132nd Bergedorf Round Table Stability in the Persian Gulf: Regional and Transatlantic Perspectives Dec. 2nd – 4th, 2005, Dubai

CONTENT

Picture Documentation 1 Participants 20 Summary 21

Protocol

Welcome 22

I. A Framework for Political Stability 23 1. Stability and Nationalism 32 2. Democratization 40 3. Multilateral Initiatives 48

II. The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 56 1. Economy and the State 65 2. Models and Obstacles for Political Reform 70 3. Can Outside Pressure Trigger Reform ? 74

III. Security Challenges 79 1. Iran’s Nuclear Program 85 2. Iran’s Regional Responsibility 95 3. Frameworks for Security 98

Annex

Participants 104 Recommended Literature 110 Glossary 112 Index 117 Previous Round Tables 120 The Körber Foundation 131 Imprint 132 INITIATOR Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Director of Research, Chatham House, Dr. Kurt A. Körber The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London Riad Kahwaji, Chief Executive Officer, Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis, Dubai CHAIR Consul General Walter Leuchs, Consul General of the Federal Republic of Germany, Dr. Volker Perthes, Dubai Director, German Institute for International and Markus Löning, MdB, Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin Member of the German Bundestag, Berlin Ambassador Paul Freiherr von Maltzahn, Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Tehran SPEAKERS VLR I Matthias Meyer, Director, Near, Middle East, Sudan Affairs, Dr. Ghassan Atiyyah, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin Director, Iraq Foundation for Development and Dr. Rolf Mützenich, MdB Democracy, Baghdad Member of the German Bundestag, Berlin Robert Cooper, Dr. Thomas Paulsen, Director-General, External and Politico-Military Affairs, Managing Director, Bergedorf Round Table, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union, Körber Foundation, Berlin Brussels Dr. George Perkovich, Rami George Khouri, Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for Editor-at-Large, Daily Star, Beirut International Peace, Washington, D. C. Dr. Michael McFaul, Ruprecht Polenz, MdB, Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Member of the German Bundestag, Berlin Washington, D. C. Dr. Johannes Reissner, Ambassador Dr. Hossein Mousavian, Head, Research Unit Middle East and Africa, German Deputy for International Issues, Center for Strategic Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Research, Tehran Berlin Dr. Michael Schaefer, Ambassador Jürgen Steltzer, Political Director, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Abu Dhabi Dr. Klaus Wehmeier, PARTICIPANTS Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, Hamburg Ambassador Bagher Asadi, Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Senior Expert, Department of International Affairs, fmr. President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tehran Berlin Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, MdB, Christian Wriedt, Member of the German Bundestag, Berlin Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, Dr. Nasser Hadian, Hamburg Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Mohsen Ziya, University of Tehran, Tehran Partner and Chairman, Al Nasr Investment Group, UAE Christiane Hoffmann, Dr. Gottfried Zeitz, Journalist, Editorial Staff, Frankfurter Allgemeine Office of President Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin Zeitung, Frankfurt

20 21 SUMMARY

How can stability in the Persian Gulf be safeguarded? Participants from the region, the United States, and EU countries analyzed regional prerequisites for reforms, the roles of external actors, and possible ways of engaging Iran in a constructive dialog. One focus of the discussion was on terminological issues of democratization (pp. 43–47). The region’s people certainly long for law-based rule, freedom of ex- pression, and representation. Yet since the term “democracy” already has negative connotations there, should “good governance” become the operative expression instead? Or should the West refuse to make concessions ? Some Western speakers were among those favoring an approach that would respect local sensibilities in the use of language and take the whole spectrum of democratic institutions into consideration, instead of reducing “democracy” to just organizing elections. Does external pressure promote democratization? Participants from the region placed part of the blame for the radicalization of the Islamic world on the continuing Western military presence there (p. 57) and spelled out the negative effects of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq (pp. 26–27, 79–80), while Western speakers highlighted the stabilizing effect of Western troops (pp. 83–84). Security consid- erations alone compel the West to actively work for the region’s modernization on a democratic basis, said European participants. These speakers emphasized Europe was pursuing a longer-term “bottom-up” approach (pp. 29–30) to achieve this goal. On the question of whether the West should support free media and opposition groups in the region, even regional speakers disagreed with each other. While some called for this kind of assistance (p. 76), others criticized the U. S. sup- port for Iranian NGOs as counterproductive because they say it discredits the re- ceivers in the eyes of the government and sections of the population (p. 75). In analyzing the role of Iran the discussion revolved around Iran’s nuclear program. Western participants cited extensive evidence suggesting Iran actually harbors covert military ambitions (pp. 81–82). Speakers from Iran responded that Iran is a peaceful country and has not attacked anyone in centuries. Scientists are seeking to complete the nuclear fuel cycle only because the West reneged on its contractual obligations after the Iranian revolution to build reactors and provide nuclear fuel, these speakers said, and concluded that Iran’s legitimate right to complete the nuclear fuel cycle as a pilot project has to be respected. (pp. 88, 92, 94). While some European and American participants argued that having nuclear weapons would actually worsen Iran’s national security, others pointed out that the United States has a less aggressive foreign policy towards nuclear-armed coun- tries such as North Korea and Pakistan than toward Iran (pp. 90-92).

21 PROTOCOL

Welcome

von Weizsäcker Let me welcome you to Dubai and thank you for accepting the invitation to the 132nd Bergedorf Round Table, “Stability in the Persian Gulf.” Our topic is a most timely one, not only because of the conflict about the Iranian nuclear program and recent contro- versial remarks by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The region has also long been considered of central importance to international security in many other respects. Making progress in areas like democracy, human rights, the rule of law and modernization is there- fore of the utmost importance not only for the region, but also for the interna- tional community. The Körber Foundation’s Bergedorf Round Table is a private and independent institution, which allows us to speak freely and openly in an atmosphere of abso- lute confidentiality without having to produce a summit meeting protocol at the end. The reclusive character of this beautiful pavilion on the shores of the Gulf will no doubt foster the analysis of the region’s problems and the development of new approaches. Participants from Iran, Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates, the US and Europe will contribute their different views to form a comprehensive spectrum of positions on what to do in the Gulf region. As everybody at this table shares the aim of achieving stability, I am confident that everybody is eager to listen and learn from each other. Volker Perthes, Director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and a highly respected authority on the Middle East, will moderate our exchange of thoughts.

The Protocol contains an edited and authorized version of the participants’ oral contributions.

22 I. A Framework for Political Stability

We will proceed in three sessions. First, we will analyze the political conditions Perthes for stability in the Gulf region. Second, we are going to speak about the socioeco- nomic conditions for reform and third, we will focus on security in the region. The main questions, not necessarily in this order, are: Is there a relationship between foreign interventions and democracy ? Is there a relationship between socioeconomic change and reform ? And is there a relationship between democ- racy and stability ? We do not want to search solely for academic answers on what has happened, but also on what we expect from different political actors. My own institute, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin, was founded to provide scientific advice to the German Bundestag and the government, and I find this practical perspective very useful for focusing our thoughts. I would therefore like you to argue not only from an analytical stand- point, but also be prescriptive. We do not have to agree on definitions and we do not have to come up with a communiqué, even though there are many diplomats at this table, but we should come up with some advice on what should be done in the near future to ensure the democratic and prosperous development for this region. Ghassan Atiyyah, Director of the Iraq Foundation for Development and De- mocracy in Baghdad and Michael Schaefer, Political Director of the German For- eign Office have kindly agreed to introduce us to our first topic: the conditions and goals of political stability. Let us start with the regional perspective: Mr. Atiyyah, a view from Iraq.

The current situation in Iraq is very disappointing, not only to me, who returned Atiyyah there in April 2003 from 20 years in exile, but for most citizens of my country. I would like to point out some historical reasons for the current state of affairs. The Middle East, especially the countries of the so-called Fertile Crescent — Outside influence has shaped the Middle Iraq, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon —, has been shaped by outside influences, East since the end of the First World War especially since the end of the First World War. Until the end of the First World War Iraq was not even a nation, but only a geographical term in 1916. The Brit- ish were given sovereignty over this formerly Turkish territory in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and in 1919 they created the protectorate “Mesopotamia.” As a political entity, Iraq only came into being in 1921 when Emir Faisal was proclaimed King of Iraq by the British. In 1925, the country became a constitutional monarchy. The British were lucky to have King Faisal I because he helped them create something like an Iraqi identity. Iraq became the first independent Arab country and it en-

23 tered the League of Nations in 1932 and became a founding member of the UN and the Arab League. Furthermore, the Iraqi constitution of 1925 was created in a liberal, open-minded spirit and the people became more and more westernized. The integration between Sunnis and Shiites made progress, and more and more Shiites were included in the government. Just to demonstrate how many areas were covered by this attempt to homogenize the nation, King Faisal I even encour- aged Iraq’s people to wear a common headdress instead of the hitherto existing variety of more than 100 local headdresses. Outside influence by the British at this time was helpful to Iraq, both in de- veloping a more secular society and in creating a good educational system, infra- structure, and a functioning economy. Both the British and the Iraqis benefited from this development. Furthermore, the Baghdad Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Iraq, Britain, Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, created on the initiative of the US and NATO and signed in 1955, served as a framework for regional stability. The Cold War and Arab nationalism Two factors changed the situation in Iraq and in the entire Middle East: the changed everything Cold War and the rise of Arab nationalism in the form of Nasserism. After the re- volt against the corrupt monarchy in Egypt in 1952 and the rise to power of the of- ficer Gamal Abd El Nasser (Prime Minister in 1954, President in 1956), every young officer in the Middle East dreamed of becoming another Nasser. He seemed to set an example of how to change one’s country: through a revolutionary process, not through democratic and free elections. In the Arab World, reforms became associ- ated with dictatorship, not democracy. Furthermore, the Suez Crisis, triggered by Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, marked the beginning of the USSR’s increased activities in the Middle East. In Iraq, the pro-Western monarchy was overthrown in 1958 when King Faisal II was murdered and General Kassem came to power and moved closer to the So- viet Union. This sentnce seems odd— it reads like the army/Baath party toppled Kassem in 1963 and the army took power in 1968 — but who was in power from 1963–1968 ?That was the moment of Saddam Hussein. First he created a centralized government, then a dictatorship. As a politician, he was Janus-faced: Vice-president Saddam revived the economy and the educational system, but President Saddam wanted to secure his place in history by seeking a dominant role for Iraq in the re- gion, leading his country first into a war against Iran and then against Kuwait. The opposition in Iraq received no support from Arab countries so it turned to the Amer- icans, even to the Communist Party and also the Shiite Islamists. But America had to choose between reforms and stability and, without doubt, during these years, the

A Framework for Political Stability 24 25 main worry of the West was not the autocratic aspects of Saddam Hussein’s regime, but containment of the Soviet Union. Democratization and reforms were neglected for the sake of stability. Opposition to Saddam found no support in the US. One must take into account this history of external influences and disap- Today, Western influence pointed hopes if one wants to implement democracy today. You have to be very is met with mistrust careful as a Westerner because everything you do can have the reverse effect. The decision of the Bush Administration to embrace regime change and foster democ- ratization throughout the Middle East under the assumption that democracies do not wage war against one another was not coherent with previous US policy. Understandably, this makes people in the region suspicious. And the first experi- ences with democracy in Iraq have not been very encouraging. Today, there are two approaches toward the Middle East, a European and an The EU uses incentives … American one. The European approach depends on incentives and can be very suc- cessful if the incentive is the chance to become an EU member, as you can see in Turkey. Its downside is, many people say, that it lacks teeth. Beyond the promise of membership, it has no effective leverage. The American version, by contrast, aims at regime change through pressure … while the Americans apply pressure and, if necessary, through the invasion of a country. The influential group of the so-called neo-cons in Washington wanted to create a new order in the Gulf region to ensure stability and, eventually, democracy. This imperial approach was based on unilateralism and took no care to embed America’s policy in an international framework. Only a year ago, in November 2004, the Americans did not give the Arab States any chance to play a role in or even to voice an open opinion on Iraq. They rejected the idea of the Arab League holding a national reconciliation meet- ing for Iraq. Pax Americana in the American Gulf (instead of the Persian or Arab Gulf) was what they wanted. I think that the Americans planned on achieving democratization in a way similar to what they did in Germany and Japan after 1945. They wanted to change the regime, stabilize the country and then teach the Iraqis how to become democratic. As we all know, this American approach has not worked out very well thus far. The invasion and the removal of Saddam Hussein from power was a brilliant military operation, but its general advisability remains questionable and Ameri- can policies in post-Saddam Iraq have largely been a failure. As to the idea of toppling Saddam, no American president in his right mind would have undertaken it after weighing the risks and costs against the benefits.

A Framework for Political Stability 24 25 Only a deeply ideologically motivated person like George W. Bush with the sup- port of a group like the neo-cons was capable of taking and implementing that decision. As far as the policy after the victory over Saddam is concerned, the fundamen- tal problem is that the Americans refused to play the role of facilitators among the Iraqis but decided to become the rulers and in some way tried to make themselves the gods of the country. The US made countless mistakes in Iraq The US committed some of its cardinal mistakes in Iraq in blatant contradic- tion of the policy recommendations the government itself had had developed before. I was a co-chairman of the US State Department’s “Future of Iraq” project. For months, more than ten Iraqis of different backgrounds discussed how to ensure stability after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Two of the most important issues were the future of the army and the future of the ruling Baath Party. As for the army, we strongly recommended not to cut it, but to trim it, because it was always one of the backbones of our national identity. It was established even before the state of Iraq was created. Baath ideology can be mixed As for the Baath party, it should not have been criminalized. It resembled with everything the Communist Party of the Soviet Union rather than the National Socialist Party of the »Third Reich«. When the Soviet Union collapsed, no member of the CPSU was court-martialed, and rightly so. The Baathist ideology itself is neither fascist nor communist. Saddam Hussein used to say, Baath is like tomato juice, you can mix it with anything, especially with pan-Arabic rhetoric, as he frequently did. Both recommendations have, as you know, not been followed — with detrimental consequences. Instead of promoting democracy, the Americans replaced the people who had fought for democracy. Furthermore, the Americans divided the Iraqis into victors — Kurds and Shiites — and vanquished — the Sunni. The Sunni were quite willing to cooperate with the Americans after the invasion because they were glad that Saddam was overthrown by the US and not by the Iraqi Shiites. Remember that hardly any Sunni soldiers fought the invaders. But the US missed the chance to take them in from day one. The invasion has not brought The US also missed the opportunity to legitimize their invasion by making life a better life for Iraqis better for the Iraqi people. Unlike the British, who won the respect of the popula- tion after the invasion of Mosul in 1918 by immediately caring for the starving,

A Framework for Political Stability 26 27 The crisis in Iraq also represents an opportunity.

Atiyyah

the Americans did not care for and did not create better living conditions. Had American rule meant cleaner water, better food, a secure provision of basic needs for everybody, the attitude in Iraq would be totally different today. The Americans had a real chance to promote democracy in the Arab world, but, to my mind, they blew it in pretty much every area. In the end, they inadvert- ently opened the door for Islamist tendencies and for a politicized form of Islam. But once you politicize Islam in an ethnically and religiously divided country like Iraq, you have a perfect recipe for civil war. All the insurgents are now readily wearing the gown of Islam. Elections in a divided country are a dangerous thing, as Angola and Cambodia show us, and the US does not seem capable of preventing the situation from getting out of hand. Today, Iraq is on the verge of becoming a failed state. The consequences of that If Iraq becomes a failed state … would be disastrous, first for Iraq itself where the vacuum would soon be filled by its neighbors, most notably by Iran, which will become for Iraq what Syria became for Lebanon. Moreover, the country will be (fragmented or) split into three ter- ritories, defined by ethnic and religious identities. Massoud Barzani, head of the Autonomous Kurdish Government in Northern Iraq, has repeatedly said that in case of chaos or civil war in Iraq, the Kurds will declare their independence. Many Sunni already today propose letting the Shiites go to Iran and aligning themselves with the Arabs. But failure in Iraq would have grave repercussions not only on region but on … that will have grave repercussions the rest of the world, too. The United States might change to an isolationist policy, on the entire world and if Iraq turns out to be a disaster, nobody in the world will ever again accept lectures about reform or democratization from the West. We all have an interest in bringing the process, which began with the American invasion, to a successful end — even those who opposed the invasion from the beginning. The US is beginning to learn from this and to realize that it needs help in Iraq. Success in Iraq must be based on regional and international cooperation if it is to be a sustainable peace acceptable to the different actors in this divided country and not only a short period of lesser violence that allows America to pull out. Eu- rope and Russia must have a stake in Iraq, and also Iran and Saudi Arabia as the protectors of the Shia and the Sunni. Only if all these actors work together and contribute their specific expertise and political clout, will we be able to provide real stability and a face-saving formula for the Americans to pull out. To my mind, the crisis in Iraq also represents an opportunity. New regional frameworks often emerge after big wars. For example, after the Napoleonic Wars,

A Framework for Political Stability 26 27 the Congress of Vienna established a new order for Europe in 1815 that lasted for several decades. After World War II, countries in Western Europe finally found the necessary strength to embark on the journey towards European integration. America and Europe must work America should try to build a much larger coalition of states to support its together to stabilize Iraq efforts to stabilize Iraq. The Europeans, especially Germany, France, and Spain, which have criticized America’s strategy, can also play a role as peacekeepers. The cooperation between France and the US in Lebanon, for example, was very successful — together they pressured Syria into accepting expanded investigations into the murder of former Prime Minister Hariri. Paris and Washington co-spon- sored UN Security Council Resolution 1559 that called on Syria to remove its mili- tary and intelligence forces from Lebanon — which Syria did in April 2005. But US-European cooperation, important as it may be, is not enough. I strongly advise the US to also work with Iraq’s neighbors, because that is the only way to overcome the anti-American sentiments in the region. The most important of these neighboring countries is of course Iran. Together with the US, Iran is the major player in Iraq. The Iranians already fill the power vacuum in Iraq and the southern part of the country is now almost completely under Iranian influence. As long as the US and Iran, as the two most important external players, do not cooperate on Iraq, I look to the future of my country with concern.

Perthes You have criticized the European approach to the Middle East for its alleged lack of teeth. Fortunately, somebody who doubtlessly does have teeth, Michael Schaefer, is here to tell us more about the chances and the limitations of this approach.

Schaefer I will structure my presentation around four questions posed to me by the or- ganizers: Are external actors serious in their demand for democracy ? Is external pressure the right formula for achieving democratization ? What are the main ob- stacles for reforms in the region ? And finally: Should the West rather keep out ? As to the first question, are external actors serious in their demand for democ- racy ? Well, the EU, for one, certainly is serious, because democracy in the region is in Europe’s strategic interest. It is easy to see that the ongoing crises — the Palestin- ian-Israeli conflict, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Syrian-Lebanese crisis — pose immediate and grave threats not only to our energy supply but also to the very stability of Europe. Europe needs democratic neighbors The European Security Strategy, formulated in 2003 as part of the EU’s process for security reasons of strategic orientation and establishment as a major foreign policy actor, is based

A Framework for Political Stability 28 29 on the concept of comprehensive security. It underlines that the best form of pro- tection for our security is a neighborhood of stable democratic market economies. But how to build these democratic states ? Democracy is not only about elections, but about good governance, social and political reforms, and dealing with corrup- tion and the abuse of power. The most important task, though, is building the rule of law. Our experience with recent transformation processes shows that this is the backbone of building a society capable of being an independent actor in international affairs. Is external pressure the right instrument for achieving democratization ? I could simply answer this second question with “no”, hinting to the widespread perception in the region that the US administration’s quest for freedom and democracy is a pretext for imposing American values and securing American interests through regime change. I would like to develop a more nuanced reply, though. I am convinced that neither the representatives of the EU nor those of the US administration want to export a specific Western-style model of democracy when they demand democratization. We strive for a process of modernizing socie- ties, building on the very cultural, religious and historic identity of each country. We believe that the region should not be left alone in its quest for modernization. American, European and other outside actors should help societies to cope with the challenges of globalization and modern development. The problem is that, I must admit, we have yet to work on how to achieve that. We have made some important first steps, though. The EU’s Barcelona Process The Barcelona Process was a first step, aims at encouraging dialog and cooperation among the countries of the Mediter- but much remains to be done ranean region to implement very concrete political projects. The Barcelona Proc- ess might not have made as much progress as we would wish since its creation in 1995. But it has established a formal framework that has opened avenues of cooperation in important fields like education. A second process, the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), was devised one and a half years ago. Drafted in the State Department as an initiative of the American G 8 presidency, the concept was changed signifi- cantly during the run-up to the G 8 summit on Sea Island in June 2004. The final document without doubt bears the imprint of the EU. The American top-down approach was complemented by the European bottom-up approach of taking into account the needs of societies in the region. While the Americans had formulated an agenda for transformation as an octroi, the Europeans asked for the priorities of the region itself. To my mind, the BMENA is a convincing synthesis of both ap-

A Framework for Political Stability 28 29 proaches. My assessment of outside pressure would thus be that it can be useful to a certain extent as long as it is embedded in a comprehensive partnership with, and engagement of the societies we want to influence. Changing societies is not a short-term activity, but a distinctively long-term process. This insight, however, is hard to keep up, especially in our political systems in which political actors are evaluated from one legislative period to the next. The European Union, and Germany in particular, ought to be much more active in Iraq, despite all earlier disagreement with the United States about the justification for invasion. Our common big challenge will be successfully conduct- ing the elections in Iraq to pave the way for the establishment of a functioning democratic system. Iraq needs a commonly accepted constitution. That will only be possible if we find a balance between the Shia majority and Sunni and Kurdish minorities. If we fail to integrate a large part of the Sunnis in the election proc- ess, we will be in trouble. Therefore, the majority must offer incentives for the minorities to participate in the democratic process. That is not the easiest thing, as our experience in the Balkans has shown. Training of the Iraqi police alone will not suffice to make the Iraqi political system work. Therefore Germany will participate actively in building political institutions and the administration. Two short remarks on Iran in this context. First, as to the direction and the speed of the reform process, we of course have to respect national pride and self- esteem, but when the developments endanger regional stability, this is a legiti- mate issue of concern for the international community. Second, human rights are not menu items in a self-service restaurant. All UN member states have accepted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and should act accordingly. With its Human Rights Dialog the EU fosters this insight, not via octroi but through incen- tives. We engage Iran and our other partners in the region to promote these basic humanitarian standards within their societies in order to enhance stability. Reforms are hindered by Now to the third question: What are the main obstacles to reform ? Certainly, the region’s autocratic leaders the region’s autocratic leadership structures are a major impediment. The de- piction of democratization as an instrument of Western imperialists by many autocrats — aimed at curbing democratic aspirations and retaining power — does, unfortunately, resonate quite well with certain parts of the population. To make people immune against pseudo-religious or pseudo-political concepts, we need to work patiently for empowering and strengthening civil societies. But while a functioning civil society is an antidote against government propaganda, we also need to build institutions to demonstrate to people in the Middle East the advan-

A Framework for Political Stability 30 31 tages of a functioning democratic framework. Only that will allow us to rein in the danger of nationalism. Another major obstacle to democratization is the new nationalism emerging New nationalism endangers in the region. While the rest of the world is increasingly forced to globalize and democratic tendencies to develop cross-border approaches to transnational challenges, many countries in the Middle East have started developing an aggressive form of self-centered ideol- ogy which denounces fundamental human rights, the rule of law, and democracy as instruments of Western domination. These countries are tempted to resort to 19th century forms of nationalism. Only building functioning institutions will al- low good governance and the rule of law to take root in this region. The developments in the European neighborhood, especially in Eastern Eu- Democratization can trigger a domino effect rope, demonstrate that the spread of democracy is maybe not quite a scientific law, but that it does certainly create a fascinating domino effect. Autocratic rulers quite rightly perceive that as an immediate threat. Therefore they deftly counter Western demands for reform with the argument that reforms in non-Western cul- tures must follow different paths, thus formulating a politically correct pretext for streamlining their societies even more under the pretext of furthering reforms. This leads to processes of self-destruction and self-isolation for their respective societies. Of course, reforms must take into account the religious and cultural conditions of each country. But the West must make very clear that the demand for reforms does come, and has to come, from within society in order to ensure participation in the economic and social fruits of globalization. This already to a certain extent answers the last question: Should the West Europe has achieved stability and welfare — keep out ? The answer is no, because this region is our neighborhood and there- why not the Middle East ? fore its security and stability is our security and stability as well. But we need a different approach. Europe and the US must engage in a comprehensive transat- lantic dialog that allows both sides to contribute their respective strengths. The Europeans should share their experiences in overcoming internal instability and regional conflict, which includes various multilateral approaches such as the Council of Europe, the EU, and the OSCE process, based on common values, common standards, human rights, the rule of law, good governance and partici- pation. In particular, the CSCE process of the 1970s provides important ideas on how counterparts with very different ideologies can find ways to cooperate. Even though European institutions should not be seen as role models for the region, they can provide a conceptual framework on how to overcome old trenches. Eu- rope as a region shows how relatively quickly hostile nations can integrate into

A Framework for Political Stability 30 31 a stable common framework allowing for stability and welfare. That raises hope for this region, doesn’t it ?

Cooper I hesitate to agree with your condemnation of autocrats. The older I get, the more Kings can be good reformers I find myself in favor of kings. Actually, if I had to chose a non-democratic regime, I would rather live in a monarchy than in a dictatorship. There are constitutional monarchies, but no constitutional dictatorships. Moreover, kings generally feel safer and have less to lose than dictators, because their family’s position has been constitutionally enshrined for centuries and their son is guaranteed to be king as well. Hence, good dictators are much rarer than good kings. Monarchies can provide reliable frameworks for constitutional change and democratization. In Europe, countries that have preserved their monarchies are among the most democratic. The strong democratic traditions of the Netherlands or of the Scandinavian nations, for example, are widely acknowledged. In the Middle East, several monarchies are indisputably reforming more resolutely than many non-monarchies in the region. Some admirable things are happening in Morocco at the moment, and guess who is doing them ? King Mohammed VI. Had Saudi Arabia’s reformist King Faysal not been murdered in 1975, the developments might have taken another turn. Of course, there are as many bad kings as there are good ones, but every now and then you get lucky and things move on.

Khouri Mr. Cooper, how about exchanging your British citizenship for some of our Arab Would you like to live in citizenships for one year to see how that affects your inclination toward monar- a Middle Eastern monarchy ? chies ? You will soon awaken to the widespread and usually well justified discon- tent in most Middle Eastern monarchies. It is not by chance that terrorists like Osama Bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi are both products of such systems.

Perthes Maybe we should keep your apologia of monarchies in mind when it comes to discussing the future of the European Constitution, Mr. Cooper ?

1. Stability and Nationalism

Perthes I would now like to focus our discussion on a notion that Michael Schaefer invoked as overarching concept of European policy: stability. Stability can mean very dif- ferent things and can justify very different courses of action in different situations. In the name of stability, the German and other European governments refused to

A Framework for Political Stability 32 33 Stability and Nationalism The opposite trend to religious fundamentalism would be nationalism.

Kahwaji

participate in the invasion of Iraq, but now they are willing to engage themselves in order to re-stabilize the country. Michael McFaul, the US certainly did not go to Iraq to stabilize Saddam’s regime. Was the American concept to de-stabilize the region in the name of stability — in order to re-stabilize it according to their own model ?

The Bush Administration is indeed convinced that the alleged stability in the Mid- McFaul dle East was a bad thing insofar as for the past 40 years it has failed to create secu- Stability no longer trumps all other rity. Stability no longer trumps all other interests in American Middle East policy. US interests in the Middle East Some proponents of this new approach feel encouraged by political changes in Lebanon, Egypt, Morocco, and elsewhere and the administration sticks to the idea in spite of the considerable problems in Iraq. The recent developments there have led to a certain counter-movement within the United States, though.

Mr. Cooper, could you as the architect of the European Security Strategy describe Perthes in a few words the role of stability for this strategy ?

The European Security Strategy does not define security as stability. It is based on Cooper the idea that change is inevitable and frequently desirable, and that change is best managed within a multilateral framework.

