Homeric Morality
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HOMERIC MORALITY by Naoko Yamagata A thesis submitted to the University of London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University College London Gower Street London WC1E 6BT April 1990 ProQuest Number: 10797741 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10797741 Published by ProQuest LLC(2018). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 TO IAN AND MY PARENTS 2 A bstract This thesis is an attempt to answer two questions on Homeric morality. One is whether the Homeric gods are concerned with ’justice’ in human society and another is what mechanism controls the social behaviour of Homeric man. Observation of human and divine behaviour, and lexical examination of terms which are considered to reflect some moral ideas, are the main grounds of argument. Part I mainly deals with the problem of morality, or rather immorality/amorality, of the gods. Part II concentrates on the morality of Homeric man. In Part I, it is shown that the gods distribute good and bad fortune to men not in response to their moral behaviour, but as required by fate, and therefore do not function as the guardians of justice in the human world. Men, however, believe that the gods are concerned with human morality. Part II describes various forces and motivations that affect human behaviour, such as fate, honour, revenge, shame, respect and pity. It is shown that human behaviour is restrained not only by man's faith in the moral gods, but by an assortment of many different forces, social and emotional. 3 Table of contents Introduction 7 Part I Morality of the Homeric gods Chapter 1 Moral functions attributed to the gods Zeus and other gods 1 2 Zeus Xeinios 1 3 Zeus Hiketesios 2 0 Zeus Horkios 2 3 Protection of the dead 2 7 Zeus , 8( kt) and 3 1 Murder and adultery 3 5 Chapter 2 The fall of Troy Paris and Helen 3 8 The Olympian scenario 4 0 The plan of Zeus 4 2 Troy in its ’historical' context 4 5 Chapter 3 The death of the suitors Crimes of the suitors 4 7 Why does Odysseus kill the suitors? 5 0 Zeus' attitude towards human sufferings 5 2 Athena and Odysseus. 5 6 Chapter 4 Phoenix's allegory Supplications in the I lia d 6 5 Phoenix’s speech 7 2 drrj in Homer 7 8 Conclusion 8 7 Chapter 5 The rainstorm of Zeus — 8Ckt) and Odfii? SCkt) in Homer 9 4 4 fle'/iiS' in Homer 1 09 S l k t j and fleets' in Homer 116 SCtcTf and in Hesiod 118 Homer and Hesiod 130 Chpater 6 Divine anger and morality Divine rtprj 137 Divine nepotism and favouritism 140 poCpa and divine anger 142 Part II Morality of Homeric man Chapter 7 Fate, gods, and men po ip a and the cognate words 150 lidpo? in Homer 15 9 The gods and poCpa 1 6 4 a t era and the cognate words 165 Conclusion 170 Chapter 8 Honour and revenge TlpLTj 17 2 Honour as observed in the usage of riprf, npdcj, tl'co, etc. The gods and rCpLTf 173 Men and ripLij 180 Revenge, recompense and penalty as observed in the usage of Turns', t(vo), rCvvpai^Xz. 1 96 Chapter 9 Forces that restrain human behaviour Divine punishment 205 211 aLSofc 2 2 0 2 4 5 £\eo? 2 4 8 Chapter 10 Good and bad 5 dperrj 260 dyadd? 2 6 5 £<rd\ d? 271 d[i€LV(dv and dpeCuv 2 81 (Spurro? 2 85 dpLcrrevs' 293 dfLovEtio 293 Kaicd? applied topersons 294 KaKdv and kokc! as neuter nouns 299 KCtxdv 3 00 Kcucd 3 03 KaKd s* applied to objects 3 06 KOk6tT£ 311 KCLKU& 3 12 Kcucdo) 312 Conclusion 313 Chapter 11 Seemly and unseemly Kakds 3 1 9 alcrxpd? 3 29 Conclusion 3 3 7 Acknowledgements 3 45 Bibliography 3 48 Back-pocket content The Apostrophe in Homer as Part of the Oral Technique' in the Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 35 (1989) 91-103. 6 Introduction This thesis is an attempt to answer two questions on Homeric morality. One is whether the Homeric gods are concerned with ’justice’ in human society (this question inevitably calls for the definition of ’justice’ in Homer which is dealt with in Chapter 5) and another is what mechanism controls social behaviour of Homeric man. Although this work falls into two parts and each part mainly deals with either of the questions, the two parts are closely connected and have many overlapping elements. While pursuing these questions, I have examined a number of passages from the I lia d and the Odyssey to form my own views of specific problems first, and then to compare them with my predecessors' views most