axworthy, 171. 56 Bowden, 189 36

57 it would be fun.’”

Moreover, the Edmonton Journal and CBS News ran another story of terror about how the hostage-takers played Russian roulette with two female hostages in an effort to extract more

58 information from the hostages. Some hostages also reported that they were handcuffed or tied

59 to tables for hours at a time. Michael Metrinko, a young embassy officer, spent most of the 444 days in solitary confinement, was beaten for insulting Khomeini, and was kept handcuffed for

60 over three weeks--another horror story broadcast to the news media. Stories like these

61 countered the Iranian contention that the hostages were treated humanely and justly. Although newspapers and radios circulated endless coverage about the hostage crisis, television was the most effective method in communicating the brutality of the hostage-takers and rousing the

American public, as it disseminated a “constant torrent of demeaning images and disturbing

62 rhetoric from this obscure and exotic land,” to concoct a “story made for television.”

Americans responded to this coverage with a “fierce, even xenophobic nationalism and

63 emotional bond to their fellow Americans held captive in Iran.” They came to perceive Iranians as merciless, evil violators of human rights who were unjustly punishing innocent citizens. The

United States could not separate this situation from its commitment to individual rights, and could not reconcile the inhumane treatment of the hostages with their belief that no one should

57 Susan Chun, “Six things you didn’t know about the Iran hostage crisis,” CNN, July 16, 2015, ​ ​ http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/27/world/ac-six-things-you-didnt-know-about-the-iran-hostage-cri sis/. 58 “Russian roulette played with hostages,” Edmonton Journal, January 21, 1981, ​ ​ https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=hfhkAAAAIBAJ&pg=6225,19155. 59 Ibid. 60 Axworthy, 171-2. 61 Chun. 62 Bowden, 196. 63 Farber, 152. 37

receive cruel and unusual punishment nor punishment without a fair trial and due process. The media purposefully chose to focus on “soft news” or emotional accounts that would aggravate the American public, rather than more technical reports about the negotiations between the

United States and Iran, as these traumatizing, pathos-laden stories made for more interesting news than ordinary politics ever would.

In addition to broadcasting the stories of the hostages themselves, American television networks further investigated the lives of the fateful fifty-two by interviewing their family members as another tactic to generate sympathy for the hostages and empathy for their loved ones. The media reports ignored the fact these hostages were professional embassy employees and agents of the United States government, instead emphasizing their role as “a fellow citizen, a

64 regular American with fearful parents, an anxious spouse, and scared children.” The kin of hostages became regulars on the nightly news, lamenting the struggles of not knowing what kind of torture their loved ones were experiencing and when they would ever come home: “Every

6566 word they uttered, every tear they shed, was suddenly news.” As soon as the identities of the hostages were released, the national issue became localized, as hundreds of city television stations descended upon the sixty-six neighborhoods of the original group of hostages. The

American public related to the hostages who had families, hometowns, and hobbies--just like

67 they did!--and became emotionally invested in the crisis. Wives and mothers watched new footage of the hostages in front of the news cameras, and often broke down and wept for the

64 Ibid., 153 65 Bowden, 191. 66 Ibid., 244. 67 Ibid., 190. 38

68 entire nation to see. The Washington Post ignited a national movement when Penne Laingen, ​ ​ the wife of hostage Bruce Laingen, announced that she “tied a yellow ribbon round the old oak tree” in her yard in accordance with the 1973 hit song; once this story hit the mass media, yellow

69 ribbons appeared all over the country as a symbol of solidarity with the hostages. The media portrayal of the hostages as ordinary family members rather than government officials resulted in a “widespread public misunderstanding of American foreign policy,” as the media led the

American public to believe that the hostage crisis was an attack on American families rather than

70 backlash against our political system that oppressed that of Iran for decades.

Despite that the coverage of the hostages and their families was integral to provoking an emotional response from the American populous, the reportage of the Iranian people complemented this depiction by making the hostages look even more like helpless victims of extremism and terrorism. Countless television stations featured footage of Iranian protestors thrusting anti-American posters into the air, burning the American flag, and shouting “Death to

71 America!” Networks frequently featured footage of mobs rallying outside the embassy both

72 before and during the hostage crisis, and their anti-Americanism was palpable. Additionally, televisions, as well as newspapers and radio, used specific terminology to pigeonhole the captors as the enemy. Instead of referring to them as students, the media labeled them as militants, extremists, radicals, and Islamists--classifications that carry provocative and adverse connotations. It is also imperative to note what the United States press ignored in its

68 Ibid., 191. 69 Farber, 152-3. 70 McAlister, 208. 71 Farber, 2. 72 Ibid., 12. 39

preoccupation with the fanaticism and fundamentalism of the hostage crisis: the mass media made no clear effort to understand the true motivations of the student-captors, nor the broader

73 revolution. As such, Americans failed to realize that the actual reason Iranian students took over the embassy was because they were overwhelmed by their frustration at the United States for supporting a leader they despised and for overthrowing a leader they supported a few decades

74 earlier. Because the Iranian Revolution that produced the crisis advocated for the dreaded mix of religion and politics, and because the media harbored rampant journalistic ethnocentrism,

Americans would have refused to accept the part their own government played in the hostage

75 crisis, placing every ounce of the blame for the tragedy on Islamic radicals. In summation, the

American media “[persuaded] Americans to see themselves as victims of ‘terrorists’ who irrationally hate ‘us,’ rather than to recognize that Iranians had attacked the U.S. embassy in

76 response to American policy in Iran.”

Another important component of the content that the American media presented was thorough and frequent coverage of the Ayatollah Khomeini as a symbol and figurehead of the

Islamic radicalism that the hostage crisis epitomized. After Khomeini announced that he supported the students and their takeover of the embassy, he became a prominent scapegoat for

77 the hostage crisis and the recipient of American hatred and disgust. A few days after the embassy takeover, Khomeini gave a speech encouraging “‘all grade-school, university, and theological students to increase their attacks against America,’” and the United States was

73 Dorman and Farhang, 174. 74 Ibid., 156 75 Ibid. 76 Farber, 154. 77 Bowden, 555. 40

78 justifiably frightened and angered by this statement. The American public perceived him as “a

79 crazy fanatic living in a time warp” who irrationally hated the United States.” His religious dress and long beard, pictures of which were featured in American newspapers and television,

80 epitomized the stereotype of a religious, Islamic extremist. Khomeini seemed to stand for everything the United States opposed--anti-Americanism, theocracy, religious fanaticism, rejection of the international system and the concept of the nation-state, support of the hostage crisis, and his call for universal Islamism--and media sources capitalized on the contrast between

81 his religious extremism and American ideals of freedom and democracy. As a result, the

United States felt genuinely threatened by him, an “irrational and even insane figure,” and the

82 power he exerted over a significant portion of his country. His statement that the hostage crisis was not a struggle between two nations, but rather “a struggle between Islam and blasphemy”

83 particularly insulted and infuriated the United States. The fact that the hostage crisis, at its forefront, featured a visible and striking leader who was easy to stereotype and despise played an important role in the media’s sensationalizing of the Iran hostage crisis.

Now that this discourse has established the causes and content of American media coverage of the hostage crisis, it can assess the consequences that this journalistic assault on Iran had on its reputation in and relationship with the United States. The United States media irreparably damaged Iran’s reputation through coverage of the hostage crisis in its failure to

78 Ibid., 14. 79 Farber, 2. 80 Ibid., 147 81 R. K. Ramazani, Independence Without Freedom: Iran’s Foreign Policy (Richmond: ​ ​ University of Virginia Press, 2013), 77. 82 Houghton, 66. 83Ramazani, 81. 41

bridge the “cultural gap” between the two nations. The mass media let the situation’s capacity to

84 become a tragic news story get the best of it, sacrificing concrete news for emotionalism. In the defense of the media and the American public, however, the coverage that characterized the hostages as innocent and the captors as evil was not executed with purely malicious motives--the hostage crisis undoubtedly possessed emotional pull, and Americans were justified in their

85 frustration at the Iranian students who captured their fellow citizens. Nevertheless, the fact that the media portrayed all Iranians through the lens of an offensive stereotype--radical Islamic jihadists clad in long beards and chadors who irrationally hate the United States and burn our flag--is less justified.

The American press coverage of the hostage crisis suffered from a serious case of

86 Western bias, falling victim to the “conventional Western equation of Islam with extremism.”

The press was unable to separate militarism and violence from Islamism, and oversimplified the

87 Muslim faith into a proclivity to “mix faith with politics, and to express both through violence.”

In emphasizing the innocent humanity of the American hostages, the media unfairly denied the captors their of their own humanity--although taking people hostage is morally incorrect, it is unfair to dismiss the students and Iranians in general as irrational and blindly motivated for their

88 religion when they were advocating for a cause in which they firmly believed. These Iranian student-captors were fighting for their freedom from imperialism--something the United States supports, in theory--and the embassy was a symbol of everything the revolution wanted to

84 Farber, 7. 85 Ibid. 86 Houghton, 53. 87 Burd, 108. 88 Houghton, 53. 42

89 eradicate. The American media, both unable and unwilling to understand why Iran would reject such sacred institutions of secular, modern democracy, classified the revolution as “an irrational backlash against a generous fatherly attempt to spread modern ways of life and to defend the

90 Iranians from communism.” The press also failed to acknowledge that not all Iranians supported the seizure of the embassy--in fact, Iranian Prime Minister Bazargan demanded the hostages’ immediate release as it violated international law and “the civilized practices of

91 diplomacy,” but he was entirely ignored and subsequently resigned. It is clear that Iran violated the human rights of the American hostages, and their brutality and violence remain unjustified, but it is wholly unfair to dismiss their entire revolution as radical fanaticism.

