UNIVERSITY OF LONDON ROYAL HOLLOWAY AND BEDFORD COLLEGE HISTORY DEPARTMENT PhD Thesis

CLASHES OF AGENCIES FORMATION AND FAILURE OF EARLY KURDISH NATIONALISM 1918-1922

By Süleyman Azad Aslan

1 Abstract

This work analyses the question of why the Kurds failed to establish their own nation- state in the aftermath of the First World War. It looks at two interconnected issues, the formation of Kurdish nationalism and the failure of the early Kurdish nationalists to establish an independent Kurdish entity. These issues have been discussed within the framework of local, regional and international political developments. The thesis argues that the beginning of Kurdish nationalism corresponded to a specific historical period, in effect, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire at the end of WWI. This study rejects the prevailing classification of Kurdish nationalism existent prior to

WWI. It attributes the failure of the early Kurdish nationalism to agencies rather than social structures. Agency is defined as the total goal-oriented activities of a group or a state for specific political objectives. Structure is defined as historically accumulated social and economic foundations, in the case of the Kurds, tribalism, pastoral economy etc. From this perspective the study examines the respective roles played by the Kurdish nationalists, the Kemalists and the British and other Great Powers‘ imperial policies at this particular period. Struggles between these agencies paved the way for the failure of the early Kurdish nationalists and the division of Ottoman

Kurdistan into three regions. The role of structure has been treated as a complementary rather than a determinant factor behind the Kurdish nationalists‘ failure. In stressing the role of agency the thesis scrutinizes the ideas, discourses, and activities of the leading Kurdish intellectuals and nationalists from 1898 to 1922 through their publications, memoirs and the British official sources. The literature in

English lacks such a detailed examination of the early Kurdish nationalists, and in that sense, this study fills a gap.

2 Table of Contents

Transliteration 5 Abbreviation 6 Acknowledgment 7-8

Introduction 9-30

1. Introductory Remarks 9 2. The Scope and Purpose of the Study 10-11 3. Discussion on the Formation of Kurdish nationalism 11-16 4. Modernist theory of Nation and Nationalism 16-22 5. Agency and Structure 22-25 6. National Identity and Kurdistan 25-27 7. Outline 27-28 8. Sources 29-30

Chapter I A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 31-83 1. The Kurds, Tribes and the State 31-38 1.1. Tribe and Nationalism 38-40 1.2. The Geography 40-42 2. Ottoman Policy in Kurdistan 42-56 3. From the Mid-19th Century up to WWI 57-65 3.1. The Establishment of Tribal Cavalry 65-71 4. First World War and Kurdistan 72-83

Chapter II KURDISH ENLIGHTENMENT, 1898-1914 84-120 1. The Kurdish Elite 86-104 1.1. New Generations 91-93 1.2. The Ulema 94-97 1.3. Tribal Chiefs 97-98 1.4. Intellectuals and Professionals 98-105 2. Cultural Enlightenment 105-120 2.1 The First Kurdish Associations 1908-1913 105-109 2.2 Kurdish Publications 1898-1914 109-110 2.3 Ottomanism and Identity 110-116 2.4 Education and Reform 117-120

Chapter III FORMATION OF EARLY KURDISH NATIONALISM 121-160 1. Political Formation 123-143 1.1 Formation of the KTJ 123-136 1.2 Division of the KTJ 136-140 1.3 Teşkilat-i Ictimai Jamiyati 141-143 2. Discursive Kurdish Nationalism 143-160 2.1 History and Language 144-146 2.2 Mythology and National Days 146-148 2.3 Culture and Tradition 149-150

3 2.4 Gender 150-152 2.5 Westernization, Modernity, and Progress 152-160

Chapter IV KEMALISM 161-204 1. The Rise of Kemalist Movement 164-179 1.1 Prelude to Kemalism: Young Turks 167-175 1.2 The End of the War and Coming of Mustafa Kemal 176-179 2. The Resistance Movement 179-197 2.1 Composition of the Resistance Movement 179-184 2.2 The Formation and Development of the Resistance Movement 184-189 2.3 Was the Resistance Movement a 'War of Liberation/Independence 189-198 3. The Kemalist Movement's Kurdish Policy, 1919-1922 198-204

Chapter V FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF KURDISH NATIONALISM 205-250 1. Kurdish Nationalism Prior to Koçgiri 206-225 1.1 The Noel Mission 211-221 1.2 The Sevres Treaty 221-225 2. Koçgiri National Movement 225-246 2.1 The Road to Uprising 226-227 2.2 The Koçgiri Uprising 227-235 2.3 Following the Defeat 235-236 2.4 Discussion in the Character of the Koçgiri Movement 237-241 3. Reasons behind the Failure 241-246 4. Post-Koçgiri Period 246-250

Chapter VI GREAT BRITAIN AND KURDISTAN 251-304 1. First World War Agreements 252-263 2. Britain in Kurdistan 1918-1920 263-293 2.1 British Policy in Southern Kurdistan 263-269 2.2 Sheikh Mahmut's First Revolt 269-275 2.3 The Inter-departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs 275-281 2.4 From the Cairo Conference to the Lausanne Treaty 281-293 3. Britain, Kurdistan and Oil 293-295 4. The Bolshevik Revolution 295-297 5. France and Britain on the Revision of the Treaty of Sevres 297-304

Conclusion 305-318 Appendixes 319-325 Map 326-331 Endnotes 332-355 Bibliography 356-371

4 Transliteration

The thesis follows the transliteration system of the International Journal of Middle

East Studies (IJMES). Diacritical marks are used only on italicized technical terms.

Macrons and dots are not added to personal names, place names, names of political parties, or titles of books. For Ottoman Turkish modern Turkish orthography has generally been used in transcribing Turkish or Kurdish names, place names, journals and books titles. The pronunciation of the following Turkish letters used in this study should be noted: c – j as in jam ç – as in Churchill ö – French eu as in deux ş – sh as on shall ü – French u as in lumiere

'i' without the dot and 'ğ' have been discarded as printing hazards.

Names of people and places that possess a Europeanized version are not transliterated, e.g. Basra, Suez. Terms found in a good English dictionary are not transliterated nor italicized, e.g. ulema, qadi, madrasa, jihad, pasha.

5 Abbreviation

BNA British National Archives CAB Cabinet Files CO Colonial Office CUP Committee of Union and Progress FO Foreign Office HMBG His Majesty's British Government KJ Kurdistan Jamiyeti (Kurdistan Society) KMF Kurd Milli Firkasi (Kurdish National Party) KNMJ Kurd Neşr-i Maarif Jamiyeti (Society for the Propagation of Kurdish Education) KTTJ Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Jamiyeti (Society for the Rise and Progress of the Kurds) KTTG Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi (Rise and Progress Society Newspaper) KTJ Kurdistan Teali Jamiyeti (Society for the Rise of Kurdistan) KTIJ Kurd Teşkilat-i Içtimaiye Jamiyeti (Kurdish Social Organization Society) KTMNJ Kurd Tamin-i Maarif ve Neşriyat Jamiyati (Society for the Kurdish Education and Press) KKTJ Kurd Kadinlar Teali Jamiyati (Society for the Advancement of Kurdish Women) P.P Parliamentary Papers TBMM Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) TPC Turkish Petroleum Company WWI World War I

6 Acknowledgment

I am especially indebted to the supervisor of my PhD thesis at Royal Holloway,

University of London, Prof. Vanessa Martin, for her guidance, encouragement and understanding. Without her support this study would not be completed. I would like to thank my father, Mehmet Emin Aslan whose insightful criticism and moral support helped me to continue my research with a clear sense of direction. I would also like to thank the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, Nechirvan Barzani, who welcomed me to Kurdistan, where I have completed most of my writing of this thesis.

I owe special thanks to my dear friends, Lee Salter, Rolf Fraun, Djene Bajalan, Rebar

Jaf for their long and arduous support during the long process of my research and writing. Their moral, material, and linguistic support are deeply appreciated. I would also like to thank two of my ex-students at the University of Salahaddin, Vian

Mahmut Abdullah and Mohammed Amin for their translation of Kurdish periodicals into English from Sorani dialects. I am grateful to Beyar, PhD student at the

University of Mosul, who provided valuable materials for my study in Kurdistan.

I also wish to thank the staff of the following institutions whose assistance greatly facilitated my research: The library of School of Oriental and African Studies; the

British National Archives; the Kurdish Institute in Paris; France Central Library; the library of University of Salahaddin; the library of University of Duhok.

Finally, but not the least, I must thank my wife, Sara, for tolerating the intrusion of this thesis into our lives for the past three years. She took on more than her share of household and family duties in order to give me time to research and write. At times

7 she believed that the thesis would never be completed, particularly at stressful moments. Here it is, finally over.

8 INTRODUCTION

1. Introductory Remarks

Since the late 20th century, particularly following the First Gulf War in 1991, the

Kurdish issue has as a whole acquired an international character, and as a result has become a new subject of scholarly studies. At the root of the Kurdish national question today lie the political developments which took place during the period immediately following the First World War (WWI), mainly from 1918 to the commencement of negotiations leading to the Treaty of Lausanne. It is thus imperative to comprehend this particular period as the historical background to the

Kurdish national question, a background which affects four nation-states in the

Middle East, in effect, Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. This study is an attempt to provide the reader with this historical background.

As this study indicates, the first four years following the end of WWI were highly decisive years not only for the Kurds but for the other major ethnic groups of the region, namely, Turks and Arabs. It was in these years that the fate of Kurds, Arabs, and Turks were sealed, and inherited ethnic and religious problems emerged. In other words major problems and conflicts that exist in the Middle East today are mainly the result of political developments and decisions that unfolded in these particular years.

9 2. The Scope and Purpose of the Study

This study sets out to analyze two interconnected issues: the beginnings of Kurdish nationalism and the failure of the early Kurdish nationalists to establish an independent Kurdish state during the period following First World War, up until late

1922. This study focuses solely on Northern (Turkey Kurdistan) and Southern

Kurdistan (Iraqi Kurdistan) which had constituted a single part within the Ottoman

Empire. Despite the fact that Syrian Kurdistan was also part of Ottoman Kurdistan this work does not include it, mainly because Kurdish nationalism only emerged in

Syrian Kurdistan after the Lausanne Treaty. Fuccaro rightly argued that 'the growth of a national consciousness among Syrian Kurds depended on developments affecting

Kurds living in Turkey, as it was nurtured primarily among a community of Kurdish

émigrés who arrived in Syria from Turkey after 1925. The development of Kurdish nationalism in Syria is thus tightly linked to the extraordinary expansion of state nationalism.'1 Iranian Kurdistan has not been included in this study mainly because its impact on the general Kurdish national movement at that particular period was insignificant. This does not mean that there was no Kurdish national movement in

Iranian Kurdistan, there was Simko. Simko however, had very little impact on the formation of Kurdish nationalism, which had been taken shape in Istanbul, and only a minor impact on Great Power policies with regard to post-war settlements in the

Ottoman territories.

This study approaches the issue of the origin of Kurdish nationalism from a modernist theory of nationalism. Abbas Vali argued that

'although historical commentary on the origins of Kurdish nationalism

is indispensable to most contemporary writing on Kurdish politics and

10 culture, serious scholarship on the subject is scarce. The proliferation

of historical and political discourse on the Kurds since the Persian Gulf

War, within and outside Kurdistan, has done little to remedy this

fundamental deficiency. Recent writings on Kurdish history and

culture, with a few notable exceptions, have remained oblivious to the

theoretical reading and evaluation of the historical argument on the

origins and development of Kurdish nationalism.'2

This study intends to contribute to the theoretical debate on the origins of Kurdish nationalism through modernist theory of nationalism.

Another crucial aspect of this study is its approach both the origin of Kurdish nationalism, and the failure of the early Kurdish nationalists to establish a nation- state, by emphasizing the role of agency in making history. Hence, the dialectic relation between agency and structure has been employed to analyze the political formations and developments of Kurdish nationalism.

3. Discussion on the Formation of Kurdish nationalism

Any attempt to analyze the history of Kurdish nationalism inevitably must refer to the theories of nation and nationalism. The concept of nation and nationalism are far from easy to define. However, for the sake of simplicity, the myriad conflicting approaches to these concepts can broadly be divided into two main categories: primordialism and modernism.3 The essence of the debate between these two categories is about both the origin of the nation and the order of causality between nation and nationalism. For the priomordalist, nation is a historical entity that has existed since time immemorial.

11 Nation, thus, is not a product of modernity, but a historic entity that has developed over the centuries and has its origin in the mists of time. Thus nationalism is its vehicle for the realization of its historical rights to a national state. The modernist, on the other hand, holds that nation and nationalism are intrinsic to the nature of the modern world and to the revolution of modernity. In the modernist paradigm of nation and nationalism, in contrast to primordialism, the primacy of nationalism over the nation and national identity is a priority. In other words, the nation is an outcome, or an effect of nationalist politics—which politics itself is a modern phenomenon.

Between this dichotomy another choice is proposed by Anthony Smith, which he terms ‗ethno-symbolism‘ and which recognizes the modernity of the construction of nations, but also identifies the continuity of such nationalisms with earlier ethnic communities and traditions.4 As Vali argued 'there is in the ethnicist approaches to nationalism a fundamental tension between the ethnic origin of the nation and its modern/constructivist identity, which undermines their logical consistency.'5

The bulk of Kurdish history writings on Kurds and Kurdistan are primordialist. As

Vali argued

'the mainstream Kurdish nationalist, hailing from Diyarbakir, Mahabad

or Arbil, is "primordialist". For him/her the Kurdish nation is a

primordial entity, a natural formation rooted in the nature of every

Kurd, defining the identity of people and community throughout

history.'6

As Chapter III indicates, the early Kurdish nationalists were anxious to prove the historical antiquity of the Kurds and their heroic past. The majority of studies and

12 works on the Kurds and Kurdistan, particularly since the 1970s amongst the Kurdish intelligentsia, academics, and historians underline the continuity of the primordialist nature of Kurdish historiography. Emphasizing the early emergence and existence of a/the Kurdish nation was/is one of the main themes in the re-emergence of Kurdish national movements, particularly for those in Turkey.7 Since the late 1980s a number of studies, carried out by Kurdish writers, have emphasized the ancient history, culture and roots of a Kurdish nation going back to 3000 B.C.8 Dr. Cemsid Bender stated that the Kurds were the oldest people of Anatolia, adding that, their age is so old that cannot be known.9 The writer further goes to assert that it was the Kurds who, as the oldest people of the Mesopotamia along with the Sumerians, contributed most to world civilization in its infancy. However, the development of Kurdish historical writings since 1970s in Turkey is both a reaction to and imitation of 20th Century

Turkish historiography. Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkish historical writings began to engage two mainstream ideas. Firstly, they tried to establish the superiority of Turkish nation over all other nations and ethnic groups, and the great Turkish contribution to world civilization. They claimed that global civilization began with the Turkish race and that the Turkish language is the oldest and most profound language in the world10 Secondly, Turkish historiography had attempted to disprove the existence of the Kurdish ethnicity and language by claiming that the Kurds were in fact a part of the great Turkish race. Such extreme writings were not mere scholastic exercises in Turkish historiography, but, as strategic discourses, they legitimized Turkish state policy with regards to the Kurds. Thus, it is not surprising to note that the Kurdish historiography is a direct response to the

Turkish history writings and to a great extent an imitation of it.

13 Though most Kurdish nationalists and historians share the primordial paradigm of nationalism, there are growing numbers of scholars and historians of Kurdish history who analyze Kurdish nationalism within the perimeters of the modernist theory of nationalism.11 This work purports to be part of this tradition.

This study sets out to examine the early formation of Kurdish nationalism with the establishment of Kurdistan Teali Jamiyeti soon after the end of the First World War

(WWI). It suggests that the classification of political, cultural and organizational activities of the Kurdish intelligentsia of the pre-war period, especially from the time of publication of first Kurdish newspaper, Kurdistan, in 1898 in Cairo, as nationalism would be inappropriate. This period, should, rather, be termed as the Kurdish

‗enlightenment‘. Some scholars and historians of Kurdish history have labeled the pre-war period as the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. Some others go even further by assuming the 19th century uprisings in Kurdistan to be the beginning of Kurdish nationalism.12 A. Hasanpour refers to the literary works of Ahmed-e Khani as the manifestation of ‗feudal‘ Kurdish nationalism.13 On the other hand, Vali regards the beginnings of Kurdish nationalism in the post-war period as the 'consequences of and response to the political and cultural processes of the construction of the modern nation and national identity in Turkey, Iraq and Iran in the early decades of the last century.'14

Here it is imperative to comment on continuity and change in history with respect to the transformation of the Kurdish ‗enlightenment‘ (1898-1914) to the formation of

Kurdish nationalism (1918- ). As can be seen through the next chapters, the actors that played a significant role during the pre-war and post-war Kurdish activities more or

14 less constituted the same group of people. An explanation is required to answer the sudden and sharp transformation of the Kurdish intelligentsia‘s political thought from

Ottomanism to Kurdish nationalism in a period of four years. Remaining strictly within the framework of nationalism that this study employs, study of the available

Kurdish primary sources presents a convincing argument with regard to the classification of the Kurdish elite‘s Ottomanism and its evolution into nationalism in a very short period of time. However, this sudden alteration in the political thought of the Kurdish elite poses a problem in the discipline of history.

This study claims that the outbreak of World War I, the evident collapse of the

Ottoman Empire, the rise of ethnonationalism amongst the various subjects of the

Empire including the Turks, Arabs and Armenia, and the nationalistic discourse of the

Allied powers, such as the Wilson Principles and the Anglo-French declaration, were the main factors behind the radical shift in Kurdish political thought. It is noteworthy to remember that WWI itself was an unprecedented event in world history. As

Roshwald acutely observed

‗the war [the First World War, my adding] created unusual

opportunities and tremendous pressure that served to catapult the idea

of national self-determination toward sudden realization across a wide

range of societies. To be sure, the cultural, economic and political

conditions in these various lands were extremely divisive; what these

cases all have in common is that their transition to political systems

based on the idea of national self-determination was very sudden,

rather that the result of a steady, evenly paced process, and that it took

15 place within the framework of a common, external contingency –a war

that transformed the shape of global politics.‘15

There had not been any radical social and economic changes in Kurdistan from the pre-war to the post-war period apart from the devastating impact of the war on its economy. In that sense, explaining the formation and development of nationalist ideas in Kurdistan from a strict modernist perspective that nationalism developed as a result of industrialization and of the impact on state and society of that process would be futile. The critical and turbulent period of WWI, on the other hand presents an explanation for the equally critical transformation of Kurdish political thought. As

Halliday argued ‗the modernist claim need not rest on a narrow, industrial-society model: rather, starting from the rise of modern industrial society in Europe and the

USA, it seeks to show how the impact of this society was felt throughout the world, in economic change and industrialization certainly, but also in the political, social and ideological changes that accompanied the subjugation to this model of the world, in the two centuries 1800-2000 that are also the lifespan of modern nationalism.‘16

4. Modernist theory of Nation and Nationalism

Hobsbawn claimed that a nation is not a primary or unchanging entity. He defined nation as belonging 'exclusively to a particular, and historically recent, period, (and) is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the

‗nation-state‘, and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it.‘17 In other words, for Hobsbawn ‗nation only exists as functions of a particular kind of territorial state or the aspiration to establish one …. But also in the

16 context of a particular stage of technological and economic development.‘18 Nation, for Hobsbawn is a product either of or created by nationalism. He distinguishes two types of nationalism, civic, mass and democratic nationalism, associated with the

French Revolution. This type of nationalism flourished in Europe from the 1830s, and operated on a ‗threshold principle‘ which implies that only nations, and only those large enough in territory and population to support a large capitalist market economy, were entitled to claim self-determination as sovereign, independent states. The second type, which he termed ‗ethno-linguistic‘ nationalism, initially occurred in Eastern

Europe as smaller groups with common ethnic and linguistic ties aspired to separate from large empires and create their own states. This type of nationalism resurfaced in

Asia and Africa in the 1970s and 1980s. For Hobsbawn the first type of nationalism is

‗top-down‘ and elite based, and focuses on official and governmental ideas and institutions. The second type is concerned with popular belief and sentiments, thus a community based on the view ‗from below‘. While Hobsbawn argued that nations are essentially constituted from above, he labeled those from below as ‗proto- nationalism‘. ‗Proto-national‘ bonds refer either to supra-local regional, religious or ethnic communities, or political bonds of select groups linked to pre-modern states.

However according to Hobsbawm, this cannot be regarded as modern nationalism simply because ‗they had or have no necessary relation with the unit of territorial political organization which is a crucial criterion of what we understand as a ‗nation‘ today.‘ 19 Hobsbawn‘s view of nation and nationalism is highly Eurocentric and elitist. 20 It is Eurocentric because he only allows nation to exist in the specific economical development of Europe, in effect limiting nationalism only to those communities with a capitalist market economy. In this manner the formation of a nation is strictly limited to western European communities. Those communities

17 without a state cannot be classified as nations under his theory. He is elitist as Smith claimed

‗accords no role to "the masses" as the subject of history. They are

passive, acted upon, and usually manipulated by elites for political

ends, but their cultures and social networks, even where they have a

measure of authority, have no political relevance. Hence their ‗proto-

national‘ bonds are, as it were, stillborn; they cannot have any political

extension, they can not provide the basis for a subsequent nation.‘21

Karl W. Deutsch differentiates nationality from nation. ‗Nationality‘ Deutsh explained, ‗is a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over the behavior of its members. It is a people striving to equip itself with power.‘ 22 A nationality can only be transformed into a nation when the people 'acquire power to back up its aspiration.‘ In other words, like Hobsbawn, for Deutsch a nation is a community in possession of a state. This compulsory unity between nation and state is refuted by Smith, who defined nation as ‗a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.‘23 For Smith, national identity—which constituted various components, ranging from kinship, class membership, religion, shared culture, regional loyalty, shared territory and shared language—is a cultural concept, and as such it has no immediate relationship with the state. The problem with this definition is that it fails to address the role of the state in creating 'a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.'

According to Smith's approach it would be problematic to define the Kurds as a nation as the Kurds do not have a common economy or common legal rights.

18 Anderson defined nation as ‗an imagined political community‘ which emerged with the development of print capitalism. He argued that nation did not come into existence as simply growing out of and replacing religious communities and dynastic realms, but rather as the result of a fundamental change in the mode of apprehending the world, in effect ‗the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community‘ which made it possible to ‗think‘ and set the stage for the modern nation.24

For modernist theory, nationalism is ultimately a political movement oriented towards establishing a state for a community who are perceived to be a nation. Gellner defined it as ‗primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.‘25 For Hobsbawn and Anderson nationalism ‗invents nation‘. As

Anderson argues ‗nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness, it invents nations where they do not exist.‘26 Gellner argued that

'nation, as a natural, God given way of classifying men, as an inherent

though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which

sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations,

sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures:

that is a reality.'27

Alter sees nationalism as an idea and a political movement, opposing Enlightenment philosophy, according to which the individual is principally a member of the human race and thus a citizen of the world. By holding ‗the nation and the sovereign nation- state to be crucial indwelling values, and which manage to mobilize the political will

19 of a people or a large section of a population.‘28 Kedourie defines nationalism as a doctrine ‗invented in Europe at the beginning of the 19th century‘ which ‗pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively of its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states.‘29

In this study nation is defined as combination of objective and subjective conditions, with more emphasis on the latter. By objective conditions it means a community who shares common cultural characteristics such as a commonly used language, identification with a particular territory, shared history and myths. In other words, it sees the existence of a cultural community with a territory assumed as their natural possession. By subjective conditions it refers to the political activities of conscious human agency with a purpose to transform such a cultural community into a political community which is based on shared rights and duties.30 Nation is a politicized community, and hence nationalism is the sum of political activities oriented towards the state. 31 As John Breuily defined it ‗nationalism is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments.‘ Breuily argued that ‗a nationalist argument is a political doctrine built upon three assertions:

a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.

b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other

interests and values.

c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires

the attainment of at least political sovereignty.‘32

20 There is an important element that must be elaborated on here: both the internal and external factors in the formation and development of nation and nationalism. The objective and subjective conditions mentioned above refer mainly to the internal factors, but they alone, isolated from external development would be unattainable.

With regard to external factors in relation to the nation and nationalism, two aspects are crucial: firstly world-wide social-economic transformation; and secondly, in combination with the first, the political -global and regional- crisis. Zubaida argued that processes of economic development and social transformation

‗have occurred all over the world in the last two centuries or longer in

relation or in response to European capitalist expansion. These

processes have taken different forms and consequences under different

structural and conjunctural conditions. Common features of these

processes have included, in some measure, the breakdown or

transformation of primary communities, urbanization, individualization

of labour, intensification of the social division of labour, the

emergence of new forms of government and institutions, widening of

education and literacy, technologies and networks of communications

and transport, and new ideational formations, often significantly

influenced by European ideas, especially in relation to political

community and the state.‘33

Indeed, economic development, and particularly the advent of capitalism, gradually but greatly changed the world‘s social and political landscape. Thus, nationalism as modern phenomenon became a world-wide political movement, albeit in different forms and colors. As Halliday argued, one aspect of nationalism is its inevitability: ‗it

21 is universal and unavoidable: in this sense nationalism is necessary the world over, no region being exempt from it.‘34 However, treating the development of nationalism

‗as though it proceeded at a relatively even, incremental pace, and as

though its full manifestation (itself an idealized and problematic

concept) were dependent upon the completion of certain material

changes that transform the inner workings of society and produced

nationalist forms of political identity (…) runs the risk of lapsing into

historical determinism.‘35

The social and political crises have had a great affect on the formation and development of nationalism throughout the world. As mentioned above, the impact of

WWI on world politics, and particularly on the development and the surge of nationalist movements throughout the world, was unprecedented.

5. Agency and Structure

This study also paid attention to the respective role of agency and structure in this particular period of Kurdish history. This study defines agency as the activities, ideas, and objectives of people or group of individuals or states or international institutions to act intentionally to shape their social, economic and political conditions. In other words, agency implies the ability of persons to choose courses of action and, acting upon their choices, to bring about certain social and political changes because of their capacity to do so. Structure is defined as historically accumulated social and economic foundations upon which human agency operates.

22 This work holds that human beings are not passive bearers of social structures but are agents actively involved in altering their social conditions. As Anderson defined it, agency is 'conscious, goal-directed activity'.36 This in no way suggests that agency is free from the constraints of social structures with which it interacts. This study argues that agency has the capacity, independent of structures, to alter social and political conditions for intended ends. Marx argued that 'men make history, but they do not make it just as they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.'37 As Callinicos noted, Marx's formula 'suffers from a fundamental flaw, namely that it conceives the role of structure as essentially negative, as simply a constraint on action.'38 Post-Marxist theorists approached the relationship of agency and structure from opposite poles. For Althusser change occurs as a result of the accumulation of structural contradictions. Agency's role within this structural process is merely to act as bearers of the structures in conflict. On the other opposite site, E. P.

Thompson argued that history is the process through which human beings constantly make and remake their lives. Thompson argued that structures represent limits to human practice, obstacles to be overcome by men and women in their struggle to assume conscious control of the social world.39 Giddens wrote

'Foucault's "archaeology", in which human beings do not make their

own history but are swept along by it, does not adequately

acknowledge that those subject to the power of dominant groups

themselves are knowledgeable agents, who resist, blunt or actively

alter the conditions of life that others seek to thrust upon them.'40

23 By attributing to agency a primary role this study aims to provide tools to analyze both the role of the early Kurdish nationalists' activities, intentions and ideas with regard to their failure to establish a Kurdish state, and at the same time to set out other agencies, such as the Kemalists, the Arab nationalists and Great Powers, in conflict with the Kurdish nationalists. This study asserts that the outcome of clashes of agencies with opposing objectives, interests and aspiration during the period under analysis contributed towards the failure of the Kurdish nationalists to attain an independent Kurdish entity.

This study claims that the growing interests in and works on Kurdish history and politics have paid little attention to the role of agency and structure in making history.

The bulk of Kurdish historiography has concentrated more on structures than agency in the development of Kurdish national history.41 Hasan Yildiz, for example, suggested that tribal consciousness (tribal formation of Kurdish society) and denominational division in Kurdistan were the two main reasons behind the failure of all the resistance movements in Kurdistan.42

The subject of structure/agency is also significant within the discussion of the concept of nation and nationalism. In this study, nation, as a constructed political entity, and nationalism, as a political movement oriented towards such construction, are attributed to the role of agency. The role of agency is limited within the primordialist perception of nation as it conceives nation as a natural entity that exists since time immemorial. In that sense there is no need for conscious human activities to create such an entity. This study suggests that construction of nation and formation and evolution of nationalism are primarily the outcome of agency. There is, therefore, an

24 undeniable bond between modernist theory of nationalism and the role of agency in making history. This, however, should not be understood to contend that there is no place for structure in the construction and formation of nation and nationalism. Social formations (e.g. tribalism), cultural specifities (customs, traditions, language(s) and existing political arrangements of a community who share common territory are necessary backgrounds upon which the nationalists, as agents transform such a community into the politicized entity that is a nation. The bulk of Kurdish historiography approached the concept of nation and nationalism within the paradigm of primordialism combined with an evolutionary and determinist historical understanding. This explains the reason behind the lack of well established discussion within the Kurdish historiography and politics about the role of agency in history.

6. National Identity and Kurdistan

Kurdish national identity and its origin are a matter of great debate among Turkish and Kurdish historians. Some Turkish scholars have tried to argue that the Kurds belong to the Turani race.43 Kurdish nationalists and the bulk of Kurdish historians assert that the origin of the Kurds goes as far as 4000 BC and that the Kurds belong to the Aryan race not Turan.44 Mehrdad Izady traces the existence of Kurdish culture back more than 50,000 years.45

This work argues that the origin of Kurdish identity is not a matter of importance for the subject-matter of this study. What is crucial is when approximately such an identity became prominent in political discourse. McDowall argued that 'there is no doubt that a Kurdish people had existed as an identifiable group for possibly more

25 than two thousand years, but it was only in the early years of the twentieth century that they acquired a sense of community as Kurds.'46 As Chapter II shows, the first newspaper, Kurdistan appeared towards the end of the 19th century.

The publication of early Kurdish periodicals and the number of Kurdish associations during the first decade of the 20th century indicate the appearance of a Kurdish sense of ethnic identity, as distinct from other identities. This self-awareness, however, remained third in the order of importance, following Islam and Ottomanism.

McDowall asks the following questions:

'Do the Kurds constitute a nation? If so, how did this nation come into

being? What are the characteristics which distinguishes a nation from

either an ethnic category or an ethnic community?'

He rightly argued that 'such issues pose difficult questions for a community that still does not enjoy international acceptance as a nation within a recognized territory.'47

Though recognition by others is a crucial factor in differentiating nation from ethnic group, the most distinctive feature of a nation, which distinguishes it from an ethnic group, is the intention, activity and demand of the community for self-determination.

In that sense, this study asserts that since the end of the First World War the Kurds constitute a nation, as there has been continuous struggle since then for their self- determination.

As the relation between national identity and territory is an important facet in the construction process of a nation, we observe that one of the first acts of the early

26 Kurdish nationalists was to draw a map of Kurdistan which they assumed to be the land of the Kurds. This map included a narrow neck of land that gave access to the

Mediterranean just north of Alexandretta, Mosul and the left bank of the Tigris as far south as Mandali, and the eastern side of Lake Urmiya. (See map I)

7. Outline

This study is divided into six chapters. The chapters do not necessarily follow a historical sequence. The first chapter provides for the reader a historical background of Kurdish society up until to the end of the First World War. It examines what

Bozarslan termed 'tacit contract', in effect, the pact signed between the Ottoman state and the Kurdish princes in the 16th century. The political relations between the

Ottoman state and Kurdish princes from 16th to the late 19th century have been looked at. It examines the turbulent relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Kurdish princes and its evolution towards fragmentation of Kurdish political structures as a result of the Ottoman centralization policy at the beginning of 19th century. The chapter also provides information with regards to the basic social structures of

Kurdish society, such as tribes, principalities, and at the same time the institutionalization of the Ottoman state apparatus in Kurdistan. Kurdo-Armenian relations and animosity as well as the destructive impact of the war in Kurdistan are also analyzed.

The second chapter deals with the Kurdish intelligentsia's cultural activities within the

Ottoman Empire. It examines the early Kurdish publications and associations from end of the WWI. These early activities of the Kurdish intelligentsia were examined

27 critically within the context of nationalist theory elaborated above. The chapter also examines some characteristics of the Kurdish elite and their political outlook.

The third chapter analyzes the political evolution of the Kurdish urban elite from the pre-war period to post-war period. It investigates in detail the Kurdish nationalists' publication, Jin, through which it looks at the political ideas of the Kurdish intelligentsia. The chapter further scrutinizes British primary sources to find out further details about the political activities of Kurdish nationalists in those crucial years.

The fourth chapter looks at Kemalism and its policy towards the Kurdish national movement. It points out the inherent contradiction between Kemalism and Kurdish nationalism. It further critically questions the assumption that Kemalism is an anti- imperialist national movement.

The fifth chapter looks at the further development of Kurdish nationalism. The first

Kurdish movement against Kemalism took place in the Koçgiri/Dersim region. The chapter searches the reasons and factors behind the uprising and failure of local

Kurdish nationalists against the Kemalists.

The final chapter examines the Great Powers' policies in Kurdistan. It pays particular attention to British policy. It also analyses the Kurdish nationalists' relations with and struggle against the British forces in Mesopotamia. The evolution of British policy in

Southern Kurdistan and the Sheikh Mahmut Berzenji‘s uprising has been looked at within the context of general British policy in the Middle East.

28 7. Sources

This study uses two main primary sources throughout the text: the British official records and Kurdish periodicals published by the early Kurdish intelligentsia from late 19th century to the early 1920s. The British records include documents, correspondence, and reports from Foreign Office, Colonial Office, India Office, War

Office, Cabinet Meetings and Parliamentary Records. These documents have been accessed via the British National Archives. This study does not treat British official documents as objective texts, but rather it exploits them as necessary documents which reflect British views with regard to the Kurdish issue. It is also necessary to highlight that the British sources should be taken cautiously as they reflect official interpretations under bureaucratic constraints. Nonetheless, due to the fact that the

British were significantly involved in those particular years, the British official documents constitute a decisive place in this study.

This work used contemporary Kurdish periodicals and journals extensively. The reason for such detailed analysis of these periodicals and journals is mainly due to the fact that this study pays particular attention to the thoughts, actions, and intentions of the early Kurdish intelligentsia and nationalists. As an agency in the political development in Kurdistan, the Kurdish elite is charged in this study as primarily responsible for the failure of the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity.

Therefore, their ideas, political thoughts, activities and aims must be considered significant.

An extensive use of secondary sources, mainly in English and Turkish languages but also in Kurdish has been made throughout the text. It must be noted that due to the

29 nature of the Kurdish question, a linguistic ability in further languages, such as

Arabic, Persian, Russian and French and Ottoman Turkish would be very useful.

30 CHAPTER I

A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

This chapter is concerned with a historical evaluation of the social and political structure of Kurdistan. It sets out to explore the historical reasons behind the politically and socially divided Kurdish society in the early 20th century. The fragmentation of Kurdish society needs to be analysed within the framework of interconnected issues, such as tribalism and Kurdish tribal specifities; the division of

Kurdistan between two empires, the Ottoman and Persian empires; the specific land and administrative policies of the Ottoman empire in Kurdistan; and the devastating impact of the First World War (WWI) throughout Kurdistan. The main intention of this chapter is to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the social, political, and historical background of the Kurds.

1. The Kurds, Tribes and the State

Many scholars and historians have emphasized that the fragmented social and political structure of Kurdistan, and lack of a unified Kurdish nationalist movement in the period analyzed, were prime factors in the Kurdish failure to establish a nation- state of their own.1 It is underlined that the tribal structure of Kurdish society is one of the fundamental reasons for such fragmentation and an obstacle in the way of the

31 formation of a unified nationalist movement. Thus it is imperative to examine the concept of tribe, its relation to the state and the characteristics of Kurdish tribes.

A tribe might be defined as representing large kin groups organized and regulated according to ties of blood or family lineage. It has been argued that such a definition does not represent the more complex reality.2 The term tribe has been used to describe many forms of groups and social organizations, so a single all-encompassing definition is not inherently possible.

For Tapper ‗tribe may be used loosely of a localized group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organization, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins); tribes are usually politically unified, though not necessarily under a central leader, both features being commonly attributable to interaction with states. Such tribes also form parts of larger, usually regional, political structures of tribes of similar kinds; they do not usually relate directly with the state, but only through these intermediate structures. The more explicit term confederacy or confederation should be used for a local group of tribes that is heterogeneous in terms of culture, presumed origins and perhaps class composition, yet politically unified usually under a central authority.‘3

Tribal societies are depicted by some anthropologists as primitive by implication because they are counterposed to the state. Tapper argued that in the Middle East groups referred to as tribes have never been isolated groups of ‗primitives‘ remote from contact with the state or its agents. As an analysis of the relations between tribes and state within the context of the Middle East reveals, tribes do not constitute an

32 evolutionary stage in history, but rather as political, social and economic entities they are constructed, reconstructed and formed within the framework of their relation to the state. For Lapidus,

‗although tribes and empires represent, in one sense, an evolutionary

sequence, once the sequence had been fully realized, the issue became

one of the construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of tribal

chieftaincies and imperial entities. (…) Tribes had a large role to play

in Middle Eastern societies, but they almost always played their part in

the context, or under the umbrella, of empire regimes.‘4

As Tapper notes ‗tribes and states have created and maintained each other as a single system, though one of the inherent instability.‘5 A tribal structure in itself does not constitute a definite barrier for its transformation into a state as ‗the important empires and dynasties appear to be a roll call of tribes turned imperial conqueror: Saljuqs,

Ghaznavids, mamluks (at one remove), Mongols, Timurids, Ottomans, Mughals,

Qizilbash, and Qajars, to name just some of the more prominent.‘6 The question is to ask why a strong and long lasting dynasty or imperial state had not arisen in

Kurdistan. At times some native Kurdish dynasties emerged in the 9th, 10th, and 11th centuries (the Shaddadids, the Marwanids, the Hasanwayhids, the Annuzids) but they did not last long.7 The answer to the question may be lie within the types of tribal culture and the geographic location of Kurdistan.

Barfield refers to two distinctive types of tribal culture associated with two largely discrete areas: ‗(1) the deserts of North Africa and greater Arabia and the mountain

33 zones throughout the whole region, generally divided into small regional states, which were inhabited both by Bedouin nomads and sedentary tribes such as the Berbers,

Kurds, and Pashtuns with egalitarian lineage structures long indigenous to the region;

(2) the Iranian and Anatolian plateau zones, generally under the control of great empires, which were inhabited by tribes organized into large confederations of Turco-

Mongolian descent.‘8 Amongst the first category, Barfield argued, success in maintaining large-scale political organizations was restricted by narrow cultural limitations on political legitimacy. ‗Where tribes were composed of egalitarian lineages whose leaders ruled groups only through use of segmentary opposition, the maintenance of a broad confederation for longer than a single lifetime was extremely difficult. (…) By contrast, in Turco-Mongolian tribal systems, where a hierarchical kinship organization was accepted as culturally legitimate, local lineages, clans, and tribes became the building blocks of political-military coalitions created by hereditary leaders whose authority was rarely challenged from below.‘9 Thus Barfield put forward the view that the creation of large tribal confederations and the establishment of long lasting empires and dynasties was the product of Turco-Mongolian peoples who moved from Inner Asia into the neighboring Iranian and Anatolian plateaus.

Compared to the Inner Asian tribal leader whose political role was stronger and whose line ruled for centuries, substantive differences in status arising from lineage within the egalitarian style tribes caused them to be weak and temporary. Barfield also emphasized the particular social structure of the egalitarian model of tribe that made tribal confederations very weak. ‗The practice of parallel cousin marriage of a man to his father‘s brother‘s daughter (FBD) turned the local kin group on itself at the cost of sacrificing ties with other tribal groups.‘10 This practice in turn restricted kin groups to

34 entering alliances through reciprocal marriage ties, as was a key element of tribal relations in other parts of the world. Another aspect of the egalitarian type of tribe was the lack of subordination of tribal leaders to someone else‘s command. Thus the strength of the tribe fell rapidly as it grew beyond the local lineage. By contrast the cultural traditional hierarchy allowed Inner Asian tribes to draw leadership from a single ruling lineage which produced long lasting and great empires such as the direct descendants of the Hsiung-nu founder, Mao-Tun, who ruled over the Mongolian steppe for six hundred years, as did the descendants of Cengiz Khan, for seven hundred years, and also the Ottoman dynasty ruled for more than six hundred years.

Inner Asian confederations were politically centralized and their leaders were no mere chieftains but possessed royal authority, which means that they had the power to rule by force.

Lapidus suggested that conquest movements led to the transformation of tribes into empires and from there the specialization of military and administrative functions, the separation of religious and political authority, and the transformation of religious or warrior leaders into emperors. Conquest movements in the Middle East, Lapidus inferred, were based on the agglomeration of diverse units, including individuals, clients, religious devotees, and fractions of clans as well as perhaps lineages and clans. However these diverse elements have been united in one of the two principal ways. The first one is through religion, which has been seen amongst the Arabs. The second principle is the acceptance of or tendency towards hierarchy, which can be seen among the Turkish Inner Asian people. Amongst these people ‗the most common form of leadership was the warrior chieftaincy supported by a lineage, clan, or

35 commitats –a band of warriors who in turn won the allegiance of other such warrior units and thereby dominated a subject population.‘11

The Kurds, as Barfield mentioned, had an egalitarian type of tribal structure. Kurdish tribes are segmentary organizations and related by common descent and a tendency towards endogamy. The practice of parallel cousin marriage of FBD is very common.

As Bruinessen inferred corporate action at the level of tribe or largest sub-tribe is not common.12

The Kurdish tribes (Aşiretler) were made up of clans (taife, bar, tira) and the clans are divided into sub-categories: hoz, khel or bnamal. Within each tribe there are three groups, the chief and his family, the privileged members of the tribe; the servants

(khulams) who filled a variety of functions; and finally the ordinary members of the tribe. ‗Each tribe also had its clergy, which was composed of Sheikhs (representatives of the various sects), mullahs (priests) and seyyids (descendants of the prophet). The clergy also enjoyed certain privileges.‘13 Bruinessen defined the Kurdish tribes as social and political and territorial units based on descent and kinship, real or putative, with a characteristic internal structure.14 The characteristics of Kurdish tribes are as follows: there is clear distinction between tribal members and non-tribal members.

Tribe itself has the connotation of military aristocracy. The economic units of tribes are camp-groups for (semi-) nomads and the village for the sedentary tribesmen. The nature of leadership varies considerably from tribe to tribe. Most tribes recognize a paramount chieftain whose functions generally are associated with warfare and inter- tribal conflicts. The chieftain is not only a political leader but also holds an economically privileged position. Pastoral nomads give the chieftain yearly gifts in

36 kind. Among cultivators the presentations from the tribesmen or subservient non- tribal peasantry to the chief are more considerable. A tribesman‘s loyalty to a certain leader is stronger than his loyalty to the tribe. This factor explains the rapid growth of tribes under some powerful leaders, followed by a decline after their disappearance. It has been argued that the Kurdish tribesmen display unreserved and unquestioning obedience towards their chieftains.15 Tribesmen would not follow any course of action without the approval, command and consent of their chief. The chief of the tribe embodies executive power whose orders have the force of law. Thus the chief plays a very crucial role in mobilizing and manipulating the tribesmen he commands.16

However, the loyalty of tribesmen towards their chief does not mean that they have no influence on the decision making process. Rich, for example, describes an interesting story regarding the Bulbas confederation: ‗in the tribes, which form the Bulbas nation, every man, even of the meanest rank, has a voice in public affairs. You may be settling business with them, when on a sudden some common fellow will start up and say ―I do not agree with it!‖ and this is enough to spoil the whole affair in a moment.‘17 Kassimlo also suggested the influence of ‗eshvins‘ the ‗white-beards‘.

‗Both the Beg, the leader of the tribe, and the Aghas, the clan chieftains, enjoyed complete legal administrative authority. The Beg‘s decision was final in all cases; however, the eshevins, so-called ―white-beards‖ had a major influence on his decisions. When the Beg died his eldest son succeeded him, or, if there was no male descendant, the ―white beards‖ elected a new leader. In a few rare cases a woman could even become the tribal chief.‘18

In Kurdistan tribes and the surrounding states have always interacted with each other, albeit with differing interests and reasons. Rivalries between or within tribes are

37 almost always associated with rivalries in their environment, in effect, surrounding states or empires. Tribal chiefs, in order to extend or preserve their influence and power, ally themselves with external powers. Thus to pursue its own policy, the state had used this point to intervene in the social and political structure of Kurdistan.

Kurdistan has been on the frontier of more than one large power whose presence affects the course of rivalries among petty chieftaincies. ‗The best thing to do for rivals or enemies of a particular chieftain who has become a vassal to one state is to try to enlist support from the other state. (…) For this other state it is precisely their rivalry with the other chieftain that is some guarantee of their loyalty.‘19

It must also be emphasized that it was not only rivalries between tribes that brought the surrounding states into the political equation, but also the rivalries between empires which affected the relationship between tribes and Kurdish princes. The case of the Ardalan and Baban principalities is a good case. Both were great rival Kurdish families which dominated the area on either side of the Iraq-Iran border until the early

19th century. The struggle between the Ottoman and Iranian empires exacerbated rivalries between these two families. Between 1821 and 1823 there were criss- crossing alliances between rival families and states created and relinquished at a bewildering speed.20

1.1 Tribe and Nationalism

It has been argued that tribalism has been the main barrier to the emergence of a national consciousness.21 Tribes have their own system of values, which ensures them self-preservation. A tribesman in a tribe may define himself by membership of the

38 tribe he belongs to. His loyalty is primarily towards his tribe; and any sense of being a member of a wider organization such as a nation is weak. As the main concern of nationalists is to persuade members of an ethnic category to subordinate all other loyalties, social or religious, to the primary one of ethnic identity, nationalism comes into conflict with the tribal concept of loyalty.

‗Tribal chiefs at all levels are required to discharge certain functions.

Within the group acknowledging their chiefship they act as arbitrators

of disputes and allocators of resources, benefits and duties. Beyond the

tribal group, the chief acts as mediator either with his peers and the

paramount chief, or with the state. A chief jealously guards his

monopoly of all relations with the outside world. If a state exercises a

monopoly of power, its authority regarding taxation and the

administration of justice will extend to every individual within its

territory, rendering the mediation of a tribal chief with the outside

world, and thus the raison d‘être of tribal existence, meaningless… The

state, [if] it is able, will take every measure to bring tribespeople under

its direct control.‘22

Such assumptions reflect a simplistic perception about the relation between tribe, nationalism and the state. The fundamental flaw in the argument is that it does not consider the complex relations between the tribe and state, both of which can exist together as is the case in most Middle Eastern countries.

39 1.2. The Geography

The geography of Kurdistan is also an important factor in the lack of emergence of a strong imperial state in Kurdistan. Kurdistan is a strategically located region within the Middle East, comprising important parts of today‘s Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

The heart of Kurdistan consists of forbidding mountains that have always deterred invading armies and provided a refuge to bandits and other persecuted groups. As

Bruinssen notes, the inaccessibility of Kurdistan and the fierce warring capacities of its inhabitants have always made it a natural frontier of the empires that emerged around it. The fact that no empire ever maintained its sovereignty in more than a part of Kurdistan inevitably resulted in political divisions throughout Kurdistan.

Constituting a crucial geo-political area in the Middle East and being a natural frontier to various empires, Kurdistan has been a battlefield throughout history. For the past two and a half millennia Kurdistan has been the buffer between Persia and the great empires of Asia Minor: Greek-Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman. Its land has witnessed innumerable wars between empires with devastating effects on people, economy and political structure. The native Kurdish dynasties that emerged in the 9th, 10th and 11th centuries came to an end towards the late 11th century when the Seljuqs defeated

Byzantium at Malazgirt in 1071. The Seljuqs ‗preferred to administer the new province of ―Kurdistan‖ through Turkoman officers.‘23

The 13th century witnessed the Mongol invasion which brought havoc and disaster to the region. The havoc brought on by the Mongols in Kurdistan was so destructive that according to various sources, many parts of Kurdistan were depopulated through massacres and migration. In 1231 the city of Diyarbakir was sacked and all its inhabitants perished. On their way to Baghdad the Mongols destroyed the region.

40 After sacking Baghdad the Mongols turned to Tabriz through Diyarbakir, Jazira bin

Umar, Mardin and Hakkari. Many of the tribes are reported to have left for Egypt as a result of the invasion. The flight from the Mongols carried some tribes as far as the west of Algeria. According to Ibn Khaldun, two Kurdish tribes named Lawin and

Badin went to Algeria, where they were well received by the Caliph al-Murtazi of the

Almohades.24 The interval between the decline of Mongol power and the rise of the

Safavids saw the rise and fall of two Turkoman dynasties in Kurdistan, the

Akkoyunlar and the Karakoyunlar. The arrival of Timur Lang, which rivaled the

Mongol invasions in destructiveness, also took place during this interval.

It is also important to note that the mountains made transport and communication very challenging. The poor communication and transport system during the pre-modern period contributed to the lack of communication and interaction between people residing in Kurdistan. According to American missionaries in the Bitlis province in

1860s ‗there were no railroads in Kurdistan; no post horses, even, came to Bitlis in the sixties, and the Americans had to send a man once a month to Erzurum for their mail.‘25 Thus, it is not surprising that relationships between people residing in

Kurdistan remained very restricted. The other impact of the geography is that any

Kurdish prince who desired to control the whole of Kurdistan would have to have a huge army and an advance line of communication, which was a very challenging task given the presence of imperial powers in the region.

Both the Ottoman and the Iranian empires successfully preserved their state structure and transformed themselves into modern nation-states after WWI. A detailed analysis of the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into the Turkish Republic will be

41 introduced later. However this does not mean only imperial states were able to create modern nation-states in the Middle East. The Arabs, for example, like the Kurds were subjects of the Ottoman Empire, but following WWI a number of Arab nation-states came into existence, mainly as a result of direct intervention of Great Powers. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the relationship between the Kurds and the Great powers did not however result in the formation of a Kurdish nation-state.

2. Ottoman Policy in Kurdistan

After the rise of the Ottoman and the Safavid empires in Anatolia and Persia respectively, the Kurds and their country became a bone of contention between these two powerful states. The Safavids, who had succeeded in wresting most of the

Northern Kurdistan from the Turkoman dynasties, were soon compelled to give up their Kurdish acquisition to the Ottomans in the battle of Çaldıran 1514. Although the

Ottomans succeeded in checking Safavid power, they failed to destroy it. As a result of this defeat, the Safavids lost the greater part of Kurdistan. Fighting between the

Ottomans and Safavids continued intermittently throughout the next two centuries.

After the battle of Çaldıran 1514, the policy adopted by the Ottoman Sultan Selim towards the Kurdish tribes and principalities stood out in marked contrast to that of the Persian Shah Ismail. The latter is reported to have replaced the leading Kurdish chiefs with that of Azerbaijani Turks as governors.26 The Sultan on the other hand pursued an accommodationist policy towards Kurdish principalities. Jwaideh stated that the Sultan ‗displayed greater generosity and farsightedness in dealing with the

Kurds.‘ 27 The generosity of the Sultan is questionable. The Sultan‘s policy in

42 Kurdistan indicates the ability of the Ottoman state institution to develop and implement various policies according to differing situation.

