The Emergence 01 a Birurcatea Ottoman Bourgeoisie
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Rise or me Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire This page intentionally left blank Rise or the Bourgeoisie, Demise or Empire Ottoman Westernization and Social Change Fatma Miige Go§eJ2 New York Oxrord OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1996 Oxford University Press Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Kuala Lumpur Singapore Hong Kong Tokyo Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town Melbourne Auckland and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1996 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gocek, Fatma Miige. Rise of the bourgeoisie, demise of empire : Ottoman westernization and social change / Fatma Miige Gocek. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-509925-7 1. Social change—Turkey. 2. Middle class—Turkey—History. 3. Turkey—History—Ottoman Empire, 1288-1918. I. Title. HN656.5.A8G63 1995 306'. 09561—dc20 95-10331 135798642 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Acknowle dgfments This book is the end product of a long search into the origins of social change in one contemporary non-Western society, namely, Turkey. My interest in these origins led me back into Ottoman history, specifically, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, during my undergraduate and master's years in the sociology department at Bosphorus Univer- sity, Istanbul. Among my many valuable friends and teachers, I am most indebted to Faruk Birtek for teaching me sociological analysis, to §erif Mardin and Ilkay Sunar for introduc- ing me to the intricacies of historical sociology. I owe my interest in Ottoman history to Murat Cizakga, Mehmet Gene,, and Heath Lowry. I thank them all for their support and enthusiasm. The sociology department and the Near Eastern Studies program at Princeton Univer- sity greatly contributed to my intellectual development. I am grateful to Bernard Lewis, Suzanne Keller, and Bob Wuthnow, who were most generous with their time and attention in directing my dissertation, upon which the empirical research for this book is based. I benefited from long discussions with many friends, in particular Cemal Kafadar, Shaun Marmon, Paula Sanders, Amy Singer, Leslie Peirce, Matthew Price, and Niliifer isvan. I completed the transformation of the dissertation into a book in the congenial and stimulating intellectual environment of the University of Michigan's sociology depart- ment, which I joined as a faculty member. The year I spent at the university's Institute for the Humanities was very significant in that it gave me the time to reflect on some of my theoretical formulations. Many of my colleagues patiently listened while I elaborated endlessly on the many problems of the Ottoman social transformation. I would like to thank, in particular, the members of our sociology reading group—Julia Adams, Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Howard Kimeldorf, Rick Lempert, Mark Mizruchi, Jeff Paige, and Sonya Rose—for their invaluable comments. I am particularly grateful to Jeff Paige who pro- vided constant support and encouragement through all the manuscript drafts. Bill Sewell, Ron Suny, and Geoff Eley were very influential in the development of my ideas. The archival work for this book required the mastery of the Ottoman language. Had it not been for the wonderful guidance and support of Halil inalcik, I would not have been able to decipher and understand the Ottoman documents I worked with. I am indebted to him and to Mehmet Gen$ for generously sharing their vast knowledge of Ottoman history; they helped me see the patterns behind the hundreds of archival documents I based my analysis on. I worked in three Ottoman archives: the Prime Minister's Archives, the Topkapi Palace Archives, and the Archives of the Office of Islamic Religious Ruling. I vi Acknowledgments would like to thank the administrators who helped me, particularly Ulkii Altindag, Filiz (gagman, Veli Tola, Abdiilaziz Baymdir and Omer Ozkan. In preparing the final version of this book, I wish to acknowledge, with deep appre- ciation, the support of Bernard Lewis and Jeff Paige. Always demonstrating in deed as well as in thought what it means to be a true scholar and mentor, Bernard Lewis read the final two drafts with utmost care and insight. Jeff Paige provided me with invaluable guidance in elucidating and articulating my sociological arguments; he also suggested the title of this book. Their feedback, as well as that of the two anonymous readers designated by Oxford University Press, greatly improved the final version of this book. All the imperfections that remain are unquestionably mine. Lastly, I would like to thank Gioia Stevens, my editor at Oxford, for her support and encouragement; Henry Krawitz, my associate editor, for his careful oversight of the editorial and production process; and my freelance copy editor, Marian Schwartz, for her excellent editing. It is with deep gratitude that this book is dedicated to the one person who, from the beginning, shared the delights and the strains of my work and supported me without reservation: my husband, Charles Hammerslough. Contents Introduction: Class Formation and the Ottoman Empire, 3 1 Ottoman Structure, Social Groups, and Westernization, 20 2 War, Ottoman Officials, and Western Institutions: Rise of the Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie, 44 3 Trade, Ottoman Merchants, and Western Goods: Rise of the Commercial Bourgeoisie, 87 4 "Civilization," Ottoman Intellectuals, and Western Ideas: Polarization Within the Bourgeoisie, 117 Conclusion: The Emergence of a Bifurcated Ottoman Bourgeoisie, 138 Appendix, 143 Notes, 145 References, 185 Index, 209 This page intentionally left blank Rise of tne Bourgeoisie, Demise or Empire This page intentionally left blank Introduction: Class Formation and the Ottoman Empire The Ottoman state evolved from an Anatolian frontier principality in 1299 to become a world empire extending from Eastern Europe and the Arabian peninsula to North Africa in the sixteenth century; it gradually receded before disappearing in 1922, when, on its central lands, the Turkish nation-state emerged. How and why did the Ottoman empire decline, eventually to be replaced by the Turkish nation-state? The argument that follows focuses on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Ottoman wars and commerce with the West interacted with the existing social structure to create a segmented bourgeois class formation. It contends that this segmentation of the Ottoman bourgeoisie, dividing into its commercial and bureaucratic class fragments, accounted for the decline of the Ottoman empire. More specifically, it argues that the effects of war, commerce, and the Enlightenment concept of "civilization" shaped the parameters of Ottoman social change. The response of the Ottoman sultan, also shaped by these parameters, was cast within the context of Ottoman Westernization and deeply influenced by the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century adoption of Western goods, institutions, and ideas. The sultan increased efforts at confis- cation as a means of control and introduced Western-style education to train a new social group loyal to his person. Yet his actions produced the unintended consequence of trans- forming three Ottoman social groups—merchants, officials, and intellectuals—into an emergent bourgeoisie segmented along religious and ethnic lines. In time, the bureaucratic element of this segmented bourgeoisie obliterated the commercial minority bourgeoisie, leading to the formation of the nation-state. As the Turkish nation-state consolidated itself at the expense of the bourgeoisie, Turkey was relegated to the margins of the world economic and political order. Social Change Analyses of Non-Western Societies Karl Marx's words of caution about the universalization of social change models is an appropriate starting point for critically analyzing theories of social change as they are applied to non-Western societies. Marx, who provided sociology with one of its most analytically rigorous paradigms of social change, stated: 3 4 Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire [T]o change my sketch of the origin of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico- philosophical theory of a Universal Progress, fatally imposed on all peoples, regardless of the historical circumstances in which they find themselves, ending finally in that economic system, which assures both the greatest amount of productive power of social labor and the fullest development of man ... is to do me both too much honor and too much discredit. (Wada 1983:59) Yet few have heeded Marx's caution. The often uncritical application of social change based on the Western European experience to non-Western societies lays bare certain problematic assumptions embedded in them. In particular, most extant theorizing on social change defines two factors—the West and the bourgeoisie—as the source or instigator of change. If and when these factors are absent in non-Western contexts, social change often appears incomplete, nonexistent, or only externally introduced by the West, and narratives often become predicated on the "chaotic" and/or "static" nature of the non-West. For some, this has led to totally abandoning