There are several tangible ways in which the United States manifested its negative perception of Iran. One instance is the fact that the Iran hostage crisis was a major factor in

President Jimmy Carter’s downfall. Despite his tremendous diplomatic and military efforts to rescue the hostages, American discontent with Iran was so pernicious that citizens made a

92 scapegoat of Carter and took out their frustration in domestic polls. Another instance occurred on May 17, 1979, when the United States Senate passed Jacob Javitz’s resolution condemning

Iran for its human rights violations, a blatant manifestation of the government’s dissatisfaction

93 with Iran’s refusal to release the hostages. Furthermore, after the failure of the rescue mission, the United States military set up a Counterterrorism Joint Task Force, demonstrating how it

94 viewed Iran’s seizure of the embassy as synonymous with terrorism. The formal responses by

89 Bowden, 4. 90 Burd, 109. 91 Axworthy, 169. 92 Axworthy, 178. 93 Robert Wright, Our Man in Tehran (New York: Other Press, 2010), 96-97. ​ ​ 94 Axworthy, 179. 43

the United States also conveyed Iran’s damaged reputation. Most obviously, the economic sanctions, freezing of Iranian assets, banning the import of Iranian oil, and the break of diplomatic relations with Iran displayed governmental condemnation that, in turn, spawned

9596 civilian condemnation. Overall, the hostage crisis “triggered the American containment policy

97 toward the revolutionary regime economically, politically, and militarily.” Also, the United

States supported Iraq in its war against Iran but condemned Iraq for invading Kuwait just a decade later, then entered into a war in Iraq within the next--clear evidence of American desire to

98 invoke revenge on Iran. In 1982, distrust towards Iran resulted in the United States suspicion

99 that Iran assisted in the Beirut suicide bombings. The United States also put significant pressure

100 on other nations to cease diplomacy with Iran. It continues to harbor suspicious tensions towards Iran to the present day, the origins of which lie in the embassy seizure: “Memory of the

101 hostage crisis and the failed rescue has poisoned US-Iran relations ever since.” For example,

President George W. Bush’s inclusion of Iran in the Axis of Evil less than a decade ago

102 evidences the deep distrust the United States harbors towards Iran. The hostage crisis also damaged Iran’s reputation internationally. In addition to general estrangement from the international community, transnational organizations issued formal disapprobation against Iran.

The United Nations Security Council condemned Iran’s human rights violations in a December

1979 resolution, and the International Court of Justice issued a Provisional Order and Judgement

95 Axworthy, 176. 96 Donald E. Nucchterlein, A Cold War Odyssey (Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1997), 311. ​ ​ 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Axworthy, 178. 102 Burd, 102. 44

103 that demanded Iran release the hostages immediately. The damage to Iran’s reputation was thus not limited to the United States.

The Iran hostage crisis of 1979 to 1981 irreversibly impaired Iran’s reputation in the eyes of the United States, as well as the rest of the world, both immediately and in the long term. The importance of the American media in marring Iran’s image cannot be overstated. Its tendency to generalize and view foreign events through the lens of liberal, secular, Western democracy primed the press to disseminate defaming coverage about the hostage crisis. The media’s decision to publish individualized horror stories of the hostages and the sob stories of their families was intended to evoke emotion and sympathy throughout the United States, and this tactic was effective in igniting the public’s rage. The resulting image of Iran was a stereotype of the entire nation as anti-American, radical, and extremely religious, and this still lingers in the

United States’ relationship with Iran; this damaged image was evident in the American responses to the crisis. Seeing as how weighty friction and hostility persists between the United States and

Iran today, studying the origins of this tension is undoubtedly a worthy endeavor.

103 Ramazani, 77.

45

Bibliography

Axworthy, Michael. Revolutionary Iran. London: Penguin Books, 2013. ​ ​ Bowden, Mark. Guests of the Ayatollah. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006. ​ ​ Brown, Harold. Star Spangled Security: Applying Lessons Learned over Six Decades ​ Safeguarding America. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2012. ​ Burd, Elizabeth Shakman. The Politics of Secularism in International Relations. Princeton: ​ ​ Princeton University Press, 2008.

“Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran.” International Court ​ of Justice. December 15, 1979. http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=331& ​ code=usir&p1=3&p2=3&case=64&k=c9&p3=5

Chun, Susan. “Six things you didn’t know about the Iran hostage crisis.” CNN. July 16, 2015. ​ ​ http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/27/world/ac-six-things-you-didnt-know-about-the-iran-host

age-crisis/.

Dorman, William A. and Mansour Farhang. The U.S. Press and Iran: Foreign Policy and the ​ Journalism of Deference. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987. ​ The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. “Iran Hostage Crisis.” Encyclopedia Britannica. June 6, ​ ​ . http://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-hostage-crisis.

Farber, David. Taken Hostage. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. ​ ​ 46

Houghton, David Patrick. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis. Cambridge: ​ ​ Cambridge University Press, 2001.

“Iran.” Gallup. Accessed December 5, 2015. http://www.gallup.com/poll/116236/iran.aspx. ​ ​ Kinzer, Stephen. “Inside Iran’s Fury.” Smithsonian Magazine. October 2008. ​ ​ http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/inside-irans-fury-11823881/?no-ist.

Koppel, Ted. “30 years after the Iran hostage crisis, we're still fighting Reagan's war.”

Washington Post. January 21, 2011. ​ http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012102914.

html.

McAlister, Melani. Epic Encounters: Culture, Media and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, ​ 1945–2000. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. ​ “‘Nightline’ Archive: America Held Hostage.” ABC News. Accessed December 5, 2015. ​ ​ http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/video/iran-crisis-america-held-hostage-9049607.

Nucchterlein, Donald E.. A Cold War Odyssey. Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1997. ​ ​ Ramazani, R. K.. Independence Without Freedom: Iran’s Foreign Policy. Richmond: University ​ ​ of Virginia Press, 2013.

“Russian roulette played with hostages.” Edmonton Journal. January 21, 1981. ​ ​ https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=hfhkAAAAIBAJ&pg=6225,19155

Skow, John. “The Long Ordeal of the Hostages.” Time Magazine. January 26, 1981. ​ ​ http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,954605,00.html.

Wright, Robert. Our Man in Tehran. New York: Other Press, 2010. ​ ​

47

48

The Salience of Masculinity in 1960 Presidential Campaign Rhetoric

Joshua Ferno Elon University

December 8, 2016

Abstract

The presidential election of 1960 occurred as the United States approached the height of a period of cultural anxiety referred to as the “masculinity crisis.” During this time, the masculinity of young American men became a point of concern as questions were raised about their perceived weakness relative to those in the east. This study explores the potential impact of that cultural context on the outcome of the narrowly-won 1960 election. Using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count software, standardized “masculinity quotients” from each candidate were compared using gendered linguistic standards established by Newman et al. (2008) and a formula to 49

quantify linguistic masculinity derived from Slatcher et al. (2007). Results reveal that Kennedy’s rhetoric was significantly more masculine in linguistic style than Nixon’s, indicating that voters’ appraisals of the candidates were likely influenced by their perceptions of the men’s masculinity, which may have affected the election’s outcome.

Introduction

The presidential election of 1960 brought about a major augmentation to the landscape of

American politics at a unique juncture in the country’s history. From the unprecedented nature of

John F. Kennedy’s victory as the first Roman Catholic and youngest elected U.S. president, to the utilization of television as a new medium of broadcasting debates, the race between JFK and 50

Richard Nixon played host to a significant shift in the culture of American political identity.

Given that neither Kennedy nor Nixon was an incumbent commander-in-chief in 1960, the process of evaluating each man’s presidential candidacy (Nixon was already prominent as VP) ​ ​ relied heavily upon the public’s appraisal of personality characteristics during the campaigning process.

A key component of the collective American identity that rose to the forefront of many discussions during this Cold War period was masculinity. Concerns about the perceived decline of hegemonically masculine traits among males of the up-and-coming generation grew parallel to the generalized fear of the encroachment of communism upon the United States. The media capitalized on this anxiety, as television shows like The Flabby American brought attention to ​ ​ the issue and millions of help-books, pamphlets, magazine articles, and educational videos were distributed to instruct parents and children alike on how to improve their sedentary lifestyles for

104 the good of the country. Perhaps the most crucial item of discussion during this heightened period of gendered physical awareness was the public release of statistics granting legitimacy to fears of the unthinkable inferiority of western bodies. A number of major news outlets publicized that nearly one-third of Vietnam draftees called up between 1950 and 1957 were deemed “unfit for combat” and sent home, and that 57.9% of American children failed to meet minimum standards on the Kraus-Weber physical fitness test while only 8.9% of European youth failed to

105 do so. These facts, and the insecurity that accompanied their publication, formed the basis of what historians and sociologists have dubbed “the American masculinity crisis” - a period of

104 Jeffrey Montez de Oca, “As Our Muscles Get Softer, Our Missile Race Becomes Harder”: Cultural Citizenship ​ and the “Muscle Gap”. Journal of Historical Sociology, 18 (2005): 145–172. ​ ​ 105 Jeffrey Montez de Oca, “As Our Muscles Get Softer, Our Missile Race Becomes Harder”: Cultural Citizenship ​ and the “Muscle Gap”. Journal of Historical Sociology, 18 (2005): 152–154. ​ ​ 51

reckoning for the superiority complex the country clung to so fiercely in the face of communist opposition in the Cold War.

Kennedy and Nixon’s race for the presidency happened to play out as tensions rose to their peak in the American masculinity crisis, as measured by the large volume of references to it

106 in the media. Therefore, it stands to reason that on a conscious or subconscious level, the

American electorate was not simply considering policy stances and past experience when appraising the nominees, but also which man would serve as a more powerful role model for the young men of America who appeared to be in desperate need of a classically masculine figure to rally around.