The more homogeneous a society, the more stable it is. But the countries in the Kahwaji region are ethnically and religiously diverse. In the era of 19th century imperialism or in the settlements after the First World War, Western countries grouped to- gether a chunk from here with a chunk from there, regardless of ethnic divides. Our nations never had the chance to build a national identity from within. Against this background, their politics have been determined by the struggle between nationalist tendencies and religious fundamentalism during the past decades. During the Cold War, there was a clear divide between left and right, between the The ideological vacuum after World War I supporters of the West and the followers of the Soviet Union. Religious forces were was filled by the Islamists just a minor actor in the political spectrum. But after the collapse of the Communist empire, most leftist camps just faded away, leaving a vacuum, which was easily filled by religious fundamentalists presenting themselves as the main opposition force. To cope with this new threat, many dictators resorted to employing religious rhetoric. The opposite trend to religious fundamentalism would, in my eyes, be nation- alism. But groups like the Kurds or the Assyrians feel threatened by pan-Arab na- tionalism, because they neither constitute the ethnic majority in their countries

A Framework for Political Stability 32 33 Stability and Nationalism nor belong to the Arab world. Nationalism might be useful as a counterforce to religious fundamentalism. But the diversity of the countries in the Gulf makes the guarantee of minorities’ rights and the establishment of functioning democratic procedures a precondition for building states on national identities. Minorities must be able to keep their identity while integrating into the nation-state. Iraq is a prime example of the problems at hand. A Pandora’s box has been opened After Saddam Hussein tried for decades to impose an Iraqi identity upon his in Iraq following the invasion: people, the Americans opened a Pandora’s Box of diverging ethnic and religious Ethnic and religious rivalries identities and interests when they toppled Saddam and dissolved the structures of his state. In the UAE, the strong tribal identity has united people on a different level that allows for a stable society and eventually the creation of a regional framework for integration. These tribes are interconnected through marriage and business. Religious fundamentalism and religious feuds are hardly a problem. In Saudi Ara- bia, by contrast, sectarian groups and economic and social divides pose more of a challenge. But even there, the ordinary citizen is open to regional integration. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is successful on the popular level because people here, especially those from societies with tribal structures, are quite willing to live within a larger entity. The leaders, of course, have their personal interests to protect and are therefore rather opposed to integrating their countries into a multilateral framework.

Perthes Mr. Atiyyah pointed out the crucial role of Arab nationalism for the region in the 1960s, Mr. Schaefer identified new nationalism as a major obstacle to reform and Mr. Kahwaji pointed out the opportunities and risks of pan-Arab nationalism. The destructive side of nationalist sentiments was obvious for example during the Iran-Iraq war, when nationalist slogans, defining the enemy as despicable because of his ethnicity, were widespread. In the dispute between Iran and the UAE over the strategically located islands Abu Musa, Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs near the Strait of Hormuz, nationalist sentiments are invoked regularly. Is nationalism in the region rather a destructive force or is it also used to define a community that pools resources and finds ways to ensure the participation of its members ? How is Middle Eastern nationalism perceived in the US ?

McFaul Recently, a group within the Administration has been proposing a new line of think- ing. They recommend using nationalism in the Middle East to counter other, more

A Framework for Political Stability 34 35 Stability and Nationalism extreme ideologies. Personally, I am very skeptical as to whether we should try to The Pentagon thinks about using nationalism use nationalism as a tool, because there is always the danger of people abusing as a counter force against other ideologies nationalist feelings and creating a dynamic that can get out of control anytime.

If we plan to analyze the role of nationalism in the region, clarifying the concept’s Cooper meaning beforehand might be quite useful. Speaking, as Mr. Atiyyah did, about There is no such thing as Arab nationalism Arab nationalism, means invoking a conceptual non-entity. There never was a real movement to create a unified Arab nation with a common border and proper in- stitutions, therefore there never was Arab nationalism in the true sense of the word. Arab nationalism is not nationalism but something else, a fig leaf for a whole panoply of other motives and objectives. What one would aim at in Iraq, if one wanted to foster nationalism there, would be Iraqi, not Arab nationalism. Such a kind of nationalism can indeed be a positive force. Development in In Europe, nationalism was crucial the region — i. e. political development, because the much-discussed notion of for creating loyalty to the state economic development turns out to be a chimera if you take a closer look — de- pends on turning people into loyal citizens in the democratic sense of the word. To create the loyalty needed for a functioning state, to make people accept that a candidate whom they did not vote for but who won 55 % of the popular vote and implements policies they resent leads the government, to make citizens pay taxes, each state needs a certain sense of community. In Europe, this sense has been based on nationalism during the past 200 years. The community upon which citizens conferred their loyalty has been a national community ever since the Peace of Westphalia established the concept of the sovereign nation-state in 1648. There might of course be other ways and forms. But drawing on the Euro- pean experience, I would say that if you want to talk democracy, you have to talk nationalism.

I presume all of us concur that nationalism is a potent factor, for all of us, in every Asadi society, and one that we have to live with. It is impossible to get rid of it altogeth- We will always have to live with nationalism er — even if that were to be considered desirable. The recent ethnic conflicts in the Balkans — in the direct neighborhood of Europe — showed clearly that it is a pipe dream to factor out nationalism, ethnicism or tribalism. They are and will remain important determining factors of human society, whether we like it or not. What we really need is to arrive at a sophisticated understanding of their role in human societies and how — I am afraid, this is the difficult part — they affect and shape the behaviour of individuals and communities.

A Framework for Political Stability 34 35 Stability and Nationalism The traditional reading of Islam and the concept of the nation-state are irreconcilable.

Hadian

Schaefer I stick to my negative assessment of nationalism. Due to our historical experience, Nationalism is dangerous because Germans are particularly sensitive to any kind of -ism, especially nationalism. The of its aggressive potential main reason for my resentment is that nationalism is inherently directed against a third party and always has an aggressive undertone. National identity is a very important factor for stability in any society, but nationalism has a destructive potential.

Reissner I would also like to challenge Mr. Cooper’s praise of nationalism. Is democracy inevitably linked to nationalism because it was like that in European history ? I doubt it and I wonder what kind of nationalism will eventually emerge in the Arab world. It seems that by now alternatives to the old-fashioned, Nasser-style, top- down nationalism are developing. Whatever the nature of the Arab nation-state will be, it will have to be capable of coping with the challenges of globalization on the one hand and of mobilizing the loyalty of its citizens on the other.

Atiyyah Mr. Cooper was right in expounding the conceptual problems of the notion of “Arab nationalism”. When I studied in Lebanon decades ago, everybody spoke of Arab nationalism, but nobody defined what that was supposed to be. It was indeed used as a sort of fig leaf for mustering political support. The Palestinians called out to the Arabs to help them against Israel. The Iraqis invoked Arab nationalism in the 1960s to get their Syrian brothers’ support for suppressing the Kurds. When Saddam Hussein spoke about Arab nationalism, he was promoting himself as a custodian of the whole Arab nation. These days, Arab nationalism is a mere syno- nym for cultural identity. But this identity is in a crisis, not only in Iraq but throughout the whole Arab world.

Hadian National identity and nationalism face a fundamental problem in the Middle East. To my mind, the traditional reading of Islam and the concept of the nation-state are irreconcilable. This is a problem not only for the Arab world, but also for Western states with large Muslim minorities. You may say that theories about Is- lam and the nation-state are too abstract to have a political impact, but a convinc- ing interpretation is a precondition for allowing Muslim citizens to be loyal to their nation-state. Can the concept of the nation-state I am therefore glad about the vivid debate on that topic going on in the Muslim be reconciled with Islam ? world. The existing views can be divided into four categories. First, the traditional, conservative interpretation of Islam claims that all Muslims are brothers and

A Framework for Political Stability 36 37 Stability and Nationalism sisters and that political and territorial borders are thus meaningless. This is the interpretation preferred by most Muslims living in Western countries. Second, the ideological interpretation of Islam demands that the unity of all Muslims should be seen as a political goal. Third, scholars in Iran are developing a reformist interpre- tation of Islam, in the attempt to reconcile Islam with the institutions and ideas of nation-state on an ontological and epistemological level for the first time in more than a century. The fourth interpretation, which is just developing, is a secular version of Islam which will not conflict with the idea of the nation-state at all.

You were talking about the praiseworthy attempt to reconcile Islam and the na- Hoffmann tion-state in Iran. I think this is essentially what the new president Ahmadinejad Ahmadinejad amalgamates Islamism is trying to do. He indeed almalgamates Islamist ideas with nationalistic topics in and nationalism in a dangerous way a way that is, to my knowledge, new in Iranian history. For the first time national- ism is not combined with secularism and the struggle for democratization, but is used to rally support for an Islamist government. I would not call this a reconcili- ation with a positive impact, though, but rather a very dangerous development

I was not talking about these developments. Instead, I wanted to point out, first, Hadian that in spite of the religious foundation of our government, Iranian society is the most secular of all Muslim societies. Surprisingly, our religious government has even contributed to the emergence of this very modern and secular social sphere. Second, I wish for a reconciliation of nation and religion that will be quite the opposite of fusing nationalism with Islamism. We need a nation-state based on the notion of citizenry and its implications, which means individual human rights. My idea of a nation-state is that I am an Iranian citizen because I live on that particular territory, and as a citizen of Iran I have the freedom to be a Communist citizen or an Islamist citizen or a nationalist citizen or whatever I choose to be within the limits of my constitutional rights.

In Iran, nationalism and Islamism — or the religious factor — have been the two Asadi dominating and deeply intertwined aspects determining our identity, respectively Iran needs to find a balance several millennia for what can be reckoned as the traditional Iranian nationalism, between nationalism and Islam and for 14 centuries for the Islamic factor. The dynamic, intricate interaction be- tween them has played a critical role in shaping the dominant political concepts and processes in modern Iran since the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 –06 with

A Framework for Political Stability 36 37 Stability and Nationalism a still unfolding dynamism. As none of them can or should be neglected — let alone be suppressed — we Iranians must find a commonly accepted balance between them to be able to move towards achieving long-term, sustainable stability. Iran’s intellectual elites — across a wide political and ideological spectrum — have been working at this for almost a century, and we are still working on it. Let me also further emphasize the relevance and role of the specific reading of religion — Is- lam — in this regard, as my other Iranian colleague just alluded to.

Hoffmann I see a great danger, that some people in Washington will try to exploit ethnic Will America use ethnic rifts rifts in Iran to put the regime in Tehran under pressure and work in the direction to put pressure on Teheran ? of regime change. Fearing a nuclear Iran, the hardliners in Washington are cur- rently stepping up their efforts to destabilize the regime. Drawing on the experi- ences of the Cold War and the eventual breakdown of the Soviet Union, they use clandestine programs to — as they claim — promote democracy in Iran. I am afraid that somebody might come up with the idea to instigate ethnic tensions to use ethnic minorities who according to estimates account to more than half of the Iranian population to undermine the position of the Mullahs. Since the summer we have already witnessed rising tensions in Kurdistan, with the Arabs in Khus- estan and the Balutch in Sistan-Balutchistan. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have disturbed the fragile order in these border regions, and it should not be too difficult to instigate and exploit this unrest. To my mind it is the most promising way to create trouble for Tehran but it is also the most dangerous. There is no way that the resulting chaos could be controlled by those who instigated it. Promoting ethnic violence in a country with an essentially pre-modern form of coexistence between ethnic groups will lead us not to a Soviet but to a Jugoslav scenario.

Khouri The basis for any kind of nationalist identity in the Middle East would be a funda- How to establish national identities mentally sound nation-state, but there is no such thing in the region. No ethnic in the Middle East … group and no single citizen here has ever had the opportunity to engage in the process of national self-determination in recent centuries; instead, modern states and their elites were either imposed by the Europeans or through military coups and maintained by local elites and autocrats. Many people look at the existing nation-states as unsatisfactory remnants of European colonialism. Those states are in danger of being broken down into smaller ethnicities and militias. Between 1920 and 1960 our tribes used to display their flags, nowadays they all have their own militias.

A Framework for Political Stability 38 39 Stability and Nationalism I wish the Western governments promoted self-determination in the Middle East as they did in the Soviet Empire.

Khouri

As the configuration of our nations has never been defined by their own peo- … without sound nation-states ? ple and as there is no credible participatory process, we are completely ignorant of whether the majority of people in the region consider their states legitimate and are loyal to them. We know very little about the real political preferences of people in the region, because they have no chance to express their will in free and fair elections or in parliaments that accurately represent their populations. As of now, we only have a few ideas based on polls. I do not know whether, for example, Bahrain, Lebanon, Iraq or Tunisia are fully legitimate or natural nations — I am not saying they are not, but neither I nor anybody else knows. My personal impression is that many people talk not so much about the Arab states, but rather speak of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds; Maronites, Copts and Druse; and Orthodox and Berbers. Western powers do not comprehend the fundamental nature of the problem. They think that they have learned, and plan to carve up the Arab world again, this time in terms of Shia and Kurds and Sunnis. But that would only mean to make the same mistake again and would lead to a catastrophe similar to the one we had after 1920. What we need to do is reconsider the basic configurations of the existing nation-states. What we need to do is give people a chance to redefine their national affiliation, once and for all. What we need is not a re-run of European colonialism or post-World War I decolonization, but self-determination for the citizens of the Middle East. I wish the Western governments had that same kind of open-minded attitude to self-determination among the people in the Middle East as they had towards the reconfiguration of the Soviet Empire. That would also be the only way to lasting stability. Security or stability cannot We need self-determination ! be imposed, but must be developed through self-determination and participation of the citizens. When you are able to live a normal life, when you are treated decently by your own government, when you are not occupied by foreign armies, when you are not attacked by neighboring countries, when citizens can enjoy their basic human or civil or democratic rights, security and stability will flourish.

Stability and security are indeed the consequence of a process. They are not zu Guttenberg something we can realize through a fiat. Maybe we as Westerners should not overstretch the term “goal” when defining what we seek to achieve in the region, but rather speak of a “process.”

Mr. Khouri, of course the aspirations of the people in the region are the founda- Schaefer tion of any efforts of nation building and democratization, not only in the Middle

A Framework for Political Stability 38 39 Stability and Nationalism Many people in the region are quite aware of the distinction between national identity and an aggressive form of nationalism.

Perthes

Self-determination is crucial, but why not East. I have learned from my work in the Balkans that the most important thing learn from other countries’ experiences ? is to allow people to develop their own concepts and ideas as to how their society should work. But at the same time it is important to prevent them from making the same mistakes over and over again. Therefore, it can be very useful to share our experiences. Attempts to create a new society in a process of trial and error have often ended in disastrous conflicts.

Cooper Mr. Khouri, how should that self-determination you ask for be implemented ? Peo- ple can only express their will through institutions. If I understand you correctly, you despise colonization as much as you dislike decolonization, and you are not very fond of the nation-state either. Through which institutions would you like people in the Middle East to determine where and how they want to live ?

Perthes Nationalism is a very complex and to a certain extent a frightening phenomenon. But let me add a more positive note. Traveling in the region at the beginning of the year, I found that the intellectual discourse in a proto-state like Iraqi Kurdis- tan is already quite advanced. Kurdish experts speak, of course, of the need for Kurdish nationalism, yet at the same time they warn against Kurdish chauvinism. Their people suffered so much from Arab chauvinism that they do not want to fall into the same trap. There are many people in the region who are quite aware of the important distinction between national identity and an aggressive form of nationalism.

2. Democratization

Perthes I would now like to focus on another question, namely democratization. Iraq is probably the most controversial example here. Mr. Cooper, how do you evaluate the current situation ?

Cooper Mr. Schaefer was quite right in stating that Iraq is at a critical point as it decides Will Iraq get a constitution that about its constitution. Every democracy must be based on some kind of national commands the people’s loyalty ? compact that is usually written down in the form of a constitution. The question is whether Iraq will get a constitution to which the overwhelming majority — not just 50 %, but 90 % or 95 % — are loyal. The referendum with a no vote of 82 % and 97 % respectively in the Sunni majority provinces of Salah al Din and Anbar and of 55 % in Ninewa shows clearly that this is not the case now. But there is always

A Framework for Political Stability 40 41 Democratization a dialog between electoral and constitutional processes. Creating a constitution without people who are representative and therefore authorized to draft it is as impossible as appointing representatives without having any system of represen- tation. Iraq has been moving through the process of an interdependent develop- ment of both components, and the next six months will show whether it will be possible to bring everybody together around the constitution with a constitutional revision and another referendum. Ultimately, we are going to see whether Iraq will work out or not. To my mind, it is absolutely vital for all of us that it does work out, and I sincerely hope that the necessary spirit of compromise will arise soon enough to keep the political process alive.

There are two different schools of thought about the way to democracy. One says that McFaul before playing the democratic game and having elections you need an agreement Elections or a functioning political system — among the stakeholders about the basic rules of the game. The other claims, to the what should come first ? contrary, that in places like Iraq there is no time to wait for such an act of transition. Elections must come first to create a cornerstone for the democratic process. The Bush Administration without doubt belongs to the second school of thought and therefore sees the mere fact of elections taking place, no matter what their outcome will be, as proof that Iraq is a success story of creating democracy and stability. But, as we saw in Angola in 1992, when the UNITA refused to accept the results of the election and started a new civil war, elections can also be a stepping stone to precisely the opposite objective, i. e. to attempt to destabilize the country to gain power. I would like to ask the participants from the region how they interpret the relationship between participation in the elections and progress towards demo- cratic rule ? What do you think about the participation of the Sunnis, and do Mr. Sadr’s activities prove his successful integration into the electoral process or show that he uses the election process to reach other political objectives ?

Forgive me, but when you mentioned the possibility of using democratic elections Khouri for undemocratic goals or simply for gaining power, the first person that came to my mind is Dick Cheney. I mention that only to demonstrate that suspicions of illicit conduct are no less frequent in the Middle East vis-a-vis the US as they are in US vis-a-vis Middle Eastern countries.

The problem with democratic elections seems to be that the people in foreign Perthes countries often do not vote as we would have liked them to — many Europeans,

A Framework for Political Stability 40 41 Democratization for example, would have preferred a different outcome of the elections in Iran and in the United States. Can the US bring democracy to Iran like Mr. Atiyyah put forward the assumption in his presentation that the Bush it did in Germany and Japan after 1945 ? Administration hopes to bring democracy to Iraq as it brought democracy to Germany and Japan after 1945. Is that true, and can any historical lessons be learned ?

Cooper The notion that America brought democracy to Germany in 1945 is as widespread The US did not bring democracy to Germany as it is unfounded. As American military governor in Germany after the Second World War, General Lucius D. Clay, kept writing letters back to the State Depart- ment in which he asked them to “please explain this democracy stuff that I am supposed to teach the Germans, because I am not quite sure I really understand it”. As far as I know, he never got an answer. It seems that the Germans knew as much about democracy as General Clay did.

Perthes Germans will keep on believing that the US brought us democracy anyway, and we have actually done quite well believing it up to now.

von Maltzahn The situation in Iraq is much more similar to the situation in Lebanon in recent Iraq is more like Lebanon than years than to the American democratization efforts in Japan and Germany after like post-war Germany the Second World War. In Lebanon, the influential Maronite minority felt threat- ened by the rise of other forces and did its best to maintain its power — even when the result was a prolonged civil war. There is a similar situation in Iraq with the Sunni minority which had been dominant for a long time before the Americans intervened. An additional similarity catches the eye. In Lebanon, there was also an American intervention and this attempt to pacify the country in the early 1980s via a “pax Americana” failed. Syria, Lebanon’s predominant neighbor, wound up with the upper hand here. We know how this “pax Syriana” ended — with the withdrawal of the Syrian troops and security forces under international pressure because of the alleged involvement of Syria in the assassination of former Lebanes President Hariri. Next to Iraq, there is an equally predominant neighbor, Iran. Identification with the Shia majority, which is no longer suppressed, offers Iran ample reason to want to play this predominant role. Therefore I take some com- fort in the fact that the American administration is finally thinking about some kind of joint strategy with Iran. This will be to Iraq’s benefit.

A Framework for Political Stability 42 43 Democratization In Iraq, a new situation has arisen since the Shiite majority has re-entered the Asadi political sphere after having been marginalized not only under Saddam but A balance between the Shiite majority and practically since the emergence of modern Iraq as an independent state in the the minorities in Iraq must be found early 1920s. We understand that many in the region fear that Iran could gain considerable influence on Iraqi politics via the Shiites. Well, a matter of fact is that the political structure in Iraq has changed, and that this is an intrinsically Iraqi phenomenon. The implications of this radically changed situation for Iran, as a neighbor, is a different matter. But if a reasonable balance between the Shiite majority and the two most important minorities, the Sunnis and the Kurds, is achieved through a democratic structure and process and commensurate with their relative demographic weight, then, the resulting situation will help stabilize the situation in Iraq, and needless to say, it will be in everybody’s interest — Iran’s as well as others, in and out of the region.

Let us now turn to the question of what should be done. It appears that while Perthes everybody agrees that regional cooperation is a conditio sine qua non of achiev- ing stability, there is some disagreement about the degree to which foreign actors should engage in the region. Mr. Khouri holds self-determination in high esteem, whereas Mr. Asadi asserted that, in a globalized world, everything is deeply inter- connected and that foreign engagement in the region is inevitable. Some Western experts are quite suspicious about the term self-determination, because histori- cally it has all too often been used by Arab and other dictators to legitimize their dictatorships, fending off external actors and actually denying their people the ability to determine their own ways of life. Finally, Mr. Khouri warned us not to overlook the differences between the countries of the region.

Listening to our friends in the region, it becomes even more clear to me how cru- Polenz cial it is to avoid the impression that we want to impose Western-style democracy on people in the Middle East. My definitions of democracy are clear: First, in a democracy government derives its legitimacy from the consent of the people and second, democracy is being able to get rid of a government without bloodshed. But there are three caveats when trying to promote democracy here: First, we should not try to implement Western style parliamentarianism, or Imposing Western style parliamentarianism our system of political parties. But building democracy is impossible without es- would be counterproductive tablishing democratic institutions, as Mr. Cooper made clear. We must ensure that democracy does not mean unlimited rule by 51 % over the rest of the country, and

A Framework for Political Stability 42 43 Democratization Can the Iranian Constitution provide ideas for a credible concept for democracy in the Muslim world ?

Polenz

we must fight the “winner takes all” mentality and the fear of losing power that are the main reasons for the corruption of politics and orchestrated elections. If we focus on strengthening the rule of law and participation, for example by train- ing lawyers and members of the judiciary system, this might be perceived as a more credible kind of support by people in the region. Governments in the Muslim world Second, it is obviously very hard in the Muslim world to establish a legitimate need a religious justification government without some kind of religious justification. We should work on a constructive approach. The Iranian constitution, for example, provides us with an interesting example of a dual track for legitimacy, from Allah and from the peo- ple. Let us take a close look at this idea and think about which aspects of it might provide the Muslim world with a credible concept for democracy. Third, help from the outside will be accepted only when its ultimate goal is the self-determination of those being helped. This is of course extremely difficult to achieve because of the region’s history — from the crusades to colonialism — and because of the present behavior of the United States and Europe and their obvious interests regarding the energy resources in the region.

Khouri Self-determination must indeed be the overarching goal of political reform in the region, but I do not think that it is especially hard to achieve in the Arab world. As this is the last region on the planet to democratize and to be liberated from foreign armies, we can learn from previous experiences. And we have had a vivid debate on that topic during the past 15 –20 years. Before September 11, 2001, while many Western politicians and experts were supporting the autocrats in the region, people here were already thinking about how to replace these regimes with better ones. What should be our political goal I use the rather abstract term self-determination because I do not want to be for the Middle East ? presumptuous and judge what is good for others. But if we want to implement the proposal there is no way around using more specific terms. So what is it that we are aiming at here in the region ? Where could the aspirations of the region’s people and the values of the West coincide ? I am confident that basically both sides are talking about the same thing, but how do we name it ? I suspect that I have reasonably good insights into what people from different cultures strive for and how they name it, because I am a Christian by religion, an Arab by identity, a Palestinian by nationality, a Levantine Muslim by culture and a Jordanian and American by citizenship. Democracy is a problematic term … So what would the appropriate term be ? I hesitate to talk about democracy because this term has a specific Western connotation. The majority of people in

A Framework for Political Stability 44 45 Democratization On “good governance” the West and the Middle East can agree.

Khouri

the region are not explicitly asking for democracy or European or American style republicanism. As reasonable, normal, moderate people — which most people here are, whatever the Western perceptions may be — they want decent socie- ties without ideological excesses or abuses of power. But they do not call it democracy. People in the region, whether they are Arab nationalists, Islamists, tribalists, democrats or civil society activists, have for decades been asking for dignity and justice. Justice has been the rallying cry of the Islamists since the late 1970s. The label under which the West and the Middle East can meet and translate … so let us speak of good governance their common principles into a common operative mechanism should, I think, be “good governance,” because that is something we can agree on. Our goals should be an independent judiciary and the rule of law, freedom of expression and association, and access to information, and adequate structures of represen- tation. Law-based governance with an independent judiciary is the goal of the West and of people in the region. That might in our case mean Sharia-based governance, because Sharia is what many people in the region mean when they talk about law. I as a Christian Arab with a Western-oriented education think that — of course, despite excesses like those in Afghanistan under the Taliban — Sharia-based law is basically a positive thing. It fulfills the basic condition of law-based governance in that it provides criteria of justice, institutions to appeal to and a mechanism of last resort for agreements that cannot be reached through politics. Furthermore, we need to strive for societies where people have access to infor- mation and can express themselves freely. That is an integral element of societies which can be considered free societies in the eyes of the West, and it is something the people in the region crave, too. Finally, we need mechanisms for representation and participation. That is a critical point, both in the eyes of the West and of the population here. Participa- tion can be achieved in many ways: under a banana tree in Somalia, in a legislative assembly in Beirut, in a tribal council in Yemen, or through Sharia consultation. What counts is an inherent mechanism of accountability through a representa- tive process. How can the West support these principles ? Affirm your commitments, assist Reformers in the region need Western societies that apply these principles, and even reward progress, but let the people support, not Western octrois define them in their own terms. Many people at the local level are already work- ing on these issues. We certainly do not have to reinvent the wheel. If the West

A Framework for Political Stability 44 45 Democratization supports their work towards justice, representation and pluralism without impos- ing Western concepts, we may one day see a whole panoply of decent societies in the Islamic world that are considered free and democratic by the West and worth living in by their citizens.

McFaul Everything you just said is democracy. Rule of law, freedom of expression and Rule of law, freedom of expression — representation, self-determination — these are exactly the criteria for democracy that is democracy ! I have been teaching in my course for 20 years. I do not see the difference.

Cooper Wording is of crucial importance in this context. If you speak of democracy, you But wording is crucial: Avoid terms emphasize one particular bit of the system, which is people actually voting. But which people in the region resent what we want and what people in the region can agree to — as long as we do not insist on calling it democracy — is a package consisting not only of elections but also of transparency, accountability and, most importantly, the rule of law (actu- ally, the reason why I like democracy is because it is probably the only way of pre- serving the rule of law). As Fareed Zakaria argues, even though a bit exaggeratedly, in his book “The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad”, elections by no means always produce the other central features of democracy. Therefore I myself fear people who just keep repeating the word democracy, de- mocracy, democracy. At the last European summit in Washington, the joint EU/US statement on democracy talks about the terms rule of law, accountability and human rights to make clear that democracy is not just about elections, but about the whole way society is governed.

McFaul To my mind, the important question is how to implement these concepts, because that is where the difference between real democracy and democratic fig leaves for authoritarian regimes lies. Who gets to decide the rules for representation ? For example, who gives the Emirs of the UAE the right to decide who has the right to vote ?

Steltzer The five small Gulf states within the GCC are probably those most open to reform and development in this region. The UAE already has the second largest economy in the Arab world. According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitive- ness Report 2005–2006, this year the UAE is in 18th place considering its economic progress, whereas Germany is 15th and France 30th. In the UN Human Develop-

A Framework for Political Stability 46 47 Democratization Americans and Europeans must recognize that there is not only one single model of democracy and not only one concept of the rule of law.

Schaefer

ment Report (HDR) of 2005, the UAE ranks number 40, which puts it at number one in the Arab world. Even in the field of equal rights for women, a particularly delicate problem in this part of the world, there has been a great amount of progress. Over 65 % of students in the UAE are women. On the other hand, there has been hardly any progress toward democratiza- Equal voting rights in the UAE would tion. There are no elections of any kind, even though there are ongoing discus- result in the loss of national identity sions within the ruling families. But you have to keep in mind that the UAE is fac- ing a very grave demographical problem. Only 18 % of its population are Emiratis, i. e. nationals. Taking the current economic growth rate and its consequences as a basis, this figure will be down to 5 % by 2025. Equal voting rights for all resi- dents could then result in a total loss of national identity. Yet it would also seem ridiculous to give only such a small minority the right to vote. There are no easy answers to this dilemma.

Mr. Khouri and Mr. McFaul are equally right: the three basic principles of partici- Schaefer pation, the rule of law, and human rights are at the core of the transition to a Institutions are the key to democratization modern society. But on the other hand, who will define the procedures in which these principles will be implemented ? Maybe Mr. Polenz’s reference to institu- tions is the key: A modern society needs a procedural framework that guarantees transparency, accountability and a sense of participation, not only for the elites, but also for the middle and lower classes. Americans and Europeans must recognize that there is not only one single model of democracy and not only one concept of the rule of law. We need to for- mulate procedures in order to implement international standards tailor-made for specific societies.