The Ottoman central state pursued and applied a specific land and administrative policy in Kurdistan, which was in sharp contrast to the policy in the Western part of the empire. In the Ottoman Empire every district was governed by a Beg, a military commander, and judicial affairs were the responsibility of the Qadi, who received a religious education and was an expert in the Shariat (religious law) and Qanunname

(Law Books), the judicial rulings of the Sultan.28 Legislative authority was ultimately embodied in the Shariat. The legal expert at district level, the Mufti, applied the

Shariat in practice. The Beg had executive authority. As a symbol of his dignity he received a standard (Sancak) from the Sultan; the district under his command was also called Sancak, and he himself Sancakbegi. Above a number of Sancakbegis, a

Beglerbegi was placed, and the unit consisting of the Sancaks under his authority was called beglerbeglik or eyalet. Ottoman land was distributed amongst military and administrative officials by a system called timar. The Ottoman army originally consisted of a tribal cavalry (Sipahi) that is often called ‗feudal‘ because as a reward for military services its members received grants of land. The ‗feudatory‘ had the right to collect for himself revenue from the peasants on his ‗fief‘, in accordance with rules that were laid down in detail in the law-book of each province. He had three obligations: administrative and judicial tasks and the collection of some taxes for the central treasury; cultivation of land: he had right to exert force on the movement of peasants in order to make sure that land that he controled was cultivated; and the arming and maintenance of a number of cavalry men (Jebelu) who had to be ready for mobilization.29

43

There were three kinds of Timar, which were Timar, zeamet, and khass according to the size and number of the men. Generally a timar was granted to an ordinary cavalryman, zeamet to sipahi officials and high-ranking civil servants, and khass to

Sancakbegis and other functionaries of very high rank.

This land and administrative system had a specific characteristic: It was centrally administered. The land belonged to the state, the fief-holder never owned it, but had only the right to collect stipulated revenue from it. The fief furthermore could be revoked. It was not heritable, although the sipahi‘s son normally inherited it. The sipahis and others had only very restricted jurisdictional powers. They were responsible for applying land law of the Ottoman State in their fiefs. The sipahi was often a military man subjected to military discipline. Only the sons of sipahis or of the

Sultan‘s or Beg‘s slaves were eligible to receive a timar. Apart from them, the members of the military classes of newly conquered territories were also eligible to receive a timar.

Following the Çaldıran war (1514), which the Kurdish princes (Mirs) fought alongside the Ottoman army and contributed to its success, Sultan Selim concluded a pact with them, through the intermediary of an influential Kurdish figure, Mulla Idris

Bitlisi.30 A new land and administrative system in Ottoman held Kurdistan was arranged.

The Ottomans divided Kurdistan into three eyalets: Diyarbakir, most of Northern

Kurdistan,; Raqqa, Urfa and Syrian Raqqa which was mainly inhabited by rather

44 prosperous sedentary Syrian peasants; and Mosul, present-day Northern Iraq.

Diyarbakir was the first eyalet to be organized administratively in a pattern that other parts of Kurdistan would follow. Diyarbakir was divided into districts called Kurdish

Hukumats. The rest of the province was divided into some twenty Sancaks, of which some were to be governed in the ordinary way, by centrally appointed Sancakbegis, while in others, called ‗Ocaklik‘, ‗Yurtluk‘, or ‗Ekrad Beyligi‘ (family estate or

Kurdish sancaks) governorship were to remain within the Kurdish ruling families.

The Ottoman recognized 16 semi-independent principalities (Hukumats), 50 counties

(Sancaks) administered by hereditary Kurdish families and a number of Ottoman

Sancaks administered by centrally appointed Ottoman officials. Among these 16 principalities the Kurdish princes in Southern Kurdistan especially had a highly independent status to the extent that they struck coinage, and had the Friday public prayer (the Khutba) recited in their name. The recognized princes did not pay tribute to the central treasury, nor did they perform any form of regular military service.

Neither sipahis nor other soldiers were levied, and land was not given out in fiefs by the Sultan. The land was owned by the princes not by the Sultan. In the Kurdish administered Sancaks the central government had the right to intervene in political affairs. Thus, the central state, in the case of internal family rivalries, imposed a solution and appointed its favorite candidate but it could not replace the entire family.31

Alongside these formations, the Ottomans created nomadic tribal confederations, which were not to be subject to the Kurdish princes:

45 ‗The largest in Diyarbakir province was the Boz Ulus (the Grey

People), a remnant of the Akkoyunlu confederacy, consisting of

Turkoman and Kurdish tribes, probably 75,000 or so souls. (…) The

other major group, almost entirely Kurdish, was the Kara Ulus (the

Black People)‘32

All over Ottoman Kurdistan, under the title of ‗Mir Ashiretleri‘ more than 400 tribal confederations in various sizes were created.

Having approved and recognized semi-independent principalities and hereditary

Kurdish Sancaks, the Ottomans expected the Kurdish Mirs and chiefs to acknowledge the Ottoman suzerainty, and most importantly not to modify the frontiers of their principalities. This last point is highly important and requires more elaboration.

The reasons that the Ottoman central administration pursued a rather different, indeed, contradictory administrative and land policy in Kurdistan compared to the Western part of the empire can be found within the intersection of several interconnected factors:

Firstly, Kurdistan was a frontier between two empires in conflict, the Safavids and

Ottomans, hence the region served as a war zone between them. Alienating the Kurds would cause the Kurds to shift their allegiance from one power to the other. The

Ottoman State was aware of this fact, and the main reason the Kurds switched their allegiance towards the Ottomans was as a result of the Safavid intention to bring them under central control.

46 Secondly, Kurdish tribes did not like to be subjected to any foreign power. Due to the fighting power of the Kurdish tribes and the difficulties in controlling impenetrable mountainous land, it would not be easy for the Ottomans to engage with the Kurds in order to control them. It would require the constant presence of a substantial number of Ottoman military forces in the region.

Thirdly, it was impossible for the centrally appointed governmental officials to control tribesmen. Tribes were determined to preserve their free movement, both against the central state and Kurdish princes.

The main objective of the Ottoman central state in these new arrangements was to prevent centralization, which might pose a threat to the Ottoman establishment in

Kurdistan. They wanted to make sure that the possible rise of a strong Kurdish prince, by extending his authority over Kurdish tribes and other principalities in Kurdistan, could not take place. The Ottomans achieved this by granting protection to the tribes and principalities through blank decrees (ferman) right from the beginning of the

Ottoman entry to Kurdistan. Sultan Selim sent Idris Bitlisi to Kurdistan together with hundreds of blank decrees. The mission of Bitlisi was to travel throughout the Kurdish tribes and fiefdoms to get their support and solidarity to the Porte by granting them these blank decrees:

‗Take these imperial fermans as much as you wish. Fill them yourself

and present them to the region‘s chiefs, princes, and tribal aghas. For

the sake of religion and state, for the sake of the welfare and health of

the country, make them obey the law and gather soldiers to join the

army in time of war.‘33

47 Throughout his travels in Kurdistan, Bitlisi managed to convince the region‘s chieftains and Mirs and negotiated terms with them according to their power and position. ‗The majority of Kurdish leaders naturally welcomed reinstatement and willingly accepted an arrangement that gave them the benefit of Ottoman recognition and confirmation of their relatively independent status.‘34 With the imperial decrees even small size tribes and chieftains received a political status and recognition and were made accountable to the Sultan alone. By the time the Ottoman Empire entered

Kurdistan, the region had already displayed a highly divided social and political structure as a result of external invasions. The new Ottoman central policy, one might call containment policy, preserved the fragmented social-political condition of

Kurdistan, and with time created a more diffuse and divided Kurdish society. As

Yıldız argued, the possibility of a strong and central power arising through internal struggle between Kurdish principalities in an attempt to extend its territory and influence at the expense of others was prevented. Indeed Kurdish princes had attempted to extend their territory and authority whenever the opportunity appeared to arise.

Yıldız compared the Ottoman policy in Kurdistan to the teaching of Machiavelli in the Prince. According to Machiavelli, there are three ways to hold newly acquired state securely: first, by devastating them; next, by going and living there in person; thirdly, by letting them keep their own laws, exacting tribute, and setting up an oligarchy which would keep the state friendly to you.35 Yıldız suggested that for the reasons given above the Ottomans pursued the third option in Kurdistan. This policy can best be described in the words of Machiavelli:

48 ‗In addition, anyone in a country which differs from his own in the

way I described should make himself the leader and protector of the

smaller neighbouring powers, and he should endeavor to weaken those

which are strong. He should also take precautions to check an invasion

of the province by a foreigner as powerful as himself. Invariably, the

intruder will be brought in by those who are disaffected, because of

excessive ambition or because of fear (…) This is what happens: as

soon as a powerful foreigner invades a country all the weaker powers

give him their support, moved by envy of the power which has so far

dominated them. So, as far as these weaker powers are concerned, he

has no trouble at all in winning them to his side, because of their own

accord they straight away merge with the state he establishes. All he

has to watch is that they do not build up too much strength and too

much authority; and with his own strength and their support he can

easily hold down those who are powerful and so make himself, in

everything, the master of the country. (…) The Romans, in the

countries they seized, did watch these matters carefully. They

established settlements, supported the weaker powers without

increasing their strength, crushed the powerful, and did not allow any

powerful foreigner to win prestige.‘36

This was more or less the policy the Ottomans carried out in Kurdistan.

Once the Ottoman Empire incorporated most of Kurdistan and established a specific land and administrative system, the core of the policy was more or less unaltered for

49 the next three centuries. However, throughout this long period the Ottomans had gradually been extending central control through centrally appointed officials, judicial officers, such as defderdarlar (accountants), naibler and muftuler.37 In mid 17th century according to the great traveler, Evliya Çelebi, Kurdish rulers in the province of Diyarbakir, Van, and Mosul ‗were subject to oppression under the tyrannical hand of provincial governors‘ who ‗through their avarice dismissed a part of them from office while executing others without reasons.‘38 McDowall argued that this ‗process was less a steady government encroachment, and more an ebb and flow between the two sides, depending on their respective strengths and policies.‘39 It is certainly true that relations between the Istanbul and Kurdish chieftains reflected the balance of power and the regional political climate, for example, the Ottoman-Safavid and

Ottoman-Russo conflict and relations. Nonetheless, the process was based on a systematic policy with specific purposes: to extend central control, to weaken the strong chieftains and princes, and to check the Persian and Russian incursions.

By the 19th century the semi-independent status of the Kurdish princes came to an end as a result of Ottoman centralization policy. This was mainly attributable to the evident decline of the empire from the early 18th century. The fundamental problem for the Ottoman central state was that all over the empire tribal chiefs and provincial notables had gained semi-independent status. Local notables and provincial chieftains became so strong that the central government was forced, in 1808 by the Sened-i

Ittifak, to recognize their power and confirm their status.40 Most of these local notables failed to submit the requested taxes to the capital. This was a serious problem for the treasury, especially combined with the loss of territory in the western part of the empire. This was not the only problem that the Ottomans faced in the 19th century.

50 The expansion of capitalist Europe on all fronts of the empire, humiliation of the

Ottoman army by Russia in the second half of the century, the rise of nationalist sentiment in the Balkans in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and the advance of

Muhammad Ali, the governor of Egypt, towards Anatolia, were other developments that worried the Ottomans.41

Something had to be done in order to revive the empire. To solve the problem of deficit, the collection of taxes had to be carried out effectively: thus re-centralization of the imperial administration was the logical conclusion and which determined the

Ottoman policy in the 19th century. Removal of hereditary and semi-independent rulers was imperative, and in Kurdistan this meant the abolition of the principalities.

By 1820, Sultan Mahmud II managed to suppress all the local hereditary rulers in

Anatolia. Centrally confirmed governmental officials were installed and were made accountable to the financial and military ministries. In 1830, these local rulers in the

Balkan region were also brought under central control. The Ottomans then turned their attention to Kurdistan. For the Ottomans, the region of Kurdistan was important for two main reasons. First, it was an inexhaustible source of manpower to recruit for the army; second, deficit in the treasury meant that it needed new sources of income, which involved implementing taxes in Kurdistan and forcing the chieftains and princes to pay tribute.

While the Ottomans were occupied with the re-centralization of the empire, Kurdish princes, who were accustomed to their relatively independent position vis-à-vis the central government, had a different agenda. The Kurdish princes and chieftains were

51 not happy to see their privileges being threatened by the central government, and at the same time they were aware of Ottoman weakness. A combination of these two factors culminated in the Kurdish princes‘ rebellion against the central government. It is crucial to underline the fact that the main uprisings that took place during the first half of the 19th century were not a mere reaction against the Ottoman policy. The uprisings can also be seen as a result of the propensity of the Kurdish princes to expand their territory and holdings at Ottoman expense by exploiting Ottoman weakness during the 19th century. For example, in two great uprisings, both Mir

Muhammad of Rewanduz in 1833, and the Mir Bedirhan of Botan in 1847, brought the surrounding tribes and weaker principalities under their control before they rose against the central government. A brief analysis of these two uprisings would provide a better insight in understanding the interconnected relations between the Ottoman central state, Kurdish principalities and the growing interests of the Great Powers in

Middle East in general and in Kurdistan in particular.

Mir Muhammad, after displacing his father in 1814, brought the surrounding tribes and the Bahdinan principality under his control by 1833. His next target was the great

Amirate of Botan. Here there are two different accounts about Mir Muhammad and

Mir Bedirhan. McDowall argues that Mir Muhammad attacked the Botan Amirate, seizing Jazira bin Umar, but was compelled to return back to Amadiya where the unseated Mir of Bahdinan had regained control. Kendal and Safrastian on the other hand argue that Mir Muhammad invited Bedirhan ‗to conclude a political alliance against the Porte.‘42 Bedirhan rejected the offer but sent his brother, Seyfeddin as a form of symbolic support.43 In any case Mir Muhammad had to face the Ottoman army on his own, as the central government was worried about the activities of the

52 Mir. A bloody war ensued between the forces of the Mir and the Ottoman army.

Having won the first engagement, the Mir set out for Iranian Kurdistan and reached the border of Southern Azerbaijan. The Kurdo-Ottoman war restarted in July 1836.

Mir Muhammad‘s forces initially defeated the Ottoman troops, but in the end the

Ottomans successfully exploited the religious beliefs of the Mir‘s entourage, calling on the Mir to stop the war and to seek ‗reconciliation amongst Muslims‘. One Mulla, named Khalid, issued a fatwa (religious decree) stating that ‗he who fights against the troops of the Caliph is an infidel.‘ The Ottoman official, the governor of Baghdad who personally knew the Mir, promised him he would recommend his reinstatement and safe conduct to Istanbul for negotiations. The Mir accepted the terms and traveled to Istanbul where he was accepted by the Porte and was promised the Governorate of all Kurdistan, for which the Mir had hoped. After six months in Istanbul he set out for

Kurdistan, but he had been kept under surveillance in Amasya and later he entirely disappeared. The general assumption was that he was executed by the Ottomans.44

Bedirhan, Mir of Botan, ascended to power on his father‘s death in 1821. For the time being he remained submissive to Ottoman authority until the late 1830s. In 1839 he was appointed as an official to the Ottoman army in order to mobilize his tribal troops against Ibrahim Pasha‘s Egyptian troops. Meanwhile he consolidated his power within his domain and established contacts with the Mirs of Hakkari, Muks, and

Bitlis. The Ottoman‘s defeat against the Egyptian troops at Nacib, and the fall of Mir

Muhammad of Rawanduz, provided ample opportunity for Mir Bedirhan to expand his principality throughout Kurdistan. By 1840 he had extended his influence over all of Ottoman Kurdistan and set up an alliance with Emir Ardelan of Iranian Kurdistan.

53 The conflict between the Assyrians and the Mir of Hakkari provided an opportunity for Bedirhan to bring the Behdinan Amirate under his control. The Mir of Hakkari,

Nur Allah Beg summoned Bedirhan to help him to punish the Assyrians, whose leadership had been assumed by Mar Shimun as a result of a schism in the House of

Hakkari. Mar Shimun was supported by Suleyman Beg, who contested for the

Hakkari Amirate. In 1843 Bedirhan assembled a large force of 75,000 men and proceeded to move through the Nestorian region, massacring the inhabitants. Another invasion took place in 1846. Against the firm protest of France and Britain, the

Ottoman force moved against Bedirhan forces. In the first battle the Ottoman army was defeated. However, Osman Pasha who led the Ottoman army struck a deal with

Bedirhan‘s nephew, Yezdan Şer who commanded the eastern flank of the Kurdish forces, to go over to the Ottoman side. Mir Bedirhan, as a result, had withdrawn to the easily defensible fortress of Eruh where for 8 months he resisted against the Ottoman troops. But he surrendered in the end, and he and his family were exiled to Crete. The

Prince of Bitlis, Şerif Beg who allied with Bedirhan was deported to Istanbul and was replaced with a centrally appointed Ottoman official.

The last revolt against the central authority in the first half of the century was led by the same Yezdan Şer who betrayed his uncle, Bedirhan. Having struck a deal, he was appointed as governor of Hakkari, albeit with less functional power. He took advantage of the Russo-Ottoman war to launch his own agenda to control Kurdistan and place himself as King. In 1855 he seized the town of Bitlis and then captured

Mosul with little difficulty. Within months a vast area from Baghdad to Lake Van and

Diyarbakir had come under the control of Yezdan Şer. In the struggle against Yezdan

Şer, Britain and France, which had supported the Ottomans against Russia during the

54 Crimean war, helped the Ottomans as they feared that separation of Kurdistan from the empire might further place the former under the influence of Russia. Indeed,

Yezdan Şer had sent letters to the Russia for help. A certain British emissary, Nimrud

Rassam, persuaded Yezdan Şer to negotiate the independence of Kurdistan from the

Central government with the British acting as a mediator. Yezdan accepted the offer, as he believed that securing independence would only be achievable with the help of a

European power. He traveled to Istanbul with Rassam for negotiations but was arrested as soon as he arrived in Istanbul. The uprising was over.

In the first half of the 19th century over 80 insurrections broke out but they were all, one by one, suppressed and their leaders were either killed or exiled to remote parts of the empire. Having suppressed the uprisings, the Ottoman State confiscated the properties of these princes and would not let them to return back to their lands. The objective of the Ottomans was clear: to destroy the link between Kurdish leaders/princes and the land and people they controlled. Even defeated and suppressed princes posed a serious threat to the Ottoman administration, as they still had the potential ability to mobilize a large number of people across a wide area.

The distinctive features of these uprisings were that they were all led by Kurdish ruling families, whose main concern was to secure their semi-independent status and extend their area of influence and privileges. In the case of Mir Muhammad of

Rewanduz, Mir Bedirhan of Botan, and Yezdan Şer of Hakkari, they also had the objective of creating an independent Kurdistan free from the Ottomans. This however does not mean that they were nationalistic movements. Their primary objective was to establish a kingdom, i.e. they were dynasts. Certainly it would have been a great step if they had succeeded in establishing an independent kingdom. Such a creation could

55 have evolved towards a centralized state, which in turn would have established central institutions necessary for a modern nation-state.

There are several reasons why these insurrections failed: lack of unity between

Kurdish princes, each of whom rose up on their own. If Mir Bedirhan and Mir

Muhammad united their forces they might had had a better chance. The disunity is an understandable fact as each Kurdish Mir wanted to expand his territory and authority at the expense of others, which in itself is proof that they were not motivated by a nationalistic cause. Lack of foreign support. Britain and France did not want to see a weakening of the Ottoman Empire in its eastern flank, as it blocked the Russian expansion towards the East.

The suppression of the 19th century uprisings had serious consequences for both the political and the social life of Kurdistan. With the destruction of the principalities, the political structure of Kurdistan was further fragmented into smaller units. As the

Ottoman central administration had failed to fill the vacuum created by the removed princes, inter tribal conflict began riddling Kurdistan. Chaos and anarchy became widespread. The Mirs were part of the balance of power as they mediated between tribes and tribal sections in their territory. Because they were eliminated, unrestricted inter-tribal conflicts arose all over Kurdistan. Religious figures, especially Sheikhs, began to rise and obtained a prominent role in Kurdish social and political life as they gradually filled the vacuum. As spiritual leaders they were beyond tribal kinship, and became perfect candidates to play the role of mediators. In due course they seized more power for their own advantages.

56 3. From the mid-19th Century up to the First World War

The Sheikhs in Kurdistan belonged to one of either of two tariqas, dervish orders,

Nakshibandi and Qadiri. Up until the early 19th century the prominent tariqa was

Qadiri. During the 19th century there were two Qadiri Sheikhly dynasties in

Kurdistan, the Berzenjis who hailed from the village of Berzenji, near Sulaimania, and the Seyyids of Nehri (in Hakkari). Both families had Seyyid status (descent from the prophet). The Qadiri order allowed only family members, in effect, Seyyids, to aspire to the Sheikhly status, in order to maintain hierarchical control over their followers.45 At the early 19th century a new tariqa was born out of the Mujaddidi tradition within the Nakshibandi order and surpassed the Qadiris in Kurdistan. The instigator of this Nakshibandi tariqa was Sheikh Mawlana Khalid who was born into the Jaf tribe in Shahrizur in late 18th century. Qadiri Seyyids of Nehri switched to the

Nakshibandi order in mid-19th century.

During the 19th early 20th centuries three Sheikhly families dominated the political scene in Kurdistan: Nakshibandi Seyyids of Nehri; the Barzanis; and the Qadiri

Berzenjis. Their status was also strengthened by intermarriage with daughters of dying amirates and powerful chiefs. Through the dervish orders the Sheikhs were in contact with devoted dervishes, and hence were capable of mobilizing a large following. The rise of Sheikhly families to prominence in the social and political life of Kurdistan has led some scholars to analyze the relation between religion and

Kurdish nationalism.46 Jwadieh has pointed out that the tariqas’ involvement with nationalism was a significant development in the history of Kurdish nationalism:

‗for a number of reasons, the importance of the takiyahs (tariqas) as

centers for the dissemination of nationalist ideas can scarcely be

57 exaggerated. The ideas emanating from these focal points found ready

and wide acceptance among the Kurds. For they bore the stamp of the

great learning and unimpeachable religious authority of the Sheikhs.

Moreover, the religious character and influence of the Sheikhs gave the

takiyahs relative immunity from interference and harassment by the

authorities.‘47

Jwadieh was right to argue that the Sheikhs had great influence on the social and political life of the Kurds. Their influence was weightier than that of the urbanized

Kurdish elite in Istanbul. However, the nationalist character of the Sheikhs must be questioned. As Jwaideh himself indicated, Sheikhs ‗both by training and conviction

(…) stood for the traditional Islamic state as opposed to the modern secular state envisaged by the Young Turks.‘48 Their preconception with the Islamic state49 and

Caliphate inevitably impeded them from greater involvement in the development of nationalist politics.

In an exceptional case, Sheikh Abdulselam Barzan‘s involvement in Kurdish political affairs came near to nationalist discourse. In a petition sent to the Porte and the

Ottoman parliament in Istanbul in 1907, one can detect early signs of nationalist ideas. The petitioners, Sheikh Abd al Salam of Barzan and the Sheikh Nur

Muhammad Brifkani of Duhok, requested the following reforms:

1-The adoption of Kurdish as the official language in the five Kurdish Qadahs

(administrative districts).

2-The adoption of Kurdish as the language of instruction in the Kurdish areas.

3-The appointment of Kurdish-speaking qaimmaqams, mudirs of Nahiyas, and other officials.

58 4-The administration of law and justice in accordance with the Shariat, in view of the fact that Islam is the state religion.

5-The positions of qadi (religious judges) and mufti (cannon lawyers responsible for delivering formal legal opinions) to be filled by adherents of the Shafi-i school of law.

6-Taxes to be levied in accordance with the provisions of the Shariat, and the abolition of all taxes which are in excess of or incompatible with the amounts established by the Shariat.

7-Taxes collected for exemption from labour service to remain in effect, provided they are set aside for the repair and maintenance of roads in the five Kurdish qadahs.50

This petition is highly significant as it indicates the awareness of the Sheikhs about the importance of the Kurdish language in Kurdish areas.

The last Kurdish revolt of the 19th century, by Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri, is a good case from which to analyze the highly interconnected web of religion, nationalism, the growing interest of external powers and the cunning Ottoman policy in Kurdistan.

Sheikh Ubeydullah enjoyed high prestige due to his religious genealogy going back to

Abd-al-Qadir Gilani, the founder of the Qadiri order. The family line of the Sheikh goes back to the prophet through his daughter Fatima.51 It was argued that through this religious prestige the Sheikh family generated the income necessary to rise and become a great landowning family.52 Combined with the destruction of the Kurdish principalities, the Sheikh, following the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman war, arose as the most powerful leader, religious and political, in Kurdistan. Özoğlu has indicated that, by 1880, the Sheikh‘s control ‗extended beyond Hakkari into a vast region that was controlled by the Botan, Behdinan, Hakkari and Ardelan confederacies.‘53

59 The Sheikh Ubeydullah revolt began in September 1880 against the Iranian government because of its harsh treatments of tribal chiefs whom were loyal to the

Sheikh and paid him tribute. The Iranian local authorities‘ action against the tribal chiefs without consulting Sheikh Abdulkadir, the son of the Sheikh, representing him in the border villages, led Sheikh Abdulkadir into rebellion against Iran. In a very short time he proceeded to the Southern side of Lake Urmiya. During his proceedings a Shia town called Miandoab, refused to surrender and killed the Sheikh Abdulkadir‘s envoys, whereupon the inhabitants of the town were executed. While his son led his troops towards Lake Urmiya, the Sheikh‘s other son, Muhammad Sadiq, and his

Khalifa, Said, crossed into Iran with their troops.

In a very short time the Sheikh forces approached Tabriz. Due to fact that most of the troops involved in pillage and left for home with their holdings, the Sheikh‘s army was reduced considerably. As a result, the Sheikh failed to seize the Azerbaijani capital, Tabriz. Due to the lack of discipline in the Sheikh‘s army, advancing Iranian troops from the west and east sides of Urmiya, and the deployment of Ottoman troops near the Iranian border, the Sheikh decided to withdraw back to Ottoman Kurdistan.

The revolt was over. The Sultan initially did not take any punitive action against the

Sheikh. On the contrary, he sent gifts to the tribal chiefs and invited the Sheikh to

Istanbul. Having spent 6 months in Istanbul, the Sheikh left the capital for Kurdistan.

However, as a result of growing Iranian and European power pressure on the Ottoman government, and as well as the rumours that the Sheikh was in touch with Russia, the

Sultan exiled the Sheikh and his family to Mecca.

60 If the Sheikh‘s revolt resulted partly from Iranian mistreatment of tribal chiefs— clients of the Sheikh—another reason was the growing tribal disorder within his territory. The Shikak tribe‘s incursion in Hakkari-Baradust from Iranian Kurdistan threatened the Sheikh‘s patronage. The inability of the Iranian government to curtail the activities of the Shikak tribe in Ottoman territory led the Sheikh claim his revolt

‗was against Iranian incompetence and local banditry.‘54

Sheikh Ubeydullah‘s objective was ambiguous. On the one hand he expressed a nationalist discourse which was evident in his letter to an American missionary:

‗The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families, is a people

apart. Their religion is different, and their laws and customs distinct.. We are

also a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our hands, so that in the

punishment of our own offenders we may be strong and independent, and have

privileges like other nations… This is our object ... Otherwise the whole of

Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put up

with these continual evil deeds and the oppression which they suffer at the

hands of the [Persian and Ottoman] governments.‘55

But on the other hand, as the British primary sources indicate, he was ready to settle the issue, providing his authority in Kurdistan was acknowledged by the Ottoman

State. The British Consul general in Erzurum, in a letter asserts:

‗I believe the Sheikh to be more or less personally loyal to the Sultan;

and he would be ready to submit to his authority and pay him tribute as

long as he could get rid of the Ottoman officials, and be looked as de

lege as well as de facto the ruling chief of Kurdistan.‘56

61 Asked by the British Consul-general, Abbott, whether it was

‗his objective to form Kurdistan into separate Principality, independent

of the Porte or merely to weld together its rude components, reduce

order out of chaos and become the responsible head of the Kurdish

nation, answerable to the Sultan for their good conduct and the

collection of taxes? To this the Sheikh replied that nobody ever

doubted his loyalty to the Sultan but that he had poor opinion of the

Pashas [i.e. the provisional administration].‘57

Another report indicates the Sheikh‘s intention:

‗The Sheikh was going to send his son to Constantinople with the

following proposals: He will point out the large sum paid to the Sultan

by Bedirhan Beg, when semi-independent, and will offer to pay a still

larger sum if his authority over Kurdistan is recognized, and his rule is

not interfered with.‘58

Some scholars on Kurdish history claimed that the Sheikh had nationalist motives.

Jwadieh argued that the Sheikh‘s statement certainly leaves ‗no doubt as to his strong nationalist sentiment.‘59 R. Olson classified the Sheikh‘s revolt as the beginning of

Kurdish nationalism. A number of scholars, on the other hand, have denied the nationalist character of the revolt. Özoğlu, for example, put forward the view that ‗the

Ubeydullah revolt of 1880 was more like a trans-tribal revolt than a national one.‘60

McDowall had same view: ‗yet apart from such utterances [the Sheikh‘s statement] the revolt bore little evidence that it was anything other than the kind of tribal disturbance, but on a larger scale that already bedeviled the region.‘61 Another writer argued that 'nationalism as an analytical category does not help us understand Sheikh

62 Ubeydullah's reasons for leading an army of Kurdish fighters into Iranian Azerbaijan.

Instead, it was his personal interests and ambitions that motivated his invasion of

Iran.'62

Excerpts from British primary sources cast doubt on the Sheikh‘s nationalistic motives. This study, like Özoğlu and McDowall, claims that the revolt cannot be classified as a nationalist movement. The principal reason for disavowing the

Sheikh‘s nationalism is the fact that he was mainly interested, like the Kurdish Mirs before him, in the preservation and protection of his status. Creation of an independent Kurdistan or a Kurdish principality within the orbit of Ottoman capital, was not geared towards the creation of a Kurdish nation-state, but rather based on as an effective means for continuation and preservation and extension of the Sheikh‘s privileges and status.

Two crucial aspects of the Sheikh‘s revolt must be dealt with here: first the reason behind the Sheikh‘s use of nationalist discourse; and secondly his so-called loyalty to the Sultan and Caliphate. McDowall has rightly argued that the Sheikh‘s application of nationalist terminology based on the fear of Armenian ascendancy and evident interest of the Great Powers on it. The Treaty of Berlin (13 July 1878) stipulated that the Ottoman should undertake necessary steps to protect Armenians against the

Kurds. The growing interests in Armenian and other Christian minorities discomforted the Sheikh, who warned the Ottoman officials:

‗What is this I hear, that the Armenians are going to have an

independent state in Van, and that the Nestorians are going to hoist the

63 British flag and declare themselves British subjects. I will never permit

it, even if I have to arm the women.‘63

Thus McDowall argued ‗lies the clue to his own call to Britain to recognize the Kurds a ‗nation apart‘. If, as feared, an Armenian or Nestorian protected entity was in prospect, it would be established partly in his area of influence. It was a clear case of

―them or us‖. Sheikh Ubeydullah therefore, it seems, made the case for the Kurds in the secular nationalist vocabulary current in European chancellories.‘64

The Sheikh‘s loyalty to the Sultan and Caliphate was well argued. McDowall inferred that the Sheikh ‗to the very end had been true to his spiritual mentor,‘ Mawlana

Khalid, who ‗had taught his followers to ―pray for the survival of the exalted Ottoman state upon which depends Islam, and for victory over the enemies of religion, the cursed Christians and the despicable Persians.‖‘65 This assertion, however, is debatable. A primary source, a report written by a Russian army officer, P.I.

Avriyanov, casts doubt on the assumed loyalty of Sheikh towards the Caliphate. The report quotes a full speech of the Sheikh, shortly before his revolt in Iran, to his followers that deserve quotation here:

‗The Ottoman Empire was established about 555 years ago. The

Ottomans had their empire erected by means of illegal rebellion (Gayr-

i Kanuni). The Sharia demands the Sultan –Padisha- to be a descent of

the Prophet. The Ottomans rule over the Islamic world –Alem-i Islam-

is illegal. (….) The Ottoman government having acknowledged the

infidel‘s laws, gave up the laws of the Sharia and as a result it is

weakening and decaying. The rate of decay is so fast, there is no doubt

that very soon the state (the Ottoman) will cease to exist. For that

64 reason, my dear sons [referring to all his followers] it is already

enough to have become the subject of and to endure the rule of the

Turks who have became unbelievers. Not only the Ottomans, but also,

according to the Sharia, the Iranians, are infidel.‘66

This report is crucial for two obvious reasons: one is that it is rebuttal of the official

British view of the time of the Sheikh‘s loyalty to the Caliphate. The speech explicitly indicates that the Sheikh did not even acknowledge the legitimacy of the Ottoman

Sultan‘s title for Caliphate, as the Ottoman Sultans were not descendants of the

Prophet. Secondly, it displays the Sheikh‘s pragmatism. Although the Sheikh portrayed himself as a loyal person to the Caliph through his dialogue with British officials, he explicitly encouraged his followers into the rebellion against the ‗infidel‘

Iranian and Ottoman governments.

3.1. The Establishment of Tribal Cavalry: The Hamidieh Regiments

It is not within the scope of this work to fully analyze the Hamidieh regiments. This study would rather confine itself to emphasizing the way in which the regiments were formed, and their conduct and the consequences in regard to the further fragmentation of Kurdish society.

One of the most crucial developments in Kurdistan, in terms of Ottoman policy after the suppression of the Ubeydullah revolt in 1880, was the establishment of the

Hamidieh Light Cavalry Regiments in 1891.67 The formation of regiments is another example of the Ottoman policy of divide, protect and rule in Kurdistan. Major Noel

65 notes that the very aim of the Hamidieh had been ‗(to use) tribal feuds so as to create a system which would make combination against the government very difficult.‘68 It has been rightly argued that the establishment of the Hamidieh cavalry has to be placed in the context of Abdulhamid‘s policy objectives:

‗to establish central authority; to create a new social-political balance

to make the government more effective in Eastern Anatolia; to take

advantage of tribal forces for military purposes; to use the cavalry

against the Armenians and to equalize the balance of power, at least

military power; to protect the Empire against Russian invasion and

impede or stop Great Britain‘s policies of penetration in Eastern

Anatolia; and to implement the policy of Pan-Islam.‘69

The Eastern region of the empire constituted one of the most sensitive strategic zones.

It was bordered by Russia and Persia, and included a Christian ethnic group, the

Armenians, with contacts in Russia and Europe.

The Armenians constituted a sizeable minority in the eastern provinces of the empire.

They were mostly peasants who were dominated by Kurdish tribes. Armenian nationalism emerged in the 1870s. An Armenian delegation demanded reforms in the eastern provinces of the empire at the Congress of Berlin. The early Armenian nationalist organizations appeared in mid 1880s.70 Russia had occupied eastern part of the Ottoman Empire twice, in 1828/9 and 1877/8. It has been argued that Russian stimulated Armenian nationalism and separatism in the east.71 Britain was also involved in the Armenian question at the Berlin Congress. The cooperation of the local Muslim population, the Kurds, was essential for the defense of the area against the Armenians and Russia.72

66 The regiments were recruited from nomadic or semi-nomadic Kurdish tribes and led by their tribal chiefs. Some large tribes formed one or two regiments and some other smaller tribes joined together to form one regiment.73 The number of the men in each regiment consisted of between 500 and 1250 men. The regiments were not permitted to unify except in times of war on the order of the commanding general, and they were under the control of the 4th army commander, Muşir Zeki Pasha.74 The regiments were not subject to the local administration but to the Sultan alone through his brother-in-law, the same Zeki Pasha. The chiefs of the regiments were sent to a special school in Istanbul for education. The tribes who participated in the regiments gained many advantages: they were exempted from most taxes; they received weapons and in turn increased their dominance over other tribes who were not involved in the regiments.

Those tribes who were Sunni in origin and loyal to the state were favoured by the

Porte as part of Abdulhamid‘s Pan-Islam policy. The appointment of a very powerful chieftain, Ibrahim Pasha, the chief of the Milan confederation, as head of a Hamidieh regiment is an example of this policy. The main criterion for Ibrahim Pasha‘s promotion was that he had always been loyal to the Sultan. He had been a very powerful chief since he assumed leadership of the Milan confederation in 1863. He managed to reunite a section of the confederation after it had fallen apart as a result of internal conflicts in the 1850s.75 Abdulhamid hoped to instill a strong sense of personal loyalty amongst the Kurds. The selection of tribes for the regiments was also based on balancing the tribes against each other. As Duguid notes: ‗in some cases the selection of tribes for the Hamidiya was used to maintain the balance of power in the region, while in others it had the opposite effect. Weaker tribes were usually chosen

67 where possible because the better-quality equipment and training available to them offset the greater strength of their traditional rivals.‘76

With the Young Turk revolution the Hamidieh regiments were disbanded. However, the Young Turks soon revived and extended the Hamidieh as Tribal Regiments

(Aşiret Alaylari) because of the usefulness of the regiments on the eastern frontier.

These regiments remained essentially the same as that of the Hamidieh. By August

1910 the number of the men serving in the regiments was about 53,000.77 These regiments were sent to trouble spots alongside the regular army. They were dispatched to Yemen in 1908 and to Albania in 1911. They also fought during the

Balkan War (1912-1913) and the First World War.78

Olson identified the period of the Hamidieh Regiments (1891-1914) as an important stage in the emergence of Kurdish nationalism ‗serving as a fulcrum of Kurdish power for over two decades. There had not been such a concentration of Kurdish power and authority since 1847. From 1895 to 1914, the Kurds had 50,000 men…‘79

He further suggested that serving in the Balkans exposed Kurdish tribal regiments to

Balkan nationalism. Those Kurds who had been trained in the schools established by

Abdulhamid became aware of the international politics that had contributed to the

Balkan wars. He also argued that ‗Abdulhamid‘s policies, implemented via the

[Hamidieh], allowed the Kurds to oppose the bureaucracy of the Porte and their counterparts in the provinces more forcefully. The Kurds looked upon the Ottoman bureaucrats as implementing reforms that favoured the creation of an Armenian state.

(…) Such a situation must have contributed to the Kurdish sense that they had to take matters into their own hands.‘80

68 This type of reasoning is not convincing enough to classify the period as an important stage in the emergence of the Kurdish nationalism. Firstly, the amount of men serving in the regiments was not that important partly because they had never been allowed to become a unified force, and partly because they were selected among the tribes loyal to the Sultan. Secondly, the selection and formation of the regiments further fragmented the social and political structure of Kurdistan. The creation and practice of the regiments contributed more to the already chaotic political situation in Kurdistan.

Because the regiments were not responsible to the local governments, but rather to the

Sultan alone, they were unrestrained in their actions and inevitably became involved in atrocities against Alevi tribes and the Armenian people. Lynch notes in 1894 the activities of the regiments at the city of Erzurum:

‗It is well known that these bands were led by officers in the Hamidieh

regiments –tenekelis-, or tin-plate men, as they are called by the

populace, from the brass badges they wear in their caps. The frightened

officials, obliged to report such occurrences, take refuge behind the

amusing euphemism of such a phrase as ―brigands, disguised as

soldiers.‖‘81

Another British military consul reports:

‗The Hamidieh troops, in fact, are under no control whatever, beyond

that of their own native chief, which does not appear to be exercised

much in the interests of law and order. It is a curious sight to see Kurds

walking about the streets of the town (Başkale) in their native

customs…. They have a habit of taking what they require out of the

shops without payment.‘82

69 The Hamidieh regiments intensified the conflict between Alevi and Sunni Kurds. The hostility between the Cibran tribe and Hormek is an example. The Cibran tribe, which provided four regiments, began to assault the Alevi Hormek, confiscating their lands.

The Alevi population throughout the existence of the Hamidieh regiments suffered greatly. Not surprisingly the central and local governments did nothing to prevent such atrocities.

Although the Sunni regiments attacked and caused mayhem throughout the Alevi tribes, the main atrocities, however, seem to have been directed against the Armenian people. The regiments‘ mistreatment of the Armenians ‗was egged on or even deliberately directed by the Ottoman military authorities.‘83 A British official, Consul

Hampson, serving in Erzurum indicated that ‗this measure of arming the Kurds is regarded with great anxiety here. This feeling is much increased by the conduct of the

Kurds themselves, many of whom openly state that they have been appointed to suppress the Armenians, and that they have received assurances that they will not be called to answer before the tribunals for any acts of oppression committed against

Christians.‘84 From early 1890 onward, serious atrocities had been committed against the Armenians by the Ottoman soldiers, the Hamidieh regiments and Muslim citizens both Turks and Kurds. In 1894 in the Sasun district more than 1,000 Armenians villagers perished and the following year in areas such as Trabzon, Erzincan, Bitlis,

Erzurum, Diyarbakir, Sivas, Kharput, Kayseri and Urfa thousands of Armenians were massacred.85 In such atrocities the Hamidieh regiments played a prominent role. The regiments‘ mistreatment of the Armenian people and their misconduct in Kurdistan were fiercely criticized in the issues of Kurdistan (1898-1902). The editor of the paper rightly blamed the central government and the Sultan for the excesses of the

70 Hamidieh regiments. Deterioration of Kurdo-Armenian relations had indeed strained both parties in the post-war period in their relations with the Great Powers, and created suspicion when they attempted to collaborate for mutual political interests.

McDowall inferred that ‗the Hamidieh cavalry was clearly a failure. On the whole, there was little sign of integration into a wider Ottoman context. On the contrary, through the license allowed to the Hamidieh regiments, tribalism enjoyed a strong resurgence. (…) However much Abddulhamid was opposed to reform, he could hardly have had in mind a reversion to the tribal principalities his forebear Mahmud II had abolished.‘86 It is certainly true that the creation of Hamidieh regiments did not integrate the Kurds further into the Ottoman establishment as it was expected.

However, the regiments further fragmented Kurdish society by instigating Sunni and

Alevi conflict and between Hamidieh Kurdish tribes versus non-Hamidieh Kurdish tribes. The selection of the tribes, loyal and Sunni, and being centrally controlled by

Istanbul, meant the regiments had no chance to evolve into a principality. The

Ottoman State and later nation-states (Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria) had never intended nor wished to abolish tribalism in Kurdistan. On the contrary, they encouraged or at least remained indifferent to the tribal structure of Kurdistan. These facts explain the reason why tribalism still persists as an important element of Kurdish society today, whereas in the western part of Turkey it ceased to exist long time ago.

The Sultan‘s objective in creating the regiments to suppress Armenian nationalism worked. The regiments were so effective that even the Young Turks had to revive them a short time after they abolished. The creation of conflict between Sunnis and

Alevis, Kurds and Armenians proved to be decisive in the post-war era, during which the Kemalist movement exploited it for its own advantage.

71 4. First World War and Kurdistan

As the Ottoman Empire entered WWI alongside the Axis powers, Kurdistan became a theatre of battle between warring forces of the Ottomans, Russians and British.

Throughout the war armies had gone through Kurdistan leaving behind a wasted country, and an immense loss of Kurdish lives. Deportation and massacres became part of everyday life. As Ahmad notes ‗it would have been impossible for Kurdistan to have remained immune from the causes of the war, the war itself, or its impact.‘87

The 19th century witnessed the great Kurdish uprisings against the central government of the Ottomans, thus one might assume that the Kurds would use the war as an advantage to overthrow the Ottoman rule in Kurdistan. However, this is not what happened. Despite some passive resistance against the Ottoman‘s call for Jihad in areas of Southern Kurdistan and the Dersim region, most Kurds participated in the war activities alongside the Ottomans. The Kurdish elite who contributed to pre-war pro-Kurdish cultural activities also participated in the war efforts. Seyyid Abdulkadir, for example, supported and called for Jihad against the ‗infidel‘. Sheikh Mahmut

Berzenji, who played a prominent role in the post-war period in Southern Kurdistan also fought with a thousand Kurdish troops along with the Ottoman regular army against British troops in Shvaiba in Southern Iraq.88 L. Rambout notes that

‗when WWI broke out, Turkey, although not enjoying a favorable

position with the Kurds, nevertheless hoped to have Kurds on her side.

By way of propaganda and intrigues, the government succeeded in

making the Kurds consider their patriotic duty to effect actions against

the Russians who, presumably excite the Armenians, and against the

British, who support the Arabs. The Kurds did act.‘89

72

All the Kurdish youth and able bodied men were recruited into the Ottoman regular army and dispatched to battlefield in various parts of the empire. Recruitment was in such intensity that in most families no one remained other than children, women and old people.90 Most of the Kurdish recruits perished on the battlefield. The most extreme case is called the ‗drama of Sarikamiş.‘ In the winter of 1915, the third army, commanded by Enver Pasha, was destroyed at Sarikamiş. According to Liman van

Sanders, out of 90,000 troops only 12,000 survived. The army perished not only as a result of a clash with the Russian army, but mainly ‗died of hunger or froze to death while camping in the snow without tents.‘91 In the Third Army thousands of Kurdish recruits also perished. According to O. Uzeri 40,000 Kurdish soldiers perished:

‗one of the fronts against the Russians was the Kars-Ardelan front. The Turks

under Enver Pasha, when it became clear that there were no hope in defeating

Russians, assembled 40,000 Kurdish warriors and sent them as reinforcement.

As these Kurds were armed with rifles only, Enver Pasha recklessly ordered that

the Kurds would have to climb the mountain Alla-Akbar and suddenly attack the

Russians from the other side… The time was mid-winter, therefore, as only to be

expected, the cold, snow and frost not only prevented any advance but froze to

death the whole campaign in the middle of the slope… It is related that many had

frozen standing rifle in hand like statutes… In this way from the forty thousand

no one returned. Behind them there were left as many families, helpless and

hopeless in the grip of fate.‘92

Although the Kurds participated in the war effort alongside the Ottomans, nonetheless in some parts of Kurdistan there was a reluctance to serve in the army, especially in

Dersim and Southern Kurdistan. The Times reported an interesting observation:

73 ‗In outline the story of the Kurds of Turkey during the war is as follows…they

were amongst the few who were somewhat impressed at the proclamation of the

Jihad by the Caliph on the outbreak of war. The Turks succeeded in drawing

from them bodies of irregular forces. Some of these fought against us in

Mesopotamia in the early days, but they became so disgusted at the way in which

they were treated that they returned to their homes, and from 1915 onwards the

Kurds hardly furnished a single horseman. The Jihad fell flat. The Kurdish ulema

refused to preach it, and openly proclaimed the war to be for Turkish

aggrandizement… chiefs in the Mosul area even found themselves forced to seek

refuge in Russian territory.‘93

WWI caused further deterioration in intercommunal relations in Kurdistan. The

Armenian-Kurdish and Nestorian-Kurdish conflicts were intensified and culminated in the genocide of the Armenian people as well as massacre of Kurds at the hands of the Armenian partisans. This inter-communal conflict must be analyzed within the framework of Great Powers policies in Kurdistan and Armenia. The main culprit in

Armenian genocide was the central Ottoman government, the government of the

Young Turks. According to Dadrian the decision for extermination of Armenian people had been taken very secretly and at the very high official level of the government:

‗there is an excerpt from the speech which the distinguished Ottoman

statesman, Reşid Akif Pasha, delivered in the Ottoman Senate on 21

November 1918. In that speech he revealed that when he was President

of the State Council (Şuray-i Devlet) and was a member of the first

post-war Ottoman Cabinet of Ahmed Izzet Pasha, he came across two

documents. One was the formal deportation order issued by then

74 Interior Minister, Talat which order was meant for public consumption.

The other, however, was ―a secret circular‖ sent to the provincial party

branches by Ittihad‘s Central Committee ordering the killer bands to

commence the massacres as soon as the deportee convoys were sent

off to exile.‘94

Although official deportation of Armenians was approved on 27 May by the Council of Ministers, the exercise of deportation and massacre began earlier than those official decrees. During the war period more than one million Armenians perished and those remaining fled to Russian controlled territory.

Some Kurdish groups and individuals participated in the Armenian genocide. Ahmad argued that ‗the Kurds did not participate as a people in the Armenian massacres.‘ It is only ‗a handful of Kurdish lords and feudalists benefited from the Armenian massacres by seizing the land of the killed and the fugitives, with government help in different forms, while many others distanced themselves from events, some even giving assistance to the Armenian victims.‘95 Analyzing the role of the Kurds in the

Armenian Genocide using modern ethnic categories, as Ahmed does, does not offer an adequate explanation. Some sections of the Kurds were involved in the Armenian genocide simply because they had material interests in eliminating the Armenians.

Plus the Great Powers involvement in the Armenian issue had long alienated and distanced the Kurds from Armenians. Kurdo-Armenian relations must be seen within the context of their respective approach to the Ottoman Empire. The Kurds identified themselves with Ottomanism and therefore it is not surprising to see their involvement in Ottoman policy. The fact that the Dersimi and the southern Kurds were not

75 involved in the Armenian genocide is due to their stormy relations with Ottoman institutions, thus their reluctance to participate in Ottoman policy in the region.

During this horrible climax the Armenians were also involved in massacring the

Kurds in revenge. According to A. Powell

‗in 1916 a Russian column, largely composed of Armenians and other

Christian volunteers, calling themselves the Army of Revenge, invaded

Central Kurdistan, the atrocities committed by them during the

destruction of Rewanduz upon Kurds, who, until then had known

nothing of them, being in every respect equal to anything attributed to

Kurds in former massacres of Armenians.‘96

Despite the Kurdish involvement in the Armenian genocide there is some evidence, which indicates that some sections of the Kurds indeed helped and saved the life of

Armenian people. E.H. Keeling narrates such a case:

‗Sir Mark Sykes one of the most jealous friend of Armenians.. was anxious to

learn what was the condition of those who had survived the massacres in

Western Kurdistan, including Urfa, Diyarbakir, and Mardin, and what were the

relations between the Armenians and the Kurds. A deputation of Kurdish

Sheikhs had come to Aleppo with a petition, of which the following is an

abbreviate translation: ―we have in our villages and tents 650 Armenians, mostly

women and children. Our friendly neighbours have 3,800 more. We wish to have

these people over the European powers… We must, however, state that this can

only be done on condition that the Turks leave our district and European

governors take their place, because we know that Turks wish to destroy the

Armenians… We have fed these people for four years and do not wish to see the

76 bread we have given them wasted.‖ We also know of 6,800 more Armenians in

the tents of the tribes friendly to us but too far east to allow us to speak for them.

We are sure that if the Europeans send officers to these tribes they will find the

same conditions.‘97

There are number of factors which contributed the Kurdish involvement in Armenian genocide. McDowall argued that tribal lawlessness, Muslim identity and Armenians‘ connection with the hostile European powers are some of the reasons behind the

Kurdish attitude against Christians: ‗It is no accident that atrocities were worse the further east one went, where the Russian danger was greatest, and those areas where tribes gave protection to Armenians were well away from the battlegrounds. In short, most Kurds involved in the massacres probably felt it was a question of ―them or us‖‘.98 Another factor, not least important, is that the Kurdish tribes had their eyes on the property of the Armenians. They were aware that with the removal of Armenians their land would be available for confiscation. Certainly the Ottomans gave the green light for such action. This was compounded by the fact that Kurdish tribes in that part of the region were threatened with the establishment of an Armenian state in which they might lose their land and grazing rights as nomadic tribes which they had been practicing freely under Ottoman rule.