Literature Review

There is no shortage of academic interest in studying the social construction of gender.

Erving Goffman initiated the push for greater study on the subject when he adapted the theatrical term “dramaturgy” in 1959 to the field of sociology in one of the field’s most seminal works - ​ ​ The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. The dramaturgical, or social constructivist, theory ​ presented there has become the basis of modern progressive thought regarding the practice of labeling people on the basis of race, gender, sexual orientation, etc., as it declares that such classifications exist only as a result of socially ascribed norms to which people feel inclined to conform for the sake of social acceptance rather than as reflections of individuals’ natural

107 predispositions. In keeping with this principle, scholars have operationalized the concept of gender in a wide variety of ways to examine how different individuals go about expressing

106 Jeffrey Montez de Oca, “As Our Muscles Get Softer, Our Missile Race Becomes Harder”: Cultural Citizenship ​ and the “Muscle Gap”. Journal of Historical Sociology, 18 (2005): 150-152. ​ ​ 107 Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (United States: Overlook Press, 1974). ​ ​ 52

gender-associated traits, as well as how definitions of masculinity and femininity differ across

108 cultural contexts. Although politicians’ performance of gender has been covered to some degree by past researchers, a large majority of the published works on the topic lean more toward speculative, narrative approaches rather than adhering to a concrete method of analysis, making

109 many previously drawn conclusions somewhat shaky. Furthermore, there has not been a single quantitative study published on masculinity in the campaign rhetoric of the 1960 election, leaving a gap in the body of research that can be filled using recently developed linguistic analysis tools.

The Expression of Masculinity

Research has shed light on the more nuanced aspects of gender’s social construction that go beyond conventional wisdom, indicating that while there are numerous ways to perform gender, they are viewed as either more or less desirable depending on the cultural context. A study by Wetherell and Edley produced a model of the psychological processes that accompany the outward expression of masculinity, including the hegemonic conformist they refer to as the

“celebrated and exalted hero.” This model was that sought by the anxious American population in the election of 1960, as it stands for the very tenets of hardened American masculinity that

108 Rosemary Ricciardelli et al., "Investigating Hegemonic Masculinity: Portrayals of Masculinity in Men’s Lifestyle Magazines." Sex Roles 63, no. 1-2 (2010): 64-78; Virginia E. Schein, Ruediger Mueller, Terri Lituchy, and Jiang ​ ​ ​ Liu, "Think Manager -- Think Male: A Global Phenomenon?" Journal of Organizational Behavior 17, no. 1 (1996): ​ ​ 33-41; Yue Tan et al., "The Construction of Masculinity: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Men’s Lifestyle Magazine ​ Advertisements." Sex Roles 69 no. 5-6 (2013): 237-49. ​ ​ 109 Emma Cannen, “US and Venezuelan Presidential Masculinities in the First Decade of the 'war on Terror'” Doctoral thesis, University of Technology, Sydney (2013): 1-255; A. J. Moore and D. Dewberry, "The Masculine Image of Presidents As Sporting Figures: A Public Relations Perspective." SAGE Open 2, no. 3 (2012); Mysha R. ​ ​ Whorley and Michael E. Addis. "Ten Years of Psychological Research on Men and Masculinity in the United States: Dominant Methodological Trends." Sex Roles 55, no. 9-10 (2006): 649-58. ​ ​ 53

110 appeared to have begun eroding. The high levels of interpersonal variability in how masculinity is expressed and perceived is mirrored in media studies of how masculinity is expressed in men’s lifestyle magazines, which emphasize how the general priorities of a group or subgroup (in this case, the American electorate) shape its perceptions of appropriate performance of gender, supporting the assertion that 1960 U.S. citizens would have responded most positively to an example of hegemonic masculinity rather than an equally masculine candidate who

111 performs gender in a non-conformist way. A similar study on lifestyle magazines by Tan et al. solidifies this conclusion in its clear indication that the desired masculine archetype is dependent

112 upon cultural - and therefore, historical - context.

Masculinity and Perceived Leadership Capability

A large body of scholarly research has found a strong correlation between the performance of masculinity and perceptions of effective leadership. Virginia E. Schein summed up the prevailing stereotype with her 1996 article, “Think Manager - Think Male,” in which she concluded that “successful middle managers possess characteristics, attitudes and temperaments more commonly ascribed to men” based on responses to a 92-item index questionnaire. This trend was observed consistently across cultures in Japan, China, Germany, Great Britain and the

113 United States, typically with a stronger presence among male respondents than females.

Another study conducted by Lord et al. used meta-analysis to assess leadership emergence

110 Margaret Wetherell and Nigel Edley, "Negotiating Hegemonic Masculinity: Imaginary Positions and Psycho-Discursive Practices" Feminism and Psychology 9 no. 3 (1999): 335-356. ​ ​ 111 Rosemary Ricciardelli et al., "Investigating Hegemonic Masculinity: Portrayals of Masculinity in Men’s Lifestyle ​ Magazines," Sex Roles 63, no. 1-2 (2010): 64-78. ​ ​ 112 Yue Tan et al., "The Construction of Masculinity: A Cross-Cultural Analysis of Men’s Lifestyle Magazine Advertisements." Sex Roles 69, no. 5-6 (2013): 237-49. ​ ​ 113 Virginia E. Schein, Ruediger Mueller, Terri Lituchy, and Jiang Liu, "Think Manager -- Think Male: A Global ​ Phenomenon?" Journal of Organizational Behavior 17, no. 1 (1996): 33-41. ​ ​ 54

among a gender-diverse pool of subjects using six scaled categories, including a measure of masculinity which was defined as aggressive, decisive, and/or unemotional behavior. Results indicated that these masculine traits were positively associated with positive perceptions of

114 leadership capabilities. These findings were later called into question by Epitropaki and

Martin, who used a similar set of scales to determine the desired qualities of a prototypical leader. Contrary to the findings of prior research, their results indicated that the expression of masculinity in leadership appeared to be closely related to that of tyranny, both of which made up their concluded model of the anti-prototypical leader. This anomalous finding may be indicative of changing U.S. paradigms of gender, but more likely is a result of the characterization of masculinity within the study’s questionnaire, which intentionally separates the trait from those of strength, dedication, and charisma - traits often thought of as the more favorable aspects of a masculine personality - which were found to be very desirable in leaders.

115

Masculinity and Perceptions of Effective Governance

Lord et al. makes the important distinction that masculinity has not been empirically tied to above-average performance in leadership roles, but rather with the expectation of quality ​ ​ ​ ​ performance, which supports the notion that it would play an important role with undecided

116 voters, particularly within the historical context of the American masculinity crisis. Research

114 Robert G. Lord, Christy L. de Vader, and George M. Alliger, "A meta-analysis of the relation between ​ personality traits and leadership perceptions: An application of validity generalization procedures," Journal Of ​ Applied Psychology 71, no. 3 (August 1986): 402-410. ​ 115 Olga Epitropaki and Robin Martin, "Implicit Leadership Theories in Applied Settings: Factor Structure, ​ Generalizability, and Stability Over Time," Journal Of Applied Psychology 89, no. 2 (April 2004): 293-310. ​ ​ 116 Robert G. Lord, Christy L. de Vader, and George M. Alliger, "A meta-analysis of the relation between ​ personality traits and leadership perceptions: An application of validity generalization procedures," Journal Of ​ Applied Psychology 71, no. 3 (August 1986): 402-410. ​ 55

by Smith, Paul, and Paul corroborates this assertion of the importance of masculinity particularly for presidents in a 2007 study exploring disparities in attitudes toward voting for women for federal-level legislative seats versus voting for a woman in a presidential election. They found that while respondents responded similarly to identical credentials assigned to simulated male and female candidates for a Senate seat, the same test produced significantly different results when replicated with simulated presidential candidates. The results showed that the male-named candidate presented was consistently scored higher on a scale of presidential potential, whereas the female or androgynous-named candidates were more likely to be regarded as “very

117 unskilled.” One could predict that these results would be even more protracted in 1960, given the documented shift in public opinion toward a more egalitarian view of female candidacy for president as evidenced by a study of mid-19th century Gallup polls by Ferree and General Social

118 Survey data.

The historical context of the 1960 election is especially important when considering the potential competitive edge for the presidential candidate who was perceived as more masculine.

As the forces of communism moved closer to home with Fidel Castro’s rise to power in Cuba in

1959, anxiety built over the potential for nuclear or armed conflict with the new Soviet auxiliary.

The perceived threat of terror provided a basis for American citizens to hold such a preference for a more masculine presidential candidate, as is substantiated by the findings of Rosenwasser and Dean in 1989. Their study on perceptions of gender in relation to the political office

117 Jessi L. Smith, David Paul, and Rachel Paul, “No Place for a Woman: Evidence for Gender Bias in Evaluations ​ of Presidential Candidates.” Basic and Applied Social Psychology 29, no. 3 (August 14, 2007): 225–33. ​ ​ 118 Myra Marx Ferree, "A Woman for President? Changing Responses: 1958-1972." The Public Opinion Quarterly ​ ​ 38, no. 3 (1974): 390-99; Tom W. Smith, Peter V. Marsden, and Michael Hout, 2011. General Social Survey, 1972-2010 Cumulative File. ICPSR31521-v1. Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center. Distributed by Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. 56

concluded that a major reason cited by those preferring a male over a female president (who

119 made up the vast majority of respondents) is the perceived superior ability to handle terrorism.

The increased threat of such an attack from Cuba, then, would have heightened the perceived need for a more masculine (therefore, perceived as capable) figure in charge. The prevalence of the masculinity crisis that characterized this time also points to the need for a strong masculine example for the country, as is asserted by the work of Jeffrey Montez de Oca, which provides greater perspective on the extent to which the masculinity crisis was perpetuated within the media. Coding newspaper and magazine articles to identify references to the crisis, he found that it was referenced both explicitly and indirectly in both forms of writing, meaning that citizens received consistent reminders of the deficient masculinity of the country, likely reaffirming their

120 resolve to elect a president that could alleviate it.

