U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia

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6-2009

Winifred L. Tate Colby College, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Tate, Winifred. 2009. U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia. Colombia Internacional 69, ene - jun 2009: 50–69. ISSN 0121-5612.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Colby. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Colby. Colombia Internacional 69, ene - jun 2009, Pp 228, ISSN 0121-5612, Bogotá, Pp. 50 - 69

U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia El activismo estadounidense en derechos humanos y el Plan Colombia

Winifred Tate*

recibido 26/04/08, aprobado 03/12/08

50 U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia • Winifred Tate

Resumen Las organizaciones no gubernamentales dicen que juegan un papel central en definir las políticas internacionales estadounidenses, en particular sobre el tema de derechos humanos. Aquí, examinaré la influencia de los derechos humanos y grupos humanitarios en los debates sobre la política internacional hacia Colombia, enfocándome en el diseño y las apropiaciones adicionales subsecuentes para el Plan Colombia, un paquete de asistencia multibillonario que comenzó en el año 2000. Propongo que ONGs fueron capases de usar el legado del activismo por los derechos humanos del pasado que se concentraba en América Latina, pero que no logró una movilización popular alrededor de éste tema. Examino los problemas estructurales que limitan ese tipo de movilización, así cómo exploro la manera en que las ONGs sí usaron las condiciones legislativas que se colocaron al paquete de asistencia para que la preocupación sobre los derechos humanos se mantuviera como parte de los debates acerca de las políticas Estadounidenses. Este caso de estudio contribuirá al registro histórico sobre cómo las políticas se establecen y desarrollan, para ser parte de la literatura creciente que explora la manera en que reclamos de derechos humanos se transforman en políticas gubernamentales específicas.

Palabras clave: movilización popular, ONG, asistencia militar, relaciones colombo- estadounidenses.

Abstract Non-governmental organizations claim to play a central role in defining U.S. foreign policy, particularly in the field of human rights. Here, I will examine the role of human rights and humanitarian groups in the debates over U.S. foreign policy towards Colombia, focusing on the design and subsequent additional appropriations for Plan Colombia, a multi-billion dollar aid package beginning in 2000. I argue that NGOs were able to build on the legacy of prior human rights activism focusing on Latin America, but failed to achieve significant grassroots mobilization around this issue. I examine the structural issues limiting such mobilization, as well as exploring how NGOs did leverage legislative conditions placed on the assistance package to keep human rights concerns part of the debates over U.S. policy. This case study will contribute to the historical record of how policy is made and developed, adding to the growing literature exploring how human rights claims translate into specific governmental policies.

Keywords: grassroots mobilization, NGOs, military assistance, U.S.-Colombia relations

* Assistant Professor of Anthropology, Colby College, Waterville, Maine, United States.

51 Introduction for three years at the Washington Office o n - g ove r n m e n t a l on Latin America. Founded in 1974 organizations claim following the Chilean coup by a small N to play a central role cohort of activists with extensive expe- in defining U.S.foreign policy, par- rience in Latin America, WOLA is dedi- ticularly in the field of human rights. cated to changing U.S. policy towards Here, I will examine the role of human Latin America to promote social justice. rights and humanitarian groups in the While at WOLA, I researched the impact debates over U.S.foreign policy towards of U.S. policy on political violence and Colombia, focusing on the design and the illicit drug economy in Colombia, subsequent additional appropriations and led advocacy efforts with a coalition for Plan Colombia, a multi-billion of U.S.-based NGOs as well as holding dollar aid package beginning in 2000. I frequent meetings with policymakers. argue that NGOs were able to build on The analysis presented here has emerged the legacy of prior human rights acti- from my notes and recollections of this vism focusing on Latin America, but experience, as well as fieldwork conduc- failed to achieve significant grassroots ted over the past three years while a post mobilization around this issue. I exa- doctoral fellow at the Watson Institute mine the structural issues limiting such for International Studies at Brown Uni- mobilization, as well as exploring how versity and as a visiting research fellow at NGOs did leverage legislative condi- the National Security Archive. During tions placed on the assistance package to this fieldwork, I have examined public keep human rights concerns part of the and declassified government documents, debates over U.S.policy. This case study and conducted interviews with offi- will contribute to the historical record cials and activists who participated in of how policy is made and developed, the debates over appropriate U.S. policy adding to the growing literature explo- towards Colombia. This research is part ring how human rights claims translate of a larger project examining U.S. policy into specific governmental policies. towards Colombia and the origins and evolution of Plan Colombia. 1. Methods and Scope While activism against Plan This work, like my previous Colombia initially appeared an inevi- study of Colombian human rights acti- table successor to the Central Ameri- vism (Tate 2007), grows out of what I can peace movement, major grassroots describe as my “embedded” experience mobilization never materialized. At least with activism. In addition to my formal in part because of these structural factors fieldwork and training as an anthropo- discussed below, there were insufficient logist, I have also worked over the past existing channels to resonate with calls two decades in a variety of capacities for for activism. In my account, I stress the human rights and policy advocacy orga- structural factors in which these efforts nizations, as well as currently serving take place. My intention in presenting on the board of directors of the Latin this account is not to dismiss the efforts America Working Group. During the to foster activism in response to U.S. initial Plan Colombia debates, I worked policy towards Colombia, but to illu- as a senior fellow and Colombian analyst minate the process, and in this case, the