The reason this study emphasized the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish participation in that genocide is that it created tension and conflict between these two peoples. This conflict was used by the Kemalist movement in the post-war period for its own advantages. In the post-war period, the Kurds and Armenians perceived each other as potential enemies, and thus, each tried to ally themselves with others, either the Great Powers or the Kemalists, which in turn made the post-war settlement very

77 difficult. The Kemalists played on the fear of the Kurds against the Armenians, and as a result managed to secure the valuable support of some of the Kurdish tribes in the post-war period. Kurdish-Armenian relations in the post-war period will be looked in more detail in the next chapters.

During WWI the Kurds were deported to the western part of the Empire. According to the Immigration General-Directorate‘s instruction in regard to the resettlement of the

Kurdish immigrants, reports Kurdistan, ‗Kurds will be divided into small groups and disarmed to be send to various locations where they can not exceed 5% of the population of any locality… Kurdish chiefs, mollas and other influential individuals will be sent with others and they will be separated from them in a way that they can not contact with their people, and they will remain under government surveillance.‘99

‗This policy had been carried out specifically against the Kurds living in the regions of the eastern front during the war.‘100 People from Bitlis, Erzurum, Muş and

Diyarbakir province were evacuated and sent to Mosul, Adana and Aleppo and other western parts of Turkey. More than half of those exiled died on the way because of starvation, cold and diseases. There were many depressing stories reported in regard to the conditions of these exiled people. The Kurdish journals, Jin and Kurdistan, published in 1918-1919 and 1919-1920 respectively, depicted the sad and pitiful situation of these people who were forcefully deported. In the 24th issue of Jin, Kemal

Fewzi, described the people who immigrated to Urfa from Bitlis, Erzurum, Muş and

Van. Fewzi himself witnessed that those people were dying on daily basis as a result of hunger, and in desperation and for survival; they had been cannibalizing dead bodies.

78 The economy in Kurdistan, which was mainly based on agriculture and stockbreeding, also collapsed during the war. Both the Russian and Turkish armies‘ activities in the region contributed to the collapse of the economy as they confiscated food supplies for their troops. As part of their revenge, the armies were also involved in destroying the agricultural products and stocks:

‗When Russian troops withdrew into Iran in June 1917, Turkish forces

rapidly reoccupied the area as far as Khaniqin, ravaging whatever was

left, and punishing those who had co-operated with the Russians or

been in communication with British by demolishing their homes and

execution. A year later, when Britain was forced temporarily to

withdraw, those who had aided the invaders were again punished and

their homes plundered and demolished.‘101

An advancing British troop to Khaniqin reports:

‗in no part of Mesopotamia had we encountered anything comparable

to the misery, which greeted us at Khaniqin. The country harvested by

the Russians had been sedulously gleaned by the Turks who, when

they retired, left it in the joint possession of starvation and disease…

The destruction of the Persian road exceeded, if possible, that of

Khaniqin. The villages had been gutted by passing armies, Russian and

Turkish, the roof beams and all wooden fittings torn out and used as

fuel, and the rain and snow of winter had completed the destruction of

unprotected mud walls. The fields lay untilled, and if any of the

husbandmen remained, it was because they were too greatly extenuated

by hunger to flee.‘102

79 The city of Sulaimania was no different. Captain Chales Beale reports: ‗The town of

Sulaimania before the war had a population of 40,000. By December 1918 there were barely 9000 people and many of them were dying of hunger. Dead bodies were collected in the Bazar every morning, and in some cases people were eating their dead babies.‘103 Wilson, a British political officer, remarks on his experience in Kurdistan during this horrible period:

‗From Kahaniqin to Enzeli famine prevailed, unmitigated by public effort..

During the months of 1914, and in 1915 and 1916, the whole area west of Urmia

Lake had been stripped bare of supplies and of flocks by the Russians or Turks

or, only too often, by both. When I went up the road from Khaniqin in April

1918, I saw a sight I hope I may never again witness –a whole people perishing

from want of food… I saw similar sights in every town and every village that

still existed on either side of the road. I was filled with horror at the spectacle….

Khaniqin liwa, had been reduced to terrible straits by the cruel ebb and flow of

war.‘104

This misery was also narrated by Major Mason:

‗In this district of Kurdistan the Kurds have only two towns –Rawanduz and

Neri. Before the war the former contained about 2000 houses and a population of

over 15,000. Neri was smaller and consisted of 250 houses. After the armistice,

Rawanduz and its suburb Kala Teluk contained only sixty houses and Neri

something under ten. Rawanduz with its roofless crumbling walls looks more

like some town in Flanders. The whole country has, in fact, been laid waste by

fire and sword, disease, pestilence, and starvation. To complete their cup of

misery, when we visited the Kurds last winter, they were just recovering from

the world-wide epidemic of ―Epagnol‖ –Spanish influenza.‘105

80 The war had a devastating impact in Kurdistan. It cost more than 700,000 Kurdish lives either as a result of fallen recruits in the battlefield, or starvation, cold, and diseases.

In conclusion, by the time the Kurds entered the post-war period in search of their place within a new post-war settlement, they displayed a highly fragmented and conflict-ridden society. Social and political structures across Kurdistan were fractured, which was further compounded by the fallout of a collapsing economy and a considerably reduced productive population. This chapter has attempted to provide the basic historical background which in summary and as follows:

Conquest movements in pre-Ottoman period, namely the Mongol invasion, the two

Turkic dynasties, the Akkoyunlu and Karakoyunlu, and later the Persian Empire had dire consequences on the social and political structure of Kurdistan. With the incorporation of Kurdistan into the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish Princes enjoyed greater relative freedom which they had lost during the Persian occupation. However, the specific Ottoman land and administrative policies in Kurdistan were based on preserving the existing political structure, which was divided between tribes, tribal confederations and principalities. Ottoman protection for tribes prevented the Kurdish princes from obtaining a monopoly over the tribes. This gradually weakened them.

The Ottomans also fiercely resisted any prince‘s attempt to extend his territory and influence at the expense of other smaller principalities. Creating artificial tribal confederations (more than 400) and providing protection for them, the Ottomans further fragmented the social and political structure. Intermittent wars between

Ottomans, Russia and Iran mainly took place in Kurdistan and further caused the economy to deteriorate and as well as preventing the emergence of a peaceful period

81 long enough for the cultural and political developments. Indeed during the relative peaceful periods, some Kurdish principalities strove to become cultural and political centers, for example Bitlis, Ardelan and Soran. The Rise of Armenian nationalism towards the end of the19th century and consequently the Ottoman policy to use the

Kurdish tribes and Muslim sentiment of the Kurds to curtail the Armenian nationalism, created tension and conflict between the two peoples. The inference was that the rising tensions between them did not benefit either party during the post-war period. The creation of the Hamidieh regiments in 1890s intensified further denominational division within the Alevi and Sunni Kurds that played a significant role in diminishing the post-war Kurdish uprisings. Finally the unprecedented destruction of WWI brought the economy to a halt, as well as a considerable loss of able-bodied workers, which resulted in a reduction of manpower in Kurdistan.

It has been argued that WWI has disrupted the development of Kurdish nationalism which had taken shape in the pre-war period.106 As the next two chapters will illustrate, this study disputes the idea that there was Kurdish nationalism prior to the

WWI. Therefore, it would be an incorrect assumption to state the war had a negative effect on Kurdish nationalism. On the contrary, the war shifted the pre-war Kurdish cultural activities towards nationalism. One of the main reasons of this transformation was the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the near collapse of the Ottoman state apparatus.

However, it must be added that with the advent of the war, all the pre-war Kurdish cultural activities ceased to exist. Most of the Kurdish intelligentsia and notables were called up for the Ottoman army and dispatched to various parts of the empire. How

82 would the pre-war Kurdish activities have evolved if there was not a war? It is hard to make any guess, but one thing is certain—that the war had a profound effect on the political thinking of the Kurdish intelligentsia and notables in regard to the concept of nation and nationalism.

83 CHAPTER II

KURDISH ENLIGHTENMENT 1898-1914

This chapter is concerned with the emergence of the Kurdish intelligentsia and their activities in the realm of culture, history and language in the very early 20th century.

Indeed, as an analysis of the primary Kurdish sources of the time indicates, the

Kurdish intelligentsia‘s prime concern was to enlighten, inform and educate the

Kurdish masses who had been deliberately neglected by the Ottoman state. The intelligentsia were aware that there was a Kurdish question, but this question was understood as an internal part of the Ottoman whole and its solution was sought within the political boundaries of Ottomanism. The question had not yet been perceived as having a political character. The crucial point to highlight here is that the period under analysis, in contrast to some views1, cannot be classified as a nationalist period, but rather a time of culturally oriented awakening for the Kurdish intelligentsia. They were in search of a means of accommodating their ethnicity and identity within the Ottoman social and political structure. It is also imperative to differentiate between the cultural activities and intentions of the Kurdish intelligentsia predominantly in Istanbul and the engagement of local notables, in effect tribal leaders, influential families and religious leaders in Kurdistan. The former were trying to accommodate the cultural distinctiveness of Kurdish people within the Ottoman polity by advocating both reformation and modernisation of the Ottoman state structure, as well as improving the social conditions of Kurdistan mainly through

84 education and structural reforms. The latter, however, were concerned with the advancement of their regional influence and local interests, in effect tribal, inter-tribal and as well as tribe-state issues in their environment. This disparity between the

Kurdish intelligentsia and local notables played a significant role during the post-war period.

Robert Olson has traced the origin of Kurdish nationalism to the Sheikh Ubaydullah of Nehri movement in 1880.2 Some other historians have suggested that developments in the very early period of the twentieth-century represented the rise of the Kurdish nationalist movement.3 Entessar categorized the period as Kurdish ethnonationalism.4

However, this study would challenge the view that Kurdish nationalism existed before

1918. As indicated earlier, nationalism is primarily a political movement that seeks to obtain a nation state or self-determination.5 A close examination of the associations and publications of the Kurdish intelligentsia does not reveal any such objective. They were mainly interested and involved in the cultural aspects of the Kurdish people, particularly in the area of education and literature. Their thoughts were far away from mobilising the Kurdish masses in pursuit of a nation-state of their own. They mainly identified themselves with Ottomanism. One must note though, as Hutchinson would argue, that the demarcation between a cultural movement and a nationalist movement is not clear-cut and it only needs political crisis and external factors, such as war or disruption of social and political life, for a cultural movement to transform itself into a political nationalist movement. As we will see in this and the following chapters, those Kurdish elites who were involved in cultural movements also played a significant role in the post-war period when Kurdish nationalism gradually emerged.

85 The main catalyst for this transformation was ultimately the dismemberment of the

Ottoman Empire, with which the Kurds had identified themselves.

1. The Kurdish Elite

It has been widely argued that the elite play a significant role in the formation and development of nationalist movements.6 For many scholars, the role of the elite, and particularly the intelligentsia, occupies a pivotal role in their analysis of nationalism.

Many nationalisms are led by intellectuals and professionals who furnish the basic definitions and characterization of the nation, and disseminate the idea of the nation.7

The relationship between the elite and masses is highly important. Based on his analysis of East European countries, Miroshlav Hiroch, for example, suggested a chronological progression from elite to mass involvement in nationalist mobilization.

In the first stage a small circle of intellectuals construct the nation‘s historical heritage, its culture and history. The second phase follows the dissemination of the formulated ideas of the nation by professionals in the growing towns. The final stage includes popular support of the idea of the nation and the creation of a mass movement.8 Smith rightly asked whether Hroch's sequence could be generalized. 'It is tempting to see nationalism as a river of wave-like movements starting out as a trickle in its cultural heartlands and gaining in power and extent of involvement as it gathers pace. This is one of nationalism's most successful self-images. But it can also be misleading and Eurocentric.'9 Nevertheless the role of the elite and its relation with the masses is tremendously important:

'Beyond the immediate needs of propaganda, advocacy and

communication, the intellectuals and intelligentsia are the only stratum

86 with an abiding interest in the very idea of the nation, and alone

possess the ability to bring other classes onto the platform of

communal solidarity in the cause of autonomy. Only they know how to

present the nationalist ideal of auto-emancipation through citizenship

so that all classes will, in principle come to understand the benefits of

solidarity and participation. Only they can provide the social and

cultural links with other strata, which are necessary for the ideal of the

nation to be translated into a practical program with a popular

following. This is not to deny the importance of other elite or strata

like bureaucrats, clergy and officers, who can exert a powerful

influence on the cultural horizons and political directions of particular

nationalisms. But, whereas such "leading classes" may vary between

and even within movements at different times without endangering the

success of the movement, the pivotal role of professionals and

intellectuals must remain constant or the movement risks

disintegration.'10

The division and split of the elite into rival nationalist organizations is also crucial as rivalries may weaken and jeopardize the nationalist movement.11

A central focus of this study is the role of agency in making history, and thus it is imperative to analyse the vision, practice, and discourse of the Kurdish elite. The

Kurdish elite analyzed in the period were blamed for their failure to establish a

Kurdish nation-state. For Kendal, Kurds failed to have their own state 'largely because of the political incompetence and historical backwardness of their leaders.' 12 This view needs modification partly because the Kurdish elite neither entertained nor

87 contemplated the concept of a state based on ethnicity prior to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Identification with the Ottoman state and Ottomanism was quite natural for the Kurdish elite. This is true for the Arab elite as well. As William

Cleveland stated: 'the majority of the Arab elite sought survival within the framework of a strengthened Ottoman state, not in separation from it.'13 The Kurdish elite in the pre-war period entertained cosmopolitan ideas mixed with the enlightenment philosophy of the 18th century:

'The philosophy of the Enlightenment prevalent in Europe in the

eighteen-century held that the universe was governed by a uniform,

unvarying law of Nature. With reason man could discover and

comprehend this law, and if society were ordered according to its

provisions, it would attain ease and happiness. The law was universal,

but this did not mean that there were no differences between men, it

meant rather there was something common to them all which was more

important than any differences… The state, on this philosophical view,

is a collection of individuals who live together the better to secure their

own welfare, and it is the duty of rulers so to rule as to bring about –by

means which can ascertained by reason- the greatest welfare for the

inhabitants of their territory.'14

'Such a view', further argued Kedourie, was also ‗the official doctrine of Enlightened

Absolutism according to which 'the enlightened ruler regulates the economic activities of his subjects, provides them with education, looks after health and sanitation, supplies uniform and expeditious justice, and generally concerns himself –if need be even against their wishes- with his subjects‘ welfare, because the greatness of a state

88 is the glory of its ruler and a state can become great only in proportion to its population and to their prosperity.'15 An examination of the political thought of the

Kurdish elite both in the pre-war and post-war periods reveals their enlightened view in regard to the concept of the state, albeit with differing emphasis. During the pre- war period they envisaged a cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious community. By the end of WWI they had shifted their vision from cosmopolitanism towards a more ethno-nationalist perspective, but their thoughts on the enlightenment remained intact. As the next chapter will demonstrate, the Kurdish elite in the post- war period continued to believe that the betterment of Kurdish society could only be achieved through education, application of laws of science to social issues and exposure to progressive ideas. 16 In the pre-war period the Ottoman central government was expected to carry out such tasks, but in the post-war period these tasks were expected to be conducted by a would-be Kurdish government. The question to ask here is why the Kurdish intelligentsia of the pre-war period, exposed to some European ideas, were not affected by the nationalist ideology prevalent in

Western Europe and America since the 18th century and the Balkan region since the early 19th century.

The Kurdish intelligentsia‘s political thought developed alongside other Ottoman intellectuals during the Tanzimat and Hamidian period. Indeed, growing middle classes and bureaucracy during the 19th century provided a similar background for almost all the intellectual community within the Ottoman Empire. Thus it is quiet understandable to note that the Kurdish intelligentsia worked and aimed alongside the

Young Turks for the reformation of the Ottoman state institution. During the

Tanzimat period a new educated class emerged to run Ottoman affairs. As S. Shaw

89 argued ‗the whole assumption of the Tanzimat was that reform meant codification, systematization, and control, even in those areas where actual reforms were not needed. To accomplish this, the old decentralized bureaucracy was replaced by a highly centralized hierarchy of civil servants.‘ This new professional and educated class, due to their education in modern European ways, assumed themselves to be

‗Europeans in spirit, dress, and ideal.‘17

By the early 20th century the Kurdish elite broadly constituted two main categories: notables, and a small but growing group of middle class intellectuals, and professionals. Albert Hourani has defined the notables within the Ottoman Empire as intermediaries between the central state and the people. The Ottoman notables, according to Hourani had three subcategories, the ulema (religious functionaries), the local military leaders and secular traditional notables.18 Hakan Özoğlu rightly argued that Hourani's classification of Ottoman notables refers, specifically, to the Arab provinces, thus 'in the Kurdish context, (...) Hourani's categories of the ayan require a slight modification.'19 As Özoğlu has argued, in the Kurdistan region separate local military leaders had not existed. This is mainly due to Ottoman land and administrative policy in Kurdistan. Therefore 'religious leaders and the secular traditional notables were the leaders of local forces. Another modification of

Hourani's paradigm of Ottoman notables in regard to the religious functionaries, is that 'in the Kurdish provinces the ulema were almost entirely Sufis. Contrary to the suggestion by Hourani, in some cases the distinction between the traditional notables and the Sufis was not very clear.‘ 20 Kurdish notables were those who had the

‗minimum quality of exercising political authority in and collecting respect from their

90 communities due to their genealogical and religious background.‘ 21 And they

‗functioned at various degrees as intermediaries between the state and the people.‘22

Kurdish notables can be subcategorized under three sections:

1- New generations of the exiled and destroyed Mirs

2- The Ulema

3- Tribal chiefs

This subcategorization should not be assumed as distinctly separate categories, but rather inter-connected, for example, the Barzanis were both a strong tribe and an influential religious family in Southern Kurdistan.

Here an attempt is made to explore some of the background of the most influential

Kurdish notables, intellectuals and professionals in order to provide for the reader some crucial clues as to the Kurdish elite's political weaknesses and shortcomings and as well as their strengths in the period analysed.

1.1. New Generations

Two families of new generations of exiled Kurdish princes, the Bedirhans and

Babans, played significant roles in the cultural, social and political life of Kurdistan.

As explained in the first chapter, after the 19th century uprisings the Kurdish Mirs and their families had been exiled to remote parts of the Empire. Later, especially during

Sultan Abdulhamid II‘s reign, their sons were incorporated into the Ottoman establishment. In response to his critics of incorporation, the Sultan defended himself by saying

91 'I am aware that I am criticized as a result of incorporating some of the

Agha's children into the establishment. (…) I am also being blamed by

those who suspect that protecting and keeping the sons of Bedirhan in

the centre will disturb the peace of the country. Of course everybody is

free to have his opinion! However I am convinced that I am on the

right path in my policy about the Kurds.'23

It is reported that approximately 200 members of the Bedirhan family were appointed to posts within the Ottoman bureaucracy. It is also reported that one of Bedirhan's sons, Bahri Beg, was appointed aide-de-camp to the Sultan himself. 24 Some of

Bedirhan sons and grandsons, like Emin Ali Bedirhan, Midhat and Abdurrahman

Bedirhan, played significant roles in both the Kurdish cultural and nationalist movements. Emin Ali was the most prominent one. He was educated and literate in

Turkish, Arabic, Kurdish, and French. He studied Law and became a public prosecutor in the Ottoman judicial system. Sultan Abuldhamid exiled him, along with other Bedirhan family members, as a result of their alleged involvement in the killing of Ridvan Pasha, the mayor of Istanbul, in 1906, to Ankara and Akka. He remained in exile and returned to Istanbul after the 1908 Young Turk constitutional revolution. He became a founding member of the Kurdistan Teavvun ve Teraqi Jamiyati—the

Society for the Rise and Progress of Kurdistan- (from now on KTTJ) in 1908 in

Istanbul. After the war he took part in forming Kurdistan Teali Jamiyati –the Society for the Rise of Kurdistan- (from now on KTJ) in 1918, and when that broke up he formed another organization called Kurd Teşkilat-i İçtimaiye Jamiyati—Society for the Kurdish Social Organisation- (KTIJ). It is interesting to note that while he was involved in Kurdish affairs, Emin Ali was also active in Ottoman politics. 'In 1920

92 Emin Ali was in the Ottoman political system; he joined Ottoman political parties, such as the decentralist Ahrar Firkasi (Party of the Free, est.1908) and later the

Hürriyet ve Ittilaf Fırkasi (Freedom and Harmony Party, est.1911, reopened 1919).'25

The other two member of the Bedirhan family, Midhat and Abdurrhaman Bedirhans, published the first ever bilingual Kurdish and Turkish newspaper, Kurdistan, in Cairo,

1898. According to Celile Celil, Abdurrahman was vice-chairman of the Ministry of

Education in Istanbul before the publication of Kurdistan.26 Abdurrahman Bedirhan, like his father Emin Ali, was also involved in the Ottoman political system. He was active in Europe within the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) movement. The paper, Kurdistan, which he published, was supported by the Young Turks. In Paris

1902, Bedirhan joined the Young Turk Congress with another Kurdish activist,

Hikmet Baban.27

Apart from the Bedirhans, the Babans also participated in Kurdish affairs. The influential members were Babanzade Ismail Hakki, Dr. Şükrü Baban, Fuad Baban, and Zihni Baban. Like the Bedirhans, the erstwhile Baban Amirate's new generations participated both in the politics of Ottomanism and the Kurdish question. For example while being a member of KTTJ, Ismail Hakki also took part in the Ottoman Senate as the MP for Baghdad.28 The Babans however, relative to the Bedirhans, had much less influence amongst the Kurdish population both in Istanbul and in Kurdistan during this particular period. The Babans were founding members in Kurdish associations and contributed with their writings to the Kurdish journals.

93 1.2. The Ulema

As mentioned before, three sheikhly families were dominant in Kurdistan and Kurdish affairs. The Seyyid Abdulkadir, the Sheikh Abdul Selam Barzan and the Sheikh

Mahmud Berzenji occupied prominent roles within Kurdish political life.

Seyyid Abdulkadir was the son of the great religious Nakshibandi leader, Sheikh

Ubeydullah of Nehri. The family emerged as the leading political and religious family in Kurdistan in the second half of the 19th century. The Seyyid joined the Young Turk movement in 1896, and returned from exile after the 1908 revolution and was appointed a member of the Ottoman Senate of the Young Turk government. Özoğlu claims that Enver Pasha, one of the leading members of the CUP, 'asked for

Abdulkadir's service in convincing the Kurdish tribes to accept the authority of the

CUP regime. Meeting with Enver Pasha, Abdulkadir agreed to send telegrams to the

Kurdish tribes, persuading them to recognize the CUP.'29 His involvement with the

Ottoman political system continued after WWI. He 'was appointed to the Ayan

Council (Meclis-i Ayan) by the Ferit Damat Pasha cabinet of 1919 and became the chair of the Şüra-i Devlet, a subcommittee in the Ottoman Senate –a very prestigious position indeed in the Ottoman bureaucracy.'30 The Seyyid had a significant role in

Kurdish political affairs from 1908 up to his execution by the Kemalists in 1925. He became a founding member and lifetime president of the KTTJ in 1908. After WWI, alongside other prominent Kurdish leaders, Abdulkadir founded the KTJ in 1918 and was elected as president.

The Seyyid enjoyed high popularity amongst the Kurdish working class in Istanbul.

This popularity as well as Aldukadir‘s high position within the Ottoman bureaucracy

94 strengthened his position against the Bedirhans in their rivalry for leadership, particularly after WWI.31

Two other prominent Sheikhs of Nehri worth mentioning were Sheikh Muhammad

Sadiq, the brother of the Seyyid, and his son Sheikh Taha. Sheikh Muhammad was allowed to return back to Şemdinan after the uprising and inherited his father's prestige and position in Kurdistan. The Ottoman officials were suspicious of Sheikh

Muhammad‘s relations with Russia, suspecting he was seeking autonomy. 32 After

Muhammad‘s death, his son Sheikh Taha took his place in 1911. The Seyyid was not happy about it. He had wanted, as the son of Sheikh Ubeydullah, to inherit his father‘s title and position. This conflict between the Seyyid and Sheikh Taha was exploited by both the British officials serving in Mesopotamia, and the Kemalists against the

Kurdish movement.33

The Sheikh Berzenji family in Southern Kurdistan came to prominence after the suppression and demise of the Baban Amirate. Sheikh Said Berzenji, the father of

Mahmud Berzenji, is reported to have cured the favourite son of the Sultan

Abdulhamid and thus he 'enjoyed carte blanche with local officials enriching himself at the expense of Sulaimania's citizens.'34 Sheikh Said, who had gained control over the Hamawand tribe through intermarriage, then revolted against the Young Turk

Constitutional government in 1908. Without sufficient troops to defeat Sheikh Said‘s forces, the Ottoman officials persuaded the Sheikh to come to Mosul for negotiations.

There in Mosul he and his other son, Sheikh Ahmed, were killed in a public affray organized by the Ottoman authorities.35 After his death, his son Sheikh Mahmud took his place and revived the insurrection, which continued up to the outbreak of WWI.

95 Ironically, despite his father's and his own revolt against the Young Turk government, during the war the Sheikh fought alongside the Ottoman army against the British forces in Shuaiba in Southern Iraq. It is also reported that he engaged the Russian troops in Penjuin.36 However following WWI, Sheikh Mahmud became one of the most distinguished Kurdish nationalist leaders in Southern Kurdistan and led a movement against the British forces for independence and declared himself the King of Kurdistan.

Sheikh Mahmud's stronghold was the city of Sulaimania but he had influence as far as

Rawanduz, Koy-Sancak, Raniya and Kirkuk. McDowall argued that Sheikh Mahmud had 'his opponents, among the Jaf and Bajalan tribes and notably among the [Sheikh]

–the Talabani [Sheikhs] of Kirkuk, who were his Qadiri rivals, and the Nakshibandi

[Sheikhs] of Biyari and Tawila. Indeed, on account of such opposition the townspeople and tribesmen of Kirkuk and Kifri were specifically excluded from

[Sheikh] Mahmud's area of authority.'37 However, Refik Hilmi‘s memoirs provide a contrast with McDowall. Hilmi inferred that Sheikh Mahmud had great influence and popularity among the population of Kirkuk including the Talabani Sheikhs, so:

'Thousands of people waited four hours for the return of Sheikh Mahmud to Kirkuk, the plain of Kirkuk was indeed a very interesting sight. The Tariqqas of Sheikh Ali

Talabani and Sheikh Ahmed paid the expenses for the reception ceremony of Sheikh

Mahmud's return.' 38 According to Hilmi, the popularity of the Sheikh extended throughout Southern Kurdistan: 'The Mosul governor released the Sheikh and permitted his return to Sulaimania. When this decision was heard the people all over

Kurdistan and especially in Arbil, Kirkuk, and Sulaimania rejoiced and celebrated.'39

Despite McDowall‘s claim, the reason for the exclusion of Kirkuk province from the

96 Sheikh‘s area of authority must be sought within the context of British policy in Iraq in general, and in Southern Kurdistan in particular. Sheikh Mahmud exploited his popularity for his nationalist movement against Britain. However, the Sheikh lacked a coherent, well-defined political program and organization.

The third influential Sheikhly family was that of the Sheikh of Barzan, Abdul Selam

Barzan. The family‘s influence and authority after the execution of Sheikh Abdul

Selam in 1914 seemed to be temporarily eroded. Before his execution by the Mosul governor, Süleyman Nazif, Sheikh Abdul Selam was active in Kurdish affairs. Like the Berzenji family, Abdul Selam also disliked the Young Turks and was uneasy with the Constitutional revolution of 1908. The Barzan family has played a highly significant role in Kurdish politics from the mid-30s up to present time.

1.3. Tribal Chiefs

Although the tribal chiefs lacked the popularity and influence of the Sheikhly families beyond their own tribes, nonetheless they constituted an important element amongst the Kurdish notables because of their tribal power. As the preceding chapter indicated, from the mid-19th century Kurdistan was riddled with tribal conflict. For

Kurdish nationalists, the resolution of tribal conflict and involvement in a nationalist political agenda was of prime importance. Indeed, many such attempts were made.

Dr. Nuri Dersimi, an active member of KTJ, recollects a scene in the Dersim region:

'In Dersim there were 60 tribes and none of which had a relationship of brotherhood and warm friendship between them. For this reason, to unite these tribes and at least to create a temporary peace between them was my prime concern/objective.

Otherwise failure was inevitable.'40

97

The involvement or disinvolvement of the tribal chiefs in the Kurdish nationalist movement and the rivalries between them proved to be a decisive factor, and one of the weak points of Kurdish nationalism. Inter-tribal conflicts were ruthlessly exploited by both the Kemalist movement and the British administration in Iraq against Kurdish nationalism. The Kurdish nationalists failed to unite tribes for a common nationalist cause. Some of the tribal chiefs, like the chiefs of Milli tribe, (Mahmut, Ismail, Halil,

Bahur, Abdurrahman) were members of KTJ, but mostly tribal chiefs took up positions according to the balance of power in order to protect and preserve their tribal entity. Some tribal chiefs supported the Kemalist movement. The conflict between the Sunni and Alevi tribes also contributed to the failure of uniting tribes in

Kurdistan.

It would be safe to assert that tribal chiefs as part of the Kurdish elite played secondary role in Kurdish nationalist politics compared to the other section of the elite mentioned above but due to their tribal power, which constituted the bulk of the

Kurdish population, their position vis-à-vis Kurdish nationalism and great and local powers was highly significant.

1.4. Intellectuals and Professionals

The Kurdish intelligentsia and professionals were not a wholly distinct group from that of the Kurdish notables mentioned above. The Bedirhans were also leading

Kurdish intellectuals of the time. However, a growing number of urban intellectuals came to prominence in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Among them were

98 people like Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, Memduh Selim Beg, Kemal Fevzi, and Mukuslu

Hamza.41

By professionals this study refers to those people that served within the Ottoman bureaucracy and army, but were aware of their Kurdish identity. By professionals it also refers to those people involved in professional employment such as teachers, lawyers, doctors and so on. The most prominent of these professionals was General

Şerif Pasha. Again, professionals and the elite mentioned above were not an altogether distinct group. For example, Seyyid Abdulkadir was also a high-ranking member of the Ottoman bureaucracy.

The growing influence of the Kurdish intellectuals and professionals in Kurdish nationalism was evident in the membership of KTJ in which amongst the known 169 active members of the association, more than 70 were from this group.42 It would be useful to look at two prominent personalities from this group, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet and General Şerif Pasha.

Dr Cevdet together with another Kurdish intellectual, Dr. Ishak Sukuti, and one

Caucasian and one Albanian, all of whom were students at the Istanbul Military

Medicine School, founded Ittihad-i-Osmani, which later evolved into the CUP. Due to his anti-Abdulhamid activities Dr. Cevdet was exiled to Trablus and later managed to flee to Genoa. There he published an Ottoman newspaper, Ottoman Gazetesi, a publication of the CUP.

99 For Dr. Cevdet, the Kurdish question was a political issue that could be resolved within the Ottoman Empire. In other words, ethnicity as a cultural aspect was to be resolved within the unity of the Ottomanism. Dr. Cevdet wrote in 1907 'look I am a

Kurd. I love Kurds and Kurdishness. But because by law and duty I am a citizen of

Turkey, so before everything else I am a Turk. However, it should not be understood that being a Turk means forgotten the Kurdish language or Kurdishness. On the contrary, a Kurd should practice his Kurdish language, and so the Armenian his

Armenian language. Anyone who assumes that Turkey will suffer from this is either a stupid or a heinous person.'43 Şerif Mardin, a leading scholar on the Young Turk movement, defined Dr. Cevdet as an Ottoman patriot. 'The crucial point is that

Abdullah Cevdet had not cooperated with the relatives of Bedirhan who were involved in opposition against Abdulhamid, and that Cevdet had assumed the Turkish language to be a tool with which to realize a national culture.'44 This is only partly true. Primary sources indicate that Dr. Cevdet had indeed, contrary to Mardin‘s assumption, cooperated with Abdurrahman Bedirhan who was publishing Kurdistan.45

The point here is that Kurdistan itself was swimming in the waters of Ottomanism.

Yıldız acutely notes: 'Those two (Dr. Cevdet and Dr. Sukuti) who perhaps occupied the most pivotal role within the Kurdish intelligentsia perceived (the Kurdish question) within the framework of Ottomanism and central policies to a degree that they failed to analyze the importance of Wilson‘s Fourteen Principles from the perspective of the Kurds.'46 Malmisanij suggested that Dr. Cevdet contributed greatly to the rise of Kurdish nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century.47 It is certainly true that Dr. Cevdet was involved in the Kurdish issue, but it would be an incorrect assumption to classify his contribution as a nationalistic one. Dr. Cevdet's main concern and attention was focused on the reformation of the Ottoman state, and its

100 transformation through reform and modernization so that it ruled a multi-ethnic and multi-religious community, managed by constitutional, democratic and plural institutions where each ethnic and religious element could practice their customs and beliefs.48

The case of General Şerif Pasha also represents both the typical Kurdish intellectual and the professional. Having graduated from prestigious schools in Istanbul and

France (Galatasaray and Saint-Cyr respectively), and being a high civil-servant

(Ottoman Ambassador to Sweden for ten years), he was involved mainly in Ottoman politics and only at the end of the war became a prominent Kurdish activist by representing the Kurdish people during the Paris Peace Conference. Even at the

Conference he was initially elected as a delegate not only to represent the Kurds, but the Ottoman State as well. According to the Ikdam daily newspaper (21 January 1919)

Şerif Pasha was at the Peace Conference as part of an Ottoman delegation. While he was in Paris KTJ asked him to represent the Kurds at the same conference. On 16

April 1919 he resigned from his Ottoman delegation and declared that he would only attend the Conference as a Kurdish delegate.

Şerif Pasha, like most of the Kurdish intellectuals, was a member of the CUP and only after 1909 did he leave the CUP and begin to oppose its policy as it evolved from

Ottomanism to Turkish nationalism. In self-imposed exile in Paris he founded Islahat- i- Esasiye-i-Osmaniye (the Ottoman Radical Party) and published a journal called

Meşruitiye'. His main energy was directed towards the criticism of the Young Turk regime. In a letter to the French authorities he states: 'The Committee (CUP) administrators have declared in front of the civilized world that there is a constitution

101 in Turkey. But their deeds show their true intentions. If there is a real constitution in

Turkey, why, then, have liberal editors and writers been brought before the military court and without any legal procedure, have been subjected to torture and punishment?'49 The Young Turks responded in kind. In his absence they conducted a trial and sentenced him to death, and later in Paris they attempted to assassinate him.50

Şerif Pasha was among the members of one of the first Kurdish associations, KTTJ.

However, he was not very active within Kurdish political affairs. The main characteristic of Şerif Pasha was that having lived in Europe for so long and served in the high Ottoman bureaucracy, he was culturally, politically and geographically isolated from the Kurdish people and Kurdistan. Despite his involvement in Kurdish political affairs, particularly after the war, he had no real base or influence or authority in Kurdistan. This crucial fact was noted by the Great Powers' officials.

When he informed the British Embassy in 1919 that he was ready to become a Mir of an independent Kurdistan to preside over a federal council of chiefs, an official commented 'I understand that he is quite unsuited for the position he covets, his qualifications being those of a Parisian pamphleteer.'51

To sum up then, the Kurdish elite in the early 20th century was horizontally and vertically divided and riddled with personal rivalries. This fragmentation limited their bargaining power against the Great Powers and contributed significantly to their failure to create a unified nationalist movement following WWI. The rivalries between two prominent Kurdish notables, the Bedirhans and Sheikh Abdulkadir were widely known. It has been suggested that rivalry between these two families weakened the Kurdish cultural and national movements right from the beginning.

Kadri Cemil Pasha claimed that

102 'during this wave of confusion [in the very early 20th century] in

Istanbul and in the whole Ottoman country, Kurdish Pashas and

Umeras52 of the Palace, who were kept in Istanbul and paid by the

Sultans, being confused over what to do as their base was collapsing

[referring to the Young Turk revolution] found salvation in

Kurdishness (Kurdluk), and as a result of personal conflicts and enmity

between them, these individuals, after the declaration of 1908

[Constitution], established (…) Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Jamiyeti.

Unfortunately this organization could not last long. The conflicts of

pashas and umeras with each other made it easy for the Ittihaddis

(CUP) to disperse them.'53

Bruinessen also noted that rivalries between Bedirhans and Seyyid Abdulkadir made the suppression of the KTTJ very easy. Özoğlu claimed that the dispute between these two families originated in the second half of the 19th century when Sheikh

Ubeydullah extended his influence over the areas formerly controlled by the

Bedirhans. This in turn resulted in competition for the rulership of Kurdistan.54 It is also important to note that rivalries were prevalent even within the notable families.

For example Seyyid Abdulkadir and his nephew Sheikh Taha, were both involved in

Kurdish politics, and competed against each other for leadership. In the case of the

Bedirhans, Emin Ali Bedirhan, Sureyya Bedirhan, Abdullrezzak and Husayn

Bedirhan, each was independently involved in Kurdish political affairs and entered into relations with the Great Powers in their own way.

Another crucial fact in regard to the Kurdish elite's horizontal division is evident in their attitude towards the Young Turks. While most of the Kurdish intellectuals and

103 notables in Istanbul associated with the Young Turk movement and celebrated the advent of the Young Turk revolution in 1908, those Kurdish notables in Kurdistan were against it and looked on the Young Turks with disdain.

Analysis of the Kurdish elite reveals the fact that most of the Kurdish intellectuals and notables had no strong link with the Kurdish masses and local notables in Kurdistan.

Part of the reason for this can be attributed to the fact that they had lived, been educated and worked in Istanbul. This was not just the case for the Kurdish intelligentsia and professional class, but was also the case for the growing Ottoman professionals and intelligentsia as a whole. As Shaw argued, the growing Ottoman professional class of the Tanzimat era ‗as a result of their education in modern

European ways‘ failed not only ‗to understand and consider the mass of Ottoman subjects in carrying out their duties‘, they also ‗scorned and ignored them.‘55 The distance from Istanbul to Kurdistan and the poor transport and communication system in the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century, was yet another reason for the weak relations between the Kurdish notables and intellectuals in Istanbul and the Kurdish masses in Kurdistan. It is also necessary to consider the fact that the Ottoman administration prevented the return of influential Kurdish leaders to Kurdistan. Emin

Ali Bedirhan and Midhat Bedirhan, for example, attempted to go back to Kurdistan in

1889, but were caught and brought back to Istanbul. It was Ottoman policy to keep members of Kurdish ruling families, who had risen up against the Ottomans in the

19th century, away from Kurdistan. The Ottomans did that in two ways: first, the lands of those ruling families who rebelled against the central government were confiscated, hence the social, economic and political bases of those ruling families in

104 Kurdistan were eliminated. Second, they were exiled to a remote part of the Empire or to Istanbul and were not allowed to return to their native lands.

2. Cultural Enlightenment

2.1.The First Kurdish Associations 1908-1913

Kurdistan Teavvun wa Teraqi Jamiyati (KTTJ, est. 1908)56

It is generally agreed that the first Kurdish association was the KTTJ, the Society for the Rise and Progress of Kurdistan. According to the memoirs of Kadri Cemil Pasha

(Zinor Silopi) the first ever Kurdish association was Kurdistan Azm-i Kavi Jamiyeti founded by Diyarbakirli Fikri effendi.57 However, there has been no document found to prove it or any information about it. Even if there was such an organisation it did not have any impact on the Kurdish intelligentsia or Kurdish people in general.

Therefore it would be safe to assume that the KTTJ was the first Kurdish association formed by the emerging Kurdish intelligentsia mainly in Istanbul.

The founding-members of the KTTJ are highly interesting for this work. They represented various types of Kurdish notables and intellectuals who played significant roles in the period between 1918 and 1923. The most prominent ones were the

Şemdinani and Bedirhan families. The association also attracted many politicians and military persons serving in the Ottoman bureaucracy and army. Some of the other members included General Şerif Pasha, an Ottoman ambassador to Sweden and a general in the Ottoman army, Ismail Hakki Babanzade, Pashazade Muşir Ahmet

Pasha, Dr. Şükrü Mehmet Sekban and Babanzade Ahmet Naim Beg.58 Zinar Silopi mentions Halil Hayali59, Diyerbakirli Miri Katibizade Cemil and Liceli Kurdizade

105 Ahmet Ramiz as the other influential founding members of the association. KTTJ was closely associated with the Young Turk movement and supported the constitutional revolution of 1908.

The aims of the KTTJ included: 60

a- To introduce the Constitution which is in accord with the great Islamic law

and bounded with (responsible for ) the prosperity of the millet61 and the

security of vatan62, to Kurds who are not aware of it;

b- To protect and defend the Usul-u Meşruitiyet (Constitutional Government)

and parliament which are the main paths of religion and progress;

c- To intensify the link between the Kurds and the authority of the Caliphate

and Sultanate;

d- To further intensify the good relation between the Kurds and the citizens

of the Ottoman units (elements – Unsur), the Armenians, Nestorians and

the others;

e- To eliminate the conflicts that arise from time to time between tribes and

create an atmosphere where they can live within the unity of law;

f- To publish on education, industry, trade agriculture.

Article 1 suggests that the association was primarily concerned with, and under the influence of the Young Turk movement, and the constitutional revolution of 1908. It did not have any nationalistic character nor did it seek autonomy for Kurdistan, let alone secession. It was an Ottomanist association with a Kurdish colour. Its

Ottomanist character was also reflected in its publication called Kurd Teavvun and

Teraqi Gazetesi (KTTG). Tunaya argued that the only political activity conducted by the association was to deliver a memorandum to the Kamil Pasha‘s government, the

106 ‗Investigation and Improvement of the Anatolian Condition‘ in 1909. The association was not a political organisation, and did not have a well-defined structure, program or strategy. As Kendal has argued ‗it brought together a range of Kurdish émigré intellectuals and patriots whose ideas and ambitions were quite heterogeneous.‘63 Its activities were mainly social, cultural and welfare oriented. The KTTJ concentrated on the whole the enlightenment of the Kurdish people through education and literacy.

It aimed to collect, arrange and publish ‗a perfect history of Kurdistan and the Kurds and Kurdish national literature.‘ 64 These sorts of activities and the other political objectives of the association will be analysed by scrutinizing its publication, KTTG. It has been argued that the association was riddled with internal rivalries between leading members.65 It appears that the main rivalry was between the Bedirhans and

Seyyid Abdulkadir, the president of the KTTJ.66 K. Cemil argued that the rivalries within organisation made it easy for the CUP to dispose of it.67 However, the main reason for the closure of the society was the general CUP policy towards all the non-

Turkish associations and publications.

Kurd Neşr-i Maarif Jamiyati (Society for the Propagation of Kurdish Education).68

It was formed by Kurds in Istanbul with a close connection to the KTTJ. The aim of the association was primarily to spread education and literacy among the least educated and most backward element of the Ottoman millet, in effect Kurds.

According to Article 3 of the association‘s charter it initially aimed to open schools for Kurdish children in Istanbul, and later with the help of its well-off members to establish educational institutions in the places populated by Kurds—especially among the tribes, in order to eliminate illiteracy.69 Both associations alongside other non-

Turkish associations and organisations throughout the empire were closed in 1909-

107 1910 by the CUP as it embarked upon a policy of Turkification. The relation between the Kurds and the Young Turk movement will be fully evaluated in the subsequent chapter.

Hivi-ya Kurd Jamiyati –Hevi-(Kurdish Hope Society) 1912-191470

The Society was founded by Kurdish students in Istanbul. Kadri Cemil Pasha was among the founders: ‗in 1911 I entered the Halkali Yuksek Ziraat Mektebi (Halkali

Agricultural High School). With fellow Kurdish students I became interested in the national question and exchanging ideas. Halil Hayali Beg, who was the accounting officer of the school, was encouraging our national feelings by enlightening us. We, the fellow students decided to establish a student society‘71 Kadri Cemil along with

Omer Cemil Pasha, Fuat Temo, Diyarbakirli Cerrahzade Zeki prepared the charter of the society and got permission for its founding from the government in 1912.72 The numbers of members increased within a short time.73 The Hevi published a journal called Roji Kurd. When the authorities banned the journal, the society then published another journal called Hetavi Kurd.74 The charter of the society explains its aims:

To introduce Kurdish students to each other to create unity and brotherhood among them; to work towards developing Kurdish language and literature and to print works in Kurdish; to guide Kurdish students into entry to schools in the capital; to help those students who were not financially well-off; to endeavour for the scientific and social progress of the Kurds and for that purpose to establish branches in the provinces; to publish a Turkish-Kurdish journal. 75 Dr. Şükrü Sekban suggested that the society should urge the government to initiate reforms in the eastern provinces, to appoint honourable governors, to construct roads and to conduct justice in these provinces.76

Having been established in Istanbul, a new branch of the society was also opened in

108 Erzurum by Tayyip Ali77 and students in other provinces of Kurdistan had contact with Hevi.78 Kurdish students in Europe established Hevi‘s branches in Lausanne,

Genoa and Munich.79 Hevi temporarily ceased to exist with the outbreak of the First

World War, and almost all its active members were enrolled in the Ottoman army.80

These three organisations, as their charters indicate, were mainly involved in Kurdish cultural activities. Their ideas, objectives and perception of Kurdistan and the

Ottoman state, and as well as other regional and international forces will be evaluated by scrutinizing their journals in the next section.

2.2. Kurdish Publications 1898-1914

Three main journals (or gazettes) were published in this period: Kurdistan in 1898 by

Midhat Bedirhan, and later Abdurrahman Bedirhan; Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi by KTTJ in 1908; and Roji Kurd (later Hetavi Kurd) by the Hevi society in 1913.81

Kurdistan, which was published from 1898 to 190282, provide the reader with an analysis of the very early ideas of the Kurdish intelligentsia within the Ottoman

Empire, in effect, their attitudes towards the Ottoman State (Caliphate and Sultan), their ideas on the Kurdish people and Kurdistan, and their relations with the other ethnic communities of the Ottoman Empire, mainly the Armenians. Essential questions include how did these early Kurdish intellectuals define themselves in terms of an ethnic origin? How did they identify themselves on the basis of nationality and religion?

The Kurd Teavun ve Teraki Gazetesi (KTTG) was published by Kurd Teavun ve

Teraki Jamiyati at the crucial time of 1908-09, the period when the Young Turks

109 seized power and declared a constitutional monarchy. There were nine particular issues from this period, which provide a view of the political and social development in Istanbul from the perspective of the Kurds. These issues provide the reader with invaluable information about the position and relations of the Kurdish elites to the

Young Turk movement. They also reflect their aspirations, objectives and perspectives at the time. The question of nationality and identity will be looked at from the pages of those issues. Close reading of the KTTG would suggest that far from being a nationalist journal, it reflected the aspirations of the Kurdish intelligentsia which was highly Ottomanist to a degree that one might identify them as

Ottoman nationalists in their stand against particular issues of nationalist development in Balkans and in Crete within the Ottoman Empire. Their identification with the

Ottoman Caliphate and Sultanate puts a huge question mark over claims of their

‗nationalism‘.

The third journal, the Roji Kurd was published by the Kurdish student society, Hevi, which had been established in Istanbul in 1913. At this time the positive impact of the constitutional revolution in Istanbul had disappeared and the dark clouds of the First

World War were looming. It would be highly interesting to find out how the Kurdish intelligentsia and notables perceived the political climate of the time, the Young Turk movement, and the nationalist developments within the empire.

2.2.1 Ottomanism and Identity

The Ottoman state was seen as a legitimate power and institution by all these journals.

For example in the fourth issue (3 June1898) of Kurdistan, Midhat Bedirhan in an

110 open letter to the Sultan states: ‗as is known by your Highness, the Kurds are the most distinctive people of your Ottoman state that will live forever…‘83(Italics added) The issues of Kurdistan reminded and urged the Sultan to apprehend the strategic importance of Kurdistan for the well being and security of the Ottoman state. In the

13th (2 April 1899) issue, for example, the editor in an open letter to the Sultan

Abdulhamid II, states: ‗For the Ottoman government 84 to live continuously the importance of the protection of Kurdistan as the only standpoint against Russia is of course absolutely apprehended by your highness as well…‘85 Abdurrahman Bedirhan, the editor of the journal, in the 16th issue (6 August 1899) states:

‗Every person who is a Muslim would want the continuation of the

Ottoman state. When we see the illness in the body of the State due to

its administrative misconduct, we have to treat that illness and get rid

of the sources of that illness. The health of the State is our health, and

its death is our death. (Italics added)‘86

Maybe the most striking example of the journal‘s Ottomanist stance can be detected in the 22nd issue (2 February 1900), in an article written by Bahriyeli Riza. In this article the writer criticizes the way in which the Ottoman bureaucracy conducts its internal and external affairs. He sadly acknowledges that because of the incompetent regime of Abdulhamid‘s policy of ‗idare-i maslahat and iş’ar-i ahiret ‗one of the most important parts of our land (vatan)87, Crete island was lost.’ He continued:

‗The Greek government despatched soldiers to our borders and

launched an assault [on our borders]. Our military commander who

was in charge, reported the situation [to the palace] and asked how to

respond. The answer [from the palace] was to refrain from any

assertive behaviour until the iş’ar-i ahire [final order from Palace] was

111 received. Two or three days passed. No news from iş’ar-i ahire yet.

Meanwhile the enemy has captured a few places near the border. (….)

Our soldiers, courageous and full of love of vatan could not stand

anymore [patience run out] and began to attack the enemy.‘88 (Italics

added)

The writer further argues that ‗our courageous soldiers‘ would prove to the world that they were still like those previous heroic Ottomans, as long as they were not restrained ‗by the heinous and felonious orders of the Palace.‘89 What is striking here is that the author not only identified himself with the heroic Ottoman past and the

Ottoman army, he also perceived the nationalist secessionist movements within the

Ottoman empire as enemies and justifies the suppression of such movement by ‗our courageous‘ Ottoman army. Another example was in the 29th issue (14 October 1901), in an article that dealt with the Armenian question. The rather long article states: ‗If it is not worked out together with the other issues of the Ottomans under the banner of independence and freedom of Ottomanism the Armenians would be worse-off than in their situation today. The Armenians can be better off with the justice and security of the Ottomans, and without the Ottomans, Armenians might wither away.‘90 This type of identification with the Ottomanism and the Ottoman institution, above else the

Ottoman state, is evident throughout the issues of Kurdistan.

A close reading of Kurdistan indicates that the journal separates the corrupt Ottoman administration and bureaucrats, including Sultan Abdulhamid II himself, from the concept of Ottomanism. For them the security and unity of Ottoman state and its territory are essential for the well being of the millet of the Ottomans. However in

112 order to keep the Ottoman state and its territory intact the journal suggests that it needs to be reformed. For the writers of Kurdistan, the Ottoman millet, regardless of their differences in religion and nationality can live in peace and prosperity. Only a just government and ruler can realise this. Thus the main criticisms were directed against the Sultan Abdulhamid II for not being able to rule competently or justly.

