Where did Trudeau go wrong? On the Question of Nationalism and Charter Patriotism in Canada
Donald Ipperciel*
Introduction nationalism since its purpose is not to address the functions of the nation, but rather those of In an attempt to overcome national rival- the state. As will be demonstrated, constitu- ries, many will invoke the idea of constitutional tional patriotism and nationalism operate on patriotism. #is idea, which serves as a collec- di$erent levels, and follow di$erent logics. At tive cement, is conceived as a rational commit- best, Charter patriotism can, if one adheres to ment and loyalty towards the democratic and the perspective defended in this article, be su- universal principles of liberal constitutions. perimposed onto nationalism, thereby meet- #e universalism of constitutional principles ing the distinct need for unity in the Canadian serves as a shield against national particular- multinational state. isms. Indeed, this was precisely the intention of Jürgen Habermas, one of the most famous I support this thesis mainly through theo- advocates of constitutional patriotism. With retical demonstration, but this demonstration this political idea, Habermas set out to defeat will be based on some empirical %ndings. To Teutonic nationalism and its antimodern and prepare for this demonstration, I will brie&y chauvinistic manifestations. If nationalist pas- explore the nature of the concept of constitu- sions can be subdued, it would be with the help tional patriotism as it originally appeared in of such a “postnational” attitude. the work of Dolf Sternberger and Habermas. And since constitutional patriotism Canadian- For Habermas, and political thinkers in style %rst took shape in Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s general, the United States represents the model writings, I will focus particular attention on par excellence of such a constitutional patrio- these, approaching Charter patriotism as a tism.1 However, the concept also has a Cana- speci%cally Canadian manifestation of con- dian version that is seldom highlighted in this stitutional patriotism. In spite of the failure of connection, namely, “Charter patriotism.”2 Charter patriotism as a symbol of Canadian #is Canadian version of constitutional patri- unity, I will nonetheless outline a certain Qué- otism is also presented, by all participants in bec paradox allowing for the coexistence of the debate, as antagonistic to nationalisms and separatist thoughts with a strong attachment particularisms of all kinds. to the Canadian Constitution. I believe this paradox can be untangled with the help of my For my part, I argue the following thesis: working thesis. constitutional patriotism — and hence Char- ter patriotism — should not be perceived as the negation of and potential substitute for
Constitutional Forum constitutionnel !" Nature of constitutional patriotism procedures and principles, then, is to allow for coexistence and communication among na- in Habermas tions and cultures within a state. But for those #e phrase “constitutional patriotism” was who would believe that concrete ways of life and coined at the end of the 1970s by Dolf Stern- nations thereby become obsolete, Habermas is berger (1907-1989), a central %gure in German quick to add: “#e attachment to these princi- political science a)er the Second World War. ples supposed by constitutional patriotism must For Sternberger, constitutional patriotism is actually feed on the consonant legacy of cul- above all an analytical and historical concept. tural traditions.”9 Hence, it seems that Haber- Because the national sentiment of Germans had mas did not introduce constitutional patriotism been wounded by their recent Nazi past and as a substitute for, but rather as an addition to by the country’s East-West split, it no longer nationalism. su*ced for the construction of political iden- In fact, constitutional patriotism is necessar- tity.3 In response to this situation, Sternberger ily coloured by the national and cultural context claimed that “we do not live in a full Germany, in which it takes root. In this sense, German but we live in a full constitution, a fully consti- constitutional patriotism is bound to be di$erent tutional state, and that too is a kind of father- from its American, French, or Canadian occur- land.”4 Constitutional patriotism thus ful%lled a rences. In Habermas’s view, the distinctive fea- particular need in postwar Germany. ture of German constitutional patriotism is its Habermas readily admits to borrowing particular and historical memory of Auschwitz the concept of constitutional patriotism from and the vanquishing of Nazism.10 To this extent, Sternberger