52 U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia • Winifred Tate

obstacles, to the practice of activism. This Green reached similar conclusions in study contributes to a growing body of his work on U.S. solidarity with Brazi- work, primarily produced by political lian victims of the dictatorship (Green scientists, that examine when and how 2003). An ethnographic, rather than particular issues become the focus of philosophical or media-centric, appro- human rights activism (Bob 2005; 2008). ach allows us to consider the collective While a number of studies have expan- identities and material processes that are ded on Keck and Sikkink’s important critical to mobilizing activism. For acti- work (1998) examining how and why vists, this analysis is important in order transnational campaigns succeed or fail, to understand the windows of politi- scholars are only now turning to why cal opportunity in which activism can campaigns fail to materialize around thrive, in order to be able to more rea- specific issues (Carpenter 2007). listically assess the possibilities (rather This case study also contributes than simply to assert the necessity) of to a growing ethnography literature grassroots response to particular human on human rights work (Goodale 2007; rights crises, and how such responses Merry 2006; Speed 2007; Tate 2007). can be built over the long term. Here, my analysis complicates the Within the more restricted uni- understanding of human rights work as verse of such organizations focused on “mobilizing shame.” Activists claim that advocating for specific policies towards human rights discourses work in the Colombia, there are a range of NGOs world by mobilizing the shame of citi- that I will not focus on here, most nota- zens and governments, who will react bly the U.S. Colombia Business Part- and reform to prevent further exposure nership. Founded in 1997 and initially of their abuses, typified in the work of convened by the Colombian embassy Human Rights Watch. Academic work during the certification crisis of the theorizing this conception of human Samper administration to bring the rights work has focused on the media- perspective of business community to spectator relationship (Keenan 2004; the debates, they actively supported the McLagan 2005; Drinan 2001). Rather aid package for Colombia, and are now than view human rights activism as the lobbying for the Free Trade Agreement. spontaneous result of exposure to injus- According to the Wall Street Journal, the tice—the ‘mobilizing shame’ paradigm Colombian embassy pays approximately of such work—I believe that we must USD 100,000 a month to public rela- shift the focus to include the collective tions firms for lobbying in support of processes that channel the subjectivities additional assistance to Colombia (Davis mobilized into action. In her analy- 2007). Here, I focus on a much smaller sis of Southern Cone human rights subset of groups, largely self-identified organizations, sociologist Mara Love- as politically progressive and concerned men stressed the importance of “dense with human rights and humanitarian yet diverse interpersonal networks… issues, and who function as a loose coa- embedded within broader national and lition known as the Colombian Stee- transnational institutional and issue ring Committee (CSC). Founded in networks” as well as external support 1998, the CSC is chaired by the Latin (Loveman 1998, 477). Historian James American Working Group and the

53 U.S. Office on Colombia, and includes 1.2 billion dollar aid package for Colom- more than 30 organizations.1 The CSC bia, since extended in yearly appropria- has been the central location for strate- tions to more than USD 5.4 billion in as gizing how to promote grassroots mobi- part of ongoing efforts to strengthen the lization around human rights issues in Colombian state and reduce the amount Colombia and policy initiatives intended of illicit coca production. The package to improve the human rights situation. was designed by an interagency task force CSC member organizations have been convened by the Clinton Administration active in a number of human rights issues involving a range of U.S. agencies inclu- in Colombia, including internal displa- ding the Defense and State Departments. cement, violence against religious com- While the Plan Colombia aid package munities, Afro Colombians, unions, and offered a dizzying area of programs desig- the impact of multinational corporations ned “for democracy and the strengthening in Colombia, including Coca-Cola and of the state,” the vast majority of the aid coal mining. Scholars of these efforts have was destined for fumigation efforts and begun exploring the myriad challenges military assistance. The extensive military faced by such efforts (Gill 2005; 2007; hardware and training made the Colom- Chomsky and Striffler 2008). Here, I will bian army the primary U.S. operational focus on Plan Colombia debates, and the partner and was the biggest single shift in elite lobbying strategy that developed in U.S. policy which had long favored the response to the failure of major grassroots Colombian National Police (Crandall mobilization efforts, in particular the 2002). This shift put human rights and emphasis on the Leahy Law as a means the nature of paramilitary violence squa- to push for human rights reforms in the rely into the U.S. policy debates. context of escalating military assistance. The majority of Americans (as opposed to immigrant Colombians) came 2. U.S. Policy Towards Colombia to the issue of human rights in Colom- and The Legacy of Central bia with the Central American peace American Activism movement as their primary reference U.S. based human rights and social point. During the 1980s, the Reagan justice groups began to focus their inter- Administration funded billions of dollars est on Colombia in the late 1990s, as to the Salvadoran military and the Nica- the United State government began to raguan contra forces despite their egre- increase military and other kinds of assis- gious human rights abuses. Thousands of tance to the Colombian government. In people joined a range of solidarity orga- 2000, the U.S. Congress passed a USD nizations, participating in a range of pro-

1 The member organizations of the Colombia Steering Committee include: the American Friends Service Committee, Ame- ricans for Democratic Action, Catholic Relief Services, the Center for Justice and International law (CEJIL), the Center for International Policy, Church World Service, the Due Process of Law Foundation, the Federation of American Scientists, the Franciscan Washington Office on Latin America, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, Global Exchange, Insti- tute for Policy Studies, International Labor Rights Fund, Jesuit Refugee Services, Latin America Working Group, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, Lutheran Office for Government Affairs, Lutheran World Relief, Maryknoll Office on Global Concerns, Mennonite Central Committee, Peace Brigades International - Colombia Project, RFK Memorial Center for Human Rights, U.S. Committee for Refugees, U.S./Labor Education in the Americas Project, Washington Office on Latin America, Witness for Peace, World Vision, Amnesty International, Colombia Human Rights Committee/Network DC, Presbyterian Church USA Washington Office National Ministries Division, Christian Aid. (List found at the U.S. Office on Colombia website, http://www.usofficeoncolombia.com/USOC%20Partners/, accessed April 18, 2008).