Only with justice could the Ottomans stand against the intervention of external powers, whose main intention was to exploit the Ottomans for their own benefit. As a solution to the corrupt regime of Abdulhamid II, the journal advocated the application of Ottoman constitution, in effect Kanun-i Esasi.91 In other words, the journal was the mouthpiece of Kurdish intellectuals who were associated with the Young Turks movement.92

The perception of Ottomanism in Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi is not far from that of Kurdistan. The terminology used by the paper itself reveals their Ottomanist perspective. Throughout the nine issues, frequent use was made of such phrases as:

‗our government‘ ‗our Great State‘, ‗our heroic soldiers‘, ‗our land‘ which are all in reference to the Ottoman state, territory, and army. This was apparent right from the first issue 93(5 December 1908). Babanzade Ismail Hakki, a founding member of the

KTTJ, writing in the first issue implied that the Kurdish people before everything else were Muslims, and then Ottomans and then Kurds. Kurdishness as an identity came only third in the order of importance. He states further: ‗No power in the world one can think of wishes to eliminate this old link, this truthful and honourable connection between Kurdishness and Ottomanism. (…) these two words are conjoined. For God forbid, if Ottomanism disappears nothing would remain of Kurdishness either.‘ 94

Süleyman Nazif in the second issue (12 December 1908) writes: ‗Before the Vienna

113 Walls and Crete fortress you could find Kurdish corpses. These heroic victims have never given up their desire to be good Ottomans. The Ottoman state should provide and satisfy their human rights and their needs for civilization to realise its duty of sovereignty.‘95 In the fourth issue an article written in Kurdish (Kurmanci dialect) with a Turkish title ‗Our Kurdish Language‘ put forward the view of Ottomanism:

‗Brothers! The name of our people (millet) is Kurmanc. Kurmanc are all the same. (..)

Our country is subjected to (dependent on) to the Ottoman state.‘ All the subjects of the Ottomans, Turk, Kurmanc, Jews and so on so forth are all same and together living in the land of the Ottomans. Our country is the country of the Ottomans.96 The

Ottomanist stance of the KTTG is most evident in the case of nationalist developments in the Balkan regions and Crete. In the sixth issue (9 January 1909) there was a special article published anonymously under the title of the Crete

Question. The article claimed that the sudden independence of Bulgaria and loss of

Bosnia-Herzegovina had caused great sadness amongst the Ottoman millet.

Furthermore it implied that the rumour of annexation of Crete by Greece ‗awakened every Ottoman citizen‘, and as a result a rally was organised to protest at the separatists‘ developments in Crete, and everybody ‗took oath in the name of God, honour and consciousness that they would sacrifice their life in this cause.‘97 The article suggested that Kurds also opposed fiercely this annexation. The article quoted a speech made by a member of the KTTJ, Süleymaniyeli Pashazade Süleyman

Begefendi, in the same rally:

‗We in the name of Kurdish people express our opinion and swear

before you that we, Kurds, like our ancestors, without making hills

made by our bones beneath the Castle and Walls of the Crete we would

not accept that even one stone of the island of the Crete be surrendered

114 to the enemy and we would like to express our sympathy with our

fellow countrymen of Crete. Long live national unity 98 , long live

Crete.‘99

In the 9th issue (30 January 1909) again on the question of Crete the same writer declares:

‗O my Kurdish brothers. Let us be united too, and hurry to help all our

Ottoman brothers, and like everybody else let us die (sacrifice

ourselves) for the country (vatan). Because Islam and humanity ask us

to do so.‘100

These illuminating examples indicate the depth of loyalty of the KTTG towards the

Ottoman Empire and its institutions.

What distinguished the KTTG‘s Ottomanism from that of the Kurdistan is the change in the Ottoman regime deriving from the Young Turk constitutional revolution in

1908, with which KTTJ was closely associated. There was no longer criticism of the

Ottoman administration and bureaucracy but solidarity with the CUP and the expectation of reform to be carried out in Kurdistan in areas of education and administration. There was a great hope among the Kurdish intelligentsia that the constitutional revolution would bring peace and prosperity to the Ottoman land.101

The change of tone from Kurdistan to KTTG was a transition from being oppositional

Ottoman intellectuals into a participatory association with the Ottoman institution.

Nothing can better exemplify this transition than their leaders‘ position vis-à-vis the

Ottoman state. While the editors of Kurdistan and their families had been threatened and punished for their activities by the Ottoman administration during the

115 Abdulhamid II era, the president of the KTTJ, Seyyid Abdulkadir was appointed as an

MP in the Ottoman parliament after the constitutional revolution of 1908.

The final journal Roji Kurd also had an Ottomanist character. In the first issue, Dr.

Abdullah Cevdet writes: ‗I would like to ask to the Kurdish youth, what would they like to be? Or what not to be? An element within the Ottoman Empire? What sort of an element, a decaying and corrupting element or renovating and modernizing (….) element?‘102 Necmettin Kerkulu in the same issue emphasize that the Hevi society and its journal Roji Kurd were endeavouring to advance the progress of the Kurdish people so as to become a better element of the Ottoman millet. He continues: ‗The enlightened intellectuals of the nations (kavim)103 under the name of Ottomans have established students‘ societies and their endeavour towards making their nations‘ progress, can be counted as holy endeavours for the future of the Ottomans.104 He further suggested that the first duty and priority of such associations was to strengthen their nations‘ connection with the institution of the Caliphate.105

The reading of the three journals strongly indicates that the Kurdish intelligentsia conceived the Ottoman state and the Sultan and Caliphate as legitimate institutions.

They identified themselves before everything else as citizens of the Ottoman Empire.

The Kurds, for these journals, were just an element that made up part of the Ottoman millet as a whole.

116 2.2.2 Education and Reform

The second feature of these publications and the Kurdish intelligentsia of this period is what might be called educationalism and reformism. The journals indicate that education and reformism were interconnected within the context of Ottomanism.

Alongside the Young Turks, 106 the Kurdish intellectuals were convinced that reformation of the Ottoman administration was essential for the survival of the empire. The position of the Ottoman Empire had been weakening in international politics since the late 16th century as ‗European states, especially the newly emerging nation states in Western Europe, had surpassed it economically, technologically and military.‘107Since then, various modernisation attempts had been made to alter this situation.108 The Kurdish intelligentsia assumed that the reform and modernisation of the Empire would affect the Kurds. The Kurdish elite believed that Kurdistan was one of the most backward regions of the empire and its inhabitants were uneducated and ignorant. The reason for this backwardness and ignorance was attributed to the

Ottoman administration‘s negligent policy towards Kurdistan. This had to be changed.

It was essential for the well-being and security of the empire that Kurdistan and the

Kurdish people become modernised through education and literacy. They assumed that the main problem facing the Kurds was their illiteracy. They saw Kurdistan as geographically constituting an important area within the empire. It was bordered by the Persian and Russian empires, and the security of the empire dependent on the loyalty of the Kurds.109 Thus the enlightenment of the Kurds, in effect education to make them ‗civilised‘ was essential for the security of the empire. In the 3rd issue of

KTTG, Ismail Hakki Baban criticised the pre-constitutional Ottomans‘ policy of prohibiting the use of the various languages of the Muslim people of the Empire, and warned that ‗power and authority is in education. And education is dependent on

117 language. If the Kurds, as constituting one of the most important foundations of the

Ottoman Empire, remain decayed and rusty (uneducated), God forbid, Ottomanism will be destroyed.‘110 Three journals profoundly stressed the need for education and enlightenment. Thus it is not surprising to see that both KTTJ and Hevi prioritised their objectives so as to enlighten Kurds through education. The three journals published by the Kurdish intelligentsia in relatively short but fundamentally different periods put equal stress on the need for education and cultural reforms in Kurdistan.

Kurdish intellectuals visualized themselves in a messianic and paternalistic way, as the educators of the ignorant. An article in the Roji Kurd illustrates this perfectly:

‗Milletler and Kavimler 111 are like children. (…) I think it is not

possible to keep nations away from danger and defection. If that is so,

the question of how to educate highly illiterate societies like ours,

needs to be considered. If it were up to me, I would say that it should

be done by beating in their heads… (….) I have said highly illiterate;

yes, it must be confessed that Kurds are highly illiterate‘112

The aim of the Kurdistan was to awaken the Kurdish masses from illiteracy and ignorance by encouraging the development of science, art and education in Kurdistan.

It called on Kurdish notables in Kurdistan to establish and send their children to schools. For Kurdistan a true patriot was someone who helped to build schools in

Kurdistan.113 The editor of Kurdistan in an open letter to the Sultan states: ‗In order to encourage Kurds to learn science and arts and as well as to make them conscious of the necessities of the time, I have prepared and published this newspaper in the

Kurdish language.‘ 114 Babanzade Ismail Hakki, in the first issue of the KTTG, implied that it was time for the Eastern people, particularly the Kurds, to begin to

118 work: ‗When it comes to the question of where to begin to work, (the answer is) from education, then again education. Then? Then once more education, and again education!‘115

One of the most interesting and important articles was published in the 8th issue of the

KTTG, and in it the intertwined relationship between the Kurdish intelligentsia, education, language and Kurdishness was portrayed. It was written by Erzincanli

Hamdi Suleyman. It suggested, from a functionalist perspective, education in

Kurdistan should be conducted in Turkish for various reasons: first the official language of the Ottomans was Turkish. Speaking Turkish proper would enable an individual to manage his business with the government in a most effective way. An individual who could not speak Turkish would have to face problems of communication, and would need to use an interpreter. Secondly, as every male citizen of the Empire had to serve in the holy institution of the Ottoman army, they needed to communicate in Turkish. Thirdly, the fact that there were no Kurdish language books and Kurdish dictionaries meant it would be very difficult to conduct education in

Kurdish. For these reasons the writer suggested that education in Kurdistan ought to be in Turkish. Hence Kurds should work and endeavour for the diffusion of Turkish in Kurdistan.116 It seems that their primary concern was to develop the educational institutions in Kurdistan: establishing schools and allocating resources to that end. It does not seem to be the case that they had given any specific consideration about the use of the Kurdish language in schools. This lack of consideration, combined with the idea of using the Turkish language for schools in Kurdistan is a prime example of how remote the Kurdish intelligentsia were from a nationalist discourse, and how deeply they were imbued with an Ottoman identity.

119 The history and literature of the Kurds was also scrutinized by the journals. Their ambition was to revive past Kurdish literature and history. Kurdistan, from the second issue onwards, began to print sections from the epic poem of Ahmede Khani ‗Mem u

Zin’.117 The editor of Kurdistan asserted that Kurds did not know their own history and ‗for that reason in my newspaper I will write briefly about the history of

Kurdistan and the history of my ancestors Azizan‘.118 From the 8th issue onwards he wrote about Kurdish principalities, particularly on the Bedirhan family. 119 Kurd

Teavvun ve Teraqi Jamiyeti, announced in the KTTG that the association intended to write a complete history of Kurdistan and the Kurds and to collect and publish

Kurdish national literature.120 Dr. Abdullah Cevdet touches on the question of history:

‗What memory means for individuals, history does for nations. (…) A nation that does not have its proper and perfect history is a nation in effect has never lived. (….)

Let us all confess that Kurds do not have their own proper history books…‘121

The analysis of the Kurdish elite‘s pre-war discourse thorough their publications and associations indicate that they did not entertain the idea of an independent Kurdistan, or any thought about establishing a Kurdish nation-state. On the contrary they, like the Young Turks, aimed at reforming the Ottoman state institution. For the Kurdish elite, the Ottoman state was a legitimate authority, and the Kurds were seen as an inherent part of the entities that constituted the Ottoman Empire. Reformation of the empire was seen as the only right course for the betterment of the Kurdish society. It is because of this idea that the Kurdish elite become part of the Young Turk

Movement during the pre-war period. It is only after the war that the Kurdish elite changed their course in regard to the Kurds and Kurdistan.

120 CHAPTER III

FORMATION OF EARLY KURDISH NATIONALISM

The formation of early Kurdish nationalism took place in the post-war period, a turbulent period full of uncertainties. The Kurdish elite who had been involved in the pre-war cultural movement were the ones who began to engage in nationalistic politics and discourse through post-war political establishments and publications, which were based mainly in Istanbul. Those who were involved in Kurdish political activities were influential Kurdish notables residing in either Istanbul or in the capitals of Europe.

This period also witnessed the rise of nationalist movements in Kurdistan led by

Sheikhs and tribal chiefs. The Sheikh Mahmud Berzenji movement in Southern

Kurdistan was directed against the British authority in Baghdad with the objective of declaring an independent Kurdistan. The other one was the Koçgiri movement, which was against the Kemalist forces in Anatolia. The aim of the Koçgiri uprising was also independence. Despite their significance within the context of nationalism, these two movements remained isolated from the rest of Kurdistan and thus had the characteristics of localized movements rather than fully fledged national movements.

Relations between the Kurdish nationalists in Istanbul and those in Kurdistan were weak and inconsistent. The emergence of localized nationalisms was in fact not

121 accidental but rather a reflection, an outcome of the characteristic divisions within the

Kurdish elite and the divided Kurdish social and political structure.

Here, in this section, the political formation of Kurdish nationalism as it emerged in

Istanbul will be analyzed. The Sheikh Mahmud and Koçgiri movements will be the subjects of the next chapter.

In Istanbul, Kurdish nationalists established a number of political and cultural associations, such as Kurdistan Teali Jamiyati (Society for the Rise of Kurdistan,

KTJ, est.1918), Kurd Tamin-i Maarif ve Neşriyat Jamiyati (Society for the Kurdish

Education and Press, KTMNJ, est.1919), Kurd Teşkilat-i İçtimaiye Jamiyeti (Society for the Kurdish Social Organization, KTIJ, est. 1920), Kurd Hevi Jamiyati (Kurdish

Hope Society, KHJ, est. 1913 and re-est.1919), Kurd Kadinlar Teali Jamiyati

(Society for the Rise of Kurdish Women, KKTJ, est.1919). They also published two journals, Jin and Kurdistan, which disseminated nationalist discourse. For the importance to this research, this study will confine itself to the analysis of the nationalist and political activities of the KTJ and the KTIJ. The issues of Jin will be scrutinized in order to pursue early Kurdish nationalist discourse. The other associations will be treated as of secondary importance, and thus will be mentioned only within the context of their relations/connections with the KTJ and the KTIJ.

122 1. Political Formations

1.1 Formation of the KTJ

Soon after the Mudros Armistice which ended the First World War, the KTJ as a political association was established towards the end of 1918. Amongst the leading founding members were Seyyid Abdulkadir as president, Emin Ali Bedirhan as vice- president, as well as Babanzade Hikmet Beg, Dr. Mehmet Şükrü Sekban, Mukuslu

Hamza and Mela Said-i Kurdi. 1 Alongside leading notables, there were a large number of Kurdish intellectuals, military/bureaucratic officials and tribal chiefs linked to the KTJ. Goldas, in his extensive research on the KTJ mentions 167 active members from a wide spectrum of Kurdish society.2 Membership of the KTJ indicates that the organization attracted people from different levels of Kurdish society.

However, the organization's main political activities were influenced by a few numbers leading notables, mainly Seyyid Abdulkadir, and the Bedirhan family.

Soon after its establishment a number of local branches appeared in Kurdish cities:

Diyarbakir, Elazig, Arapkir, Gazan, Hozat, Bitlis, Umraniye, Dersim, Van, Sivas-

Koçgiri, and Siirt. It may be argued that the KTJ was well received by the Kurds. In his memoirs Kadri Cemil Pasha reported that a meeting was organized for the establishment of a local KTJ branch in Diyarbakir. In this gathering the Jemiyat was established and leading notables, intellectuals and ordinary citizens of Diyarbakir took part in its activities: 'During this time, apart from Mufti Haci Ibrahim Efendi and his relatives –Prinçzadeler-, all the citizens of Diyarbakir supported the branch which recognized the activities and initiative of the KTJ.'3 According to Dr. Nuri Dersimi,

Alişer Beg who was one of the leaders of the Koçgiri national movement, was also propagating the KTJ amongst the people of Dersim and Koçgiri. Another tribal chief

123 of Koçgiri, Haydar Beg who had been a Hamidieh Regiment chief, joined the KTJ and established a branch in Umraniye.4

Some sources suggest that a Kurdish leader of Iranian Kurdistan, Simko, and the infamous Kurdish national leader, Sheikh Mahmud Berzenji, had relations with the

KTJ.5 The mushrooming of the KTJ branches in Kurdistan attracted the attention of both the Ottoman establishment and the growing Kemalist movement in Anatolia. As we will see in the coming chapters, both the central Ottoman government and the

Kemalist movement in Anatolia cooperated together to curtail the KTJ activities in

Kurdistan. In any case, the relationship between the KTJ and its local branches in

Kurdistan ceased to exist towards the end of 1920 as a result of internal divisions within the KTJ and intensified Kemalist pressure.

The main political objective of the KTJ was to secure general rights for the Kurdish people.6 An important article published by Jin provides more information with regard to KTJ‘s aims and activities. Narrating the events of a conference held by the KTJ in

Istanbul, the writer quotes from the conference that:

'The Association is intended to protect the general and national

interests of the Kurds. In order to guarantee the national rights

provided by the Wilson Principles, naturally the association put the

Wilson Principles into its programme. The Wilson Principles, which

were approved by the whole world and recognized by the Ottoman

government, provide for, and secure national rights. For, if national

rights [of the Kurds] were not realized/secured, the Kurds would

124 remain oppressed and without rights, and perhaps for centuries to come

the Kurds would remain imprisoned.'

The writer, having analyzed the conference, asserted:

'So, as the Kurdish people has preserved its existence up to this

century, and in this century, before our eyes, and clearly with its

language, characteristic features, traditions, needs and environments

distinct from others, thus it is imperative to admit "there is a Kurdish

nation", then it is their [the Kurds] right to obtain the same [national]

rights as the neighbouring and other communities of the same level.'

These rights, for the writer, include: 'They [the Kurds] too want to be listened to by those who speak the same language, to be healed by those who understand them, to be ruled by a law of its own, to be able to create their own conditions which makes them happy and to live in their own country as they like.'7 Here there is certainly a strong nationalist argument: to live on their own land with their own people and by their own rule. How were the Kurds to obtain these national rights? Examination of the KTJ and reading Jin reveals two main roads by which they believed they would realize their political objective: by entering into diplomatic relations with the Great Powers, in effect, Britain, France and United States of America; and by the cultural, scientific and educational advancement of the Kurdish masses. In other words diplomacy and what might be called 'progress'.

Amongst the Great powers, it was Britain that they associated themselves with and with which they had their greatest hopes. From this same conference where the writer held that 'for the most important aspect of this meeting attended by the prominent intellectuals and youths of the Kurdish people in Istanbul is their psychological state

125 of mind, which indicates their strong connection to the Islamic community [Camia-i

Islamiye] and deep conviction and trust towards Britain. It was unanimously accepted and wished that in order to achieve the objective of setting up Kurdistan and its development, it is an absolute necessity to secure the support of the great English state

[British Government.]'8 Leading Kurdish nationalists had placed great hope for the future of Kurdistan in the hands of the British government. Seyyid Abdulkadir, notes

Hohler, British High Commissioner, ‗wished to form his course absolutely in accord with the Allies, but especially with England, for he considered that the fate of

Kurdistan was intimately linked with the policy of Great Britain, much more so than with that of any other of the Allies, and he was anxious to do nothing which would not have our entire assent and approval.‘ 9 In a report by the British High

Commissioner in Constantinople, narrating a meeting between the Kurdish delegates and the Ottoman authorities, Hohler noted ‗Mevlana Zadeh Rifat Bey, speaking on behalf of the Sheikh [Abdulkadir] Efendi, replied that according to the Wilsonian principles every nationality had the right to work for their own welfare and that the

Kurds were convinced that the only Power which could assure them freedom and security was Great Britain. They had therefore considered it desirable to approach the

British Authorities.‘10

The KTJ set up a committee to present the Kurdish issue and their wishes to the representatives of Britain, France, US, and Italy in Istanbul. It also empowered

General Şerif Pasha, as a Kurdish delegate, to represent the Kurds at the Peace

Conference. The committee submitted a map of Kurdistan (see map1) which included access to the Mediterranean Sea, together with information in regard to the distinct national features of the Kurds for the Great powers representatives and the

126 Conference.11 In his memorandum to the Peace Conference Şerif Pasha also submitted a map (see map 2) of Kurdistan.12 What Kurdish nationalists were not expecting was that the Armenians were also claiming the same territory for a 'Great Armenia'. Thus the already contentious Kurdo-Armenian relations further deteriorated in the early period of the post-war negotiations. The All Armenian Delegation (Delegation de

L‘Armenie integral) headed by Bogos Nubar Pasha and Avetis Aharonian submitted a joint memorandum to the same Conference in which they claimed their independence.

The Independent Armenian state included six vilayets13 within the Ottoman Empire

(Van, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Kharput, Sivas, and Erzurum).14 Kurdish fear and suspicion was exacerbated, and therefore they turned their attention to the Armenian question.

They also suspected that the Great powers, mainly America, of supporting the

Armenians‘ demand. Indeed throughout 1917 and 1918 European and American statesmen had made ‗enormous, verbose and rhetorical‘ promises to the Armenian people. Lloyd George, prime minister of Britain, declared in December 1917 that

Armenia was one of the countries which would ‗never be restored to the blasting tyranny of the Turk.‘ The following year he further proclaimed that Britain would ‗not forget its responsibilities to the Armenians.‘15 Similarly, the Italian prime minister announced, ‗say to the Armenians that I make their cause my cause.‘16 The American

President Wilson, whom the Kurds adored, asserted in a speech to the National

Democratic Committee that 'I am not without hope that the people of the United

States would find it acceptable to go in and be trustees of the interests of the

Armenian people and see to it that the unspeakable Turks and the almost equally difficult Kurds had their necks sat on long enough to teach them manners.'17

127 In response to the Armenian demands, the Kurdish nationalists counter-argued that the contested territory in fact belonged to the Kurds, and that it was called Kurdistan.

Throughout the issues of Jin, the KTJ‘ negotiations with representatives of the Great

Powers, and Şerif Pasha in the Peace Conference, the early Kurdish nationalists anxiously argued that the national rights of the Kurdish people and their land should be acknowledged. In a memorandum to the Paris Conference, Şerif Pasha, having classified the Armenian territorial claims as 'Imperialistic', indicated that most of the territories demanded by the Armenians belonged to the Kurds, and that historically the Kurds had constituted the majority of the population residing in the contested territory. He suggested to the Conference that in order to settle the question, the

Conference should set up 'an international commission to conduct a plebiscite to determine the territory where the Kurds constituted a majority and the national border of Kurdistan according to the principle of nationality.'18

In a meeting with the American Inquiry Commission on 11 August 1919, reports Jin, the Kurdish delegates stated as follows:

'In the area where the Kurds constitute a majority there could only be

Kurdish national rights. For centuries the Kurds made up the majority

of the population in these areas and this is a fact which is proved by the

works of foreign researchers. Apart from that, the denial of the

historical and racial (national) rights of the Kurds in these areas is

impossible. The rights of the Kurds are not only demanded by the

Kurds themselves but also acknowledged and secured by the American

public and its representative by Wilson's principles. The delegate

submitted the essential evidence and information about the issue…'19

128 K. Cemil Pasha recalls another not very friendly meeting between the KTJ and the

American commission:

'In a meeting with the American Commissioner the Kurdish delegates,

Seyyid Abdulkadir Efendi, Emin Ali Bedirhan Beg, Molla Said, Dr.

Şükrü Mehmet Beg, in a long statement indicated to the Americans the

map of Kurdistan and asserted that the Kurds should have access to the

seas. Upon which the American Commissioner stated that the creation

of Armenia including the greater part of Kurdistan had been decided.

Molla Said in a reply stated that ―if Kurdistan had a shore you would

perhaps succeeding realizing your plan with your war‘ ships, but your

war‘ ships can not climb to the mountains of Kurdistan and your

decision can not be realized.'20

Throughout the Jin, the Kurdish nationalists paid profound attention to the Armenian territorial claims and Allied intention to include parts of Kurdistan in Armenia. An article written by Ihsan Nuri, a member of the KTJ who later became the leader of the

Dersim uprisings in the 1930s, carried warnings for both Armenians and the Allies:

'Amongst the judgment taken by the Allied States Military Court 21 (Duvel-i

mu'telife Divan-i Harb-i Orfi) about the defeated nations and therefore the

Ottomans, it has became known that our Kurdistan, of which every inch is

washed with the blood of our ancestors, which it is our legitimate property, of

which the majority of its population is Muslim, is to be put under Armenian

sovereignty and rule.

(…)

‗I am sure and convinced that in the face of such worrying developments the

Kurds, who want either to be dead or live absolutely free, are not hopeless but

129 upset… I hope for the interests of these two nations, Armenians and Kurds, and

that our Armenian citizens, who have witnessed the heroic and courageous

character of the Kurds, in such a dangerous game should not be too greedy.'22

The same issue published a population charter of the province of Van to indicate the percentage of Armenians and Kurds. According to the charter the number of Kurds and Armenians numbered 158262 and 82476, respectively. Abdurrahman Rahmi, another member of the KTJ and regular contributor to the Jin, warned his fellow

Kurdish people: 'if we do not protect [Kurdistan] do not doubt, the Armenians will come in their hundreds and possess Kurdistan and steal our country.' 23 On the applicability of Armenian rule over Kurdistan, Kamran Ali Bedirhan had his doubts:

'to establish a government for today's Armenians will not have any

base. (…) In order to have a new government, it must have

considerable executive force (Kudret-i tazyikiyeye). The Armenians

have no such effective force at all. The Armenians do not have a

sufficient force to protect their government's sovereignty, and to make

the Kurds obey that government. The Kurds overall constitute a

majority.'24

The rise of Armenian nationalism and the growing Great Power and Russian interests in Armenia from the late 19th century had always caused great anxiety amongst the

Kurds. Armenian-Kurdish relations in the immediate post-war era deteriorated further as both groups contested for the same territory. This contention was an important factor in contributing to the rise of Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds felt strongly that it was either 'them' or 'us'. What differentiated the immediate post-war conflict from that of the pre-war period was that the Kurds realized the inability of the Ottoman

130 central government to deal with the issue and the growing physical presence of the new actors in the arena, that of Britain and France. This was compounded by the explicit support of the US towards the Armenians. The Kurds had seen the Caliphate as the supreme protector of Muslim citizens against the infidel and spiritually identified themselves with it. They no longer had the hope, in the post-war period, of expecting the Ottomans to solve the issue on behalf of, and according to the interests of the Muslim Kurds. A British document which reports the meeting between the KTJ and the Ottoman government on 10th July 1919 indicates Kurdish disillusionment with the Ottoman government on the issue of Armenia. A meeting between the KTJ delegate and the Ottoman officials25 indicates the tension between the Kurds and the government. (See appendix I)

If the formation of early Kurdish nationalism had taken shape partly as a reaction against Armenian nationalism, the effect of the Great Powers‘ discourse on self- determination of the oppressed people was another factor that contributed to the development of Kurdish nationalism. Indeed the rhetoric of the Great Powers was promising. On November 1918 a British-French joint declaration on Middle Eastern policy stated its aim to be ‗the complete and final liberation of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations that shall derive their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.‘26 However, it was the Wilson

Principles which caused the greatest hope amongst the Kurdish elite because of its explicit advocacy of the right of self-determination for the non-Turkish subjects of the

Ottoman Empire. The 12th point of the principles states: 'The Turkish part of the present Ottoman empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but other

131 nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.'27

It was because of the hope and excitement that had arisen from the principles, that the first Kurdish national organization had the Wilson Principles in its programme. They demanded the application of the Wilson principles to the Kurds due to the fact that, as they argued, the Kurds constituted a distinct nation, and thus had rights to their own self-determination. An article in Jin indicates the complex relationships between the

Wilson Principles and the Armenian issue:

‗Yes, up to the present time, we Kurds did not feel like separating from

the Turkish government or the Ottoman community (Menzuma-i

Osmaniyan). Whereas now, we see that Wilson says ―we will not give

non-Turks to the Ottomans‖. So this is the case, our land is called

Kurdistan and there are, apart from 2 to 3 civil servants, no Turks. If

there are no Turks what about Armenians or others? The Armenians

only constitute 5% and the others not more than 2%. Therefore in

Kurdistan there is no other nation than the Kurds and thus, Kurdistan is

the right of the Kurds not others. Wilson's Principles provide us with

the right to have Kurdistan.‘28

Reading Jin reveals that Wilson represented, for the Kurdish nationalists, the voice of a new age, in which justice, reason and the laws of science were to dominate international relations: 'the old ideologies, the erstwhile political and social ideologies are collapsing', asserted a writer, 'other principles, other leaders are appearing; reason dominates hatred, darkness is being imprisoned by enlightenment.'29

132 In their dealings with the Great powers, the leading Kurdish elite within the KTJ had not followed a centrally administered policy with a clear-cut systematic and coherent political programme. They had entered into relations with the Great powers in their own individual way and had individual designs for their prospective future of

Kurdistan. Seyyid Abdulkadir, Emin Ali Bedirhan and Şerif Pasha, each on their own terms suggested themselves as possible leaders of an established Kurdistan under the auspices of one Great power.

It was well known that Seyyid Abdulkadir displayed a tendency towards Britain. The

British High Commissioner in Istanbul, Richard Webb, in a report to Earl Curzon, made this tendency evident:

'The position which he [Seyyid Abdulkadir] takes up to-day in private

conversations, is that what Kurdistan needs is administrative separation

under British auspices, and that, if this were assured, independence

from Turkey would not be essential. If the British government met his

wishes and gave him a leading position in the kind of Kurdistan he

advocates, he would be prepared at any moment they wished to declare

independence. Meanwhile he does not wish to compromise himself

unduly and he is undoubtedly actuated by a great deal of veneration for

the Caliphate.'30

This excerpt illustrates some crucial aspects of Seyyid Abdulkadir's vision about

Kurdistan and himself. It reveals two important facts about him, one of which indicates that he wished to be placed in a leading position with the help of Britain.

Here, he is certainly contesting for the possible leadership, mainly against the

Bedirhan family and perhaps against his nephew, Sheikh Taha. The second point is

133 that he was ready to leave the question of independence of Kurdistan to the wishes of the British government. This is highly interesting for a nationalist leader to leave the destiny of his people, which he is aspiring to lead, to the whims of a foreign power.

The Bedirhanis, like Seyyid Abdulkadir, had great hope and expectation from the declarations of the Great Powers. Emin Ali Bedirhan, for example, nominated himself to be the ruler of Kurdistan. In a letter sent to the French High Commission in

Istanbul, he asked for a French mandate in Kurdistan, particularly the territory of

Botan, his father's principality: The 'Bedirhan family require the territory, which has been populated entirely by Kurdish people, ruled by our ancestors from the 7th century up to 1847, to be put under the French mandate and part of South Kurdistan

(Cezire ibn-i Omar) to be under the economic control of France'. Having provided the history of Botan principality, E.A.Bedirhan continued: 'We would like to indicate to his Excellency that for all over Kurdistan and especially the part under French mandate we have great influence of which your government may take benefit for the well-being and peace of the country for which your government is responsible.'31 An additional letter was attached indicating the territory of the Botan Amirate 'during the rule of Mir Bedirhan:

-Cezire Province: from Southeast Diyarbakir; Nizip; Midyat

-Bervari, Eruh, Shirnak, Gozan, Shirwan, Siirt (South of Bitlis)

-from South of Van and Colemerk

-Zakho, Amadiya, Duhok (Northwest of Mosul)

-Uveynada and Hugne Plateous (Northeast of Mosul)

-Birzar province (East of Mosul)

-The mountainous region that constitute Tiyar-Tikhup provinces.'32

134 As Yıldız has rightly argued, the territory of the Botan Amirate was divided by the

British-French zones of influence, and the Bedirhan family was anxious to see the erstwhile principality put under either French or British mandate as a whole. It should be underlined that the same letter with a change of addressee, was sent to the British

High Commission, and asked for a British mandate.

On his own initiative, Şerif Pasha asked the British authorities to establish an independent Kurdistan under British control. This Kurdish state, envisaged by Şerif

Pasha, would be administered by a council of influential local chiefs and he himself, as reported, 'was ready to shoulder the burden' to become the Amir of the Kurdish government to preside over the council.

Apart from these three, there were others contesting for possible leadership of

Kurdistan who approached the British authorities. Among them were Sheikh Taha, chief of the Milli tribe, Mahmud Beg, Sheikh Mahmud Berzenji of Sulaimania, and

Surreya Bedirhan who set up a 'Committee for Kurdish Independence' in Cairo.

A British official, Hohler, reporting to Curzon on November 1919 depicted this fragmented leadership as follows: 'The Kurds are like a rainbow of every shade of colour.'33 That situation remained the same a year later: 'There exists much doubt whether the independence or autonomy of Kurdistan is a proposition at all and in any case no such thing as "Kurdish opinion" in the sense of coherent public opinion can be said to exist… The few educated Kurds outside Kurdistan holding separatist ideas are very apt to exaggerate their own influence and importance.'34

135 It should be noted that their idea of independence basically meant, with the exception of Seyyid Abdulkadir who had initially displayed some loyalty towards the Ottoman central government, freedom from Ottoman rule. They were ready to accept a Great

Power's mandate, possibly British.

1.2 Division of the KTJ

The initial division within the KTJ occurred as a result of differences in opinion amongst the Kurdish nationalists in regard to their stand toward the central Ottoman government. It has been widely argued that within the KTJ two distinct approaches developed over the issue of independence and autonomy within the Ottoman political/geographical unit. Most historians on Kurdish history put forward the view that the tendency for autonomy was represented by Seyyid Abdulkadir, and the more radical independent tendency was led by the Bedirhans. One must be cautious about such generalization as both groups pursued their aims according to the internal and international developments that had taken place. Even though Seyyid Abdulkadir entertained the idea of an autonomous Kurdistan, neither he nor the Bedirhans ignored the idea of independence completely, albeit under the auspices of Britain.

The autonomist tendency of Seyyid Abdulkadir was attributed to his spiritual loyalty towards the Caliphate. Özoğlu made the claim that Seyyid Abdulkadir 'respected the office of the Caliphate, and thus he did not favour secession.' 35 McDowall also asserted the same view and connected the Seyyid's inclination for the Caliphate 'to his

Naqshibandi roots.'36 A view such as this is not the whole picture. As chapter I demonstrated, the famous Sheikh Ubeydullah had doubts about the religious

136 legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate. There is no conclusive evidence to believe his son, Seyyid Abdulkadir, should have been entirely motivated by veneration for the

Caliphate. After all, this view is a subjective perception of British officials in the field. Even amongst the British officials there were different views in regard to Seyyid

Abdulkadir‘s tendency. In a memorandum, T. B. Hohler states: ‗I was again much impressed by the firm resolution that [Seyyid Abdulkadir] showed in pursuing his aim of independence for Kurdistan and for separation from the Turks.‘37 The fact was that the Seyyid displayed readiness to secede from the Ottomans 'if the British government wishes so' casts doubt on his religious concern about the Caliphate.

It may be argued that he was merely a pragmatist politician who had taken the balance of power into consideration. The ambiguous policies of the Great Powers vis-à-vis

Kurdistan, as McDowall himself rightly acknowledged, made the Seyyid cautious about secession. Indeed during his meeting with Hohler, the British High

Commissioner in Constantinople, he raised the issue of independence, as Hohler reported: ‗The Peace Conference would in due course make its decisions, but he

[Seyyid Abdulkadir] was inclined to wonder what measures it would take to enforce them, and he quoted an Arab proverb: ―Though your enemy is only an ant, so long as he is an enemy you should not go to sleep.‖ With great tact he insinuated the difficulty which the Kurdish people would have in making good their claim to independence, if the Allies had not sufficient forces to overawe the Turks into a full acceptance of the peace terms.‘ 38 The ambiguities of British policy in Southern

Kurdistan also pushed Sheikh Mahmud Berzenji towards the Kemalist movement in

Anatolia, suggesting that the Kurdish nationalists‘ position towards or against the

Ottoman central government and Kemalist movement was determined to a great

137 degree by British policy rather than their religious concern over the institution of the

Caliphate. The background of the Seyyid, with a long history of involvement with the

Young Turk movement, casts further doubt about his veneration for the Caliphate.

This study would argue that his high position within the Ottoman bureaucracy, rather than his religious connection with the Caliphate, and alongside ambiguous British policy, had influenced his opinion on the issue of separation. The case of Şerif Pasha was more or less the same. Having been alarmed about the rumours of a partition of

Kurdistan between two Allied powers, Şerif Pasha decided that 'autonomy under

Turkish sovereignty was preferable.' 39 It was in this crucial period that the new

Ottoman government (1920) offered autonomy which would have been subject to the

Sultan and to a Turkish parliament, in which the Kurds would be represented.

It would thus be reasonable to argue that the question of autonomy/independence must be analyzed within the framework of interconnected factors: the ambiguous policies of Great Powers which were inclining towards partition of Kurdistan; the

Ottoman policy of offering autonomy; the growing Kemalist movement in Anatolia; and the Kurdish elite's, notably Seyyid Abdulkadir's, high position within the Ottoman establishment.

The conflict within the KTJ had gradually been rising. According to the memoirs of

Dersimi, the tension was evident:

'In a general meeting [held by the KTJ] the youths demanded that a decision be

taken for the declaration of independence of Kurdistan and for not a single

foreigner to remain in Kurdistan. Whereas the head of the parliament [referring to

Meclis-i Ayan] Seyyid Abdulkadir, was opposing such ideas and asserting that it

would not be a proper act for the Kurds to go against the Turks in these difficult

138 times of theirs and suggesting that we should assist the Turks for the time being.

Seyyid Abdulkadir, in order to deceive the young Kurds, implied that the Turks

had agreed to the establishment of Kurdistan and acknowledged an autonomous

Kurdistan within the Ottoman Sultanate. Further, to flatten our national pride, he

was saying that should the Turks go back on their promises, the Kurdish nation

had the ability to secure its national rights by force. The Young Kurds, apart from

agreeing a few ideas of Seyyid Abdulkadir, refuted most of what he said. As a

result during the meeting two main current ideas came into existence.'40

It seems that the debate within the KTJ intensified after the president, Seyyid

Abdulkadir, had given an interview to a daily newspaper in which he responded to a question of 'what are the real demands of the Kurdish nation?' by replying that 'today there are five to six provinces (Vilayets) inhabited by Kurds. Let the government grant these provinces autonomy, and for our part let us make progress by the employment of persons chosen by ourselves who are just and honest. As I stated above, we are not entertaining any feelings of enmity against the Turks at all. The

Turks could also take part with us in the autonomous [Kurdish] government.' 41

According to the British sources the Bedirhan section dismissed Seyyid Abdulkadir as president and expelled him from the KTJ after his open statement at the Ikdam newspaper.42 Seyyid Abdulkadir responded by dissolving the KTJ and calling for a new election for a new committee. As he enjoyed unquestionable support of the Kurds residing in Istanbul, a majority of whom were working as porters and other low-paid manual jobs, Seyyid Abdulkadir had a complete victory.

Soon after the election, the Bedirhans and other radical Kurdish nationalists split from the KTJ and established another organization, Kurd Teşkilat-i İçtimaiye Jamiyati. In

139 this split it was argued that primordial ties and rivalries between the two Kurdish notable families contributed profoundly as much as their ideological differences.43

The British sources also suggest the split was a result of personal rivalries.44 Özoğlu has argued that rivalries between the two families went back to the second half of the

19th century 'when Ubeydullah, the father of Abdulkadir, extended his influence over the areas formerly controlled by the Bedirhans.'45 The Feuds between the two families may explain, to a certain degree, the reason for the split—but it does not explain why some of the other members had left the KTJ alongside the Bedirhans. Certainly the most radical Kurdish nationalists had left the KTJ purely for ideological reasons.

Those radicals took part in the KTIJ. Indeed, prior to the split, some of the radical intellectuals had already established another political association, the Kurd Milli

Firkasi (Kurdish National Party –KMF) towards the end of 1919. Amongst the founding members were Necmeddin Huseyn, Memduh Selim, Kemal Fevzi and

Babanzade Aziz Beg.46 Those intellectuals occupied a pivotal role within the KTJ and

Jin. The KMF also joined when the KTIJ was established. It may be reasonable to argue that initial ideological tension within the KTJ was evident amongst the most radical members and had taken a sharper form parallel to the internal and international developments. In this manner familial feuds were minor contributory factor in the main split. In any case the split considerably reduced the political activities of the

KTJ, and it gradually ceased to be an effective political body.47 Most of its local branches were closed down by the central government and those associated with local branches joined the ranks of the KTIJ. So within less than 2 years this political organization, which had included wide layers of Kurdish society, ended its life cycle.

140 1.3. Teşkilat-i İçtimaiye Jamiyati (TIJ)

Apart from its ideological differences on the issue of independence, the TIJ was more or less, in terms of organization, membership and political views, like that of its predecessor. Among the founding member were Emin Ali Bedirhan, Kemal Fevzi,

Ekrem Cemil Pasha, Dr. Abdullah Cevdet and Şükrü Beg.48

A statement of Emin Ali Bedirhan in a daily newspaper indicates the political objective of the TIJ and the reason for its establishment:

'Up to the present time, based on our confidence in the rights and justness of the

Great Allied states and particularly Great British state, Kurdish intellectuals and

leaders, who are working for the realization of the Kurdish objectives, in the land

of Kurds, of which the political status (existence) was acknowledged by the Peace

Conference‘ final decisions, for the purpose of establishing social institutions and

organizations according to the needs (realities) of the century, an organization,

called Kurd Teşkilat-i İçtimaiye, was established. The main objective of the

association which is based on the welfare and freedom of the Kurdish nation is to

elevate the Kurdish social union, is to elevate the Kurdish nation to respect and to

be respected within the communities of nations and especially within its natural

and national borders to live peacefully with its neighbours, and understanding and

civilized nations.'49

Goldas asserted that the association, in order to establish an organic link/connection with the Kurdish people in Kurdistan, had sent its young active members to Kurdistan

'to put into effect the association's objectives.'50 In 1921 Ekrem Cemil Pasha, who had great influence in Diyarbakir, and Mukuslu Hamza were sent to Kurdistan. However, while they were working for the cause of the association, they were arrested and

141 charged with treason by the Kemalists. According to the memoirs of K.Cemil Pasha, there was another attempt to activate the association in Kurdistan: 'The president of the KTIJ sent a delegation comprised of Halil Rahmi Beg, Mustafa Pasha Yamulki,

Kemal Fevzi, Mevlanzade Rifat Beg to Iraq in 1921 in order to cross into Kurdistan.

The English [authorities] did not allow access to the delegation to cross into Kurdistan via Iraq. Only Mustafa Pasha was allowed to Sulaimania due to it being his birth place.'51

K. C. Pasha claimed that the Hevi members in Diyarbakir also joined the ranks of the

TIJ, and attempted to establish links with the Sheikh Mahmud Berzenji movement in

Southern Kurdistan. In a meeting involving Dr. Fuad, Bave Tujo, Çerçizade Fikri and some other members, it was decided to send someone to Sulaimania to find out about the Sheikh's situation. Bave Tujo, who was selected to contact the Sheikh, had traveled to Southern Kurdistan, but unfortunately he was arrested by the British authorities, and was handed over to the Turkish authorities.

One concluding remark about these two organizations, as Özoğlu acutely notes, was that they both stood against the growing Kemalist movement in Anatolia. 'Clearly, the

Kurdish leaders were aware that the Kemalists fully intended to implement the first article of the National Pact (Misak-i Milli), which rejected the separation of any territory where the majority were Muslims.'52 Özoğlu quotes from a British document which indicates that Emin Ali Bedirhan offered to cooperate with the Greek representative against Kemalism: 'Emin Ali Bey said that, in view of the present situation, he and his friends had come into [contact] with the Greek representative here, who had listened favourably to the suggestion of a Kurdish movement against

142 the Kemalists, which, without any formal co-operation, would promote the interests of both Greece and the Kurdish nationalists.'53

Both organizations, the KTJ and the TIJ, had to face the combined efforts of the

Ottoman government and the Kemalist movement, both of which curtailed the activities of these organizations in Kurdistan and in Istanbul. In 1922 both organizations ceased to exist.

2. Discursive Kurdish Nationalism

2.1 History and Language

The history of the Kurds and Kurdistan was one of the most prominent themes that

Kurdish nationalists were engaged with. Their main emphasis was to locate the origins of the Kurds and their distinct history. Right from the first issue in his article

'Mythology of Dehak', Kurdiye Bitlisi, claimed that the Kurds historically originated from Iranian peoples and that the Kurds were the oldest amongst them. 54 As a response to an article published in İçtimaiyet, which claimed that the Kurds, in only a scattered way and in various times and tribal forms, had been dispatched towards inner Kurdistan, and that they had not been the original people of Kurdistan, Bitlisi made a counter argument:

'It is sufficient to say that the time that has passed between the events that caused

the Kurds' migration to Kurdistan and our contemporary century is about 4900

years. If we justly compare the historical life span of the Kurds, which is 49

centuries, and the short time scale of the occupations of those nations who claim,

or want to claim rights to sovereignty to the regions of the earth, our nation's

entry into Kurdistan –even if this region had been occupied by others before the

143 Kurds- is such as to oblige others to modestly bow before the historical seniority

of the Kurds. Then, is there any other nation on earth that, since the beginning of

history up to now has protected its social and political existence? For that reason,

the Kurds, like any other great nation who lost its greatness and sovereignty, have

exploited every opportunity in order to bring back their historical greatness; here

and there, the Kurds established states, scattered but sustained longer than

Genghis and Timur‘s governments. Their states, compared to those of their

contemporaries in terms of civilization, were much much higher.'55

What is important here is that the writer originates the history of the Kurds at least 49 centuries ago and claims that the Kurds constituted the oldest nation in the region. He also refers to the historical greatness of the Kurdish people and their honourable and great past.

The Jin editorial states: 'we should not forget that entry to the community of nations

(Cemiyetgah-i Milele) can only be possible with a national history and national dictionary. These are the only identities necessary for entry to it.'56 A very interesting article written by Yamulkizade encapsulates the basic parameter of the early Kurdish nationalists‘ vision of Kurdish history. (See appendix II) This article articulates the typical nationalist preoccupation with a 'great-distinct historical past'. The article implies that although the Kurds were backward, fragmented and divided, once in their past they had contributed profoundly to civilization, creating great and just empires with powerful armies led by strong leaders. The implicit assumption here is that because the Kurds had such a great past, it is time to revive this nation and bring it back to the glorious of its past. This theme, 'great-glorious' past, was frequently put forward by almost all of the writers who contributed to the Jin. The other postulation

144 is that if the Kurds had such a great past, then it would be easy for the Kurds to recapture civilization as a nation and to take their place within the civilized community of nations.

If the Kurds had a pre-historical existence, then their Kurdish language should logically also be pre-historical. Ismail Vedad, who defined himself as a 'Young Kurd', writes: 'my father is trying to prove the pre-historical existence of the Kurds. I, myself, will prove that the Kurdish language has existed since pre-historical times.

[My proof] is based on the most updated and trustworthy European works [on linguistics]. (…) The Kurdish language is much older than the Persian.'57

The significance of language for a nation was emphasized by a sister cultural association of the KTJ, the KTMJ. According to its charter published by Jin, it states:

'Yes, it is a sad reality, indeed a very sad reality that we have not upgraded our

Kurdish language according to the needs and realities of the age. The Kurdish language even in its existing condition can claim superiority compared to other peoples' languages in terms of its perfection and variety.'58 The charter claimed that despite the literary ability and perfect grammar, which had proved itself in Kurdish classic works of literature up to the last century, for some reason—chance or destiny—the Kurdish language had not fully modernized itself. Thus the KTMNJ in its programme set out objectives in regard to the Kurdish language:

'1- To publish a scientific weekly journal 2- To publish the literate works, -divan, poems- of all the Kurdish writers, poets and scientists in the Kurdish language. 3- To arrange and publish a Kurdish dictionary containing all the dialects of the Kurdish language 4- Suitable grammar books will be published

145 5- To publish essential books in order to conduct primary education in Kurdish 6- To arrange and publish a journal on Kurdish proverbs (Atasözleri) in all dialects.‘59

Kurdiye Bitlisi, who acknowledged the necessity to modernize and develop the

Kurdish language, suggested that a 'Language Committee' be set up with the help of the KTMNJ and to follow a certain methodology for its activities. He indicated that despite the works of great Kurdish writers, poets in Kurdish and a few non-Kurdish linguists' works on the Kurdish language, the real source of the Kurdish language was the colloquial language spoken by non-educated people and particularly by elderly women. If this colloquial language was to be arranged and organized according to contemporary scientific procedures, the writer argued 'without doubt I can claim that we could have a written and spoken language richer than most of the existing languages in the East.'60 For the writer, the standardization of Kurdish language was the duty of the 'language Committee' and it was only achievable if the Committee with the help of the Kurdish intelligentsia worked according to scientific rules. The prominent role that the state plays in the standardization of a language was not mentioned. Perhaps the writer was not aware that even in Europe standardization of national languages was the production of nation-states.

2.2 Mythology and National Days

One of the methods that Kurdish nationalists deployed in order to determine the origin of the Kurds and their ancient history was to investigate Kurdish national myths. In the first issue of Jin, Bitlisi asked whether the myth of 'Dehak' had any connection

146 with the Kurdish history and nation. Having analyzed the content of the mythology of

'Dehak' the writer asserts:

'under the leadership of Kawa with skilful war-games those sections of people

who had chosen to eject the occupiers from the country had succeeded in this

objective and managed to liberate their country. Every nation in their history has

such a special days and rightly they celebrate such special national days with

great ceremonies. Indeed, so the Kurds have acknowledged their special day, a

day of independence and they have been celebrating each year the 31 August as

national liberation day. The fact that only the Kurdish people participate in the

celebration of what is called a Kurdish festival proves that the nation who

declared war against Dehak in order to end his tyranny was the Kurd. (…)

Because every nation would only celebrate the special day which belongs to it

and created and influenced by it. Now, from the mythology (of Dehak), I will

summarize some conclusions:

1- The Kurds in origin belong to and constitute the oldest Iranian people;

2- Although some section of the Kurds during the Dehak period migrated

towards the west, they again returned back to their political land in today's

Kurdistan Mountains;

3- The nation who ended Dehak's occupation is none other than the ancient

Kurdish people'.61

Another writer in the 16th issue of Jin suggests: 'as a historical nation it is our duty to know our special [national] days. Up to now we have neglected our special days. One of the ways to know ourselves is to find out our special days and to make them alive; it is also an introduction, a step towards the origin of our civilized history.'62

147 The KTMNJ organized a conference on account of 'Kawa National Day' in which seminars on the importance of the myth of Kawa were presented. M. Selim Beg who attended the conference, asserts: 'by historical research it is proved that Kawa was

Kurdish. Therefore Kawa is our "national hero" and the day he rose up against Dehak is our "special day"'.63

The importance attached to the mythology of Dehak by Kurdish nationalists is significant for a number of reasons: first, the implicit analogy between the Kurds during the Dehak tyranny and the Kurds today. As the Kurds then succeeded in overthrowing the despotic regime of Dehak and achieved their independence, the

Kurds today can overthrow despotism as well.

Secondly, revolutionary uprisings against oppression by oppressed people were legitimized, or were shown as an effective method. The same writer asserts: 'the fundamental law (Hukuk-i Esasiye) acknowledges as it a natural right for nations to rise against oppression, and to exercise the right to revolution. (…) Today the communities who have the great power to arrange world affairs have used this right the most. History and [historical] events prove to us with thousands of examples that those nations who have not used this right but have just complained and claimed, have had as their share only poverty and disaster'64.

Thirdly mythology was used as a determinant to prove the origins of the ancient

Kurdish history, the historical existence and seniority of the Kurdish people; and finally, as a means to glorify the Kurdish past.