and thus acknowledges its origi- it is di$erent from the occurrences of constitu- nally descriptive character.5 As did the latter, tional patriotism elsewhere in the world. Habermas understands this new identity con- ferred by constitutional patriotism as a form of distancing from a “past centered on national Constitutional patriotism in history.”6 But Habermas’s reading of this con- Trudeau’s Work cept will be coloured in a fundamental way by Although inspired by other sources — by a polemical and normative intention. #ough Julien Benda’s rationalist universalism and by constitutional patriotism is still perceived as an American civic constitutionalism in particular historically observable fact in Germany, it will — Trudeau’s postnationalist thought takes on a moreover become a good to be protected, a ral- form similar to that of Habermas’s.11 However, lying cry against German conservative and fas- it must be pointed out from the outset that the cistic forces conspiring to “rehabilitate national young Trudeau could not consider such a thing consciousness.”7 as Constitutional patriotism. Before 1968, the Constitutional patriotism takes shape, ac- constitution had, in Trudeau’s mind, an essen- cording to Habermas, in the historically ob- tially pragmatic — indeed instrumental — func- servable disjunction between culture and state tion: it served to counter the centrifugal forces politics, i.e., between nation and state. Haber- threatening the cohesion of the Canadian state. mas does not make a distinction between “eth- It allowed some protection for French Canadi- nie” (or culture) and nation; rather, the ways of ans, whom he considered socially and economi- life de%ning cultures are distinguished from cally backward. #e promotion of transcendent 12 state activities. Furthermore, during this pro- normative principles was far from his mind. cess of disjunction, “the identi%cation with our In the period before 1968, thus, Trudeau did not own ways of life and our own traditions are cov- contemplate the idea of an American-style bill ered with a more abstract patriotism, which is of rights, although, even then, he strongly de- no longer articulated with the concrete whole fended individual rights against state preroga- of the nation, but with abstract procedures and tives and against claims stemming from ethnic principles.”8 #e role of these constitutional and national groups.
'( Volume 17, Number 2, 2008 Trudeau had a change of heart during his Hence, the necessity of a revitalized e$ort at early years of political life. In a document en- formal constitutional renewal as the only guar- titled !e Constitution and the People of Can- antor of the desired unity of a country marked ada, which served as a working document for with signi%cant, concrete diversity.21 #e sym- the constitutional amendments proposed in the bolic content of the Constitution, in this con- Canadian Constitutional Charter of 1971 (Vic- text, becomes crucially important for the new toria Charter), Trudeau recognizes from then project of uni%cation. on a transcendent and symbolic function to the Constitution. Indeed, it would no longer be con- As with Habermas’s, Trudeau’s constitu- sidered a pragmatic product born of a particular tional patriotism is not meant to be abstract or historic situation, but as a founding document deny Canadian cultural particularities. Admit- performatively establishing the Canadian na- tedly, this is a criticism o)en directed against 22 tion (i.e., through the very act of enunciation): Trudeau but it deserves to be quali%ed, in my “the Constitution must express the purpose of view. Actually, Trudeau’s work contains ap- Canadians in having become and resolving to parently contradictory passages, sometimes remain associated in a single country.”13 In this defending the right to existence of ethnic and sense, the Constitution is much more than the national particularities, sometimes a crude re&ection of the population’s values; it is, in a antinationalism. symbolic mode, the founding act of the nation. What Trudeau excoriates, in fact, is a par- Of course, for Trudeau, his proposed Char- ticular meaning of the nation. Whereas the soci- ter of Rights becomes the cornerstone of the ological nation — understood as a synonym for Constitution since “the rights of people must ethnie — is quite acceptable to him, the politi- precede the rights of governments.”14 It is then cal nation, for its part, is altogether objection- incumbent on the resultant Canadian Charter able. In the words of Trudeau: “It is not the idea of Rights and Freedoms15 to contribute, as is of nation that is retrograde; it is the idea that 23 the case with other federal