54 U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia • Winifred Tate

test practices and providing humanitarian to reporters and write op-eds), lobbying assistance to refugees and victim commu- your member of Congress, and connec- nities (García 2006). The organizations ting with and expanding existing activist that developed during this period ranged networks. Many of these educational from radical supporters of the revolutio- efforts also provided activists with the par- nary groups to moderate groups pushing ticulars of policy advocacy, including how for limiting military aid and promoting to develop specific policy goals, the range negotiated settlement to the conflicts. of foreign policy instruments, and infor- There is a growing literature considering mation about specific pieces of legislation, this history, including accounts of the amendments and Congressional debates. Sanctuary Movement within the U.S., Many of these efforts focused on Con- broader activist participation, and activist gress, historically only a marginal foreign memoirs (Cunningham 1995; 2001; Hil- policy actor, because of the leadership role dreth 1994; Smith 1996). the Democratically-controlled House of One central legacy of the Central Representatives played in opposition to America movements was the consolida- the Republican Reagan Administration. tion of a repertoire of practices intended Organizations also developed emergency to develop activist identities and pro- response networks, devoted to immediate mote the practice of activism in particu- letter writing campaigns responding to lar ways.2 This repertoire did not emerge threats against activists. simply from Central American causes, of Groups organizing in response course, but was built on a long history of to Plan Colombia inherited these acti- activist practices within the United States vist practices. LAWG, itself a coalition (Rabben 2003). These included ways in of religious, humanitarian and solidarity which activists were recruited and given organizations, was founded in 1983 as the the analytical tools to understand U.S. Central American Working Group, and policy as a grievance that must be reme- had until the early 1990s focused entirely died through action. Educational efforts on building citizen activism to oppose included “witnessing” tours, political U.S. policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua tourism orchestrated by non-governmen- and promote policy reforms. Working tal organizations in order to spark personal with five paid staff in the Washington transformation, or bringing activists and office, LAWG expanded their work to survivors on speaking tours within the focus on support for implementation of U.S. This training also included conferen- peace accords, humanitarian and develo- ces and teach-ins, which often featured pment assistance and disaster relief, oppo- instruction in the practice of activism in sing the Cuba embargo, and Colombia. addition to forming the identity of acti- Many other groups that emerged in the vists. These workshops included educa- 1980s focused on Central America also tion in media outreach (such as how to went on to make Colombia policy a build media contacts, provide interviews major focus in the late 1990s, and many

2 I do not mean to suggest here that this process was seamless or uncontested. In practice, there were a range of competing visions over the appropriate response of U.S.activists to the challenges presented by U.S.foreign policy, and profound differences among activists within different religious and political traditions.

55 of the now professional policy advocates were vulnerable to Communist take- involved in Colombia began their work over. Within Central America, concern as activists focusing on Central America over the possible export of the Cuban in the 1980s. The legacy of organization Revolution (1959) and the successful around Central America remained strong Sandinista Revolution (1979) fueled the even for a new generation of activists Reagan administration’s obsession with who had been too young to partici- the region, as did the proximity to the pate directly in those campaigns. For the United States. U.S.-sponsored military younger generation of activists who were initiatives in Central America were front in college in the 1990s and early years page stories and considered policy prio- of 2000s, the Central America solidarity rities for more than a decade. movement became a central touchpoint The post cold war context sig- in the history of U.S. leftist politics. Many nified a lack of central coherent meta- went to Latin America for study abroad narrative of U.S. foreign policy, without and learned about these efforts in college the urgency of the apocalyptic visions of courses and from older activists. a Soviet triumph, or the possibilities of For activists schooled in the socialist social change. The Clinton admi- Central American peace movement, nistration and other policymakers were the debates over U.S. policy towards attempting to redefine the U.S. global Colombia had many similarities with role from the position of the single remai- the policy towards El Salvador in the ning super power. Some pundits sugges- 1980s: The U.S. appeared to be streng- ted that human rights could now play a thening an abusive military with a his- more central role in foreign policy, while tory of well publicized collusion with others engaged in remapping the national paramilitary forces, taking sides against security threats facing the United States long running Marxist insurgencies. to include immigration, narcotics tra- However, activists would soon discover fficking, and terrorism. These discussions there were significant differences bet- opened up space for a less overtly politi- ween the Central America and Colom- cized debate of the role of human rights bia policy that made mobilization of in foreign policy, and for some to argue large scale grassroots activism difficult. that in the post cold war context, human rights concerns could play a more central 3. Political Context: The Cold role in policy. However, Latin America War and the War on Terror was no longer the focus of human rights One of the most important diffe- debates, which prioritized the complex rences between activism over the past conflicts in Africa and the Balkans. As three decades has been shift in the funda- the 1990s progressed, the failure of the mental paradigms of U.S. foreign policy, U.S. and Europe interventions, inclu- from the cold war to the war on terror. ding in some cases the failure to inter- During the cold war, the meta narra- vene, prompted debates over the validity tive of U.S. foreign policy divided the of the human rights framework (Cmiel globe into two super powers battling for 1999). Latin America, rarely in the U.S. world supremacy, with proxy wars such news, was largely viewed as a continent as Central America fought in the name that was on the path to successful tran- of the domino theory in which regions sitions to democracy, and no longer in