148 2.3 Culture and Tradition

Like its predecessor, Jin also spent a lot effort on the revival of Kurdish culture.

Indeed, this was one of the main objectives of Jin: 'the aim of Jin is to elevate Kurdish culture and civilization to the level of world-contemporary culture and civilization.

For this cause it will do its utmost. The most suitable culture and civilization for the

Kurds is a combination of Eastern and Western cultures and civilizations combined with the Kurdish national characteristics in accordance with social and national laws.' 65 Jin writers, the early Kurdish nationalists, worked on various aspects of

Kurdish culture such as the ordinary life of a Kurdish man and woman; publication of

Kurdish literate works like Mem u Zin of Ahmed-e Khani; writing short stories on

Kurdish life and so on. Most of these literary works had a very strong nationalist character. For example, a poem published by A. Rahman in Kurdish under the title of

'the love of country':

'Dibejin welat bo dijmin e Ez sax bibim qet mimkun e! Xiret, hemiyyet zamin e Esqa wi mehvane min e Qurban ji wi ra, merge min e Esqa welat, esqa welat Te cerg u melake me pat'66

Here the poet basically asserts that he is ready to sacrifice his life for his country.

Mukuslu Hamza, in an introduction to the publication of Mem u Zin of Ahmed-e

Khani, refers to the importance of literature in the life of the nation:

'what strong bases for tall palaces, means for each nation and people, literature and its works mean the same. A literate nation no matter how decayed and its glorious palaces destroyed, can be revived. (…)According to this fact, in order to exist and to acquire national sovereignty, every nation, as a first step, has to pay profound

149 importance to its literature and literate works. (…) Especially in the age of civilization of today‘s world, the only proof of nationhood is language and literature.'67

The KTMNJ also included within its programme activities in the realm of culture: 'In all the region [of Kurdistan] our association will collect Kurdish stories, tales and folk songs: and gather information in regard to Kurdish traditions and customs; it will open a museum containing private and communal things of everyday life of Kurdish men and women..'68

To encapsulate what has been said so far in regard to the early Kurdish nationalists' view throughout Jin:

1- They were trying to prove the historical existence of the Kurdish nation and their

country of Kurdistan

2- The revival and elevation of the culture– literature, language, custom and

tradition- of this historical nation

3- As a historical and distinct entity, the Kurds, and their equally distinct culture

provides a historical and natural right to self-determination .

2.4 Gender

The Early Kurdish nationalists‘ approach to and concern with the issue of gender within the framework of nationalism had four aspects:

1- Since women constitute half of the nation, it is, for the well being of the nation,

essential that they like men, should be elevated and illuminated with scientific

education

150 2- Women were assumed to be reproducers and thus guaranted the future of the

nation, to phrase Anthras and Yuval-Davis 'as biological reproducers of members

of ethnic collectivities'.69

3- Women were assumed 'as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of

the collectivity and as transmitters of the culture'70, in other words, they had the

role of cultural transmitters and cultural educators of the Kurdish nation

4- Women were assumed to take part in the social struggle for the elevation,

development, and well being of the nation.

For the early Kurdish nationalists the advancement of the status of women in society was deemed crucial for the achievement of the twin goals of Kurdish nationhood and modern progress. As Klein argued, the 'Kurdish nationalists assigned a primary role to

Kurdish women in both the "national awakening" and in national life in general as teachers. Yet it was not so much in the capacity of schoolteachers, but rather as mothers, who would raise children in a uniquely Kurdish manner.'71 M. Selim Beg paternalistically asserted: 'our wives (hanimlarimiz) can only achieve the objective of advancement and development of Kurdish womanhood, if they become good house- wives and proper mothers, able to instill into our children and youth a feeling of patriotism, sense of duty and sacrifice.'72 So the role of women was limited within the boundaries of home as cultural educators for the new generation, on whom the future and well being of the nation depended. Because, argued the same writer, in another article, 'the Kurdish woman is the only and absolute educator of her child. Every

Kurdish child has a strong spirit molded by the child mother's hand and spirit.'73 The writer further suggested that women and men should have more or less the same level of education and that both sexes should eagerly pursue scientific knowledge. If, the

151 writer argued, qualitative and quantitative imbalance in education and cultural knowledge between men and women occurred, then a women question would be inevitable. The same article suggested that it was crucial for women to participate in the social struggle alongside men: 'did not we see in this Great War, how the best prepared and the most civilized nations' women participated in the war.'74

A Society for the Advancement of Kurdish Women (Kurd Kadinlari Teali Jamiyati) was established in May/June 1919 under the wings of the KTJ with the objective of ' realizing the advancement and development of Kurdish womanhood in line with contemporary understanding; to carry out radical social reforms in family life; and to provide employment for those Kurdish widows and orphans who are suffering in poverty due to forceful migration and mass-murdering.'75

In this first Kurdish women‘s association, the members mainly came from the leading aristocratic Kurdish families of Istanbul. The head of the Society according to some sources was Emine Khanim76, the wife of Şerif Pasha. There is not enough material to determine their work and activities, but based on very few articles in Jin it seems that they were more like a charity organization.

2.5. Westernization, Modernity, and Progress

The early Kurdish nationalists were deeply imbued with the political thought of the

18th and 19th century's enlightenment philosophy. For the early Kurdish nationalists only the application of ‗the laws of science' to social issues, primarily the Kurdish question, would bring solutions. They believed that the post-war era was a new age

152 wherein the laws of science, reason and justice would dominate international relations and politics. For the nationalists, the presentation of the Kurdish question within a scientific manner assumed prime importance. It was also believed that the elevation of

Kurdish society through scientific education and the enlightenment of the Kurdish people in the line of European civilization was the only secure way to achieve the desired self-determination. The Kurdish nation could only take its proper place amongst the 'civilized' nations if it were to apply itself to the laws of science, modernity and enlightenment thought.

With the advent of the industrial revolution, scientific and technical development in

Western Europe had caused great debate mainly within the elite groups of the

Ottoman and Russian empires. It is not accidental that in both empires elite groups hotly debated whether, in order to revive their empires, they should follow the same path as that of Europe. In Russia the debate was labeled as 'Westernism' versus

'Slavapholism' and in the Ottoman Empire it took the form of

'westernism/progressivism' versus 'traditionalism/backwardness'. In both empires those associated with 'Slavopholism' and 'traditionalism' were mainly Orthodox

Christians and Sunni clerics/ulema respectively. In both empires such debate arose from the first half of the 19th century onwards.77

Within the Ottoman and the modern Turkish context the discussion/conflict between these two schools of thought still remains an important issue in social and political life. It would be reasonable to assert in the Ottoman empire/Turkey that Westernism reached the peak of their influence with the rise of the Kemalist movement in

153 Anatolia, which culminated in a number of so-called 'revolutions' to modernize

Turkish society after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.

The fundamental principle of 'Westernism' was an uncritical belief in the superiority and functionality of science for the betterment of any society. The Europeans paved the way, and what was required was to follow the same path to achieve what

Europeans had achieved. To put it another way, the aim was to reach civilization, the civilization of Europe, and to absorb and apply the laws of science to society. Mustafa

Kemal summarized this when he stated that 'our aim is to bring the Turkish nation to the level of and a step ahead of contemporary civilization.'

The early Kurdish nationalists in the period analyzed entertained the same kind of debate albeit at a limited level. Jin reveals a number of points in regard to the Kurdish nationalists approach to the issue of science-knowledge and literacy:

1- Illiteracy as the main culprit of poor conditions of the Kurdish people

2- To remedy this chronicle illness in Kurdistan, laws of science and literacy should

be applied to Kurdish society

3- The ulema and local chiefs were the obstacles to and main reason for the

backwardness of the Kurdish people

4- Security, prosperity, and the future and well-being of the Kurdish nation could

only be secured by literacy and application of scientific laws

A rather long and significant article in Jin attempted to tackle the issue of modernity, tradition and religion. The writer stresses the importance of religion in social life:

'personally, I believe to a degree that religion is absolutely necessary for people and

154 communities and they need religion. A human-being, I think, cannot live without religion just as he can not live without air, water and bread.' He then moves on to imply that religion is not a barrier to progress rather 'religion and progressiveness hand in hand should enter the spirit of nation. Indeed, religion is nothing but progressiveness.' He admits that in every nation and every period there has always been opposition to progress and development. Those who oppose progress, argues the writer, are the ones whose interests might be jeopardized. Throughout history the first initiative towards progress and enlightenment had always been opposed by such groups whose interests had been affected by such developments. For the writer the progressive development of the Kurdish people would also face some opposition, but the Kurdish people had awakened and realized their backward situation and were looking for progress:

' The Kurds are aware of their problems and acknowledge the necessity

of progress (…) We understand the mystery of the universal forces

which have been carried forth out from Europe and America, and we

know also that the air currents coming from there [Europe and

America] are not poisonous but winds of life.'

The writer, who conducted field research among the Kurds, confirms that the culture of the Kurdish people and Kurdish characteristics are highly open to the internalization of new developments and progress. 'To acknowledge the European and

American civilization and its application is not a difficult and alien thing for the

Kurds', and they had already stepped down 'the enlightenment road', but the only danger was from those who under the religious pretexts, purely for their own interests,

155 prevented such progressive developments. Even if there were obstacles caused by such people they would not be able to halt development because:

'the Kurdish national masses have understood the truth and the facts.

As I mentioned above, the Kurds possess a "conscious belief". On the

day that this characteristic –conscious belief- evolved to "religious

consciousness", then the Kurds would be liberated from illiteracy and

imprisonment and they would be able to protect their rights, and in the

long road of the future, would cover a great distance.'78

The declaration of the KTMNJ provides more information about identity of those groups who, for the KTMNJ, were the main culprits of the backwardness of the

Kurdish people. They were the ulema and chiefs. The KTMNJ states: 'these two groups whose personal interests can only be secured by total submission of the nation and connected with that keeping [the nation] in profound illiteracy, continue with all their might to maintain the divisions between the people and also invent new ones to increase these divisions.'79 The objective of the KTMNJ was to illuminate the Kurdish people with contemporary skills based on scientific foundations. Freeing people from the 'darkness' of ignorance and illiteracy, and enlightening them through literacy and science, would secure their future happiness and prosperity.80

These ideological currents were well situated within the pages of Jin. Another writer asserts: 'our most important and essential duty to secure the existence of Kurdishness and the future generations, their happiness, prosperity and rights was to leave [social and political issues] to the hands of science. Our hope, aim, wishes are to bring the

Kurdish youth together and to eradicate the evil of illiteracy from Kurdistan.'81

156 The idea of scientific knowledge or scientific laws as a means to achieve or secure national rights was put forward in an interesting article by A. Rahman:

'Everybody has to protect/preserve their rights…

Preservation/protection of rights can be realized in two ways: either by

force, in effect by cannon, bombs, pistols, and rifles; or by laws of

science, by history. The time for rifles and cannon has long passed…

The time for cannon and warfare has ended. It is time for everyone to

know that the protection of rights can be secured by the law of science,

by the pen.'82

Unfortunately the history of the world in general and Kurdistan in particular has witnessed even more bloody wars throughout the 20th century. 'Cannons' were not exchanged for the pen. The naive belief in the eventual dominance of science over world affairs, history, and tyranny and the great expectations of an age of national justice and self-determination can be illustrated by an article of Kamuran Ali

Bedirhan:

'the specific, general, natural and social disasters which were born out

from the Great War are limitless. The only consoling point for

humanity about this unfortunate war lasting four years without any

virtue for innocent humanity is that from now on humanity has entered

a new humanist period and purified the world of the bloody and

degenerated men which had covered the face of humanity. (…) The

government [the Ottoman government], which was not based on

scientific laws has collapsed with its programme'.83

157 To conclude, the immediate post-war period witnessed an emerging Kurdish nationalism. These early nationalists, as the second chapter indicated, had already been involved in Kurdish cultural activities. What distinguished them in the post-war period from that of the ‗enlightenment‘ period is the fact that they began to envision the self-determination of the Kurdish nation. In their post-war discourse Kurds were no longer just an entity within the Ottoman Empire but a nation with a right to self- determination. They were making the Kurdish nation, as most nationalists in the world have done, by creating a history, myths, heroes and heroines, national days and so on through their writings.

This study sets out to explore some of the basic characteristics of early Kurdish nationalism. Analysis of early Kurdish nationalism indicates that it developed as a response to emerging interconnected factors which are the evident collapse of the

Ottoman Empire at the end of the war; the Armenian nationalists‘ objective to set up an independent Armenia in part of what the early Kurdish nationalists claimed to be

Kurdistan (six vilayets); the Great Powers discourse on the issue of nationality and the post-war settlement; and last but not least the rise of nationalism amongst the Muslim community of the empire, in effect, the rise of Turkish and Arab nationalism. The last point will be analyzed in the following chapters.

One of the fundamental characteristics of early Kurdish nationalists is that they displayed a great deal of trust and confidence in the Great Powers, mainly Britain.

They naively believed that the Kurdish question would be resolved in the post-war settlement by the Great Powers according to the principles of a ‗new age‘ which would be determined by rule of law, justice and science. They strongly believed that

158 without the protection and help of a Great Power, the establishment of an independent or autonomous Kurdistan would not be realisable. Hence they mainly opted to enter into diplomatic relations and to present their case to the Great powers for the future of

Kurdistan. They lacked an appreciation for the importance of a mass movement, and thus mobilization of the Kurdish people for a nationalist objective. The question of whether they would have been able to organise a mass movement had they tried is not easy to answer. On the one hand leaders like Seyyid Abdulkadir and the members of

Bedirhan families still had great influence in Kurdistan. They would have been able to bring influential people, such as tribal leaders, ulema and middle class urban Kurds in the cities into a common nationalist cause. Indeed that was what Mustafa Kemal had done from 1919. On the other hand these early Kurdish nationalists had long been away from Kurdistan and instead were fully integrated within the Ottoman establishment as the preceding chapter indicated. The combination of these two factors, in effect, referring the Kurdish issue to the mercy of the Great Powers and their political and social positions within the empire impeded them from developing a coherent political programme based on a country-wide political and military mass organisation.

The early Kurdish nationalists, like Kurdish society, were highly divided and fragmented. The premature split within the KTJ weakened their position vis-a vis the

Ottoman central government and the Great Powers. In a very crucial period during the

Paris Peace Conference, internal struggle and personal rivalries reduced the representation of Kurdish cause during the post-war settlement considerably.

159 The early Kurdish nationalists lacked a clear vision. They became ardent nationalists but without nationalist politics. It is this lack of nationalist politics and vision that contributed to their ultimate failure.

160 CHAPTER IV

KEMALISM

This chapter sets out to explore the rise of the Kemalist movement in Anatolia following WWI. This rise coincided with the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. As

Kemalists territorially confined themselves within the area of what is called Misak-i

Milli ( the National Pact), it was inevitable that the Kemalists would perceive the

Kurdish nationalists as potential and real opponents. The Kurdish nationalists likewise assumed the Kemalists would be a threat to their national interests and therefore took up a position against them. Thus a critical analysis of Kemalism and its policies against Kurdish nationalism in Kurdistan from 1919 to 1922 is imperative.

The rise and success of the Kemalist movement was related to the failure of Kurdish nationalism. As will be analyzed, the Kurdish nationalists found themselves competing against the Kemalist movement in Kurdistan to secure the support of

Kurdish tribal and other local forces.

An analysis of Kemalism in the period following WWI up to the establishment of the

Turkish Republic in 1923 requires further conceptual clarification on the loosely defined terms such as Turks, Turkish nation and Turkey. Turkey, as a political term, was incorrectly used by Westerners to refer to the Ottoman polity.1 In the early 20th century Turkey was not referred to either as a geographical territory nor as a political term by the Ottoman establishment, or even by the heterogeneous Ottoman subject

161 peoples. In the very early 1920s the Kemalists adopted the name of ‗Turkiya‘ from

Italian term ‗Turchia‘ as the land where the Turks lived.2 Thus it is essential to differentiate the two different uses of ‗Turkey‘ by westerners who referred to the

Empire prior to the establishment of the Republic, and Kemalists who adopted it as a new name for the Misak-i Milli in the law of 1921 and in the republican constitution of 1924. While the former referred to the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, the latter referred to a secular and mono-ethnic entity. This chapter suggests that failure to distinguish the two usage of ‗Turkey‘ would cast a shadow on any analysis of Turkish history and Kurdish nationalism at this crucial period.

Prior to the establishment of the Republic, Turks were merely one of the many subject peoples of the empire. Within the Ottoman establishment ‗the ethnic term

Turk was little used, and then chiefly in a rather derogatory sense, to designate the nomads or, later ignorant and uncouth Turkish-speaking peasants of the Anatolian villages. To apply it to an Ottoman gentleman of Constantinople would have been an insult.‘3 Indeed during the resistance period, the sense of Turkishness among the peasant population of Anatolia was very weak. A Kemalist novelist depicted this situation in his novel, Yaban:

-You are one of them, sir, I know

-who are ‗them‘?

-those who side with Kemal Pasha

-how come that anybody who is a Turk cannot side with Kemal Pasha?

-but we are not Turks, sir

-who are you then?

162 -we are Muslims, thanks be to God, those whom you mentioned live in Haymana.4

Turks, like most of the other Muslim communities within the Empire, had not been identifying themselves as a distinct nationalist category despite the fact that a version of early Turkish nationalism, pan-Turanism, had been in elite discourse since the

1860s. In the very early phase of the Kemalist movement, 1919-1924, any specific reference to the Turkish nation was restricted; instead the Kemalists used the term

‗millet’ which was inclusive of Kurds and other Muslim groups within the unoccupied Ottoman territory. ‗Millet‘, as an Arabic term, referred to religious communities, not ethnic or linguistic communities. Within the Ottoman Empire each non-Muslim community was identified as a millet. The Muslim subjects of the

Empire, despite their ethnic and linguistic differences, constituted a millet on their own. Only after the second half of the 19th century did the term millet, apart from the religious meaning, acquire ethnic and linguistic meanings, and then only within the limits of journalistic literature. In popular culture millet continued to signify religious communities.5 According to the most important Ottoman dictionary, Kamus-i Türki, millet referred to Muslim communities regardless of their ethnic and linguistic backgrounds.6 As Lewis argued ‗in the Ottoman Empire millet came to be applied to the organized and legally recognized religious communities, such as the Greek

Christians, the Armenian Christians, and the Jews, and by extension also to the different ―nations‖ of the Franks… In the Empire, there was a Muslim millet, but no

Turkish or Arab or Kurdish millets.‘7

In its early period (1919-1923) Kemalist discourse on the term ‗millet‘ referred not to the ethnic Turks but to the Ottoman Muslim millet which included Turks, Kurds and

163 other Muslim communities. However, the use of millet in its religious sense was transformed, particularly after the establishment of the Republic and the abolishment of the Caliphate, into a modern political term implying ‗nation‘. Furthermore, post- republican Turkish historiography, for a host of ideological and political reasons, has retrospectively returned the modern use of this term to the early period of the

Kemalist movement (1919-1924). Thus, in order to understand the birth of the

Kemalist movement, it is crucial to note the specific use of ‗millet‘. As it will be seen later in this chapter most Turkish historiography and some of the non-Turkish historians fail to make reference to this important semantic distinction.

I. The Rise of Kemalist Movement

The rise and development of Kemalism is closely linked with the failure of Kurdish nationalism. Post-Republic Turkish historical writings had depicted and still depict

Mustafa Kemal as a ‗super hero‘ a ‗near God‘, a man who fought against darkness, backwardness, enslavement and imperialism, in short, everything which was an obstacle in the way of progress, civilization, modernity and freedom.8 The period from 1918 to 1923 has been presented by Turkish historians as a period of national liberation, and as a war of independence launched by the Turkish nation under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal against world imperialism. Such writings on Mustafa

Kemal by Turkish historians have affected many non-Turkish scholars on the subject. 9 The consequence of such historical discourse contributed more than anything else to the misrepresentation of Kurdish national question on number of points: firstly, the Kurds as a nation and their land, Kurdistan, as a country, were and still are not recognized.

164

Secondly, in close connection with the first point, Kurdish history became a sub- history, a complementary part of Turkish history. Thus, as an appendix of Turkish history there is an implicit presumption that the Kurds do not constitute a national group on their own merit. This resulted in the Kurds being stripped of history and land, and reduced them from a nation to a sort of undefined minority, categorized as a

Muslim minority. Such a case can be illustrated in the work of many eminent historians. For example in W. Yale‘s The Near East where he says,

‗the Turks were not at first aware that the Allies were planning to

partition the Turkish territories in Europe and Anatolia. It was not

long, however, before they were forced to realize that the Allied

Powers were motivated solely by their national and imperialist

interests in utter disregard of the wishes of the Turkish

people.‘10[Italics added]

Who were these Turks and what were these Turkish territories? Before the establishment of the Turkish Republic, the sense of being Turk and identifying with a particular piece of territory was not more advanced than the same sense among the

Kurds, Arabs or others. Indeed as Robinson indicated ‗few possessed any real sense of national identity, but they did possess a deep sense of identification with Islam and of resentment of the western infidel. Contemporary observers noted that the ordinary

Turk, asked who or what he was, was inclined to answer: ‗I‘m a Muslim‘ not ‗I am a

Turk.‘‘11 This in fact is not surprising at all, due to the fact that political nationalism was a foreign concept for the Middle East before WWI. The so-called Turkish territories of Anatolia included the greater parts of Kurdistan and Armenia. Yale obviously ignores the Kurds and Kurdistan. He writes: ‗The resolution passed by the

165 First Congress of Erzurum proclaimed the right of the Turks to resist every territorial occupation and all intervention designed to establish Greek or Armenian control over any part of Anatolia.‘12[Italics added] Neither the Erzurum Congress nor any other

Congresses in the period 1918-1922 ever referred to the Turks but rather to the

‗millet‘ a term with a religious connotation. Yale is reading and writing history in retrospect. Yale goes further: ‗a little less than four years after the signing of the armistice of Mudros, Turkey was saved from partition. The European imperialists had met with a prophetic set back to their power in the Near East.‘13 Did Turkey, then, constitute a nation-state? Who was saved from partition? ‗Turkey‘ then and today includes a great part of Kurdistan. According to the Sevres treaty, Kurdish autonomy and possible independence were officially granted. Would the creation of a Kurdish state and an independent Armenia separated from the Ottoman Empire have meant partition of Turkey as the territory of Turks? The Ottoman Empire itself had participated in the war alongside Germany and Austria with expansionist purposes.

Like Germany and Austria, the Ottoman Empire were defeated and had to face certain consequences. Nobody, for example, blames the Greeks for launching an independence movement and freeing themselves from Ottoman rule. Why then were the Kurds and remaining Armenians, if they had gained their independence and their territories from the collapsing Ottoman Empire, seen as having imperialistic designs over ‗Turkey‘. It is understandable for most of the Turkish and Turkish educated historians to neglect the Kurdish issue in their analysis as any attempt to include the

Kurds would have meant persecution by the legislative bodies of Turkey. The case of

Ismail Beşikçi is well known. However, it is difficult to grasp the reasons behind the western and other non-Turkish scholars‘ negligence of the same issue.

166 This in itself is suggests that a critical analysis of the Kemalist movement, its roots, intention and policies, is necessary for a clear perception of Kurdish history and the development and failure of Kurdish nationalism.

I.1. Prelude to Kemalism: Young Turks

Mustafa Kemal and almost all his close associates who participated in the establishment of the Turkish Republic were members of the CUP.14 As Yapp argued

‗Turkish nationalists of 1922 were the inheritors of the Young Turk revolution; indeed although the policies of the leaders of the CUP were denounced for having ruined the Ottoman Empire many of the nationalists were by origin themselves

Unionists and the Defense of Rights groups which had been the precursors of the

Grand National Assembly were commonly built on the base of branch organizations of the CUP.‘ 15 Roshwald also claimed that ‗Kemal Ataturk‘s post-war vision of

Turkish nationalism was clearly rooted in the ideas and practices of certain elements within the CUP.‘16

The CUP movement, both its policies and objectives, signify a continuity of the

Ottoman endeavor towards modernization and centralization that had begun during the late 18th century.17 The CUP was in turn a continuation of the Young Ottomans who in turn were a product of the bureaucratic reforms initiated during the Tanzimat.

As the evident decline of the Ottoman Empire became more and more obvious during the 18th century, the Ottoman administration attempted to save the Empire and turn the tide of decline by searching for a new way forward. They thought that they found one by observing western success and imitating the western culture and politics.

167 Beginning with Mahmud II, the Ottoman state embarked upon centralization and modernization policies which dominated the political objectives of the Empire and modern Turkey for the next two centuries. Right from its inception, the policies of centralization and modernization contained irresolvable contradictions which had been inherited from the classical Ottoman administration and political structure.

Centralization meant the extension of central control of the Ottoman administration over the periphery, which in turn caused dissatisfaction among the autonomous subjects of the Empire content with the classical centre-periphery relations. The centralization projects of the Ottoman administration faced resistance amongst its ethnic, religious and cultural groups who enjoyed their autonomous status in their relations with the central state. As chapter II indicated, such centralization policies instigated huge unrest and resulted in the great Kurdish revolts. The conflict between centralization and decentralization, as well as the absorption of western modernity and reaction against it by traditionalists, dominated the political and social life of the

Empire. The contradiction here is that while the Ottoman officials and intelligentsia worried about the disintegration of the Empire into its ethnic and religious components, and sought a social panacea by introducing western modernization, this modernization in turn further accelerated the disintegration of the Empire, as it separated from its subject peoples one by one.18 The loss of Greece in the first half of the 19th century was followed by Muhammad Ali‘s centralization policies in Egypt, and in the early 20th century the loss of what remained of the Balkans, and Tripoli.

This inherent contradiction inevitably had a great impact on the political actors of the

Imperial administration and intelligentsia.19 The Young Turks were not immune from this.

168 The rise of the Young Turks began in the late 19th century to save the Empire from disintegration by reimplementing the 1876 Constitution, which had been suspended by Sultan Abdulhamid II. Like its predecessors, ‗the fundamental question‘ for the

Young Turks, rightly argued Lewis ‗was survival, the survival of the Ottoman state which they and their fathers had for generations saved, and both their actions and their discussions revolved around this central problem: Bu devlet nasil Kurtarilabilir?

How can this state be saved?‘20 In other words, as Şerif Mardin claimed, the strongest intention of the Young Turks was to prevent the disintegration of the Empire.21

In this early period the Young Turks gathered around the concept of Ottomanism, which was as Roshwald argued ‗a vague term denoting the cultivation of collective political identity based on civic equality among the peoples of the Empire.‘22 As a panacea for the fundamental problem of keeping the empire intact, while simultaneously pursuing the centralization and modernization policies to elevate the empire to the level of western civilization, Ottomanism proved to be too weak or too late to work. As Lewis acutely noted

‗the spread of nationalism among the subject peoples of the Empire,

and the final contamination, by the nationalist virus, of even the

Turkish masters of it, ended forever the ‗Ottomanist‘ dream of the

free, equal, and peaceful association of peoples in a common loyalty to

the dynastic sovereign of a multi-national, multi-denominational

empire.‘23

Thus, as Roshwald argued ‗Ottomanism, (…) was a very loaded term.‘24 Right from its inception the Young Turk movement contained within itself two tendencies: the tendency towards decentralization which was spearheaded by the liberals supported

169 by the ethnic groups of the Empire and the centralization tendency, which was pursued by nascent Turkish nationalists. The tension within the movement came to the surface at the first congress of the Young Turks in Paris, which resulted in the division of the movement around these two tendencies.25 The Liberal tendency never succeeded in getting a unified organization under the leadership of Prince Sabahattin.

However the nationalist tendency was rejuvenated a few years later led by Ahmet

Riza. The division of the Young Turks at the Paris congress revolved around the crucial question of the future structure of the state and its relation with the regional ethnic and religious elements of the Empire. Prince Sabahattin‘s liberal and decentralized view accommodated the autonomous structure of ethnic religious elements within the Empire. The Prince was opposed by the Ahmed Riza group who advocated unionist and centralized policies.26

Thus, the coming to power of the CUP in 1908 and the restoration of the constitution created more problems than it solved. Though almost all ethnic and religious groups within the Empire applauded the 1908 constitutional revolution, the non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities were apprehensive lest the new regime be used as a means to revive and strengthen the Empire under the leadership of the largest group, the

Turks.27 Indeed, an ideological strain that emerged within the CUP in the early years of the 20th century was Pan-Turkism.28 Leading Young Turks, figures such as Yusuf

Akçura, Ziya Gokalp and others, were inclined towards pan-Turkism. Critically evaluating the possibility of creating an ‗Ottoman millet‘, Akçura inferred that such attempts were doomed to failure for three main reasons: the nationalistic feelings of subject people of the Empire; Russian designs on the Ottoman Empire; and Islam which never recognized full equality between Muslim and infidel (gayri-Muslim).29

170 Contrary to the Ottoman millet, Akçura argued that the politics of Turkism would strengthen the link between the Turks and the non-Turkish Muslims of the Empire: those who had absorbed Turkishness to a certain degree, and those who had not absorbed Turkishness at all would be Turkified by politics of Turkism. Furthermore argued Akçura, the ever greater use of the politics of Turkism would secure the unity of all the Turks, from Central Asia to Europe. In such unity the most advanced and civilized Turks, those of the Ottoman state, had a great role to play.30 This idea of pan-Turkism gained considerable influence within the CUP, especially during the turbulent period of 1910-1913. The crucial point here is the assumption of assimilation of non-Turkish Muslim people within the Empire. Despite the circulation of pan-Turkish ideas within the CUP, in its official discourse, the CUP employed the term Ottomanism up to the Balkan war. However, amongst its inner circle, the CUP paid lip service to Ottomanism in order to disguise their inner purpose.31

The CUP, right from the time of 1908 revolution, had to face insurmountable problems and wars which had a great impact on subsequent CUP policies. Soon after the 1908 revolution, Bulgaria proclaimed its independence, and Austria annexed

Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was followed by the Italian capture of Libya, and then finally the Balkan wars, all of which eliminated the Ottoman Empire from Europe and

Africa. In short, from the time that the CUP came to power in 1908 the Empire lost

1/3 of its land and 1/5 of its population. Here lies the clue to explain the total ideological and political transformation from Ottomanism to pan-Turkism. In such a short time the loss of territory and population destroyed the multi-ethnic and religious composition of the Empire.32 Apart from a sizeable Armenian community and other minor Christian communities, the Empire became a dominantly Muslim empire. Such

171 harsh and unseen developments had a significant impact on the consequent evolution of the CUP. As Roshwald noted ‗these experiences reinforced the sense that ethnic identity was a critical element in determining mass loyalties and that the future of the

Ottoman Empire depended largely on the Young Turks ability to awaken nationalist passions among the Turkish populace… It is no coincidence, then, that the period of the Balkan wars marked the beginning of the CUP‘s open sponsorship and encouragement of pan-Turkist propaganda.‘ 33 From 1913 onwards centralism and

Turkism became official policies pursued by the CUP and later inherited by the

Republic. The CUP‘s Congress in 1913 provided the basic foundations of such policies: decisions to settle nomadic tribes; supporting the development of a national bourgeoisie etc.34

Under the CUP leadership the Ottoman Empire entered WWI alongside Germany in the hope of regaining its lost territories and prestige. The CUP leadership also ‗saw the war not only as an opportunity to recoup some of the territorial loses of recent years but to fulfill ambitious pan-Turkist dreams.‘35 The fact that the Arab part of the

Empire did not participate in the call to Jihad, and joined the Allies, forced the Young

Turks to implement further the pan-Turkist policy. As Roshwald argued ‗pan-

Turkism, then, was not just a propaganda device; it was a political ideology that came to dominate the CUP‘s definition of state interest during the Ottoman Empire‘s last years.‘ 36 This in turn resulted in the Armenian genocide simply because they constituted a buffer zone between the Anatolian Turks and those Turks in the

Caucasus.37 Despite the fact that the Kurds participated in the war effort, they also became victims of the CUP‘s regime although not on the same level as that of

172 Armenia. Many Kurds were forcefully moved to inner Anatolia during the war years.38

The defeat of the Empire at first seemed to have brought the century long question of

‗bu devlet nasil Kurtarılabilir?‘ to its ironic conclusion with the total disintegration of the state itself. However, the legacy of the CUP, its policies and ideas on Turkish nationalism become a crucial tool in saving the state, albeit not in a way the CUP had hoped. With a more realistic and sober analysis of post-war conditions, remaining members of the CUP preserved and fought for what they could save. The rise of

Mustafa Kemal and the establishment of the Turkish Republic, contrary to what most

Turkish historians claimed, was not a beginning in of itself, but the continuation of the Young Turks endeavor to save the state.

One of the important aspects of the CUP which needs to be scrutinized, so as to understand the post-war Kemalist movement, is the CUP‘s economic policy. It sought to create a ‗bourgeois Turk‘ or what was known as a ‗Milli Iktisat‘ (national economy). The Milli Iktisat policy that the CUP embarked upon aimed at eliminating

Greek and Armenian people from economic activities. As can be recalled, the Greeks and Armenians were the most active groups in the economic life of the Empire, and in contact with French and British commercial centers. Başkaya argued that

‗the CUP, after capturing power and during the WWI assumed that the

life of the Ottoman Empire depended on the Muslimization of

Ottoman capital. For that purpose they pursued a policy to diminish

the influence and economic power of Greek and Armenian merchants

173 and traders in the economic structure of the Empire and transfer the

financial and economic functions to the Muslim elements.‘39

The theoretical root of such ‗Milli Iktisat‘ policy had been laid down by the influential CUP theoreticians, Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura. Gökalp argued that the division of labour in the Ottoman Empire, military and bureaucracy (Turks) versus trade and industry (Greeks and Armenians) had brought about a ‗mutual parasitism‘ as those ethnic groups lacked a ‗common conscience‘. Thus the realization of ‗Milli tesanud‘ (national solidarity) was not possible, primarily because ‗Milli tesanud‘ required the existence of a community which had a ‗common conscience.‘ It followed that Turks who had a ‗common conscience‘ should undertake by themselves all kinds of economic activities.40 Akçura, in a similar vein, suggested that the Turks should develop a capitalist bourgeoisie who would assume the role so far played by non-

Turkish elements. He argued that the kingdom of Poland lost its independence due to the fact that its bourgeoisie was made up of Jews and Germans.41

On these theoretical foundations a policy was soon implemented during the Balkan wars and particularly during WWI. The Turkish boycott of Greek shops, during the

Ottoman, Greek and the European Powers‘ negotiations over the Aegean Islands, was extended to Armenian and other non-Muslim groups, which caused the ruin of hundreds of small Greek and Armenian tradesmen.42 The Milli Iktisad was forcefully implemented during the war. This policy was put into practice by a number of methods: firstly, discriminatory CUP policies ensured the nationalization of the economy by offering Turkish traders the lion‘s share of the market; secondly, under the war conditions Greek and Armenian businessmen were dispossessed. For example, the number of Greek merchants, traders and others from the west coast area

174 of the Empire who immigrated into Greece was about 130,000 during the war years.

Their companies and businesses were handed over to the leaders of CUP.43 During the four years of the war the accumulation of Muslim business capital accelerated rapidly with the help of the government. 44 In the countryside land which had belonged to the deported Armenians was quickly transferred to Muslims: ‗In the countryside, whereas big landlords and the emerging class of ‗middle peasants‘ acquired a good share of the lands vacated by the Armenian peasants, Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus settled on the rest… In other areas of

Anatolia, ―the properties of persons who have been dispatched elsewhere‖ were either distributed free or sold for a song to anyone who applied to the Committee for them and proved themselves of the same political persuasion or of pure Turkish or preponderatingly [sic] Turkish nationality.‘45 Astourian notes that the processes of

Milli Iktisad ‗enriched the supporters of the CUP. High functionaries, former officers, and Unionist bureaucrats turned into capitalists; merchants from Salonica and large landlords took over the lands of the Armenians and their possessions in international trade; and Turkish provincial property-owners formed the nascent middle class.‘46

However, some sections of the Kurds, mainly landlords and members of ex-Hamidieh regiments, participated in the Armenian massacre, and profited by looting the deported Armenian properties, land and personal belongings.47 It was these newly developed ‗Milli bourgeoisie‘ who built on the ruins of the Armenian and Greek peoples‘ enterprises, and that most actively participated in and responded to the call of the Kemalist movement.48

175 1.2 The End of the War and the Coming of Mustafa Kemal

The Ottoman Empire under the Young Turk leadership had to concede defeat and concluded an armistice on 31st October 1918 at Mudros.49 The armistice contained 25 articles which included the military occupation of the Straits, control of all railway and telegraphic lines, demobilization and disarmament of the Ottoman troops and most importantly (under article 7) the Entente had the right to occupy any territory of the Ottoman Empire if it considered its security to be under threat.50

As soon as the Armistice was concluded the CUP leaders left the country (1

November 1918) as they feared that they would be held to account for their treatment of the Armenians. Despite the fact that the CUP leaders had left the country, the CUP organization remained intact, and they ‗controlled parliament, the army, the police force, the post and telegraph services and many other important organisations. Purges were started by the new regime in 1919, but neither it nor the Entente had enough manpower to replace the majority of Unionist officials.‘51 The CUP, even before the end of the war, prepared the ground for the political and military struggle in Anatolia during 1915 in case the British and French navy managed to break through to the

Dardanelles. A sub-organization of the CUP, the Teşkilat-i Mahsusa was ordered to store arms and ammunition in secret depots in a number of places in Anatolia. The

Teşkilat which was reconstituted in October 1918 as the Umum Alem-i Islam Ihtilal

Teşkilati (General Revolutionary Organization of the Islamic World) was instructed to begin guerrilla resistance in the interior. This organization had played a significant role in the Armenian genocide and maltreatment of the Greek populace in the Empire.

Not surprisingly, they feared retribution should they give up their arms and disband.52

The CUP leaders also established, before they had left the country, the Karakol

176 organization with the purpose of protecting the Unionists in the post-war situation and shielding them from the revenge of the Christian communities and possible retribution of the Entente. A second crucial purpose was to strengthen the resistance in Anatolia and the Caucasus by sending able people, money, arms, and supplies from the capital. 53 The other important steps taken by the CUP, alongside an armed resistance movement from Anatolia, was to prepare public defense organisations which took the shape of the formation of ‗societies for the defense of the national rights.‘ These societies played a vital role in the establishment of the resistance movement in Anatolia.

These points on the CUP leadership‘s preparation for resistance movement have been mostly ignored by official Turkish historiography which based its analysis on M

Kemal‘s speech in which the CUP leadership was accused of dragging the nation and the country into the war, and after the defeat of leaving the country and running away to save their own lives.54 The implicit assumption here is that it was solely M. Kemal who created, organized, led and successfully executed the ‗nationalist‘ movement and saved the ‗nation and country‘. This assumption was also shared by number of western scholars. Toynbee, for example, claimed that ‗a Turkish soldier, Mustapha

Kemal Bey, come forward to save his country from oppression and despair‘55 H.

Allen also inferred that

‗he [M Kemal] was the chief initiator of the movement for the defense

of Anatolia contrary to the wishes of the Sultan‘s government in 1918-

1919. The force of his personality, his determination, his endurance,

his executive ability, but, above all, his inspiring generalship, which

led Turkey‘s small but brave Nationalist army to victory against the

177 invading Greeks in 1922, raised him to the highest pinnacle in the

heart of his fellow-countrymen.‘56

Robinson goes so far as to claim that ‗without Kemal there might not now be a

Turkey‘ and that Mustafa Kemal was a hero who combined the qualities of George

Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and Frank Roosevelt in one. 57

Helmreich believed that ‗the Nationalist movement, which first appeared in May

1919, was founded by Mustafa Kemal Pasha…. The Nationalist movement was independent of the Young Turks in its origins, and subsequent Allied charges that the

Nationalists were mainly a continuation of the old CUP were without foundation.‘58

A Turkish historian D. Avcioğlu enthusiastically put forward the view that ‗Atatürk, before everything else, was the creator of the Turkish nation.‘59

The resistance movement in Anatolia was prepared, organized and launched long before Mustafa Kemal landed at Samsun on May 1919. Prominent army commanders, like Kazim Karabekir got themselves appointed to the interior with the full intention of initiating the resistance movement. Karabekir at his own request was appointed to the 15th Army corps situated in Erzurum. He and like minded officers urged Mustafa

Kemal to join them, as the only solution to save the country was resistance from the interior.60 Mustafa Kemal opted to remain in Istanbul in the hope that he could be appointed in the Cabinet. Ahmad inferred that ‗he was willing to serve as war minister in the Sultan‘s government during the armistice. But he was rejected by the pashas because of his social class.‘61 While Mustafa Kemal remained in Istanbul he had tried to establish good relations with the British authorities, the Sultan and the liberals.62 The place he chose to stay, Pera Palace, was full of officers of the Allies‘

High Commissioners. Lord Kinross mentioned a meeting between Mustafa Kemal

178 and Ward Price who was working for the Daily Mail on 14 November1918. Through

Price, Mustafa Kemal offered his services to the British and asked him to put him in touch with the British authorities.63 He reiterated his inclination toward the British in an interview in Minber daily newspaper in 17 November the same year.64 He had close contacts with Avni Pasha, Bahriye Naziri, and M.Ali Bey, Dahiliye Naziri.65 It was such close contacts with the Ottoman administration, his publicly expressed opinion towards Britain, and the fact that he was not closely associated with the CUP triumvirate, what led Damat Ferid Pasha, British authorities, and the Sultan all to agree to send Kemal to Anatolia as General Inspector of the 3rd Army with extra responsibilities. His duties included to restore order and law, hasten disarmament and to disperse the established Şuras (Soviets) in Eastern Anatolia. Şuras had proliferated in areas close to the Soviet Union. As General-Inspectorate, Kemal was in a position to command both civil and military authorities in Anatolia.66 With such a superior commanding post, Kemal was in a good position to lead the resistance movement.

2. The Resistance Movement

2.1 Composition of the Resistance Movement

Those behind the resistance movement were mainly military officers, Muslim landowners, traders (eşraf), ulema and the administrative officials. It may be argued that the resistance movement in Anatolia was based on the collaboration and alliance of these groups of the Ottoman Empire. The backbone of the resistance movement was the military officials. Almost all the low-mid-high ranking military officers participated in the resistance movement right from the beginning. Leading figures like

Kazim Karabekir, Rauf Bey, Ali Fuat, Ismet İnönü and others played significant

179 roles. The common characteristic of all those military officers was that they were ex-

Unionists, and they had a huge stake in the preservation of the state and the army, which the Allies had the intention of reducing considerably (but not to destroy).

The Muslim landlords, traders (eşraf), tribal leaders, ulema, and especially those who enriched themselves on the ruins of the Armenian and Greek population of the

Empire were the first to rally behind the military officers.67 Zürcher was right to indicate that ‗in the towns of Anatolia, the ―Defence of Rights‖ organisations were generally supported by the Muslim landowners and traders. Many of them had become wealthy through government contracts and by taking over the land, property and businesses of the deported or emigrated Greeks and Armenians for next to nothing, they thus had a very strong incentive to resist the Greek and Armenian claims.‘ 68 It is not surprising to note that one of the first ‗Defence of Rights‘ associations was established and active in Erzurum. In this locality the landlords, merchants and others were afraid that the Armenians, who had been removed from the area during the war time, might return and claim their possessions. The provinces which sent delegates to the Erzurum Congress were mainly those of Erzurum, Bitlis,

Van, Mus, and Erzincan—provinces that the Armenian nationalists claimed to be part of Greater Armenia.69 The other prominent ‗Defence of Rights‘ associations were established in Trakya, Trakya Paşaeli Mudafa-i Hukuk-i Milliye Jamiyeti, where the possibility of Greek occupation threatened those who possessed the former Greek properties. Ş. Sureyya argued that during the ‗National resistance movement, in all the cities and towns Mustafa Kemal had come into contact with, the eşraf and ulema were the vanguard of the people.‘ Although, bizarrely, he then goes on to contradict himself by claiming ‗It would be misleading to characterize the resistance movement

180 as a middle class movement.‘70 Karpat also stressed the pivotal role of the middle class in the countryside: ‗various sub-groups of the new middle class came to dominate the social and political life of the Turkish countryside, especially after the

1880s. The Young Turks‘ revolution of 1908 and Turkey‘s 1919-1922 War of

Liberation were led by the central elites but carried to a successful conclusion by the participation and support of the middle class in the countryside.‘71 Thus, the ‗War of

Independences‘ can be classified as a movement with a strongly middle class colouring, rather than a mass popular movement, a point that will be further elaborated.

The so-called ‗War of Liberation‘ in Asia Minor was in fact a resistance movement to oppose Armenian, Greek and the Kurdish nationalists‘ claims. Indeed the resistance was not aimed at the British and French forces but rather the Armenian, Greek and the Kurdish nationalists‘ forces. The fact is that while under the British occupation, the regions of Antep, Maraş, and Urfa did not mount resistance against the occupiers.

Quite the contrary, the local population welcomed the Allied forces. Even the Kuvayi

Milliye leaders in Istanbul advised people in Maraş and Antep to be well behaved with the British and French forces who occupied Maraş and Antep.72 Only when in the spirit of the Sykes-Picot agreement the British were replaced by French troops, which contained a number of Armenians, did initial resistance gradually develop.

Some Kemalists writers argued that the resistance against the Armenians originated from a fear of Armenian retributions and illegal claims on Turkish land and property.73 However, the real motive for Turkish resentment against the Armenians was the fact that the Armenians were trying to repossess their confiscated and plundered properties that had been taken during the Armenian exile and genocide of

181 1915. Those who had enriched themselves by the ruin of the Armenian people had real cause for alarm. It was this fact that propelled them towards the Kemalists. This explains why the local notables and the resistance leaders were not worried about the

Allied occupying forces, but were welcoming and inviting them in, while they were agitated and violently resisted the Armenian people who wanted to return back to their homes.74 It also explains why it was that the aforementioned provinces during the British occupation did not opt to send delegates to the Sivas Congress which was held by the Kemalists.

The third group, the administrative officials both in the capital and the provinces of

Anatolia also supported the resistance movement. Particularly those workers in the postal and telegraph section proved to be crucial, as they provided the communication which was imperative for the resistance movement to unify local forces and responded quickly to any eventuality. In a dispatch to Curzon, Captain Hurst informed him that

‗he [M. Kemal] has been carrying on a large telegraphic

correspondence with the surrounding towns and beyond, so much as to

have practically monopolized the telegraph, and his officers have been

seen in several, or most, of the towns and villages of the

neighbourhood, where their influence has certainly not made for

conciliation.‘75

The provincial governors and local administrative officials followed the orders of the resistance movement, which practically reduced the Ottoman central administration to the capital and its environs. The participation of the administrative body in the resistance movement was thanks to the CUP‘s country-wide organization. The role of

182 those ex-CUP officers serving in the capital, in particular at the Ministry of War, during the Allied occupation was crucial.76

Despite the fact that the peasantry constituted the bulk of the population, mass participation in the resistance was limited, and force had to be applied in order to mobilize the peasantry for military activities. This was most evident in the case of military deserters, as was debated in a close meeting of the Grand National Assembly on 5 July 1920. The Konya MP, Vehbi Bey, in his speech refers to the urgency of the issue of military deserters: ‗the issue of deserters within the army is known by all our friends. Two hundred were dispatched from Konya and only 30 of them arrived at

Karahisar. A three-hundred military convoy was reduced to a hundred and fifty in three days. If a solution cannot be found in a month a serious consequence is imminent.‘ The same Vehbi Bey underlines the reason for such large-scale desertion:

‗the peasant is fed up with for sacrificing themselves on behalf of town traders

(eşraf). They are opposing the saying that ―they (eşraf) are Gazis, we (peasants) are martyrs.‖ This time we want to be Gazis and they to be martyrs. This is what preoccupies the soul of the soldier.‘77 In the same meeting the Trabzon MP, Husrev

Bey said ‗it becomes clear that the level of desertion in our county has risen considerably and therefore our forces at the front are wavering. The government should punish these people.‘ 78 Military desertion became so endemic that a law proposed to the Grand National Assembly by the Representative Committee (Vekiller

Heyeti) towards the end of 1920 included:

-Those who do not obey the call to military service are to have their homes burnt, their properties confiscated, their families deported; and those who continue not to obey shall be hanged upon their arrest

183 -Those who desert from their military unit are to be sentenced according to the article 3

-Each village council of elders (Köy Ihtiyar Heyeti) is responsible for catching the deserters and surrendering them to the government. Should the council not obey such orders themselves they shall be liable to and subjected to article 3

-Those who hide deserters and encourage and support deserters shall be subjected to article 3.‘79

Such harsh measures signify limited and involuntary mass participation in the resistance movement.

2.2 The Formation and Development of the Resistance Movement

As mentioned above, soon after the armistice small resistance groups were established in a number of localities in Anatolia by the initiative of the CUP. These groups increasingly agitated due to the Greek army landings‘ at Smyrna (Izmir).

These initial resistance groups were, through the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, gathered under a unified organization with held clear objectives and a program. Soon after Mustafa Kemal arrived at Samsun on 19 May 1919, a meeting was held between resistance leaders in Amasya which produced what is famously known as the Amasya

Tamimi (Amasya Proclamation) on 21 June: (Mustafa Kemal, Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat,

Refer Bele, and Kazim Karabekir through telegraphic consultation in Erzurum).

-The unity of the fatherland and national (milli) independence are in danger

-The Istanbul government is unable to carry out its responsibilities

-It is only through the nation‘s (millet) effort and determination that national independence will be won

184 -It has been decided to hold immediately a National Congress in Sivas, the most secure place in Anatolia

-Three representatives from each province should be sent immediately to the Sivas

Congress‘80

The fact that the Defence of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia had already arranged a meeting to be held in July in Erzurum under the leadership of Kazim Karabekir,

Mustafa Kemal attended it to secure the support of Kazim Karabekir and the local resistance leaders. The Erzurum Congress reached important decisions in the formulation of the resistance movement‘s objective and provided the basic elements which the Sivas Congress duly adopted. Its ten point resolution had an immense impact on Kurdish nationalism as well:

1- The province of Trabzon, the district of Samsun, and the provinces o Erzurum,

Sivas, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Van, and Bitlis, sometimes called the ―six provinces,‖ are an integral whole which cannot be separated from each other or from Ottoman territory for any reason.

2- To preserve the integrity of the Ottoman country and our national (milli) independence and to protect the sultanate and the caliphate, it is essential that the national forces (Kuvayi-i Milliye) be put in charge and the nation (millet) will be recognized as sovereign.

3- As all occupation and interference will be considered undertaken on behalf of establishing Greek and Armenian states, the principle of united defense and resistance is resolved. The bestowing of new privileges on Christians in such a manner as to alter political control and social balance will not be allowed.

185 4- In case the central government, under foreign pressure, is forced to abandon any part of the territory, we are taking measures and making decisions to defend our national (milli) rights as well as the sultanate and the caliphate.

5- We affirm the legal rights, as indicated in the laws of the Ottoman state, of non-

Muslims with whom we share our Fatherland. The protection of their property, life, and honour is among the basic tenets of our religious practices, national traditions, and legal principles. This policy is confirmed by the consensus of our Congress.

6- We are calling for a decision based on right and justice, one that respects our historic, cultural, and religious rights, and that rejects totally the theory of dividing

[Ottoman]countries (memleketler) and separating peoples, who are true brothers, co- religionists, and inseparable from each other, and who are within the boundaries established by the armistice signed by the Allies on October 30, 1918 and are in eastern Anatolia, as well as in other regions, inhabited by a majority of Muslims and dominated by Muslims culturally and economically.