What Mr. Khouri said was a very convincing appeal to listen to what people in the Reissner region really want. Thank you for explaining that the call for Sharia-based law is not only an Islamist idea but can also be seen as an expression of the search for justice. And thank you for reminding me that we need much more concrete dialog and fewer big, vague words like democracy und human rights. We from the West should always ask ourselves: on what grounds are we at all invited to promote anything in the region ? Who wants us here and for what ?

A Framework for Political Stability 46 47 Democratization 3. Multilateral Initiatives

Perthes Let us now move to a more concrete level. The region cannot complain about a lack of initiatives from its Western partners. While the US has developed its Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), NATO put forth the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), and the EU offers countries in the region two concepts for cooperation: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership — or Barcelona Process — and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that is supposed to com- plement the Barcelona Process. Which are these initiatives’ respective potentials and shortcomings, which of them is suitable for which country in the region, and how should they complement, substitute or support each other ?

Hollis I doubt that the European Neighbourhood Policy is the silver bullet to foster re- The ENP does not work very well form in the region. Many representatives of the EU seem to think that negotiating for the Middle East … individual action plans within the ENP in addition to the multilateral Barcelona approach will create ownership and thus home grown reform. But the ENP, even though extremely rich in possibilities, does not work too well for the region, be- cause it is a fundamentally European approach. … because it was created with The ENP was created with Ukraine and Moldova in mind. To ensure stabil- Ukraine and Moldova in mind ity at the Eastern border of the EU without overstretching the Union, the idea was to offer these countries the same as candidate states to the EU except for membership. Helping countries create democracy and market economies would create stability. The Action Plans allow countries to set priorities with regard to which parts of the acquis communautaire they want to adopt and with which reforms they want help from the EU. Countries might indeed like the opportunity to cherry-pick from the acquis. However, they are not equipped to make an informed choice. Plus the EU insists on the inclusion of certain items like reform of the judiciary, the role of women, privatisation and the establish- ment of market economies which carry a European signature to such an extent that I doubt countries from the region do really feel they have an ownership in them.

Schaefer The European Neighbourhood Policy was not only designed specifically to deal with Ukraine and Moldova. It resulted from the European Security Strategy’s idea that beyond enlargement, the EU needs to establish a belt of stable neighboring countries in order to secure its own internal stability.

A Framework for Political Stability 48 49 Multilateral Initiatives Of course the European Neighbourhood Policy is not a fantastic thing. It has been Cooper in effect only for a few years, therefore it is a little early to say it does not work, Support within the ENP framework but don’t worry: it will not work because nothing ever works, and you will find a can be an incentive for reform lot more to criticize in the future. Nevertheless, the ENP’s mechanism of reward- ing those neighboring countries who are willing to promote good governance is fundamentally the right concept. Giving Morocco more money than Tunisia is the ENP’s way of promoting the rule of law. This policy supports reform in subtle ways — we say to the countries, look, if you want to have foreign invest- ment, you need to have better commercial courts, and we will help you with that.

The ENP’s very comprehensive package of rules, institutions and support mecha- Hollis nisms was sold to Eastern European countries with the implicit prospect of paving the way toward membership. That was not said explicitly, but that is what made the ENP attractive to countries like Ukraine and Moldova. Nowadays, this prospect of membership is becoming ever more distant for Eastern Europe, and for the Middle Eastern countries membership is not even on the table — so why would these states adopt the acquis communautaire ? Of course Europe would welcome their adoption of the acquis, the process and the outcome, but what is in it for countries in the Middle East ? If we sell them the ENP on the promise of closer integration with the single market, we may not be able to deliver. Neighboring countries doubt the real seriousness of the EU in all this.

The Neighbourhood Policy is not the EU’s most serious policy: that would be Cooper European enlargement. Promoting the rule of law in countries like Bulgaria The EU’s most effective policy and Romania with the goal of taking them into the European Union is real is enlargement policy, and real effort and real money are put into it. We can also see the power of this policy, for example, in Turkey. It is exerted rather by accident there, as many people in the EU object to Turkish membership. But the existing member- ship perspective is, slightly against our will, forcefully promoting democracy in Turkey. Even more so in Ukraine: The flags that the protesters of the Orange Revolution were waving included European flags. These flags were a symbol of what modern Ukrainians want to become and what their goal is when they sup- port democratic forces in their country — although most people in Brussels run a mile when anybody suggests that Ukraine might become part of the European Union.

A Framework for Political Stability 48 49 Multilateral Initiatives BMENA constitutes an artificial attempt by Western experts to create a common solution for completely different countries.

Hadian

zu Guttenberg Where do our friends from the region see themselves with regard to concepts like the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, BMENA. Disregarding its ill-chosen name, does the concept catch the reality or do you feel like you are situated on a parallel level or on a meta-level ?

Hadian BMENA suffers from a fundamental constructional flaw: there is no “Broader Mid- BMENA is flawed – there is no “Broader dle Eastern and North African” identity comparable, for example, to the European Middle East and North African” identity identity. Nor does the concept inspire or anticipate the creation of such an identity. BMENA constitutes an artificial attempt by Western experts to create a common solution for completely different countries facing entirely different problems. If you put aside the basic rules of conceptual precision for political reasons you may at best be able to justify targeting this group of countries in a joint initiative with the fact that they all suffer from authoritarianism or a lack of democracy. But even then, to be of any political use a common strategy can be applied only in countries whose problems call for a common solution, and nobody can reasonably say that that of Morocco, Iran and Afghanistan.

Kahwaji Being already overwhelmed with initiatives from Europe and the United States, the region does not need another initiative, but more credibility on the part of the West.

Meyer The EU is currently working on a strategic partnership with the Gulf region The Barcelona Process … equivalent to the EU’s Barcelona Process with North African countries. But what worked well for North Africa need not be the best way of dealing with the Gulf. … builds on economic incentives … In the negotiations over Barcelona and over the Action Plans within the frame- work of the ENP, the North African partner countries had to swallow many hid- den demands concerning values and human rights, in order to get the economic benefits they wanted. Governments were thus forced to agree to something they had not asked for, but the people of these countries can refer to these agreements and ask their governments to deliver what they promised. … but that mechanism does not work The conditions in rich Gulf countries like Dubai are totally different. Because for the rich Gulf countries of their natural resources and financial wealth they do not need economic support and the EU cannot use incentives to push its agenda for reforms. Also, we should seriously ask ourselves in what direction we really want to change the existing conditions. For its strategic partnership with the Gulf region, the EU should use

A Framework for Political Stability 50 51 Multilateral Initiatives different incentives. Here, cooperation in areas like the fight against terrorism can be attractive enough for governments to make them accept commitments in areas like human rights or other EU priorities.

Comparing the American and European ways of promoting democracy and sta- Perthes bility in the region, what are the biggest differences ? Is it the fact that the US is America and Europe: top-down vs. following a top-down-approach, as Mr. Schaefer suggested, while the EU prefers bottom-up approach ? to build cooperation from the bottom up ?

There is no empirical proof that the Americans historically have a top-down ap- McFaul proach to promote democracy and that the Europeans have a bottom-up approach. The US does not have a top-down approach … Two military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq — which were of course prime ex- amples for a top-down approach — have brought a lot of confusion in this regard. But the United States has never invaded a country or gone to war in the name of democracy. There is just never popular support for it. The Bush administration went to war to eliminate Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction. Only once the soldiers were in and did not find any such weapons, the administration justified the invasion retrospectively as a means to promote democracy.

The Europeans are much more influenced by Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points Cooper with their emphasis on self-determination than the Americans are. Opinion polls show that the idea of promoting democracy gets a much more positive response in Europe than it does in the USA.

Top-down approaches are not actually determining the promotion of democracy McFaul from the side of the US. Look at which American actors are actually promoting … but a bottum-up strategy democracy and how they do it. Then you will see that Americans apply the bottom- up approach much more consistently than the Europeans: the American actors are Internews, Freedom House (FH), National Endowment for Democracy (NED), National Democratic Institute (NDI), International Republican Institute (IRI). They have very little to do with the government, in stark contrast to the European Neighbourhood Policy which is actually a state-to-state approach.

Despite your insistence that the United States favors bottom-up approaches, we Schaefer have seen many examples of democracy being promoted in a top-down way. Espe- We in Europe do not have that impression cially the rhetoric of “frontiers of freedom and democracy” puzzles not only the

A Framework for Political Stability 50 51 Multilateral Initiatives people in the region but also us in Europe who have been promoting democracy for quite a while and quite successfully.

McFaul Of course, the US administration has different country strategies to the EU, but At least the US does have a strategy I contest the idea that the European strategies are better because, to be honest, I can hardly identify any. Of course, I hear the words “ENP” and “engagement” over and over again. But while I could outline the strategy of the Bush administration to promote democracy in Iran rather precisely and then debate its merits, I have no idea what the EU strategy for promoting democracy in Iran is. I personally believe that the US strategy in Iran is wrong, but at least they have one.

Schaefer What we mean by engagement is the active participation of the people in order to establish those procedures in societies that ensure principles like participation, transparency and legitimacy.

Cooper If the EU was to openly promote democracy in Iran through NGOs and somebody Open support for the democratic opposition would notice, that would be the kiss of death for those we want to support, given in Iran would do more harm than good recent history. Our work in Iran is done indirectly. We see WTO membership as a way of promoting democracy because it would reduce the power of some of the undemocratic forces. If there are funds available we may support groups of doctors or environmentalists, and scholarships are also a good thing. Anything more ag- gressive than that would be the worst thing we could do to the democratic forces. Furthermore, I doubt that Iran needs promotion from the EU or the US to become democratic. Iran is a society which could become a democracy any minute. This does not have to happen through a revolution — I hope it will not, because revolutions normally end up with someone like Mao, Lenin or Cromwell in charge. But some day, something will happen and Iran will be democratic and I do not think that will be much of the result of what we do.

Hadian I agree that any public international support does more harm than good to Iranian Instead of giving money to NGOs. Unfortunately, the US Congress just passed a law to contribute over seventy oppositional Iranian NGOs … five million dollars to Iran’s NGOs and opposition forces. This will no doubt greatly undermine their credibility, and moreover, many of those NGOs which have flour- ished in recent years are going to be closed down because they will be accused of being foreign agents. The Americans should stop this kind of direct financial aid immediately — it is not helpful at all.

A Framework for Political Stability 52 53 Multilateral Initiatives The West should accept the national interests and the geographical and economic realities also of those countries which are not among its favorites for political reasons.

Asadi

But concrete incentives may help, for instance, on human rights or the ban of … the West should reward progress harsh punishments. We have to emphasize those goals in the areas of participa- in the area of human rights tion, minority rights, good governance, accountability, the rule of law, and so on which are achievable, and the West should reward concrete steps instead of always talking about democracy as a vaguely defined collective term for everything that is desirable to Western minds. To generally condemn Iran for being undemocratic is not helpful.

Engagement in an interconnected world should, first and foremost, mean genuine Asadi subscription to multilateralism, and should not at any rate mean military inter- The use of force does not bring vention. Sitting here in late 2005 and looking at the world with the benefit of about sustainable change hindsight — particularly for us Iranians buffeted between two still on-going cases of outside military intervention — one cannot but come to the conclusion that the use of force does not bring about sustainable change. Judging from our own century- long experience — to which I alluded earlier — and also of others in the region and farther away the emergence of a civil society as a fundamental prerequisite and stepping stone towards democracy has to come from within, not via foreign inter- vention. Engagement from outside — which I reckon to be absolutely inevitable and unavoidable in our deeply interconnected and ever-complicating world — should aim at helping foster, through home-grown processes and dynamisms, a general agreement on fundamental concepts of democracy, rule of law and accountable governance. In politics, it always used to take two to tango. Today, to tango it takes a whole lot of partners — stakeholders, as the current parlance goes.

So contemporary foreign policy is no longer a tango but rather a polka where Perthes everybody is involved.

I wonder whether we can easily find a common understanding of the parameters zu Guttenberg of engagement, even if we try to keep them on a very general level.

I have one concrete piece of advice for you: The West should also accept the na- Asadi tional interests and the geographical and economic realities of those countries in the region which are not among its favorites for political reasons. For example, the United States’ opposition to the gas pipeline through Iran, was motivated, as we all know, by purely political incentives and against obvious economic and geographic realities, not only led to further tension between Tehran and Washington, but also

A Framework for Political Stability 52 53 Multilateral Initiatives Europe must improve its picture in the region, because most US shortcomings are also attributed to the EU.

Kahwaji

created tensions between Tehran and those countries in this region that were pressured by the US to decline the project. The US foreign policy lacks sensitivity for the regional circumstances. In this regard, the EU seems to be doing a better job. Let us all remember that each and every country has a number of genuine national concerns and interests that are not polity-specific or transient. They stay around and outlive political regimes. They have to be recognized by others as enduring and legitimate concerns and interests. Such a recognition by others, neighbours and otherwise, would help everybody arrive at a better understanding of the parameters involved for developing more harmonious relations.

Perthes If the European Union’s approach is so convincing, then why do people in the region not appreciate the EU like they should ?

Schaefer The EU has difficulties in selling its rather evolutionary concepts because they are How can the EU win over people not producing visible results within measurable time spans. Indeed, the Ameri- in the Middle East ? cans are seen as the ones who are doing things, whether bad or good. But this should not be a reason to give up long-term engagement. Maybe our local partners can help us find ways to tell the ordinary people, in a credible way, what the Euro- pean goals and the potential benefits for the people of the Middle East are. This is equally important for the Americans, because they basically want the same as we do: Cooperation to make the societies fit for the challenges they are facing.

Kahwaji Everything that comes from the West is under suspicion. The widespread feeling of repression and the outrage about the situation in Israel have been exacerbated by what the West, especially the US, has done in the course of its so-called global war on terror. Plus, unlike 15 years ago, today there is a very active free media in the region with credible, well-respected commentators. These commentators challenge most Western initiatives, often for good reasons. Their criticism in- creases people’s suspicion that some kind of Trojan horse is concealed in each Western offer, with the ultimate goal of re-colonizing the region.

Khouri Recent polls show that people in the region see not Iran, but the United States, Great Britain and Israel as their biggest threat.

Kahwaji To change this, the West has to work a lot more on communicating its policy The West needs a communication strategy through the Arab media. You must attempt to convince those who shape public

A Framework for Political Stability 54 55 Multilateral Initiatives opinion. How ? My advice would be: sensitivity and honesty. Tell people the truth and consider how they experience the reality in the region. A recent example of bad communication is the Egyptian election. The Western experts only spoke about the tremendous step towards reform, while ignoring the fundamental democratic deficits of the elections. Therefore, the majority of Egyp- tians say that this election was approved and orchestrated by the United States. As a result, the United States end up losing even more credibility. Europe should work especially hard to improve its picture in the region, because as a matter of fact most US shortcomings are also attributed to the EU. The masses are hardly able to identify a difference between the two. If Europe produces honest and trustworthy assessments of what happens in the region and makes use of the free media in order to communicate them to the people, it may win over the hearts and minds and get support for its initiatives. Governments in the region have been very adept in using Western interest groups, in particular those which lobby for big companies, for deflecting Western pressure. Each time the pressure on authoritarian regimes in the region grew stronger, they were able to reduce this pressure by giving big contracts, especially oil contracts, to Western firms who would then activate their lobby groups to defend the regimes, so the contracts were used as a kind of bribe to divide the Europeans and the Americans.

It was quite helpful to realize that all of us here agree upon the importance of von Weizsäcker basic human rights: political participation, the rule of law, and freedom of expres- Let us be careful with the term “democracy” sion. In that, we have made enormous progress. But in order to transform this progress in the political sphere, we have to be very careful with the words we use. I am thankful to Mr. McFaul for reminding us that the war in Iraq was originally not waged for the sake of democracy, and to Mr. Khouri and Mr. Cooper for analyz- ing why using the term “democracy” in the region might be counterproductive for the time being. If I may, I would like to make another, very open remark to Mr. McFaul: You have defended American policy in the Middle East very convincingly and have painted a promising picture of what the US wants to and will achieve. But to be honest, I have my doubts that the present President of the United States has listened carefully to your teachings — or maybe he has forgotten them. Therefore American foreign policy may not be what you wish, in rhetoric as well as in sub- stance.

A Framework for Political Stability 54 55 Multilateral Initiatives II. The Social and Economic Basis for Reform

Perthes In our second session we will focus on the social and economic conditions for reform. What should local actors do and where can Western experts and govern- ments help ? Rami Khouri, Editor-at-Large of the Daily Star in Beirut will analyze the question at hand from a local perspective, while Michael McFaul from the Hoover Institution, a leading expert on democratization, will provide a Western perspective.

Khouri As I have spent most of my adult life in the region, these introductory remarks The Arab world has been struggling are not only an academic, but also a personal account of the challenges facing the with the same problems for decades … Arab world. My children, the fourth generation of Arabs in countries which have been nominally sovereign for decades, still have to face the same problems that my grandparents faced almost a century ago: Identity, governance, basic human needs, the role of Zionism, relations with Israel and relations with the West, the balance between secularism and religion, between individual identity and collec- tive identity, the role of gender, the relations between the Arab majority and the non-Arab minorities. The majority of the population is still unsatisfied with the situation, to say the least. People express their discontent through various means, including resignation, emigration, and radicalization. … because five crises have pertained … The reasons for that lie in five crises that have affected the Arab world for decades. I am using the term Arab world here in its narrow sense, which excludes Iran and Turkey, but many of these issues affect these countries as well. … the crisis of sustainable The first crisis concerns sustainable human development throughout the human development … Arab world. Between 1980 and 1995, according to the annual Arab Economic Re- port published by the Arab Monetary Fund, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the League of Arab States, the population of the Arab world increased by 53 %, while the GDP increased by a mere 21 %. This is equivalent to a 20 % decline in Gross Domestic Product per capita. To give the example of a specific country, in Jordan income per capita measured in dollars declined by 59 %. And Jordan is not even close to being the worst case. Throughout the region, per capita real income in dollar-constant terms declined from 2,244 dollars in 1985 to 908 dollars in 1995. That amounts to a crisis of basic human needs in areas like food and water, health care or environmental issues. During the last two decades, most of the people in the Arab world have either become poorer or have just barely maintained their level of poverty. … the crisis of statehood … The second crisis concerns statehood. Most of the Arab countries have faced huge, sometimes existential, crises of statehood during the past decades: border

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 56 57 conflicts, civil war, terrorism, domestic insurrections, violence, and massive emi- gration. Many of them are still facing such crises in one way or another. The third crisis is a crisis of citizenship rights. In most countries in the region, … the crisis of citizenship rights … citizens have no clear knowledge of their rights and responsibilities. Neither the exercise of power nor the limitations of the state have been clearly defined by the people in most Arab countries for most of their period of independence, whether 80, 50 or 30 years, which affects good governance and democratic aspirations. The fourth crisis is about identity at the levels of the state, the community … the crisis of identity … and the individual. Apart from the official national and sub-regional entities (like the Gulf Cooperation Council or the North African Union), there are ethnic identi- ties, tribal identities, and transnational identities, including pan-Arabism or the Islamic Umma. In addition to transnational organized crime at the regional and global level, nations have also been called into question during the past decades by globalized commercialism and consumerism. This crisis of identities is further complicated by the powerful and complex role of religion. The fifth crisis concerns the coexistence with the people of Israel and of the … and the crisis concerning the coexistence role of Western powers in the region. For generations people have struggled with with Israel and the role of the West how to relate to Israel and the British, the Americans, and their respective armed forces. These armies have frequently been active in the region and that has not changed until today. We are the only region in the world still suffering from for- eign intervention on a large scale. Because of their combination and their persistence these five crises have had a truly deadly effect: They have triggered a steady radicalization of those who felt mistreated by their own political structure, be it their national governments or occupying forces. Not very surprisingly, anger and skepticism today determine the region’s relationship with the Western powers. Now, even when being offered help in promoting democracy, freedom and human rights (which are things that we want), people are deeply skeptical because of their historical experiences. Two seminal moments led to concerns among the younger population about their citizenship rights as citizens and quality of life. I am not talking about 9/11, but about the oil boom and its interruption in the 1970s, and about the end of the Cold War. These historic moments led to societies with intense pressures, distortions, corruption, violence, militarism, and autocracy, and finally to the willingness of the people to fight back. Today, in contrast to the Western world, the Arab world is a region of extraordinary youth. Close to 65 % of our population is under the age of 30 and mostly educated. Their education is a good thing but

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 56 57 at the same time paradoxically worsens their problems, because they are mostly unemployable in any productive way other than for the most fundamental farm- ing and simple manual labor. The fact that they mostly live in urban areas does not make things any easier. Young frustrated urban citizens This large, educated, unemployable, frustrated urban citizenry brings about turn to radicalism developments like those in Algeria, for instance, or Yemen, or any other Arab country where hopeless people, who turned to God and were disappointed by the religious movement or were denied a chance to compete politically, decided to dedicate themselves to suicide bombings, killing and destruction because their lives no longer had any meaning. In this situation, our big challenge is to find the right balance in several areas: First, a balance between democracy and dignity. Some people will understand- ably prefer autocratic solutions and the suspension of some of their basic human rights, if in return their basic material, psychological and emotional day to day needs are met, i. e. if they are treated reasonably and decently by their own soci- ety. They might even be willing to suspend their right to travel without having to get permission by the intelligence department or to turn on the TV and get something close to the truth. People are not willing to put up with an autocratic regime forever, though. Once they have reached a certain level of income, they demand more democratic participation. This lesson can be learned from countries like Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore. To counter radicalism … If we do not find such a balance, the dangerous radicalization will continue. Between 1980 and 1995, we saw the expansion of a huge Islamist movement as a result of the crises affecting the region’s societies. Osama Bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi were not born out of a vacuum. They and their kind were radicalized in Afghanistan, but they were first politicized in their own coun- tries, in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They came to fruition and “matured” politi- cally in such peaceful places as Newark, New Jersey; Hamburg, Germany; and Leeds, England. There is a common responsibility for this problem, for which the common denominator is the existence of disenfranchised, marginalized young people in a vortex of needs and concerns that have not been met for decades. … we need to guarantee the expression The solution lies in finding answers to the following challenges: First, how to of social and cultural identities … guarantee the expression of social and cultural identities in a way that is accept- able to the populations themselves ? Today, many social and cultural identities are suppressed by the tyranny of some kind of larger political identity.

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 58 59 Islam has not been able to find an answer to how to combine religion with social identity, national identity and good governance.

Khouri

Second, how can people, in particular young people, define their national … help people define identity and safeguard it against foreign influences ? How can they safeguard their their national identity … identity as Syrians or Jordanians or Moroccans or as Arabs from foreign predatory armies, for example ? The third challenge is to strike a balance between religion and secularism. For … find a balance between almost 30 years, we have had Islamist movements, without being able to find an religion and secularism … answer to the question of how to combine religion with social identity, national identity and good governance. We need to find the answer rather quickly, because the Islamists, like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim Brotherhood, have become very popular and are, as you know, winning elections. One reason for this is that they give the impression that they are the only ones who respond to these crises and earnestly deal with human needs. The fourth challenge is finding a balance between individual national sov- … and between global interdepence ereignty and interdependence in a globalized world in a manner that is both and national sovereignty legitimate and effective. The international engagement in Lebanon has been widely considered as legitimate and effective, quite in contrast to what happened in Iraq. The fifth challenge is finding a balance between personal and collective identities. What does it mean to be a citizen of an Arab country ? They have not figured this out yet, despite all their searching: How can one have a proper bal- ance between the state, the nation and the Islamic Umma, or whatever you want to call this transnational level ?

This crisis of identity is a new phenomenon, because most people did not have Cooper national identities and thus did not see competing identities as a problem in ear- lier times. When the British author Arthur Ransom traveled in Europe during the first third of the 20th century, he asked people about their identity, whether they consider themselves Hungarians, Romanians or belonging to any other national identity. The answer was mostly the same: “We are locals, we live here”. Stable national identities are mostly a product of the 20th century. Israel of course is a very specific case in that regard.

Finally, the challenge that transcends all others: How can the region and the rest Khouri of the world engage each other in the framework of a universally and consistently How can we define a common standard applied common standard of both law and morality ? The biggest, most bitter com- of law and morality ? plaint that you hear from people in the Middle East, especially in the Arab world,

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 58 59 is the criticism of the West’s, and the United States’, double standards. I can not emphasize this enough — it is probably the single most consistent and powerful criticism of people in the region, because it is the most demeaning, the most de- grading and ultimately, the most dehumanizing dimension of how people in the Arab world feel they are being treated by the Western world. In fundamental issues like the implementation of UN resolutions, access to nuclear technology or torture, consistency is what matters to people in the Arab world. The valiant cry of the Islamists has always been justice, equality, and a sense of dignity, and in that they accurately reflect the discontent and the moral and political aspirations of a large number of people in the region. People in the Middle East share many I would like to conclude my remarks in a more hopeful tone, though. Today Western goals — a potential win-win situation there is an opportunity, for the first time in almost a century, for the Arab world and the Western powers to engage one another in a win-win situation. Funda- mentally, the vast majority of people in the Middle East, the Bush Administration and the European Union are all talking the same language, despite their usage of a different vocabulary for the same concepts. Call it freedom or democracy or human rights or sovereignty or dignity, in the end, we are all talking about the same thing. A stable society is based on individuals and collectives being treated fairly and not subjected to exploitative, expedient or whimsical double standards. In fact, we have already passed the first test: The way Lebanon and Syria were dealt with by Europeans, Americans and Arabs working together in the Security Council was an extraordinary success. The second test is going to be the Iranian nuclear issue, where even more is at stake.

McFaul This is usually the moment for the clueless yet arrogant American expert who just flew in to start pontificating about a region he knows nothing about, so that the rest of the participants can gang up on him and feel good about it for the rest of the afternoon. I will not grant you that pleasure but will instead put forward a few very basic theses about democratization in general. We still do not understand democratization I believe we are still far from understanding what democratization is. Recently, I met the CEO of a major corporation doing reconstruction in Iraq. He asked me, as an expert and promoter of democratization: “Mike, when I go to Iraq to build a bridge, I have a blueprint and a set of engineers with me and this is why I can successfully build that bridge — so which blueprint for building democracy do you advocate ?” But I had nothing to show him. We have no unified theory of de- mocratization let alone a clear understanding of how to promote it abroad. If we

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 60 61 do not understand the process of democratization, how can we hope to promote democratization in Iraq, or anywhere else in the world ? Therefore I would like to identify together with you the few facts that we know because they stand the test of empirical falsification. I want to challenge you by presenting three myths and three truisms regard- ing the relationship between development, democracy, security and stability. Being not an expert on the Middle East, but a political scientist who has been teaching a course on democratization for a long time I will present to you what is considered conventional wisdom by American social scientists. I will not talk about specific countries but ask you to tell me why, for example, Iran, Saudi Ara- bia, and Egypt do not fit my patterns, categories which are used to analyze all the other countries of the world. So let us see if you can prove to me that what I call myths are facts and what I call truisms are actually myths. Let me start with the three myths. First: “Dictatorships grow faster than de- Dictatorships do not grow faster mocracies”. This is a plain myth, the data do not support it. For every China, there than democracies is an Angola. Democratic regimes grow more slowly, but much more steadily. There is a very positive correlation between democratic and economic develop- ment, as you recently saw in the tremendous growth rates of the countries of the former Communist Bloc. Autocratic regimes do have an advantage in post-war reconstruction and in the development of heavy industries, but after that the growth rate of autocracies is lower than that of democracies. Africa is an exception which we cannot yet explain, maybe because there have not been enough cases of democratization on that continent. This leads to the second myth that “economic development leads to democra- Economic development does not tization”. Stanford’s Seymour Martin Lipset proposed this thesis forty years ago. It necessarily lead to democratization is simply false, without any support from the data. The process of regime change from autocracy and dictatorship to democracy happens in many different forms. Sometimes it is triggered in connection with economic development, as you can see in South Korea and Taiwan. But sometimes democracies arise from the exact opposite — economic crisis. Sometimes democracy starts with the death of the dictator, sometimes it results from splits within the ancien régime, sometimes it is triggered by war, and sometimes by pressure from external powers. In our ongo- ing discussion about Iraq and other countries in the region, be careful not to ex- pect democratization as a direct result of economic development. What we know, however, is that if there is already a transition to democracy going on, then it is much more likely to survive in a country with a GDP per capita of at least $ 4,500.

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 60 61 Responsible politicians interested in peace and stability for their country, must favor democracy, whether they believe in it or not.