56 U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia • Winifred Tate

need of major U.S. attention. Following observers in describing the evolution the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. invasion of and escalation of the drug war in the late Iraq and public support for the Bush 1980s, “Thus drug policy, no longer tied administration’s use of the attacks to jus- primarily to concerns about heroin, cea- tify a complete withdrawal for support of sed to be tied exclusively to drugs at all, human rights issues, greatly reduced the having evolved into a reelection, crime- political terrain for human rights advo- prevention, revenue-transferring, culture- cacy in the U.S. Rather than abide by war omnibus” (Courtwright 2001, 179). previous efforts to restrain government Congressman Jim McGovern (D-MA), abuses, the Bush administration sanc- one of Plan Colombia’s most important tioned the use of torture and secret and critics, recalled in a 2008 interview the indefinite detention. By the mid-decade, importance of drug war spending, parti- many activists prioritized action against cularly to the Republican leadership in the war in Iraq. Congress that supported the aid package. “[Speaker of the House Dennis] Hastert 4. U.S. Readings was a champion of the war on drugs, his of the Colombian Conflict attitude was ‘give me what I want or you The nature of the issues within are going to face a 30 second campaign Colombia also made generating signi- ad in your district saying that you are soft ficant activist constituencies difficult. on drugs, that you don’t want to stop Colombia was widely stereotyped within drugs that are coming from Colombia U.S. popular culture as an ‘inherently vio- into your district’.” lent’ culture primarily centered on drug The perceived differences between trafficking. Within the United States, the nature of the internal conflicts within drug war politics made critiquing coun- Colombia, El Salvador and Nicaragua ternarcotics policies extremely difficult. also influenced the degree to which the Numerous scholars have discussed the issue resonated with American activists. development of the bipartisan consen- In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government sus view of drug policies as a so-called took power from a brutal dictator in a “third rail” issue within Washington, an relatively short revolution, and began to issue that cannot be touched without institute social reforms that, while ultima- being electrocuted. (Bertram et al. 1996; tely unsuccessful in fundamentally trans- Boyum and Reuter 2005; Massing 1998). forming the country’s economy, inspired Being seen as tough on drugs is widely American supporters hoping to partici- viewed as important in electoral politics, pate in revolutionary change. The U.S. with support for zero tolerance poli- government’s blatant support for abusive tics (particularly those targeting people forces attempting to overthrow the Nica- of color, women and the poor) having raguan government further galvanized deep roots in American political culture even some of the revolutionary regime’s (Monroe 2003). The growing number critics to oppose U.S. policy. In El Sal- of federal and state agencies benefiting vador, the united guerrilla front FMLN from drug war resources resulted in eco- maintained popular support throughout nomic interests in promoting counter- much of the country during the 1980s narcotics efforts. As one of the country’s (Wood 2003), and was receptive to inter- most important drug policy historians national pressure calling for respect for

57 human rights. Even groups that rejected lity. Human Rights Watch documented the revolutionary violence of Salvadoran areas, for example, in which local parami- insurgent groups advocated a negotiated litary leaders paid military commanders settlement to the conflict, believing that rather than the reverse (Human Rights the leadership could be trusted as good Watch 2000). Colombia’s complicated faith negotiators. In the Colombian con- political panorama made it more diffi- text, such views of insurgents have been cult to recruit American activists (who, impossible given the escalating brutality like policymakers), often desire black and of the conflict, declining popular support white scenarios with clear “good guys” for guerrilla groups, and widespread cri- and simplistic solutions. minality within their ranks (including criminality developed as part of their 5. Lack of connections between military strategy, such as the FARC’s use the U.S. and Colombia of profits from kidnapping and drug pro- The United States has a long his- duction to finance their military expan- tory of direct intervention in Central sion in the 1990s). Colombian guerrillas America; following the construction of have consistently rejected human rights the Panama Canal, relations with Colom- standards and international humanitarian bia were more cordial and more distant. law, and have been largely unresponsive As one Congressional aid who closely to international pressure. The FARC has follows Colombia observed, compared held a number of Americans hostage to Central America, “Colombia feels over the years, including several who are a lot more distant [than Central Ame- presumed to have died in captivity and rica], geographically and psychologically.” three who have remained in their power Colombia was not felt through the pre- for more than eight years, and they killed sence of a large refugee population; nor three American indigenous rights activists do Americans have the range of ties to in 1999.3 There is little evidence, particu- the country that they developed to Cen- larly following the collapse of the most tral America over the previous century. recent peace talks with the FARC in This lack of historic connection between February 2002, that there is much interest the countries meant there were few esta- in negotiations on the part of the remai- blished channels to serve as the founda- ning leadership. Colombian paramilitary tion for activist connections. groups are also substantially different than The presence of millions of Cen- the Central American death squads that tral American refugees in the United operated during the 1980s. In both cases, States brought compelling stories of per- human rights groups documented subs- secution by U.S.-funded military forces tantial ties with military forces; however, in directly to American audiences, and gal- Colombia, revenues from drug trafficking vanized the Sanctuary movement (García provided these forces a greater degree of 2006). Refugees could travel relatively autonomy and offensive military capabi- cheaply, arriving by land on well-traveled

3 The nationally known activist Ingrid Washinawatok, a member of the Menominee nation and co-chair of the Indigenous Women’s Network; Hawaiian-Mohawk Lahe’ena’e Gay, a representative of the Pacific Cultural Conservancy Internation- al, and U’wa supporter Terence Freitas, an environmental activist. The three had traveled to Arauca in support of the U’Wa people’s attempts to limit oil exploration in their territory. The three were kidnapped by the FARC and later killed.