7- Our people (milletimiz) honour and respect humanitarian and progressive developments and are appreciative of our own scientific, industrial, and economic conditions and needs. Therefore, on condition that the internal and external independence of our people and our state, and the territorial integrity of our fatherland

(vatan) shall be conserved intact, we will accept with pleasure the scientific, industrial, and economic assistance of every state which will not nurture imperialistic tendencies towards our country and which will respect the principles of nationality as indicated under Article 6. We await, for the sake of preserving humanity and peace, the urgent signature of a peace based on these equitable and humanitarian conditions, which we consider to be our great national (milli) objective.

186 8- In this historical age when the nation (millet) determines its own destiny, it is essential that our central government submit itself to the national will. As made clear by past events and their results, government decisions not based on the national will have no validity for the people and are not respected by foreign nations. In consequence, before the nation is forced into taking matters into its own hands to look for a remedy to its anguish, our central government should proceed without delay to convoke the National Assembly (Milli Meclis) and submit to it all the decisions to be taken relating to the fate of the nation (millet) and the country.

9- ―The Society to Defend the Rights of Eastern Anatolia‖ (Şark-i Anadolu Mudafa- yi Hukuk Jamiyeti) is the union of societies born out of the sufferings and calamities experienced by our land. This assembly is totally free of party interests. All Muslim compatriots are the natural members of this assembly.

10- A Representative Committee (Heyet-i Temsiliye) chosen by the Congress will work in its name to establish national unity on all levels from the village to the province.81

The Erzurum Congress was followed by the Sivas Congress in early September which reiterated the fundamental principles of the Erzurum Congress. At the Sivas Congress resolution was passed to unify all the defence of rights associations under one name

‗The Society to Defend the Rights of the Provinces of Anatolia and Rumeli‘ (Anadolu

Rumeli Mudafa-i Hukuk-u Milliye Jamiyeti). The most important aspect of these two congresses was their clear objective to govern a territory which limited itself to the

Ottoman boundaries unoccupied prior to the Mudros Armistice, and thus signified a sharp deviation from the CUP‘s pan-Turkism directed at uniting the entire Turkic race in Asia and Europe. These boundaries constituted what was to become to known as

187 the Misak-i Milli (National Pact) which included that part of Kurdistan which was within the Ottoman Empire as well the Armenian territories. Within the borders designated by the National Pact, two main ethnic groups constituted the majority, the

Turks and the Kurds, both of which are Muslim. The National Pact was adopted by the last Ottoman parliament, which were dominated by the Unionists and people sympathetic to the resistance movement on 28 January 1920.82 The National Pact

‗which was the official statement of aims of the resistance movement consisted of six articles:

1- The territories inhabited by an Ottoman Muslim majority (united in religion, race, and aims) formed an indivisible whole, but the fate of the territories inhabited by an

Arab majority which were under foreign occupation should be determined by plebiscite.

2- A plebiscite could determine the fate of the ―Three Vilayets‖ of Batum, Kars and

Ardahan, which had been Russian from 1878 to 1918.

3- The same should hold true for the fate of western Thrace

4- The security of the capital, Istanbul, and of the Sea of Marmara must be assured.

The opening of the straits to commercial shipping would be a subject for discussion with other interested countries.

5- The rights of minorities would be established in conformity with the treaties concluded between the Entente and European states.

6- The economic, financial and judicial independence of the Empire should be assured and free from restrictions (i.e. a return of the capitulations would be unacceptable).83 [italic added]

188 The formal occupation of Istanbul and the arrest and exile of leading nationalist parliamentarians brought the Ottoman parliament to an end—a fact which was exploited by Mustafa Kemal who immediately called the MPs to come to Ankara and take up their seats in the ‗National Assembly‘. 92 members of the Ottoman parliament managed to reach Ankara, and together with 232 representatives elected by the Defence of Rights groups they formed the Grand National Assembly which met for the first time on 23 April 1920. From then on the resistance movement took on the character of a complete government and all legislation by the Istanbul government after 16 March (the day of Istanbul‘s occupation by the Allied forces) was officially declared void.84

Military victories against the Greek army in the west and the Armenians in the east finally secured the victory of the resistance movement and resulted in the Lausanne treaty signed on 24 July 1923.85 With the Lausanne treaty the former Allied Sevres peace treaty became void, together with the hope of Armenian and Kurds to establish their own independent states.

2.3 Was the Resistance Movement a ‗War of Liberation/Independence‘

With a very few exceptions, almost all Turkish historians and a considerable number of non-Turkish scholars on Turkish history and politics agree in classification of the period from 1919-1922 as the ‗War of Independence‘ or the ‗War of Liberation‘ of

Turkish nation.86 S. Sureyya suggests that the ‗national movement by its essence was a struggle of the nation against enslavement.‘ 87 Referring to the ‗National Pact‘,

Toynbee inserts that it was ‗in reality, a Declaration of Independence of the Turkish

189 nation. This laconic declaration of the rights and demands of an oppressed people

(…) has built up the superstructure of a virile and strong Turkish state on a western pattern.‘88 B. Lewis infers ‗the Kemalist Revolution brought new life and hopes to the

Turkish people, restored their energies and self-respect, and set them firmly on the road not only to independence, but to that rarer and more precious thing, that is freedom.‘89 M.K.Oke believes that ‗the Turkish nation took its fate into its own hands and the period of ―Defense of the Rights‖ was initiated in Anatolia which set the stage for the National struggle for independence.‘90 He continues: ‗with ―national sovereignty‖ Mustafa Kemal implied freeing the country of external enemies and giving the nation its right to self-determination.‘91 Yapp classified the period as the

‗War of Independence‘, which ‗had been won by an alliance of which the core was formed by officials and local notables.‘92 For J. McCarthy ‗the War of Independence marked a fundamental change in the Turks themselves and in their government …

(the Turks) saved the Turkish heartland of the old Empire and guaranteed a home for the Turks in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace.‘ 93 Shaw and Shaw inferred that the resistance movement developed into a full war for independence and that ‗Turkish nationalism was not imperialistic‘ and their ‗emphasize was on building a modern state for the Turks within the boundaries of the Republic created by the treaty of

Lausanne.‘94 Zürcher classified the period as the struggle for Independence.95 Most

Kurdish historians and nationalists, ironically, also refer the period as the War of

Independence/Liberation. For example, Nezan suggests that ‗the Turkish War of

Independence was strongly supported by the people, who sought to defend their lands against the savage violence wrecked upon the population by the Greek invaders.‘96

Lazarev, a Soviet historian on Kurdish nationalism infers that the Kemalist movement was a national independence movement which organized the patriotic and anti-

190 imperialist forces of the Turkish community.97 In a similar approach C.Celil and other

Soviet historians on the Kurds, identify the resistance movement as an anti-imperialist and national liberation and independence struggle.98

This study would challenge such views and suggest that the Kemalist movement was just a continuation, an extension, of WWI, launched by mainly ex-CUP officers to save the Ottoman state and the country from the disintegration and division which the

Allied powers had planned. It was neither a national liberation movement nor anti- imperialist.

Most of the analyses of the Kemalism mentioned above and others are mainly based on the premises that the so-called ‗Turkey‘ today was/is as a historical territory populated mainly by Turks with some minor ethnic and religious groups such as

Kurds and Armenians and others. At the time of Mudros Armistice the remaining unoccupied Ottoman territory was assumed to be dominated by Turks and that they were therefore entitled to the land as a sovereign ethnic group. As such, the treaty of

Sevres, which allowed the establishment of an independent Armenia and Kurdistan, was perceived as the partitioning of Turkey and the end of the Turkish nation. For

Yale, acceptance by the Turkish people of this treaty [Sevres] signed by their Sultan‘s government would have been the death knell of the Turkish nation.‘99 Allen argued similarly that ‗with the close of the World War, Turkey was subjected to a series of humiliations by the countries which had been her victorious foes. The Allies (…) proceeded to partition up the country, forcing disgraceful terms … with the treaty of

Sevres.‘100 Such a perception implies that there existed a Turkish nation identified with a particular territory, and that this territory was occupied and colonized by

191 foreigners (imperialists) attempting to sweep the Turkish nation off the earth. The intention here is not to suggest that the Allied powers did not have imperialistic plans over the Ottoman Empire. They certainly had such plans, but their plans did not concern the Turkish nation but rather the Empire which contained multi-ethnic groups who had already developed nationalist sentiment and ideas, such as the Armenians and the Kurds. Confusion between the Ottoman Empire and Turkey has not been referred to by the scholars and historians in their analysis of this particular period.

This confusion in turn causes historians to misrepresent historical facts, for example,

Yale claimed that ‗the resolution passed by the first congress of Erzurum proclaimed the right of the Turks to resist every territorial occupation and all intervention designed to establish Greek and Armenian control in any part of Anatolia.‘101 For

Sonyel the Sivas Congress ‗laid the foundation for the salvation and complete independence of the Turkish nation. It delimited the boundaries of new Turkey, inhabited by a Muslim majority, united in religion, culture and race.‘102 This ‗Muslim majority‘, however, for Sonyel, was ‗predominantly Turkish people‘.103 The Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, contrary to Yale and Sonyel statement, did not proclaim the right of the Turks but the right of the Millet. The term Millet, prior to the establishment of the republic, was mainly used to refer the Ottoman Muslim people.

Implicitly the use of millet included both the Turks and the Kurds. Indeed half of the main participators at the Erzurum Congress were the Kurdish representatives whose principal objective was to prevent the Armenian claim to the ‗six vilayets‘ which the

Kurds claimed as part of Kurdistan. Throughout the period of 1919-1922 the

Kemalists used the term millet in its religious sense not in the modern sense of nation.104 This was in parallel with the initial objective of the resistance movement which was to save the Caliph and the Sultanate. The last article of the National pact

192 refers to the independence of the Empire rather than Turkey or Turkish nation. This explains why some sections of the Kurdish populace, particularly those close to the

Armenians and within the six vilayets, participated in the Kemalist movement.

Fikret Başkaya acutely notes that any analysis of post-Republican Turkish history and the evaluation of the social formation of Turkey without consideration of the Kurdish issue would be stunted (incomplete)105 This is indeed true for most of the scholarly works carried out by Turkish and non-Turkish scholars on the history of resistance movement. Referring to Anatolia and the ‘Misaki Milli’ as the land of the Turks, implicitly ignores the Kurds and Kurdistan. Misaki Milli included Ottoman Kurdistan which the Kemalists managed to keep under their control, apart from Mosul province.

Thus Shaw and Shaw were not right when they said ‗Turkish nationalism was not imperialistic [expansionist, a.a]: it did not seek to achieve greatness by regaining lands ruled by the Ottomans.‘106 Nor was the assumption of Helmreich correct when he suggested that ‗Kemal realistically confined his territorial ambitions to the preservation of an Independent Turkish state in that area where Turks constituted the majority of the population.‘107 The Turks never constituted the majority in Kurdistan; this is a clear misrepresentation of historical fact. Even today after eight decades of forceful assimilation policies and internal deportation, in so-called eastern and south- eastern Anatolia (in effect, Northern part of Kurdistan) the Kurds clearly constitute the majority. It was true that Kemalists were realistic, they rejected other choices, they could not regain or re-create the once the Great Ottoman Empire nor they would be able to pursue pan-Turkist dreams,108 but they calculated that they could retain the rest of the unoccupied territories of the Empire which included large part of Kurdistan by the time the Mudros Armistice. The Armenians who were diminished considerably

193 in size during the 1915 deportation did not constitute the majority in areas they claimed to be part of an Independent Armenia. In those areas the Kurds constituted a majority. Thus, while it was true to suggest that in the post-war period the Muslim community made up the majority, it would be unjust to identify this Muslim community as Turks. In the area, what was/is called Kurdistan, Kurds composed the main ethnic group, and they had developed a sense of Kurdishness and nationalist sentiment albeit conflated with a Muslim identity.

The notion that the Kemalists launched and successfully carried out a ‗War of

Independence‘ is not convincing at all. Firstly, who did they liberate the Turks from?

The idea suggests that the Ottoman Empire and ‗Turkey‘ was a colonized country under direct foreign rule. The Ottoman Empire participated in an imperialist war with the hope of regaining its lost territories and, for some of the CUP regime to create a

Great Turkish state which included the entire Turkic race in Central Asia. Like

Germany and Austria-Hungary the Ottoman Empire had to face the consequences of the war and defeat. The so-called ‗War of Independence‘ was a continuation of WWI and resistance to the conditions of peace terms, mainly to prevent the establishment of

Armenian, Greek (Pontus) and Kurdish independent states. Referring to Sevres as partitioning of the Ottoman Empire is one thing, but referring to it as partitioning

Turkey is another. The process of disintegration, thus the partitioning, of the Ottoman

Empire, as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious entity, had begun long before WWI once the idea of nationalism had begun to take root among the subject people of the

Empire. ‗Turkey‘ on the other hand, as we understand today, was non-existent. The

European use of Turkey basically meant the Ottoman Empire, and the subject peoples, including the Turks themselves, never referred to the Ottoman Empire as

194 Turkey. Thus ‗Turkey‘ as a modern nation-state prior to the 1922/3 did not exist as a national political entity. This is the crux of the matter: confusing the Ottoman Empire with Turkey in the modern sense inevitably led historians and scholars to assume that the Sevres treaty as imperialist design to partition Turkey and put an end to the Turks.

As such the treaty of Lausanne, therefore, was seen to be rebirth of the Turkish nation and a victory for national independence, without consideration of the fact that the same Lausanne treaty officially divided Kurds and partitioned Kurdistan. The bulk of the Turkish historiography sees the treaty of Lausanne as a victory against imperialism and the successful result of a genuine national liberation movement, as if the treaty of Lausanne was signed against the wishes of the imperialist powers of the time.

The Treaty of Sevres certainly meant the division and partition of the Empire amongst the Great Powers. It must also be remembered that the same treaty also divided the Kurds and their lands into the zones of influence controlled by the Allies.

A small part of Kurdistan, according to the provisions of Sevres, was allowed to gain its independence.109 The provisions for establishing an independent Armenian and geographically limited an independent Kurdish state, two main non-Turkish elements within the unoccupied territory of the Empire after the Mudros armistice should not be read as imperialistic design against ‗Turkey‘, as a matter of fact these provisions were the only positive aspects of the treaty which allowed the oppressed peoples of the Ottoman Empire the right to self-determination. As can be recalled, the Arab provinces of the Empire during the war separated from the Empire as they were allied with the Entente powers against the Ottomans in the hope of establishing a greater

Arab state. The Kemalists did not pretend to claim the Arab provinces, as became

195 clear in the ‗national pact‘, but they did claim the remaining parts of the Empire, including Kurdistan, Armenia, Turkish dominated Western Anatolia. The Kemalist forces during the 1919-1922 period fought not against the Great Powers but the Greek army in the west, the Kurdish nationalist uprising in the Dersim area (Koçgiri) and the Armenians in the east.

The notion that the Turkish nationalists defeated the imperialist powers was an illusion fashioned by post-Republic, official Turkish intelligentsia as a tool in the formation of Turkish identity.110 The Kemalist objective formulated in the ‗national pact‘ was not against the imperialist powers‘ interest, on the contrary, it collaborated to a certain degree with the French and Italians. France and Italy supported the

Kemalists in order to check British domination in the Anatolia and Middle East. Thus it is not surprising to see that it was French and Italy who rushed to recognize and support the Kemalist movement alongside the newly established Soviet Union. The

Kemalist success, with the help of these three powers, was against the demands of the

Kurds and Armenians and the Greek army‘s occupation of western Anatolia, which caused unrest among the Muslim population in Anatolia. The Greek occupation of

Izmir and the western part of Anatolia in fact enabled the Kemalists to strength their hold on the mostly Muslim population of Anatolia and ‗legitimized‘ their position against the Sultan‘s government.

The Kemalist movement, upon the final and decisive victory over the Greek army, and over Armenian and Kurdish nationalism, embarked upon a new Turkish state which was as Roshwald rightly argued ‗built on a legacy of genocide and ethnic cleansing and propagated by a dictatorial regime with little patience for the niceties of

196 pluralistic policies.‘111 A myth was created about Mustafa Kemal and the resistance movement in the post-Republic era by Turkish historians, journalists and others, and was adopted by most western scholars as well. The common denominator of all these analyses was to ignore the Kurdish nation, or at least to reduce them to the minority status. Perception of the Kurds as an ethnic minority group, not as a nation with a right to self-determination inevitably stripped the Kurds of their national territory. As a result Kurdistan as a country with which Kurds identified themselves, was not recognized. Thus, Kurdistan became ‗Turkey‘, ‗Iraq‘, ‗Iran‘ or ‗Syria‘. W. Hale, for example, stated that ‗the United States, which might have provided protection to an independent Armenia or Kurdistan on Turkish soil…‘112 Since when have Kurdistan and Armenia been Turkish soil? The writer does not provide any explanation. A recent biography of Atatürk by Mango provides more evidence: ‗Mustafa Kemal

Atatürk is one of the most important statesmen of the twentieth century… For peoples ruled by foreigners, he showed a way to national independence in amity with the rest of the world. He believed that the struggle for genuine independence should be waged by each nation for itself in the name of an overarching secular ideal of progress common to all, … [H]e was an anti-imperialist only in the sense that his idea was a universal commonwealth of civilized people..‘113 The same writer later contradicts himself by inferring that ‗on the Kurds and other ethnic groups in Turkey, Atatürk shared the views of reforming Turkish nationalists. Namik Kemal, the ―poet of

Liberty‖ who had inspired Mustafa Kemal in youth, had written as early as 1878:

―We must try to annihilate all languages in our country except Turkish (…) Language

(…) may be the firmest barrier –perhaps firmer than religion- against national unity.‖‘ 114 Namik Kemal‘s successors, the Young Turks not only annihilated a language but an entire ethnic group within the Ottoman Empire, and their successors,

197 the Kemalists, in their turn, tried to do the same in the Republic era to the Kurds, but unlike their predecessors they failed.

3. The Kemalist Movement‘s Kurdish Policy, 1919-1922

The Kemalists right from the start pursued a dual policy in respect to the Kurds and

Kurdistan. While on the one hand the Kemalists tried hard to integrate the Kurdish notables within the resistance movement, on the other hand they pursued a cunning policy to destroy the organizational structure of growing Kurdish nationalism, in effect, the Kurdistan Teali Jamiyati and its branches in Kurdistan, notably its

Diyarbakir branch. This dualism was necessitated by pressing historical and political conditions of the time. It was also an indication of the resistance leaders‘ experience in state administration, a crucial advantage which Kurdish nationalists lacked.

The formation and development of Kemalist policy in respect to the Kurds and

Kurdistan must be analyzed within the framework of interconnected factors which were as follows: a) growing Kurdish nationalist activities; b) Great powers policies on

Ottoman Empire as a whole and in particular, Kurdistan and Armenia; c) logistical, military, and organizational needs of the resistance movement.

The resistance leaders, like Kazim Karabekir, as early as November/December 1918, had persistently claimed that the survival of the state and the millet require a unified resistance movement to be launched from the east where the threat of the Armenians was real. He urged like minded military officers in Istanbul to return to or to be appointed to the military posts in the east and prevent the demilitarization and

198 disarmament of the Ottoman army.115 He himself got appointed to the commanding post of the 15th army corps in Erzurum where the Ottoman army remained intact, and eventually attacked the Armenian Republic in the East. The historical tension and disputes between the two major ethnic groups, the Kurds and Armenians, in the east of the Empire was further tempered in the post-war period as both group claimed rights on the disputed area as their own (six vilayets), provided the opportunity for people like Karabekir to stress Armenian threats as an effective means to pull the

Kurds to the resistance side. To an Ottoman delegate sent from Istanbul to Erzurum,

Karabekir warned:

‗our enemies are trying to create a great Armenia. Here [in these

regions] our Kurdish brothers constitute a majority. Those who strive

for Kurdish independence are our enemies. Their intentions are to

separate the Kurds from us and then make them [these regions]

Armenia. They are going to destroy Kurds, therefore Turks and Kurds,

as brothers, should not yield to this disaster.‘116 [Italics added]

For him, Kurdish nationalist demands were poisonous, and would have to be stopped:

‗it was evident that propaganda such as borders readjustment, Kurdish

independence and etc were not going to stop. Against such poisons I

have already immunized (şerbetlemek) all the Kurds by [saying] that

―they want to make [turn] Kurdistan [into] Armenia, but we will never

let our Kurdish brothers be crushed.‘117

This issue of an ‗Armenian‘ threat was continuously propagated by Mustafa Kemal to win the collaboration of Kurdish tribal and religious local leaders in Kurdistan. In his letter to a known leading family member in Diyarbakir, Cemilpashazade Kasim Bey,

Mustafa Kemal suggests: ‗I will not allow the Kurds to establish an independent

199 Kurdistan under British protection, because such theories are absolutely a British plan for the interests of Armenia.‘118

The Kemalists blended their ‗Armenian threat‘ issue with the Islamic unity of the

Ottoman elements. The Kemalists from 1919 to 1924 refrained from referring to the nationalist discourse, which had become the backbone of Kemalism from the mid-

1920s to date. The Erzurum and Sivas Congresses referred to the ‗indivisible‘ unity of

Islamic elements of an unoccupied part of the Empire. The Kurds, in Kemalist discourse in this period, were, a ‗true brothers‘ of the Turks, together with constitutes the Ottomans. Thus, they had common objective in solidarity and resistance to save

Caliph/Sultan, who was under ‗infidel‘ occupation. This indeed was a powerful tool which proved to work in the interests of Kemalists. Substantial numbers of Kurdish notables participated within the resistance movement and had taken seats as MPs for

Kurdistan at the Grand National Assembly. They, indeed, naively believed that the unity of Turks and Kurds was essential both for the survival of the Caliph and the

Kurds themselves against the ‗imperialist‘ backed Armenians who claimed to incorporate Kurdistan into Armenia. The excessive Armenian claims (six vilayets) contributed towards such naivety. A Kurdish MP from Bitlis, Yusuf Ziya Bey who later was hanged by the Tribunal Courts (Istiklal Mahkemeleri) for his participation at the Kurdish uprising in 1930s, in his speech at the GNA enthusiastically speaks to the

MPs:

‗Europeans say that ―the largest minority group in Turkey are Kurds‖.

I am the son of a Kurd, therefore, as a Kurdish MP I ensure you that

Kurds do not want anything but only the well-being and happiness of

their big brothers, the Turks. We Kurds refused and crushed all the

200 rights given to us by Europeans with the Sevres Treaty…. We shed our

blood with the Turks and we did not and will not separate from

them.‘119

The case of the Cemilpasha family is a good indicator of the extent of the Kemalist influence amongst the leading Kurdish notables. While members of the Cemilpasa family, like Ekrem Cemil, Kadri Cemil, played a significant role in the establishment of a Kurdish Club in Diyarbakir, their uncle, Mustafa Bey, allied with Mustafa Kemal influenced leading Diyarbakir notables to switch their alliance to the resistance movement, which caused the weakness of Kurdish nationalists.120

The rise of organizational post-war Kurdish nationalism was one of the main worries of the resistance movement. They perceived the Kurdish nationalists as their rivals and challengers. It was this concern that caused the Kemalists right from the beginning to emphasize Kurdish and Turkish unity in public, whereas they were busy trying to prevent the proliferation of Kurdish nationalism in Kurdistan. The Kemalists classified the Kurdish nationalists as an ‗alien force in the hands of imperialist powers, mainly England, who working to partition the Ottoman land for the interests of greater Armenia. This notion of Kurdish nationalists as imperialist agents is still popular amongst Turkish historians and politicians.121

The resistance movement initially tried to integrate the Kurdish Club in Diyarbakir and the Kurdistan Teali Jamiyati in Istanbul into the Defence of Rights organisations.122 However, when they failed to convince them, they opted for forceful closure of the Kurdish Club in Diyarbakir.123 This action was taken by the governor, military officers and Defence of Right organization of the city. The closure of the

201 Diyarbakir Kurdish club is highly significant as it reveals a number of important points. Firstly, the governor of Diyarbakir was representing the Ottoman government and central state and so the military officers. This suggests that the central Ottoman government was also uneasy about the rise of the Kurdish nationalism. The closure of the Kurdish Jamiyati in Diyarbakir, thus, was a collective response of both the

Ottoman central state and the resistance movement. Mustafa Kemal‘s response to the closure was evident in his congratulatory letter to the authorities in Diyarbakir:

‗in such historical days where the whole nation (millet) has united in

order to defend its independence and existence, it is a highly essential

and patriotic duty to disperse any association which may lead the

country towards partition. Any kind of view which purports to live

dishonorably under the protection of a foreign state like a slave [will

not be allowed], therefore action taken against the Kurd Club was

highly approved by me as well. (…..) I would strongly advise that

support should be given for the establishment of a ‗Defence of Rights

organization in Diyarbakir and surrounding areas.‘124

The Kemalists‘ harsh response towards the Kurdish nationalism was met with protests by the leading Kurdish organisations of the time, and they petitioned the

High Commissioners in Istanbul to take action against them. One such petition was sent by the Kurdish Democratic Party to the British High Commissioner, and states:

‗The Turks have always pursued a policy of extinguishing all Kurdish

national aims and ambitions, and even to-day continue the same policy

with vigor and violence. To prove the truth of this statement we

venture to mention only a few exemplary cases. The central

202 government has sent a Vali to Diyarbakir, who does not hesitate for a

moment in applying a most exceptionally cruel system of

administration against the Kurds there. His main purpose is to kill and

uproot our national aspirations. All petitions bearing Kurdish names or

signatures receive no attention whatever. In fact we do not imagine or

recollect a more tyrannical rule than that which the Turks unblushingly

continue to perpetuate. The gates of their police stations and courts of

justice are practically closed against the supplications of our people

(…) The Diyarbakir and Siirt branches of the Kurdistan Forward

Association [KTJ] have been forcibly suppressed by the Turkish

Authorities. Notwithstanding the repeated efforts of the Committee –

which struggles for the salvation of our nation- those two clubs are still

closed. At Urfa the Turkish authorities are determined not to permit

the opening of a branch of the said Society there. Our own Democratic

party still remains unrecognized by the Ministry of Interior.‘125

In their counter-propaganda against Kurdish nationalism, the Kemalists, alongside the

Armenian issue, employed in their discourse an important and attractive concept, a pseudo-anti-imperialism. For Kemalists, imperialist powers of the world had long desired to partition and divide the Ottoman lands and therefore they always played on the multi-ethnic and multi-religious characteristics of the Ottomans. Now that the

Ottomans constituted two remaining elements, Kurds and Turks, both Muslim people, the imperialists, in order to divide the Ottomans further, were using the Kurdish issue to realize their imperialistic intentions. For Kemalists, most Kurds were good people and had nothing to do with such imperialistic designs over the Empire, but

203 unfortunately some minority Kurdish notables who sold themselves for money, were supporting English imperialists to bring about the end of the Ottoman Empire and therefore the end of both Turks and Kurds. Those Kurds who collaborated with imperialist powers were also serving the interests of the Armenians, who, as part of an imperialist design, were attempting to create an independent Armenia. In early

Kemalist discourse, those minority Kurds who ‗sold their spirits for money‘ were the

Kurdish nationalists. 126 This intensified counter-propaganda was oriented towards two ends: firstly, the Kemalists tried to diminish the influence and proliferation of

Kurdish nationalist organisations in Kurdistan by directing Kuvay-i milliye forces as well as local and central administrative authorities in Kurdistan against them; secondly they sought to channel and manipulate general Kurdish resentment against the Ottoman central government towards external enemies, the infidel, greedy and merciless imperialists.

204 CHAPTTER V

THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF KURDISH NATIONALISM

The early formation of Kurdish nationalism, such as the establishment of the

Kurdistan Teali Jamiyeti and other groups (see chapter III), was followed by Kurdish nationalist movements in Kurdistan in 1919-1920. The development of the Kurdish nationalist movement was neither coherent nor did it have a clear national-political program. It was divided, localized and without an overall nationwide political organization or structure. This chapter sets out to explore the nationalist development in North Kurdistan from 1919 till the Lausanne Treaty.

The two most important Kurdish nationalist movements in this period were the

Koçgiri and the Sheikh Mahmut Berzinji movements. While the Koçgiri was launched against the Kemalist movement in the Sivas-Dersim region of North Kurdistan, the

Berzinji movement was initiated against the British forces mainly in Sulaimania in

Southern Kurdistan. Analysis of the Koçgiri nationalist movement and its failure will allow the reader to appreciate and comprehend the weaknesses of Kurdish nationalism, as well as to provide a better insight into post-Sevres negotiations between Kemalist forces and the Allied powers. This period culminated in the

Lausanne Treaty, which confirmed the official and final international division of

Kurdistan amongst various powers.

205 1. Kurdish Nationalism prior to Koçgiri

As may be recalled from the previous chapters, the early leading Kurdish nationalists in Istanbul, following the Mudros Armistice had an unreserved trust in the British authorities about the future of Kurdistan. British officers had urged Kurdish nationalists not to initiate armed struggle but to await the conclusion of the post war

Peace Conference. Prince Sureyya Bedirhan claimed that Colonel Bell advised the

Kurds not to participate in any war and guaranteed a solution of the Kurdish case in accordance to the war plans of the Allied powers. 1 The British primary sources confirm such affirmations.2

The long interlude between the Mudros Armistice in October 1918 and Sevres Treaty in August 1920 allowed the Kemalist forces to strengthen their position against the

Kurds, Armenians and the Allied powers. During this interregnum, Kurdish nationalists were preoccupied with presenting their case to the Allied powers and hoping that an agreeable solution would be realized. Meanwhile they were trying to extend Kurdish organisations in various cities and towns of Kurdistan, despite the fact that they faced opposition from both the Ottoman central administration and Kemalist forces in Anatolia.3 Branches of the KTJ were opened in Elazig, Arapkir, Gazan,

Hozat, Bitlis, Umraniye, Dersim, Van, Sivas-Koçgiri, and Siirt. Another Kurdish association was established in Diyarbakir in close connection to the KTJ. As indicated in the previous chapter, the Diyarbakir Kurdish association and Siirt branches of KTJ were closed down by the Kemalists. The branches at Umraniye, Dersim, and Sivas-

Koçgiri were the most active ones in initiating the Koçgiri national uprising.

206 In this uncertain period it seems that the Kurdish nationalists were active in nationalist politics in various parts of North Kurdistan. These activities were occurring simultaneously but were entirely uncoordinated. The main centers of such activities were in Diyarbakir, Erzurum, and the Dersim-Koçgiri regions. Their common denominator was their loose connection to the KTJ in Istanbul. The primary and secondary sources do not reveal any high level of coordination and planning between them.4

Soon after WWI was over, some of the leading Kurdish notables in Diyarbakir established Kurdistan Jamiyeti (KJ).5 The leading figures behind the Jamiyet were

Ekrem Cemil Pasha, Cerciszade and Fikri Ganizade Reşat, all of whom were serving in the Ottoman army. Almost immediately after the armistice, they had returned to

Diyarbakir and set to work to save ‗the Kurdish people from oppression and enslavement.‘ 6 Kasım Bey, who was the father of Ekrem, was the one who encouraged them. After two months of activities, they had gained enough supporters to call a public meeting at the Sheikh Ahmet Şeyni Tekke (brotherhood). More than four thousand people attended the meeting including the town‘s leading notables, ulema, middle class and ordinary people. A number of speakers informed the gathering that Istanbul was occupied and the end of the Empire was imminent. The speakers were inviting Kurds to unity.7 Ekrem recalls a crucial speech delivered by

Hamdi Efendi Pasha, a leading alem of Diyarbakir, who at the end of his long speech stated that ‗the body of the Ottoman state has been affected with gangrene and this horrible illness is soon going to affect the whole Ottoman country. The only remedy for an affected part with gangrene is a knife. The affected part must be removed.‘8

After the meeting only forty people who knew the real reason and aims of the meeting

207 remained at the tekke. They had decided to set up an association with its centre in

Diyarbakir in order to achieve Kurdish unity. They decided to get permission from the

Governor of Diyarbakir and to prepare a charter for the association. Four people,

Ekrem, Resat, Fikri and Omer were appointed for these tasks. They got the permission and established the Kurdistan Jamiyeti.9 Ekrem Pasha was elected as the chairman of the association.

In a short period of time, the association grew so much that it had to move its headquarters to a new and larger building. It had got more than five hundred members, including some influential notables and ulema. The association managed to open branches in Nusaybin, Savur, Farkin and Lice. They established close contacts in Elaziz, Maden, and Malatya. They were also in touch with the Kurdistan Teali

Jamiyeti in Istanbul. Having recruited a number of influential and elderly notables, the young activists of the KJ decided that reorganization of the association was necessary in order to accommodate newcomers, and that they should dissolve the current committee and chose a new one. After a meeting of three hundred members, the new committee was selected. It included Kasim Bey as chairman, Ekrem Cemil as deputy chairman, and Dr. Cevdet and Hamdi Efendi Hoca as counselors.

The Kurdistan Jamiyeti bought a small print house from the Diyarbakir Chaldean

Patriarchate and issued a newspaper called Gazi (Call), which consisted of four pages, for propaganda purposes. The association was sending capable individuals to towns and villages to enlighten their people, distributing letters and publications amongst them to teach them how to read in Kurdish, and organizing conferences in its headquarters. Some of the most active young members, like Ekrem Cemil Pasha,

208 would wear Kurdish traditional outfits and stroll in the town markets in order to elevate the spirit of the people. Even when they visited officials, such as governors and military commanders, they wore Kurdish national clothes. Ekrem Cemil wrote that the main reason for emphasizing Kurdish attire was to show the people that they had no fear of the Turks.

While the Kurdistan Jamiyeti was busy with its activities, it faced a new threat from the Kemalists from the middle of 1919 onwards. Ekrem Cemil Pasha claimed that

Mustafa Kemal tried hard to secure his father‘s support, sending him many letters and telegraphs, asking him to send his son, Ekrem, to him; but Ekrem asserted that they neither believed in his father nor in him. However, Ekrem recalled that Mustafa

Kemal succeeded in securing the support of his uncle, Mustafa Pasha, the eldest member of his family. Ekrem Cemil Pasha further stated that Mustafa Kemal managed to secure the support of many influential Kurds, including Cibranli Halit

Beg, Haci Mustafa Beg, the chief of the Haydaran tribe and others.

Ekrem stated that his uncle‘s alliance with Mustafa Kemal was an important development for the people of Diyarbakir, who were accustomed to respecting and following his family. Despite the protests of family members, Mustafa Pasha would not change his mind and believed that Mustafa Kemal was sent by God to save the

Caliph, Islam, and Istanbul from foreigners and infidels and to secure his Kurdish brothers‘ rights as well. This is an important point, which indicates the weaknesses of

Kurdish nationalism and their nationalist appeals to the Kurdish traditional dignitaries, ulemas, and the intelligentsia in the name of Muslim brotherhood. As

Bozarslan rightly argued,

209 ‗[f]or the vast majority of the Kurds, ―Kurdishness‖ was in fact another

way of expressing their Muslim and Ottoman affiliations. For

centuries, and particularly during the last decades of the Ottoman

Empire, being a Kurd meant being a Muslim, by contrast with non-

Muslims, particularly Armenians –and to a lesser extent Assyrians. In

the conditions of the post-war world, this identification was only partly

a result of ―imagining‖ Anatolia as the core of the Islamic umma,

threatened by Christian invaders.‘10

The Kemalists‘ call for Muslim unity and common defence against the infidel invaders, particularly those of Armenian descent, paid off, especially among the Sunni

Kurds.11

Despite their success among the Kurdish people, the Kemalists were worried about the KJ‘s activities and initially tried to dissolve it into the Kuvayi Milliye. Ekrem mentioned number of meetings that had taken between the Pashas of Diyarbakir and the KJ in Diyarbakir. One of those meetings took place in Diyarbakir‘s municipality garden. All of the people of Diyarbakir were invited and the place was completely packed. Apart from the Pashas, there were the KJ, and ex-Unionists, Damat Ferit

Pasha‘s Hürriyet ve İtilaf Fırkası. One of the pashas who attended the meeting was

Kenan Bey, sent to Diyarbakir by Mustafa Kemal. Ekrem recalls in his speech that

Kenan Bey urged the importance of Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood and their unity. He asked the three groups who were present in the meeting to unite. Ekrem responded by criticizing the Unionists‘ discriminatory Kurdish policy. He referred to their policy of immigration as nothing but a massacre and that ‗if the unionists want to unite with the people of Diyarbakir, they should be prepared to listen to even more critical speeches

210 as such.‘12 At such a harsh response, according to Ekrem, the unionist groups and pashas left the meeting, and their proposal for unity with the KJ failed.

When the Kemalists realized that they were not going to convince the KJ to give up or be able to prevent their activities, they switched to the use of force. They injured

Hamdi Efendi Hoca by shooting at him and forced him to resign from his post in the

KJ. The people who were working for the KJ were threatened and most of them did leave their posts. Thus, the print house was dysfunctional and they could no longer publish their newspaper. The Kemalists‘ and local military and non-military officials‘ harsh and threatening response forced the KJ to end its activities. In a final meeting it was decided that Ekrem Pasha should leave Diyarbakir for Belgium to continue his education.13 The Kurdistan Jamiyeti then ceased its activities.

1.2 The Noel Mission

Ekrem Pasha on his way to Istanbul via Halep met Major Noel, a British officer sent from Mesopotamia to prepare a report about Kurdistan 14 , and his companions, including Kamuran and Celadet Bedirhans. 15 Upon the insistence of Major Noel,

Ekrem Pasha changed his plan of going to Istanbul and joined them on their journey to Malatya, an Alevi dominated Kurdish city.

Major Noel and his companions reached Malatya early in September 1919. The governor of Malatya at that time was Halil Bedirhan Bey, the uncle of Kamuran and

Celadet Bedirhans. According to Ekrem Pasha, the head of the municipal council,

Arpaci Mehmet Efendi, was also a Kurdish activist. At this particular period a few

211 other influential figures were at Malatya, such as Haci Bedr Agha, the head of the

Rishwan tribe, one of the biggest tribes in Kurdistan. Ekrem stated that their activities and meetings made Malatya a centre of the Kurdish movement.16 Galip Bey, the

Governor of Elaziz had also arrived at Malatya en route to Sivas as per an order from

Istanbul.

The gathering of all these people led the Kemalists to believe a British plot was afoot against them. In his book, Nutuk (Speech), Kemal claimed that the aims of Major

Noel and his companions together with Galip Bey and Halil Bey were to raise the

Kurds against them and to assassinate him. He argued that the group was trying to inspire the Kurds with the idea of an independent Kurdistan17. Thus, the Kemalists mobilized some troops to come to Malatya to arrest Major Noel and his companions.18

The official Turkish historiography shares the view represented by the Nutuk. 19

Primary British sources, however, indicate that Britain did not have any plans to raise the Kurdish tribes against the Kemalists. The presence of Major Noel and Governor

Galip Bey was simply accidental.20 Major Noel‘s mission was not to instigate a rising among the Kurdish tribes with the help of influential Kurdish leaders, like Bedirhans or Ekrem Cemil Pasha, but on the contrary, to maintain order in Kurdistan. A letter from the Constantinople High Commission clarifies this in plain words:

‗There is, at the present time, great need of tranquillizing the

borderland in order to save the alternative need of doing so by force –

either with Turkish or British soldiers. The latter can not be spared, and

while we have been asked several times to obtain the services of the

former, I have opposed it to the utmost, as I think it is derogatory and

undesirable to the highest degree to ask for the military help of those

212 whom we have first conquered and then demobilized. Consequently we

did some very careful sounding –much on the lines of the previous

advances of the Kurds to us, especially by Abdulkadir- and ascertained

that they were willing to go back to Kurdistan and to use their

influence for the maintenance of order. This, having been done

unofficially, I received them and had a long talk.‘

The High Commissioner made it clear for the Kurdish representatives that the British

‗were not out for intrigues against the Turks.‘ He continued

‗I could promise nothing whatsoever in regards to the future of

Kurdistan, but if they thought their influence would be successful in

maintaining order in those regions, and if they were willing to go and

use their influence‘ the British would protect, should necessity arise,

their families in Istanbul. He warned that ‗we (British) could not do so

if they were found preparing a movement against the Turks or anything

of that kind: pending the decision of the Peace Conference, our sole

object was the preservation of order –which was the vital interest of all

parties (….) The chiefs agreed, declaring that they would do nothing

more than trying to maintain order.‘21

This indeed was the case. A letter from the KTJ in regards to the incident at Malatya indicated that

‗the Kurdistan Forward Society (KTJ), whose members total 15,000 in

Constantinople, are confidently and quietly awaiting the decision of the

Peace Conference regarding their destiny. They have no common

cause whatsoever with the Anatolian Movement. They reject with

contempt the allegations made against the Kurds by the ―El Bayrak‖

213 (the Flag), or by the Chief of the Anatolian forces. We also declare, in

the name of all Kurds, that the incident of Malatya was an affront to

the Kurdish national sentiment and honour. The English officer, Major

Noel, was sent by his own Government to undertake geographical,

ethnographical and other scientific research in Kurdistan. The two

young Kurdish princes, who accompanied the English officer, received

their traveling expenses from our Committee. They accompanied the

Major simply to facilitate his scientific research, and to also inform the

Kurds to remain quiet until the Peace Conference had made its

decision. The two princes did not go there to create disturbances, but

only to advise and to order the people to remain quiet until the final

decision had been taken in regard to Kurdistan.‘22

Galip Bey, on the other hand, was acting on behalf of Damat Ferid Pasha‘s

Government to raise forces against Mustafa Kemal and to prevent the convention of

Sivas Congress. In his Nutuk, Kemal provides a number of telegrams from the central government to Galip Bey, with the appointment of Galip Bey as Governor of Sivas and the instruction to prevent the Kemalists from convening in Sivas are confirmed.23

A telegram from Galip Bey to the Premier and the Interior Minister through British officials confirms such allegations. It states:

‗on 6th [September 1919] arrived at Malatya leaving for Sivas with

gendarmerie according to your orders I became suspicious owing to

news from Sivas and because no replies to cipher wires. I felt

convinced that Sivas tapped our wires with key of Vilayet cypher. I

informed you the 9th and 10th received news O.C. 15th Infantry

214 Regiment had left Elaziz with all transport for Malatya. I also learnt

that Mustafa Kemal had ordered O.C. Cavalry Regiment Malatya

arrest Major Noel group Liaison Officer Kamuran and Cemil Bey also

the American there and the Mutessarif and Vali, but the Commanding

Officer replied that he had not sufficient forces.‘24

Galip Bey‘s mission was not accomplished but he insisted that mobilizing the Moslem tribes against the Kemalists, as suggested in his telegram, was ‗necessary and therefore (there should be an) appointment by order of SULTAN competent commanders with efficient staff organized amongst the Moslem tribes to oppose agitation without any foreign forces to take part.‘25 The use of Kurdish irregular tribal forces against the Kemalists had been contemplated by the central government throughout 1919-1920, but ultimately went unused by British officials as they thought the scheme was dangerous and not very practical. ‗The Grand Vizier volunteered the observation that it would be a dangerous policy to raise the Kurds in order to put down the Mustafa Kemal movement.‘26 A few months later, a report sent to Earl

Curzon highlighted a conversation between Seyyid Abdulkadir and Mr. Hohler in which Seyyid stated

‗that the Entente Liberal Party, with Ferid Pasha as the head, was

endeavoring to replace the present Government and to come into

power, and had made proposals of a very favorable nature to him,

promising the Kurds complete autonomy under the protectorate of the

Turkish Government.‘ ‗The price he was to pay for the concessions to

be given by the Entente Liberal was to throw the Kurds against

Mustafa Kemal‘ but Abdulkadir ‗wished to form his course absolutely

in accord with the Allies, especially with England. He considered that

215 the fate of Kurdistan was intimately linked with the policy of Great

Britain, much more so than with that of any other ally, and he was

anxious to do anything, which would not have our entire assent and

approval.‘

In his report Hohler continued

‗I enquired whether the opposition to Mustafa Kemal desired by the

Entente Liberal Party entailed the use of force; he said it did. I

observed that this seemed unnecessary, owing to the weakening of the

(Kemalist) movement to which I had already referred, and also that, in

view of the fact that His Majesty‘s Government desired, in the interests

of all parties, that peace should be established and maintained.‘27

Major Noel summarizes the Malatya incident in a telegram to the High

Commissioner, Constantinople, which stated ‗on 9th of September Vali of Kharput

[Elaziz –added by me] who had arrived at Malatya informed me that Turkish reinforcements were on their way to affect arrest of himself and the Kurdish members of my mission. On his advice, I left the town on the 10th to take refuge with Reshwan

Kurds. Two miles from town, Turkish Cavalry who demanded the surrender of Kurds surrounded my party. On showing fight, Turks withdrew.‘28 The party encamped at the Reshwan village while Galip Bey, the Mutessarif and Haci Bedr Agha joined them later in the night. The conversation between Major Noel and Galip Bey sheds light on the complicated relations between the central government, the Kemalists and the

Kurdish nationalists. In his diaries Noel provided a clear picture:

‗The situation here is somewhat complicated. The Wali has produced

an Iradeh from the Sultan ordering him to raise a body of Kurdish

216 sowars [warriors] in whom he can have confidence, and march against

Mustafa Kemal at Sivas. He is particularly advised that having reached

Sivas and liquidated the Unionist organization, he should lose no time

in getting rid of the Kurds, and replace them by a Turkish militia. The

Kurds, who are really only out for their own aims, see no reason why

they should march to Sivas when they can attack the Turks a few hours

away at Malatya. This is, of course, only common sense, but it does

not greatly appeal that way to the Wali who dreads seeing the control

of the situation passing into the hands of Kurds, which is likely to

occur if they capture Malatya, the centre of a big Kurdish district‘.29

Ekrem Pasha claimed that the group, which ran away from Malatya and gathered at the Rishwan high hill two miles from the town, initially contemplated responding to the Kemalists‘ action. Ekrem further claimed that the tribal leaders, Arpaci Mehmet

Efendi, Haci Bedr Agha and three others had approximately 6000 Ottoman assault guns and forces in their disposal. They were also in touch with Seyyid Riza of Dersim thorough the Major Suleyman Bey of Dersim. However, Ekrem stated that at the end of the 8th day, those tribal leaders lost their enthusiasm about the project and gave up.

The Elaziz governor, Galip Bey ‗made up his mind that a Kurdish tribal attack on

Malatya is open to too many risks, and he has therefore decided to disperse the tribal gatherings as soon as possible. The Kurdish chiefs are on the whole relieved.‘30

The Malatya incident reveals a number of crucial aspects about the Kurdish nationalism of the time. First it indicates that Kurdish nationalists had blindly and naively trusted the British and followed their instructions, which were mainly to

217 maintain order and peace, in effect prevent the Kurds from rising against the

Kemalists. According to Sureyya Bedirhan ‗Kurdish leaders who were not happy with the current tide of events gathered at Kahta, near Malatya [late August and September

1919] and decided to raise a force to stop Kemal‘s adventure. Unfortunately, however, Col. Bell, from the British Intelligence Service, Alleppo, advised the Kurds not to enter any armed clashes and guaranteed that the Kurdish case is to be solved according to the Allied war plans.‘31

The years of 1919 and 1920 were crucial years for the Kemalists to strengthen their base and organization without any serious resistance from the Kurds. One should not forget that the two most important congresses of the Kemalists actually took place in an area where the Kurds constituted the majority. While the Kurdish nationalists were awaiting on the advice of the British High Commissioner in Istanbul the decision of the Peace Conference, the Kemalists were busy organizing and extending their powers and influence. By the time the Peace Conference reached an agreement (Sevres

Treaty) in August of 1920, the balance of power in Asia Minor had already altered to the benefit of the Kemalists. The Ottoman Central Government was then not in a position to implement the articles of the Treaty with respect to Kurdistan.

The Malatya incident also indicates the fact that the local Kurdish nationalists failed to notice the real danger presented to them by the rise of Kemalism. According to

Major Noel‘s account, Kurdish leaders in Rashwan had wanted to attack Malatya rather than Sivas, only as Galip Bey had wanted. It is not clear why the Kurds did not use the pretext of helping Galip Bey to suppress the Sivas Congress and arrest them.

If they could have done that, the course of history in Anatolia and Kurdistan would have been very different. We should not forget that the Kemalists at this point had not

218 consolidated their powers firmly yet, and would have been easily defeated should there have been a rising by a coordinated and united Kurdish tribal force. As Major

Noel acutely noted ‗the entire lack of any resemblance of unity or common purpose among the Kurds‘ prevented ‗any real national combination against the

Government.‘32

While Ekrem Pasha was busy in Diyarbakir and Malatya, another influential Kurdish figure, Cibranli Halid Beg, an ex-Hamidieh Tribal chief, began consolidating Kurdish nationalism in the Erzurum Province from late 1919. Şerif Firat claimed that the

Hamidieh Regiments did not respond to Mustafa Kemal‘s proclamations for the ‗holy defense of the homeland against foreign invaders. All these regiments secretly agreed to join Cibranli Miralay (Colonel) Halid Beg who initiated the idea of Kurdish independence.‘33 Firat stated that Halid Bey and his relative Kasim were working for the establishment of a feudal Kurdistan. Firat claimed that Cibranli Halid, who was taking into account the advantages of the Turco-Greek war in 1920, had several meetings with tribal, religious and Hamidieh chiefs in Varto, Karliova, Malazgirt,

Bulanik and Hinis towns to propagate ideas and information against the nationalists.

They encouraged the Kurdish tribes to wear Kurdish clothes, and to speak and write in Kurdish. They were circulating well-known Kurdish poems by Cezireli Molla

Ahmed, and Ahmed-i Khani‘s Mem-u-Zin in villages and amongst the Kurds to promote Kurdish nationalism. According to Firat, Halid Bey got in touch with the

Kurdistan Teali Jamiyeti after the signing of the Sevres Treaty and aimed to acquire rights for the Kurds from the League of Nations. 34 During the fall of 1920, Halid Bey organized tribes in the areas of Varto, Bulanik, Malazgird, Hinis, Karliova, Solhan and Çapakcur. These areas subsequently participated in the famous Sheikh Said

219 uprising in 1925. By late summer of 1920, the Kemalists were suspicious of Halid

Bey‘s activities and assigned him to other duties in Erzurum.

Cibranli Halid Bey‘s activities resulted in the formation of Ciwata Kweseriya Kurd

(The Society for Kurdish Independence), popularly known as Azadi, in Erzurum in

1921.35 However, the association did not seem to be openly active up until 1924, after which it initiated the first major Kurdish uprising against the Turkish Republic in

1925. Although Cibranli Halid had connections with the KTJ, he did not have any role in the Koçgiri uprisings in 1921. This is mainly due to the fact that internal disputes and divisions in Istanbul weakened the KTJ itself with the result that it lost its central role in leading Kurdish national forces in Kurdistan.