McFaul

We also know of some correlations that we should bear in mind when dealing with specific countries, for instance, that it is easier to have a democratic transi- tion in homogenous societies, that parliamentary democracies usually survive longer than presidential ones, and that the most extraordinary success in the area of consolidating democracy during the past 20 years was the EU’s enlargement policy in Middle and Eastern Europe.

zu Guttenberg What is your definition of a consolidated democracy, and what are the impacts of consolidation ? Ironically, the EU, which you refer to as an ideal partner for demo- cratic consolidation, has lately needed consolidation itself.

McFaul As for the third and last myth, “autocratic regimes are more stable than democra- Autocracies are not more stable cies”: It is empirically proven that democracies, especially middle income democ- than democracies racies, are much more stable on average over time than autocracies. Democracies with a GDP per capita of less than $ 1,000 are indeed highly unstable. But autocra- cies, on the other hand, often lack stability even if their GDP is noticeably greater than that — which holds true for more than half the countries in the region. One reason for the lack of stability of autocratic regimes is that they have no mechanism for handing over power. Another reason is that legitimacy for autocracies is based almost solely on performance, whether political or economic. Deriving legitimacy from Divine Right, a typical principle in the distant past, is a great exception these days and in no way creates a religiously motivated social stability; the Iranian society is the most secular one in the region, precisely because it does attempt to legitimate the government through God instead of economic performance. By and large, autocracies’ legitimacy rises and falls with their performance, and this can be very destabilizing. Moreover, autocracies are much more likely than consoli- dated democracies to be involved in destabilizing conflicts with their neighbors. Democracies do not wage war Which leads to my first truism: “Consolidated democracies do not fight each against each other other”, they are much better neighbors than autocracies. I challenge you to tell me when consolidated democracies went to war with each other in the last 200 years. If you are a responsible politician interested in peace and stability for your coun- try, then you have to favor democracy as well, whether you believe in it or not, because it is useful.

Cooper Democracies do not fight each other ? What about the First World War ? By the standards of the day, the German Kaiserreich was a democracy. Of course, it was

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 62 63 not a perfect one, but none of the other democracies in Europe were perfect, ei- ther. None of them had women’s suffrage, for example, except for Finland which was not a state at that time but a Grand Duchy under the Russian Czar. To go back a little further, by the standards of the 17th century, Britain and the Netherlands were parliamentary regimes, if not democracies, and they fought each other three times during that century. Basically, I agree with your thesis, but the real world is, as usually, a little more complicated than the theory.

You of course have a point, the more you go back in history, the more potential McFaul counter-examples come to your mind — but still the data is strongly in favor of my first truism. By the way, most people actually do believe in democracy. Mr. Khouri rightly pointed to the fact that most people want to live under democratic rule. The data from the World Value Survey support his analysis of the mood in the region. When confronted with the Winston Churchill quote that democracy is ”the worst form of government, except for all those others that have been tried,” the majority of people around the world agree. Second truism: “Oil is bad for development and democracy”. The oil curse is a Oil can negatively affect development fact, as the data prove. Countries that have escaped it, Norway, Great Britain, and the United States, have done so precisely because they developed their political institutions before they discovered their oil resources. I admit that the region is handling the recent climb in oil prices rather impressively compared to the first two spikes in 1973 and 1979, which should give hope that the oil curse must not always have disastrous consequences. But as of today, I am more convinced of the opposite. For instance, 15 years ago Saudi Arabia had a GDP per capita of $ 24,000, and today it is less than half this amount. Furthermore, the so-called Dutch disease — the crowding out of other parts of a national economy in favor of the oil sector — has infected not only Africa and some states of the former Soviet Union, but also this region. The fight for this resource tends to create unstable, autocratic regimes. In the October issue of the Journal of Democracy, I published an article under the title “Chinese Dreams, Persian Realities”, arguing that the Iranian mullahs’ strategy of emulating the Chinese model of economic develop- ment to stop democratic change is doomed to fail. Countries like Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia will not be able to implement Chinese policy after they have set up political institutions that are based on the rents of oil. Third truism: “In the long run, democracies tend to reduce extremism and Democracies reduce extremism extremist elements in their societies”. This is based on the theory of the median

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 62 63 voter, which means that in order to win elections over a longer period of time, you have to appeal to centrist voters. There is also a co-optation effect. Consider the Muslim Brotherhood, or Hamas. When faced with the decision whether to play by the rules or not, those that play by the rules tend to live a lot longer than those who try to remain outside democratic rules. Also, extremists’ rise to power is usually the first step to their marginalization. In government, they tend to make mistakes, thus exposing their lack of quality as political leaders. Therefore it is unlikely that they will win several elections in a row. The problem is, though, that extremists do well in young democracies’ elections, and that makes it hard to get to a stable democracy in which extremist forces will probably die out. Personally, and this is based on intuition rather than empirical knowledge, I think that the danger of extremists coming to power and doing lots of damage is grossly exaggerated. My intuition is based solely on Algeria where we never saw a result of the Islamic Salvation Front’s victory, because the military cancelled the elections, thus starting a civil war in which more than 100,000 civilians were killed. It is usually much better to let the process play out. The other case that always comes up in this regard, the example of Weimar Germany, is a specific case to such an extent that generalizing it constitutes a gross misuse of history. Of course, the rise of democracy will not automatically lead to the extinction of extremism. Such a view is ahistorical. Extremists in the United States are a good example — such minorities exist in almost every society. The question is, can you provide a place, like for example the remote state of Montana, where they can live on the margins of society with their strange ideas and big guns without being a permanent potential threat to society ? Of course, individuals like the Oklahoma bomber show that even that will not eliminate the danger arising from extrem- ism completely. Democratization needs Finally, I would like to make a point which I still hesitate to classify as either a secure neighborhood a myth or a truism: security leads to democracy. In Iraq, this is an obvious truism. Without security there is obviously no hope for democracy. But we tend to forget the regional perspective, the necessity of a secure neighborhood as a prerequisite for a democratic transition. For the post-Communist world along the borders of the European Union, the EU provided the ideal neighbor in consolidating democ- ratization. Already for Georgia or Kyrgyzstan, where the neighborhood is a little nastier, democratic transition seems to be harder. In the short run, it may be pos- sible to succeed in a disadvantaged neighborhood, but what about the long run ?

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 64 65 Economy and the State I wonder how Iraq’s neighborhood will influence its chances to consolidate its democratization process. You doubt that security can lead to democracy ? Imagine a region that had sectarian and interstate wars, weak states next to strong, ill-defined borders, rich countries next to poor, anti-democratic parties winning elections in barely democ- ratized places, demographic problems, radicalized youth, irresponsible elites, and to make things even worse, US forces occupying parts of this region. That is — not the Middle East, but Europe after the Second World War. Back then, two treaties brought a much needed secure framework: NATO and the European Coal and Steel Community, the core element of what is now the EU.

1. Economy and the State

Mr. McFaul, your truism “oil is bad for development” is correct indeed, as one can Asadi see in my country. Iran has a three thousand year old tradition as an organized Iran lacks a vibrant civil society … state with a mostly powerful and predominant central government. Today, almost a century after the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 – 06, a little over 50 years after the popular national movement in the early 1950s to nationalize the oil in- dustry that ended with the CIA-engineered military coup against Prime Minister Mossadegh, and less than three decades after the Shah was overthrown in 1979, a civil society with well-established political parties and other institutionalized in- struments of participation has still not developed in the country. In fact, this glar- ing lack has rendered politics and political achievements reversible in Iran — as political developments in the country in recent years have demonstrated. Why is that ? Most intellectuals in Iran blame the lack of an influential mid- … because oil revenues make dle class based in a strong private sector for the state of our civil society and the state financially independent politics that leave much to be desired. This could, among others, be ascribed in large measure, to the historical preponderance of the state — a powerful central government — and in modern Iran and more specifically in recent decades to the emergence and consolidation of a rentier state as a result of oil revenues. The Iranian state is dominant because of its almost total financial autonomy from the society and its internal dynamism. Contrary to the historical experience in the Occident, where political participation and state reliance on taxation were closely linked, the continuity of an autonomous, preponderant state in Iran has not been conducive to participation. The dominance of the state in Iran, to reiter- ate, is not just a recent phenomenon, and cannot be wished away just like that.

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 64 65 Economy and the State We in Iran need to have a robust, dynamic civil society, and to that end, we need to strengthen the private sector in the national economy.

Cooper In spite of the rentier state problem, I would not despair of Iran becoming a de- In spite of the rentier state problem, mocracy, because enough educated people who desire a sense of self-worth can Iran may become a democracy soon overcome formidable obstacles. There is something a bit too Marxist about the idea “no democracy for oil producers”. The phenomenon of the rentier state has existed long before oil acquired its present-day importance. Acquiring silver and gold in South America since the 16th century was a major disaster for Spain that lost its status as the most advanced society in Europe in the 17th century to a bunch of good-for-nothings in the Nether- lands who had neither colonies nor natural resources and did nothing but trade. Dubai is a very specific and most interesting example of a rentier economy without natural resources. Nobody pays tax here, because the government has found ways of generating revenue without oil and taxation — a sort of modern miracle. As I strongly believe in the reverse of the dictum “no taxation without representation”, i. e. “no representation without taxation”, I wonder what the future of Dubai will be. But then, the world is full of exceptions, and the paths which people take are very unpredictable.

Perthes Rent-seeking is a creative business. When running out of oil, autocratic rulers have to look for alternatives to avoid the political risks coming with taxation. This is probably one of the reasons why Dubai is so open to money laundering.

Perkovich The rentier states in the region suffering from the Dutch Disease have done rela- tively well in recent decades and are actually better off than those without oil, which highlights just how problematic the economic situation is overall in the arab world.

Perthes Should the general relationship between state and economy in the region, and especially in Iran, be changed ? Mr. Asadi, you mentioned the rentier state prob- lem within that larger context, would you please elaborate on the question of state-owned vs. private business ?

Asadi Each country must find its own way to meet the challenges of a globalized world market. But some sort of independent private sector must always be part of the

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 66 67 Economy and the State answer, as well as the government’s ability to autonomously set a legal framework for its national market, in spite of growing international trade and multilateral rule-setting. In Iran, a process of privatization started after the Iran-Iraq war, at the beginning In Iran, a few wealthy rentiers took over of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency. That process, which seemed to be prom- most formerly state owned enterprises ising in the beginning, unfortunate as it is, soon was devoid of its initial aims and objectives and led to the emergence of a second tier the rentiers; most of the formerly state-owned enterprises were practically auctioned off to a few close, loyal hands.

Are there plans to privatize the oil reserves ? Because that is where the money lies. Cooper

The oil reserves were not included in the privatization plans. Moreover, I doubt Asadi that the oil sector in Iran could be considered for privatization any time soon. The point is not that, rather, we should be able to spend the oil revenues better and in a more economic and productive manner. We should, gradually at least, be able to take distance from a rentier state mentality and policy.

Privatization is important for Iran because it decreases the role of the state. That Hadian will be a precondition for democratization in my country. While I am not in favor Iran needs a leaner state, of privatization as in the US and I do not worship the gods of privatization and and Bonyads must be privatized … economic efficiency, Iran does indeed need a leaner state because only then will democracy have room to grow. Bonyads can and should be privatized, because neither the state nor the cleri- cal establishment should control a large portion of the country’s economy. The privatization of the bonyads is possible, simply through the sale of shares of the respective companies. Privatization of the oil industry and oil reserves is a fundamentally different … but the oil belongs to the state thing. Oil belongs to the state and should not be sold to the private sector, under whatever regime. We have to think about other solutions, like managing the oil revenues through an independently-controlled fund.

We must also address the question of these large and powerful parastatal foun- Asadi dations — mostly post-1979 entities — which have very strong ties to various seg- ments of the clerical establishment. They control a sizeable part of the Iranian economy, and worse still, they are not part of the official public sector and operate outside the state budget. Hence, such powerful, unaccountable institutions cannot

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 66 67 Economy and the State A major economic task for all governments in the region is job creation.

Perkovich

be considered conducive to long-term economic development of the country. Well, if we were to consider privatization in earnest, they cannot be excluded — as they have been in the past.

Kahwaji State-controlled economy, which in the region means that economic assets belong A state-controlled economy is to the ruling families, is a major obstacle to democratisation. Due to their great a major obstacle to democratization wealth stemming from the rule over the national resources and economy, the ruling sheiks have an almost boundless ability to bribe their people. Some leaders in the Middle East occasionally lower taxes, or raise salaries in the public sector, thus sharing a small proportion of their wealth in order to ensure public support in return. But privatization in the region is not always what it seems. If you investigate who actually owns newly-privatized companies, you will find that they are owned by the rulers themselves. Privatization has been another way for the rulers and the leaders to tax the people privately, without the need for public approval, which would eventually lead to democratization.

McFaul Non-democratic elites will support democratization if they are compensated. You Peaceful transitions often want an evolutionary change rather than a revolutionary one ? Be prepared to hide nasty secrets … reward the autocrats and their administration. In all peaceful transitions from autocratic regimes to democracies there are hidden nasty little secrets. … because to give up power, Whether in Chile in 1988, Poland in 1989, or South Africa in 1990, the elites the elites need incentives did not give up power for nothing. The emerging democracies allowed them to privatize their property rights granted by the ancient regimes. That is of course grossly unfair in terms of equal rights and will create dissatisfaction in the future (as you can already see in South Africa), but that is how it works. This is not about justice but about peaceful transition. Is Spain after the death of Franco not prefer- able to Iran after the expulsion of the Shah ? In Ukraine, both Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk, the richest businessmen in the country with extremely strong connections to the old regime, are still enormously wealthy, even though Pinchuk had to give back two companies acquired in dubious privatizations. When a Ukrainian politician recently showed me a list of weapons confiscated from Pin- chuk’s men, I said: Great, when is he going to jail, but he replied: We will not put him to jail because that would be too disruptive, we just want to demilitarize him. Bastards like Pinchuk — excuse my wording — will be allowed to retain their wealth and transform into respectable politicians as a trade off for their assistance in open-

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 68 69 Economy and the State Is the huge number of young people a chance or a challenge ?

Hoffmann

ing up the system. If you want a peaceful transition, instead of hoping for elites to simply abdicate their power and wealth, have some incentives prepared.

A major economic task for all governments in the region is job creation. Since the Perkovich 1990s, i. e. after the end of the Cold War, two billion new people joined the unified Job creation is more difficult since global labor market. Both China and India were cut off from that global supply China and India rejoined world markets chain due to the divided world economy. Nowadays, as you can see here in Dubai, Indians are already dominating the market for cheap manual labor. What is the strategy of governments within and outside the region for dealing with this chal- lenge of job creation for indigenous populations. This question concerns both the wealthiest countries of the region as well as the poorer ones, which are already facing unemployed masses of mostly younger people.

Mr. Reissner, you are working on Islamist discourses — is the question of how to Perthes get young people into the workforce and to participate in the democratic process being discussed by the new Islamists ? Or is their discourse still only a moral one, sticking to justice and Islam being the solution ?

These questions are discussed, of course with a strong moral undertone and al- Reissner ways in connection with the demand for justice.

Regarding labor markets, there is a growing regional discrepancy. After Septem- Kahwaji ber 11, 2001, large amounts of Arab capital were withdrawn from Western bank The gap between wealthy Gulf states and their accounts because of the new regulations imposed on money transfers in the course poor neighbors will destabilize the region of the so-called war on terror. A lot of this money was reinvested in the Gulf region. The results, reinforced by the soaring oil prices, are visible everywhere around the Gulf — for example in the UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait. That widens the already exist- ing gap between the wealthy Gulf states and their neighbors suffering from high unemployment rates and the inability to meet basic human needs. In the end, this will undermine the basis for reforms and destabilize the whole region.

The demographic conditions of the region, the huge numbers of young people, Hoffmann can be seen as a chance or as a challenge. Not long ago, almost every article about Demographics can be Iran ended with the optimistic forecast that Iran’s future was bright because the a chance or a challenge country’s overwhelming number of well-educated, politically sensitive young people could no longer be ignored. But do we know for sure that young people

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 68 69 Economy and the State in Iran are not a time bomb because of their frustrated attempts to satisfy their material needs ? Do we know for sure that they are not already radicalized and a grave threat to stability ? What makes us so sure that the inevitable change will put Iran on a path that will be desirable for the West ?

2. Models and Obstacles for Political Reform

Perthes Can the region repeat Europe’s democratization process or are conditions too different ?

Asadi The historical experience of the West cannot be repeated, because we live in a dif- ferent world with different parameters. Therefore, we have to find our own path to long-term development, as difficult as this might be.

Hadian The countries of the region are not only different, they are unique. One can of This region’s countries are course learn from general prescriptions and historical examples, but in the end not only different, but unique each country is determined by an individual set of characteristics.

Perthes Mr. Cooper, is Europe’s path to modernity in the 20th century, or from the 19th century or even from the Renaissance onward, different from the development in this region ?

Cooper Of course — you hinted at the difference yourself when you asked about the 20th, Democratization in Europe took centuries then about the 19th century and then about the Renaissance. What took place in Europe was a very slow process — inventing something and putting it into practice in a trial and error procedure always takes time. The difference between democra- tization in Europe and other parts of the world is indeed the speed.

Polenz Of course conditions here differ from Europe, and our friends in the region have with good reasons repeatedly insisted on self-determination. Indeed, all people should have the right to choose their own model of democracy, participation and rule of law. But that does not mean that all models are equally good. There are com- monly accepted universal standards — of human rights, for instance, against which we can and should measure individual countries. Achievements can also be com- pared with what has been achieved in other regions. One such benchmark could be the degree of education in a country or the distribution of wealth and poverty.

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 70 71 Models and Obstacles for Political Reform How are the conditions for introducing democracy — is the region ready ? Perthes

In the Arab world, even countries that have an old parliamentary system, Lebanon Kahwaji for example, lack an adequate electoral law that ensures representation. Every We need propoportional representation new attempt to create a new election law up to now has served those in power, not the people. As a Sunni from the Lebanese city of Tyre, I cannot run for elections, because Tyre and the surrounding region of South Lebanon do not have a seat for a Sunni. There are similar problems in Iraq. The lack of proportional representation offering security to the minorities as well as to the majorities in the region is one of the reasons for the poisoned relationships between the different groups in Iraq.

Five things hinder democratization in the region and in Iraq: demography, Islamic Atiyyah traditions, irresponsible elites, dependent people, and the neighborhood. First, demographic changes affect democratic practices: In Lebanon, the peo- ple feel threatened by a growing Shia majority, in Jordan by a Palestinian majority. The ruling elites, often belonging to the minority, react with electoral laws that violate the fundamental democratic principle of one man, one vote. The Iraqi city of Kirkuk is claimed by Kurds, and Arabs alike — the Kurds are even offering incen- tives to Kurds to move to Kirkuk in order to outnumber other ethnic groups. Second, Islam has indeed certain undemocratic traditions. During the last elections in Iran, the middle echelon of the Islamic clergy heavily influenced people’s votes. The right to vote as an individual, and not as part of a flock, was greatly disrespected. Third, until now, our elites have been power-grabbers. They have to learn to Our elites are power-grabbers share power. This will not be easy in the short run, but there are traditional values supporting the idea of power-sharing as the best way to rule a country, even if this means that democratic principles are implemented only gradually. In the Arab world, the opposition is often worse than the government. There was a homegrown opposition in Iraq until the 1950s, but later on the communists with their ties to Moscow and the nationalists with their ties to Nasser were not a true indigenous democratic opposition but influenced by foreign interests. Fourth, in Iraq the nationalization of industries and the agricultural reform after the revolution of 1958 eliminated the independence of the middle and the lower classes. It became customary to live on state support. After the fall of Saddam, Iraqis depend on whomever is willing to support them, thus allowing loyalties to be bought, regardless of political inclinations — as in the Arabic prov-

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 70 71 Models and Obstacles for Political Reform Democracies tend to grow in an atmosphere of security.

Cooper

erb “Whoever gets my mother, I will call him my uncle.” Building democracy is hard under these circumstances. Iraq has difficult neighbors: Fifth, Mr. McFaul was right to point out the importance of the neighborhood. Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria Without doubt, Eastern Europe benefits from its Western European neighbors. Unfortunately, Iraq adjoins to Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Syria.

Cooper Democracies tend to grow in an atmosphere of security. NATO played an impor- tant role in providing a secure neighborhood in postwar Europe. Another important example of the value of a good neighborhood is Japan. Although nobody in Asia will admit it, Japanese success as an economic-driven de- mocracy has been a very powerful motivation for similar developments through- out the region. Copying is a common process in history Copying is a very common process in history; Europe’s models were Rome and Greece, Venice was copied by the Netherlands and the Netherlands them- selves were copied by Britain. Then Britain was copied by the United States which referred to Montesquieu, who actually misunderstood what was happening in Britain.

Hadian Democracy in Iran will come about only when a certain level has been reached in the areas of society, culture, polity and help from the international community. Iranian society is, as Mr. Cooper said, very much ready for democracy. There is an expanded and educated middle class that organizes itself in strong (although state-controlled) civil society institutions. Culture is not decisive for democratization Culture, in contrast, is a very mixed bag. I doubt that we can claim a well-de- veloped democratic culture or a culture that is very favorable for democracy. But I personally do not think that culture, important as it is, will be the decisive factor. Fortunately, culture can change rather quickly. The most important obstacle to democratization is the state of Iran’s polity. Iranian politics are determined by rival factions and parties competing for power without adequate regulation by commonly accepted norms and rules and there- fore with unpredictable results. As long as our oil spares the state from the need to extract revenues from the citizens, Iran’s polity will lack transparency and accountability. The discourse about the rule of law among intellectuals in Iran is therefore mainly about rules for the political process, about political competition and constitutional participation. Those in power prefer to mention the rule of law only with regard to society.

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 72 73 Models and Obstacles for Political Reform Iranian society is very much ready for democracy.

Hadian

The plurality of power centers in Iran results from complex structures as envi- Asadi sioned in the post-revolutionary Constitution. While such a plurality has proved cumbersome, it has nevertheless provided some sort of a system of checks and balances and militated, in actuality, against emergence of monolithic structures.

It seems to be common knowledge that Iran is “the most secular society” in the Hoffmann region. What makes us so sure about that and what does it actually mean, “the If Iran really is the region’s most secular society” ? What are the criteria and what is the empirical proof ? The most secular country … number of young people who like to party ? The decreasing number of people who pray regularly ? I have experienced Iran as a deeply split society with a major part of it still living in a traditional way with religion playing a decisive role in people’s lives. I suspect that secularism according to the French tradition or the Turkish model would find few supporters in Iran. Support for a milder form of secularism like the one we have in Germany would probably still be confined to the upper and upper middle class urban population.

Iran’s society is secular even though it is religious — secularism is not about the Hadian absence of faith but about how state and society are organized. Secularization in Iran has three aspects: First, daily life in Iran is becoming increasingly con- ventional — moving from the sacred to the profane. Second, religion is more and more relegated to the private sphere. During Muharram, an important month in the Shia tradition with marches where men beat themselves in memory of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn, participants now gather less and less in state-con- trolled mosques after the marches, preferring privately organized places instead. Third, many people are in favor of separating the institutions of religion and state.

If Iran is so secular, was Ahmadinejad elected only for economic reasons or was Hoffmann the election fraudulent ? … then why did the Iranians elect Ahmadinejad ?

Ahmadinejad was elected for his simple attire, unpolished style, and down-to- Hadian earth approach. This distinguished him from Rafsanjani in the eyes of the ordi- Ahmadinejad only got 5,7 million votes nary people in Iran. It should be pointed out that when people had several choices Ahmadinejad only collected 5.7 million votes in the first ballot of the Election. In the second ballot when he competed with the former President Rafsanjani

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 72 73 Models and Obstacles for Political Reform he won the Election by a wide margin. However his election does not by any stretch of the imagination mean that Iran is shifting towards a revolutionary ideology.

3. Can Outside Pressure Trigger Reform ?

Perthes Can democratization be triggered from outside, Mr. Löning ?

Löning It was common sense in the international development aid community in the In the 1960s, everybody believed 1960s that the future belonged to Africa, while Asia would stay poor forever. As in Africa’s future … you know, the opposite happened. What brought about the boom in Asia ? Apart from many different elements like market economy and rule of law, I see one key element — a deliberate decision by responsible national elites to develop their respective countries. That happened in Vietnam in the 1980s, for example, and it happened in South Korea, Taiwan, and India. … but foreign aid and experts are Foreign aid and experts cannot trigger development without such decision. useless without responsible elites Western countries wasted a great amount of money (Germany, for example, spent more than the equivalent of one billion euro in India alone), until they finally re- alized it was to no avail. Are there responsible elites in the Middle East that have decided or will decide to develop their countries ?

McFaul Foreign experts and money made a big difference in Asia. Security provided by the United States was a precondition for development in South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.

Cooper Outside influence has been decisive for the development of certain countries, Dominant foreign adversaries can be though sometimes in a perverse way. The humiliation of the Japanese by the USA incentives for developing one’s country and the West, their treatment as a second-class people, made the Japanese elites decide at the end of the 19th century that they would develop their country so they would be able to stand face to face to the West. It was China’s rise to a superpower that knocked India out of its self-satisfaction. An important stimulus for democratization may be a polytheistic religion. It is hardly a coincidence that both Greece and Rome had the religious image of gods quarrelling in the heavens. Perhaps democracy works in India because Hinduism is better-suited to democracy than Islam, for example in Pakistan.

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 74 75 Can Outside Pressure Trigger Reform? The USA plays a negative role with regard to democratization in Iran, probably Hadian unintentionally. In a decade of sanctions supposed to curb Iranian weapons of mass destruction, support for terrorism and opposition to the Middle East peace process, nothing has been gained. In terms of WMD, Iran made progress, in terms of terrorism we are at the top of the State Department’s list of rogue states, and we are still vehemently opposed to the peace process. What you have achieved is that the domestic situation in Iran has become securitized. A number of my colleagues ended up in prison for apparently accepting American money, which the US Congress promised but never actually paid out. These policies hurt the democratic movement in Iran. More helpful for the support of democracy is the spread of universally-accepted values through globalization, which has strong domestic implications in Iran.

US-funded NGOs were quite helpful in Lebanon. Their representatives flew to McFaul Ukraine and brought their fresh experience of a peaceful transition to Lebanon.

Let us now define a work program. What do we expect from the elites, the ruling Perthes families, the middle classes — and the foreign experts, Americans as well as oth- ers ? What are their most important tasks and duties in the immediate future ?

I hate to tell you, but regimes in the region are entrenched and corrupt and have Kahwaji only one priority: staying in power. You cannot hope that they will make decisions To stay in power … in their countries’ best interests. Regional autocrats will always be prepared to converse about reform with the … the regional autocrats will even discuss Western governments as long as they they and their children can be sure of retain- democracy with Western experts ing their power and wealth. They will be prepared to discuss democracy as long as they can be sure they will not be threatened by real democracy. Because people in the region know that, Western negotiations with the regimes undermine the United States’ and Europe’s credibility. This region is not Asia. There will be no regime change, and there will be no democratization, as long as the current regimes control their nations’ wealth and security apparatus and are considered legitimate by the international community.

My list would be: control over the military police, the economy and the financial Khouri sector and the information market. International recognition is not the decisive factor.

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 74 75 Can Outside Pressure Trigger Reform? When promoting democracy, the West must be more consistent than hitherto.

Hollis

Kahwaji Therefore, Europe and the United States should support regime change from The West should support regime within. As during the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, the West must en- change — like in Ukraine courage the free media, the opposition and civil rights activists as much as pos- sible. Partnerships could be an effective means of encouraging change through incentives. Collaboration between NATO and the national military on defense reform can further the separation of military and civilian or state structures, which would in turn deprive the autocratic regimes of an important pillar of their power. In the economic area, reducing the influence of lobby groups which cater to their specific interests would be very helpful. Lobbyists are the advocates of auto- cratic leaders in the West, because the autocrats are important business partners for Western firms. Regional autocrats tend to use privatization to channel the national wealth to their families. The West must not allow this to go through. Western partnerships, be it the ENP’s action plans or papers in the framework of the Barcelona Proc- ess, should always include guidelines detailing how privatization and economic reforms are to be handled. That will further weaken the regimes’s hold on power and empower the people.

Cooper The so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine was not really a revolution, but a part of a so-far-peaceful transition, an election was fixed in the aftermath. I do not think that the disappearance of the House of Saud, for example, would be quite that peaceful and easy to manage. Real revolutions bring forth chaos and destruction.

Khouri Whatever it was that happened in Ukraine, a revolution or a transition, it had a The Orange Revolution had tremendous impact on the Middle East, in particular on Lebanon. They saw the a big impact on the Middle East Orange Revolution on TV and copied techniques of the Ukrainian protesters: the scarves and the music groups for example. Another source of inspiration came from the Palestinian Intifada, namely the slogan “Intifada of Independence” they used for their movement against Syrian occupation.