Linguistic Analysis of Masculinity in Political Rhetoric

Studies have empirically evaluated the presence of such expression in political rhetoric, both in terms of how candidates express gender in their campaign advertisements as well as how politicians speak about terrorism. The former study, conducted by Kahn in 1993, centered on content analysis of campaign advertisements for senatorial races in the 1980s. Its results indicated that masculinity is consistently a strong theme across advertisements for men and women, and that attacking the opposing candidate was more typical of female candidates, perhaps suggesting that the quiet confidence inherent in not doing so is an important aspect of a

119 Lindsey M. Rosenwasser and Norma G. Dean, "Gender Role and Political Office" Psychology of Women ​ ​ Quarterly 13 no.1 (1989): 77-85. ​ 120 Jeffrey Montez de Oca, “As Our Muscles Get Softer, Our Missile Race Becomes Harder”: Cultural Citizenship ​ and the “Muscle Gap”. Journal of Historical Sociology, 18 (2005): 145–172. ​ ​ 57

121 candidate’s masculinity. The latter study, conducted by De Castella and McGarty in 2011, focused specifically on political speeches on terrorism and enemies characterized as the ideological “other”. Although its content sample is limited to post-9/11 rhetoric, the relevance of its focus to studies on the Cold War is evident. The findings reflect that fear-mongering and eliciting anger from audiences are used at different rates among executives, but that such themes are very prevalent in rhetoric on the subject, which can be attributed to the desire for a strong, aggressive (hegemonically masculine) leader when confronted with terrorism and threats to a

122 national identity, at least as perceived by those in office. Coe et al. took a more focused approach to analyzing surface-level trends in political rhetoric following 9/11, coding public addresses for elements such as “discursive control” and “strength masculinity” and reporting

123 results similar to those of De Castella and McGarty.

Aside from the overt themes analyzed in political rhetoric, a more comprehensive method has developed that allows researchers to determine, on a very subtle level, how closely one’s speech aligns with a given gender identity and apply it to political discourse. A comprehensive analysis of over 14,000 samples of text was analyzed by Newman et al. using a computerized language processor known as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software to reveal gendered differences in expression patterns on the level of frequency of each part of speech,

124 average word and sentence length, and frequency of referral to different themes and feelings.

121 Kim Fridkin Kahn, "Gender Differences in Campaign Messages: The Political Advertisements of Men and Women Candidates for U. S. Senate." Political Research Quarterly 46, no. 3 (1993): 481. ​ ​ 122 Krista de Castella and Craig McGarty, "Two Leaders, Two Wars: A Psychological Analysis of Fear and Anger ​ Content in Political Rhetoric About Terrorism." Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 11, no. 1 (2011): ​ ​ 180-200. 123 Kevin Coe, David Domke, Meredith M. Bagley, Sheryl Cunningham, and Nancy Van Leuven, "Masculinity as Political Strategy: George W. Bush, the ‘War on Terrorism,’ and an Echoing Press." Journal of Women, Politics & ​ Policy 29, no. 1 (2007): 31-55. ​ 124 Matthew L. Newman, Carla J. Groom, Lori D. Handelman, and James W. Pennebaker, "Gender Differences in ​ Language Use: An Analysis of 14,000 Text Samples," Discourse Processes 45, no. 3 (2008): 211-36. ​ ​ 58

This baseline allows future researchers to apply the findings and the software to specific contexts, like that of an election, to determine how closely an individual adheres to his or her gender in terms of language use. Slatcher et al. did just that when analyzing the presidential and vice-presidential candidates from the 2004 election between Bush/Cheney and Gore/Edwards, applying the LIWC program to quantify several variables in each’s rhetoric by devising simple formulas from LIWC output to produce quotients for each candidate representing qualities like

125 cognitive complexity, depression, and femininity.

Findings indicated that Edwards and Cheney were the most and least feminine candidates, respectively, and that Bush and Kerry did not differ significantly, although Bush did receive a slightly higher score for femininity. These findings cannot be construed as a major indicator of masculine linguistic style as a perennial mark of winning candidates, but they would not discredit such a hypothesis. More importantly, they allow for an altered replication of the methodology (to quantify masculinity rather than femininity) to be performed on other elections, which would be expected to have different results given the essential nature of the cultural and historical context surrounding the perceived salience of masculinity.

Current Study

The current study seeks to build upon the existing scholarly discourse on the association between masculinity and perceptions of leadership and political capability by testing its applicability to real-life voting behavior in the context of the 1960 presidential election. Using the gender-separated results of Newman et al.’s LIWC analysis of over 14,000 text samples as a

125 Richard B. Slatcher et al., "Winning Words: Individual Differences in Linguistic Style among U.S. Presidential ​ and Vice Presidential Candidates." Journal of Research in Personality 41, no. 1 (2007): 63-75. ​ ​ 59

baseline for how masculinity is expressed through language, this study will provide a new, quantitative take on a substantial body of academic work focused on the social construction of

126 gender and lend credit to the practical significance of studies on the matter.

The public’s prioritization of masculinity, produced by the unique social climate created by the masculinity crisis in the U.S. at that time, creates the ideal setting for this type of historical audit. So high a premium was likely never placed on masculinity to justify a potential conclusion of such factors as those measured in this study to be capable of influencing an election outcome. While there is no clear way of estimating how much voters’ decisions relied upon appraisals of masculinity, Kennedy’s narrow win in the popular vote by just over 112,000 votes indicates that any number of secondary factors could have swung the election. Thus, a significantly higher level of embodiment of hegemonically masculine linguistic traits from

Kennedy could be construed as a swing-factor that helped him win the presidency. The research hypothesis tested in this study asserts that John Kennedy’s campaign rhetoric exhibited higher levels of masculinity than that of Nixon’s, therefore lending him more credibility as a solid masculine figure to guide the country and helping him to win the election. It will also explore whether the linguistic traits of each candidate were consistent across debates and speeches, as the extemporaneous and competitive nature of debate relative to pre-written, rehearsed nature of speeches would likely produce significant differences.

Methodology

To evaluate the masculinity of each candidate’s campaign rhetoric, transcripts of debates

126 Matthew L. Newman, Carla J. Groom, Lori D. Handelman, and James W. Pennebaker, "Gender Differences in ​ Language Use: An Analysis of 14,000 Text Samples," Discourse Processes 45, no. 3 (2008): 211-36. ​ ​ 60

and speeches from each were systematically processed using a computer-based linguistic analysis program. Transcribed text for the four major presidential debates were retrieved from an online database maintained by the Commission on Presidential Debates, and transcripts of campaign speeches were drawn from the archives of the American Presidency Project (APP) hosted by the University of California, Santa Barbara.

Debate texts were cut to remove speech by other parties and sorted to group statements by the candidate that made them. The candidates’ samples were then processed separately through the linguistic analysis program. Of the campaign speech texts available in the APP archives, those selected were chosen because they contained at least 5 mentions of the USSR and/or communism - topics that would have been the most closely scrutinized for masculine presentation by viewers of the time due to the insecure state of the U.S. in the midst of the masculinity crisis. Speeches were chosen at random from the database and screened to verify that they met minimum requirements until five such examples were found from each candidate. The speech transcripts were then combined into two separate files, each containing the five speeches from a single candidate, and processed separately through the linguistic analysis program.

Chosen Speeches

John F. Kennedy Richard Nixon

Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, Speech of Vice President Richard M. Nixon, Democratic Rally, George Washington High Waikiki Shell, Honolulu, HI School Stadium, Alexandria, VA August 4, 1960 August 24, 1960

Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, VFW Speech by the Vice President, National Guard Convention, Detroit, MI Armory, Rockford, IL August 26, 1960 September 22, 1960

Statewide TV Speech of Senator John F. Speech by the Vice President Before the Kennedy, Zembo Mosque Temple, Harrisburg, Association of Business Economists, Vanderbilt PA Auditorium, New York University, New York, 61

September 15, 1960 NY October 20, 1960

Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, American Speech of the Vice President at Muhlenberg Legion Convention, Miami Beach, FL College Gymnasium, Allentown, PA October 18, 1960 October 22, 1960

Speech of Senator John F. Kennedy, Chicago Speech of the Vice President, War Memorial Auditorium, Chicago, IL Auditorium, Rochester, NY November 4, 1960 November 1, 1960

The texts were analyzed using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software program developed by Dr. James Pennebaker. The settings of the program were adjusted to evaluate the transcripts for a specific set of variables based on those used in an equation

127 developed for a similar study conducted on rhetoric in the 2004 presidential election. Based on standardized, gendered means for over 80 linguistic dimensions established by the findings of a

2008 study, researchers were able to operationalize femininity in rhetoric and measure it using

128 LIWC output.

Output scores from candidates’ rhetoric were converted to z-scores, which measure the number of standard deviations above or below a given mean, and compared to the mean found for the general male population to evaluate each candidate’s level of divergence from the population norm within the linguistic dimensions. Each candidate’s score, henceforth referred to as his “masculinity quotient,” was calculated using this formula:

Masculinity quotient = zsixltr + znegate + zarticle + zpreps + zswear + zmoney + ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ znumbers - zother - zposfeel ​ ​ ​ ​ ​

LIWC Variable Name Meaning/Example

127 Richard B. Slatcher et al., "Winning Words: Individual Differences in Linguistic Style among U.S. Presidential ​ and Vice Presidential Candidates." Journal of Research in Personality 41, no. 1 (2007): 63-75. ​ ​ 128 Matthew L. Newman et al., "Gender Differences in Language Use: An Analysis of 14,000 Text Samples." ​ Discourse Processes 45, no. 3 (2008): 211-36. ​ 62

sixltr Words with six or more letters negate Ex. no, not, neither article Articles preps Prepositions swear Swear words money Ex. cash, taxes, income numbers Specific mention of number(s) other (recoded in LIWC 2015 as “they”) Ex. they, their, them posfeel Ex. happy, joy

The formula was created by negating the values in the previously mentioned femininity equation for which Cronbach’s alpha score, a statistical measure of internal reliability used with multivariate analysis, was .89 (.65 is the generally accepted minimum score for a reliable scale).