It must be added that prior to his involvement in Kurdish nationalist activities, Halid

Bey distinguished himself in the eastern Anatolian campaign of 1918 against the

Armenians. It was only at the end of the campaign that he realized the grave consequences of removing the Armenians from the region. Van Bruinessen records the following story: ‗on the day of the final victory over the Armenians, when every one else was merrymaking, Halid Bey looked very sad and sat brooding silently in his tent. Mehdi sat down with him and inquired about the reason behind Halid‘s black mood. After some insisting, the colonel told Mehdi the thought that had entered his mind and did not leave him at rest: ―This day we have whetted the sword that one day will cut our own throats!‖‘36 As Olson indicates ‗a Kurdish nationalist leader like

Halid Bey Cibran was rather late in seeing the danger presented by Turkish nationalism and conversely seeing the advantage for the Kurds of having an Armenian

220 presence in eastern Anatolia, especially with the small number of Armenians that remained after the massacres of 1915.‘37

1.2 Sevres Treaty

In April of 1920, the Allied Supreme Council reconvened at San Remo to conclude a draft peace treaty with the Ottoman Empire. The draft document was handed to the

Ottoman representatives on May 11, which they signed three months later at Sevres.38

The basic terms of the draft essentially remained the same in the Sevres Treaty.39 (See below) The draft provided ‗a Commission appointed by the British, French and

Italian Governments‘ to draft ‗a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly

Kurdish areas, east of the Euphrates, south of the boundary of Armenia, north of the northern frontier of Syria, and Mesopotamia.‘ The draft also included an article for the voluntary adhesion of the Mosul Vilayet to the Kurdish autonomous areas if

Kurds opted for independence within one year ‗of the coming into force of the present treaty‘.40

The Kurdish leaders in Istanbul were worried about the designated borders of what was to be the autonomous Kurdistan. The KTJ sent a memorandum to demand independence for Kurdistan and to protest against the proposed extension of the

Armenian boundaries. The memorandum included a boundary of Kurdistan.41 At this particular period, the KTJ in Istanbul had an internal crisis over the issue of independence and autonomy. The Bedirhan faction dismissed the presidency of

Seyyid Abdulkadir and the Kurdish representative in the Peace Conference, Şerif

Pasha. In response Şerif Pasha resigned from his post and stated that ‗he does not propose to enter into politics again until friendly relations between Great Britain and

221 Turkey are once more established‘.42 A curious statement from someone who claimed to represent Kurdish interests at the Peace Conference. This itself explains the confusion and disorientation of Kurdish nationalism at the time. Without Kurdish representatives at the Peace Conference, Seyyid Abdulkadir cabled Paris, protesting that the Kurdish nation reserves the right to protest against any decisions, which may be taken by the Peace Conference, contrary to the principles of nationality.43

The Peace Conference in Paris finally concluded in August of 1920 with the Sevres

Treaty, which included articles 62, 63 and 64 relating to Kurdistan. These articles were highly important as they shaped the subsequent development of the Kurdish national movement up to the Lausanne agreement:

Article 62: A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three

members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments

respectively shall draft a scheme within six months of the present Treaty‘s

coming into force of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas

lying east of the Euphrates, south of Armenia as it may be determined

hereafter, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia,

as defined in Article 27, II. (2) and (3). If unanimity cannot be secured on

any question, it will be referred by the members of the Commission, to

their respective Governments. The scheme shall contain full safeguards for

the protection of the Chaldo-Assyrians and other racial or religious

minorities within these areas, and with this object a Commission

composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives

shall visit the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should

222 be made to the Turkish frontier where, under the provisions of the present

Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia.

Article 63: The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the decisions of both Commissions mentioned in Article 62 within three months from their communication to the said Government.

Article 64: If within one year of the present Treaty‘s coming into force, the

Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner so as to show that the majority of the population of these areas desire independence from the Turkey. If the Council then considers these peoples‘ capability of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas.

The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey.

If and when such a renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such an independent Kurdish state of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has been hitherto been included in the Mosul Vilayet.44

223 The Treaty envisioned an independent Kurdistan, which included the areas of

Kharput, Dersim, Hakkari, Siirt, and Diyarbakir as the capital. However, many territories with an overwhelmingly Kurdish population lying west of the Euphrates

(Adiyaman, Malatya, Elbistan, Darende and Divrik) were excluded. These areas were to be ‗the French zone of interests.‘ 45 The would-be Kurdistan‘s frontier with

Armenia was in fact determined by the same treaty, in Article 89, which stipulated

‗Turkey, Armenia and the other signatories agree that the frontier between Armenia and Turkey in the vilayets of Erzurum, Trebizonde, Van, and Bitlis be subject to the arbitration of the President of the United States. They agree to accept his decision and any measures he might recommend concerning Armenia‘s access to the sea and the demilitarization of any Ottoman territories adjacent to the said frontier.‘ Thus, as

Kendal rightly argued, the treaty allocated areas such as Muş, Erzincan, Bingol, Bitlis,

Van, Karakilise (Agri), Igdir and Erzurum to the Armenian state under U.S. mandate.46

Such arbitrary divisions of Kurdistan by the Treaty, despite its allocation for an autonomous Kurdish state, had enormous impact on the development of Kurdish nationalism to come.

The Treaty not only divided Kurdistan; it also implicitly divided the potential Kurdish nationalist forces and increased the Alevi and Sunni denominational division among

Kurds. By granting a considerable part of Kurdistan to a prospective established

Armenian state, the Treaty provided the grounds for the Sunni Kurds of this part of

Kurdistan to approach the Kemalist movement. As Bruinessen argued, most Kurdish chieftains perceived the Allies as friends of the Armenians rather than the Kurds, and

224 assumed the Kemalists to be the most likely force to protect their land against

Armenian claims. 47 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Kemalists were propagating among the Kurds the idea that the Infidel was trying to turn Kurdistan into Armenia hence the imperative unity of Kurds and Turks, two Muslim brothers to fight against their common enemies. Such propaganda compounded with the provisions of the treaty to consolidate the Kemalists presence in Kurdistan, particularly among the Sunni Kurds.48

While the Kemalists succeeded in attracting a considerable number of Kurdish notables and tribes among the Sunni Kurds, they failed to achieve the same success among the Alevi Kurds of Koçgiri and Dersim region. Thus the first serious challenge against the Kemalists took place in that same region.

2. Koçgiri National Movement49

The Koçgiri region which was populated mainly by Alevi Kurds, constituted the area between the east and the north-east of Sivas province, west Erzinjan and north-west of

Dersim, lying on the west bank of Euphrates. (See map 4) McDowall remarked that

‗the timing and location were significant. West Dersim, lying west of the Euphrates, had been excluded from the area formally designated at Sevres in August as part of an autonomous Kurdish state.‘ 50 Indeed it was significant that the movement began before the Sevres treaty was signed, however, it was accelerated by the signing of the treaty and formulated the movement‘s political objective.

The leading figures of the movement were varied, including nationalist intellectuals, such as Dr. Nuri Dersimi, who was a member of the KTJ; Mirzayan Alişer who was a

225 poet and orator; and tribal leaders of the Koçgiri region including Mustafa Pashazade

Hayder Beg, his brother Alişan Beg, Haci Rassim, Izzet, Muhammad, Gul Akka‘s sons, Izzet and Neqi, Hasan Askeri and others.51

2.1 The Road to Uprising

The KTJ in Istanbul urged young members to go to various parts of Kurdistan to establish the organization and spread propaganda against the inclusion of parts of

Kurdistan into Armenia. Among those young members were Nuri Dersimi and

Haydar Beg. Nuri Dersimi who was assigned to organize the tribes in the Sivas region, left Istanbul for Sivas at the beginning of the summer of 1919.52 Haydar Beg was instructed to establish KTJ branches in the Koçgiri region.53 Dersimi and Haydar took with them books and issues of Jin to Koçgiri-Dersim. Haydar opened a branch of the KTJ in Umraniye.54 Alişer was instructed to establish an organization in Dersim region. According to Nazmi Sevgen, the main figure behind the KTJ activities in

Koçgiri and Dersim region was Alişer. Sevgen claimed that Alişer had received his instruction from Seyyid Abdulkadir through an Armenian intermediary, Migirdic.55

Dersimi succeeded in establishing a number of KTJ branches in Umraniye, Beypinar,

Celalli, Sincan, Hamo, Zmara ve Domurca districts and initiated a strong nationalist current amongst the Kurds. Meanwhile Alişer was busy organizing in the Dersim region.56

These leading Kurdish nationalists‘ activities in the region caught the eye of Mustafa

Kemal who as well was active in the region gathering the support of the Kurds for his movement. Kemal invited Alişan Beg and Nuri Dersimi to Sivas. Dersimi did not go

226 but Alişan did. In the meeting Mustafa Kemal told him that he was aware of their activities but he wished to hear from him directly. In response, Alişan informed him that they were striving for an autonomous Kurdistan within the Ottoman Empire as proclaimed by Wilson‘s Fourteen Points and that they were working against the

Armenian claims over Kurdish land, and that they had no other objectives.57 Mustafa

Kemal reacted by saying that the Wilson Principles were worthless for the people of the East and that the Kurds should cooperate with him, especially because in the

Erzurum Congress, the people of Kurdistan had promised to support him and that he represented the Kurdish people. He further suggested that Alişan and Dersimi should support him.58 However, both Dersimi and Alişan Beg refused to participate with him.

Dersimi stated that after the failure of the Noel mission and the Kemalists‘ harsh response to it, the local branches of the KTJ in Koçgiri and Dersim region had ceased their communication with the KTJ in Istanbul and they had to act on their own to prepare a national movement in Dersim in parallel with other parts of Kurdistan.59

This suggests that there were coordinated efforts and cooperation between the KTJ and its local branches for the purpose of creating a nation-wide central movement.

However, it seems that the Kemalists policies against the Kurdish nationalists in

Kurdistan, which were compounded by the division of the KTJ in Istanbul in the spring of 1920, interrupted this coordination.60

2.2 The Koçgiri Uprisings

In early 1920 the Kurdish leader Nuri Dersimi initiated a crucial meeting at the

Huseyin Abdal Brotherhood (tekke) in the Kangal district, which many Kurdish tribes

227 and influential leaders attended. Those attending the meeting had unanimously taken an oath to strive to establish an independent Kurdistan, including the areas of

Diyarbakir, Van, Bitlis, Elaziz, Dersim-Koçgiri and in order to achieve that aim they promised to engage in armed struggle and fight to the end. 61 According to the agreement that had been made, Dersimi stated that the reports reaching him from

Dersim indicated that West Dersim had mustered a force of 45,000, who ready for the movement and that East Dersim forces would also participate should a movement begin. The same reports also informed that another branch of the KTJ was established in Erzincan and that national feeling was rising all over Kurdistan.62

By July and August of 1920, the Kurds were attacking Turkish ammunition and police stations. During the clashes, some Turkish soldiers were captured and taken as prisoners. In order to soothe the unrest, the Ankara government appointed Alişan and

Haydar Begs to high official posts in Refahiye and Umraniye respectively.63

At this particular junction, some of the young Kurdish leaders were urging the declaration of the independence of Kurdistan. However, it was decided that Alişan

Beg should visit Dersim and check out the organizational situation in Dersim, after which, they should proceed accordingly. Meanwhile, on October 20th, the Kurdish forces from Dersim attacked a military convoy in Kurucay district confiscating all the ammunition. This provided an opportunity for Alişan Beg to move into Dersim-

Ovacik region under the pretext of pursuing the attackers. Alişan Beg gathered tribal leaders in Ovacik and together with them, headed to Hozat and Cemiskezek and had a meeting in which the tribal leaders declared their support and unity for an independent

228 Kurdistan, and that strong Kurdish forces in West and East Dersim were ready for the movement.64

Following the Hozat meeting, the Kurds sent a memorandum to the Ankara

Government65 on the 15th of November and demanded a respond within 24 hours:

1- The government of Mustafa Kemal should state whether or not it accepted

officially the Kurdistan autonomy as agreed by the Sultan‘s government in

Istanbul.

2- The Mustafa Kemal government should immediately respond to the Dersimi

Kurds about its attitude toward the Kurdistan autonomous administration.

3- All those Kurdish prisoners who are being held at the Elaziz, Malatya, Sivas,

and Erzincan jails should be freed immediately.

4- Withdrawal of all the Turkish government officials from the areas populated

by a Kurdish majority.

5- Immediate withdrawal of the Turkish military forces sent to the Koçgiri

region.66

The Ankara government responded by sending an ‗Advisory Commission‘ from

Elaziz to Dersim to advise the Kurds that their government was ready to recognize the

Kurdish demands. However, the Commission failed to convince the Kurds and were driven away. A new memorandum was sent to the Government in Ankara and the following was demanded:

‗To the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara

The Sevres treaty stipulated establishing Kurdistan in the areas of Diyarbakir, Elaziz,

Van, and Bitlis. Therefore Kurdistan should be established; otherwise we have to take

229 our rights by force of arms‘. The letter was signed on November 25th, of 1920 by

West Dersim‘s tribal leaders.67 The Ankara government did not respond in writing, but, through the Governor of Elaziz, it informed the Kurds that the government was in agreement with the Kurdish demands. Meanwhile, they were deploying troops around

Sivas. Dersimi rightly argued that the Ankara‘s positive response was only a tactic to buy time.68

The Kurdish leaders in Dersim urged the Koçgiri Kurds to postpone the movement to the end of the spring of 1921 as the weather conditions would prevent Dersim‘s

Kurdish forces from supporting Koçgiri. Dersimi claimed that the Kurdish nationalists were planning the following program: Independence of Kurdistan to be declared in

Dersim and the Kurdistan flag to be raised in Hozat. The Kurdish national forces would then march towards Sivas from the direction of Erzincan, Elaziz and Malatya, and would demand the official recognition of Kurdistan‘s independence by the

Ankara government. Dersimi argued that the Ankara government would have no choice but to accept the Kurdish demands due to the fact that they were backed by the

Kurdish national armed forces. Dersimi believed that after the first initiation of the

Kurdish movement in Dersim and Koçgiri regions, other parts of Kurdistan would participate in the movement since national liberation and being free from foreign oppressors were the aims of all honorable Kurdish people.69

The Kurdish national leaders‘ decision to postpone the movement provided the opportunity for the Kemalists, as Olson described ‗to surround the area, to circumscribe the spread of unrest, and to co-opt certain tribal leaders.‘ 70 The

Kemalists, while they were quietly deploying troops to Koçgiri-Dersim, spread

230 rumours that Kurdish people were in collaboration with the Ankara government and

Kurdish representatives from all over Kurdistan were represented at the Grand

National Assembly and that the Assembly would pass decisions according to the wishes of the Kurds. The Kemalists sent the governor of Elaziz to Pertek in person to meet Meço Agha of Dersim and convinced him to visit Ankara to meet Mustafa

Kemal. Other influential tribal leaders followed suit and joined the Kemalists. Diyap

Agha, head of the military branch, Mustafa of Dersim, Binbaşi Hasan Hayri, and

Ahmet Ramizi were appointed as members of parliament for Dersim vilayet. Seyyid

Riza, who was the most influential leader and in control of Dersim region, declared that those deputies were collaborators and selfish individuals. The Kurdish deputies sent letters to Seyyid Riza to convince him that their true intention was to realize

Kurdish rights through peaceful methods.71

Mustafa Kemal also tried to win Alişan over and through Dersim‘s deputies, he invited him to Ankara as deputy of Sivas or to accept a high position in Sivas and leave Dersim. He also informed Alişan that a Kurdish governor would be sent to

Dersim according to the wishes of deputies there. Alişan refused the invitation, while

Seyyid Riza of Dersim occupied the Hozat, the principle city of Dersim region, and sent a telegram to Ankara to declare that the deputies of Dersim had no authority to represent Dersim and that the city wanted an independent administration. Only when the Ankara government recognized and declared support for Kurdish national wishes would Kurdistan collaborate with the Ankara government on the basis of a confederation.72

231 Despite the fact that the Kurdish national leaders decided to begin the movement at the end of the spring in 1921, the movement had begun as early as January of that year. A Turkish battalion on their way to Zara was attacked by Kurdish forces and their ammunition was confiscated. Following this incident, Miralay (regimental commander) Halis was dispatched to Zara to demand the return of the confiscated ammunition. Upon the refusal to return them, Miralay Halis marched on Umraniye.

This agitated the Koçgiri Kurds. The Kurdish Koçgiri tribes wanted to rise but the

Koçgiri leaders asked for orders from Dersim. Those Kurdish national leaders in

Dersim urged the people in Koçgiri to be patient till the end of spring.73

According to Dersimi‘s account, the plan of the Ankara government was to deceive

Kurdish revolutionaries one by one and destroy their organisations without firing a shot; to arrest some of the nationalists and deport others in order to isolate Dersim; to prevent the revolt spreading before the winter ended and the road to Dersim opened.74

For this reason, argues Dersimi, when spring was approaching the Turkish regiments in Umraniye intensified their agitation to provoke the Kurdish tribes. The Regiment announced the surrender of Kurdish forces without conditions; otherwise they would destroy Kurdish villages. This caused excitement amongst the Kurds. In a number of meetings the Kurds were demanding a rising against the Ankara government but were stopped by the leaders and told to wait. On March 4th, some Kurds were arrested and dispatched to Zara with a squadron, but the Kurdish forces freed the prisoners. ‗After this victory, Miralay Halis was told to surrender himself and his regiment to the

Kurdish forces otherwise he would have to take responsibility for facing the consequences.‘ 75 As expected, Miralay Halis refused the Kurdish demand and clashes occurred as a result in Umraniye on the 6th of March. After day long clashes,

232 the Regiment surrendered and Miralay Halis was sentenced to death by a Kurdish

Military court76 in Umraniye, where he was executed. The Kurds raised the Kurdistan flag in the centre of Umraniye. The Turkish soldiers were released, but all the ammunition along with 1000 horses and all of the mules were confiscated.77

This major clash between the Turkish forces and Kurds caused the Ankara government to take stronger measures against the Kurds. All the Kurdish forces prepared for the front-line of the war. Koçgiri leaders informed the tribes in Erzincan,

Dersim, and Malatya and asked them for help. However, the fact that it was winter and snowing heavily meant that prospective help was unlikely to arrive. Some Kurds contemplated securing help from French forces who were advancing to Urfa and

Antep, but the younger Kurdish nationalists refused to receive assistance from foreigners. Dersimi stated that they had decided to fight on their own.78

However, a small force of about 2,500 came from the Ovacik tribes to help by crossing the snow-covered Munzur Mountains and occupied Kemah, arresting the owners of large lands and capturing the local governor and gendarmerie commander.

They took them to Umraniye for trial. The leaders of the Ovacik forces were Alişer,

Mira Ibrahim, Mahmut Agha, Arslanan and the Pezgavir tribe leaders along with many others.79 Having captured Refahiye town and some of the surrounding towns, the Ovacik force sent a telegram to the Ankara Grand National Assembly stating that they wanted to establish a vilayet staffed by Kurds from the areas of Koçgiri, Divrigi,

Refahiye, Kurucay and Kemah and that a local Kurdish governor should be appointed.

The Ankara government responded by sending another advisory commission, this time headed by Şefik Bitlisi, who was a Kurd himself, to the region. Bitlisi informed

233 the nationalists that Ankara wanted to settle the matters peacefully while at the same time the government reinforced troops in the area once more.

The Ankara government prepared a new army [Merkez Ordusu] under the command of Nureddin Pasha for an offensive purpose, namely to tackle the Koçgiri uprising. On the 15th of March, the government declared martial law in the vilayets of Sivas, Elaziz and Erzincan. The Sivas governor notified the Dersim tribes to enquire about their position regarding the uprising. The Dersim tribal leaders replied by saying that they were aware of the Turkish government‘s intention, which was to deport the Kurds just as it did the Armenians. They said that they would continue to fight in defence of their national rights and self-defence.80

The clashes continued throughout the months of March and April. The major offensive was carried out by the central army and by the Circassian Regiment which was known for its barbarity, commanded by Topal Osman. 81 In the midst of the clashes, the Kurdish national forces received an internal blow. The Ginyan tribe leader, Murat Pasha82 who had joined the uprising and had taken the defence of Sivas and the Kangal front, had also met with the Kangal tribe leader Haci Agha, who was a member of the CUP. Upon this meeting, Murat Pasha switched sides to the Turkish forces. He invited one of the key Kurdish front commanders to his mansion, had him arrested and handed to the Turkish authorities. This caused the collapse of the Kurdish fronts in the Celali region, as well as the morale of the nationalists. Another blow to the Kurdish nationalists came from Haydar Bey, one of the Koçgiri leaders. His family was arrested and brought to Sivas. Nureddin Pasha sent some the notables of

Sivas to Haydar Bey to negotiate for surrender. Haydar Bey together with 1,000

234 armed men surrendered to the Turkish army. Haydar‘s capitulation to the Turkish forces had a negative impact on the movement. Following this event, the Kurdish nationalists decided to retreat to Dersim.83 By the end of April of 1921, the Turkish army had pretty well crushed the Koçgiri uprising.

2.3 Following the Defeat

Having defeated the uprising, the Ankara Government brought those who participated in the uprising to trial at the Sivas Martial Court. Haydar Bey, and other arrested leaders were sentenced to death, and leaders like Alişer and others who managed to retreat to Dersim were also sentenced to death in their absence. Most of the 400 prisoners were given sentences from 5 years to lifelong imprisonment. Amongst them, only 110 were released but then they were exiled to isolated parts of the country.

In the Dersim region, however, the Kurdish nationalists were still active and there was combat between the Turkish forces and the Kurdish nationalists. The Kurdish nationalists asked the Ankara government for amnesty for those arrested and sentenced. In order to force their demands on the Ankara government, the Kurdish nationalists began to attack Zara and Divrigi from the directions of Erzincan, Kemah and Egin. Given the sensitive situation of the Kemalists at this particular period and facing the Greek threat in the west, an Amnesty was issued for those arrested, but leading figures such as Alişer and Dersimi, and those who retreated to Dersim, were excluded from the general pardon. Upon the pressure from Dersim, a second amnesty was issued by the GNA, which covered those in the Koçgiri tribes who had gone to

235 Dersim. Alişer and Dersimi again were not given amnesty; however, Alişan was to be pardoned on condition he left the Dersim region.

As the situation in Dersim deepened, the Ankara government sent a delegation to

Dersim headed by Haci Fevzi, the deputy of Erzincan, to negotiate with the Kurdish leaders to ease the tension. The place for negotiation was the village of Kısmikör of

Erzincan. Seyyid Riza and Nuri Dersimi proposed to the delegation a memorandum including 24 articles in which recognition of the independence of Kurdistan and the appointment of a Kurdish Vali (governor) to the region. The Turkish delegation rejected the Kurdish demands. The Turkish delegation claimed that the proposed

Kurdish memorandum could only be valid between two governments, and that they could only continue to negotiate on the condition that Dersim accepted to become a part of Turkish government. 84 This caused anger among the Kurdish delegates and they reiterated their demand upon which the meeting was postponed. In the meanwhile the Turkish delegation managed to convince Alişan to leave Dersim for

Erzincan as he had been pardoned in the last amnesty. When the Kurds returned to negotiations next day, they realized that the head of Turkish delegation, Haci Fevzi together with Alişan Bey, had gone to Erzincan, upon which the Kurds returned to

Dersim.

Towards the end of 1921 the Koçgiri movement was completely suppressed by the

Kemalists.

236 2.4 Discussion in the Character of the Koçgiri Movement

Some Turkish historians had claimed that British intrigues were behind the Koçgiri movement against the Kemalists, who were ‗launching an anti-imperialist and national liberation struggle‘.85 The logic runs like this: The KTJ was a pro-British

Kurdish organization and was a puppet in the hands of British officers. The Koçgiri movement was initiated by the KTJ which in turn served British interests. Such arguments, however, run counter to the evidence provided by the British documents.

It is true that the KTJ was very close to the British officers and that they had high expectations from Britain with regards to the solution of the Kurdish issue at the

Peace Conference. However, this does not mean that the KTJ was solely acting on the order of the British officers. The British documents indicate that British officials were not even aware of the extent of the Koçgiri movement. There were only brief telegraphic statements which mentioned that there was something going on in Dersim region. A message from the Istanbul High Commissioner, H. Rumbold to Baghdad illustrated this clearly:

‗Rumours have been current here for some time that a serious anti-

Kemalist movement has developed amongst Kurds of Dersim and the

adjoining country between Kharput and Sivas. The movement is

alleged to be causing considerable anxiety at Angora. It is impossible

to control these reports at this end. If any reliable news reaches you

perhaps you would communicate it to His Majesty‘s Government and

to me.‘86

A few weeks later, Rumbold still had no definite news:

‗I am still without any definite information regarding the anti-Kemalist

movement which broke out some time ago among the Kurds in the

237 country east of Sivas. It appears to have been of sufficient importance

to cause apprehension in Angora and to necessitate strong military

action. I have, however, no reason to suppose that it has had any

extension beyond the Kizilbash or Alevi Kurds, who are numerous in

Dersim and the country adjoining it, or that it amounts to more than a

local insurrection, which the Kemalist authorities, with their superior

military organization and equipment, are capable of repressing.‘87

Such telegrams indicate the fact that British did not have any role in the Koçgiri uprising.

Some scholars have paid attention to the religious and geo-politic characteristics of the Dersim region in the uprising. Keiser argued that the Dersimi Kurds, for a number of reasons, were the first to demand their independence. These reasons were: that they were Alevis and they did not accept the Sultan/Caliph as their spiritual leader, as he saw them as heretics; their participation in WWI was highly marginal; they were not affected by the Kemalists‘ call to save the Caliph against the infidel; and finally as compared to the Sunni Kurds, relation were friendly between Dersimis and the

Armenians.88 During WWI majority of Dersimis collaborated with Armenians and

Russians against the central Ottoman state. The Ottoman establishment‘s pressure on

Dersimis to change sides through Çelebi Cemalleddin Efendi, the guardian and keeper of the Haci Bektas Tekke, was a complete failure.89 McDowall also paid attention to the Alevi-Sunni dichotomy and the Armenian issue: ‗Kurdish nationalists, particularly those who explored the chances for a Kurdo-Armenian alliance, could only mobilize national feeling among those who felt least threatened by Armenian ambitions. Of these the clearest group was the Alevis, who did not share the fear felt by many Sunni

238 Kurds further east.‘90 Both Keiser and McDowall emphasized the relative freedom of the Dersim region from Ottoman control. Indeed, the Dersim region had never been directly controlled by the Ottoman central state and had only been temporarily subdued in 1878 for the first time.

The Koçgiri national movement, however, cannot only be explained in terms of religion, location or historical specificities, though these are certainly important factors that contributed to the uprising. This study, however, suggests that apart from the reasons mentioned one other crucial factor has to be considered. Namely, that the

Kurdish nationalists‘ activity in the Koçgiri region was for the purpose of raising the

Kurds against the Kemalists for Kurdish self rule or autonomy.

The Kurdish leaders‘ continuous nationalist activities and propaganda culminated in the first serious Kurdish uprising against the Kemalists.

Bozarslan stressed the local character of the movement which ‗was aimed at a local rather than at a broader Kurdish autonomy, still less at independence.‘ The localism of the movement argued Bozarslan referred to ‗the preservation of both Kurdishness and the Alevi character of the Dersim region.‘91 It is true that the Koçgiri movement was a local movement, but its localization was not due to its political aim as Bozarslan suggested, but due its geographical limitations. One of the first memorandum sent by the Koçgiri leaders to the Ankara government envisioned a Kurdistan including

Dersim, Diyarbakir, Van, Bitlis, and Elaziz. This suggests that the Koçgiri leaders did not limit themselves to Kocghiri/Dersim region but wanted a wider Kurdistan.

However, the fact that the movement failed to inspire other regions of Kurdistan and

239 the movement‘s limitation to the borders of Koçgiri region characterized it as a local rather than a national movement.

The Kurdish nationalists‘ activities and meetings in the Koçgiri-Dersim region revealed the fact that they envisioned an independent Kurdistan, or a Kurdistan as stipulated by the Sevres treaty. With this political objective in mind, the Kurdish nationalists began their activities as early as 1919. The movement had taken place in a period in which the Kemalists were engaged against a number of external and internal forces. The Greek army offensive against the Kemalists in Ankara was the most serious one. Koçgiri Kurdish nationalists had a different attitude towards the Greek occupation of Anatolia than other Kurds. A memorandum by an Interim Kurdish

Government of Koçgiri 92 , which was found at the Turkish Republic Presidency archive, called the Kurdish people to participate in the struggle for independence and declared the formation of an Interim Kurdish government which will be the nucleus of an independent Kurdish state. The memorandum asked the Kurdish people not to participate with the Kemalist forces against the Greek army, and said that they had no reason to fear the Greeks, but rather the Kemalists who had risen against the

Sultan/Caliph. The memorandum called people to revolt against the Kemalists forces until the day of freedom.93

This memorandum is highly important as it reveals a number of crucial characteristics of the Kurdish national movement in Koçgiri. Firstly, it indicates the true intention of the Kurdish nationalists, in effect, to establish a Kurdish state. It is a clear manifestation of the political development of Kurdish nationalism in pursuit of a nation-state. Secondly, it suggests the order of priority, rather than Muslim versus

240 non-Muslim, was Kurds versus Kemalism. The Kurdish nationalists clearly defined their prime enemy, which was the Kemalists rather than Greek army or other foreign forces occupying parts of the Empire, including the capital, Istanbul. The Kurdish nationalists explicitly perceived the Kemalists as the prime obstacles in the way of

Kurdish self-determination. Thirdly, the Kurdish leaders were aware of the great opportunities presented during this time period and were keen to exploit these historical opportunities. Thus the Greek army‘s offensive against the Ankara government was implicitly welcomed by the Kurdish nationalists who urged the

Kurdish people not to take part alongside the Kemalists forces against the Greek army. Such characteristics of the Koçgiri movement, however, were at odds with the view of the considerable Sunni Kurdish population who collaborated with the

Kemalists.

3. Reasons behind the failure

The Koçgiri movement was important not only because it was the first against the

Kemalists, but also because of its timing. It occurred from early 1920 to mid 1921, at a time when the Kemalists were engaged against the Greek army in the west and

Armenians in the east. It was also a period in which the Great powers‘ policies were taking shape in terms of the likely future of Middle East. Thus the defeat of the movement must be considered as a defeat not only of a local Kurdish uprising but a general defeat of Kurdish nationalism. The Kemalists‘ success against Greek,

Armenian and Kurdish forces without doubt altered the Great powers‘ policies in the region and forced them to reconsider and reconstruct their post-war plans. This reconsideration in turn caused the modification of Sevres Treaty which paved the way

241 for the Lausanne Agreement. It was this agreement which destroyed the Kurdish nationalist aspiration for self-determination.

Having examined such a sensitive period, it is imperative to look at some of the fundamental reasons behind the defeat of the Koçgiri movement. N. Dersimi in his account mentions a number of crucial reasons behind their failure: firstly, the movement lacked centrality and coordination as a result of the liquidation of the

Kurdistan Teali Jamiyeti; secondly, the lack of foreign support for the Kurdish cause; thirdly, the tribal structure and the lack of a middle class in Kurdish society foiled the attempt to create national unity and coherence; fourthly, some of the tribal leaders were easily co-opted by the enemy; and fifthly, religious and sectarian differences among the Kurds thwarted national unity.94

Dersimi‘s account, as Olson argued, was well founded. Some of the tribal leaders switched their allegiance right in the middle of the war, Murad Pasha for example.

Other tribal leaders allied with the Kemalists and either remained indifferent or took their place with the Kemalists against the Kurdish nationalists. As Bruinessen noted

‗in the years 1919-21 Mustafa Kemal‘s contacts with Kurdish chieftains appeared to be better than those of the Kurdish nationalist organisations.‘95 This indeed was ‗one of the ironies of Kurdish history‘, as Olson acutely notes, ‗the Turkish nationalist military and governmental challenge to the Istanbul government and to the occupying forces began in areas that Kurdish nationalists claimed as part of the homeland they wanted to establish. Instead, they aided the Turkish nationalist forces, which prevented its realization.‘96

242 Religious and sectarian differences certainly played their role in the uprising. The

Sunni participation in the movement was minimal as most Sunni Kurds assumed it be an Alevi only uprising.97 Sunni Kurds were more attracted to the Kemalist call for

Muslim unity against the infidel and Armenia than the Alevi Kurds. The reason for the attraction, as Olson argued, was that the Kurdish urban and rural notables who possessed the Armenian land and properties could claim legal rights from the

Kemalists who were engaged against the Armenian forces. Sunni Kurdish participation in the Armenian genocide ironically contributed to the defeat of Kurdish nationalism.98

Olson added a few other reasons behind the failure, such as the proximity of the region of the rebellion to areas largely populated by Turks ‗meant that the Kurds were more amenable to Turkish authority and more accessible to Turkish patronage.‘ ‗The overwhelming superiority of Turkish military power and organization and the extensive patronage, land, and resources at the command of the Ankara government‘ was another reason which, according to Olson, contributed to the failure. 99

Apart from the abovementioned reasons, there were two interconnected fundamental factors which also contributed to the Kurdish nationalists‘ failure in Koçgiri. The first one was, as Dersimi briefly mentioned, that the movement lacked central coordination and planning. This was compounded by the second factor, the lack of a coherent national political program.

The main Kurdish national organization and the leading Kurdish nationalists, the KTJ, were in Istanbul rather than in Kurdistan. The poor communication and transport

243 system prevalent in the Empire at the time contributed to the inefficient coordination between the KTJ and the local leaders. Had the influential Kurdish leaders established themselves in Kurdistan and centrally coordinated the local Kurdish movements, they would have had a better chance of raising a simultaneous nation-wide movement against the Kemalists. The KTJ certainly played a significant role in the Koçgiri-

Dersim region as it sent its members to the region for organizational purposes.

However, by the time Kurdish leaders such as Nuri Dersimi, Alişer and others managed to set up the KTJ branches throughout Koçgiri-Dersim region and prepared the uprising as part of a general Kurdish movement, the KTJ itself, due to internal conflicts and divisions ceased to be an effective organization. This forced the local leaders to take the initiative into their own hands without clear contacts with rest of the country. The minimal Kurdish Sunni participation in the Koçgiri movement was not solely due to religious sectarianism but also due to this lack of centrality. The lack of creativity and vision among the Kurdish leaders in Istanbul, despite the warning of

Nuri Dersimi, in smoothing the Alevi/Sunni contradiction in Kurdistan, provided ample opportunities for the Kemalists to exploit religious friction to their own advantage. Dersimi blamed the Kurdish leaders in Istanbul for not paying attention to the Alevi-Sunni dichotomy in Kurdistan. In a KTJ meeting in Istanbul, Dersimi urged that ‗we [should] send, as soon as possible, a delegation to the Kurdish Alevi areas in order to refute [the idea that] relations between the Sunni and Alevi Kurds were cold.

[I explained that] in the case of a Kurdish uprising in the Alevi areas, the Sunni Kurds might remain quiet, and, in the case of a national liberation movement in the Sunni areas, the Alevi Kurds might behave in a similar way. The Turkish government forces could profit from this situation.‘100

244 This study suggests that the lack of centrality and central coordination in Kurdish national movements can not solely be attributable to the tribal social structure.

Certainly the tribal social structure of Kurdistan played a significant role in the formation and development of Kurdish nationalism. However, this is not the whole picture. The lack of a coherent national political program and lack of vision of

Kurdish nationalists are two of the factors for which contributed to the fragmentation of Kurdish nationalism. This can easily be seen in the Koçgiri movement. The confusion of the Koçgiri leaders in terms of their political objectives is evident. Their political objectives swayed between independence, autonomy and a Kurdish administered Vilayet for certain Kurdish districts in the Koçgiri-Dersim region. This confusion was not limited to the local Kurdish leaders alone but included the main

Kurdish influential leaders as well. They did not have a clear political vision in terms of a future for Kurdistan. They naively believed that the Great Powers, mainly Britain, would help them in establishing Kurdistan. The Kurdish leading nationalists at the time did not perceive the importance of mass movements and a cohesive organization.

They did not attempt to mobilize the Kurdish masses for a common strategy and objective. Internal divisions within the KTJ, however, not only paralyzed the organization and weakened the Kurdish nationalists in Istanbul and Europe, but also as Bozarslan argued, left the Kurdish Societies in the provinces without intellectual and moral input.101

The fragmentation of Kurdish nationalism in Istanbul contributed significantly to the decentralization and localization of the Kurdish national movement in Kurdistan. The

Koçgiri movement, thus, was not only the first Kurdish national movement in the

245 north but also the first example of the fragmented, localized, and decentralized characteristics of Kurdish nationalism throughout the 20th century.

4. Post-Koçgiri Period

The defeat and suppression of the Koçgiri movement was a strong blow to Kurdish nationalism. From then on, there was not a serious challenge against the Ankara government up until 1925 when a large Kurdish uprising took place under the leadership of the Azadi organization against Ankara.

It is quiet interesting to question the reasons behind this temporal gap between the

Koçgiri and the Sheikh Said movements. There are number of points: firstly, after the heavy-handedness of the Kemalists against the Koçgiri movement, the Kurdish nationalists opted for a much more clandestine organization than previously. Azadi, for example, established sometime in 1921 in Erzurum, carried out its activities in a highly secretive way.

Secondly, the Kurdish leaders were seeking British assistance for their possible revolt against Ankara. Khalil Bedirhan, for instance, informed Cox, the British High

Commissioner in Iraq his plan and requested the following:

‗The Kurdish revolt for which we have been working these two years

past is about to break out. The areas which are to rise simultaneously

are Dersim, Diyarbakir, Bitlis, and Van, whose populations total five to

six millions. These people have throughout the past year refused to pay

taxes to the Turks and are only waiting for the presence of myself the

246 representative of the Bedirhan race to unite. We are heart and soul pro-

British. We want a British mandate and if Britain will assist us we on

our part will be her buffer state between her Iraq and her enemies in

Russia and in Turkey. We will co-operate with the Armenians and with

other Christian communities.

The help that we want immediately is firstly, the presence of a very

few keen British officers, such as Major Noel, who will adopt Kurdish

dress and come with us and report to His Majesty‘s Government

whether my promised revolution is a genuine one.

Secondly, [we want] at least two mountain guns, a few machine guns,

five thousand rifles and some ammunition as a first supply to be aided

to only as occasions may hereafter demand. I ask for no money, and all

supplies you give me will be considered credit transactions and will be

paid for as soon as an Independent Kurdistan is established. If you

refuse me I must still go on and if I have not the resources to conduct a

regular campaign at least I can organize guerrilla warfare. But my

agents are now out; the time is at hand. I start shortly for Zakho, and

the rest is unto God.‘102

However, the anticipated assistance from Britain never materialized. It may be argued that the lack of British support and their ambiguous Kurdish policy contributed to the delay of another major Kurdish uprising against the Ankara Government.

Thirdly, as has been mentioned earlier, the Kurdish nationalists‘ grip on the Kurdish masses in general and on urban and rural notables in particular, was considerably

247 weak. In contrast to the Kurdish nationalists, the Kemalists did manage to secure the support of the Kurdish people. Ekrem sadly recollects that even in Diyarbakir, the

Kemalists managed to get the support of more than 90% of the town population.103

Thus, the strong Kemalist‘s military and organizational presence in Kurdistan may have either caused the Kurdish nationalists to be more cautious and reticent or deterred them from further nationalist activities. Ekrem Cemil Pasha, for example, upon his release from Ankara104 to return Diyarbakir in 1922 had retreated to his home and busied himself with his family‘s estate. He only returned to politics in 1924 to open Azadi‘s branch in Diyarbakir.105

It is only after the Turkish nationalists‘ policy began to alter vis-a-vis Kurds and caliphate that the Kurdish nationalists gradually managed to gain a hold among the

Kurdish masses and even most importantly to secure the support of religious and tribal leaders who initially supported the Kemalists against the infidel, to save the caliph for Muslim unity. For example, at the Grand National Assembly elections in

1923, the numerous deputies were denied the chance to return back to their constituencies, but new candidates were appointed and fielded by the Government.

‗Kurdish dissent, therefore, was exiled from the soi-disant democratic forum of the new republic.‘106 This was followed by other measures indicating the radical turn in

Kemalist policy. Almost all the senior administrative and half of the junior posts in

Kurdistan were filled by newly appointed Turks. Those Kurds in office could remain there till they were cleared of all nationalist taint. All reference to Kurdistan was removed from official documents and materials. Kurdish names for places were gradually replaced by new Turkish names. This anti-Kurdish policy reached its climax in 1924. In March the same year the use of the Kurdish language was prohibited and

248 in courts, schools and other public and official places Turkish was the only language to be allowed for communication. On 4 March the Grand National Assembly of

Turkey abolished the caliphate.

Such developments inevitably cut all the ties between the Kurds and the Ankara government. It was only after such radical alteration that the Kurdish nationalists had the chance to mobilize Kurdish tribal forces against the Ankara government. This can easily be seen among the eleven reasons for the preparation of an armed revolt by

Azadi against Ankara. Some of those reasons indicated the genuine disappointment with the Kemalist movement.

‗A new law regarding minorities already applied to Christians; it is the

Turkish Government‘s intention to transplant all the Kurdish

population of the Eastern Vilayets to Western Anatolia, replacing them

with refugees and others of Turkish race, thereby removing the break

in the broad Turanian ribbon which stretches from the Mediterranean

across Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Trans-Caspia to Turkestan; The

abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish Government, which has

broken one of the few remaining bonds between the Turks and Kurds;

the limitation of language to Turkish in the law courts and schools and

the prohibition of Kurdish being taught in the latter; the omission of

the word Kurdistan from all educational books and the substitution of

Turkish geographical names for Kurdish over throughout the country;

The senior government officials in Turkish Kurdistan, i.e., Valis and

Mutassarifs, becoming practically without exception Turks and

Qaimmaqams about half Turk and half Kurd; Government interference

249 in the election of deputies to the Turkish National Assembly from the

Kurdish vilayets, resulting in almost all Deputies being ―elected‖ by

Turkish Government orders and not in accordance with the free vote of

the people.‘107

These grievances resulted in a Kurdish revolt, known famously as the Sheikh Said revolt, against the Ankara government in 1925. By the time the Kurdish urban and rural notables had realized the intention of Kemalism and switched their alliances to the Kurdish nationalists, it was already too late as the Kemalists had consolidated their power in western Anatolia and were in a much better position to deal with the

Kurdish uprisings. Plus by the Lausanne Agreement, the Kemalists reconciled their differences and agreed with the Great Powers in designing the new map of the Middle

East.

250 CHAPTER VI

GREAT BRITAIN AND KURDISTAN

With the end of the WWI came the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and its partitioning among the victorious powers became inevitable. The manner of partitioning was shaped by the balance of power, and simultaneously the heterogeneous policies of the Great Powers involved within the framework of local, regional and international political developments.

As Elie Kedourie argued ‗the position of Great Britain in the Middle East at the end of the World War I was dominant if not paramount… Of the Great Powers influential in the region at the beginning of the war, only France remained. Its position in Syria and the Lebanon, however, could by no means be compared with that of Great Britain.‘1 It should not be assumed however, that British power and policies in the region were unchecked. As the de Bunsen Committee assumed

‗it is, of course, obvious that British desiderata in Asiatic Turkey are

circumscribed by those of other Powers, and that any attempt to

formulate them must as far as possible be made to fit in with the

known or understood aspirations of those who are our allies to-day, but

may be our competitors to-morrow.‘2

France, worried at the prospect of British dominance in the region, tried its utmost to check British policies, especially in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia. The French

251 opposition was compounded by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, which caused great anxiety among the Great Powers due to fears of revolution spreading to the ‗Asiatic oppressed people‘. Another crucial factor which further impeded British policy in the Middle East was the pressure building at home with regard to troop reductions and financial restraints, necessitating the minimizing of overseas expenditures.3

Due to Britain‘s strong position in the post-war period, both militarily and politically in relation to Ottoman affairs, the future of Kurdistan was inevitably linked to the general British policies in the Middle East. The fact that British troops occupied the

Mosul Vilayet (Southern Kurdistan) of the Ottoman Empire in late 1918 predestined

British involvement in the Kurdish issue. And at the same time it determined the future of Kurdistan. Thus it is imperative to scrutinize British policy in Kurdistan from 1918 up to the commencement of the Lausanne Agreement. Therefore, this study sets out to look at British policy in Kurdistan, and particularly in Southern

Kurdistan, in direct connection with the other secondary regional and international actors and their affairs in Kurdistan. These actors, such as France, the Arabs and the

Turkish nationalists considerably affected and shaped the development of the British policy with regard to Kurdistan.

I. First World War Agreements

The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war alongside the Axis powers brought the

Eastern Question to its final stage.4 The ‗sick man‘ of Europe, which had survived during the 19th century mainly as a result of the balance of power amongst the Great

252 Powers, finally had to end. The question remained as to what might become of the

Ottoman territories. Right from the beginning of the war the three allies, Britain,

France, and Russia had contemplated and prepared detailed plans as to their intended share of the dismembered empire, should they be victorious.

Even before the Ottoman Empire entered the war on 14 September 1914, the Russian

Foreign Minister, Serge Sazanov, demanded the permanent freedom of the Straits to be realized by their internationalization, the disarmament of the Dardanelles and the establishment of a Russian station at the mouth of the Bosporus. Russian demands on the Straits later increased as the British ambassador to Russia, Sir George Buchanan, described them in a telegram to Grey as ‗all the territory east of the Enos-Midia line together with sufficient territory on the Asian shore of the Bosporus to enable her to guard the entranced to the Black Sea.‘5 Buchanan further commented that though

Russia did not demand the possession of Constantinople officially, the majority of the

Russian Duma desired it. Soon after the Ottomans entered the war, Britain signaled its consent towards the Russian demands.6 Later in March, Russia further clarified its claims of possession to include Constantinople, the Western shore of the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmora, the Dardanelles, and Southern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line.

In return, Russia promised Britain and France ‗the same sympathy for realization of desiderata which they may form in other regions of the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere.‘7 The British War Council agreed to Russian demands, ‗subject to the war being prosecuted to a vigorous conclusion and to Great Britain and France realizing the desiderata in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere as referred to in the Russian aide-memoire.‘8

253 On the other hand, France made it clear that it demanded ‗Cilicia and Syria, in which latter term included Palestine and Christian Holy Places.‘ 9 Britain, in a Cabinet meeting on 19 March, decided that the Basra Vilayet must come under at least indirect control, as it was vital for the security of India. The Cabinet decided to set up a special committee to formulate British policy with regard to Ottoman territories.

What had become known as de Bunsen Committee, provided initial guidance for

Britain to pursue in its war aims in the Ottoman territories.

The de Bunsen Committee considered a number of memorandums presented by the

India Office, the War Office, the Admiralty, and the Board of Trade. Among the issues discussed, the most important agenda was the territories of Asiatic Turkey over which Britain should assert control. As a political secretary of the India Office, A.

Hirztel, stated in his memorandum that

‗a rough idea has thus been obtained of what is the largest area that

need be detached from the Asiatic provinces of Turkey in order to

satisfy the axiom laid down above, and is found to be comprised within

the following limits: a line following the Turco-Persian frontier from

Mohemmera to Kala Nuft; thence running along the Jebel Hamrin to

the point Fatha, where the Tigris cuts that range; thence straight across

the wilderness to the Euphrates at Ana or Hit (inclusive); and thence in

a south-east direction, skirting the desert to the confines of Koweit.‘10

One of the reasons that Hirtzel did not consider an arbitrary frontier cutting through

Mosul was due to its ethnography:

254 ‗it is true that it comprises a geographical and ethnological unit: but

unfortunately it does more than this, for it comprises part of Kurdistan,

between the Tigris and Turco-Persian frontier, and at once raises the

Kurd[ish] question in its acutest form. It has already been suggested

that the Kurd[ish] question may be found to be the crux in the future

arrangements of eastern Asiatic Turkey, and this is perhaps the most

convenient place to say a few words about it.‘11

Hirtzel then went on to suggest the following in regards to Kurdistan:

‗If it were possible to set up Kurdistan as an independent whole, under

the rule of a Kurd family the problem would be comparatively simple.

But it is not. It is understood that there is no suitable family available;

and it is very doubtful whether the real Kurd[ish] question, which is

mainly an agrarian question, can be solved from within. There remain

only two alternatives, that Kurdistan should be either under the

political influence of, or actually administered by, the Powers to the

north of south of it, i.e. Russia or ourselves. If it were under the

political influence of Russia, we should never have a moment‘s peace:

if it were under our own, we should have the impossible task of

controlling its foreign relations and should be responsible for the

protection of Armenia against Kurdish depredations. Equally

impossible for us would the task of administration; moreover, it is

highly improbable that Russia would be content to have a British

district on her flank….. The only alternative, therefore, is to leave

Kurdistan to Russia to administer, which will be the more natural

since, through her hold on Azerbaijan, she will already be responsible

255 for the Kurds of north-west Persia. But if this is to be done, it will be

necessary also to hand over to her the Kurdish portion of the vilayet of

Mosul, so that the whole of Kurdistan may be under one control and

administration.‘12

Sir M. Sykes, the War Office representative on the committee, strongly criticized the

India Office‘s perspective on Kurdistan, as expressed by Hirtzel. Sykes argued that there was no Kurdish nationalism similar to Armenian, Bulgarian or Irish nationalism.

He stated that ‗the Kurds have no sense of nationality of any kind whatever. They have a subconscious sense of race and certain tribal instincts, but they are entirely uninfluenced by the idea of nationality as modern Europeans understand the word.‘13

Sykes further claimed an absence of tradition among the Kurds in establishing a state of their own and the lack of a nationalist movement:

‗In the present situation there are Persian Kurds, Turkish Kurds and

Russian Kurds at one and the same time, besides Kurds who are

subjects of all three states. As it is now so it has been in the past. It

may be objected that Armenians and Jews are similarly broken up, but

still have a strong sense of nationality. To this it can be answered that

there is a tradition of an Armenian nation and a Jewish nation which

once formed a State; this tradition the Kurds have not got. No Kurds

repines over his lost Empire. The Kurdish national songs do not tell of

the palmy days when Kurdistan was really Kurdistan. (…) The

Kurdish ―intelligentsia‖ is almost non-existent; a Kurd who gets

educated gets engulfed in the bureaucracy and becomes a Turk. There

is no class of unemployed, and doctors, dentists, lawyers, clerks, or

256 journalists, among the Kurds, and these being wanting, there is no

public opinion of a nationalist kind, forming secret societies and

preaching nationalist propaganda. The few Young Turk Kurds of

Constantinople, such as Babanzade and the Kurdish newspaper writers

in Switzerland are entirely out of touch with the Kurdish tribes.‘

Sykes argued that among the Kurds there was a sense of loyalty to the clan; a sense of enmity to the next tribe, whether it be Kurdish or Arab; and a sense of vassalage to an alien Government. ‗The Kurdish noble as such does not aspire to kingship. His ambition is to form a confederation, to be a great person, and to be honored by a paramount power. He is instinctively a vassal.‘ Thus, according to Sykes a

‗consolidated Kurdistan is an impossibility. There is no reason why the distribution of the Kurds should dictate frontiers or why Kurds should be regarded as a people who require consolidation.‘14

After the lengthy discussions and a ‗careful study of the political, financial, commercial, and military considerations involved‘ the de Bunsen Committee considered four possible alternatives with regard to possible British policies in

Ottoman territory: a) partitioning the Empire; b) nominal independence under

European control; c) the maintenance of the Empire in Asia as an independent state; and d) an independent Ottoman State with a decentralized administration. 15 The

Committee concluded that ‗decentralization, if attainable on the lines indicated in this report, offers on the whole the best solution, in the interests both of Turkey and Great

Britain.‘ 16 The Ottoman territory in Asia was divided into five great provinces:

Anatolia, Armenia, Syria, Palestine, and Iraq-Jazirah. (See Map 5) The Committee claimed that ‗the Turkish Empire is about to lose the centre of administration whence

257 the affairs of these territories have been directed or misdirected for centuries and a new centre will have to be created without the prestige and traditions of Stemboul.

