Rationalism or Revelation? Author(s): Robert Grafstein and Darrell Dobbs Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 579-587 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1957402 Accessed: 10/12/2010 23:45

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http://www.jstor.org RATIONALISMOR REVELATION?

A re thereappropriate limits to theapplication of rationalchoice in politicaldecision making?Does rationalismin politicslead to absolutism?Is therea "pressingthreat" to liberal democracy "posed by the irreverentconviction of the hegemonyof reason"?In theJune 1987 issue of thisReview, Darrell Dobbs drew lessons fromHomer's epic poem, the Odyssey, to argue the limitsof rationalismin politics.In this Controversy,Robert Grafstein argues thatDobbs's case against rationalismis not proved. In turn,Dobbs holds to his constructionof the relevanceof Odysseus' nod to sacred values.

A ccordingto Rationalityand Dominance Dobbs (1987),Homer's Odyssey offers us a valuable lesson about the limitsof The crewon Odysseus'boat decidesto reasonand, morespecifically, about the eat thesacred cows, reasoning by thera- limitsof rationalchoice approachesin tionalchoice principle of dominancethat politicsand politicalscience. The lesson regardlessof what the gods do, theconse- apparentlyextends to both rationally quence of slaughteringis always better guided action and belief.These limits, than the consequence of refraining. moreover,are avoidable. Once, Dobbs Homercondemns the crew's decision as argues,we recognizematters inaccessible reckless,implying, according to Dobbs, to reason,the sacred, and recognizenon- thatthe sacred must be respectedeven if rationalisticmeans to apprehendthem, doing so is irrational.Rationality has revel; on, we will be able to recognize reachedits limits. withHomer the degree to whichmany of Decision theory,however, does not ourintellectual and politicalproblems are recommendthe principle of dominance in self-imposed. this kind of case (see, e.g., Levi 1980, These are veryimportant conclusions 107). Forthis principle to apply,the alter- and iftrue would have far-reaching impli- nativestates of naturemust be indepen- cationsfor political science. Rather than dent(causally or statistically,depending arguethat they are false,which I think on thedecision theorist) of the act chosen theyare, I willargue that Dobbs has not by thecrew. It is difficultto imaginethat presenteda persuasivecase for them. thedecision of thegods to cooperateand Specifically,his argumentis based on a punishis independentof thecrew's deci- misunderstandingof decision theory and sion to do somethingpunishable. Dobbs rationalchoice. The premisesof his nega- (1987,507) concedesthat expected utility tive argumentare thusfaulty. Further- considerationsmay indeedconflict with more,even if the, verdict against rational- the dominanceprinciple. One of his ism is nonethelesstrue, this does not by responsesis thatsuch conflictis "rare." itselfjustify the endorsement ofrevelation Yet its rarityis not obvious;and evenif as a higheror supplementarymeans to such cases are rare, the story of the wisdom. slaughteringofthe cattle may still be one;

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW VOL. 82 NO. 2 JUNE 1988 AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 82 and even if rare,such cases maystill be thereare at leasttwo problems with this important.Jeffrey (1983, 2, 8-9), forex- kindof proposal. ample,illustrates the relevance of the con- First,correctness and incorrectnessare flictto argumentsover nuclear deterrence notso muchstates of nature as character- and disarmament. izationsof statesof nature;and workby Dobbs believes,in addition,that it logicianssuch as AlfredTarski suggests would be reasonableto construethe thatmixing the two can be perilous(see crew'sdecision problem so as to meetthe Grafstein1983). Second, conflict between independence requirementand thus dominanceand expectedutility may be restorethe relevance of thecrucial domi- obviatedin thisparticular case, but I do nanceprinciple. He citestextual evidence notsee thatindependence-which allows that,in translation,is unclear to thisnon- us to applydominance when relevant- expert.More strongly,Dobbs suggests has been secured.Suppose the being has thateven if there are problemcases, they beencorrect 900 thousand times when one can be reformulatedto exhibitthe requi- boxwas chosen,correct ninety times when