Because the variables used to determine femininity were chosen simply for the large discrepancy between the mean values for males and females, this method of negating them is methodologically sound because of the relative, two-way (gender binary) nature of the data.

Based on previous scholarship establishing the link between performance of masculinity and the perception of effective leadership coupled with the social context of the U.S. masculinity crisis nearing its peak in 1960, one could logically hypothesize that Kennedy’s victory in the

1960 election can be (at least) partially explained by his greater embodiment of hegemonically masculine linguistic traits relative to those of Nixon in their public debates and campaign speeches. Higher levels of masculinity would have been well-received by the public given the increasing anxiety over proliferation of media attention on the masculinity crisis at the time and 63

would have resulted in more favorable appraisals of Kennedy not only as a president, but as a more powerful force to combat the softness that threatened the integrity of the United States.

Analysis

LIWC analysis of the four presidential debates and each candidate’s five chosen speeches revealed a number of similarities and significant differences between the linguistic styles of

Kennedy and Nixon. It also revealed multiple areas in which both candidates diverted very ​ ​ strongly from the established population mean. Swear words were omitted from analysis when it was confirmed that neither candidate used one in any of the selected transcripts.

Table 1. Means, Z-Scores, and Masculinity Quotients for all Texts Variable Name Male Population All Nixon Text (z) All Kennedy Text (z) 129 Mean (SD) sixltr 15.25 (5.91) 19.32 (.68) 19.80 (.77) negate 1.72 (1.17) 1.62 (-.09) 1.63 (-.09) article 6.70 (2.94) 8.05 (.46) 9.01 (.79) preps 12.88 (2.64) 14.91 (.77) 14.30 (.54) swear .17 (.44) 0 0 money .29 (.49) 1.35 (2.16) 1.39 (2.24) numbers 1.59 (1.55) 1.49 (-.06) 2.80 (.78) other 2.74 (3.01) .94 (-.60) .87 (-.62) posfeel .51 (.65) 3.26 (4.23) 3.04 (3.89)

Masculinity Quotient: .29 1.76

129 Matthew L. Newman, Carla J. Groom, Lori D. Handelman, and James W. Pennebaker, "Gender Differences in ​ Language Use: An Analysis of 14,000 Text Samples," Discourse Processes 45, no. 3 (2008): 219-20. ​ ​ 64

As shown in Table 1, the candidates scored very similarly in their use of negating words,

“other” words, and mentions of money. The LIWC program found that Kennedy used articles at a higher rate than Nixon, an indication of greater linguistic masculinity. Nixon’s greater volume in use of prepositions, however, counters that difference as such is also a trait of masculine speech. The overall masculinity quotient difference can be largely attributed to discrepancies in the use of words with six or more letters, mentions of numbers, and allusions to positive feelings, all of which gave him a comparative advantage in regards to the embodiment of hegemonically male linguistic traits (“posfeel” is subtracted in the MQ equation, meaning that Kennedy’s lower score in that metric contributed to his higher MQ). The large disparity between the overall masculinity quotients lends support to the research hypothesis, as such a significant difference very likely would have been perceptible to the public as they appraised the personality characteristics of each candidate, with a high priority placed on impressions of their masculinity.

One thought-provoking feature of the data in Table 1 is the very large break from the established male population means for both candidates regarding mentions of money, and the even greater disparity seen in the allusions to positive feelings in their rhetoric. While the former could likely be accounted for in consideration of the content at hand - discussion of the economy, cost of war efforts, and other such money-centric topics would naturally be more pertinent to campaign speeches and debates than to normal conversation - the latter is, perhaps, less commonsense in its explanation. The variable “posfeel”, which both candidates scored highest on in z-score measurements, is negatively associated with masculinity. In addition to that, Nixon ​ ​ and Kennedy both scored in the range of four standard deviations removed from the mean.

Statistically speaking, that would place both candidates above the 99th percentile in terms of 65

positive feeling word usage.

There are a few simple factors that could account for the remarkably high rates of positive feeling word usage in these instances. On one hand, it may be reflective of a specific message the candidates were trying to convey in their word choice. Positive feelings words may have been chosen strategically when discussing expectations for their own presidency or their qualifications in order to frame them in an appealing light for audiences. There is also a potential element of control embedded in the intentional use of such words, in the sense that the speakers could be attempting to convey an ability to produce positive results, but a close reading of the texts for the context of such words would be necessary to support that.

Aside from the possibility of the context and the intentions associated with the texts being responsible for the enigmatically high “posfeel” rates, the cause could potentially stem from a limitation of the method used. There is a possibility that the previous research used as a base male population mean to compare the candidate means against is not perfect for this study, given that it may not be reflective of the pervasive linguistic trends of males in 1960, but trend toward reflecting more recent ones. However, it seems highly unlikely that such a discrepancy between time periods would only be so visibly pronounced in only a single variable. All explanations are worth consideration for such a highly irregular value, though, and more discussion on the potential limitations of LIWC measurement in this study can be found in the conclusion.

Differences in Speeches and Debates

The results become more varied and complex when the speech and debate transcripts are processed separately. Debates were found to be overwhelmingly more masculine in linguistic style than speeches based on the specific metrics analyzed by the LIWC program in accordance 66

with the prior scholarship. While this finding adds an interesting degree of nuance to the results of this study, it does not detract in any way from support lent to the research hypothesis asserting that Kennedy’s greater exemplification of masculine norms aided his campaign because he scored significantly higher in both categories.

Table 2. Means, Z-scores, and Masculinity Quotients for all Texts, Separated by Debates and Speeches Variable Male Nixon Nixon Kennedy Kennedy Name Population Debates (z) Speeches (z) Debates (z) Speeches (z) 130 Mean (SD) sixltr 15.25 (5.91) 19.43 (.71) 19.23 (.67) 19.81 (.77) 19.77 (.77) negate 1.72 (1.17) 1.71 (-.01) 1.54 (-.15) 1.49 (-.20) 1.85 (.11) article 6.70 (2.94) 7.97 (.43) 8.11 (.48) 9.10 (.81) 8.87 (.74) preps 12.88 (2.64) 14.67 (.68) 15.10 (.84) 14.01 (.43) 14.75 (.71) swear .17 (.44) 0 0 0 0 money .29 (.49) 1.37 (2.20) 1.33 (2.12) 1.83 (3.14) .70 (.84) numbers 1.59 (1.55) 1.68 (.06) 1.33 (-.17) 3.15 (1.01) 2.24 (.42) other 2.74 (3.01) .78 (-.65) 1.08 (-.55) .70 (-.67) 1.15 (-.53) posfeel .51 (.65) 2.59 (3.20) 3.80 (5.06) 2.92 (3.71) 3.23 (4.18)

MQ: 1.52 -.72 2.92 -.06

One could take a number of angles to explain potential causes of the stark discrepancy between the linguistic qualities of campaign speeches and debates. One such explanation could simply be found in the origins, so to speak, of each type of rhetoric. Whereas debates are more extemporaneous and unrehearsed in their nature, campaign speeches are pre-written, oftentimes

130 Matthew L. Newman, Carla J. Groom, Lori D. Handelman, and James W. Pennebaker, "Gender Differences in ​ Language Use: An Analysis of 14,000 Text Samples," Discourse Processes 45, no. 3 (2008): 219-20. ​ ​ 67

not by those delivering them. Essentially, this discrepancy could potentially have little to do with

Nixon and Kennedy, themselves, but rather the staffers or groups of staffers that penned their campaign speeches. While both nominees scored below the population average in terms of the masculinity quotient associated with their selected campaign speeches, Nixon was rated significantly lower in this measure (-.72.) than Kennedy (-.06).

While it is unclear who oversaw speechwriting for Nixon’s 1960 campaign, there is historical context to support that Ted Sorensen would have been largely responsible for writing and approving Kennedy’s. Sorensen, a close friend and advisor to Kennedy who served on the

Executive Committee of the National Security Council during the Cuban Missile Crisis, was best

131 known as the President’s primary speechwriter. It can logically be concluded, then, that all campaign speeches would have crossed his desk for editing and approval even if they were not personally written by him. Because the background of Nixon’s speeches is unclear in this respect, it does leave open the possibility that the very low relative masculinity quotient of his speeches relative to his own debate rhetoric and all of Kennedy’s texts could be accounted for by significant female influence over the writing of his speeches.

In any event, differences within the debate texts are likely more important to outcome of the election (and as an extension, this study) for several key reasons.

1. Debates are viewed by much larger audiences than campaign speeches.

The national audience afforded by television and radio broadcasts allowed for the four presidential debates to reach much further to capture public attention than campaign speeches conducted in school gymnasiums and armories. While some of the latter may have been

131 Obituary of Theodore Sorenson, The Guardian, November 1, 2010, online edition. ​ ​ 68

broadcasted to audiences greater than just those physically in attendance, they still would not have come anywhere close to the 60.4-66.4 million viewers that tuned in to watch the televised

132 debates. Therefore, the above-average masculinity levels in the debates, and the discrepancy between them that appears to have given Kennedy a significant edge, are more valuable and telling with regards to the purpose of this study.

2. Debate listeners were more likely to be truly undecided voters than those attending campaign

events.