institutions,16 to the the nation must necessarily be sovereign.” For unity of the country. #rough the statement of Trudeau, the political nation is nothing other universal rights (i.e., political, judicial, and an- than an ethnic group claiming political power tidiscriminatory rights) and particular rights for itself. For this reason the modern nation, (i.e., linguistic rights), which all Canadians can de%ned since the French Revolution in terms 24 agree upon, the Charter expresses the common- bound to the “principle of all sovereignty,” be- ness of all Canadians, regardless of the diversity comes reprehensible. In his view, this principle composing the country, including the nations of sovereignty should legitimately be attributed and ethnic groups in its midst. to the state not the nation. As a result, Trudeau’s aversion to nationalism becomes understand- It is no doubt noteworthy that Trudeau, in able insofar as it is construed as an ideology constitutional position papers appearing under seeking to put popular sovereignty in the hands his name,17 banks on passion just as much as rea- of a sociological nation (or an ethnie), to the son (contrary to his credo of earlier years).18 It is detriment of citizens belonging to other ethnic in this context that his preference for a Charter groups. In this sense, the nation must renounce of Rights must be understood. #e federal Con- its nationalism.25 stitution of 186719 seems to him too lifeless and uninspiring: Charter Patriotism: Between the [Its constitutional enactments] contain little Union and the Division of the to inspire the pride, solidarity, magnanim- ity and serious commitment required for the Country pursuit of a national ideal. #is has hampered the development of a Canadian identity and With good reasons, the Canadian Charter patriotism.20 of Rights and Freedoms can be considered the political outcome of Trudeau’s thought. With
Constitutional Forum constitutionnel '+ the adoption of the Charter, the foundations of Hence, although the Charter had the desired a Canadian-style Constitutional patriotism was e$ect in English Canada,36 it is still a hard sell in laid in concrete. Shortly a)er 1982, a true “Char- Quebec. #is is not to say that Quebeckers are ter patriotism” — an expression popularized not receptive to a culture and rhetoric of human by Alan Cairns26 and Peter Russell27 — spread rights, far from it.37 A)er all, Québec instituted across the country. a Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms38 some years before the adoption of its Canadian coun- #rough the mechanism of Charter en- terpart. In an analysis of the unifying mission thusiasm, Trudeau explicitly hoped to create a of the Charter, Cairns identi%es three reasons pan-Canadian nation and nationalism. Indeed, that explain Québec’s antipathy towards the about a decade a)er the adoption of the Charter, Charter:39 1) #e imposition of the Charter on Trudeau interpreted the event as “a new begin- Québec is perceived, particularly among sover- 28 ning for the Canadian nation.” In taking this eignists, as a betrayal on the part of the federal view of his project, Trudeau reiterated an ob- government; 2) the Charter had a restrictive im- 29 jective he had stated as early as 1967. #e goal pact on language laws in Québec, which are at was, in spite of a rhetoric of rational universal- the core of an essential dimension of Québec’s ism borrowed from Julien Benda, to substitute a national identity; and 3) the Charter is part of a pan-Canadian nationalism for substate nation- vision of Canada that clashes head-on with Qué- alisms, Québec nationalism in particular. #e bec nationalism. It is thus quite understandable defence of a more encompassing (if no less par- that Charter patriotism could not take root in ticularistic) nationalism, resting in part on the Québec as it has in Anglophone Canada. In all Charter, will clearly become his main concern likelihood, this situation will carry on as long as 30 a)er 1968. the Assemblée nationale continues its political Ironically, however, it seems that this pan- and symbolic refusal to duly ratify the Constitu- Canadian nationalism, which relies on Charter tion Act, 1982. In the meantime, Charter patrio- patriotism, has had precisely the opposite e$ect tism, far from promoting a civic nationalism all than the one Trudeau intended. Instead of uni- across the country, might instead stir up a back- fying Canada in a common political identity, lash of Québec nationalism. the Charter is splitting up the country. Com- However, despite the acknowledged fail- mentators agree in claiming that the Charter, ure of Charter patriotism in Québec, one can as an instrument of