Perthes The astonishing and encouraging thing about Lebanon is that a public prosecutor and a popular movement managed to bring about the peaceful demise of authori- tarianism, without any military coup or foreign intervention.

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 76 77 Can Outside Pressure Trigger Reform? It is impossible to solve all the region’s problems simultaneously, not the least Khouri because men like the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, know all the tricks of Men like Hosni Mubarak know staying in power from decades of experience. all the tricks to retain power … But one good example could make a start. Europe and the United States should engage Lebanon to manage the breakthrough. It would have the same impact on the Arab world as Solidarity in Poland had on the Soviet Bloc in the 1980s. What the region needs most is accountability. Lebanon could become the one example, the one success story we need where a society holds its elites accountable, builds the rule of law through an independent judiciary and finds commonly accepted ways of participation.

One of the main reasons why many of the regimes and autocrats in the region Reissner have remained in power so long is that they have consistently managed to play off one foreign power against another. We must ensure that it is no longer possible to play this game with the Europeans, the Americans or the Chinese ?

Should there be a work program for the opposition too, Mr. Atiyyah ? You said that Perthes some opposition groups are worse than the governments.

The Europeans and Americans should make it clear to the opposition groups that Atiyyah if they want to be an alternative to the existing government, they have to abide by certain rules. That would help to encourage a more mature Arab opposition.

When promoting democracy, the West must be more consistent than hitherto. Hollis Europe and the US tend to want democracy as an instrument for delivering cer- If the West wants real democracy, it must tain outcomes, whereas real democracy is establishing institutions and processes respect the outcome of free elections and respecting the outcome. Europe is extremely nervous because many Palestin- ians will likely vote for Hamas. But if certain parts of the Palestinian electorate use their democratic rights to elect Islamists — Islamists represent a part of the population — it would not be democratic to object.

The EU has recognized Hamas as a legitimate participant in the elections — the US Cooper will not even speak to them.

There is a big debate in the United States, even in the Bush administration, as to McFaul how to deal with Islamist groups. Hamas is of course a very delicate issue. If they

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 76 77 Can Outside Pressure Trigger Reform? get into local governments in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, they get access to multi-million dollar USAID-sponsored programs, including those for techni- cal assistance and food relief. Should that make us happy ? I doubt it. Americans will not tolerate that their support is used to subsidize the activities of a terrorist organization.

Perthes During the presidential election in Palestine, Europe successfully pressured Mar- wan Barghouti to withdraw his candidature. The EU wanted to assure a particular outcome which had already been negotiated with the Americans and the Israelis: that Mahmoud Abbas would become Palestinian President.

Khouri The Islamists are the ones who are perceived as paying attention to the problems The Islamists seemingly do care for of the ordinary people. This is why they got so much support during the past the ordinary people — just like decades. They do exactly what religious movements are supposed to do — think Martin Luther King or Desmond Tutu of Reverend Martin Luther King’s role in the US civil rights movement of Bishop Desmond Tutu as a leader of the anti-Apartheid movement, in South Africa, or of Cardinal Jaime Sin’s role for democratization in the Philippines. Faith gives hope, courage and strength — all the things needed to overcome oppression.

The Social and Economic Basis for Reform 78 III. Security Challenges

We will now concentrate on the risks, threats, and security challenges in the re- Perthes gion and on how regional and international actors should tackle them. Hossein Mousavian, Advisor to the National Security Secretary of the Islamic Republic of Iran and former head of Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, will analyze the situation from the perspective of the biggest country in the region, Iran. He will also explain his views on Iran’s nuclear program that is seen by many as a major security threat itself. Our second speaker, Robert Cooper, Director General for Politico-Military Af- fairs at the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU is not only one of the EU’s most senior diplomats. he has also acquired a reputation as a leading conceptual thinker with important books like his analysis of the international system after the end of the Cold War “The Breaking of Nations”.

I see ten major challenges to this region’s security: Mousavian The countries of the Middle Eastern and the North African region, especially those of the Persian Gulf, are among the most heavily armed in the world. Instead of investing their petro-dollars in economic development, they import large quan- tities of military equipment. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the brutal policy of the Israeli government threaten both regional and international stability. Furthermore, the unwilling- ness of the United States to use its influence on Israel to resolve the conflict under- mines the legitimacy of its Arab allies and strengthens Islamic fundamentalism. Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Taliban are serious threats to regional People in the region believe there is and international security. The American war on terror combined with the United a Jewish-Christian war against Islam States’ support for Israel is counterproductive: The consecutive invasions of Af- ghanistan and Iraq are increasingly being interpreted as a Jewish-Christian war against Islam in the region, which increases support for Al-Qaeda. The willingness of the US to use force as a legitimate means for regime change in various Arab countries endangers regional and global security. The invasion and reconstruction of Iraq is not seen as an exception, but as a precedent that can be replicated elsewhere if needed. American unilateralism and its implications for how transformations in the Unilateralism is deeply rooted Arab world and Iran are to be triggered from the outside challenge the long-term within American policy stability of this region. This unilateralism is rooted deeply in American foreign policy, because while neo-cons talk about empire and American primacy, neoliber- als just use other words when they call for leadership by the United States.

79 The invasion of Iraq can be replicated elsewhere if needed.

Mousavian

The present security strategy is financially unsustainable because the costs both for the US and the GCC states are too high. Instead, we need a framework of regional collaboration for security, stability and peace. The West applies double standards concerning weapons of mass destruction. Israel, Pakistan and India possess a wide range of these weapons and refuse to sign, ratify and implement the international WMD conventions. Nevertheless, the US, the EU and other important members of the international community like China and Russia compete for strategic relations with these countries. No country in the region apart from Iran is taking serious measures against drug smuggling even though these drugs have devastating effects also in the EU. As a result, Iran is threatened by narco-terrorism without any support from its neighbors or the international community. Territorial integrity, internal stability, Iran follows four guidelines in its policy towards Iraq: Territorial integrity, strong central governments and participation internal stability, a strong central government and the participation of all ethnic are essential for the region’s security and religious groups (mainly the Shia, the Sunni, and the Kurds). These are also the main factors for the region’s security. The US and other Western countries’ military presence in the Persian Gulf, Central Asia and the Caucasus region is threatening Iran and destabilizing the whole region by stirring up ethnic conflicts and influencing domestic policies.

Cooper The European Security Strategy identifies a number of threats to Europe, namely weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, failed states and organized crime. In a way, this list of threats demonstrates just how secure Europe is at the moment: Weapons of mass destruction are a rather remote threat, organized crime and failed states happen at the worst around our borders, but more likely further away, and we are getting on top of the problem in the Balkans. Measured on a historical scale, Europe Regarding terrorism, of course there have been horrible terrorist attacks, the is extraordinarily secure at the moment … most spectacular of which were the attacks of 9/11 that killed nearly 3,000 people. On the average day during the Second World War 17,000 people died and World War II lasted six years. It is therefore justified to say that we live in an extraordi- narily secure environment measured on a historical scale. … whereas the Middle East is potentially In the Middle East, all these threats — failing states, terrorism, weapons of the world’s most dangerous region mass destruction, organized crime — are clear and present dangers. Looking at the beach and the sea outside you might have the impression that today is a nice day in a nice place, but there are good reasons to be fearful. There is no potentially more dangerous area in the world.

Security Challenges 80 81 As to failing states, there are several candidates, most notably Iraq. Success there can be achieved only in the long run, and we are still far from that. I cannot help recalling, without pleasure, winding up accidentally on a television program in which Richard Perle told me, “Iraq will be a democracy in six months”. “But we have been in Bosnia for seven or eight years, and we are making progress, but there is no stable democracy yet,” I replied. He insisted that “No, no, there was a civil war in Bosnia and Iraq is totally different.” But maybe in the long run the American strategy will work out and Iraq In the long run, Iraq might become the will become the Arab version of the American dream: a stable, freedom-loving Arab version of the American dream democratic country, where all minorities are included in the political process. The American administration hopes that this example will destabilize the autocratic governments in the region. If Iraq becomes a stable country, it will also help in stabilizing the region. As to terrorism, it might be an exaggeration to say that it is a part of the nor- Many Middle Eastern governments mal way of life of the governments here. But many governments in the region are are involved in terrorism indeed involved in terrorism, as financiers or through logistical support. On the other hand, major countries like Saudi Arabia are seriously threatened by fundamentalist terrorism. Remember that just a couple of years ago, there seemed to be a bombing or kidnapping in Saudi Arabia every week. Whether the government has now found a way to control the situation and is on a path to becoming stable and legitimate in the long run, we just do not know. But there may still be enormous risks in Saudi Arabia. Weapons of mass destruction have been high on the agenda ever since Saddam used gas in the Iran-Iraq war. The alleged existence of Iraqi WMD was the main reason for the US-led invasion in Iraq; today the Iranian nuclear program dominates threat analyses. Apart from failing states, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the Gulf In the Gulf region, old-fashioned region is the only place in today’s world where a good honest interstate war, an in- interstate wars still make sense vasion by military force to capture territory, would make any sense. If the Japanese invaded, say, Singapore again, they would hurt Japanese businesses there. But in the Gulf region, territory itself is valuable because of its natural resources. Let me now come to the Iranian nuclear program. With all respect to our Iran’s nuclear program has Iranian friends, it is difficult to believe that Iran’s nuclear aspirations are peace- “nuclear weapons” written all over it ful. A peaceful nuclear program starts with building power stations and only later turns to the production of the radioactive material to run them. To start with radioactive material without yet having any working power stations and to start

Security Challenges 80 81 Although it may seem different to Iranians, Iran actually is a naturally secure country in many ways.

Cooper

with a heavy water reactor and centrifuges — using technology borrowed from the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan (not especially famous for his power plants), and to furthermore experiment with po- lonium, which is used to detonate atomic bombs — such a program has “nuclear weapons” written all over it in capital letters. A naturally secure country like Iran To act in that way would be, again with all due respect, a spectacularly stupid does not need nuclear weapons thing to do. Although it may seem different to Iranians, Iran actually is a natu- rally secure country in many ways. If such a naturally secure country wished to bring a threat upon itself, a good way to do so would be to make people think you want to acquire nuclear weapons. First, that would attract the attention of the USA and second it might persuade others in the region that they also need nuclear weapons. India has not become more secure by having nuclear weapons; on the contrary, it lost its natural security advantage over Pakistan, because it has persuaded Pakistan to get nuclear weapons. There are others here at the table, most notably Mr. Mousavian and Mr. McFaul, who know even more about the different efforts being made to negotiate on this subject, and I am still profoundly hopeful that they will be successful. But if they are not and the Iranian government, which does not seem to show enormous sensitivity to global opinions at the moment, goes ahead with this, then what will happen ? A possible scenario would be that all countries in the region decide that they need nuclear weapons, too. The Saudis could buy them from Pakistan, for exam- ple, and Syria, Egypt and others could not fail to conclude that it is just not safe not to have nuclear weapons. Containment of Iran is not The second option would be a policy of containment. That would require an a very attractive option even more comprehensive, deeper involvement of the US in the region. An organi- zation like NATO would have to be devised for the region, with a sort of US tripwire around Iran, and with a strong, permanent US presence in the region. That does not strike me as being particularly stabilizing, either, and while the involvement of the Europeans might help, it still would not make that option very attractive. Regional governments This rather bleak outlook makes me wonder why governments in the region need to be more active are not working much more actively to find ways out of this quagmire. Politicians here should worry much, much more and need to stop being passive.

Kahwaji They are not passive, but a bit more discreet about their concerns and intentions, not the least because of cultural habits. They prefer to do things behind closed

Security Challenges 82 83 Foreign troops are a part of the problem, but they are also an inevitable part of the solution.

Hollis

doors instead of communicating through the media, and they do not want to scare The Gulf States are discreet because they off global investors. Investments in Dubai and Qatar are built on the confidence do not want to scare off global investors that the region is secure and stable. The Gulf states are actively developing a strategy given the possibility of a nu- clear arms race initiated by the Iranians. Just a few days ago, the Secretary-General of the GCC made very clear statements about the potentially destabilizing conse- quences Iran’s nuclear program would bring to the whole region.

The UAE is not passive in the face of the threat from Iran. On the contrary, Iranian Steltzer nuclear ambitions are the most important topic in foreign policy debates. Iran is Iran is for the UAE what the USSR was traditionally the powerful neighbor to worry about, comparable to what the Soviet for Germany during the Cold War Union used to be for Germany and its Bundeswehr. In recent years, its growing defense budget, nuclear ambitions and lack of transparent policy have increased these worries.

I still think that the governments in the region are too passive, and as to their zu Guttenberg being discreet, I sometimes wish there would be more discretion, for instance, towards Israel.

Mr. Mousavian said that Israel’s policy and the United States’ support for Israel Perthes undermine regional stability. Do you agree, Mr. Schaefer ?

The chicken-and-egg-game about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will lead no- Schaefer where. Regional actors blame the United States for the current situation The chicken-and-egg-game about and conclude that the US ought to find a solution, too. But even though the the responsibility for the Israel-Palestine Americans play of course an important role, there can be no solution as long conflict leads to nowhere as regional players call the existence of Israel into question. A two-state solu- tion in which Israel and Palestine can exist side by side in peace is the only way.

Is Mr. Mousavian correct in stating that foreign armies destabilize the region ? Perthes

Foreign troops are a part of the problem, but they are also an inevitable part of Hollis the solution. For at least a decade, the Americans have bolstered the defenses of Foreign troops are part of the problem the GCC states and supplied them with weapons. Yet these states are still unable as well as part of the solution to defend themselves.

Security Challenges 82 83 Foreign troops produce new insecurities.

Khouri

If the US troops withdrew, the GCC states In effect, the United States has become a local as well as an external actor in would soon ask for their return this region and will remain so in the foreseeable future. This was pointed out in the 1990s by Gary Sick, a member of the NSC under three US Presidents, includ- ing Carter during the 1979 US-Iran hostage crisis. And the portents for the future do not look good. Just contemplate the spectre of a Shia-controlled ‘Petrolistan’, encompassing Iran, southern Iraq and Saudi Arabia’s eastern province Al Hasa, where much of Saudi Arabia’s Shia minority and, coincidentally, most of its oil is situated. If the US military were withdrawn from the region in the near future, leaving the region in turmoil, the GCC states would probably be the first to ask for a renewed American engagement.

Khouri I disagree. Foreign troops are here in the name of security and stability, but in The longer Western troops stay, fact they produce new insecurities. Osama bin Laden was partly motivated by the the more people will become terrorists American presence in Saudi Arabia. To put it briefly, the longer American, British and other Western troops stay in the region, the more people will become terror- ists. The situation has already turned us into barbarians: people see Americans and British on al-Jazeera and CNN being beheaded in Iraq, but you do not hear any public condemnation. Foreign troops should leave as soon as possible.

Asadi You are right Mr. Khouri, sooner or later the Western governments will leave the region and we will stay here and will have to engage with each other, big or small, with all our peculiarities and what I said every country’s enduring, genuine and legitimate concerns and interests, beyond the short-term — if not short-sighted — and transient expediencies of the moment and requirements of politico-military alliances. The inevitability of peaceful coexistence will force us to develop long term approaches on how to deal with each other. I would also like to underline that all of us in the region should be able to address each other’s genu- ine and legitimate concerns, including security concerns (which is not my cup of tea, anyhow), through home-grown democratic processes, rule of law, accountable governance, respect for and promotion of human rights, and what I prefer to call mutuality of empathy, and move, individually and collectively, towards achieving long-term sustainable, human development. On a concrete point, mention was just made by another colleague of para- graph 8 of the UN Security Council resolution 598 on the imperative of developing regional security arrangements in the Persian Gulf. Let me also draw attention to an example of bilateral agreement between Iran and Iraq — as two important

Security Challenges 84 85 Iran’s Nuclear Program We must develop long term approaches on how to deal with each other.

Asadi

countries in the area. I am referring to the Treaty of State Frontiers and Good Neighbourly Relations, which was signed between the two countries in June 1975 — ill-fated as unfortunately it proved to be once Saddam Hussein decided to invade Iran in September 1980. That Treaty and its various Annexes and Proto- cols — an instrument recognized by the United Nations and the international com- munity — address all aspects of the relations between the two countries and can still be considered a good basis to resolve the outstanding issues between us and serve the long-term goal of development and consolidation of bilateral elations.

Unfortunately, there is no such thing as inevitability of peaceful coexistence in Cooper the region. Much to the contrary, conflict is inevitable. It can be prevented only Conflict is inevitable unless we take by concerted active measures. concerted active measures

1. Iran’s Nuclear Program

One major threat to stability is, in the eyes of many Western observers, the Iranian Perthes nuclear program. Do people from the region see Iran as a peaceful country and would they want the Iranians to have nuclear weapons ?

Iran is a potential threat and governments in the region are very aware of that. Kahwaji The ongoing Iranian presence on the disputed islands near the Strait of Hormuz People are well aware of Iran’s willingness shows Iran’s willingness to make use of its military strength. It shows what Iran to use military strength could do if foreign armies in the region were no longer here to deter it. Apart from its military potential, Iran can also use its proxies in the Gulf states to agitate the minority Shiites and thus destabilize these countries. There is a direct link between weapons procurement in the region and the fear of Iran. Defense spending in the Gulf has increased dramatically since the 1970s with Iran and Iraq being the main reasons. In their effort to build up a deterrent force to be prepared for the day when The GCC states have almost achieved US and European forces might leave, governments are primarily buying airpower, military parity with Iran aerial warning systems, and even ballistic missiles; the UAE has Russian Scuds. Defense experts agree that the UAE, Saudi Arabia and the whole GCC have come close to achieving their common goal of matching Iranian military quantity with supreme military quality. But no deterrent force could protect the Gulf states against the consequences of a military showdown where the USA and Israel are on one side and Iran is on the other.

Security Challenges 84 85 Iran’s Nuclear Program The Iranian nuclear program is a cause for concern not only for military, but also in the environmental reasons. Should there be a Iranian Chernobyl — God forbid — Kuwait would probably be harmed more than Iran itself because of its geographic proximity.

Hadian Do not forget Iran’s legitimate security concerns and Iranian threat perceptions. First, Iranians are convinced for historical reasons that their country is funda- mentally peaceful but often endangered. Iran has not attacked any country in 250 years, but it has often been attacked itself.

Mousavian During the past decades, Iranians were the victims of WMD, not the ones who The Iranians were victims used them. During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraqi troops made the most extensive use of of WMD in the recent past chemical weapons since the end of the First World War.

Reissner Iranians might base their assessment on historical experiences, but Western poli- ticians look at present or future threats. It is crucial for Iran to understand that.

Atiyyah Iran has interfered in several regional conflicts during the last one and a half centuries without ever acting so crudely as actually attacking or invading any country: In 1959, they supported the Kurdish rebellion against the regime of Abd as-Sallam Arif. Since the 1980s, they have interfered in Lebanon with the help of Hezbollah.

Hadian Today, Iran faces objective security challenges: The presence of US forces in the Iran faces objective security challenges region; the narco-terrorists from Afghanistan who have already killed at least 3300 Iranian police and citizens (by the way, we have not seen any support from the West in this war); the danger of Afghanistan and, less likely, of Pakistan be- coming a failed state; Washington’s attempts to stir up ethnic conflicts inside Iran; and finally, neighboring states questioning Iran’s territorial integrity for example regarding the islands in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran can rely only on its own strength In the face of real and perceived threats Iranians feel they can rely on no one but themselves. When Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, the West either supported Saddam or remained silent instead of protesting against this grave violation of the Geneva Conventions. Iran’s decision makers and citizens have believed since then that their country is of no importance for the international community and must therefore rely on its own resources for its defense.

Security Challenges 86 87 Iran’s Nuclear Program Governments in the region might fear Iran and its nuclear program but, like it or Khouri not, the ordinary Arab and Iranian citizens want Iran to have a nuclear weapon. People in the region are fed up They are fed up with Westerners telling us, “you may not have these weapons, with Western double standards you may not have these systems,” tired of the tradition of double standards that often seem to verge on racism and neo-colonialism. People experience that as a degradation of their humanity and see international law only as a fig leaf for pursuing Western interests.

The West’s ongoing usage of double standards has indeed increased the support Hadian for an Iranian nuclear weapons program in the Islamic world. Israel has more While Israel has more than than 200 nuclear warheads and has not joined the NPT, yet the West does not 200 nuclear warheads … exert any pressure.

Western double standards also keep the GCC’s leaders from condemning Iran’s Kahwaji nuclear ambitions. Most Arabs, including the people in the Gulf states, are under … Muslims are not allowed to have the bomb the impression that both Christian Europeans and Jewish Israelis are allowed to have atomic bombs, but Muslims obviously are not. Pakistan is already under great pressure because of its bomb. This problem also has a growing sectarian dimen- sion, because people are beginning to ask why the Sunnis — in Pakistan — have a bomb, but the Shia do not.

Indeed, the obvious double standards regarding weapons of mass destruction Mousavian are undermining the legitimacy of the West. Israel, Pakistan, and India are not Double standards undermine threatened with international sanctions for their disregard of non-proliferation the West’s legitimacy treaties. Instead, the United States, the EU, China, Russia and other important international members compete for strategic relations with these countries. Iran, on the other hand, is threatened by sanctions for its research into the civilian use of nuclear power.

Mr. Mousavian, does Iran pursue a nuclear arms program ? Mr. Cooper told us why Perthes it is hard to believe that your country only wants to satisfy its energy needs.

No, our nuclear program has nothing to do with acquiring weapons. Not only is Mousavian there a fatwa, issued by our highest religious leaders, that such weapons are for- Nuclear weapons are forbidden in Iran bidden, but there is also all kinds of legislation supporting this fatwa.

Security Challenges 86 87 Iran’s Nuclear Program Iran wants to have a nuclear option in order to strengthen its geopolitical position.

Schaefer

Schaefer To be honest, the Iranian nuclear program makes sense only if it aims at nuclear weapons capability. Then why does Iran need Why should Iran need nuclear enrichment even though it does not make eco- nuclear enrichment ? nomic sense in Iran ? Iran does not have a single light water reactor. Until there is a significant number of these reactors, there is no sense in Iran having its own enrichment capability. Producing fissile material does not make any sense unless there is a much greater number of nuclear power plants, and without enrichment there is no need for conversion. Iran already has a lifelong supply for all reactors in Bushehr from Russia. The EU is willing to actively support the Iranian energy diversification program. The only possible explanation is that the whole program exists in order to develop nuclear weapons. Iran believes it needs to have a nuclear option in order to strengthen its geo- political position. This results from a strange dichotomy of feeling superior to its neighbors but inferior toward the United States.

Mousavian There are very good reasons why Iran wants to close the fuel cycle in the pursuit Iran has good reasons to mistrust the West of a civil nuclear program. Besides the lack of Western pressure on Israel, we have other reasons to accuse the West of using double standards. We have good reasons to mistrust Western governments out of our experiences after the Revolution of 1979. If the West would have fulfilled After the Islamic Revolution, Germany, meaning Siemens, refused to complete its contracts after 1979, nobody in Iran an almost finished nuclear power plant in Iran. Even though Iran had already paid would want to close the fuel cycle eight billion Deutsche Mark, the contract was never fulfilled. In 1974 Iran had also bought a share in a French uranium-enrichment enterprise, the gaseous diffusion consortium Eurodif. But later on, the French government did not authorize the transfer of the enriched uranium from the enrichment plant to Iran. This was due to pressure by the German and American governments. There is no guarantee that similar difficulties will not arise again. If Siemens had built the nuclear power plant, and if the Eurodif had delivered the 10 % share of production of enriched uranium according to our share in the consortium, I swear to God, nobody in Iran would be thinking about a fuel cycle. But after these disappointments, Iran had no other option but to build its own fuel cycle. Now that Iran has built the capability to have a fuel cycle, why should it give it away for nothing ?

Schaefer The fact that the EU lost credibility in the 1980s is not a sufficient justification for Iran’s ambitions to get highly enriched uranium.

Security Challenges 88 89 Iran’s Nuclear Program In Iran there are different views on the issue of nuclear armament.

Hadian

But the issue of Eurodif shows that dialogue is needed. Solving these differences Polenz could be the first step toward a solution of the entire conflict about Iran’s nuclear Maybe Iran has reasons to mistrust program. the West — we need dialogue

The EU should indeed think about how guaranteed international fuel services Perkovich could give Iran sufficient security to set aside its own fuel cycle program in spite of its rather unsatisfactory experiences with the Eurodif consortium. Even if you deny that Iran is justified to mistrust the international community after the Eurodif case, even if you think Iran should trust the EU’s declarations of being willing to help, the EU should still try and get beyond this stalemate by enquiring which additional guarantees could allow Iran to strike a deal, if only to remove that recurrent Iranian argument.

Different factions in Iran hold different views on the issue of nuclear armament. Of Hadian course there are hardliners. One faction among them argues that Iran should with- Regarding the nuclear program, draw from the NPT at once, because they consider the IAEA’s inspectors as spies aim- some Iranians are hardliners … ing only at gathering intelligence about Iran’s nuclear program and military bases for possible attacks. They point to the example of North Korea which is shielded by its nuclear program, unlike Iraq, which was attacked because it lacked such weapons. But the majority of Iranian elites still believes that a nuclear weapons program … but the majority believes that nuclear would decrease instead of enhance our security. First, it would lead to an arms race weapons would make the country less secure in the Region and the Egyptians, Saudis, Turks, Syrians and others would also ac- quire nuclear weapons. The idea of a nuclearized Middle East is even more fright- ening than elsewhere because here missiles reach the enemy country within two minutes. Such geographic proximity makes it impossible to manage mistakes and misinformations about incoming attacks. Second, our conventional superiority is going to evaporate with the aquisition of nuclear weapons by other countries in the Region. Third, a nuclear Iran would probably make smaller states form closer alliances with superpowers outside the region directed against Iran. Fourth, we have good reasons to fear nuclear proliferation in general even Our borders are even less protected against more than the US because our borders are less protected and nuclear terrorism nuclear terrorism than those of the US would be a more immediate threat to our country. Among those who are against actually having nuclear weapons, there are again different factions. Some foreign policy civil servants and experts argue that Iran should have only the knowledge and technology needed for the peaceful use of atomic energy.

Security Challenges 88 89 Iran’s Nuclear Program Another group, mostly people from the military and some academic experts, is convinced that Iran should also have the capability to build nuclear weapons and should possess the necessary components, without actually building the weapons themselves. The government position is somewhere in between these two standpoints. That is, yes, we should have a closed nuclear fuel cycle, but we are ready to provide all the necessary guarantees to reassure the international community about our peaceful objectives. The West should be careful not The West should be very careful not to undermine this compromise by severe to support Iran’s radical faction santions or military actions, because that might support the more radical group by isolating moderate forces and result in an immediate weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program.

Perthes So Iran does not want nuclear weapons, but it could want them for good reasons ? Would it be rational to pursue a nuclear arms program ?

Polenz Mr. Hadian said North Korea proves that nuclear weapons protect you against Iran should not try to imitate North Korea the danger of regime change. Just the opposite is true. The moment the interna- tional community is sure about Iran’s aspirations to build nuclear weapons, it will undertake every effort to prevent it from succeeding. Iran’s striving for nuclear weapons seems to me like an attempted bank robbery with a water pistol — some people die trying this.

Perthes But some succeed, too.

Cooper By the way: North Korea’s trump card is not its nuclear weapons, but the conven- North Korea’s trump card is not tional ones which it uses to threaten South Korea. Its alleged nuclear weapons are its nuclear weapons program rather irrelevant in this conflict.

Perthes But is it not true that North Korea became more secure once it had convinced the international community that it had nuclear weapons ? Is it not true that Saddam Hussein would have been better off had he managed to make everybody think he had a nuclear arsenal ?

Cooper If you manage to convince the world that you have acquired nuclear bombs, you Avoid making people believe you have might be better off, but not if you convey the impression you want these weapons the bomb if you do not have it without yet having them.

Security Challenges 90 91 Iran’s Nuclear Program The worst position you can put yourself in is to make people fear that you might acquire a gun without having one. Everybody gets worried and considers attacking you, and you do not even have a gun to defend yourself. That was the mistake Saddam Hussein made: He managed to convince the world that he did have weapons.

Iran could indeed not harm its own security more efficiently than by threating the McFaul world declaring its wish for nuclear weapons without having them yet. But basically I am convinced that acquiring nuclear weapons would be funda- A gun does not necessarily mentally bad policy for Iran and other countries in the region. I used to live next increase your security to crazy people with guns in Montana, but it was not at all rational for me to buy a gun just because my crazy neighbors had guns. It was much smarter to call the police in case a neighbor threatened me.