58 U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia • Winifred Tate

immigration routes. Large refugee camps cularly within Catholic and mainline in Mexico and Honduras provided the Protestant denominations that played a opportunity for further direct engage- central role in the Central America soli- ment on a large scale. No such popula- darity movement. Catholic lay missio- tion arrived from Colombia. In part, this naries inspired by Liberation Theology was the result of resources; there is no land with a long history of work in Central route from Colombia to the United Sta- America constituted an extensive net- tes because of the Darien Gap, the jungle works of Americans with significant on separating Panama from Colombia is the the ground experience viewed as credible only remaining break in the Pan Ameri- (non-radical, in many cases non politi- can highway. Rather than gather in large cal, and non biased) when they expres- refugee camps, most Colombians fleeing sed dissent regarding official accounts of violence and instability left their homes political violence in the region (Nepstad as individual family units resettling infor- 2004). These religious activists served as mally in shanty towns within Colombia, the foundation for many solidarity net- creating one of the world’s largest—but works (Smith 1996; also in Peru, Youn- largely invisible—internally displaced gers 2003). Colombia did not have the population. Even in areas where the Uni- extreme poverty that brought Liberation ted Nation and others anticipated large Theology-inspired religious workers to refugee populations, like along the border other parts of the Andes (such as Peru and with Ecuador, shelters stood empty, for a Bolivia) and Central America, and featu- range of reasons including the strength of red a conservative Catholic hierarchy that Colombia’s economy compared to the was less receptive to the concerns of Libe- neighbors, growing urbanizations and the ration Theology. Unlike Central America long history of internal displacement in Colombia was a net exporter of priests the face of political violence. (Increasing and religious workers, sending many to international awareness of the humani- other parts of Latin America and Africa. tarian crisis during the 1990s led to an Other typical U.S.-Latin Ame- increase of international organizations rica connections were also not present in providing humanitarian assistance within Colombia. As a relatively well developed the country.) The population of Colom- middle income country, the nation was bians emigrating to other countries did host to few humanitarian workers until increase (including Spain, Ecuador, and the IDP crisis of the late 1990s. The Peace the U.S.), but they were largely educa- Corps program in Colombia lasted from ted middle class, often identified with the 1961 to 1981, with a relatively large num- government and were not natural allies of ber of total volunteers compared to Central U.S.-based activists protesting U.S. assis- America (4,600) but without the annual tance to the Colombian military. Within flow of new volunteers returning to form the U.S., their primary political agenda a critical base of interest in the country. was the provision of favorable immigra- Colombia has historically maintained tion status, such as Temporary Protective relatively few academic connections with Status, for Colombians. U.S. universities, preferring to send stu- There were also fewer connec- dents to Europe, particularly France and tions between religious communities England. Within the U.S., there are rela- within the U.S. and Colombia, parti- tively few Colombianistas, given the real

59 and perceived dangers of fieldwork and tactics described above. Amnesty Inter- the general view that Colombia remains national, founded in 1961, remained a an exception to the academic models and membership organization who included theories of the region. grassroots mobilizing and letter-writing campaigns among their central strategies 6. Activist Response to promote human rights. On a much This is not to say that there has smaller scale, the Washington Office on been no activist response to U.S. policy Latin America, founded in 1974, was a towards Colombia. In this section, I critical link for grassroots groups within will outline efforts to organize activism the U.S. and Latin America interested in in opposition to Plan Colombia, and influencing U.S. policy. All these organi- highlight the achievements of the lobb- zations including Human Rights Watch ying strategy adopted by the NGOs that used both volunteer and paid staff; regar- focused on U.S. policy towards Colom- dless of their status, all that I interviewed bia, in particular the conditions placed referred to themselves as “activists.” on U.S. assistance to Colombia, and the In U.S. policy debates, Colombia Leahy amendment. I will conclude with had long been considered a drug policy some of the critiques of this strategy, and issue, not a human rights issue, and was a some lessons for thinking about human low priority for these institutions throug- rights activism in the 21st century. hout the 1990s until Plan Colombia focus It is important to locate these on military assistance made human rights efforts within the larger context of the a more salient issue. The major human professionalization of human rights acti- rights groups (including Amnesty Inter- vism. Much of the recent research on national, Human Rights Watch, and on a human rights activism has stressed profes- much smaller scale, WOLA) had conduc- sionalization as a contested process (Tate ted periodic research missions to Colom- 2007; Merry 2006; Goodale 2006; 2007). bia, and published regular reports for Some groups, typified by the approach more than a decade. Beginning in the late of Human Rights Watch, have attempted 1980s, two Colombian immigrants, both to completely divorce their activism to married to Americans and settled in the promote human rights from social move- U.S., established human rights committees ments and so-called “politicized” human in Washington (the Colombia Human rights activism. “Human rights work can- Rights Committee) and Madison, WI not be confused with solidarity groups,” (the Colombia Support Network). These one former senior Human Rights Watch committees have been important out- staff member told me. The organization posts of U.S.-based activism on Colom- devoted their substantial resources to bia, serving as a base for speaking tours publishing reports, promoting the use of of Colombian activists throughout U.S. international human rights legal standards, While membership in these committees and elite lobbying targeting the media has varied, in general they have maintai- and policymakers. However, the majo- ned a small core of participants who are a rity of professional human rights activists mix of progressive Colombian immigrant attempted, to a greater or lesser degree, to and U.S.-born activists; they have also ins- foster grassroots interest and mobilization, pired activists to create associated small generally employing the repertoire of committees in other cities. They have also