siteindependence. His illustrativecase is two boxes were chosen, incorrectten Newcomb'sProblem. While this problem timeswhen one box was chosen,and in- has politicalanalogs (see Brams 1976, correct100 thousandtimes when two 197-212;Frydman, O'Driscoll, and Schot- boxes were chosen(this example is in- ter1982) I will brieflydescribe it in its spiredby Levi1975). The beinghas been originalform. You arepresented with two correct90% of thetime yet the states of boxesand a choicebetween the contents natureare not statistically independent of ofthe first box or both.In thesecond box thechoices. Nor, it seems,is thebeing's thereis one thousanddollars. As forthe correctnesscausally independent of what first,which is opaque,there is someoneor thedecision maker does. somethingthat puts one million dollars in One can in fact always reformulate it if thatbeing predicts you will choose decisionproblems to ensurecausal inde- onlythe first box; it putsin nothingif it pendence,although, as Newcomb'sProb- predictsyou willchoose both. The being, lem illustrates,one cannotalways addi- by theway, is an excellentpredictor. In tionally guaranteestatistical indepen- morethan one milliontrials, it has been dence (see Luce and Krantz1971). To correct90% of the time.What is your complicatematters further, there are in- choice, given the apparentconflict be- correctways to securecausal indepen- tweenthe principle of dominance (choose dence,at leastin theeyes of thosefocus- bothboxes) and expectedutility (choose ing on this formof independence(see thefirst box)? Skyrms1980, 128-39). What rationalism FollowingBrams (1976,200-203) -who recommendsfor the crew,it turnsout, in turnfollows a suggestionby John Fere- transcendsany reflexivereliance on john-Dobbs (1987, 506) believes the dominance. problemcan be solved "by recastingits gamingelements into independentdeci- sions." Specifically,interpret the two Representationof theProblem statesof naturenot in termsof whether thebeing put themoney in or notbut as Since the dominatedchoice of the beingis correctand beingis incorrect. crew-respectthe cows-leads to the Note,however, that as a resultof thisre- same consequenceregardless of thestate formulationthere is no longerany domi- of nature,one mightstill argue that by nant choice; so the implicationsfor coincidencethe dominance principle pro- Odysseus'crew are unclear.In any case ducesthe correct rational choice with or

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withoutindependence: no jugglingof 506). If thisis trueof the ancients,so probabilitieswill make the dominated muchthe worse for them.It decidedly choicepreferable. This objection,while misrepresentsmodern decision theory. In correct,simply highlights another prob- the marketplace,commensuration does lem-Dobbs's representationofthe crew's indeeddescribe the way peopletypically decisionproblem. behave.Some would argue that as a mat- To see this, note that the crux of terof fact, this is theway nearly all people Dobbs's argumentis that dominance behavein general(e.g., Rothenberg1961, wouldbe correct(as in thePenelope ex- 234-35). This is one reasonwhy the as- amplehe cites)were it notfor the role of sumptionof commensurabilityhas been thegods, their commands, and the sacred. so widelyadopted for specific empirical Butit is notrational choice theory that ig- modelsof rationalchoice. Another is a noresthese additional elements. Rather, technicalconsideration: without com- thefault lies with Dobbs's depiction of the mensurability,preferences cannot be rep- choice situation:the crucialdifferences resentedby a real-valuedutility function. betweenthe Penelope and crewexamples Yet thisdoes notmean that choice with- do notreceive appropriate recognition in out the assumptionof commensurabil- his characterizationof the consequences ity-lexicographicpreferences-is seen by for the crew, which are describedby theoristsas irrationalor nonrational. Dobbs in purelysecular terms. And note Is there any consensusamong the thatthe crew's preferences and choices, as "moderns"for treating commensurability Dobbssets up thedecision problem, range as a cornerstoneof rationality?Not for over these possible consequences,not von Neumannand Morgenstern(1953, overthe states of naturethemselves. 