pan-Canadian unity, ended bring to the fore what could be described as the in failure. In 1992, Cairns maintained that “the “Québec paradox.” In spite of strong national- national unity purposes of the Charter have not ist sentiments in Québec and the ever-present only fallen short but, in a sense, have back%red possibility of secession, there is a strong sense with respect to relations between Quebec and of belonging to the Canadian state. In a CROP- 31 the rest of Canada.” In 1994, Peter Russell was Express survey conducted in 2005, 49 percent even more caustic: “I believe the country might of Quebeckers would have voted in favour of 32 choke on Charter patriotism.” In his view, secession,40 although 71 percent also claimed to Charter patriotism is a sort of “Charter idola- be “very attached or quite attached to Canada.”41 try,” which conveys a certain “political funda- More interesting are the reasons for this attach- 33 mentalism.” In 2000, F. L. Morton and Rainer ment. In the same survey, questions were asked Knop$ adopted a similar position: “With re- about the bene%ts of being part of Canada. #e spect to most of francophone Quebec, Charter results are as follows: 67 percent of Quebeck- 34 patriotism has been a dismal failure.” Recent- ers believed they are bene%ting from Canada’s ly, in 2007, Guy Laforest claimed that “Ideally, international reputation; 65 percent from the we should be able to say ‘the Charter is us’, but Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and 35 Quebec can’t share this identity marker.” Here, 64 percent from federal transfers for social pro- Laforest was here restating a position already grams. Without doing too much violence to the explicated in 1992 in his Trudeau et la "n d’un facts, one could argue that these perceived ben- rêve canadien. e%ts derive mainly from the Canadian Constitu-
', Volume 17, Number 2, 2008 tion. Indeed, the Charter makes up Section I of portance, whereas the latter emphasizes above the Constitution Act, 1982, and is undoubtedly all the political participation of the people. Ac- the heart of 1982 Constitution. Social transfers, cording to Charles Taylor: however, are the object of Section III of the 1982 Constitution and are, in Canada, an essential In one model, the dignity of the free individual resides in the fact that he has rights that he can element of the citizenship regime which inte- make e*cacious if necessary even against the grates social and economic rights with civic and 42 process of collective decision making of the political rights. As for Canada’s reputation as society, against the majority will, or the pre- a tolerant and pluralistic country, it derives for vailing consensus. . . . In the other model, his the most part from the constituent laws of the freedom and e*cacy reside in his ability to country which elevate these values to binding participate in the process of majority decision norms. making, in having a recognized voice in estab- lishing the “general will.”44 Now, how should the Québec paradox of an attachment to Canada, coupled with a desire to Taylor recognizes that this distinction be- be detached from it, be understood? How can tween liberalism and republicanism does not one reconcile the postnational appeal of Can- imply a disjunction of the two models, but rath- ada and its institutions with a speci%c Québec er a tension within democratic societies. Both nationalism? #e Charter is not, for reasons al- liberalism and republicanism, a)er all, incor- ready identi%ed, a symbol of unity in Québec, porate rights and participation into their mod- but it is nonetheless, as the CROP-Express poll els, albeit in varying proportions. Moreover, shows, an object of deference justifying a strong according to Taylor, the participation of the attachment to Canada. While leaving open the people in political decision making presuppos- question of whether “strong attachment” and es a strong sense of belonging to a collectivity, “patriotism” are equivalent in matters of the which then becomes the living source and end Constitution, it seems, in accord with CROP- of participation.45 And since Canada has more Express, that a certain Charter patriotism is than one collectivity, Taylor goes on to argue, taking root in Québec, perhaps unknowingly the application of a participatory model neces- or even unwillingly. However, one must add, sarily calls for regional decentralization.46 this patriotism has the distinctive feature of rejecting the Charter as a symbol of national #is distinction between liberalism and re- unity, acknowledging only its juridical content publicanism is illuminating when applied to the guaranteeing a set of rights, something akin to