often in footnotes. Although my discoveries are mostly nothing other than rediscoveries of my predecessors’ discoveries, I have been able to take advantage of a dissertation solely devoted to these questions which has allowed me to discuss some major problems in the subject at a greater length than they have. By presenting and discussing all relevant passages in each problem, I have striven to give firmer grounds for supporting or criticizing their views which are often only briefly touched upon or based upon a highly selective collection of evidence. How far I am successful in reinforcing, modifying, refuting or coordinating traditional views of traditional problems is for the readers to judge. 'Morality', of course, is a very general term and may require definition. In this work, I use the terms 'morality' and ’moral’ rather loosely, in reference to the way men and gods behave in their dealings with others at one time, and at another in reference 7 to their system of values by which they define what they should or should not do. Some readers may complain at this point that by defining the terms this way, I have already taken a stance against B. Snell and his followers who do not think Homeric man is capable of consciously choosing whether to behave in one way or another. Snell says:1 ... Homer's man does not yet regard himself as the source of his own decisions; that development is reserved for tra g e d y . Homer lacks a knowledge of the spontaneity of the human mind; he does not realize that decisions of the will, or any impulses or emotions, have their origin in man himself. What is true of the events in the epic holds also for the feelings, the thoughts and the wishes of the characters: they are inextricably linked with the gods. I will be the last to deny that there is much truth in his statement. I have even produced a good example of divine control of the human mind in Chapter 3 where I describe Athena's total control of the behaviour and psychology of Penelope and her suitors. However, this is a view from above, from the view-point of the gods, the poet or his audience/readers. Homeric men themselves will, though they probably think that the gods are ultimately responsible for everything, seek revenge or ask a compensation from the person who has harmed them himself instead of the gods — they will never dream of suing the gods for the damage done by any 1 The Discovery of the Mind (tr. T. G. Rosenmeyer, Oxford 1953), p. 31. 8 human beings. Although I am not getting into the problem of 'free will' except in passing, I believe that I have made it sufficiently clear that Homeric man is expected by his society to be capable of abiding by certain social codes and, in failing that, is regarded as responsible for the consequences. I have tried to describe what fulfils the functions of our conscience in Homeric / [( man, namely, what restrains him from anti-social behaviour. Whether it is conceived as an external or internal force is not a matter of my chief concern. However, I must point out that certain human feelings, such as a i’Sco' s* and e'Aeos*, are never explicitly described as a result of divine intervention (cf. Chapter 9). Therefore I have some reservation in accepting Snell's statement that Homer completely lacks a knowledge of the spontaneity of the human mind. Finally, the term 'we' may also require definition, because when I say 'we', someone may complain that I have not been brought up in the Western system of moral values and therefore, strictly speaking, I cannot identify 'my' views with those of Westerners, the most likely readers of this work because of the language in which it is written. Again, I use the term in a rather loose way. By 'we', I sometimes mean 'we who are familiar with English/a Western language' when I talk about English/Western expressions or conventions. At other times, I mean 'we readers of Homer' or 'we human beings in general' with no strong association with a specific culture or time. But most of the time when I say 'we', I do not mean 'we Westerners’, or 'we Orientals', or 'we classicists', but 'we citizens of the modern world in which a global consensus is gradually being formed on the matter of what is just and what is unjust under direct and indirect, crossed 9 influence of major religions, philosophy and science, and through shared experience of sufferings and prosperity’.