630) who describethat assumptionas If,in short,there is moreto killingthe "probablydesirable." Chipman (1960) cowsthan the possibility of a quickdeath, even argues that lexicographicprefer- namelythe violation of thesacred, that ences,which induce vector-valued utility factought to be reflectedin the conse- functions,are themost general and genu- quencesthe crewconsiders. Their reck- ine basisfor rational choice theory, with lessnessdoes notlie in theirchoosing ra- commensurabilityconstituting just a tionallybut in theiraccepting Eurylochos' specialcase. Taylor's(1973) analysisof characterizationof theirdecision prob- politics employsthe lexicographicas- lem,which Dobbs reinforces.Given this sumption.Its use by Rawls(1971) is well characterization,the crew could reveal known.Finally, Dobbs simplymisunder- theirpreference but not their reverence. standsElster (1979) on thispoint. In some specialcases, what appear to be lexico- graphicpreferences are better understood, accordingto Elster, as constraintson deci- Commensurability sion making.But contraryto Dobbs (1987,508) he does not meanthat these The precedingdiagnosis is wrong- constraintsrepresent limits on rational headed,Dobbs wouldargue, insofar as it thinkingabout the world. Rather,they stilldoes not confrontthe fundamental representlimits on our abilityto change failureof rationalism,its insistencethat the world.On the otherhand, in cases everything,sacred and profane,is com- whenthere truly are lexicographicprefer- mensurable:"Whatever their other dif- ences,Elster observes, the failure of com- ferences,ancients and modemalike ack- mensurabilityto apply,"of course,does nowledgecommensuration as the charac- not meanthat [those cases] are unamen- teristicmodus operandi of reason" (1987, able to rationalanalysis" (1979, 127).

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Revelation I do not suggestthat reason has no In myessay on recklessrationalism and limits.Any instance of deductivereason- heroicreverence in the Odyssey(Dobbs ing involvesassumptions that are not 1987)I calledattention to a discrepancyin themselvesdeduced. Gddel's Theorem the poet's evaluationof two rational, tellsus no consistentset of assumptions strategicallydominant choices. Homer can generateall truths;although this does condemnsas utterlyreckless the decision notmean there are truths no consistentset ofOdysseus' crewmen to slaughterHelios' ofassumptions can generate(Quine 1976, cattle,but he certifiesthe widsom of 66). Inductivereasoning faces fundamen- Odysseus'formally identical decision to talchallenges (Goodman 1965). And what concealhis identity. I argued that this dis- is therational choice is notalways clear. crepancyis neitheran artifactof editorial So in these senses thereare limitsto patchworknor a "Homericnod" but is in- reasonapart from any problems in using steadindicative of a distinctionthat re- or relyingexclusively on reason or in mainsobscured by an exclusivelyration- treatingit as thewhole of science. alisticorientation, the distinction between Yet thisadmission falls far short of the foolhardyrecklessness and discerning conclusionsDobbs recommends.For even wisdom.The recklessnessof Odysseus' if reason cannot confirmevery "self- crewmenlies in theirtreatment of the evident"or revealedtruth, the converse is divinesanction of Helios' cattleas if it not necessarilycorrect: no claimsabout weremerely a pricethat might be weighed the sacred,the self-evident, or anything in a commonbalance with other circum- else becometrue just because reasonis stantial considerations,such as their unable to prove or disprove them. hunger.Their confidence in theboundless (Tocqueville'sconsequentialist argument rangeof commensurationis, I suggesed, forfaity, cited by Dobbs [1987,492], is ir- the hallmarkof a rationalisticcast of relevantto thequestion of truth.) Revela- mind.The wisdomof Odysseus,by con- tion,in sum,is no automaticantidote to trast, is manifestin his temperinga the real limitsof reason. By the same superlativeintellect with respect for the token,in responseto Leo Strauss'sobser- limits of commensuration.Odysseus' vation, "Philosophyhas never refuted reverence,according to my account,is revelation,"I would ask, To whosesatis- establishedupon an insightor revelation faction?Dobbs certainlygives practition- thatoccurred in the courseof extraor- ers of reasonno reasonto questiontheir dinaryconversation with the shade of understandingof theway knowledgeof Achilles. In this encounterAchilles theworld comes about, an understanding declareshis preferencefor even the most thathas survivedconfrontations with