question of the relationship between Québec what Russell called “Charter realism.”43 If there nationalism and Canadian Charter patriotism. is such a thing as Charter patriotism in Québec, #e latter, in establishing the primacy of indi- it is thus of a di$erent nature to the one existing vidual rights, obviously corresponds to the liber- in Anglophone Canada. al juridical vector of society. Charter patriotism represents a power constitutive of the state that trumps even the will of the people. I contend Constitutional Patriotism and furthermore that, for its part, the republican Nationalism: Incommensurable participatory vector is embodied by the nation. Indeed, the modern nation, as de%ned since the Notions? French Revolution,47 is precisely the locus of To help us elucidate the apparently contra- popular sovereignty and thus of popular will dictory — or at least ambivalent — question of and participation. Taylor also attributes such a the coexistence of a “postnational” attachment participatory role to the nation. However, just to the Canadian Constitution with Québec na- as do Trudeau and Habermas, Taylor con&ates tionalism, I believe that the distinction between “nation” and “ethnie” in this context. Granted, liberalism and republicanism can be useful. Anthony Smith is probably right in claiming an ethnic origin to nations.48 And, following Will #e former o$ers a model of society in which 49 individual rights are assigned the highest im- Kymlicka, one must also recognize the post-
Constitutional Forum constitutionnel '! ethnic nature of many Western nations, and integration into two distinct public spaces. In of Québec in particular. Through its policies this sense, language is an instrument making of interculturalism, an avatar of multicultur- it possible to transcend ethnic particularities. alism, Québec adheres fully to ethnic plural- But to seek to transcend language itself is to ism so that minority ethnic voices can also undermine an actual condition of possibility participate in forming popular opinion and of public political discussion central to mod- will. ern nations, thus jeopardizing the establish- ment of a popular will that is truly common. The argument here rests on the thesis that the nation is different from both the ethnie It is important, in the context of this and the state. To reinforce this distinction, it study, to clarify the intimate relationship be- is helpful, perhaps, to return to Dominique tween state and law since it brings to light the Schnapper, for whom the modern nation is anchoring point of the Charter and of consti- essentially defined by political sovereignty.50 tutional patriotism more generally: insofar as According to Schnapper, drawing mainly the Charter is an expression of a legal order, from the French republican tradition, a nation it exemplifies a state function. Correlatively, is political by definition. In this respect, the Charter patriotism (or constitutional patrio- defining characteristic of the nation is its po- tism) thus corresponds to an attachment to litically integrative function: “The specificity the state, as Sternberger perceived it to in the of the modern nation is to integrate all popu- 1950s, and not to the nation. In the case of na- lations into a community of citizens.”51 This tion-states, this distinction is perhaps moot, is possible only if individuals transcend their but in the context of multinational states, it ethnic particularities. By contrast, the ethnie is highly relevant. In multinational states, is defined as a group of individuals united by constitutional patriotism — along with other cultural and historic links, but with no politi- interests, of course — strengthens the attach- cal organization or expression. On the other ment to a collective entity extending beyond hand, the state, construed as a set of institu- the nation. tions exerting some sort of coercion on the collectivity,52 ensures the political expression If Charter patriotism, construed as at- of the nation. Thus, the three collective enti- tachment to the juridical order and to prin- ties — ethnie, nation, and state — each have ciples of civic and universal law, cannot com- their appropriate locus within the sociopoliti- pete with nationalism and supplant it, it is cal organization of modern collectivities. because Charter patriotism is subject to a dif- ferent logic and assumes different functions. To Schnapper’s theoretical definitions I Whereas Charter patriotism is addressed to would add that political integration, the key- the inalienable rights of individuals, nation- stone of her conception of the nation, can be alism is concerned with individuals’ partici- realized only through