Campaign events including the types of rhetorical speeches pertinent to this study were likely attended by voters with a particularly high level of interest/support for the speaking candidate, whereas the four presidential debates would have been viewed by citizens with allegiances across the entire political spectrum. While some speeches do not necessarily fit this conclusion, such as Nixon’s speech to the Association of Business Economists, the majority of them were not geared toward a politically-diverse group. Rather, they were open for attendance to interested members of the public, which would likely have been mainly comprised of supporters. Therefore, the masculinity quotients associated with debates would be more meaningful because the debates were more likely to reach undecided voters who could have been swayed by differing levels of masculinity.

As previously stated, some of the speeches made by either nominee on his campaign trail may have been broadcast to larger audiences. However, as that information is not available in the database from which the speeches analyzed here were selected, its potential implications must be noted only as possibilities.

132 Commission on Presidential Debates, "1960 Debates," CPD, 2015, accessed December 07, 2016. 69

3. The nature of debate is more conducive to the type of critical personality appraisal (esp. of

masculinity) voters would base decisions on.

In addition to the higher likelihood of impressionable voters viewing debates relative to campaign speeches and higher overall viewership, one could also contend that the nature of debate is more likely to produce the comparative evaluation of candidates’ masculinity than witnessing one-sided speech. The presidential debates in question allow for direct comparison of candidates. Not only is this significant because the manifest purpose of debate is to compare candidates, but also because the subtle nature of the linguistic differences this study evaluates would likely play a larger role in candidate appraisal when viewers are exposed to it in the back-and-forth banter of debates than in the completely separate listening sessions characteristic of campaign speeches.

On a related note, the competitive spirit of debate could also could elicit a greater amount of attention from viewers to the masculinity of each candidate. Because audiences often try to determine a “winner” of each presidential debate, 1960 viewers would have been actively looking for qualities that gave either candidate an edge. With the masculinity crisis hanging overhead at the time, audiences would have been looking for indicators of masculinity and may have keyed in on the candidates’ differing exemplification of hegemonically masculine traits in their speaking patterns.

Discussion

Overall, the results clearly indicate that John F. Kennedy displayed much higher rates of masculine linguistic traits than Richard Nixon in the rhetoric associated with the 1960 70

presidential election. This comparative advantage was found to be consistent when debate texts were processed through the LIWC program separately and when entered as a single body of text.

This supports the research hypothesis claiming that Kennedy’s victory in the election could be partially attributed to his relatively greater embodiment of masculinity through his rhetoric. The disparity in masculinity quotients was found to be very significant between the nominees. Given that the margin of victory for Kennedy was so slim (app. 112,000 votes), one can argue that his masculinity was well-received by Americans, who placed a high premium on that quality during the Cold War masculinity crisis, and gave him a more favorable appraisal from undecided voters, assisting in his victory.

The masculinity quotients of each candidate were not consistent across speeches and debates, as predicted by the secondary part of the research hypothesis. Speeches for both nominees scored significantly lower than their own debates, as well as below the population mean in terms of masculinity quotients. As discussed in the results section, this can be accounted for with several explanations. However, it does not affect the soundness of the conclusion to the primary research question as A) debates are logically more important to swaying voter opinion, especially within the context of this experiment, and B) Kennedy scored significantly higher than

Nixon in masculinity quotient in the results presented in both Table 1 and Table 2.

Conclusion

The results of this study offer a great deal of suggestion that American voters in 1960 responded to variance in masculinity between candidates in their voting decisions. While these results are very encouraging, perhaps the greatest limitation in this study is its inability to 71

determine how much of the voting behavior in the election was related to differing appraisals of

2 the candidates’ masculinity. A value similar to a statistical R ​ indicating that such differences ​ explained a significant portion of the voting behavior in 1960 could lend a great deal of credibility to its conclusions, but no such measure is available for this particular context. As a result, the substantial body of work detailing the magnitude of the masculinity crisis at this time in U.S. history will have to suffice as assurance that such factors were heavily considered by the public, as a result of fears that younger generations were growing increasingly “soft” and susceptible to the subversive power of communism.

Additionally, there is little research empirically suggesting that humans are consistently capable of picking up on particular trends in subtle linguistic patterns, like those used in this study to quantify masculinity. Although the masculinity quotient formula laid out in the methodology is sound, as shown by the Cronbach’s alpha test, the fact that it is a reliable measure does not necessarily mean that people can perceive these subliminal differences. While this study followed the trend of past scholarly articles analyzing linguistic traits in similar manners and took this point for granted, research specifically dealing with that cognitive process would be helpful in determining how far research of this type can presume to go.

Aside from the limitations associated with the general topics of this research, its design also had a few notable limitations. One such limitation is the study’s limited focus on the candidate appraisals of undecided voters, and the underlying assumption that the closeness of the final election results equates to the outcome having been determined to where those initially undecided votes fell. Considering that Nixon was already prominent as Vice-President, along with citizens’ allegiances to their political parties, several fringe factors aside from masculinity 72

could have affected how citizens voted and decided the election outside of major factors such as policy stances and past experience.

There are also limitations inherent in using the LIWC software to process the transcripts.

While the program serves the purpose of coding text infinitely faster than humans could, using it comes with the tradeoff of its blunt oversight or miscoding of certain words that may have multiple or alternative meanings based on context (i.e. “good” or “fine”). As previously stated, there is also the issue of measuring speech from 1960 against standards for the male population published in 2008. The 14,000 text samples combined to produce the gendered population means were gathered from samples used in 70 previous linguistic studies, and the time period(s) to

133 which those samples pertain is unclear. While there is discussion about age as a potential conditioning factor of some linguistic traits that may apply to this issue, there is no clarity of

134 protocol about how to control for it in other studies.

This research serves as a potential leaping-off point for future quantitative analyses on the cross-section of linguistics and public opinion - two independent academic areas of interest that have only seldom been considered as related variables. The possibilities of creating measurement scales using linguistic metrics are infinite, and this study could be replicated using other historical contexts in which a particular trait or value can be identified as particularly meaningful, as masculinity was in the 1960 United States, to analyze its interaction with public opinion and/or sociopolitical behavior. While the use of LIWC programming limits studies of this type to English-language text records, other linguistic processing engines could be

133 Matthew L. Newman, Carla J. Groom, Lori D. Handelman, and James W. Pennebaker, "Gender Differences in ​ Language Use: An Analysis of 14,000 Text Samples," Discourse Processes 45, no. 3 (2008): 211-36. ​ ​ 134 Richard B. Slatcher et al., "Winning Words: Individual Differences in Linguistic Style among U.S. Presidential ​ and Vice Presidential Candidates." Journal of Research in Personality 41, no. 1 (2007): 63-75. ​ ​ 73

substituted in its place to replicate such an experiment across cultures and lend credibility to the conclusions drawn in this study.

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Jibraan Mansoor

Obligations of Law: A Theory and Justification of Civil Disobedience

Introduction

Recently there has been a huge environmental and humanitarian cry about the growing climate changes and the implications of the same. Most of the politicians, legal institutions and individuals argue the need to prioritise environmental protection over other things. But when a group like Delta 5 resorts to civil disobedience to gain attention and highlight the issues with environmental laws, the same politicians and individuals demand the need for “law and order”; 76

the same legal institutions prosecute these groups in order to avoid “lawlessness”. Thus exactly at the moment when we begin to suspect the congealed injustices in the law and when we begin to take actions to change or highlight the fossilised structures present in the society, a cry of “law

135 and order” supersedes all our activities in most of the cases. It thus becomes imperative to justify the actions of such groups who work for the society’s benefits. Now even though justifying civil disobedience becomes easier in societies such as Nazi Germany wherein most of the laws were abhorrent and unjust, the issue arises when societies which are considered to be

136 fundamentally just, have certain unjust laws. The question thus arises that whether there is a prima facie obligation to obey all laws at all points of time and if not, can civil disobedience with certain characteristics be justified in a society?

Through the course of this paper I intend to answer this question further. The paper has been divided into two sections. The first section takes upon the task stipulate a definition of civil disobedience for the purpose of this paper and then specify some characteristics of the same. I spend a considerate amount of time on this phase since, the justifications I provide for these characteristics, themselves become an answer to various criticisms of civil disobedience. In the second phase, I will then try and justify civil disobedience using concepts of act utilitarianism, social contract and moral obligations.

Characteristics of Civil Disobedience

Unlike a revolutionary who intends to change or overthrow the civil body and bring about a change of the structure rather than in the structure, a civil disobedient understands his

135 Disobedience and Democracy: The Nine Fallacies on Law and Order, Howard Zinn 136 Should we ever disobey the law, Stephen Grant 77

obligations towards the legal system and merely intends to bring about changes in certain unjust

137 laws. So the definition of civil disobedience which I stipulate for the purpose of this paper

(using genus differentia method) is that “Civil Disobedience is the deliberate and public violation of law without the fear of a punishment which is done due to the moral obligations for the society and in order to maintain democratic ethos.” The concept of “democratic ethos” which I

138 refer to can be traced in Paul Fower’s work “Civil Disobedience as Functional Opposition”.

Now there are three important aspects of this definition which I intend to take up that would eventually help in developing my theory of civil disobedience. But before I explain these aspects,

I wish to notify the reader that the characteristics mentioned are not supposed to be taken as a universal theory for legitimising or de-legitimising the civil disobedience movements since most of the movements have to be justified contextually. Rather these characteristics merely serve the purpose of giving some basic understanding of civil disobedience movements which I intend to justify in the due course.