re- miserableof lives over his current station vealedbiblical truths about creation and as kingof the dead. I pointedout that othermatters. Those, on theother hand, Achilles'speech is incongruouswith his ir- who have faithin an epistemologyof reproachablycourageous deeds, incon- revelationeven when it conflictswith or gruous,that is, unlessone sees thatlife transcendsreason have therebyinsulated itselfis sacred.As indicatedby Achilles' themselvesfrom the commands of ration- choice,the "value" of human life is notar- ality.What could a refutationof revela- rivedat via rationalcommensuration in a tionpossibly look likein theireyes? nexusof exchange.As Odysseuslearns, thesanctity of human life defies commen- ROBERTGRAFSTEIN suration;it demandsrespect on its own Universityof Georgia terms,not by virtueof comparisonwith,

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or analogyto, anythingelse in thisworld Rationalityand Dominance (cf.Mt 16:26).Odysseus consequently re- jectsthe boundless competitive ambition Grafsteinlodges three objections to my of his past, which he recognizesas use of decisiontheory in interpreting nothingmore than reckless commensura- Homer's Odyssey,contending (1) that tion in heroic guise. His remarkable "decisiontheory . . . doesnot recommend changeof heartdisposes him to respect theprinciple of dominance in thiskind of even the sacred cattle of Helios. For case"; (2) thatmy representationof the Helios,the sun-god, is sovereignover the crewmen'schoice situation is faulty;and days and seasonsthat measure the limits (3) thatmy emphasis on commensurabili- of ourmortality. Odysseus' reverence for tyas thecrux of reasonis inaccurate,at this god manifestsitself in a proper leastas concernsmodern decision theory. respectfor these limits,including the Letus considerthese objections in order. limitsof humanreason. Is my use of strategicdominance in I suggestedthat we are in no way ex- describingthe crewmen's irreverent deci- empttoday from the pitfalls of reckless sion appropriate"in thiskind of case"? rationalism.Our situationis precariousin Noticethat the issue here calls foran in- thatit is thecommercial character of our terpretationof thespecific circumstances own politythat inclines us towardsuch presentedin the Odyssey.The critical recklessness.For commercialism is merely question,as Grafsteinagrees, concerns rationalismin a three-piecesuit. With its theindependence of thegods' decision to exclusiveorientation toward "bottom- cooperatein punishingthe crewmen from line" comparisons,commercialism takes the crewmen'sdecision to slaughterthe forgranted that everything has itsprice, cattle.Grafstein addresses the issue of in- includingthe veryprinciples that make dependencebut his volleys miss their commercialfreedom, to say nothingof markand, as we shall see, merelytrace our otherfreedoms, possible. As against tangentsto thecentral point. The problem rationalism,I suggestedthat reverence for is thatGrafstein shows little interest in the common-lawliberties and theequal rights specificcircumstances that constitute this with which we are endowed by our case. -He dismisses specific textual Creatormay well proveto be our most evidence,which I citedto supportmy for- reliablesupport in thestruggle to keepthe mulations,as "unclearto thisnonexpert"; republicwe have beengiven. Now Graf- and he asserts,without any referenceto stein,in response,maintains (1) thatthe the relevant data-the speeches in case I makeagainst rationalism "is based Homer'spoem-that thenecessary inde- on a misunderstandingofdecision theory pendencebetween the decisionsof the and rationalchoice"; and (2) that-"evenif gods and the crewmenis "difficultto theverdict against rationalism is nonethe- imagine."Now, theindependence condi- lesstrue, this does notby itselfjustify the tionis satisfied,in plainEnglish, as long endorsementof revelationas a higheror as it is not thecrewmen's decision itself supplementarymeans to wisdom."He de- thatcauses divinecooperation, or more votesonly a concludingparagraph to the strongly,if other gods are as likelynot to lattercharge, directing his greatesteffort cooperateas theyare to cooperatewith towardestablishing the former. Helios in punishingOdysseus' crewmen. This, I submit,is not at all difficultto imagine.Cooperation is underno cir- cumstancesto be takenfor granted among Homericgods. On thecontrary, factious- nessis theirmost notorious characteristic.