60 U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia • Winifred Tate

partnered where possible with interested activist working with an advocacy group, policymakers and analysts and academics. “the main goal of getting a better vote In one of the first major expressions of on the McGovern amendments, and interest among NGOs that previously had making sure that the vote was seen as a not addressed Colombia, in January 1998 I message to the Colombian government, helped organize a delegation to Colombia to the paramilitaries and to the military, of NGO leaders from Washington. The to clean up their act.” Activists working group included the director of WOLA, within LAWG would identify swing a senior associate from the Center for voters and attempt to mobilize people International Policy, and the then Deputy in their district to lobby the member Director of the Latin America Working of Congress. They would then contact Group as well as religious representatives membership organizations (including from the United Church of Christ. All religious groups, Amnesty International, went on to make Colombia advocacy and labor unions, and other grassroots orga- activism a major focus. In their lobbying nizations). Efforts to educate constituents on Plan Colombia, concern about para- on Colombian issues including bring military abuses, their ongoing links with speakers to tour those districts and con- officials, and impunity for past abuses were vening public meetings. In some cases, the central concerns. they attempted to reach out to particular constituencies with news of targeted 7. Limited Grassroots Colombians from those groups, such as Mobilization African Americans, women, unions, tea- All the members of the Colombia chers, and religious people. Attempting Steering Committee employed tactics to draw established activists into Colom- learned from previous activism and other bia work had limitations, however. One groups. Much of their work organized to activist concluded, “I don’t think we had target sympathetic members of Congress a significant impact. …In a lot of cases, to lead opposition (almost all Democra- with a lot of people, I think the people tic) to Colombian military assistance. One we would go to were the go-to activists of their central allies was Congressman on a lot of different issues, and Colombia Jim McGovern (D-MA). As a Congres- never became their priority issue.” sional aid, he had traveled to El Salvador There were a number of relatively in the 1980s to investigate impact of U.S. large events organized to mobilize inter- military aid there and worked on the est in Colombia between 2000 and 2003, Congressional commission investigating many centered around college campuses the murder of four Jesuit priests, their and through existing activist networks. housekeeper and her daughter by an One AI activist recalled hundreds of elite squad of U.S.-trained Salvadorian people attending events organized on the soldiers in 1989. His foreign policy aid, west Coast and Midwest teach-ins. “You Cindy Buhl, had served as the director of could tell there was growing grassroots Central America Working Group in the interest because there were large crowds at 1980s, and was also very active on the these events. And because of the growing Colombia issue. McGovern sponsored a support for the McGovern amendments. series of amendments to reduce military There was that kind of thing going on assistance to Colombia. According to one all the time, until September 11.” Activists

61 agree that the 9/11 attacks, and parti- and the United Nations (although the cularly the 2003 invasion of Iraq, had a U.S. is not a signatory to the majority profound impact on efforts to generate of human rights treaties); and military grassroots interest in Colombia. intervention (such as the 1994 Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti). Despite 8. Elite Lobbying Strategies significant effort devoted to develop- Despite these setbacks, human ment of some policy tools, to date there rights activists continued their elite lobb- is no consensus regarding the long-term ying efforts, working with allies within impact of these policies or which are the government and Congress. Throug- most effective (Mertus 2004; Sikkink hout the 1990s, a growing bureaucratic 2004). For example, some officials argue infrastructure within the government that the most appropriate policy towards developed to address human rights con- abusive government is engagement, cerns.4 Human rights policy tools deve- including financial assistance which loped by policymakers include private increases U.S. leverage, while others diplomatic discussions; public statements argue that cutting off assistance to gover- by government officials; documenting nments involved in violating human abuses in the annual State Department rights avoids implicating the U.S. in abu- reports; reporting on specific human ses and demonstrates the importance of rights issues as required by legislation; respect for human rights. It is important prioritizing aid to reflect human rights to note that unlike Western Europe and goals; human rights training programs Canada, where governmental human for military, police, government officials; rights agencies address domestic issues, sanctions; support for human rights cases U.S. governmental human rights efforts moving through the legal system; parti- are considered foreign policy initiatives cipation in verification and promotion and devoted exclusively toward attemp- missions; support for human rights work ting to influence the behavior of other at the Organization of American States governments.5