public discussion, which pation in collective decision making. In other in turn presupposes a common public lan- words, it sees to it that popular sovereignty guage.53 Hence, civic though the nation is, on is realized. Hence, nationalism and constitu- Schnapper’s account it must also be aware of tional patriotism do not and cannot enter into its linguistic foundation since the language of a relationship of conflict because they cover discussion is an essential political instrument different conceptual spaces of the political. for the formation of popular will. If Canada Nor does constitutional patriotism depend on is binational, it is not due to the presence of a a “delegitimization of nationalism”54 in order Québécois or French-Canadian ethnie and an to supplant it. Constitutional patriotism, if it English-Canadian ethnie (their pre-eminence is not to alter is nature, should not seek to op- over other ethnic groups would be unjustifi- pose nationalism (understood as the defence able in a liberal context, even for historical of the prerogatives of the nation), but should reasons), but because it is comprised of two of- be firmly anchored to the state. ficial public languages providing for political
'' Volume 17, Number 2, 2008 Conclusion: Instead of Antagonism, kamp, 1967) at 14. 5 Jürgen Habermas, “Geschichtsbewußtsein und Complementarity posttraditionale Identität – Die Westorientierung der Bundesrepublik” in Eine Art Schadensab- One should, in my mind, avoid understand- wicklung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987) 161 at 168 ing Canada as a postnational state. Certainly, the [“Geschichtsbewußtsein”]. Canadian state o$ers its citizens a political-legal 6 Ibid. framework which transcends particular ethnies 7 Jürgen Habermas, “Apologetische Tendenzen” in and nations, but the negation of actual nations Eine Art Schadensabwicklung (Frankfurt: Suhr- in its midst would be tantamount to destroy- kamp, 1987) 120 at 131 and 133. ing spaces of popular will formation, dealing 8 “Geschichtsbewußtsein,” supra note 5 at 173 a fatal blow to the idea of popular sovereignty. [emphasis added]. Canada’s present and future must consequently 9 Ibid. be construed in a multinational framework re- 10 Jürgen Habermas, “Grenzen des Neohistoris- specting and nurturing nations in its midst. mus” in Die nachholende Revolution (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990) 149 at 152. Trudeau’s error, so to speak, was to fail to 11 Michel Coutu speaks of an “elective a*nity” understand the integral relationship between between Habermas’s constitutional patriotism constitutional patriotism and nationalism. In and the federal initiative seeking to establish a this sense, the Québec nation and nationalism Canadian civic nation with the help of the Char- ter. Michel Coutu, “Citoyenneté et légitimité. Le are not rivals of a Canada uni%ed by Charter patriotisme constitutionnel comme fondement patriotism, as Trudeau has thought; rather, they de la référence identitaire” (1998) 40 Droit et form a concrete foundation feeding the more Société 631 at 636. abstract idea of constitutional patriotism. 12 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “Fédéralisme, nationa- lisme et raison” in Le fédéralisme et la société canadienne-française (Montréal: Éditions HMH, Notes 1967) 191 at 209 [Le fédéralisme]. * Donald Ipperciel, Institute for Canadian Studies, 13 Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Canada, the Constitution University of Alberta. and the People of Canada/ La Constitution Ca- 1 Not everyone would agree with this statement. nadienne et le Citoyen (Ottawa: Gouvernement See for example, Kok-Chor Tan, Justice Without du Canada, 1969) at 4 and 6 [Constitution and Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism and People]. Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 14 Ibid. at 4 and 16. Press, 2004) at 183; and Margaret Canovan, 15 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Sched- “Patriotism is Not Enough” (2000) 30 British ule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 Journal of Political Science 413 at 425. [Charter]. 