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Butwe neednot leave thedisposition of to thecase ofOdysseus' crewmen, then he this issue at the level of imagination. assumes the responsibilityfor a more There is, as I have alreadyindicated, carefulstudy of the substantive details of specifictextual evidence to supporta Homer'sstory than he has thusfar under- positiveclaim for independence (p. 507). taken.Certainly, if one does not under- In the lines I cited, Helios deliversa stand the "kind of case" presentedby powerfulthreat to Zeus,chief of the gods. Homer,one is in no positionto dictate Heliosdeclares that unless the other gods appropriatetheoretical devices for its cooperateand punish Odysseus' crewmen analysis. to avengehis cattle, he willleave his ap- pointedstation and go insteadinto Hades and shinefor the dead. Now, it seemsto me self-evidentthat Helios would not Representationof theProblem have resortedto threatshad he expected thegods to cooperatein thepunishment Next,Grafstein claims that I misrepre- of the crewmen'ssacrilege. Helios sup- sent the crewmen'schoice situationby poses thegods' cooperationis not to be leavingall but secularconsiderations out takenfor granted, regardless of whatthe of theircalculus. I expresslystated that I crewmenhave done. In otherwords, he constructedthe decision matrix describing sees thegods' decisionto cooperatewith the crewmen'schoice situation "directly himas independentof themen's action. out of thealternatives and consequences This conclusionis confirmedby Zeus's as theyare formulatedin the text"(p. responsein the sequel. For Zeus takes 496). Thus Grafstein'squarrel is really Helios' threatseriously. He urgesHelios withEurylochos and therest of the crew- not to departand promiseshim in ex- men,who all assentto Eurylochos' formu- changethat he will punishthe Ithakans lationof theproblem. The realproblem, immediatelyby hurlinga thunderboltto however,is thatGrafstein fails to grasp splittheir ship into little pieces. It is final- the significanceof thisassent. He con- ly Helios' threat,not the crewmen's sidersthe crewmen's assent merely a tac- sacrilege,that invokes Zeus's punishment ticalblunder. As a result,he holdsthat (see Odyssey12.382-88). "the crew could reveal theirpreference By Grafstein'sown admission,the butnot their reverence"-as if the matter demonstrationofindependence suffices to of theirreverence remains unsettled. I underminehis objectionto the use of maintained,however, that it is precisely strategicdominance of thiscase. But a the crewmen'sassent to Eurylochos' miracleintervenes. From the ashes of characterizationof theirdecision prob- Know-Nothingismconcerning the plain lem,as beingamenable to commensura- speechof Helios and Zeus therearises a tion in the firstplace, that testifies veritablephoenix among decision theo- conclusivelyto theirculpable irreverence. rists.Grafstein rehearses at length(and The crewmenerr in treatingthe divine withfull apparatus criticus) his misgivings sanctionof Helios' cattle as thoughit were with the scholarly literature on simplya signalof the price charged by the Newcomb'sProblem. If Grafstein is more gods for Thrinakianroast beef. They interestedin.Newcomb's Problem than he carelesslytransgress the limits imposed by is in Homer'sOdyssey, that is, ofcourse, the sacred upon rationalcommensura- his privilege.But if in oppositionto my tion. This rationalisticcast of mind, argumenthe means to assertthe relevance whichrecognizes no boundsto commen- of Newcomb'sProblem (with its inherent surationand thusholds nothing sacred, is violationof theindependence condition) whatHomer condemns as reckless.