4 The broader context for this is, of course, that U.S.policies have in many cases contributed to human rights abuses as the U.S.offered support, and in some cases, direct participation, in the overthrow of democratically elected governments (such as in Guatemala 1954 and Chile in 1973) as well as supporting abusive military forces throughout the continent. The military regimes that replaced them engaged in the most serious abuses of the past century, including the disappear- ance and murder of hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans. The military regimes that took power in Brazil (1964- 1985), Uruguay (1973-1985), Chile (1973-1990), and Argentina (1976-1983) employed significant political violence against their real and perceived opponents, while enjoying U.S.support. U.S.policy also contributed to human rights abuses during the Central American civil wars of the 1980s, when the Reagan administration provided military assistance to abusive governments in El Salvador and Guatemala, and provided support for the Nicaraguan Contra forces. 5 The only U.S. state human rights agency is the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, the lead federal agency charged with implementing U.S. foreign policy and representing U.S. interests abroad. Originally called the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, the division was created in October 1977 by Congres- sional mandate and reflected Carter’s emphasis on human rights. The office was staffed with career Foreign Service Officers, while the first leaders were political appointees who had been active in the civil rights movement. The agency faced numerous obstacles including considerable resistance from other bureaus within the State Department. With only 20 staff members in 1979, President Ronald Reagan weakened the bureau. President Bill Clinton changed the name to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DHL) and expanded the mandate in 1998. Each March, by Congressional mandate, the DRL must produce hundreds of pages addressing a growing range of human rights issues in almost every country in the world; the 2004 report was 5,000 pages long and covered 194 countries. Embassy human rights officers draft the reports, which then are revised by DHL staff in Washington. These reports were often accused of political bias, particularly during the Reagan administration; by the end of his term, U.S. based human rights groups the Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights was publishing critical evaluations and counter-reports. The office also provides assistance to human rights programs abroad through USAID funded programs (Denzer 2000).

62 U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia • Winifred Tate

U.S. government human rights credibly alleged to have participated in policy was in part the result of dedica- gross violations of human rights abu- ted officials, but would not have made ses; the amendment was subsequently the limited progress it did without con- amended to all foreign military assis- siderable pressure from domestic advo- tance and made into permanent law. In cacy groups promoting human rights part because of its more limited scope, in Latin America. International non- this law has been more widely applied, governmental organizations including and military units in Colombia, Bolivia the religious organizations, solidarity and Mexico have been suspended from groups, and human rights groups provi- receiving U.S. assistance. ded training, support and public aware- Professional advocates, most of ness for human rights groups throughout them based in Washington, achieved the continent. Following Congressional some significant results through their concern over the accuracy of informa- elite lobbying strategy. In addition to tion from the executive following the documenting abuses, this work invol- Vietnam War and the Watergate scan- ved developing lobbying strategies, dal, members of Congress began taking relationships with government allies, a more activist orientation towards designing specific materials for use in foreign policy and international affairs. Washington lobbying, and providing Congress included Section 502B in the testimony and questions for members 1974 Foreign Assistance Act, requiring in hearings. Elite lobbying required that security assistance to governments detailed knowledge of policy processes, which grossly violated human rights to including the positions and motivations be restricted; in 1976 a provision was of distinct agencies and policymakers, as added allowing the president to conti- well as legislative and committee sche- nue aid to abusive governments under dules and procedures. In some cases, “extraordinary circumstances.” Section activists were able to get their concerns 116 of the 1976 Foreign Assistance written into the legislation, through Act required human rights conditions conditions placed on assistance and the be considered in economic aid as well. Leahy Law. However, these measures have never When Plan Colombia was pas- been applied. Country-specific condi- sed by Congress in 2000, the legisla- tions on human rights assistance were tion included human rights conditions applied to numerous countries inclu- focused mainly on severing the links ding Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and between the security forces and parami- Colombia. The Congressional Human litary groups.6 These measures required Rights Caucus was founded in 1983 that the State Department certify that to organize briefings and Congressio- the president of Colombia has issued nal testimony on human rights issues. a directive that cases involving soldiers In 1996, the Leahy Amendment barred and officers be tried within the civilian U.S. counternarcotics assistance units court system, and the officers in ques-

6 An additional condition included in the legislation required the implementation of a strategy resulting in the total elimi- nation of coca and opium by 2005.

63 tion suspended from duty, and that the What became the Leahy Law security forces are fully cooperating began as the Leahy Amendment, first with these measures and with investi- passed in 1996. The genesis of the gations, and the development of Judge bill was activist concern over military Advocate General Corps. Activists assistance to abusive units in Colom- involved in creating the conditions had bia. A 1994 Amnesty International drawn on previous examples imple- report included cases of human rights mented in the cases assistance to Serbia abuses in Colombia involving 13 spe- and Peru. In the first year, the Clinton cific military units. AI staff sent copies administration waived the conditions of the report and a letter requesting on the national security grounds; subse- information about the assistance and quently the Bush administration simply U.S. monitoring efforts to U.S. gover- certified over the objections of human nment officials but received no reply. rights groups. Despite the failure of the However, the U.S. embassy did pre- conditions to impact aid delivery, acti- pare a analysis revealing that 12 of the vists argued that the conditions served 13 units mentioned in the report had several important functions. First and received U.S. assistance; a sympathetic foremost, the conditions kept human official leaked the list to an investiga- rights issues in the debate, and forced tive journalist, who then passed it to a yearly discussion of the human rights AI staff in Washington. Meanwhile, situation in Colombia. The certifica- a Senate staffer concerned about the tion process also provided an important issue began an email exchange with the incentive for Colombian government AI Washington director, who modified action on specific cases in order to her proposal and sent them to Tim provide justification for the annual Reiser, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) certification. Unlike general human staff on the foreign relations commit- rights legislation, the conditions were tee with a profound commitment to written specifically in response to the human rights issues. situation in Colombia, and were modi- The Leahy Law began as requi- fied as the legislation went through ring the U.S. to suspend counternarco- the yearly appropriation process. NGO tics assistance to units credibly alleged activists complained, however, that the to have participated in abuses where Colombian government would present the government is not taking corrective statistics claiming to represent progress measures. The law was designed to be in terms of human rights but without narrower than Section 502B in that aid the real substantive changes in policy. was only suspended to particular units But in the words of one activist, “until rather than cut off to an entire country, September 10, we had something and although it did not include a wai- going. We were players, the human ver option the aid could be continued if rights community was in the game, we the recipient government demonstrated mattered. We didn’t get everything we that they were engaged in corrective wanted, we didn’t even get half of what measures (such as investigations of the we wanted, but we were relevant in a allegations). The measure was expanded way that we hadn’t been seven or ten to cover the entire foreign appropria- years before.” tions bill and eventually the Defense