The first characteristic is the ambiguity in the definition on whether civil disobedience should be violent or non-violent. This I believe is one of the most important characteristic of civil disobedience movements as various political theorists including John Rawls stress on the

139 need for civil disobedience movements to be non violent. Now even though I agree with the theorists on the need for prioritising non violence over violent civil disobedient movements, but I believe a black and white characterisation of the same should not be in order. Through this I do

137 Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence: A Distinction with a Difference, Berel Lang 138 Civil Disobedience as Functional Opposition, Paul F. Power, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 1972), pp. 37-55, Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association 139 John Rawls, A theory of Justice 1971 78

not advocate the vindictive use of violence, rather argue that the effectiveness of a civil disobedient movement might require the disobedient to resort to violence from time to time. For example as seen in the case of Liberty City and South Central, the peaceful demonstrations were

140 largely ignored by the media and recognised completely ineffective. Another example of resorting to violence in order to maximise efficiency of the movement is given in Lang’s work

141 on Civil disobedience . He supposes the existence of a law of conscription which drafts men into the army but is inequitable in its formula for the process of selection and if the personal records used for the selection process were to be acquired by the citizens protesting, then it would be reasonable on the citizens part to destroy the records in order to maximise the efficiency of their movement. So the first principle to be taken into consideration while qualifying the validity of a violent civil disobedient movement is the principle of efficiency.

Preempting the criticisms of the principle of efficiency such as it becoming a tool for justifying any form and amount of violence, the second qualifier which I intend to add for justifying violent civil disobedience movements is based on the principle of proportionality see under International Humanitarian Law. Even though proportionality is considered to be an international relations principle but the idea behind it i.e. the harm done by the violent actions should be necessary and proportionate to or not in excess to the advantage gained, should be taken into consideration while qualifying the legitimacy of a movement. An important remark to be taken note of is that minimum threshold violence should be given priority in all cases of civil disobedience and proportionality should be kept only as a determinant for maximum possible violence allowed and and that too only if it becomes necessary . Due to limited space, I will not

140 When the Law is not One’s Own: A case for violent civil disobedience, Barbara La Bossier 141 Civil Disobedience and Nonviolence: A Distinction with a Difference, Berel Lang 79

be engaging in elaborating the exact method of determining proportionality in this discourse, but

142 an understanding of the same can be gained from Michael Newton’s work on proportionality.

Even though proportionality has not really been applied to cases of civil disobedience by political theorists, but the essence of the same can be understood using the example. Under the

Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, escaped slaves upon capture had to be returned to their masters and all free citizens had to cooperate with the same. So now if person X tried to let a slave escape and in the process of the same he has to punch the slaveowner to grant the slave the adequate time to escape, then person X would be a civil disobedient but he would completely morally

143 justified in using violence to help the slave escape. Essentially the proportionate attack would ​ maximise the efficiency of the morally justified civil disobedience. Hence as we have seen, justifying violent acts becomes more of a relational concept to the law as compared to an absolute concept of de-legitimising it and thus a more contextualised analysis of the same is necessary as compared to a simple black or white characterisation of calling all civil disobedient movements ill-legitimate.

The second characteristic which I shall be focusing about is the ambiguity in the definition on whether civil disobedience should remain as a last resort i.e. whether civil disobedience should only be followed if all legal redressal mechanisms have failed. Critics of

Civil Disobedience argue that a movement can never be justified if people have not used the mechanism available in the structure which can resolve the issue peacefully and lawfully even if done slowly. There are two major issues with this assertion. The first contention that this

142 Proportionality in International Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2014) , Ch 6 Michael Newton and Larry May 143 The Justifiability of Violent Civil Disobedience, John Morreall, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Mar., 1976), pp. 35-47 80

assertion seems reasonable only if those disobeying the law are fine with the prolonged delay specifically when the delay in remedy has already been excessive, and greater speed of action

144 through lawful channels seems extremely unlikely. Hence in the cases when judicial decisions take a lot of time, it may be justified to use civil disobedience as a tool to over turn imperative decisions. The second contention is that the assertion neglects the fact that civil disobedience movements themselves become a way of expediting legal decisions and without the expedited decision, great levels of unjust activities could take place as seen in the case of Vortkuta Prison

Camp in the summer of 1953 in the Soviet Union or the 1956 disorders in Ponzan, Poland

145 against the Polish laws. Hence in some scenarios civil disobedience becomes a tool to attain greater and faster justice.. Thus such movements may be justified in the cases where they have not been used as a last resort.

The third important assertion in the definition which becomes my responsibility to defend is the idea that the disobedient must be ready for punishments at all times. Now I wish to remind the reader that the notion of being ready for punishment is not the same as punishment being necessary for all cases of civil disobedience. Through this discourse I won’t be engaging into the latter issue, rather I will be justifying the need of the former by using Walzer’s concept of “moral

146 seriousness”. Now even though I understand that passing judgments on the movement by characterising the person can be reduced to being an ad hominem argument, but in this case the willingness and self sacrificial element of the civil disobedient to increase social utility in spite

144 DEFENDING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, Carl Cohen, The Monist, Vol. 54, No. 4, Legal Obligation and Civil Disobedience (October, 1970), pp. 469-487 145 Scholmer, Joseph 1954 Vorkuta. London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson ​ ​ 146 The Obligation to Disobey, Michael Walzer ,Source: Ethics, Vol. 77, No. 3 (Apr., 1967), pp. 163-175 Published by: The University of Chicago Press 81

of the punishment acting as a deterrent does speak for the good faith and imperative belief that the disobedient has for the law. The fact that civilly disobedient citizens might be punished not only contributes to the symbolic meaning and impact of their protest, but also acts as a built-in

147 disincentive to its commission. Yet again I realise that there have been cases wherein citizens have irrationally and publicly disobeyed laws out of self interest but there are fundamental distinctions in such cases as compared to the ones that I am talking about due to the concepts of morality and social utility which I shall argue in the next phase.

Justification of Civil Disobedience

At the beginning of this paper, I set out my thesis as determining whether there exists a prima facie obligation to obey laws at all points of time and if not can civil disobedience with certain characteristics be ever justified? Having justified some basic characteristics of civil disobedience, it now becomes imperative to justify the entire process of civil disobedience in a democracy. To do the same, I resort to three major concepts: 1) act utilitarianism 2) social contract theory and 3) moral obligations.

Act Utilitarianism

Act utilitarianism in its most naive understanding, is a principle of ethics which states that a person's act is morally right if and only if it produces some amount of greater good as

148 compared to any other act that the person could perform at that time.

147 Smith, William. “Civil Disobedience And The Public Sphere.” Journal Of Political Philosophy 19.2 (2011): 145-166. Academic Search Premier. Web. 28 Nov. 2013 148 Lyons, David. Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965, p. vii. ​ ​ 82

So a legitimate justification of civil disobedience under the umbrella of act utilitarianism would be if I am able to argue that civil disobedient acts, resolve democratic issues and promote efficient laws which I assume could be translated as being the greater good in the democratic society as compared to letting the democratic issues exists or having inefficient and unjust laws.

(Even though I will not engage in determining the characteristics of unjust laws through this discourse due to limited space, but to increase the ease in understanding the same, we can refer to the Letter from a Birmingham Jail which Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote. He said “An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St.

149 Thomas Aquinas, an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal and natural law.”)

Civil disobedience can be perceived as being a socially necessary function to correct various democratic deficits of a society. The idea and examples of various democratic deficits present with regards to the legislative system can be seen in Daniel Markovits work on

Democratic Disobedience. One of the reasons he gives for such deficits is that democratic deficits can arise because the very same procedures needed to generate a “sovereign will” are open to manipulation and abuse by special interest. For example if in a representative democracy, a determined faction gains majority and controls the legislature proceedings and outcome, then there is a huge chance of the faction imposing its preferences without regards to the preferences of others which might just go against the idea of liberal democratic structures. So essentially civil disobedience acts as a functional opposition and works towards reducing these democratic deficits by ensuring that a check on the legislations is maintained. In this discourse, I

149 Letter from a Birmingham Jail, Dr. Martin Luther King, 16 April 1963 83

will be highlighting two such examples in which civil disobedience manages to resolve democratic deficits.

First, I argue that in representative democracies, civil disobedience becomes a tool to manifest a better form of General Will which Rousseau has talked about in his work “The Social

Contract”. In his understanding of the procedure used to reach the General Will, men assemble together and have only one common will since the “common good makes itself so manifestly

150 evident”. Now, Rousseau while developing his theory on General Will thought of a direct democracy wherein men voted on legislations to manifest the purest form of general will. Now even though a reincarnation of direct democracy like that of Athens which Rousseau wanted is highly problematic in today’s world, let us assume that the best model which we can work with is that of a representative democracy. In a representative democracy, the biggest issue which arises is that a few politically motivated individuals vote on laws and this voting may be based on self interests. Rousseau highlights this point correctly, in his work, Histoire des Moeurs, ​ ​ wherein he says,"it will always be difficult to submit the dearest affections of nature to country

151 and virtue” and thereby agrees to the difficulty in eliminating particular wills. If the removal of particular wills is so difficult, making sure that votes are not manifested by self interests becomes highly problematic. Hence it is extremely possible that in a representative democracy, the ‘general will’ reduces down to being an amalgamation of a few particular wills.

The other way to put this issue of only having a few particular wills in representative democracies, is to argue the absence of a more wider view in the formation of laws. It is usually considered important that the net political system determines the parameters of systemic rule

150 The Social Contract, Rousseau 151 A Possible Explanation of Rousseau's General Will, Riley, p 94 84

making, application, and adjudication by means of constitution making and revision and most

152 importantly everyone’s (public) opinion. But this notion of public opinion playing an important role is not always carried forward as argued by Greenwalt who claims that in a representative democracy, our chances of influencing the legislature are extremely less and

153 highlights the same using certain examples. So in lieu of the importance of people’s opinion, civil disobedience then becomes one of the most effective and symbolic tools (considering the issues with legal mechanisms as highlighted in the previous section) to notify the government about the same.