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Commensurability But whatis new in this?I alreadymade thispoint in referenceto Achilles'prefer- In a thirdattempt to establishhis thesis, ence for the most miserableof human Grafsteinopposes my observationthat lives over being king of the dead: commensurationis central to modernas "Achilles' preference,like all lex- well as classicalconceptions of reason. icographicorderings, does not violate Althoughhe has no quarrelwith the ac- transitivity.Lexicographic preferences are curacyof this observation as itbears upon rational in this purely ordinal sense, ancientthinkers, he is vehementin his though they preclude rational com- denialof itsvalidity for modern decision parisonsin themore meaningful sense of theorists.His argument,however, sup- reasonas commensuration"(p. 507). One ports neitherthe denial nor its vehe- may indeedsay that"rational thinking" mence.For I agreethat the "assumption of about the worldremains possible apart commensurability"is questioned by some from commensurability,if one is in- of themost thoughtful decision theorists. terestedin maintaininga thesisat all The problemis that Grafsteinmiscon- costs.But it shouldgive us pause to note struesthe point of theirquestioning. He thatthe cost paid for this stipulation is by mistakenlysupposes that it somehow con- no meansinsubstantial; "thinking" is now cernswhether commensuration is, in fact, to be understoodas restrictedto checks the characteristicmodus operandi of fortransitivity or consistency. As against reason. He has confused what the my observationthat commensuration is "assumption of commensurability" thehallmark of reason,this view would means.The authorshe citesdo not, in implythat the enforcement ofconsistency fact,deny the role of commensurationin is reason's characteristicfunction. In reason but only whetherall objectsof short,it seems to me that Grafstein's humanchoice should be assumedto be defenseof rationalismrests, ironically, commensurable.In other words, the upona conceptionof reason that does not authorsGrafstein cites are pointingout givereason its due credit.I holdreason in the fallacy of imposinga scheme of higheresteem, notwithstanding my criti- commensurationupon mattersthat are cismof rationalism. notamenable to commensuration.In this respectthese decision theorists are to be applauded for avoiding preciselythe Revelation recklessnessfor which Homer blames Odysseus' crewmen. I accordingly Grafsteinin a finalparagraph elabo- creditedElster (1979, 125) and othersfor rateshis contention that "even if the ver- acceptingthe existence of incommensur- dict against rationalismis nonetheless ability"as defininglimits to theirrational- true,this does not by itselfjustify the choicetheory of politics" (p. 508). endorsementof revelationas a higheror Grafsteincounters by pointing out that supplementarymeans to wisdom."He incommensurabilitydoes not "imply notesthat claims about the sacred should limitson rational thinkingabout the not be acceptedas true "just because world."His argumentis thatchoice with- reason is unable to prove or disprove out commensurabilityis not irrational. them."I heartilyagree. Moreover, if this Now ifone stipulates a different, and con- is whatGrafstein means by "automatic," siderablyscaled down, conception of ra- thenhis assertionthat revelation is "no tionalityfrom the one I arguedfor in my automaticantidote to the real limitsof essay,it wouldindeed follow that choice reason"strikes me as singularlyuncon- withoutcommensuration is not irrational. troversial.Who, really,would disagree?