Let me take up the story of the two neighbors: There is one neighbor with a Hoffmann gun — the US — and one unarmed — Iran —, who have distrusted each other for twenty years. The one with the gun tells the other, trust me, you do not need a gun. Then he breaks into another neighbor’s house, and says, do not worry, this will not happen to you, no need for you to have a gun. What would you do if you were in the place of the unarmed neighbor ? If there is an Iranian nuclear arms program, it is motivated much more by a per- But North Korea is not threatened by the US ! ceived threat from the US than by regional security considerations. In the regional context, nuclear missiles would make no sense, as Mr. Hadian said. But look at how the United States treats countries that have the bomb — like India, Pakistan and North Korea. These countries are not less secure than before, to say the least. Iran, placed on the axis of evil and time and again subject to considerations about mili- tary strikes, does have good reasons for not feeling entirely secure. Mr Bush insists that in the nuclear row all options, including the military, are on the table. It would be quite understandable and not entirely wrong, if the Iranian leadership thought the best way to be safe from American threats would be to have the bomb.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons brings about the threat to Iran in the first McFaul place ! As an American, I have the constitutional right to buy a gun. But the pur- chase of a gun does not make me and my family more secure. My worst nightmare as an American is that we will undertake a military Confidence building lies in Iran’s interest strike against Iran, because we cannot assess the progress and the motives of its nuclear program. At the moment, the chance of this happening is still very low,

Security Challenges 90 91 Iran’s Nuclear Program A nuclear free zone in the Middle East is the only option.

Schaefer

but Iranian actions are making it more likely. It is up to Iran to do some confidence building and stop its nuclear program.

Schaefer It is simply not true that Iran could increase its own security by acquiring nuclear weapons. We need to get out of the vicious circle of mutual distrust, threats and armaments buildup. A nuclear free zone in the Middle East is the only option.

Hoffmann Mr. Schaefer and Mr. McFaul, you are asking Iran to behave completely rationally Why should Iran behave rationally — in a conflict that has been highly emotional for decades, without asking the same the West does not ! degree of rationality from the Western side. Only three years ago, there was a discussion about military action against Iran within think tanks well-connected to the American government. When Mr. Schaefer said there was “no objective reason for Iran to feel threatened”, he added, “at least not at the moment”. This restriction might be reason enough for Iran to want an atomic bomb. And Mr. McFaul, if you consider a nuclear attack on Iran an — even though re- mote — real threat, Iranian threat perceptions are not as far off as you said earlier. Maybe an American nuclear strike against Iran is the Iranians’ worst nightmare, too.

McFaul You think it is rational for Iran to want the bomb because think tanks in the US The US never attacked Iran debated a possible invasion three years ago and there are some isolated persons that might consider a nuclear strike if Iran continues to radicalize its policy ? But when the Iranian President demands that Israel be wiped off the face of the earth, Iranians assure us that is not serious because their country has not started a war for several decades. The US has not attacked Iran ever. But of course I agree that it would be useful if the US provided certain security guarantees that it will not invade Iran.

Mousavian Solving the nuclear issue through a compromise with the EU is decisive, not be- Solving the nuclear issue could be cause of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but because it could be a role model to handle a model for solving other conflicts future differences as well. Let me propose concrete ideas for the solution. between the West and Iran I am convinced that the issue of Iran’s nuclear policy can be solved in the near future on the basis of the following five principles: The EU must respect Iran’s right to use nuclear technology for civilian pur- poses according to the framework of existing non-proliferation treaties, without any discrimination.

Security Challenges 92 93 Iran’s Nuclear Program Solving the nuclear issue through a compromise with the EU is decisive.

Mousavian

Iran should respect EU and international concerns about the possibility of the diversion of Iran’s nuclear capability. Iran should be prepared to give all necessary objective guarantees to assure the EU and the international community that its nuclear capabilities are not di- verted for military purposes. The EU should be prepared for comprehensive cooperation with Iran in the ar- eas of economy, security, technology and nuclear technology on the basis of the so- called Paris Agreement of 2004 and the guarantees laid down in that agreement. Iran’s neighbors should be reassured about the peaceful nature of its nuclear program through confidence-building measures.

The EU has never questioned Iran’s right to exercise peaceful nuclear power under Schaefer the NPT. We do not have a legal argument, Europe is just demanding confidence- Europe demands confidence building building measures. Understandably, 18 years of clandestine nuclear activities measures for good reasons undermined the confidence that this program has been solely used for civilian purposes. Therefore, the IAEA’s Board of Governors urged Tehran to stop all activi- ties which were perceived as illegal under the NPT until international confidence could be restored.

We have signed international conventions banning the use and the production Mousavian of weapons of mass destruction, culminating in an intensive cooperation with Iran signed all kinds of the IAEA. During the last two years, we had 12,000 person-days of inspection in conventions banning WMD ! Iran — we were even prepared to have a permanent specialist of the IAEA supervise our facilities in Natanz and Isfahan.

Signing conventions is not enough. To build confidence, Iran needs to behave like Schaefer a reliable partner of the international community over a certan period of time, Signing conventions is not enough, and by that I do not mean a few months but between 10 and 15 years. If you vo- you must behave responsibly lontarily renounce your legal right to exercise certain activities like enrichment for a certain period of time for such a period, the international community would regard you as a responsible player in the field of security and you would be playing in the league where Brazil or South Africa are today. It is still possible to solve the nuclear issue overnight on the basis of the NPT rules.

If I were an analyst in Tehran, I would recommend to my country the brilliant stra- McFaul tegic move of playing by the rules of the NPT instead of provoking fear about its

Security Challenges 92 93 Iran’s Nuclear Program If Iran really wants to put nuclear program. This would put Israel under pressure to sign the NPT — just what international pressure on Israel, you say would allow for a breakthrough in the perception of the Islamic world and it should play by the NPT rules end the impression that the West applies double standards. As long as Iran breaks the NPT rules, blaming Israel for not joining the treaty is not very convincing.

Mousavian You ask us to play by the rules, which is fine with us, but you do not honor it if we fulfil your request. If you want us to renounce our right to a closed fuel cycle — a right within the NPT — who guarantees that you will not ask us to abandon our chemical program next time, despite the fact that we signed the convention on chemical weapons ? Who guarantees that the West will not mistrust us on that and believe that we want to divert chemical technology to weapons production ?

zu Guttenberg Mr. Mousavian, would you please describe what exactly “necessary objective guar- How can Iran provide antees” could mean ? I sometimes have the impression that this term is only one “objective guarantees” ? of the more prominent euphemisms often heard in the current debate ?

Mousavian It is not a euphemism at all. Iran is willing to give guarantees that its nuclear We need a two step approach … program is not aiming at building nuclear weapons. We need to proceed in two steps, one short term approach to allow for further negotiations, to agree on the mid-term approach to solve the issues at hand in a sustainable manner. Here is my — purely personal — proposal on how to solve the issues at hand. At first, concerning Isfahan, we would like to make use of the initiative by South African president Thabo Mbeki. His country would deliver the yellowcake needed and we would deliver the whole production of gas in return to ensure that it is not used for nuclear weapons. I think that South Africa would be a better solu- tion than Russia, even though Russia has offered a similar deal. At Natanz, the IAEA is welcome to supervise all activities. The facility there is the main concern of the West, which will be taken seriously by Iran. Therefore, it should also be flexible about a closed fuel cycle. With an open fuel cycle, there could be no weapons production at all. Natanz could be run as a joint venture. As board members, the EU and Russia would be able to supervise its production without any problems. … to be negotiated in a package All these measures should be negotiated in a package that also includes a pilot project and confidence-building measures.

Perthes Could you please clarify what you mean by pilot ?

Security Challenges 94 95 Iran’s Regional Responsibility Europe is ready to contribute a lot to confidence building if Iran is ready to do the same.

Schaefer

In order to assure and publicly demonstrate that Iran is not deprived of its legiti- Mousavian mate right to a closed fuel cycle, we need to operate a limited number of centri- fuges as the first step and continue negotiation for the objective guarantees for industrial production as the second step.

A pilot scale enrichment is extremely problematic not only because of the danger Perkovich of diversion. Even after extensive inspections, the IAEA is still unable to answer What happened with the P2 gas the question of what happened to the advanced P2 gas centrifuges that supposedly centrifuges from Pakistan ? came from Pakistan eight years ago. There might be undeclared facilities in Iran, operated maybe by military organizations, where the results of the pilot could be applied to advance the nuclear weapons program.

If Iran sets up a pilot scale enrichment facility there, it crosses the red line of en- Schaefer richment. You can not be a little bit pregnant, either you are or you are not, and Pilot scale enrichment crosses the red line you either do enrichment or you do not. It would be very unwise for Iran to fool around with this extremely important aspect of confidence. The Iranian people are interested in human rights, wealth, welfare, and maybe also in Iran’s oil production, but not in any enrichment facilities. That is only something the government is trying to portray to the international com- munity. Europe is ready to contribute a lot to confidence building if Iran is ready to do the same. We offer you a deep engagement not only in the nuclear sector but in all sectors that are crucial for Iran’s ability to tap into the global economy. Instead of steering a hazardous political course, Iran should take on its re- Iran could be a global player in sponsibility as the leading regional actor. Its geopolitical position, its resources, its two decades if it behaves responsibly geography and its cultural and historic importance would probably propel Iran to the position of a leading regional and even global player within two decades.

2. Iran’s Regional Responsibility

Iran as a potential hegemon must aim at creating a balance ensuring regional Perkovich stability — especially now that the progress of its nuclear program adds another, frightening aspect to its hegemonic potential. It must therefore try to understand its smaller neighbors. There are two ways for smaller neighbors to deal with a regional hegemon. Iran’s neighbors have yet to decide about You can either try to balance its power by aligning yourself with other smaller how to deal with the hegemon

Security Challenges 94 95 Iran’s Regional Responsibility states or you can decide to climb onto the hegemon’s bandwagon. As for Iran’s neighbors, they are yet to decide on their strategy, but age old aversions between Shia-dominated Iran and its Sunni-dominated neighbors make the balance option much more likely and the bandwagon less likely. I doubt if that would be good for Iran. Diplomatic reconciliation would probably serve its interests much better. China reassures its neighbors Along these lines, China is an interesting example. For twenty years, this ris- about its peaceful ambitions — ing global power has reassured its neighbors about its peacefulness, thus success- that is what a hegemon must do fully preventing them from directing any treaties against China. These diplomatic efforts included a very understated way of handling China’s nuclear weapons. Of course, besides effective diplomacy economic reasons have also contributed to China’s success. The fact that China has recently faced a greater possibility of its neighbors trying to balance its power despite all these efforts shows what Iran may be confronted with if it fails to adopt a more conciliatory style.

Schaefer A hegemon must behave responsibly and peacefully, instead of threatening its Politics is about perceptions neighboring states. Unfortunately, it no longer matters whether this is a real or perceived threat because politics is all about perceptions. Of course Iran can follow its own foreign policy strategy, but it should start to reconsider its relationship with actors like Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad; Iran’s support for these groups is seen by the United States and Europe as a major hindrance to Iran becoming a responsible partner in the region. We need a responsible Iran to establish Should Iran decide to behave as a responsible actor, there is a chance for a a new security structure at the Gulf whole new security structure for the Gulf region. Assuming Iran would acquire the trust of its potential partners, it would be in a very good position to take the lead in a cooperative effort such as a GCC-Iraq-Iran-Yemen cooperation.

Mousavian Iran’s policy concerning its regional role and its relations with the West after the fall Iran already acts responsibly of Saddam Hussein is a responsible and peaceful one. It rests on five cornerstones: The disappearance of Saddam Hussein provides the opportunity to build a new security structure for the region, taking into account stability and security, the fight against terrorism and organized crime, arms control to eliminate WMD in the region and to stop the conventional arms race, the peaceful bilateral reso- lution of border disputes and security for energy exports as well as expanding economic, social and cultural relations, establishing good relations with the international community and the transatlantic partners, and finally promoting democratization, human rights and the rule of law.

Securitiy Challenges 96 Iran and the US need mediation.

Hoffmann

The presence of US troops must gradually be reduced to counter the impres- sion that the US is only another power in the long succession of outside powers imposing their will on the region by military force. The tension between the USA and Iran should be reduced, both sides should instead start cooperating on their common fields of interest and work to establish just solutions for areas of differing interests. The USA must manage to walk a fine line to pursue its goal of bringing stability to the region while removing fears of American domination in the region and deflect- ing its image as the leader of a Jewish-Christian alliance against Islamic countries. Despite the influence of the USA and Iran in Iraq, internal factors are the main determinants. All foreign actors, including Europe, should recognize this and should establish a close cooperation with regional actors to ensure the stabil- ity, security, unity and integrity of Iraq.

As to the relation between the US and Iran: The position of the United States, at Perkovich least its posture, has obviously changed in the last couple of months. Neither Since August 2005, the US made President Bush nor Secretary of State Rice responded to President Ahmadinejad’s no bellicose remarks about Iran infamous remarks about Israel. Since August 2005, in spite of the resumption of work at Isfahan, the US has made no bellicose remarks, as they have done in the past. These are signals that the US might open a window of opportunity for a dia- log in the near future if Iran behaves accordingly, though that window can close quickly in favor of a regime change strategy.

That is rather encouraging, taking into account that today the US has less contact Cooper with Iran than with North Korea.

Iran and the US need mediation. They have such a long history of mutual distrust Hoffmann and of demanding the other side make the first step that they will not be able to Iran and the US cannot break the make a breakthrough themselves. There is an endless history of missed opportuni- deadlock without European help ties, mutual disappointments, unrewarded first steps, misunderstood openings, un- heard proposals, endlessly repeated reproaches, denials, injuries, defamations. Iran reproaches the US for not rewarding its cooperation on Afghanistan while the US demands that Iran prove its willingness to cooperate, the US reproaches Iran with promoting terrorism while Iran claims to be a victim of terrorism itself — and so on and so on. Europe should not only appeal to both sides but should work out a step- by-step scenario detailing how to encourage an Iranian-American rapprochement.

97 Iran’s Regional Responsibility European integration has finally brought peace and security to our continent.

Polenz

Schaefer European mediation between Iran and the US makes sense only in the medium- Without political will on both sides, term perspective, because there is no political will from either side right now. But mediation makes no sense the Middle East’s way to security and prosperity leads indeed via the battle of the titans. The decisive question is whether Iran and the US as the major players in the region will come to an understanding.

3. Frameworks for Security

Perthes Let us now come to the collective security arrangement Mr. Mousavian mentioned. Could the CSCE be a model … Could the CSCE be a model for enhancing cooperation and security in the region ?

Schaefer When Europe started the CSCE in 1977, the Cold War was at its peak. The two … of how to stop a vicious circle ? major players were locked in conflict, a frightening arms race was threatening the world and small powers like Germany were victims of the conflict. To stop the vicious cycle, each side had to engage with its potential opponent. The CSCE proc- ess concentrated on a commonly accepted mix of security guarantees, economic cooperation and human rights declarations that allowed both sides to gain from it. The US and Iran should start a similar process to reverse the trend of mutual suspicion and threats in the region. Europe would be prepared to offer its good offices to facilitate such a process.

Mützenich From my personal experience during the Cold War’s arms race, I know that one effective way to deal with the arms race in the region — because what you are call- ing militarization is in fact an arms race — would probably be to initiate a public discussion. That might channel the fears of the people into beneficial political pressure. Also, to end the arms race of the Cold War, arms control talks were very useful. I encourage the regional actors to engage in such talks.

Polenz Perhaps we need the help of outside actors to initiate a process comparable to A security conference what happened in Western Europe after 1945. Maybe a conference set up with the might be a starting point support of the West could be the starting point for that. In the Middle East, the people do not even trust their own governments, let alone foreign ones. The Middle East needs more discussion, more transparency and more integration. Germany does not feel threatened by the nuclear capabilities of neighboring France today because the German government and the German people finally

Security Challenges 98 99 Frameworks for Security We must indeed encourage people in the region to start talking to each other.

Meyer

trust France after centuries of bitter conflicts — European integration has finally brought peace and security to our continent.

We must indeed encourage people in the region to start talking to each other. We Meyer need forums where the regional actors — not only at the governmental level, but We must establish forums also at the grassroots level — can define their own respective roles. Only then we for the regional actors can start thinking about how Europe and America can contribute. But already now, we could agree on areas of cooperation and involvement ranging from the fight against terrorism to curbing drug smuggling and organized crime on a bilat- eral base or with the GCC as a regional body.

The idea of a CSCE-like process for the region seems very attractive at first, but the Cooper confidence-building measures that were suitable for Europe during the Cold War To start a CSCE-like process you need might not be the right thing for the region at the moment. In Europe, essentially countries accepting the status quo … every government accepted the status quo. All that was needed in the 1970s and 1980s was to convince both sides that this was really true. I doubt if the circum- stances are similar in the region today. The notion of a commonly accepted status quo is questionable considering the … which nobody in state Iraq is in and that Saudi Arabia’s future is at best unclear and at worst fright- the Middle East seems to do ening. It seems that Iran ought to be the status quo power country in the region because it has the highest interest in preserving frontiers and the distribution of power. Yet Iran still adheres to revolutionary rhetoric. So where is the majority of actors that want to preserve the status quo ?

The notion of status quo and the related hopes for a CSCE-like process are indeed Perthes problematic: Today, geo-political stability in the region, basically dating back to With borders coming under pressure, the end of the Second World War or at least to 1967, seems to be vanishing. The stability in the region seems to vanish Israeli withdrawal from Gaza has changed a border which had been stable for 40 years. If Iraq splits up, new borders will arise — just think of the emergence of a Kurdish entity. Borders are also under pressure because loyalties and definitions change as transnational confessional and ethnic ties become more important: Peo- ple now speak about Shia oil instead of Iranian oil, which opens rather frightening perspectives for new conflicts. Another important aspect distinguishes the region from CSCE Europe: We in In the Middle East, anger and hate the West feared the Warsaw Pact states’ missiles and nuclear warheads, but we are stronger than fear never hated the people in East Germany, or in Poland or even in the Soviet Union,

Security Challenges 98 99 Frameworks for Security nor did they hate us. Fear itself would be a good initial reason to rebuild some kind of confidence, like the Europeans did during the Cold War. But in this region here, there are emotions stronger than fear: anger, hate, and the wish to seek revenge for all kinds of historical injuries or traumas.

Cooper Maybe a cooperative security structure like NATO would be a more useful idea for the region even though it is of course hard to imagine because of the deep rifts between different countries. Multilateral agreements are more transparent and inspire more confidence than bilateral ones. Even though the Soviet Union no doubt regarded NATO as a hostile organization, it was easier to read than a series of bilateral agreements between the US and its allies.

Steltzer For the UAE, the NATO-ICI initiative is a very attractive first step. Neither the states The UAE search for reliable partners of the Non-Aligned Movement, which the UAE joined after their independence and embrace NATO-ICI in 1971, nor the United States as its bilateral partner since Saddam’s invasion in Kuwait, were well suited to the specific needs of a small country like the UAE. The Non-Aligned Movement could not prevent the loss of islands in the Strait of Hormuz to Iran and of a piece of land to Saudi Arabia, and the US is just too big a partner. Neither the GCC nor any of the EU’s strategic initiatives is considered to be of much help against the hegemonic aspirations of Iran, which seems more and more to be walking in the footsteps of the ancient Persian empire. This is one of the reasons why the UAE is not only spending such large amounts of money to bolster its defense but also embrace the NATO-ICI initiative enthusiastically as a possible step to a much needed collective security arrangement.

Perthes What about Iraq ? Is it or will it be a player in enhancing regional security despite its internal problems ?

Atiyyah First, today the most important players in the region are Iran and Turkey, not any Iran and Turkey are the region’s Arab country. Even the Palestinians would like to rely on the Iranians rather than big players, not the Arab states. on the Arabs nowadays. The Iraqis themselves are no longer actors; they are pawns in a game of chess played by the American-European team against actors like Iran. Iraq itself is especially ill-suited to playing an active role because it is on the verge of breaking up. The division of Iraq according to ethnic and sectarian lines is discussed openly in certain Iraqi circles. This new phenomenon shows how di- vided the country already is.

Security Challenges 100 101 Frameworks for Security Therefore, there is no unified position toward Iran. Some Iraqi Kurds see Iran Traditionally, Iran knows how as a threat, others as a potential ally. Many Shi’ites of course count on Iran to to play the diplomatic game protect them after the Americans leave, and most of them would like to see a nuclear armed Iran because, it would int their eyes be more powerful. Iran in its turn does have a strategy for Iraq and pursues its implementation A Shia crescent would radicalize very skillfully. Out of age-old traditions as an empire, the Iranians are used to play- the whole region ing diplomatic games. They are much cleverer and much more patient than the Arabs – an Iraqi waves a carpet in six weeks, Iranians take two years for that. As I said earlier, Iran has interfered in several regional conflicts without ever actually attacking or invading a country: Today, Iran is of course a major actor in Iraq, and they have many cards to play. Some Iranians are advocating an alliance between Hizbollah, Syria and Shi’ite Iraq – a nightmare: If it succeeds, there will be a Shia- dominated crescent, which will radicalize the whole region, first and foremost Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. To prevent this worst case scenario, the Americans should seek some kind of a rapprochement with Iran. The United States has always had a good sense of political realism, too, espe- The US has always had a good sense cially when it comes to foreign policy. Just think of the Iran-Contra affair in the of political realism … mid-1980s, when the Americans delivered weapons to Iran, while supporting Saddam Hussein against the Iranian counterattack. Today America should revert to this strength of pragmatism and should use … they should now cooperate with Iran Iran’s traditional diplomatic capabilities to establish some kind of cooperation. Without it, the situation in Iraq might go out of control very soon.

If we fail to establish a functioning state where Iraqis govern their own life, this Schaefer will have disastrous spill-over effects in the wider region. Especially the axis from State failure in Iraq would have Iran-Iraq-Syria to Saudi Arabia opens a frightening perspective. a disastrous spill-over effect

Let me conclude with a few brief remarks. The challenges for the region are Perthes as numerous as the need for action is obvious. During our discussion we have identified the main causes of instability and discussed ways of tackling them in an open and sometimes controversial dialogue not only between representa- tives of the West and the region, but also among representatives of these re- spective groups themselves. For partners who have increasingly lost confidence in each other during the past years, we have had a remarkably high quality exchange. Meetings like ours could, I think, be important steps to rebuilding confidence.

Security Challenges 100 101 Frameworks for Security von Weizsäcker Stability in the Persian Gulf is a major task for the West not only because 35 % of worldwide oil imports come from here or because extremism in the region threatens the United States and Europe most directly. The West has a duty to help It is also our duty to do all we can to help people here live a decent life, as Mr. Khouri put it shortly and aptly. After decades of a complicated history dominated by conflicts, under the not always beneficial involvement of Western powers, we need to bring stability and prosperity to a region that because of its tremendously rich culture and immense natural resources has the potential to be one of the most blessed places on the globe. Like Western Europe, the Middle East I do hope very much that the Western partners will find a way to foster the can one day achieve peace and prosperity rule of law, participation and the peaceful solution of conflicts in the Middle East according to their respective strengths. If Europe and the United States work firmly but patiently, complementing each other in close cooperation, and reach- ing out to the majority of people in the region that long for stability and an end to conflict, we will one day see a region emerge where peace and prosperity flour- ish as they do — still one of the most wonderful surprises of my life — in Western Europe today. As Mr. Cooper rightly said, people in Europe do not fight each other any more because they have found a way of integrating with each other and finally trust their neighbors after centuries of horrible conflicts. I honestly believe in the possibility that the participants of the 300th Bergedorf Round Table, maybe in Tehran or Beirut, will be able to look back at a similarly marvelous development, if all actors involved decide to put their respective egoisms aside to make a common effort for a common future.

Security Challenges 102 ANNEX Participants

Ambassador Bagher Asadi Fixing it: The London Conference, Tehran Deal, And Born 1951 Beyond (2003). Senior Expert, Department of Inter- Pages: 23–28, 36, 71–72, 77, 86, 100–101 national Affairs, Ministry of For- eign Affairs, Tehran; fmr. Member Robert Cooper of Secretary-General’s Panel of Emi- Born 1947 nent Persons on United Nations- Director-General for External and Civil Society Relations (2003 –2004); fmr. Chairman, Politico-Military Affairs, General Group of 77, United Nations, New York (2001); Chair- Secretariat, Council of the Euro- manship of the Second Committee and Committee pean Union, Brussels; fmr. Head, of Programme and Coordination (1998 –1999), Co- Policy Planning Staff, Foreign and chairmanship of the Intergovernmental Forum on Commonwealth Office (FOC), London; fmr. Direc- Forests (IFF, 1997–2000) and Vice-chairmanship of tor for Asia, FOC, London; fmr. Deputy Secretary the Preparatory Committee for the Five-Year Review for Defence and Overseas Affairs, Cabinet Office, of the Social Summit, New York (1999 –2000); fmr. London; fmr. Special Representative for the British ECOSOC Ambassador, Iranian Mission to UN, New Government on Afghanistan; diplomatic service in York (1996–2002); fmr. Charge d’affaires, Iranian New York, Tokyo, Brussels and Bonn. Mission to UN, Geneva (1988 –1990); Winner of Eliza- Selected Writings: The Breaking of Nations: Order beth Haub Award for Environmental Diplomacy and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (2003). (2002); B. A and M. A. (economics). Pages: 32, 33, 35, 40 – 41, 42, 46, 49, 51, 52, 59, 62–63, Pages: 35, 37, 43, 53, 65–55, 66, 67, 68, 70, 73, 84 66, 67, 70, 72, 74, 76, 77, 80 – 82, 85, 90 –91, 97, 99, 100 Dr. Ghassan Atiyyah Born 1940 Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, Director, Iraq Foundation for Devel- MdB opment and Democracy, Baghdad; Born 1971 Editor-in-Chief, Al-Malaf Al Iraqi Member of the CDU/CSU Faction (Iraqi File), London; fmr. Founder of the German Bundestag, Berlin; and Director, LAAM Publications, Member of the German Bundes- London; fmr. Editor-in-Chief, Sh’un Arabiya’ (Arab tag’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Affairs), London; fmr. Director, Arab League Journals Deputy Member of the Defence Committee and the and Research Department, League of Arab States, Tu- Subcommittee for Disarmament and Arms Control; nis; fmr. Member, Iraqi Delegation to the U. N.; fmr. Chairman of the CSU’s Foreign Affairs Committee; Professor, Political Sciences, Baghdad University, Member of the German Council on Foreign Rela- Baghdad; fmr. Director, Research Centre, Baghdad. tions. Selected Writings: The Making of Iraq: 1908 –1921, Pages: 39, 50, 53, 62, 83, 94 (1974); Iran and the Region after Elections (2005); Wanted in Iraq: A Roadmap to Free Elections (2003);

105 Dr. Nasser Hadian Dr. Rosemary Hollis Born 1957 Born 1952 Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law Director of Research, Chatham and Political Science, University of House, The Royal Institute of In- Tehran; fmr. Visiting Scholar and ternational Affairs (RIIA), London; Adjunct Professor, Middle East In- fmr. Head, Middle East Programme, stitute, Columbia University, New RIIA; fmr. Head, Middle East Pro- York; fmr. Director of Graduate Studies, Faculty of gramme, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Law and Political Science, University of Tehran; Studies, London; fmr. Lecturer, Political Science and fmr. Visiting Scholar, Center for Strategic and In- International Affairs, George Washington Univer- ternational Studies, Washington D. C.; fmr. Director, sity, Washington, D. C.. Committee on Political Development in Iran, Te- Selected Writings: SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Arms, Dis- hran; fmr. Assistant Professor, Department of Social armament and International Security, Ch. 5: The Sciences, Lincoln Memorial University, Harrogate. greater Middle East (2005); The Middle East Security Selected Writings: Seventh Majlis Election and the Agenda Strategic Yearbook (2005); Europe in the Emergence of ‘Transitional Conservatives’ in Iranian Middle East, in: Louise Fawcett (ed.), The Interna- Polity (2004); Iran’s Nuclear Program: Contexts and tional Relations of the Middle East (2005); Iran and Debates, in: Kemp (ed.), Iran’s Bomb: American and the United States: Terrorism, Peace in the Middle Iranian Perspectives (2004); US Policy Toward Iran East and Iraq, in: Reissner/Whitlock, Iran and Its Should Promote Civil Society (co-author) (2003). Neighbours: Diverging Views on a Strategic Region Pages: 36, 37, 50, 52, 67, 70, 72, 73–74, 75, 86, 87, (2004). 89–90 Pages: 48, 49, 77, 83