2 Alan C. Cairns, Charter Versus Federalism (Mon- 16 Constitution and People, supra note 13 at 10. treal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992); 17 See generally, Constitution and People, ibid; and Peter H. Russell, “#e Political Purposes of the Pierre Elliott Trudeau, A Time for Action: Toward Charter: Have #ey Been Ful%lled? An Agnostic’s the Renewal of the Canadian Federation (Ot- Report Card” in Philip Bryden, Steven Davis & tawa: Government of Canada, 1978) [A Time for John Russell, eds., Protecting Rights and Free- Action]. doms (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1994); 18 Le fédéralisme, supra note 12. and Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: 19 Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. Guy Laforest, ed. (Montreal: McGill’s-Queen’s 20 Similarly, Trudeau will say: “[#e new Constitu- University Press, 1993). tion] must command the respect of all Canadians 3 Reinhard Blänkner, “Warum Verfassungs- and provide them with an enlightened basis for patriotismus? Historische Anmerkungen” in patriotism.” Trudeau, A Time for Action, supra Gerhard Göhler, Mattias Iser & Ina Kerner, eds., note 17 at 20 and 21. Verfassungspatriotismus und nationale Identität 21 Trudeau believes in a voluntarist nation as (Berlin, 2003) 27 at 30. described by Renan, ibid. at 3: “For in the %nal 4 Dolf Sternberger, Ich wünschte ein Bürger zu sein. analysis, it is the collective will of all Canadians Neun Versuche über den Staat (Frankfurt: Suhr- which will ensure this country’s survival.” See
Constitutional Forum constitutionnel '- also ibid. at 19. establishing – the unity of Canada.” Pierre El- 22 On Trudeau’s abstraction and antiparticularism, liott Trudeau, “A Constitutional Declaration of see for example, Claude Couture, La loyauté d’un Rights” in Federalism and the French Canadians laïc. Pierre Elliott Trudeau et le libéralisme cana- (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968) 52 at 54. dien (Montréal: L’Harmattan, 1996) at 15; George See also, Wayne Norman, “Justice and stability Grant, “Nationalism and rationality,” in William in multinational societies,” in Alain G. Gagnon Christian & Sheila Grant, eds., !e George Grant & James Tully, eds., Multinational Democracies Reader (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 1998) 102 at 104; Guy Laforest, Trudeau et la "n 90 at 101. d’un rêve canadien (Sillery: Septentrion, 1992) at 30 Laforest, supra note 22 at 177. 131; Gordon Robertson, Memoirs of a Very Civil 31 Cairns, supra note 2 at 121. Servant (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 32 Russell, supra note 2 at 42 and 35. 2000) at 361-2. For the views on Trudeau of con- 33 Ibid. at 36. temporary political actors, see Ian MacDonald, 34 F.L. Morton & Rainer Knop$, !e Charter From Bourassa to Bourassa (Montréal, McGill- Revolution & the Court Party (Peterborough, ON: Queen’s Press, 2002) at 147 (on Claude Ryan); Broadview Press, 2000) at 61. and Ramsay Cook, Watching Quebec (Montreal, 35 Quoted in Michael Healy, “Notwithstanding: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2005) at 130 (on André A Playwright Takes on the Charter” (2007) Laurendeau). For those who believe Trudeau 4 !e Walrus 46 at 49. See also Guy Laforest, does not deserve such a criticism, see for ex- “L’exil intérieur des Québécois dans le Canada ample, Samuel LaSelva, !e Moral Foundations of de la Charte” (2007) 16:2 Constitutional Forum Canadian Federalism: Paradoxes, Achievements, constitutionnel 15. and Tragedies of Nationhood (Montreal, McGill- 36 Cairns, supra note 2 at 119: “#e evidence from Queen’s Press, 1996) at 114. public hearings convincingly suggests that the 23 “toute pensée qui tend à réclamer pour la nation Charter has ‘taken’ in English Canada.” la plénitude des pouvoirs souverains est politi- 37 Cairns, ibid. at 121 and Russell, supra note 2 at quement réactionnaire.” Pierre Elliott Trudeau, 35-36. “La nouvelle trahison des clercs,” in Le fédéralis- 38 R.S.Q. c. C-12 me et la société canadienne-française (Montréal: 39 Cairns, supra note 2 at 121. Éditions HMH, 1968) 159 at 179 [Trahison des 40 During the same year, a CROP-Express survey clercs]. See also ibid. at 186-7; and Le fédéralisme, revealed that 56 percent of Quebeckers would supra note 12 at 202. have voted in favour of secession: Document 24 See article 3 of the Declaration of the Rights of d’Information (2006), online: Centre for Research Man and of the Citizen, as well as the French and Information on Canada (CRIC)
'. Volume 17, Number 2, 2008 47 Supra note 24 and accompanying text. 48 Anthony D. Smith, !e Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1988). 49 Will Kymlicka, “Immigrant Integration and Mi- nority Nationalism” in Michael Keating & John McGarry, eds., Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 61 at 64. 50 Dominique Schnapper, La Communauté des citoyens (Paris: Gallimard, 1994) at 45. 51 Ibid. at 73. 52 Ibid. at 55-6. 53 I defend this paragraph’s thesis in detail: Donald Ipperciel, “Constitutional Democracy and Civic Nationalism” (2007) 13 Nations and National- isms. In the present short article, this exposition will have to su*ce. 54 Coutu, supra note 11 at 638.
Constitutional Forum constitutionnel '/