64 U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia • Winifred Tate

Department; the amendment was also The Leahy Law has had a made into permanent law. The major substantial impact on U.S. policy in debates over implementation have Colombia, although not always in the focused on the interpretation of specific ways in which the original authors of wording, most importantly what consti- the bill may have wanted. Senior State tutes a “unit.” If an entire division, batta- Department and Defense Department lion, or company of military personnel officials who participated in the design were to be trained, clearly that would and implementation of the first years of constitute a unit and the entire group Plan Colombia agreed that the military would have to be vetted. For individuals strategy promoted by the United States attending training, the debate was over was determined in part by the Leahy whether or not his group had to be vet- amendment requirements. Throug- ted. Eventually, the interpretation was hout the 1990s, the majority of U.S. ruled to be that the “unit to be trained assistance was provided to the Colom- is the unit to be vetted;” thus even indi- bian National Police. In 1998, the U.S. vidual soldiers from abusive units may signed a new inter-military coope- participate in training unless abuse can ration agreement, and began training be traced to their name. Both AI staff and funding the first counternarcotics and the Congressional aids that worked battalion of the Colombian army. With on the legislation feel this interpretation Plan Colombia, the development of violates the intention of the bill. counternarcotics battalions became the The law was extremely contro- centerpiece of the “Push into Southern versial within the Colombian military Colombia”, with military assistance establishment; General Bonnett, then making up approximately 80% of the head of the armed forces, refused to sign package. As one senior policymaker told the required memorandum of agree- me, “They made the decision that no ment with the U.S. State Department unit that existed could meet the stan- stating that he would comply with the dard, so they started from scratch. There conditions for almost a year. Some U.S. were three new units created, and then officials also objected to the law. In they watched them like hawks.” Leahy one of the most notorious examples, requirements meant aid intended for declassified embassy cables revealed that some existing battalions, including the Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert 17th brigade and the 24th brigade, were told Colombian military officials, saying suspended. he would work to “remove conditions According to Leahy supporters, on assistance” and complained about the provision sent a very important the previous years of “leftist” influence message that human rights issues are in the U.S. Congress that “used human important to the U.S. Congress. The rights as an excuse to aid the left in law encouraged conscientious officials, other countries.” Hastert promised to along with investigative journalists and promote counternarcotics assistance activists, to pursue cases; it also required and recommended that Colombian tracking military assistance and vetting officials should “bypass the U.S. execu- its recipients. Activists and Congressio- tive branch and communicate directly nal staff concerned about Leahy imple- with Congress” (Evans 2002). mentation used the Senate confirmation

65 of ambassadors and public hearings to given current figures provided by ensure compliance, as well as to empha- human rights activists and journalists in size the importance of the human rights Colombia, it is difficult to see progress message. According to one former Con- on this front. According to one of the gressional aid, “my experience was that law’s first promoters, “I am not aware with career ambassadors before the of any place where the Leahy Amend- Senate, [if] you make any fuss or hint ment ended up being an anti-impunity that their confirmation could be in jeo- law.” However, Leahy supporters insist pardy[,] you can get them to really pay that the measure has been a useful tool attention. Working on the senate foreign to continue to bring human rights relations committee, the committee pressure on the U.S. government and had an unbelievable leverage point.” All their military allies. embassies were required to comply with Activists within the United Sta- the measure; some of the other well tes remain divided over the appropriate publicized cases in which compliance strategies to best promote social change with the Leahy Law led to the suspen- and human rights in the U.S. and in sion of aid include Mexico, Turkey and Colombia. Activists within grassroots Sri Lanka. organizations critique elite advocacy However, even Leahy suppor- requiring compromises and ‘insider’ ters acknowledge that the measure has strategies employed by NGOs in Was- severe limitations. First, it places the hington, believing their mandates to be burden on the victims of human rights more confrontational and protest orien- violations to identify their attackers, tated, with little interest in negotiating arguably creating an incentive for the their demands for dramatic changes establishment of irregular forces, dis- in U.S.policy. Others take issue with guising the identity of military forces the high turn over and relatively short during operations and the formation institutional memories of NGOs, cha- of paramilitary groups. Second, there racterized by low pay and long work is a clear loophole, employed by the hours, with many activists focused on U.S. in the case of Colombia: crea- political analysis rather than direct gras- ting new units to bypass the vetting sroots organizing. Such divisions have requirements. Rather than restricting long been common within activist coa- aid until the entire military force was litions, as scholars of social movements sufficiently reformed to pass Leahy have observed in other cases. requirements, the U.S. opted to create new military units geographically iso- Conclusions lated from the rest of the force. It’s also Academics and practioners see- important to note that the Leahy Law king to understand the possibilities and requires not a complete end to abuses, limitations of human rights activism but the absence of allegations or the need to look beyond the “mobilization lack of corrective measures including of shame” to the study of social move- investigations. Assessing the role of ments in order to better understand Leahy in encouraging the investigation, why some human rights crises generate prosecution and incarceration for those grassroots responses abroad and others responsible is also extremely difficult; do not. As I have presented here, the

66 U.S. Human Rights Activism and Plan Colombia • Winifred Tate

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