Christiane Hoffmann Riad Kahwaji Born 1967 Born 1965 Journalist, Editorial Staff, Frank- Chief Executive Officer, Institute furter Allgemeine Zeitung (F. A. Z.), for Near East and Gulf Military Frankfurt; fmr. Political Corre- Analysis (INEGMA), Dubai; Middle spondent for Russia and the fmr. East Bureau Chief, Defense News, Soviet Union, F. A. Z., Moscow; fmr. Springfield, Virginia; fmr. Deputy F. A. Z. Correspondent for Iran, the Caucasus and Assignment Editor, Middle East Broadcasting Center Central Asia, Tehran. (MBC), London; fmr. Middle East Correspondent, Selected Writings: Leben mit dem Kopftuchzwang Jane’s Defense Weekly; fmr. Field Producer and (2005). Coordinator of activities, BBC News, Lebanon, Syria, Pages: 37, 38, 69 –70, 73, 91, 92, 97 and Iraq; fmr. Broadcast Journalist, BBC World Serv- ice Arabic Television. Selected Writings: Alternative Frameworks for Gulf Security (co-ed.) (2004); US-Arab Cooperation in

105 the Gulf (2004); Gulf Cooperation Council Threat Consul General Walter Leuchs Perceptions and Deterrence Objectives (2003); Con- Born 1951 tributions to various Jane’s publications (Jane’s Intel- Consul General of the Federal ligence Review; Jane’s Sentinel; Jane’s Islamic Affairs Republic of Germany, Dubai; fmr. Analyst) and Al-Hayat newspaper. Deputy Consul General, San Fran- Pages: 33, 50, 54, 68, 69, 71, 75, 76, 82–83, 85, 87 cisco; fmr. Head, Consular Assist- ance Unit, Federal Foreign Office, Rami George Khouri Bonn; fmr. Ambassador, German Embassy, Bujum- Born 1948 bura; previous positions at German Embassies in Editor-at-Large and fmr. Executive Tripoli, Cairo, and the German Consulate General Editor, Daily Star Newspaper, Bei- in Toronto. rut; Member, Task Force on U. S. Relations with the Islamic World, Markus Löning, MdB Brookings Institution, Washington Born 1960 D. C.; fmr. Senior Analyst, International Crisis Group, Member of the FDP Faction of the Mideast Regional Office in Amman; fmr. Nieman German Bundestag, Berlin; Vice- Fellow, Harvard University; fmr. Editor-in-Chief, President, European ELDR-party; Jordan Times Newspaper; fmr. General Manager, Chairman, FDP, Berlin; Spokesman Al Kutba, Publishers; fmr. Senior Associate, Global on the Affairs of the European Un- Affairs Institute, Maxwell School of Citizenship and ion, FDP parliamentary group, German Bundestag; Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse. Member, Committee on the Affairs of the European Selected Writings: Jacob’s Bible, Esau’s Bible: Re- Union, German Bundestag; Deputy Member, Com- considering the Biblical Significance of the Land mittee on Foreign Affairs, Berlin. of Transjordan, in: Bienert/Müller-Neuhof (eds.), At Pages: 74 The Crossroads: Essays on the Archaeology, History and Current Affairs of the Middle East (2001); The Ambassador Ancient Monuments of Jordan (forthcoming 2007). Paul Freiherr von Maltzahn Pages: 32, 38–39, 41, 44–46, 54, 56–60, 75, 76, 77, 78, Born 1945 84, 87 Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran; fmr. Ambassador to Cairo; previous postings in London, Algiers, Paris, Damascus, Beirut and Dublin. Pages: 42

106 107 Dr. Michael McFaul Ambassador Born 1963 Dr. Hossein Mousavian Peter and Helen Bing Senior Fellow, Born 1957 Hoover Institution, Washington Deputy for International Issues, Cen- D. C.; Associate Professor of Politi- ter for Strategic Research, Tehran; cal Science and Director, Center on fmr. Head, Foreign Policy Commit- Democracy, Development, and the tee, Supreme Council for National Rule of Law, Stanford University; Co-Director, Iran Security, Tehran; fmr. Iran’s Chief Delegate to the Democracy Project, Hoover Institution, Stanford IAEA; fmr. Ambassador, Iranian Embassy, Berlin; University; Research Associate, Center for Inter- fmr. General Director of West Europe, Ministry of national Security and Cooperation, Stanford Uni- Foreign Affairs, Tehran; fmr. Head of Administra- versity; Senior Adviser to the National Democratic tion, Parliament of the Islamic Republic Iran; fmr. Institute; fmr. Senior Associate, Carnegie Endow- Editor-in-Chief, Tehran Times (English Daily). ment for International Peace in Residence, Moscow Pages: 79–80, 86, 87, 88, 92–93, 94, 95, 96–97 Carnegie Center, Moscow. Selected Writings: Beyond Incrementalism — A New Dr. Rolf Mützenich, MdB Strategy for Dealing with Iran (co-author, 2005); Born 1959 After the Collapse of Communism: Comparative Member of the SPD Faction of the Lessons of Transitions (co-author, 2004); Power and German Bundestag, Berlin; Speaker Purpose: American Policy towards Russia after the for the Parliamentary Social Demo- Cold War (co-author, 2003). cratic Party for Disarmament, Arms Pages: 33, 34–35, 46, 51, 52, 60–65, 68–69, 74, 75, 77, Control and Non-Proliferation; fmr. 91, 92, 93 Assistant Head of Government Department, Staff of the President of the State Parliament of North Rhine- VLR I Matthias Meyer Westphalia; fmr. Member, State Parliament of North Born 1952 Rhine-Westphalia; fmr. Staff Member, SPD-Faction, Director, Middle East and Sudan State Parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia; fmr. Affairs, Federal Foreign Office, Head, Advisory Department, State Parliament of Berlin; fmr. Ambassador, German North Rhine-Westphalia. Embassy, Khartum; fmr. Ambassa- Pages: 98 dor, German Embassy, Dushanbe; fmr. Counselor and Deputy Chief of Mission, Ger- man Embassy, Amman; fmr. Deputy Consul General, German Embassy, Barcelona; fmr. Consular Officer, German Embassy, Cairo. Pages: 50, 99

106 107 Dr. George Perkovich Ruprecht Polenz, MdB Born 1958 Born 1946 Vice President for Studies, Carn- Chairman, Foreign Affairs Com- egie Endowment for International mittee, German Bundestag, Berlin; Peace, Washington D. C.; fmr. Member of the CDU/CSU Faction of Director, Secure World Program, the German Bundestag; Rappor- W. Alton Jones Foundation; fmr. teur for Iran and Turkey, CDU/CSU- Speechwriter and Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag, Berlin; Joe Biden. fmr. Head, TV Council, ZDF-German Television; fmr. Selected Writings: Iran is not an Island: A Strategy Secretary General, CDU, Berlin; fmr. Leader, CDU, M to Mobilizing the Neighbours (2005); Strengthen- nster City Council; fmr. Assistant, Fiscal Law, Univer- ing Non-Proliferation Rules and Norms — The Three sity of Münster. State Problem (2004); India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Selected Writings: Eine faire Chance für die Türkei Impact on Global Proliferation (2001). (2004); Das faule Versprechen — Die Türkei gehört in Pages: 66, 69, 89, 95, 97 die EU (2003); Sicher nur mit Amerika: NATO, Ter- rorismus und eine neue Weltordnung (2002). Dr. Volker Perthes Pages: 43, 70, 89, 90, 98–99 Born 1958 Director, German Institute for In- Dr. Johannes Reissner ternational and Security Affairs Born 1947 (SWP), Berlin; fmr. Head, Research Head, Research Unit Near and Unit Middle East and Africa, Middle East and Africa, German SWP; Member of Steering Com- Institute for International and Se- mittee, Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission curity Affairs (SWP), Berlin; Work- (EuroMeSCO); Member of Advisory Board, Interna- ing Group Core Participant, TFPD- tional Spectator; fmr. Assistant Professor, American Project “Iran and Its Neighbors: Diverging Views on University of Beirut. a Strategic Region”; fmr. OSCE Monitor, Dushanbe. Selected Writings: Orientalische Promenaden: Der Selected Writings: The New Gap between Iran and Nahe und Mittlere Osten im Umbruch (2006); Syria the West: The Presidential Election as an Expression under Bashar al-Assad: Modernisation and the Lim- of a Fundamental Shifting of Power (2005); Nuclear its of Change, Adelphi Paper (2004); Arab Elites: Issue instead of Iran Policy (2005); Iran and its Neigh- Negotiating the Politics of Change (2004); Geheime bours: Diverging Views on a Strategic Region – Vol II Gärten: Die Neue Arabische Welt (2004); Germany (2004); Europe’s ‘Critical Dialogue’ with Iran, in: and the Middle East Interest and Options (2002). Haas/O’Sullivan (eds.): Honey and Vinegar: Incen- Pages: 23, 28, 32–33, 34, 40, 41– 42, 43, 48, 51, 53, 54, tives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy (2000). 56, 66, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 83, 85, 87, 90, Pages: 36, 47, 69, 77, 86 94, 98, 99 –100, 101

108 109 Dr. Michael Schaefer Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker Born 1949 Born 1920 Political Director, Federal Foreign Fmr. President of the Federal Re- Office, Berlin; fmr. Special Envoy public of Germany; fmr. Govern- for Southeast Europe; fmr. Head, ing Mayor of Berlin (1981–1984); Western Balkans Task Force, Fed- fmr. Vice President of the German eral Foreign Office; fmr. Head, Parliament (1969 –1981); fmr. Mem- Political Department, Permanent UN Mission, Ge- ber of the Federal Executive Board of the Christian neva; fmr. Head of Training for Senior Civil Serv- Democratic Union (CDU); fmr. President of the ants, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin; fmr. Permanent German Lutheran Church Council; Laureate of the Representative, German Embassy, Singapore; fmr. Heinrich Heine (1991) and Leo Baeck Awards (1994); Advisor, UN Permanent Mission, New York. Chairman of the Bergedorf Round Table of the Kör- Pages: 28–32, 36, 39, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 83, 88, 92, 93, ber Foundation. 95, 96, 98, 101 Selected Writings: Was für eine Welt wollen wir ? (2005); Drei Mal Stunde Null ? 1949 –1969 –1989 Ambassador Jürgen Steltzer (2001); Vier Zeiten. Erinnerungen (1997); Richard Born 1942 von Weizsäcker im Gespräch (1992); Von Deutsch- Ambassador of the Federal Repub- land nach Europa (1991); Die deutsche Geschichte lic of Germany, Abu Dhabi; fmr. geht weiter (1983). Deputy Chief of Protocol, Federal Pages: 22, 55, 102 Foreign Office, Bonn/Berlin; fmr. Consul General, Consulate General, Mohsen Ziya Saratow; fmr. Consul General, Consulate General, Born: 1965 Gothenberg; fmr. First Counsellor for Information, Senior Advisor to the Government German Embassy, Cairo; fmr. Deputy Head, Ger- of the Emirate Ras Al Khaimah and man Embassy, Lomé; fmr. Consul, German Embassy, Special Advisor to Crown Prince Lima; fmr. First Secretary Press Affairs, German and Deputy Ruler; Advisor to Al Embassy, Lagos; fmr. Second Secretary Press Affairs, Mubadala Energy Company, UAE; German Embassy, Rangoon; fmr. Editor, Hessischer Partner and Chairman of Al Nasr Investment Group, Rundfunk, Frankfurt. UAE; Senior Advisor to CEO of Emirates National Oil Pages: 46, 83, 100 Company, UAE.

108 109 Recommended Literature

Samir Amin / Ali El Kenz, Europe and the Arab World, Ugo Fasano / Zubair Iqbal, GCC countries: From Oil De- London: 2005. pendence to Diversification Washington, D. C.: 2003.

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, The International Politics of Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: De- the Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy, New York: 2006. mocracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, New Haven/London: 2006. Jon B. Alterman, The Promise of Partnership: U. S.-EU Coordination in the Middle East (Policy Report / Ameri- The Greater Middle East Initiative: Sea Island and can Institute for Contemporary German Studies; No. Beyond (Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign 10), Washington D. C.: 2003. Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Eighth Congress, Second Session, June 2, 2004), Washing- Gawdat Bahgat, The New Geopolitics of Oil: The United ton D. C.: 2004. States, Saudi Arabia, and Russia, in: Orbis, 47 (Sum- http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi ? mer 2003) 3, pp. 447– 461. dbname=108_senate_hearings&docid=f:96429.pdf

Ian Bremmer, The Saudi Paradox, in: World Policy Samir Radwan et al. (eds.), The Euro-Mediterranean Journal, 21 (Fall 2004) 3, pp. 23–30. Partnership, 10 Years after Barcelona: Achievements and Perspectives, Femise Report, Februar 2005 Nathan J. Brown, The Rule of Law in the Arab World: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf (Cambridge Middle East Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Glo- Studies No. 6), Cambridge / New York 1997. bal, Cambridge / New York: 2005.

Nathan J. Brown, Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional Ruth E. Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Account- Neocolonialist Notion, in: American University Jour- able Government, Albany, NY: 2002. nal of International Law and Policy 12 (1997) 6, pp. 903 –974. Ivo H. Daalder / Nicole Gnesotto / Philip H. Gordon (Hg.), Crescent of Crisis: U. S.-European Strategy for the Raymond Hinnebusch / Anoushiravan Ehteshami Greater Middle East, Washington, D. C.: 2005. (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (The Middle East in the International System), Boulder, Richard Hrair Dekmejian, The Liberal Impulse in Saudi CO: 2002. Arabia, in: The Middle East Journal, 57 (Summer 2003) 3, pp. 400– 413. International Atomic Energy Agency, In Focus: IAEA and Iran EUROGULF: An EU-GCC Dialogue for Energy Stability and http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/ Sustainibility: Final Research Report, April 2005. index.shtml http://ec.europa.eu/comm/energy_transport/doc/2005_ 04_eurogulf_kuwait.pdf

110 111 The Next Iraqi War ?: Sectarianism and Civil Conflict, Amin Saikal / Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), Democratiza- Middle East Report No 52, 27. February 2006. tion in the Middle East: Experiences, Struggles, Chal- http://www.crisisgroup.org/ lenges, Tokyo: 2003.

Dietrich Jung (ed.), Democratization and Development: Bassam Tibi, Islam, Freedom and Democracy in the New Political Strategies for the Middle East, New York: Arab World, in: Emerson, Michael (ed.), Democrati- 2006. sation in the European Neighbourhood (Center for European Policy Studies), Brussels: 2005, pp. 93 –115 Michael Knights, Troubled Waters: Future U. S. Security Assistance in the Persian Gulf, Washington D. C.: 2006. United States Department of State: Middle East and North Africa Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terror- http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/middle_east_north_africa/ ism in the Service of Jihad, New Haven/London: 2006. forum_for_the_future.html

Thierry de Montbrial, The Greater Middle East, the United States Government Accountability Office, United States, and Europe, in: The Future of US-EU- Foreign Assistance: Middle East Partnership Initiative NATO Relations: After the Cold War and Beyond the Offers Tools for Supporting Reform, but Project Moni- War in Iraq (CSIS Think Tank Summit), Washington/ toring Needs Improvement (Report to Congressional D. C.: 2005. Requesters), Washington, D. C.: 2005. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05711.pdf Yitzakh Nakash, Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World, Princeton, NJ: 2006.

Helen Mary Rizzo, Islam, Democracy, and the Status of Women: The Case of Kuwait, New York: 2005.

Robert Rotberg (ed.), When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Princeton, NJ: 2004.

Barry M. Rubin, The Long War for Freedom: The Arab Struggle for Democracy in the Middle East, Hoboken, NJ: 2006.

Amin Saikal, Iraq, Saudia Arabia and Oil: Risk Factors, in: Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58 (December 2004) 4, pp. 414 – 418.

110 111 Glossary

Arab League (AL) bodies such as the Joint Defense Council, largely Also known as the League of Arab States (LAS), this ineffectual. When members agree on a common regional organization was formed in Cairo in 1945. position, such as support for the Palestinians, they The founding members were Egypt (whose member- rarely go beyond issuing a declaration. ship was suspended between 1979 and 1989 because http://www.arableagueonline.org it signed a peace treaty with Israel), Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan (now Jordan), Saudi Arabia, and Bonyads Yemen. A large number of Arab states have joined Bonyads are Islamic charitable trusts, set up after the League since its founding, among them Libya, the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the nationaliza- Sudan, Algeria and Morocco. In 1976, the Palestine tion of most of Iran’s major private enterprises. They Liberation Organization (PLO) became a member. To- were used to redistribute profits from oil exports day, the LAS has 22 members. Its goal is to deepen among the Iranian population. Today, Bonyads such relations among members in the fields of politics, as the “Foundation for Oppressed and Disabled culture, social issues and trade. Its founding charter Veterans” are secretive and autonomous state-con- also identifies upholding members’ independence trolled conglomerates that control a large part of and Arab external interests, recognizes Palestine as the Iranian economy. They are exempt from taxes an independent state, and works to prevent and me- and have strong ties to the highest religious leaders diate conflicts among members. The highest body which enable them to dominate competition within of the League is the Council, which consists of rep- the private sector. Economically, Bonyads are said resentatives of member states, usually the foreign to be overstaffed and prone to corruption according ministers, their deputies, or permanent delegates. to Western experts. Politically, they are believed to The Council meets twice a year and may convene a be an important base of power of the ruling Shia special session on request of two members. The day- clergy. to-day running of Arab League affairs is entrusted to the General Secretariat. Headed by a secretary- Failed States general, it is the administrative body of the League “Failed States” is a term used to describe states in and the executive body of the Council and the which the central government no longer controls specialized ministerial councils. The Arab League the state’s territory and has lost its monopoly of is based in Cairo; since 2001 the secretary-general power to various actors. As a result, a failed state has been the former Egyptian foreign minister, Amr is no longer able to externally act as a member of M. Moussa. The League’s resolutions are binding the international community, nor can it provide the only for those member states that voted for them. most basic infrastructure internally such as security, Moreover, every member has the power of veto. governance or education. The term is nevertheless Consequently, conflicts of interest often impair the controversial because there is no clear, commonly League’s effectiveness. The League has failed to coor- accepted definition when a state should be described dinate Arab foreign, defense and economic policies, as a failed state. Therefore, failure is often measured rendering core League documents like the Treaty of gradually. The independent “Fund for Peace” lists Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation, and key twelve indicators in its “Failed States Index”:

112 113 – Mounting Demographic Pressures inter-communal conflict, all of which would herald – Massive Movement of Refugees and Internally a failed state. Displaced People – Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance GCC — Cooperation Council for the – Chronic and Sustained Human Flight Arab States of the Gulf – Uneven Economic Development Along Group Commonly known as the Gulf Cooperation Coun- Lines cil (GCC). In March 1981, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, – Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – Criminalization or De-legitimization of the State formed the GCC as a regional subsection of the Arab – Progressive Deterioration of Public Services League to promote stability and cooperation in the – Widespread Violation of Human Rights Gulf region. Yemen is seeking membership, but has – Security Apparatus as “State Within a State” been excluded due to its weak economy and status – Rise of Factionalized Elites as a republic. Despite their geographical location on – Interventions of Other States or External Actors the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Iran are not members, al- According to its first annual index from Decem- though there have been signs of closer cooperation ber 2004, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of with Iran. A communiqué issued September 2002 Congo, Sudan, Iraq and Somalia were the states by the Ministerial Council following a visit of the closest to failure. Next on this list are Sierra Leone, King of Bahrain to Tehran refers to deeper rela- Chad, Yemen, Liberia and Haiti. The fact that seven tions between the GCC States and Iran in order to of these ten states are located in Africa hints at a strengthen security and stability in the region. widespread explanation of why states fail: the herit- The GCC was founded as a reaction to political age of the colonial regimes and failure of moderni- and economic uncertainties: the Islamic revolution zation that followed. During the Cold War, regimes in Iran (1979) and the Iran-Iraq war (1980 –1988) were without true roots were often supported by the the main political concerns whereas the falling price super powers, preserving them as potential allies. of oil posed the biggest economic peril at the time. Those states, now without comparable support, are According to the preamble of its Charter, special re- increasingly subject to attempts at destabilization lations, common goals, and similar systems founded by foreign governments, such as fuelling ethnic on the creed of Islam are the basis for the coordina- warfare or supporting rebel groups, thus causing tion of economic and defensive efforts. It is hoped the state to disintegrate. But even highly developed, that regional integration, based on strong religious democratic Western countries possess some traits and cultural ties, will prevail over old rivalries. of failed states. For example, the state’s monopoly The GCC’s highest decision-making body is the of power is embattled in the suburbs of certain Supreme Council, which meets once a year and is European cities or in some American inner-city composed of its members’ heads of state. Decisions districts. In Iraq, the unsatisfactory aftermath of on substantive issues require unanimous approval. the elections is increasing the momentum toward The Supreme Council also chooses the Secretary- regionalism, encouraging the insurgency, delaying General (currently Abd-al-Rahman al-Attiya, a rebuilding and leaving the way open for intensified former Qatari Foreign Ministry official). The Minis-

112 113 terial Council consists of foreign or other ministers, cal machinery, and mechanical appliances. Due to meets every three months and is responsible for the large quantity of fuel shipped from the Gulf (69 % the implementation of decisions. Other institutions of all EU imports from the GCC countries), the GCC include the Consultative Commission and the Secre- is the EU’s 14th largest source of imports. tariat-General. The former consists of five represent- EU relations with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, atives from each member state and is responsible for Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are chan- selecting the Supreme Council. The latter, which is neled through a Cooperation Agreement signed in based in Riyadh, serves as the administrative body 1989 by the European Community and the GCC. of the GCC; it prepares meetings and monitors the The last EU-GCC ministerial meeting was held in implementation of policy. The Commission for the Brussels in May 2004. Foreign ministers meet an- Settlement of Disputes is formed on an ad hoc basis nually, most recently in Bahrain in April 2005. The and works to seek solutions to problems occurring aftermath of the Iraq war and EU efforts towards the among member states. establishment of an EU Strategic Partnership for the Despite clear common goals, the GCC has Mediterranean and the Middle East provoked a re- proved to be a rather loose alliance for boosting newed interest in EU-GCC relations. Recently, the EU economic cooperation between members and, was criticized for maintaining a very narrow focus through collective security, for guarding against on trade relations with the GCC, ignoring important threats from neighboring states and Islamic extrem- fields like education. ism. Economically, Bahrain’s decision to seek a free trade deal with the US cast a shadow over the 2004 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) summit and caused a rift with Saudi Arabia. Despite The IAEA was established in 1957 as an autonomous these and other unsolved questions, there are plans intergovernmental organization under the United to create a common market by 2007 and a single cur- Nations (UN). It is dedicated to promoting the rency in 2010. Security has also played a role from peaceful use of atomic energy worldwide. Its stat- the beginning and has grown even more important ute outlines the three pillars of the Agency’s work: in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. Still, there nuclear verification and security, safety, and tech- is no consensus about strategy. Although the GCC nology transfer. Growing support for international, wants to reduce its dependence on US troops for legally-binding commitments and comprehensive security, there’s no alternative in sight. An attempt safeguards to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to create a significant collective defense force failed and work towards their eventual elimination, led to in the early 1990s. the approval of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty http://www.gcc-sg.org/Foundations.html (NPT) in 1968. The IAEA is headquartered in Vienna. It cur- GCC — Cooperation with the EU rently has 139 member states, whose representatives The GCC is currently the EU’s sixth largest export meet annually for the General Conference where market. EU exports to the GCC are diversified. 35 members are elected to the Board of Governors. Roughly half are machinery and transport goods, The Board is a consensual body which meets five such as power plants, locomotives, aircraft, electri- times a year; it prepares material to be discussed at

114 115 the General Conference. It also approves safeguard cern. To date, four of the six countries — Bahrain, agreements and the publication of the IAEA’s safety Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates — have standards and is responsible for appointing the joined the Initiative; Oman and Saudi Arabia have Director General (with the approval of the General shown interest in joining. Despite efforts of the Conference). Currently, the Director General is the GCC as a whole to institutionalize its cooperation Egyptian Mohamed ElBaradei, who was appointed in with NATO, this is not on the agenda at present. The 1997. To honor their commitment, the IAEA and its Initiative is open to all countries of the broader Mid- Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were jointly dle East region (including the Palestinian Authority) awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. In recent that support the fight against terrorism and prolif- years, several countries have raised controversy eration of weapons of mass destruction. over their aspirations to develop nuclear weapons, In order to avoid political problems, e. g. regard- including Israel, North Korea and Pakistan. Most ing Iraq or Israel, NATO has made clear that the recently, Iran has been under suspicion of harbor- ICI cannot be used to create a political debate over ing such ambitions, despite having signed the NPT. issues more appropriately handled elsewhere. The In February 2003, ElBaradei traveled to Iran with a practical cooperation functions on a 26 + 1 basis: team of inspectors to begin probing Tehran’s nuclear The 26 members of NATO work with each country plans. The Agency has added some other urgent on an individual basis. Furthermore, the process is dimensions to its agenda in recent years, includ- distinct from yet takes into account and comple- ing countermeasures against the threat of nuclear ments other international initiatives, including the terrorism. On January 10, 2006, Iran announced G 8 and international organizations such as the EU it would remove UN seals from sensitive nuclear and the OSCE. research sites and resume enriching uranium. The Following the launch of the ICI, NATO countries move sparked an international crisis. decided to establish the Istanbul Cooperation Initia- tive Group, composed of political counselors from NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative the 26 delegations of member countries to NATO. (NATO-ICI) The Group is in charge of defining the procedures The NATO-ICI was launched on June 28, 2004 at for the development of a menu of practical activi- NATO’s summit meeting in Istanbul, extending the ties with interested countries and ensuring its im- model of cooperation used in NATO’s Mediterranean plementation. dialog to the Gulf region. It attempts to improve re- gional security by offering countries of the broader Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Middle East region practical bilateral security coop- The NPT, the world’s most widely accepted arms eration with NATO, starting with the member-states control agreement, was initiated in 1968 by the of the Gulf Cooperation Council. For example, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. Initiative offers advice on defense policy, military- It seeks to ban the proliferation of nuclear devices to-military cooperation, cooperation in the fight while encouraging international cooperation for the against terrorism, and civil emergency planning, peaceful use of nuclear technology. The NPT entered as well as political dialog on issues of common con- into force in 1970 after the signature of 43 countries.