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Whythis failure, then, to joinany serious Homer'saudience, the quintessential man issue? The problemis thatGrafstein is of reason.Thus the veryfact that it is operatinghere with a surprisinglycrude Odysseuswho acknowledges the limits of notionof revelation. Consider his coup de commensurationstands as an impressive, grace, the contentionthat sciencepro- thoughadmittedly not a conclusive,argu- vides a betteraccount of creationthan mentfor the existence of theselimits. It does revelation.Note thatin promoting would be as wrong,however, to close thiscontest, Grafstein assumes without one's mindto the impressivenessof this argument(1) that the questions that argumentas it wouldbe to supposethat scienceseeks to answerare thesame as it, taken alone, is conclusive.In this thosetoward which biblical revelation is spirit,and with the tools of decision directed,and (2) thatthe interpretation of theory,I recounted the story of Odysseus Scripturethat he findsantagonistic to as the Homericcase of (to paraphrase scienceis thecorrect interpretation. There Hume)a thinker"turning the weapons of is amplereason, it seems to me,to dispute reasonagainst the rationalists." I hoped as theseassumptions. Grafstein's view of the well to warnagainst the self-destructive oppositionbetween science and faithpre- rationalistictendencies present in our own supposesa degreeof convergenceof pur- commercialrepublic. But, in the last pose thatsimply does not exist.Broadly analysis,it mustbe admittedthat what speaking,modern science aims at predic- Homertaught and what we findbeneficial tionand control;while faith, it may be arenot, for these reasons alone, to be cer- said, is directedtoward discerning God's tifiedas true(though once again the evi- providenceand will. This differencein denceis impressive).Nevertheless, I con- purposeshould be keptin mind in anyat- siderthe truth of Homer's teaching-once tempt-to pit modernscience against the we correctlygrasp what that teaching Bible.Besides, even the most literal read- is-to be themost important question. It ingof Genesisneed not conclude, against is all themore regrettable, therefore, that the scientificallyestablished geological Grafstein'scomments to not more suc- record,that all of creationtook place in cessfullyjoin thisissue. six solardays. After all, thesun was not itselfcreated until the fourth "day." Thus DARRELLDOBBS themeaning of "creationday" in Genesis Marquette University is unclearand requiresinterpretation, an interpretationobviously different from References the one presupposed in Grafstein's account. Brams, Steven J. 1976. Paradoxes in Politics. New I willresist the temptation to delvefur- York: Free Press. Chipman,John S. 1960. The Foundationsof Utility. therinto the serious issues to whichGraf- Econometrica28:193-224. stein'sconcluding remarks merely nod a Dobbs, Darrell. 1987. Reckless Rationalism and distantgreeting. My essay,after all, is an Heroic Reverence in Homer's Odyssey. interpretationof the Odyssey,not the AmericanPolitical Science Review 81:491-508. Bible. I suggestedthat a revelation,or Elster, Jon. 1979. Ulysses and the Sirens. Cam- bridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. noeticinsight, brings about a decisive Frydman,Roman, Gerald O'Driscoll, and Andrew change of heart in Odysseus. Homer Schotter.1982. RationalExpectations of Govern- presentsthis change of heart and the ment Policy: An Application of Newcomb's reverencethat accompaniesit as the Problem. Southern Journal of Economics 42: 311-19. criticalfactor in Odysseus'heroic return Goodman, Nelson. 1965. Fact, Fiction, and Fore- to home and throne. Nevertheless, cast. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Odysseusremains for Homer,and for Grafstein,Robert. 1983. The Social ScientificInter-

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pretationof Game Theory. Erkenntnis20:27-47. Rothenberg,Jerome. 1961. The Measurement of Jeffrey,Richard C. 1983. The Logic of Decision. Social Welfare.Englewood Cliffs,NJ: Prentice- Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press. Hall. Levi, Isaac. 1975. Newcomb's Many Problems. Skyrms,Brian. 1980. Causal Necessity.New Haven: Theoryand Decision 6:161-75. Yale UniversityPress. Levi, Isaac. 1980. The Enterpriseof Knowledge. Taylor, Michael. 1973. The Problem of Salience in Cambridge:MIT Press. the Theory of Collective Decision-Making. In Luce, RobertDuncan, and David H. Krantz. 1971. MathematicalApproaches to Politics, ed. Hay- Conditional ExpectedUtility. Econometrica 39: ward R. Alker, Jr.,Karl W. Deutsch, and An- 253-71. toine H. Stoetzel. Amsterdam:Elsevier. Quine, Willard V. 1976. The Ways of Paradox. Von Neumann,John, and Oskar Morgenstern.1953. Cambridge:Harvard UniversityPress. Theoryof Games and EconomicBehavior. New Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cam- York: JohnWiley. brige: Harvard UniversityPress.

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