Civil disobedience in such scenarios compels the legislators and the representatives to re-consider their laws, to take remedial actions and incorporate public views as a major consideration in the same. This idea can be seen using the case of the British Campaign for

Nuclear Disarmament (Referred to as CND). The CND in the early 1960s decided to act arbitrarily on the British Nuclear Deterrent. This was met with great reluctance from the public

154 as people frowned upon the negligence that CND showed towards people’s view. The

Conservative party’s actions were met with major skepticism for the same and the party took a huge hit in the elections of 1964. So the next time when the issue of NATO’s deployment of additional nuclear missiles on British soil was seen in the early 1980s, the CND was highly

152 Civil Disobedience as Functional Opposition, Paul F. Power, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Feb., 1972), pp. 37-55, Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science Association 153 Kent Greenawalt, "A Contextual Approach to Disobedience," in Political and Legal Obligation, ed. Pennock and Chapman (Nomos, XII), 332-369, 344. 154 James Hinton, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, in PROTEST, POWER, AND CHANGE, supra note 97, at 62, 63. See Also: Democratic Disobedience, Daniel Markovits, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 114, No. 8 ​ (Jun., 2005), pp. 1897-1952 85

considerate towards the indirect disobedience movements aimed against the policy and was even

155 seen endorsing such movements in the name of a healthy democracy.

Now, I am not arguing that whatever the CND did in 1960s was out of self interest, but the purpose of this example is to elucidate the idea that civil disobedience helps in avoiding certain particular wills of the people supersede the general will. So essentially the civil disobedience movements reduce the gap between the representative democratic structures and the citizens, and thereby push towards a better form of ‘general will’ by incorporating a more accepted view.

The second deficit that civil disobedience is able to rectify is the issue of unjust laws in a democracy. In a society, as soon as we consider the possibility of allowing unjust laws to strive, we implicitly recognise standards of justice external to the democratic political process. These external standards then become the grounds for disobedience to unjust laws, as the citizen stops

156 seeing any form or political or moral obligations in them. Historically we have seen civil disobedience being efficient ways in repealing or changing these unjust laws in a lot of cases.

This can be seen using the example of the anti-poll tax campaign of 31 March 1990. Various economists such as Charles Moore were seen arguing that this law was an unfair way of raising revenue for local councils as taxes were levied on houses as compared to individuals so essentially the he rates meant that someone living alone had to pay the same amount towards the

157 cost of local services as a multi-person household living next door. “In the case of the poll tax, a nationwide network of campaigns and non-payment unions had developed. These groups

155 PAUL BYRNE, THE CAMPAIGN FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 132 (1988) 156 Civil Disobedience, Rex Martin, Ethics, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Jan., 1970), pp. 123-139 157 Charles Moore (6 October 2015). Margaret Thatcher: The Authorized Biography, Volume ​ ​ Two: Everything She Wants. Penguin Books Limited. pp. 58–9. ISBN 978-0-241-20126-8. ​ ​ 86

brought people who were ordinarily isolated, or not politically active, together. Their strategy was to resist at every step: refusing to register for the tax, contesting liability orders from the

158 council (thus clogging up the legal system) and finally refusing payment.” Eventually the conservatives, were seen repealing off this unjust law. So civil disobedience essentially using the pressure of dissent made a statement which compelled the legislators to review their decision and hence was able to resolve the issue of unjust laws.

Apart from these, there are various other ways in which civil disobedience has been seen as an effective tool be it via increasing political participation or reducing the time gap in changing unjust laws. So under act utilitarianism, civil disobedience movements are justified since they help reach the greater goods for the society.

The Contractarian Justification

The traditional social contract theories have usually been attributed to Hobbes, Rousseau and Locke. There are two kinds of legal positivists views that we get from these traditional contractarians. The first is a Hobbesian understanding of civil disobedience. Hobbes in his

Leviathan rests extreme authority with the sovereign by arguing that disobedience shouldn't be given much priority as the citizens have consented to give up their major rights to the sovereign

159 while forming the contract. But historically as we have moved towards democratic structures, we have seen that at least in theory, the relations between the government and citizens, which

Hobbes has been talking about have not been so extreme. The second understanding is that of

Locke. Locke argues that the essence of the commonwealth is the preservation and protection of

158 Five examples of civil disobedience to remember, Richard Seymor, The Guardian 159 Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes 87

the citizens‟ lives, liberties and wealth.” That being the case for Locke, it is only logical that the

160 commonwealth losses its mandate as soon as it fails to keep to the dictates of the contract.

Therefore, Locke provides the first contractarian reasoning for justifying civil disobedience.

The second justification of civil disobedience movements using the social contract theory can be traced using the evolving concept of consent and agreement. Most of the traditional contractarians have used the term consent in evolving their theories. For example even Locke argued that “consent of free men” could make them members of government. “Now in the hands of these theorists—and in much ordinary discourse—the idea of “consent” implies a normative power to bind oneself. When one reaches “the age of consent” one is empowered to make certain

161 sorts of binding agreements—contracts.” So essentially consent creates various kinds of obligations in the social contract theory.

This notion of a consent based social contract seems to be evolving to an agreement based social contract at least theoretically as we start resting more agency with the citizens.

Contemporary social contract theorists such as Freeman, are seen employing the language of

162 agreement as opposed to consent. This notion of citizens having the agency to agree to certain laws, then makes us question the idea that there exists a blanket obligation to obey all laws. As

Lessnoff argues, the agreement in itself is not a binding act and doesn't create obligations but is

163 merely reason revealing.

160 UNJUST LAW AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, Arinze Agbanusi 161 D'Agostino, Fred, Gaus, Gerald and Thrasher, John, "Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . 162 id 163 id 88

Let us take now take the case of the Pentagon Papers which revealed that many lawmakers, let alone common citizens, were tricked or bamboozled into support of policies they would have rejected had the whole truth been available to them. So the entire Gulf of Tonkin

Resolution, and the entire legislative justification for the Indochina War, were apparently based

164 on frauds. In such scenarios where the people had no part in framing the laws and were not in agreement with the same, the contractarian approach helps us understand that the citizens would be completely justified in not obeying the law as they don’t seem to have any prima facie obligation towards such laws and ipso facto, civil disobedience would be justified in such cases.

The Moral Obligations Justification

Lefkowitz in his work argues, that is our moral responsibility and political obligation to reduce the degree to which it remains a matter of luck whether one attracts the needed attention

165 to support for one’s reasonable views regarding what justice requires. Critics of this view argue that moral responsibility clashes with the legal obligations which citizens have towards the laws and hence is not justified. There are two issues with this assertion. The first being the social contractarian contradiction as argued before. The second issue is the diminished importance that this assertion levies on morality. Most of the legal understandings that we come through, have been abstracted and then codified from certain forms of beliefs, practices which have been moral in nature. The hope of morality getting abstracted from legality is the same as hoping to find moral reasons to justify what Nazi legislations did to the Jews. So essentially establishing a

164 Democracy and Civil Disobedience, Menachem Marc Kellner, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Nov., 1975), pp. 899-911 165 On a Moral Right to Civil Disobedience, David Lefkowitz, Ethics, Vol. 117, No. 2 (January 2007), pp. 202-233 89

hierarchy of obligations wherein the legal obligations take precedence over moral obligations in all cases becomes highly redundant. Not to mention that imposing legal obligations, following unjust laws and not letting the citizens shape the laws which then govern their lives, essentially

166 denies autonomous lives to the agents and has no non instrumental value attached to the same.

This idea of certain moral obligations taking precedence over legal obligations has also been accepted by various courts themselves wherein the disobedient have used the principle of necessity so as to highlight the morally imperative nature of their actions. Even though there are certain requirements which are supposed to be met for the necessity argument to qualify as a valid one, yet this defence has always been accepted as a legitimate one be it in the case of

167 United States v. Bailey or United States vs Dorrell.

T. R. S. Allan in his work titled, “Citizenship and Obligation: Civil Disobedience and

Civil Dissent” claims that laws usually require agreement from citizens on the ground of their contribution to the common good and to acknowledge an obligation of obedience in such cases is

168 to accept that conformity of such rules is justified by the requirements of the common good.

So essentially legal obligations themselves derive their legitimacy on the grounds of them serving the common good. So if the citizen challenges the particular law’s claim that it serves the common good, then that citizen has an “individual moral responsibility” to disobey the law and

169 highlight the common good.

166 id 167 The State Made Me Do It: The Applicability of the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience, Steven M. Bauer and Peter J. Eckerstrom, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 5 (May, 1987), pp. 1173-1200. Refer Footnote 13 too. 168 Citizenship and Obligation: Civil Disobedience and Civil Dissent T. R. S. Allan, The Cambridge Law Journal, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Mar., 1996), pp. 89-121 169 id 90

Now various claims have been made that people might have wrong moral notions and hence disobedience might create various issues. To respond to this I use Professor Dworkin’s argument in which he claims that laws aren’t created using some arbitrary metaphysical

170 principles but are a product of rigorous deliberations between the agents working on them.

There is no denying that some people might have wrong moral notions on just and unjust laws, but the costs of tolerating these wrong notions are far less than the costs of disallowing disobedience and then not letting people with right moral notions highlight the common good.

Having said that, through this argument we can see that civil disobedience then becomes a morally imperative tool to highlight more efficient laws, thereby it serves to foster the true purpose of laws and ipso facto the legal obligations and hence is justified.

Conclusion

Through the course of this paper, I have tried to develop my theory on the legitimacy of civil disobedience movements by highlighting few characteristics of civil disobedience movements, stipulating a definition and then justifying these movements using the concepts of act utilitarianism, social contract and moral obligations. I finally conclude this paper by claiming that civil disobedience movements can be justified in some cases and there exists no blanket obligation to obey laws at all times.

170 Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin Ch 8 91