114 115 It was prolonged indefinitely by all member states Agency (IAEA). Iran insists that it merely wants to in 1995. A vast majority of sovereign states, 189, are develop nuclear power for peaceful use, but there is now parties to the treaty, while a few countries, a growing concern that Iran wants to gain time to most notably Israel, India, and Pakistan, which are present accomplished facts to the world. These fears all known or presumed to possess atomic weapons, heightened in January 2006 when Iran resumed are not. Their absence from the treaty, as well as nuclear resaearch. According to intelligence sources recent events, have led to doubts as to whether the cited by the German Magazine “Der Spiegel” in No- NPT will be able to reach its main goal of freezing vember 2005, Iran is already negotiating with North the number of declared nuclear weapon states at Korea to acquire more powerful carrier missiles, sup- five (USA, Russia, Great Britain, France and China). posedly for the delivery of nuclear weapons. Despite As a result, worldwide acceptance of the NPT is wan- these and other indications, intensive efforts, most ing, especially since the end of the Cold War. notably from the so called EU-3 (Germany, France One reason for this increasing dissatisfaction, and Great Britain) and Russia, are being undertaken especially in the Muslim world, is the variety of ways in order to reach a diplomatic solution for this ongo- the world has reacted to Israel’s and North Korea’s ing international crisis. nuclear aspirations. Another reason is the so-called “Islamic bomb:” this term is used for a nuclear weapon acquired for broad ideological reasons, a bomb that supposedly belongs to the collective Mus- lim world and, as such, can be seen as the ultimate expression of Islamic solidarity. Concern about the Islamic bomb is at the heart of the intense effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to Muslim countries. The official justification is a general one: proliferation must be curbed globally. But unoffi- cially, the Islamic bomb has received special atten- tion. At first, this was mostly concerning Pakistan, a Western ally which never signed the NPT. But in recent years, Iran has received much more atten- tion, especially since June 2005, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former mayor of Tehran and a political hardliner, became President. Although Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and its membership was never suspended, the United States and other countries now suspect that Iran has violated the treaty through an active program to develop nuclear weapons. These alleged violations are currently be- ing investigated by the International Atomic Energy

116 117 Index

accountability  democracy Dubai 50, 66, 69, 83 Afghanistan 28, 38, 45, 50, 58, 79, 86, 97 elections, democratic  democracy Americans  USA elites 37–38, 47, 65, 68–69, 71, 74–75, 77, 89 Arab League  Glossary 25 Egypt 24, 33, 54, 61, 77, 82, 89 armament 89, 92 EU 28–31, 47–54, 62, 64–65, 77–78, 79–80, 87–89, arms race 83, 89, 96, 98 92–94 army 24, 26 - acquis communautaire 48–49 - troops 42, 83–34, 86, 97 - European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 47–49, autocrats/autocracy 30–32, 38, 44, 57–58, 61–63, 51 66, 68, 75–77 - European Security Strategy 28, 33, 80 - autocratic regime 58, 61–63, 68, 76 failed states  glossary 27, 80, 86 Baath party 24, 26 fundamentalism 33–34, 79 Barcelona process 29, 47– 48, 50, 76 - extremism 63–64, 102 BMENA 29, 47, 49 - radicalization 56–58 Bonyads  Glossary 67 GCC  Glossary 34, 46, 80, 83–85, 87, 95, 100 China 61, 69, 74, 80, 87, 96 Germany 25, 28, 30, 41–42, 46, 58, 64, 75, 83, 88, civil society 30, 44, 53, 65–66, 72 s. a. NGOs 98–99 civil war 27, 41– 42, 57, 64, 81 globalization 29, 31, 36, 75 colonialism 38–39, 44 Good Governance 29, 91, 97, 46–47, 50, 52, 55, 57, CSCE 31, 98 –99 59 democracy 23–29, 31, 35–36, 38, 40–53, 55, human rights 30–31, 37, 46, 47, 50, 52, 55, 57–58, 57–58, 60–67, 70–77 60, 70, 84, 95–96, 98 - accountability 45–47, 52, 72, 77, 81 IAEA  Glossary 89, 93–35 - elections, democratic 24, 38, 64 India 69, 74, 80, 82, 87, 91 - institutions, democratic 43 Iraq 23–28, 30, 33–35, 38, 40–43, 50, 55, 59–61, - participation 31, 34, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 52, 55, 64–67, 71–72, 79–81, 84–86, 89, 97, 99–101 58, 65, 70, 72, 77, 80, 102 - constitution 23, 40 - representation 40, 45–46, 66, 71 - Iraq Crisis 28 - self-determination 38–39, 43–45, 51, 70 - Kurds 26–28, 33, 38–39, 42, 71, 80, 101 - transparency 46–47, 52, 72, 98 Iran 24, 27–28, 30, 34, 36–38, 41–42, 50–54, 56, democratization 25, 27, 37, 39–40, 42, 46, 56, 60–61, 63, 65–67, 75, 79–101 60–61, 64–68, 67–68, 96 - constitution 43 - domino effect 31 - nuclear enrichment 88, 93, 95 - examples 51 - fuel cycle 88–90, 94–95 - model 28–32 - hegemon 95–96, 100 - myths 61– 65, 67, 70–72, 74–75, 78 - Iran-Iraq war 34, 67, 81, 86 dictatorship 24, 32, 43, 61 - Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)  Glossary 60, double standards 60, 80, 87–88, 94 87, 89, 93–94

116 117 - nuclear power/ issue/ programm/ weapons 60, Pakistan 24, 74, 80, 82, 86–87, 91, 95 79, 81–83, 85–96 Palestine 23, 78, 83 - nuclear technology 60, 92–93 - Palestinian-Israeli conflict 28, 79, 83 - confidence building 91–95, 99 participation  democracy - WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) 51, 75, Persian Gulf 25, 79–80, 84, 102 80–81, 86–93, 96 privatization 67–78, 76 Islam 27, 36 –37, 69, 71, 74 radicalization  fundamentalism - Islamist 24, 44, 59–60, 69, 77–78 reform/reform process 23, 27, 30, 31, 34, 44, 46, Israel 54, 56–57, 59, 79–80, 83, 85, 87–88, 92, 94, 48, 54, 56, 70–71, 74–76 97 regime change 25, 29, 37, 61, 75–76, 79, 90, 97 Istanbul-Cooperation-Initiative  Glossary 47, 100 religion 37, 44, 56–57, 59, 73–74 Jordan 56, 58 rentier state  oil Kurds  Iraq representation  democracy Kuwait 24, 69, 86, 100–101 rule of law 29, 31, 43, 45–49, 52–53, 55, 70, 72, Lebanon 23, 27–28, 33, 38, 42, 59–60, 86 74, 77, 84, 96, 102 Middle East 23–25, 28–34, 36, 38–41, 43, 45, 49, Russia 27, 63, 80, 87–88, 94 54–55, 59–61, 65, 68, 74–76, 80, 89, 92, 98–99, Saudi Arabia 27, 32, 34, 58, 61, 63, 72, 81, 84–85, 102 99–101 - bottom-up/top-down approach 29, 50–51 Shiites 24, 26–27, 42, 85 - demographics 65 secularism 37, 56, 59, 73 - middle class 65, 72–73 security 23, 29, 31, 33, 39, 42, 61, 64–65, 71–72, militarization/military, also army, armament 74–75, 79–80, 82, 84, 89, 91–93, 96–102 64–65, 75–76, 84, 90–91, 98 - security guarantee 92, 98 minority/minority rights 42, 47, 52, 71, 84–85 - security structure 96, 100 nationalism 24, 31, 32–37, 40 Sharia 45, 47 nationalization  oil stability, regional 24, 30, 83, 95 NATO 24, 47, 65, 72, 76, 82, 100 Sunni 24, 26–27, 30, 38, 39–42, 71, 80, 87 NGOs 52, 74 Syria 23, 27–28, 42, 60, 72, 82, 89, 101 North Africa 50, 57, 79 Taiwan 58, 61, 74 North Korea 89–91, 97 Taliban 45, 79 NPT  Iran terrorism 50, 54, 57, 69, 75, 78, 79–81, 89, 96–97, nuclear energy/issues/programm/weapons  Iran 99 nuclear technology  Iran tribal identity/thinking 32–35, 44, 57 oil 55, 63, 65–67, 69, 72, 84, 95, 99, 102 Turkey 24–25, 49, 56, 100 - rentier state 65–67 UAE 34, 46, 69 - nationalization 24, 71 Ukraine 48–49, 68, 75–76 opposition 24–25, 33, 52–53, 71, 75–77 - “Orange Revolution” 49, 76 OSCE 31 UN Security Council 28, 60, 84

118 119 USA 25, 42, 51, 74–75, 82, 85, 97 Persons - Americans 14–17, 25, 29, 34, 42, 47, 50–52, 57, 60, 75, 77–78, 83–84, 101 Abbas, Mahmoud 77 - Bush administration 25, 33, 41, 51, 60, 77 Ahmedinejad, Mahmoud 72–73 - unilateralism 25, 79 Akhmetov, Rinat 68 Weapons of Mass Destruction  Iran, WMD Al Zarqawi, Abu Musab 32 Barghouti, Marwan 77 Barzani, Massoud 27 Bin Laden, Osama 32, 58, 83 Bush, George W. 26, 90, 96 Cheney, Dick 41 Clay, Lucius D. 41–42 Hussein, Saddam 24–26, 34, 84, 89, 95 Imam Husayn 72 Khan, Abdul Quadeer 81 King, Martin Luther 77 King Faisal I. 23–24 King Faisal II. 24 King Mohammed VI. 32 Lipset, Seymour Martin 61 Mbeki, Thabo 93 Mossadegh, Mohammed 65 Mubarak, Hosni 76 Nasser, Gamal Abd El 24, 36, 74 Perle, Richard 80 Pinchuk, Viktor 68 Rafsanjani, Akbar Hashemi 67, 73 Rice, Condolezza 96 Sick, Gary 83 Sin, Kardinal Jaime 77 Tutu, Desmond 77 Wilson,Woodrow 51

118 119 Previous Round Tables*

Protocol Topic Speakers Chair Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

1961 1 Schwächen der industriellen Gesellschaft F. W. Schoberth H. B. Tolkmitt

2 Kulturkrise in der industriellen Gesellschaft Erik von Sivers Fritz Voigt

3 Glanz und Elend der Entwicklungshilfe Fritz Baade Günther Buch

4 Gesellschaftliche Entwicklung im Osten Helmut Gollwitzer Eugen Kogon

1962 5 Die Fragwürdigkeit der Bildungspolitik Rüdiger Altmann Josef Müller-Marein

6 Die Erziehung zum Europäer Stéphane Hessel François Bondy

7 Die Bewältigung des Preis-Lohn-Problems Theodor Pütz Gottfried Bombach

8 Die Preis-Lohn-Dynamik in der BRD Hans-Constantin Paulssen Fritz Voigt

1963 9 Maschine — Denkmaschine — Staatsmaschine Pierre Bertaux Arnold Gehlen

10 Kybernetik als soziale Tatsache O. W. Haseloff Freiherr von Stackelberg

11 Westliche Gesellschaft und kommunistische Drohung Winfried Martini Th. Eschenburg

12 Wohin treibt die EWG ? U. W. Kitzinger, Eugen Kogon Roland Delcour

1964 13 Planung in der freien Marktwirtschaft Edgar Salin Gottfried Bombach

14 Wohin Deutschland in Europa ? Alfred Grosser, François Bondy Karl Theodor Frhr. zu Guttenberg

15 Entwicklungshilfe — Mittel des Aufstiegs oder des Verfalls ? Walter Rau Edgar Salin E. F. Schumacher

16 Industrielle Gesellschaft — menschlich oder unmenschlich ? Raymond Aron Ralf Dahrendorf

1965 17 Vermögensbildung in Arbeitnehmerhand Helmut Meinhold Eugen Kogon H. J. Wallraff

18 Hemmen Tabus die Demokratisierung ? Alexander Mitscherlich Hellmut Becker

19 Automatisierung — eine gesellschaftliche Herausforderung ? Gottfried Bombach Hans Wenke Günter Friedrichs Kurt Pentzlin

*a complete list of all participants since 1961 is available at www.bergedorf-round-table.org

120 121 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

20 Ein Dilemma der westlichen Demokratien Leo H. Klaassen Edgar Salin

1966 21 Die “unterentwickelten” hochindustrialisierten Gesellschaften Friedrich Heer Hellmut Becker

22 Muss unsere politische Maschinerie umkonstruiert werden ? Rüdiger Altmann Eugen Kogon Joseph Rovan

23 Wissenschaftliche Experten und politische Praxis — Das Helmut Schelsky Hellmut Becker Problem der Zusammenarbeit in der heutigen Demokratie Ulrich Lohmar

24 Ist der Weltfriede unvermeidlich ? Carl-Friedrich Frhr. Edgar Salin v. Weizsäcker

1967 25 Bedroht die Pressekonzentration die freie Meinungsbildung ? Helmut Arndt Hellmut Becker

26 Neue Wege zur Hochschulreform Ralf Dahrendorf Hellmut Becker

27 Beherrschen die Technokraten unsere heutige Gesellschaft ? Alfred Mozer Eugen Kogon

1968 28 Freiheit als Störfaktor in einer programmierten Gesellschaft Jeanne Hersch Carl-Friedrich Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

29 Fördern die Bündnissysteme die Sicherheit Europas ? Wladimir Chwostow Alfred Grosser

30 Haben wir im entstehenden Europa eine Chance für Hans von der Groeben Hans Peter Ipsen die freie Marktwirtschaft ?

31 Mögliche und wünschbare Zukünfte Robert Jungk Hellmut Becker

1969 32 Die Biologie als technische Weltmacht Adolf Portmann Hoimar von Ditfurth

33 Verstärken oder verringern sich die Bedingungen Friedrich Hacker Eugen Kogon für Aggressivität ?

34 Welchen Spielraum hat die Entspannungspolitik ? Alfred Grosser Theo Sommer

1970 35 Zugänge zur Friedensforschung Carl-Friedrich Frhr. Karl Carstens v. Weizsäcker Richard Löwenthal

36 Europäische Sicherheit und Möglichkeit der Zusammenarbeit Alfred Grosser Nikolai E. Poljanow Leningrad Nikolai E. Poljanow

37 Demokratisierung der Demokratie ? Joseph Rovan D. Klaus von Bismarck

1971 Arbeitsgespräch : Aufgabenstellung und Verfahrensfragen — Franz Karasek einer internationalen Konferenz für Europäische Sicherheit

120 121 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

38 Infrastrukturreform als Innenpolitik Helmut Kohl D. Klaus von Bismarck

39 Globalsteuerung der Wirtschaft ? Gottfried Bombach Herbert Giersch

40 Der bevollmächtigte Mensch Dennis Gabor D. Klaus von Bismarck

1972 41 Sprache und Politik Hans Maier Hellmut Becker

Arbeitsgespräch : Demokratie und Nationalbewusstsein Richard Löwenthal François Bondy in der BRD

42 Das erweiterte Europa zwischen den Blöcken R. Dahrendorf Rudolf Kirchschläger Jean-Pierre Brunet Sir Con O’Neill

43 Wo bleiben die alten Menschen in der Leistungsgesellschaft ? Helge Pross D. Klaus von Bismarck

1973 44 Die “neue Mitte” : Schlagwort oder Strukturwandel ? Richard Frhr. v. Weizsäcker D. Klaus von Bismarck

45 Umsteuerung der Industriegesellschaft ? Hans-Jochen Vogel Gottfried Bombach Hugo Thiemann

46 Neutralität — Wert oder Unwert für die Rudolf Kirchschläger Olivier Reverdin Vienna europäische Sicherheit Gaston Thorn Jósef Czyrek

1974 47 Revolution der Gleichheit — Ende oder Beginn der Freiheit ? Ralf Dahrendorf D. Klaus von Bismarck

48 Rohstoff- und Energieverknappung H. B. G. Casimir Gottfried Bombach Manfred Schäfer

49 Entwicklungshilfe — eine Illusion ? Peter T. Bauer Max Thurn Karl-Heinz Sohn

1975 Arbeitsgespräch : Entspannungspolitik, wirtschaftliche Ralf Dahrendorf Kurt A. Körber Moscow und kulturelle Zusammenarbeit H. Ehrenberg Lew Tolkunow Theo Sommer C.-F. Frhr. v. Weizsäcker G. Arbatow O. Bogomolow Schalwa Sanakojew Georgij Shukow

50 Kooperation oder Konfrontation — Stürzt die Wirtschaft in Helmut Schmidt Gaston Thorn eine weltpolitische Krise ?

51 Welche Zukunft hat die parlamentarische Demokratie Gaston Thorn Ralf Dahrendorf Bonn westlicher Prägung ?

122 123 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

52 Ordnungspolitik oder Verteilungskampf ? Kurt H. Biedenkopf Theo Sommer

1976 53 Die Berufsgesellschaft und ihre Bildung Hans Maier Hellmut Becker

54 Nach der Wahl ’76 : Welchen Spielraum hat — Ralf Dahrendorf die deutsche Innenpolitik ?

55 Entspannungspolitik nach Helsinki G. Arbatow Ralf Dahrendorf Leonard H. Marks Theo Sommer Ryszard Wojna

1977 56 Ein anderer “Way of Life” E. F. Schumacher Hans K. Schneider Bonn

57 Europa und die Weltwirtschaft Claude Cheysson Gaston Thorn Luxemburg Herbert Giersch

58 Energiekrise — Europa im Belagerungszustand ? Guido Brunner Hans K. Schneider

1978 59 Terrorismus in der demokratischen Gesellschaft Walter Laqueur Ralf Dahrendorf

Arbeitsgespräch : Alternativenergien Joachim Gretz Werner H. Bloss

60 Europäische Arbeitslosigkeit als Dauerschicksal Volker Hauff Gottfried Bombach Gerhard Fels Erich Streissler

61 Wachstum und Lebenssinn — Alternative Rationalitäten ? Carl-Friedrich Ralf Dahrendorf Frhr. v. Weizsäcker

1979 62 UdSSR und Bundesrepublik Deutschland — wirtschaftliche Klaus von Dohnanyi K. A. Körber Moscow und politische Perspektiven in den 80er Jahren Alexander E. Bowin Boris A. Borrissow

63 Jugend und Gesellschaft Leopold Rosenmayr Hans Maier

Weltrezession 1980 ? Herbert Giersch Hans K. Schneider 64 Befürchtungen und Hoffnungen Karl Otto Pöhl

1980 65 Der Westen und der Nahe Osten Arnold Hottinger Udo Steinbach Hans A. Fischer-Barnicol H. Hobohm

66 Europas Sicherheit Christoph Bertram Theo Sommer W. R. Smyser

67 Voraussetzungen und Ziele der W. A. Matweew Karl Kaiser Entspannung in den 80er Jahren Stanley Hoffmann

122 123 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

1981 68 Der Ausbau des Sozialstaates und R. Dahrendorf Armin Gutowski das Dilemma des Staatshaushaltes Anke Fuchs

69 Europe and America facing the crises of the 80’s R. Dahrendorf Karl Kaiser Washington Stanley Hoffmann

70 Was bleibt noch vom staatsbürgerlichen Grundkonsens ? Hans-Jochen Vogel Ralf Dahrendorf E. Noelle-Neumann

1982 71 Repräsentieren die Parteien unsere Gesellschaft ? Werner Remmers Hans Heigert Richard Löwenthal

72 Wirtschaftspolitik in der Krise ? Zur Situation in den J. Tobin Herbert Giersch Bonn Vereinigten Staaten, Großbritannien, Frankreich und der M. Feldstein Bundesrepublik Deutschland Sir Alec Cairncross A. A. Walters P. E. Uri P. Salin A. Gutowski H. Schulmann

1983 73 Ein Weg zur Erneuerung der Industriegesellschaft Präsident Gaston Thorn Ralf Dahrendorf Zurich

74 Die deutsche Frage — neu gestellt Richard Frhr. v. Weizsäcker Karl Kaiser Berlin

1984 75 Zukunft Europas : Probleme der politischen Horst Teltschik Karl Kaiser Moscow und militärischen Entspannung. Wadim W. Sagladin Juri Shukow

76 Ist die Spaltung Europas das letzte Wort ? Franz Kardinal König Luigi Vittorio Graf Rome Helmut Schmidt Ferraris

1985 77 Neue Strukturen für die soziale Sicherheit ? Helmut Meinhold Fides Krause-Brewer Ulf Fink Olaf Sund

78 10 Jahre Helsinki — die Herausforderung bleibt R. Burt Ralf Dahrendorf Bonn S. Tichwinskij M. Szürös L. V. Graf Ferraris M. Dobrosielski H. Teltschik

1986 79 Findet Europa wieder die Kraft, Jacques Delors Karl Kaiser Brussels eine Rolle in der Weltpolitik zu spielen ? Lord Carrington Helmut Schmidt

124 125 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

80 Bürger und res publica — die Zukunft der Verantwortung Hans Maier Ralf Dahrendorf

1987 81 Die Beziehungen zwischen der Sowjetunion Volker Rühe Valentin Falin Moscow und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Wadim W. Sagladin Theo Sommer Egon Bahr

82 Die Modernität in der Industriegesellschaft — und danach ? Hermann Lübbe Luigi V. Ferraris Geneva

83 Zusammenarbeit als Mittel zur Vertrauensbildung M. Szürös Karl Kaiser Budapest Helmut Schmidt R. Bogdanow H. Sonnenfeldt

1988 84 Systemöffnende Kooperation ? W. Leonhard Jürgen Engert Berlin Perspektiven zwischen Ost und West Harry Maier

85 Die ökologische Wende — hat sie noch Chancen ? Frhr. v. Lersner Hans Maier Munich Alois Glück

86 Das gemeinsame europäische Haus — aus der Sicht der Wadim W. Sagladin Karl Kaiser Bonn Sowjetunion und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Horst Teltschik

1989 87 Globale Umweltproblematik als gemeinsame Überlebensfrage W. Mundt Max Schmidt Dresden W. Haber

88 Auf dem Wege zu einem neuen Europa ? Perspektiven Lawrence Eagleburger Sir Ralf Dahrendorf Bonn einer gemeinsamen westlichen Ostpolitik Sir Christopher Mallaby Horst Teltschik

89 Chancen für die europäische Kultur Valtr Komárek Hans Heigert Prague am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts Kurt Biedenkopf

1990 90 Wie geht es weiter mit den Deutschen in Europa ? Willy Brandt Sir Ralf Dahrendorf Dresden Manfred Stolpe Lothar Späth

91 Europa im Aufbruch — auf dem Wege zu einer neuen Frieden- Wadim W. Sagladin Andreas Meyer-Landrut Moscow sordnung Horst Teltschik

1991 92 Perestrojka : Kontinuität, Ende oder Wende ? W. Wladislawlew Sir Ralf Dahrendorf Moscow F. W. Christians

93 Nach dem “Sozialismus” : Wie geht es weiter Tadeusz Mazowiecki Hans Maier Berlin mit den neuen Demokratien in Europa ? Sir Ralf Dahrendorf

1992 94 Wege zur inneren Einheit Kurt Biedenkopf Brigitte Seebacher- Dresden Wolfgang Thierse Brandt

124 125 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

95 Welche Antworten gibt Europa auf Willy Brandt Karl Kaiser Paris die neuen Einwanderungswellen ? Jacques Delors

96 Zwischen Integration und nationaler Eigenständigkeit : Jim Hoagland Andreas Meyer-Landrut Tallinn wie findet Europa zusammen ? Dr. Krenzler Lennart Meri T. Örn B. Schmidbauer

97 Energiesicherheit für ganz Europa ? Hermann Krämer Andreas Meyer-Landrut Kiev W. Skljarow Helga Steeg Y. Rudenko

1993 98 Orientierungskrise in Politik und Gesellschaft ? Perspektiven Antje Vollmer Jürgen Engert Berlin der Demokratie Wolf Lepenies

99 Will the West survive the disintegration of the East ? Bill Bradley Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Ditchley W. F. van Eekelen Park H.-G. Poettering

100 Wieviel Gemeinsinn braucht die liberale Gesellschaft ? Kurt Biedenkopf Dieter Grimm Dresden Albert O. Hirschman

1994 101 Russland und der Westen : Internationale Sicherheit und A. A. Kokoschin Andreas Meyer-Landrut St. Petersburg Reformpolitik Volker Rühe A. A. Sobtschak

102 Zukunftsfähigkeit von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lothar Späth Jürgen Engert Friedrichsroda Leo A. Nefiodow

1995 103 Die Verfassung Europas Jean-Claude Casanova Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Oxford Timothy Garton Ash Wolfgang Schäuble

104 Europa — aber wo liegen seine Grenzen ? Bronislaw Geremek Karl Kaiser Warsaw Anders Björck J. François-Poncet

105 Ein neuer Gesellschaftsvertrag ? Horst Seehofer Hermann Korte Munich Barbara Riedmüller

1996 106 Europe and the Future of the Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi Michael Stürmer Jerusalem Middle East — an Agenda for Peace Hanan Bar-On Leonard Hausman Jean-Paul Jesse Helmut Schäfer

126 127 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

107 Medien — Macht — Politik Wolfgang Donsbach Thomas Kielinger Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem Theo Sommer

108 Was bewegt Russland ? Sergej Baburin Andreas Meyer-Landrut Moscow Sir Rodric Braithwaite

1997 109 At the crossroads of geo-politics — Ilter Türkmen Curt Gasteyger Istanbul Turkey in a changing political environment Morton Abramowitz Hans-Ulrich Klose

110 Wege aus der blockierten Gesellschaft André Leysen Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Berlin Jürgen Rüttgers

111 Wie ist Europa zu sichern ? Ulrich Cartellieri Michael Stürmer Amsterdam Sir Christopher Mallaby Wolfgang Ischinger Marten van Heuven Frits Bolkestein David P. Calleo Max Kohnstamm Elmar Brok

1998 112 Wachsende Ungleichheiten — neue Spaltungen ? Kurt Biedenkopf Barbara Riedmüller Leipzig Heinz Bude Wolfgang Huber

113 Energie und Geostrategie im kaspischen Raum Terry D. Adams Andreas Meyer-Landrut Baku Vafa Goulizade Paul Haseldonckx Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz

1999 114 Welche gesellschaftliche Wertigkeit hat der Sport ? Hans Lenk Hermann-Anders Korte Magdeburg Herbert Riehl-Heyse Jürgen Palm

115 Neue Dimensionen des Politischen ? Antonia Grunenberg Jutta Limbach Berlin Herausforderungen für die repräsentative Demokratie Sabine Leutheusser- Schnarrenberger

116 Russland in Europa : Zehn Jahre nach dem Kalten Krieg Wolfgang Ischinger Andreas Meyer-Landrut Moscow Oleg Morosow Ulrich Cartellieri Andrej A. Kokoschin

2000 117 Modell Deutschland : Henning Scherf Klaus v. Dohnanyi Berlin Reif für die Globalisierung ? Carl Christian v. Weizsäcker

126 127 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

118 Ein föderatives Europa ? Sylvie Goulard Rudolf von Thadden Berlin Klaus Hänsch Jerzy Kranz

119 China : Partner in der Weltwirtschaft Yang Qixian Mei Zhaorong Beijing Zheng Silin Karl Kaiser Wang Chunzheng Shen Jueren Zhu Min Shi Mingde Song Jian Konrad Seitz Horst Teltschik Martin Posth

2001 120 Verhandlungsdemokratie ? Politik des Möglichen — Dieter Grimm Robert Leicht Berlin Möglichkeiten der Politik Annette Fugmann-Heesing

121 The Baltic Sea — a Region of Prosperity and Stability ? Bertel Haarder Jaako Iloniemi Helsinki Artur J. Kuznetsov Alar J. Rudolf Olljum Hans Olsson Timo Summa Erkki Tuomioja Christoph Zöpel

122 Russia’s European Dimension — Sergej W. Jastrschembskij Moscow Sergej A. Karaganow

2002 123 The Future of Southeast Europe Andy Bearpark Martti Ahtisaari Belgrade Erhard Busek Erhard Busek Nebojša Čović Bozidar Djelić Alexandra Jovičević Herwig Kempf Gerald Knaus Wolfgang Petritsch Goran Svilanović

124 Contours of a “New World Order” ? Egon Bahr Lord Ralf Dahrendorf Berlin John L. Hirsch Peter W. Singer Paul W. Schroeder Georges-Henri Soutou Karsten D. Voigt Norbert Walter Samuel F. Wells Jr.

128 129 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

2003 125 Reinventing Europe — Hélène Ahrweiler Otto von der Gablentz Hamburg Cultural Dimensions of Widening and Deepening Üstün Ergüder Monika Griefahn Yudhishthir Raj Isar Hywel Ceri Jones Karl Schlögel Gary Smith Gijs de Vries

126 The Future of Democracy — European Perspectives Henri de Bresson Roger de Weck Florence Andrea Manzella Gesine Schwan Larry Siedentop Gijs de Vries Helen Wallace

127 The Middle East and Western Values: A Dialog With Iran Gilles Kepel Christoph Bertram Isfahan Michael McFaul Seyed Kazem Sajjadpour Homayra Moshirzadeh Ahmad Nagheebzadeh Giandomenico Picco Johannes Reissner Hossein Salimi

2004 128 Power and Rules — Elements of a New World Order Paul Schroeder Christoph Bertram Wilton Park Dame Pauline Neville-Jones David Rieff Heather Grabbe Ghanim Alnajjar Michael Schaefer Avis Bohlen

129 Frontiers and Horizons of the EU — Ian Boag Roger de Weck Lviv The New Neighbors Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova Gernot Erler Yaroslav Hrytsak Danuta Hübner Evgenii M. Kozhokin Wolfgang Schäuble Oleksandr O. Tschaly Jakub T. Wolski

2005 130 Forging a Just Global Order — Badria Al-Awadhi Theo Sommer Cairo Trade, Development, Political Strategies Mark Chingono Larry Diamond Rainer Forst Sheikh Ali Gom’a Amr Hamzawy Stefano Manservisi Norbert Walter

128 129 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

131 Russia and the West Elmar Brok Wolfgang Eichwede Berlin Vladimir Chizhov Vasili Likhachev Dmitri Rogozin Wolfgang Schäuble Manfred Stolpe

130 Protocol Topic Speakers Chair

130 The Bergedorf Round Table

Chairman Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, former President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Coordinator Dr. Klaus Wehmeier (Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board) Dr. Thomas Paulsen (Managing Director)

Program Assistant Karen Pehla, M. A.

Program Manager Dr. Thomas Weihe

Address Bergedorf Round Table Berlin Office of the Körber Foundation Neustädtische Kirchstraße 8 D -10117 Berlin Phone : +49 -30-20 62 67-60 Fax : +49 -30-20 62 67-67 E-Mail : [email protected] www.bergedorf-round-table.org

Imprint

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http ://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar.

© edition Körber-Stiftung, Hamburg 2006

Editor Dr. Thomas Weihe Translations Jonna Meyer-Spasche Pictures Marc Darchinger Design Groothuis, Lohfert, Consorten | glcons.de Printed in Germany by Offizin Andersen Nexö Leipzig

ISBN 10 3-89684-361-3 ISBN 13 978-3-89684-361-6

All rights are reserved. These minutes may be reproduced upon request. www.edition-koerber-stiftung.de

The Bergedorf Protocols are also published in German. Both versions are available for download and research at www.bergedorf-round-table.org

PCA gültig bis 2007