Complete Protocol
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135th Bergedorf Round Table Interests and Partners of German Foreign Policy September 29th – October 1st, 2006, Berlin CONTENTS Picture Documentation 1 Protocol Participants 20 Summary 21 Welcome 23 I. Determinants of Foreign Policy: Geography and History ? 24 1. The Significance of Geography for German Foreign Policy 27 2. Historical Responsibility as a Guiding Principle 33 3. German Modesty ? 36 II. Foreign Policy Debates and Institutions in Germany 37 1. We Need a Political Debate on Foreign Policy 37 2. Does Germany Need a National Security Strategy ? 41 III. Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests 44 1. Security Risks 44 2. Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests 47 IV. Germany and Its Partners: The UN, NATO, and “the West” 51 1. Multilateralism 51 2. NATO and the UN 53 3. The Transatlantic Partnership and the “New West” 54 4. Western Values as Principles for German Foreign Policy 59 5. Should Germany Be More Engaged Militarily ? 60 V. Germany and Its Partners: The European Union 65 1. The EU and a Common European Foreign Policy 65 2. Should Germany Lead in Foreign Policy ? 72 3. Objectives of Germany’s EU Presidency 75 4. Enlargement or a European Neighbourhood Policy Plus ? 78 VI. EU Policy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 80 Annex 1. The State of EU-Russian Relations 80 2. Germany’s Role in EU-Russian Relations 83 Participants 111 3. Growing Closer by Interweaving ? Four Spaces and the New PCA 88 Recommended Literature 118 4. Russia and the EU: Rivals in the Post-Soviet Space ? 89 Glossary 120 5. The Frozen Conflicts and the Role of Russia 94 Index 125 6. Economic Cooperation 97 Previous Round Tables 131 VII. The EU’s Southern Neighborhood 100 The Körber Foundation 141 1. The EU’s Relations with Turkey 100 Imprint 142 2. The EU and Germany in the Middle East 104 Initiator Eric Gujer, Correspondent, Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), Berlin Dr. Kurt A. Körber Dr. Klaus Hänsch, MEP Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy, Social Democratic Faction (SPE), European Parliament, Brussels CHair State Secretary Dr. Gert Haller, Head of the Office of the President of the Federal Roger de Weck Republic of Germany, Berlin President, Graduate Institute of International Studies MD Dr. Christoph Heusgen, (HEI), Geneva Foreign Policy and Security Advisor to the Federal Chancellor and Director General, Chancellery of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin Speakers Dr. Werner Hoyer, MdB Deputy Chairman and Spokesman for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Christoph Bertram, Free Democratic Party (FDP) Parliamentary Group, Hamburg German Bundestag, Berlin Ambassador Vladimir Chizhov, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to the to the European Communities, Brussels Court of St. James, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Mehmet Dülger, Germany, London Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, MD Dr. Wolf Kischlat, Grand National Assembly, Ankara Director-General for Foreign Affairs, Office of the Sylvie Goulard, President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin Lecturer, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris Ali Kizilkaya, (Sciences Po), Paris and College of Europe, Bruges Chair, Islamic Council of Germany, Cologne Jim Hoagland, Philipp Mißfelder, MdB Associate Editor and Chief Foreign Correspondent, Member, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) The Washington Post, Washington D. C. Parliamentary Group, German Bundestag, Berlin Dr. Ulrich Schlie, Professor Dr. Roger Morgan, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Ministry of Defense, London Berlin Dr. Thomas Paulsen, Professor Dr. Fritz Stern, Managing Director, Bergedorf Round Table, Columbia University, New York Körber Foundation, Berlin General (ret.) Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, President, Clausewitz Society, Hamburg participants Tøger Seidenfaden, Executive Editor-in-Chief, Politiken, Copenhagen Dr. Nadia Arbatova, Ambassador Shimon Stein, Head, Department on European Political Studies, Ambassador of the State of Israel to Germany, Institute for World Economy and International Relations Embassy of the State of Israel, Berlin (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow Dr. Klaus Wehmeier, Dr. Laurens Jan Brinkhorst, Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board, fmr. Minister of Economic Affairs, The Hague Körber Foundation, Hamburg Dr. Marek A. Cichocki, Dr. Richard von Weizsäcker, Programme Director, The Natolin European Centre, Fmr. President of the Federal Republic of Germany, Warsaw Berlin Sir Brian Crowe, Christian Wriedt, Deputy Chairman, Royal Institute for International Chairman of the Executive Board, Körber Foundation, Affairs, Chatham House, London Hamburg MDg Dr. Markus Ederer, Dr. Gottfried Zeitz, Head of Policy Planning, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin Office of President Richard von Weizsäcker, Berlin 20 SUMMARY I. Foreign Policy Determinants: Geography and History ? Is German foreign policy determined by traditional categories such as Germany’s “middle position” and “responsibility to history ?” Or are such thought patterns superfluous and counterproductive within the enlarged EU ? Can and should Ger- many function as a bridge between the continent’s various parts (pp. 24–35) ? What do Germany’s neighbors worry about: German arrogance or German mod- esty (pp. 36) ? II. Foreign Policy Debates and Institutions in Germany: Some speakers saw a lack of debate over Bundeswehr deployments as a potential risk that could foster the growth of populism. A lack of interest in foreign policy within the political class and the non-involvement of the Bundestag in governmental decisions was criticized. Participants agreed that the quality of foreign policy debates in Ger- many is inadequate (pp. 37–40). Some speakers saw a need to develop a German counterpart to the European Security Strategy (ESS), while others said German and European interests are practically identical. (pp. 41–43). III. Germany’s Foreign Policy Interests: Participants identified terrorism and fail- ing states as focal points for security policy. Western states must uphold their values more, some maintained. A representative of the Muslim community in Germany warned against stigmatizing Islam (pp. 44–46). The claim was debated that the term “German interests” is often invoked, even though the discussion of what they represent is often “diffuse.” It was said interests cannot be defined as abstractions, but only within concrete situations (pp. 47–50). IV. Germany and its Partners — the UN, NATO, and »the West«: Multilateralism was seen as a model for the future but not a panacea (pp. 51–52). The ineffi- ciency of the UN was discussed and reforms were encouraged. NATO’s loss of prestige was for many a particular source of worry (pp. 53–54). The possibility of a “New West” was explored. Various participants rejected the Bush Administra- tion’s unilateralism and called for reciprocity in transatlantic relations (pp. 54– 57). For some, the lack of willingness to make sacrifices and isolationist tendencies put a question mark over Germany’s military reliability (pp. 57–64) V. Germany and its partners — the European Union: The EU’s Common For- eign and Security Policy was regarded as a chance of bringing Europe closer to 21 its people, something that would require willingness to part with national priv- ileges (pp. 65–71). The role of the German-French tandem was regarded with skepticism (pp. 68–69). Non-German participants called for more German leader- ship instead of modesty (pp. 72–74). Several speakers assailed what they saw as an emerging “minimalism in European affairs” during Germany’s EU presi- dency. Others defended a cautious approach (pp. 75–77). The development of the ENP-plus was seen as a way of extracting neighboring countries from the binary logic of accession or non-accession (pp. 78–79) VI. EU policy toward Russia and the post-Soviet Space: Is the negotiation of the EU’s new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia a turning point ? Is there a threat of a relapse into the dualism of cooperation/confronta- tion or are relations stable (pp. 80–83) ? A special role for Berlin in the relation- ship with Moscow was regarded with skepticism (pp. 83–87). The new PCA is meant to help the two sides “grow closer by interweaving” and to establish mu- tual decision-making structures (pp. 88–89). Russian participants emphasized Rus- sia’s positive influence in the post-Soviet space and warned against escalation in the frozen conflicts (pp. 89–97). Western participants criticized Russian demo- cratic deficits and unreliability in energy policy (pp. 97–99). VII: The EU’s Southern Neighborhood: The effects of EU membership for Tur- key were repeatedly referred to. One Turkish representative criticized the lack of sympathy for the difficulty of Turkey’s transformation process (pp. 100–102). It is essential that Turkey fulfill all the rules of the “club,” it was agreed, but some suspected that cultural prejudices were hiding behind more formal objections (pp. 102–104). Some regarded EU participation in military operations to stabilize the Middle East as a chance to overcome the distance between Israel and the EU. All European states, it was agreed, have a commitment to upholding Israel’s right to exist, yet many asserted that that would also oblige Israel to be willing to con- sult with its allies (pp. 104–107). 22 PROTOCOL Welcome I warmly welcome you all to the Bergedorf Round Table. We could von Weizsäcker not have found a more appropriate venue for our discussion about German contributions to European foreign policy than Schloss Bellevue, the official residence of the German President in the heart of Berlin. I might also add that, of all the rooms we have used for Bergedorf Round Tables, none have been as familiar to me as this one is. We will first be investigating Germany’s place in European foreign policy with a retrospective of Germany’s history and identity. I believe that, in the brawl of day- to-day politics, it is greatly beneficial to take time out and ask where one has come from. Party politicians out on the campaign trail generally are not tested on their grasp of history, yet historical awareness greatly facilitates reaching decisions in the present and for the future.