The Rise of Economic Nationalism, the Case of Norway, 1814-1940
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Pål Thonstad Sandvik, Work in progress EBHA 2011, SESSION 21: ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND BUSINESS IN SMALL COUNTRIES THE RISE OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM, THE CASE OF NORWAY, 1814-1940 Nationalism and modern capitalism emerged at roughly the same time. There is a vast literature on both subjects, but little research linking them. Few economic and business historians have paid much attention to economic nationalism. Similarly, scholars working on nationalism have seldom focused on its economic and business content. Yet nationalism has often had a crucial impact on the economic development of countries and on business life. There are several reasons why economic nationalism hasn‟t been more thoroughly explored. For Marxists, nationalism (and economic nationalism) is simply a cover or a distraction, for the real plot of history is about the development of productive forces and class conflicts. Furthermore, during the era of globalization, many observers have regarded economic nationalism as a relic, which can only hinder world trade and development. The economist Harry G. Johnson summed up this latter viewpoint very clearly when he claimed a bit dismissingly that countries – by following economic nationalism – attained “psychological income” at “the expense of material income.”1 This paper approaches the subject economic nationalism from a different angle. Firstly: It is based on the firm belief that nationalism is a part of the main “plot of history”, perhaps especially so in many late developed, peripheral countries. Secondly: What Johnson calls psychological income may in fact help generate material income, or at least influence how this income is generated, not just destroy it. Economic nationalism may – as nationalism itself – be utterly destructive or benign. The point of departure is the research of the late Czech historian Miroslav Hroch. He argued that nationalism often had an emancipatory content.2 Nationalism helped countries to achieve independence and to build cohesive states. The American scholar Gregory Jusdanis has followed this line of reasoning. In many societies nationalism was a vehicle for modernisation. Jusdanis claims that “nationalism is born out of a theory of progress and that nationalists appropriate culture in their projects of modernization”. <…> “a significant impulse for the emergence of nationalism has been the discovery by intellectual and political 1 Quoted after Jan Kofman, “How to define economic nationalism?” in Henryk Szlajfer (ed.), Economic Nationalism in East Central Europe and Central America 1918-1939, Librairie Droz, Geneva, p. 46. See also Harry G. Johnson, Economic Nationalism in Old and New States, Univ. of Chicago Press 1967. 2 Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, Cambridge 1985. 1 elites of the tardiness of their societies. Nationalism is therefore in part a response to a condition of belatedness.”3 Nationalism was thus a driving force in the modernisation of many late developed countries. Liah Greenfeld has taken these viewpoints much further. She has turned the tables on conventional wisdom by making modernization a product of nationalism, rather than vice versa. Greenfeld seeks to answer three questions: what caused the emergence of the modern economy, what made the economic sphere so dominant; and what are the reasons for sustained economic growth? She has done case studies on the British, Dutch, German, Japanese and American development. Her fundamental proposition is that nationalism – from the 16th century onwards – was responsible for the reorientation of economic activity toward growth. She claims in fact that “the spirit of capitalism was born as economic nationalism.”4 This paper has a more modest aim, namely to examine the emergence of Norwegian economic nationalism 1814-1940 and – as far as possible – review its effects on the country‟s economic and business development. There has not been undertaken any systematic research on Western European economic nationalism. Such case studies may enhance our understanding of the evolution of national business systems and the “varieties of capitalism”. The term economic nationalism is used in a wide sense in this paper. It covers all nationalist inspired politics that have aimed at protecting as well as expanding national wealth. The term is not only used in the protectionist or beggar-thy-neighbour sense which the concept is often used, but it also includes progressive modernisation and nation building policies. This approach is much in line with recent scholarship. In his discussion of the historic contents of economic nationalism Eric Helleiner includes all economic policies that help nations obtain “prosperity, civilisation and power.”5 The means to achieve these ends have varied from country to country and over time. One can therefore find several different strands of economic nationalism, ranging from autarchic policies to support for liberal economic policies. The paper is structured in the following way. It starts with a short description of Norwegian politics, economy and nationalism. In the main part we‟ll explore the manifestation of economic nationalism in four policy areas, namely the establishment of the monetary system, railway policy, tariffs and rules on foreign ownership of natural resources. 3 Gregory Jusdanis, The Necessary Nation, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2001, p. 7. 4 Liah Greenfeld, The Spirit of Capitalism, Nationalism and Economic Growth, Harvard University Press 2001, p. 107. See also Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism, five roads to modernity, Harvard University Press 1992. 5 Eric Helleiner, “Economic Nationalism as a Challenge to Economic Liberalism? Lessons from the 19th Century”, International Studies Quarterly, 2002, 46 (3), p. 322-327. George Crane, “Economic Nationalism, Bringing the Nation back in”, Millennium 1998, 27 (1), p. 55-76. 2 In the end we‟ll briefly sum up and discuss our findings and assumptions. A gentle warning should be added, as this is an early stage working paper not all assumptions are backed up by hard facts. A lot of archival work remains to be done. Norway, a new state in the European periphery Compared to Denmark, Sweden or Great Britain, Norway is a new state. It was (re)established only in 1814, more or less as an historical accident of the Napoleonic wars. Norway enjoyed a short independence as a fully sovereign state in 1814 and adopted a liberal and democratic Constitution. She was forced in August that year to enter into a loose union with Sweden as a junior partner. At the beginning of the 19th century Norway had around 900.000 inhabitants. GNP per capita was probably somewhat lower than in Denmark and markedly lower than in the Netherlands and Great Britain. Norwegian economic growth was quite rapid until ca. 1875, but according to Angus Maddison, GNP per capita was still only half that of Great Britain.6 Norway was a quite egalitarian country as she lacked a land-owning aristocracy as well as numerous merchant class. Compared to Denmark and the Netherlands, agriculture was underdeveloped as well as constrained by climatic conditions. However, Western and Northern Norway had rich fisheries. The Eastern part of the country ran a flourishing timber trade and produced some iron and glass for export. Shipping and maritime services also played an important role in the Norwegian economy, especially in the Southern parts of the country. The Swedish-Norwegian union lasted till 1905 when it was peacefully dissolved. During most of this time period the two countries had a quite harmonious relationship. They had the same king (who resided in Sweden) and followed a joint foreign policy. Apart from that Norway was to a large extent de-facto independent with its own constitution, parliament, government, army etc. The king exerted considerable personal power up till the 1830s, by the 1890s this power was very much reduced. As Øystein Sørensen has shown in his works, Norwegian nationalism was rather peaceful, liberal and democratic. Norwegian nationalists have by and large looked upon their 6 Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD 2003, p. 61. 3 neighbouring countries primarily as partners and Scandinavian relatives, and not as foes.7 However, they did have an inferiority complex towards Denmark and Sweden. It should also be said that Norwegian nationalism has been somewhat stronger on the left side of the political spectrum than among conservatives. Opinions differ on how strong Norwegian patriotism was prior to 1814.8 However, there is no doubt that it was strengthened or vitalised by the political upheavals that year. In the first two decades after 1814 Norwegian independence and state institutions were somewhat precarious. Nationalism was the cohesive force that held the new state together, gave her legitimacy and protected her against royal (and Swedish) encroaches of her sovereignty. The most prominent 19th century Norwegian nationalists were poets, historians, priest and philologists, seldom economists or businesspeople. The nationalists focused on Norway‟s allegedly heroic past, on symbols like the national flag and coat of arms and they debated intensely the thorny question of how to construct a new Norwegian language (instead of Danish). In most nationalist circles conjugating verbs was a bigger issue than economic policy. Yet, from the early years onwards, economic nationalism played a vital role in securing the independence and survival of the new kingdom. The emergence of Norwegian economic nationalism In 1814, the newly created Norwegian state had a weak financial basis and the monetary system was in full disarray after years of war and conflict. In the following decade the establishment of a viable domestic monetary system with a central bank became a key aim for Norwegian politicians eager to safeguard national independence. The alternative was increased economic and political amalgamation of the twin kingdoms Sweden and Norway.9 After a rapid inflation during wartime and the first post-war years the Bank of Norway (established 1816) pursued a deflationary policy in order to regain the par silver value of the 7 Øystein Sørensen, Kampen om Norges sjel 1770-1905, Norsk Idéhistorie bd.