The moment is therefore favorable to strengthen the local administrations, to free them for the vampire-hold of the metropolis, to give them a chance to foster and develop their own resources.‘17

The de Bunsen Committee‘s conclusion of a possible path for British policy in Asiatic

Turkey indicates the preamble division of a Kurdistan between Armenia, Syria, and

Iraq, despite the fact that the India Office initially argued for the consolidation of the whole of Kurdistan, including the vilayet of Mosul. The de Bunsen report provided the basis of the infamous Sykes-Picot agreement.

While Britain was engaged with Sharif Husayn of Mecca, the ruler of the Hedjaz in what was known as the Husayn-McMahon correspondence during late 1914 and

191518, Britain was also discussing its interests in Ottoman territories with France.

This resulted in the Sykes-Picot agreement.19 British diplomat, Sir Mark Sykes and his French counterpart Charles Francois George-Picot20 began their negotiations in late 1915 and proposed their plan to both governments. Shortly after, their plan was ratified in February 1916.

According to the Sykes-Picot agreement (see map 6) the following points were concluded between France and Britain:

‗1.France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an

independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States in areas (A)

and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab

258 chief. That in area (A) France and in area (B) Great Britain shall have

priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France,

and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign

functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab

States.

2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall

be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control

as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State

or Confederation of Arab States.‘21

The Sykes-Picot agreement was expanded with the amendments required by Russia including:

‗1. That Russia shall annex the regions of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van,

and Bitlis, up to a point subsequently to be determined on the littoral of

the Black Sea to the west of Trebizond.

2. That the region of Kurdistan to the south of Van and of Bitlis

between Muş, Siirt, the course of the Tigris, Jezireh-ben-Omer, the

crest-line of the mountains which dominate Amadia, and the region of

Merga Var, shall be ceded to Russia; and that starting from the region

of Merga Var, the frontier of the Arab State shall follow the crest-line

of the mountains which at present divide the Ottoman and Persian

Dominions.‘22

Later, Italy also joined the club to require its share as part of its participation in the war alongside the Allies. As a result of a number of meetings between Britain, Italy,

259 and France, the Saint-Jean de Maurinne agreement was concluded, and Italy was awarded the south-west of the Ottoman Empire.

As far as Kurdistan was concerned, the common denominator of all these wartime commitments and agreements among the Great Powers was the division of Ottoman

Kurdistan between two powers, Russia and France. In these early arrangements

Britain excluded itself from Ottoman Kurdistan, leaving the province of Mosul to

France. However during the War, an important and unexpected development occurred in Russia in November 1917—the Bolshevik revolution. The revolution was responsible for not only changing the course of the history in the Middle East, but also for causing the Great Powers to re-evaluate their wartime policies. After seizing power in Russia the first act of the Bolsheviks was to repudiate all the Tsarist international commitments. 23 The advent of the Bolshevik revolution, and consequently Russian withdrawal from the Sykes-Picot agreement, had two crucial implications for the post-war settlement. Firstly, it complicated relations among

France, Britain and Italy in regards to the Ottoman areas that were initially left to

Russia. The northern part of Kurdistan and Ottoman Armenia were the areas that particularly proved to be the most problematic, as there was no power willing to control or annex these territories. Britain and France proposed to that the United

States, which had entered the war at a later stage, to replace Russia‘s commitment to control certain areas formerly belonging to the Ottoman Empire..

The US was well aware of the secret treaties between the Allies even before the

Bolsheviks exposed them. Washington considered the scheme for carving up the

Ottoman territories contrary to American objectives, and laid plans to dissociate the

260 US from the secret treaties. On 1 December 1917, President Wilson cabled Eduard

House, the President‘s confidential adviser in Paris, that ‗our people and Congress will not fight for any selfish aim on the part of any belligerent… least of all for divisions of territory such as have been contemplated in Asia Minor.‘24 A speech delivered by the President to the US Congress, which was famously known as the

Fourteen Points dealing with the post-WWI situation, was an indication of US policy in contrast to the Allied arrangement. Point 12 declared that

‗the Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire be assured a

secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under

Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an

absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and

the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the

ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.‘25

The US reluctance to participate in the Allies‘ war scheme was one of the main reasons why the post-war settlement with the Ottoman Empire was delayed from the

Mudros Armistice to the Sevres Treaty by almost two years. This gap, without doubt, worked to the benefit of the Kemalist movement, which exploited the uncertainties in

Great Power policies.

Secondly, as Ro‘i noted, ‗the threat of Bolshevism was of major concern to the

Western leaders not only as far as their own countries were concerned but also in their colonies and empires.‘ 26 The Allies were apprehensive about the spread of

Bolshevism in Asia and the possibility of it emerging as a major threat to their imperial interests. They tried to destroy the revolution by assisting the counter- revolutionary White army without any success. The Allies then tried to contain27 the

261 revolution in Russia. Within this framework of containment, the advent of the

Bolshevik revolution can be seen as strengthening Kemalism in Anatolia. By exploiting Bolshevik weaknesses during the civil war in Russia, and the Western concerns about the spread of revolution to Asia, the Kemalists played a double game between the opposing powers, and greatly utilized the situation for their own benefit.

Towards late 1918 out of the confusion created by the Bolshevik exposure of the secret treaties and the declaration of Wilson‘s Principles, France and Britain felt obliged to give a proclamation in November 1918 in order to allay Arab nationalist concerns about British and French intentions in the Middle East. The declaration stated that

‗far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any

particular institutions, they are only concerned to ensure by their

support and adequate assistance in the regular working of

Governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations

themselves.‘28

The wartime commitments of Britain to France and Italy (as in the Sykes-Picot agreements); to Arabs (as in the Husayn-McMohan correspondence which stipulated establishment of an Arab state in the Levant); and to the Zionist, (as in the Balfour

Declaration to support for a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine), prepared the ground for contention and conflict among the Allies over the post-war peace settlement. These contradictory commitments, which were further compounded by two crucial developments, i.e. the Bolshevik revolution and hence the withdrawal of

Russia from the war and its war time commitments; and the entry of the US into the

262 war and Wilson‘s principles of self-determination, both which caused further disagreements among the Allies over the partitioning of Ottoman territories in Asia.

The importance of these events had a colossal impact on the future of the Middle East in general and on Kurdistan in particular.

2. Britain in Kurdistan, 1918-1920

2.1 British Policy in Southern Kurdistan

With the occupation of the Mosul Vilayet, which constituted a large part of Southern

Kurdistan, Britain became directly involved in the Kurdish issue. It would be misleading to argue that British policy in regards to Kurdistan in general, and

Southern Kurdistan in particular, was consistent or coherent. Over time it underwent great changes and confusion. What primarily concerned British policy makers at the

Foreign Office, the India Office, and the high officials in Mesopotamia (Iraq), were the security, stability, and viability of creating an Arab state in Iraq. The assumed huge oil potential of the Mosul vilayet was another crucial aspect which contributed to the formation and development of British policy, both in regard to Kurdistan and

Mesopotamia. The question of the future of Southern Kurdistan was largely discussed and contemplated by officials within this framework of British concerns. A. Wilson, the Civil Commissioner to Iraq wrote as early as 15 October 1918 that

‗politically as well as strategically there is much to be said for adopting

line of the lesser Zab as the frontier of Iraq state, including the latter

Altun Köprü, Sulaimania and Panjwin: the rich districts of Sulaimania

and Halabja are susceptible to great development, and their products

are essential to industries and the general well-being of Iraq, viz.,

263 petroleum, coal, seed-wheat, gall, nuts, and tanned material and

tobacco. The first two in particular, as His Majesty’s Government are

aware, are of great potential value. The foregoing is an assumption

that arrangements made regarding Basra and Baghdad Vilayets will not

hold good as regards the Mosul Vilayet.‘29 [Italics added]

Another official report indicates British concerns on a similar line:

‗with regard to the tracks immediately adjoining the northern borders

of Iraq and within the borders of the Turkish Vilayets of Baghdad and

Mosul it is necessary to take into consideration the question of the

security of the British protected Arab State. To do this we must find a

well-defined and practical frontier. The Arabs and Kurds on the

borderland being largely nomad and inter-mixed, it is impossible to

adopt a purely ethnographical frontier, nor is it altogether necessary,

for a large number of the Kurds on the Southern borders of Kurdistan

have always looked towards Baghdad and Mosul for trade and

government, and their interests are more closely bound up with the

south than with the hilly country to the north. The sub-mountain tracts

of Sulaimania, Koi Sancak, Erbil and the corresponding belt to the

west of the Greater Zab are capable of considerable development under

a good government and through the Erbil district lies one of the future

railway routes to Mosul while it constitutes one of the most important

granaries of northern Iraq. To the north of this belt lies a high, rugged

and barrier-like range penetrated only in a few places by tracks leading

over difficult passes or through wild and precipitous gorges, which

264 effectually shuts off Iraq from the wild and mountainous country to the

north. This range would appear to be the most natural frontier line

separating Kurdistan from Iraq. Sulaimania, Rania, Koi Sancak, Erbil,

Akra, Dohuk and Zakho must then be considered to lie, not within

Kurdistan, but in Iraq.‘30

Such early considerations and reflections on integrating Southern Kurdistan into Iraq were determined to a considerable extent by the policies implemented by the British

Civil and later High Commissioners of Iraq. The fact that Britain failed to develop a coherent and clear policy in regard to Kurdistan, did provide ample space for British officials to accommodate Kurdish demands on a temporary basis, but at the same time created conflicts and contradictory policies to the annoyance of the Kurds.

Initial contacts with Kurdish representatives took place in late 1918 when British forces occupied Kifri. Two Kurdish notables, on behalf of Sheikh Mahmut, approached a British political officer in order to hand over a letter from the Sheikh

‗earnestly appealing to His Majesty‘s Government not to exclude Kurdistan from list of liberated peoples.‘31 For military reasons it was recognized that ‗the organization of

Kurdistan would have to be undertaken by purely political means.‘32 For this purpose, an able British political officer, Major Noel was assigned to Sulaimania with instructions ‗to arrange with local chiefs for the restoration and maintenance of order in areas outside the limits of our military occupation, for the exclusion and surrender of enemy agents and for the supply of commodities needed by our troops.‘ Noel was authorized ‗to appoint Sheikh Mahmut as [British] representative in Sulaimania should [he] consider this expedient and to make other appointments of this nature at

265 Chamchamal, Halabje, etc at [his] discretion.‘ The tribal chiefs with whom Major

Noel established relations were told that ‗there is no intention of imposing upon them an administration foreign to their habits and desires. Tribal leaders will be encouraged to form a confederation for the settlement of their public affairs under the guidance of the British Political officers.‘ Major Noel was followed by the Civil Commissioner,

A. Wilson, who paid a visit to Sulaimania to hold a meeting with 60 leading chiefs of the region, and representatives of the Kurdish tribes of Persian Kurdistan. Wilson found that

‗the national movement was strong in Kurdistan… there was a general

recognition of the need of British protection if they were to prosper in

the future. There was, however, hesitation on the part of some of the

chiefs as to the wisdom of placing Kurdistan under effective British

administration, while others claimed that Kurdistan must be separated

from Iraq and be run direct from London.‘

After that meeting a document was drawn up between Wilson and the chiefs to the effect that

‗H.B.M.‘s Government having announced that their intention in the

war was the liberation of the Eastern peoples from Turkish oppression

and the grant of assistance to them in the establishment of their

independence, the chiefs, as the representatives of the people of

Kurdistan have asked H.B.M.‘s Government to accept them also under

British protection and to attach them to Iraq so that they might not be

deprived of the benefits of that association, and they requested the

Civil Commissioner of Mesopotamia to send them a representative

with the necessary assistance to progress peacefully on civilized lines.

266 If H.B.M.‘s Government extended its assistance and protection to them

they undertook to accept H.B.M.‘s orders and advice.‘ [Italics added]

In return, the Civil Commissioner signed a document stating ‗that any Kurdish tribe from the Greater Zab to the Diyalah who of their own free will accepted the leadership of Sheikh Mahmut, would be allowed to do so, and that the latter would have our moral support in controlling the above areas on behalf of the British

Government whose orders he undertook to obey.‘33

Early British policy on Southern Kurdistan was formulated in an interdepartmental conference in April 1919 at the Foreign Office. 34 A. Wilson proposed that two alternatives be discussed with regard to the Mosul Vilayet. One was to make it an autonomous Kurdistan with Mosul as its capital. The second was to form a Mosul

Province as a part of Mesopotamia. This would leave a fringe of autonomous Kurdish states, which would be governed by local chieftains with British political advisers, and would fall directly under the control of Baghdad. These states included

Sulaimania, Rawanduz, Amadia and Jezirat-ibn Omar. However, Erbil, Akra, and

Zakho were to be within the Mosul province. When Wilson was asked ‗how it was proposed to graft Diyarbakir, Urfa and Jerablus on to this second alternative, in the event of its being decided that these districts should be entrusted to the Mesopotamian administration‘ Wilson responded that he ‗earnestly hoped that no such decision would be arrived at. Any combination of Diyarbakir and Urfa with Sulaimania was in his opinion out of the question.‘ He pointed out that ‗the administration of the

Diyarbakir area would involve greatly increased military responsibility.‘ He ‗agreed that the Kurds of the Mosul area might be subjected to political influence from

Diyarbakir, but did not consider that the connection was sufficiently strong to

267 outweigh the lack of symmetry involved in a combination of these areas with

Mesopotamia.‘ Wilson further urged that people like Şerif Pasha, Seyyid Abdulkadir and the Bedirhani family members ought not be taken very seriously as they were out of touch with local conditions, and not likely to be welcomed by the people. Wilson

‗would himself prefer to see the Turks in Diyarbakir.‘ [Italics added] The Conference decided that ‗Colonel Wilson should be authorized to take steps for the creation of the five provinces suggested by Colonel Howell for Iraq proper, and of an Arab province of Mosul, surrounded by a fringe of autonomous Kurdish states under Kurdish chiefs, with British political advisers.‘35

The initial British political establishment in Southern Kurdistan did not go as smoothly as was expected. Throughout 1919, there were a number of riots and disturbances involving the killing of several British political officers. These commotions were partly the result of the ambiguous British policy vis-a vis the Kurds; partly due to Turkish intrigue in the region; and partly due to inter-tribal conflict.

In April the Goyan tribe in the Şirnakh area, located on the other side of the Armistice line was encouraged by Turkish propaganda to attack the Assyrians in the British controlled zone, culminating in the murder of the British political officer, Captain

A.C. Pearson who had set out to parley with them from Zakho.36 Two months later fresh disturbances occurred in Amadia where an assistant British political officer and his colleagues were murdered. Other skirmishes occurred in Akra where, following the imposition of a fine by the local political officer, the Zibari chiefs appealed to their Barzans rivals to rise against the British. In November, they ambushed and killed a political officer and most of his entourage in Akra.

268 However, among such troubling developments, the most serious one was the uprising of Sheikh Mahmut against the British authorities. The fact that he himself was appointed by British officials makes his rebellion even more interesting. An analysis of Sheikh Mahmud‘s revolt is imperative as it underlines the complicated relationship between Kurdish nationalism and British policy.

2.2 Sheikh Mahmud‘s First Revolt

Having been appointed as Hukumdar of Sulaimania in December 1918, Sheikh

Mahmut proved to be, in Wilson‘s words ‗our most difficult problem.‘37 The cause of the problem was the conflicting approaches to the question of the future of Kurdistan envisioned differently by British officials and the Sheikh himself. Mahmut was not content with the political arrangement and had a larger picture of Kurdistan in his mind than that of the Sulaimania division which the British had granted to him. In

February 1919, the Sulaimania division included the Kifri and Kirkuk districts and extended to beyond Rawanduz in the North.38 Sheikh Mahmud, as Wilson noted,

‗was, however, in no way satisfied: he claimed that he had a mandate from all the

Kurds of the Mosul vilayet and many in Persia and elsewhere to represent to us their desire to form a unitary autonomous state of which he was to be the head under

British protection.‘39

Britain was not prepared to give the Sheikh space and support for consolidation of his power in Kurdistan. On the contrary, as early as March 1919, a number of measurements were taken to curb his power. Major Noel, who was often called the

‗Second Lawrence‘ of the Kurds, was replaced by E.B. Soane as Political Officer to

269 the Sulaimania division. Soane was an open critic of Noel‘s policy of creating a tribal confederation in Kurdistan. He argued that

‗in the beginning a system of administration, which one may call the

Tribal system, was adopted. It was considered by the Political officer

in charge [Major Noel] that this would best meet the national

aspirations and preserves the characteristic features of Kurdistan. It

was considered by Sheikh Mahmut equally desirable to institute the

tribal system as by that means he could more easily bribe or threaten

the chiefs, could more readily centralize the control in himself, and

more rapidly attain the position of absolute power which was his aim.

The system of direct government by officials, which naturally tends to

disintegrate tribes and create a democratic and industrious homogenous

population, was by no means to his taste.‘ Soane further argued that

‗revival of the tribal system was a retrograde movement. Already

South Kurdistan had become largely detribalized and a measure of

prosperity, in consequence, had been its lot in pre-war times. Now the

Political Officer, accepting the views of Sheikh Mahmut, devoted his

energies to re-tribalizing. Every man who could be labeled a tribesman

was placed under a tribal leader. The idea was to divide South

Kurdistan into tribal areas under tribal leaders… Ideal for the clansman

but fatal for trade, civilization and tranquility. The tribal system was an

idealistic one, and like so many idealistic schemes, it broke down when

brought into contact with dishonest and mundane human nature.‘40

270 New arrangements were carried out by British officials to curtail Sheikh Mahmut‘s area of influence and activities. Wilson, who had a very poor opinion of Sheikh

Mahmut, stated ‗it was … clear that we could not prudently lend our active support to

Sheikh Mahmut‘s pretensions to the hegemony of any considerable group of tribes, and, this being the case, it was generally agreed that it was necessary to modify our policy in Southern Kurdistan by the introduction of some sort of administration on lines similar to those in force in Iraq.‘41 In his memoirs Hilmi argued that British political officers were trying to diminish the Sheikh‘s influence and authority among the people. 42 Apart from that, a number of localities such as Kirkuk, Kifri, Koi

Sancak, Rawanduz, Halabje and the Jaf lands were excluded from Sheikh Mahmut‘s control. Such developments inevitably caused Mahmut to become uneasy. British officials sensed and interpreted Sheikh‘s apprehensions in a different light as Soane reported ‗Sheikh Mahmut had viewed with annoyance the separation of Kifri and

Kirkuk, the defection of the Jaf, his failure to impress himself on Koi and Rawanduz and now began to take active steps against the British Government… He collected round him the malcontents and ne‘er-do-wells of the district and considered how he might avenge himself upon the British Government because it had detected and scotched his plans for the prostitution of the idea of a free and prosperous Kurdistan to his personal lust of power.‘43

Sheikh Mahmut responded to such British overtures by a revolt in May 1919.44 He was supported by the Kurdish tribes across Iranian Kurdistan, especially by the

Hawraman tribe. He obtained control of Sulaimania, ‗seized the Treasury, imprisoned all the British personnel who happened to be present, and hoisted his flag, in place of the Union Jack over the Political Office.‘ 45 He declared himself Ruler of all

271 Kurdistan. However, Sheikh Mahmut‘s uprising was short lived. He enjoyed initial military success against British forces near Chamchamal, but his forces were finally defeated in the Bazyan Pass by mid-June, and the Sheikh himself was wounded and captured. He was brought to Baghdad to a military court and sentenced to death, although later pardoned and exiled to India. Wilson wrote that he opposed the pardon

‗on the grounds that so long as Sheikh Mahmut was alive his adherents in Southern

Kurdistan would live in hope, and his enemies in the fear, of his eventual return, and that his death would contribute more than any other single factor to the restoration of tranquillity.‘46

This first Kurdish uprising against British forces was important and it indicates a number of points with regard to British politics and the weakness of Kurdish nationalism in Kurdistan. McDowall argued that ‗trouble might well have arisen with another Kurd in his place. For behind the clash of personality, lay conflicting systems and expectations. There was a fundamental conflict between institutionalized government on the one hand, in which officials were appointed on merit and owed their loyalty to an abstract idea – the state, the administration, the Crown or whatever- and, on the other hand, the highly personalized form of government based on patronage‘.47 This view had been put forward in a different way by Soane who wrote

‗it is well to note that had Sheikh Mahmut not precipitated matters, a breach would as inevitably have occurred, for corruption and peculation were, under his guardianship, growing so rife that whatever representative of H.B.M.‘s Government might have been present, would have been forced to an issue with Sheikh Mahmut on the point.‘48

Such reasoning as to the conflict between Sheikh Mahmut and the British forces was not only retrospective, but highly Eurocentric. It is true that Kurdish society was tribal

272 and fragmented, and had always been subjected to the direct or indirect control of imperial powers. A native central administration after the destruction of Amirate system by the Ottomans in the first half of the 19th century in Kurdistan had never occurred or been allowed.49 Should there have been the clear intention of British policy to create a native central administration in Southern Kurdistan, Sheikh Mahmut could have managed to create one with the support of British officers. The fact that

Kurdish tribes and chiefs initially backed Sheikh Mahmut with the knowledge that he was appointed by Britain indicates as much. Soon after British officers made it explicit that tribes and other towns and districts were free from Sheikh Mahmut, his prestige and authority was reduced considerably. The fact is that not only in

Kurdistan, but in most of the Ottoman-run Arab regions too where there was no institutionalized government and central administration such as existed in Western

Europe. This was something unique to Europe with the advent of capitalism and industry. To expect such system to be established in a short period in a fragmented society like that of the Kurds is unrealistic. The clash was rather due to a conflict of interests between the ambiguous policy of Britain and Kurdish nationalist aspirations.

The uprising caused the British officials to contemplate the withdrawal of British officials from Kurdistan. The reason that the British had extended their influence in

Southern Kurdistan, argued the Secretary of State, was

‗because they believed that the inhabitants themselves welcomed it…

It will now appear that belief was misplaced, and that inhabitants, so

far from welcoming British influence, are so actively hostile that

strategic railways are required to keep them in check. In these

273 circumstances might it not be the better course to withdraw our

political officers and leave the Kurds to their own devices.‘50

It must be remembered that the Kurds had asked for the extension of British influence into the Kurdish areas, but with the intention of establishing a Kurdish self- government, one not to be subjected to other forces, especially the Arabs. Wilson in his reply stated that the situation in Sulaimania was quiet and the rebellion was not widely supported. Wilson believed that the ‗idea embodied in President Wilson‘s 14 points and confirmed in the Anglo-French declaration on November 8th of substituting nationality, religion or race on the basis of Government in the Middle East in lieu of

―ability and power to govern‖ has aroused the dormant animosities of past hundred years.‘ For Wilson the political dissension that had occurred in Syria, Palestine and

Kurdistan, thus was the reaction to such discourse. However, Wilson argued that the

‗tide has already turned‘ in Sulaimania. ‗After a brief taste of anarchy they have no desire to try it again.‘ He further argued that Sulaimania ‗has always been regarded by the Turks as part of Mesopotamia, it was so classified in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and geographically and strategically it belongs to Mesopotamia not to Kurdistan.‘51

This is undeniably an interesting comment from someone who himself initiated the setting up of Sulaimania as one of the fringe Kurdish states.

Despite the British officials‘ misinterpretations, Sheikh Mahmut was mainly motivated by nationalist ideas. This can be clearly seen in Wilson‘s own writing when he visited the Sheikh in a hospital in Baghdad: ‗I had seen him in hospital when, with a magnificent gesture, he denied the competence of any Military Court to try him, and recited to me President Wilson‘s twelfth point, and the Anglo-French declaration of

8th November 1918, a translation of which in Kurdish, written on the fly-leaves of a

274 Qur‘an, was strapped like a talisman to his arm.‘52 Despite its nationalist character, the revolt failed to attract most Kurdish support, much to the advantage of the British who were able quickly to suppress it.

2.3 The Inter-departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs to the Cairo

Conference, 1919-1921

Despite the suppression of the Sheikh Mahmut uprising and the ensuing relative stability, British policy in late 1919 and early 1920 towards Southern Kurdistan was still far from clear and defined. This can be observed in a combined inter- departmental meeting held on 13 April attended by Foreign, Colonial, War, Air

Ministry, and India Office.53 The conference reviewed three main proposals that had been discussed among the British policy makers in regards to the future of Kurdistan.

The first one was the creation of a fringe of autonomous Kurdish states around the borders of the Mosul vilayet; the second was the French proposal according to which

Kurdistan should be divided into British and French spheres of influence; and the third was the British idea to cut themselves loose altogether from Kurdistan and confine themselves to the river districts.

The last proposal was without a doubt contemplated by the Foreign Office. In a telegram to the Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, the Secretary of State informed him that ‗they [H.M.G] were in favour of complete withdrawal from Kurdistan and non- acceptance of any responsibility for administration even of Sulaimania area, feeling that a grant to Southern Kurdistan of wider measure of autonomy under British

275 suzerainty than that enjoyed in Mesopotamia would set up an invidious distinction which could scarcely fail to cause trouble.‘54

Both the India Office and the Civil Commissioner of Baghdad opposed such considerations, which they thought would be detrimental to the position of the British in Mesopotamia and India.55 In a telegram, A. Wilson, the Civil Commissioner urged that

‗it is my duty solemnly to express to Government my conviction that

the policy which they are apparently about the adopt is likely before

long to prove fatal to retention of Mesopotamia.. The evacuation of

Sulaimania and withdrawal of the British administration will involve

us in considerably larger commitments on Kurdistan-Mesopotamia

frontier than is represented…. The vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad, and

Basra, as administered by the Turks, form a single and indivisible

whole.‘[Italics added]56

During the conference, Secretary of State to India, Edwin Montagu, remarked that ‗in any discussion on the future of Kurdistan it was essential to decide how the Turks was going to be turned out. It was difficult to treat the Treaty with Turkey piecemeal, as each part had a bearing on the others.‘ He thought that military measures would be necessary for its enforcement. The Chairman, Curzon, agreed that this should be considered and suggested the proposed draft by Vansittart of the Foreign Office as a possible answer, since ‗it did not severe Kurdistan from Turkey straight off, but left the problem to be solved in the course of the next year.‘ The draft clause by Vansittart stated:

276 ‗The Turkish Government agrees to submit to the Council of the

League of Nations, within one year of the coming into force of the present treaty, a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly

Kurdish areas east of the Euphrates, south of the Southern boundary of

Armenia, north of the northern frontier of Syria and Mesopotamia, and west of the Turco-Persian frontier; (…) and to put into execution of this scheme in the form approved by the Council and within six months of such approval being given.

If, however, within the period above specified, the Kurdish peoples within the said areas shall address themselves to the Council of the

League of Nations in a manner showing that a majority of population of this area desire independence from Turkish rule, if the Council then considers that these people are capable of such independence, and recommend that it should be granted to them, Turkey aggress in advance to execute such a recommendation and to cede her rights or titles over this area. The detailed provisions for such cession will, however, form the subject of separate agreement between Turkey and

―Principal Allies‖ signatory to the present treaty.‘ This draft proposal was accepted by the conference and subsequently became articles 62,

63, and 64 of the Treaty of Sevres. In regard to the future of Southern

Kurdistan, Hubert Young, from the Foreign Office suggested that ‗we should say to the French that while we had no intention of forcefully incorporating Southern Kurdistan with Mesopotamia, the fact that it had formed part of Mesopotamia under the Turks appeared to justify its inclusion in that country by the Peace Conference. At the same time

277 we might make it clear that our intention was to set up an independent

state in Southern Kurdistan, which could opt later on to join either

Mesopotamia or Northern Kurdistan, if the latter eventually succeeded

in establishing its autonomy.‘57

The Inter-departmental conference indicates that British policy on Kurdistan had become clearer in the division of Kurdistan into south and north, with Britain having more interests and concerns in the south with the general inclination to incorporate it into Mesopotamia. A Cabinet meeting held March 23, 1920, shortly before the conference, stated ‗the mandated territory must include Mosul, since there is no suitable physical boundary for Mesopotamia in the plains between Mosul and the

Persian Gulf; since the inhabitants object to the partition of their country, and since the oil-bearing regions of Mosul are essential to the revenues on which the future development of the whole country will depend.‘ The Cabinet meeting thought that

‗the policy of the British Government is, and will be, to develop an Arab Government founded on representative Arab institutions and an Arab Administration.‘58 From then on the main question that was contemplated by British officials was which kind of political character Southern Kurdistan should be have within Mesopotamia, or Iraq, which gradually became the more used term among the British.

One of the most important aspects of the conference was the proposal of the Air

Scheme with its implicit affects on the incorporation of Southern Kurdistan into

Mesopotamia. The Air scheme would allow the air force to become the dominant military presence in Mesopotamia, with the ultimate result of reducing Britain‘s military commitment. Air-Marshall Trenchard was convinced that the Air Scheme

278 would take control of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan with less cost.59 Olson argued that

‗it is important to understand that if the Air Scheme was to work as well as its proponents thought it would as of April 1920, these views would be reflected in the depth of British commitment to Iraq. The greater the commitment, the greater the desire to include Southern Kurdistan in the new state.‘ It is ‗interesting to note that the very mechanics of implementing the Air Scheme that would work against an independent or autonomous Kurdistan were being discussed and partially implemented in 1920 when the Treaty of Sevres advocated such a policy.‘60

A few days after the inter-departmental conference at the Foreign Office, the Supreme

Council reconvened at San Remo on 19 April and issued the mandates for

Mesopotamia and Palestine to Britain and Syria to France. Prior to the Council‘s proclamation, the second General Syrian Congress sat in Damascus and passed a resolution declaring the independence and integrity of Greater Syria as a sovereign state under Amir Faysal. Similar development took place in Mesopotamia when a group of twenty-nine passed a resolution and chose Amir Abdullah as their first monarch. These proclamations evoked reactions in London and Paris.61

France, which was adamant about keeping Syria under its mandate, demanded that

Syria acknowledge the mandate and its consent in the French occupation of the country. On 24 July, the French army marched on Damascus and forced the Syrian government to evacuate the city. The Syrian army was defeated at Maysalun by the

French, and Faysal fled to exile in Europe. Arab discontent with European powers followed a revolt in Mesopotamia, which reached its peak in August.

279 The revolt, which began at Rumaitha on the Lower Euphrates, spread to the Middle and Upper Euphrates, but fell short of reaching Mosul and Basra. It was repressed by

British forces in October at a high cost: more than 400 British troops were killed, and more than 1200 wounded. There were over 8000 casualties among the insurgents.

Financially, it cost £35 million in 1919-20 and £32 million in 1920-21. Such economic damage had a tremendous impact on British policy-makers, who were already contemplating the reduction of British expenditures overseas. In this manner the revolt had considerable influence on British policies and decisions made in the area directly affecting Kurdistan.

Though some British officers blamed the external factors for the Arab revolt 62, it is, however, generally agreed that one of the main reasons was that London had been unable to make any firm commitments or give clear directions to those on the spot.63

Whatever the reasons behind the rising, the revolt brought fundamental British policy changes in Iraq.

One of the first apparent policy changes was the replacement of A. Wilson on 4

October, who had been blamed for ‗Indianizing Mesopotamia‘ through the introduction of direct British rule.64 Percy Cox was sent as Wilson‘s replacement, and described his task as ‗a complete and necessarily rapid transformation of the façade of the existing administration from British to Arab, and, in the process a wholesale reduction in the numbers of British and British Indian personnel employed…‘ 65

Within a short period of time the new Commissioner announced the formation of a

Council of State as the provisional government with Abd al-Rahman al-Gaylani, the

Naqib of Baghdad, as president of the council.66

280 The second indirect result of the rising was the creation of the new Middle Eastern

Department, with the responsibility for policy making and administration, as well as all civil and military expenditure in the Middle East. The new department was entrusted to the Colonial Office.67

These changes as Eskander argued, ‗in both the policy making process and policy direction insofar as they affected the Middle East, had a great impact on the future of

Southern Kurdistan.‘68

2.4 From the Cairo Conference to the Lausanne Treaty, 1921-1922

The immediate task of the new department was to organize the Cairo conference to discuss the future political, financial, and military arrangements for the mandated territories. Wilson Churchill, who was transferred from being Minister of War to

Minister of Colonies in February 1921, described the main objective of the conference was to maintain firm British control as cheaply as possible.69

The Cairo conference was convened on 12 March 1921. On 15 March 1921, a political committee70 discussed the memorandum that had been drawn up in London by the Middle East Department. The memorandum stated ‗we are strongly of the opinion that purely Kurdish areas should not be included in the Arab state of

Mesopotamia, but that the principles of Kurdish unity and nationality should be promoted as far as possible by His Majesty‘s Government. The extent of the area within which it will be possible for His Majesty‘s Government to carry out this policy must necessarily depend upon the final terms of the peace settlement with Turkey.

281 Whatever the extent of this area may be, we consider that not only control by His

Majesty‘s Government, but also negotiations with the Mesopotamian Government…, would be facilitated if there were some form of central Kurdish Organization to which a British adviser could be attached. This adviser would be under the orders of the

High Commissioner for Mesopotamia and would report through him to His Majesty‘s

Government.‘71

Percy Cox responded that ‗he had already intimated to his Council of State that during the year within which Kurdistan had the right under the treaty to opt for independence he would deal with the Kurdish districts himself, and that he already received a protest from the Council against this decision. The area in which the Kurds were predominant was in the divisions of Kirkuk and Sulaimania and certain districts north of Mosul.‘ Cox further added that he ‗was of opinion that these divisions formed an integral part of Iraq,' and that these regions for economic concerns 'should undoubtedly belong to that country.‘ Major Young and Major Noel argued against

Cox and opted for a separate Kurdish buffer state. Young suggested that setting up a

Kurdish state should not be delayed and that the state ‗would be directly under the control of the High Commissioner and would not be part of, or responsible, to Iraq

Government.‘ Noel shared Young‘s view and thought that ‗the Kurds would prefer

Home Rule, and that they would demur at accepting any responsibility to the Iraq

Government, especially if Turkish propaganda were used to intensify their objections to being placed under an Arab state.‘ Noel also considered that ‗British policy demanded the setting up of a Kurdish buffer state which could be used to counter- balance any strong anti-British movement which might occur in Mesopotamia.‘

Colonel Lawrence inferred that despite the fact that the Iraq Government would

282 endeavor to arrange the incorporation of Kurdistan into Iraq it was his opinion that

‗the Kurds should not be placed under an Arab Government.‘ Winston Churchill,

Secretary of State for Colonies, was inclined towards the views of Young, Noel, and

Lawrence who thought that a future ruler of Iraq with the power of an Arab army

‗would ignore Kurdish sentiment and oppress the Kurdish minority.‘72

The political committee discussed the issue of Kurdistan and recommended that ‗until such time as a representative body of Kurdish opinion might opt for inclusion in Iraq,

Kurdistan should be dealt with direct by the High Commissioner and kept separate from Iraq.‘73

Having been decided not to incorporate Kurdistan into Iraq, Churchill asked whether the Cairo proposals would necessitate any special provisions to be made in the mandate regarding Mesopotamia. A clause, therefore, was added into the Article 16 of the Mandate for Mesopotamia which included ‗nothing in this mandate shall prevent the mandatory from establishing such an autonomous system of administration for the predominantly Kurdish areas in the northern portion of Mesopotamia as he may consider suitable.‘74 Churchill informed the Prime Minister, Llyod George, about the

Cairo proposal and the Colonial Office‘s general line on Kurdish policy, which would be directly conducted by the High Commissioner. Llyod George approved the Cairo

Conference recommendations. 75 Thus it became clear that by mid-1921, general

British policy in regard to Southern Kurdistan was to keep it as a separate state, with the intention of it acting as a buffer state between Mesopotamia and Turkey.

283 Despite such high level policy decisions, the Cairo recommendations in regards to

Southern Kurdistan never materialized. Instead, the incorporation policy succeeded over the separation policy, and by the time the Lausanne treaty commenced in 1922, the separation policy was long forgotten.

British failure to implement the Cairo proposals in regard to Southern Kurdistan can be analyzed within a framework of the interconnected factors and political developments from mid-1921 to late 1922. These general factors included Percy

Cox‘s pro-Arab stance, and the Arab nationalists‘ demand to incorporate Southern

Kurdistan within Iraq; the rise and success of Kemalism in Anatolia; and the French and Italian defection to the Kemalist side.

Olson blamed Cox for the failure of the implementation of the Cairo proposals. Olson argued that ‗Cox himself was the instrument of this reversal. He may have been influenced by his perception that the Iraqis did not want an independent Kurdistan and the difficulty that he would have as high commissioner in finding a sufficiently tame

Kurdish leader for the independent entity.‘76 In a dispatch to Churchill shortly after the Cairo conference, Cox informed him that ‗before I left Baghdad for Cairo position was briefly that I had intimated that in view of pertinent clause in Treaty of Sevres I should continue to administer Kurdis(tan) direct(ly), and that in reply council of state found it necessary to object to an arrangement which they thought might be ultimately lead to excision of Kurdistan from Iraq.‘ Cox added that having consulted experts on the issue, they arrived at a unanimous decision that the ‗best solution from all points of view would be to retain Kurdistan as an integral part of Iraq for financial and fiscal purposes but for High Commissioner to administer them direct through Kurdish and

284 British officials on such a basis of local autonomy as would satisfy their Home Rule idea.‘ To support his reasoning, Cox stated that apart from Sulaimania all parts of

Southern Kurdistan preferred to be a part of Iraq. Cox warned that ‗it would be realized by you that picture would be somewhat spoilt if Sulaimania alone were to stand out. Customs barrier involved by that solution would be a chronic source of difficulty and if Sulaimania were allowed to separate Basra and other communities would want to follow suit and it would be difficult to argue with them.‘77 Churchill responded by stating that he approved the proposals ‗on the assumption that they do not entail Kurdish representation in National Assembly or Council of State, or the submission of Kurdish budget to either of those bodies or to an Arab minister. So long as the temporary inclusion of Kurdish area in Iraq is dependent solely upon presence of British High Commissioner, and so long as British officials form the only link between the two countries he shall be in a strong position to deal with any future Arab ruler whose Arab advisers may persuade him to attempt interference in Kurdish affairs.‘78 As Olson and Eskander noted, Churchill used the phrase of ‗two countries‘, indicating that he still was assuming Kurdistan and Iraq to be two separate entities.79

Cox‘s determination can be further seen in his dispatch to Churchill in late June: ‗two alternative policies were mooted at Cairo Conference (1) that Kurdish districts should be retained as part of Iraq; (2) that districts should be encouraged to separate.

Generally balance of opinion was in favour of former.‘ Churchill in his minutes on

Cox‘s telegram wrote that ‗I am assured by Major Young and Colonel Lawrence that

Sir Percy Cox's recollection of the ―balance of opinion‖ at Cairo is not accurate, and that in fact the general consensus of opinion at the Cairo Conference favoured the second of the two alternative policies quoted by Sir Percy Cox.‘80

285 Churchill thought that it would be desirable to postpone any final decision on Kurdish policy until Cox ‗has had an opportunity of discussing the matter with Feisal.‘ 81

Before he discussed the issue with Feisal, Cox developed another argument for his scheme of incorporating of Southern Kurdistan into Iraq. In his dispatch to Churchill, he referred to the growing threats of Kemalism and Bolshevism to British interests in

Mesopotamia. He argued that promoting Arab nationalism would be the only real alternative ‗to combat a possible campaign of Turco-Bolshevism from Angora and perhaps from Tehran.‘82 As Olson noted ‗Cox‘s proposals of June very much put in jeopardy the Cairo conference position on Kurdistan. How could Southern Kurdistan be kept separate from Iraq if the British or, indeed, even Cox pursued a policy of Arab nationalism?‘83

When Cox raised the issue with Feisal, the latter told Cox that

‗the question of Kurdistan had further aspect for him as King of Iraq

which had probably not been fully considered by us. This was question

of preponderance of Sunnis or Shiahs with special reference to

question of constitutional Assembly shortly to be convoked. As we

were aware there was already technical and numerical preponderance

of Shiahs and excision of a large slice of Sunni districts of Iraq out of

state and exclusion of their representatives from National Assembly

would place Shiahs in a very strong position and filled him with

misgivings. Personally he believed as long as they were assured of

being administered by Kurdish officials and if necessary were allowed

to deal with Iraq Government through High Commissioner (an

arrangement which if necessary was quiet acceptable to him) rather

286 than resort to possible alternative of becoming part of mandated state

under control of some European state senate they (the Kurds) would

prefer to be nominally under rule of Mohammadan King.‘

Cox thought that Feisal‘s ideas ‗would be a reasonable course to work for inclusion of

Kurdish districts, their participation in national assembly on condition of local autonomy, and special supervision by British officers and if necessary by High

Commissioner.‘84 R. Bullard and J. Masteron-Smith, two members of the Middle East

Department, in their minutes to Cox telegram, inclined towards Cox‘s argument.

Churchill telegrammed Cox on 3 October and stated ‗I appreciate force of arguments advanced by you and Feisal, and I am prepared to consider very favourably the proposals contained in the last paragraph thereof subject to proviso that Kurds are not to be under Arabs if they do not wish.‘ 85 Thus, as Eskander argued, Churchill moderated his position when agreeing to the participation of the Southern Kurds in the forthcoming referendum on Feisal‘s candidacy for the Iraqi throne.86

It seems that by late 1921, British policy regarding Southern Kurdistan shifted from separation to incorporation. However, political developments in that part of the country prevented straightforward implementation of Cox's incorporation policy. In the August 1921 referendum the Kurds overwhelmingly refused to vote in favour of

Feisal as their King and Iraq as their state.87 This failure, combined with the growing instability in the Kurdish region caused the Colonial Office to interfere in Kurdish policy and allow Kurdish nationalists to re-establish a second Kurdish government.

Throughout 1921 and 1922, Kurdish nationalists had demanded the release of Sheikh

Mahmut and his return to Kurdistan.88

287 From mid-1920 there was growing disorder in the Kurdistan region. In April, the

Surchi tribe attacked Aqra and their relatives drove British political officers from

Rawanduz and Koi-Sancak. Arbil was under threat, but the Dizayi tribe saved it on behalf of the British. Disturbances had increased by 1922 in Halabja, Sulaimania,

Rawanduz, Barzan and Aqra. These anti-British disturbances were encouraged and aided by Turkish nationalists who had managed to get a stronghold in Rawanduz.89

Sheikh Mahmut‘s followers, especially Mahmud Khan Dizli, and Karim Fattah Beg of the Hamawand tribe had been attacking the British posts on the Persian-Iraq border.90 Under the command of Ali Şefik, commonly known as Ozdemir Pasha, a small column of Turkish nationalist forces made Rawanduz their stronghold and organized some powerful tribes against the British forces.91

Earlier in 1921 Cox had mainly blamed Turkish nationalist propaganda for the troubles, 92 but later in 1922 he acknowledged the growing sense of Kurdish nationalism alongside the Kemalist intrigue as possible causes of unrest in Southern

Kurdistan. In a telegram to Churchill explaining the unrest in Sulaimania, Cox provided two factors for the trouble:

‗First, failure to make peace (with) Turkey. This coupled with

extensive Turkish propaganda makes waverers afraid to take line

which will prejudice them in the event of return of Turks to Kurdistan.

Secondly, growth of spirit of independence. … The more enlightened

tribal leaders while anxious for British advice are clamouring for a

national ruler, and this movement naturally reacts most unfavorably on

the turbulent elements scattered over the country.‘

288 Cox continued that ‗although many individual elements of bitterness have been left behind by the Sheikh Mahmut rising and its suppression (there is) general desire for a national ruler and a strong feeling against inclusion in Iraq.‘93 Eskander noted that disturbances and political unrest intensified in Southern Kurdistan after the formation of an Arab state.94 This can be clearly observed in a Kurdish notable‘s complaint:

‗The policy of the British government had been dangerously

inconsistent. The British had denied to the Kurds their racial

aspirations and, while carrying Feisal and the Iraqi government on

their shoulders, showed no inclination to do the same for Sheikh

Mahmut and Kurdistan. If HBMG was not ready to play the part

expected of it, the Kurds must peacefully bring pressure to bear;

otherwise, there would be no alternative but anarchy fostered by

Turkish propaganda.‘95

Kemalist policy to win the Kurds over by offering a kind of autonomy96 worried the

British due to its effectiveness on the Southern Kurds. As early as March 1921, the

British Prime Minister raised this issue in his letter to Churchill: ‗you must expect attempts from Angora Government to seduce Southern Kurds into cooperation with their northerly brethren with a view to incorporation in Anatolian state.‘97 Increasing

Kurdish unrest and the alleged Kemalist threat to attack the Mosul vilayet98 worried the Colonial office as reports indicating the fragility of the general state of affairs:

‗The Kurdish situation is extremely delicate. It is, at least, a possible, if not probable theory that the Turks, still intending to attack Iraq in the spring, are deliberately working to drive wedge between the Kurds and ourselves.‘99 This in turn explains

289 ‗why the administration of Southern Kurdistan remained separate and unaffected by the rapid political developments taking place in Arab Mesopotamia.‘100

As the situation deteriorated further in 1922, the British had no choice but to find someone to rally the Kurds against the Kemalist activities in the region. For this purpose, pardoning Sheikh Mahmut and allowing him to return to Kurdistan was an obvious option despite Cox‘s opposition.101Like A. Wilson, Cox also had a poor opinion of Sheikh Mahmut. For Cox, Sheikh Mahmut was ‗actuated mainly by personal and dynastic considerations‘ and was ‗identified with a policy of absolutism‘ and ‗is feared as a feudal baron of worst type.‘102 Cox tried to convince Churchill that

Sheikh Mahmut would not be welcomed by all Kurds. Those Kurds who petitioned for Sheikh Mahmut‘s release, for Cox, ‗in no way represent tribal feeling which is definitely opposed to‘ his return or else indifferent.103

Prior to Sheikh Mahmut‘s release and return to Southern Kurdistan, Cox introduced the Said Taha scheme, with a view of creating an autonomous entity in Sulaimania and Rawanduz, two regions of constant trouble for the British authorities in

Mesopotamia.104 Eskander argued the scheme was designed by Cox ‗not so much for the containment of the growing Kemalist threat as preventing Mahmut from returning as governor.‘ This interpretation was supported by C.J. Edmonds, who served as

British Political Officer in Southern Kurdistan. He claimed that the scheme aimed principally at undermining Mahmut‘s position.105

290 By mid-September, Sheikh Mahmut was recalled from his detention in Kuwait and appointed once again as president of the Sulaimania Council. Once reinstated, Sheikh

Mahmut wasted no time in making his plan clear:

‗From to-day I have taken in my hands the tiller of the state and

assumed responsibility for the protection of the independence of

Kurdistan…A nation which sheds its blood in the cause of freedom can

never suffer defeat nor ever be enslaved.. The civilized world has

decreed that all nations and peoples shall govern themselves according

to their own desires.‘106

He sent a deputation to Baghdad to put Kurdish national demands before the High

Commissioner on 2 November. The demands included

‗official and public recognition of the independence of south

Kurdistan; the transfer to the Government of south Kurdistan of all the

areas in Iraq inhabited by Kurds; the creation of a Commission to fix

the boundary between Kurdistan and Iraq; the official recognition of

Sheikh Mahmut as Hukumdar of Kurdistan.‘

The High Commissioner asked them to moderate their immediate demands and refused to hold any free elections in the Kurdish areas. Following the deputation, the

High Commissioner received Said Taha on 6 November and the latter proposed the recapture of Rawanduz by tribal action. ‗Arrangements are being made to assist him with money, munitions and a backing of volunteers from among the Kurds in the

Arab army.‘ As British officials observed, the Said Taha scheme made Sheikh

Mahmut ‗uneasy‘. 107 His uneasiness was quiet understandable as Eskander argued

‗on the one hand, he was brought back to Southern Kurdistan to form a second

Kurdish government, with a view to containing the Kemalist threat and re-establishing

291 peace and order. On the other, the British authorities use Seyyid Taha to undermine his position among the Southern Kurds.‘108 Ambiguous British policy with respect to

Kurdistan and Mahmut was one of the main factors of the latter‘s attitude towards the

Kemalists. Hilmi‘s memoirs provide detailed information in regard to the relations between the Kemalist agents and Sheikh Mahmut in Southern Kurdistan. These relations annoyed Britain.109 British-Kurdish relations deteriorated further when Cox rejected Mahmut‘s demand to extend his rule to Rania and Koi. Mahmut responded by purging all Kurdish officials who were suspected of being loyal to the British.110

British officers, who had been aware of Mahmut‘s intrigue with the Kemalists and their alleged plan to attack Kirkuk and Koi, summoned Mahmut but he refused the come. Upon his refusal, the British ordered a suspension of his administration on 24

February and ordered him to leave the town on 1 March. A couple of days latter, the

RAF bombed government buildings and Sheikh Mahmut had to flee, bringing about the collapse of Sheikh Mahmut‘s second attempt to establish an independent

Kurdistan and paving the way for Britain to incorporate Southern Kurdistan into

Iraq.111

Sheikh Mahmut‘s timing to achieve an independent Kurdistan was not the best.

Firstly, Britain began negotiations with the Kemalists in Lausanne in October, which symbolically terminated any hope of an independent Kurdistan as the latter party was fiercely against such an establishment. Secondly, by October and November successful British air raids routed Turkish detachments from their strongholds in

Southern Kurdistan.112 This in turn diminished the bargaining position of Kurdish nationalists vis-a vis the British, and the Iraqi government. Thirdly, in October 1922,

Llyod George‘s coalition government was replaced by a Conservative government.

292 W. Churchill lost his position as secretary of State. It must be remembered that

Churchill was one of the most active British policy-makers to advocate the exclusion of Southern Kurdistan from Iraq. The new Colonial Secretary, Leo Amery, contrary to

Churchill, did not have strong views on Kurdish affairs.113

3. Britain, Kurdistan and Oil

It is also imperative to look at the issue of British policy with regard to Kurdistan in terms of oil. British interest in exploiting and controlling Middle East oil sources is a well known fact.114 Britain was not alone in the oil business. As Sluglett argued 'once oil began to be widely used by the World's navies, it was considered essential that supplies and reserves should be freely available, that the Great Powers should be able to ensure that their own access to sources would not be impeded. Hence the guidelines of British oil policy were formulated very quickly: that Britain should be in a position of political influence or control in the territories where oil was known, or equally important, thought likely, to exist, and that other Powers should be excluded as far as possible, both politically and commercially from these areas.' Sluglett further argued that 'in the period after the war, the question of British control of Middle Eastern petroleum was a subject of intense concern to several departments in Whitehall. It was above all vital that no power should be in a position to deny access of supplies to

Britain.' It was because of this concern that '"every effort was made to score as heavily as possible on the Tigris before the whistle blow", with the result that General

Marshall, following instructions from the War Office, captured Mosul (thus gaining formal control over Mosul Vilayet) some three days after the Armistice of Mudros.'115

In his speech in the House of Commons, Churchill, then First Lord of Admiralty,

293 stated that 'we must become the owners or at any rate the controllers at the source of at least a proportion of the oil which we require.'116 Foster was right to argue that

'whatever the reciprocal benefits, Great Britain was interested in imperial objectives, political and economic, especially in the very concrete commodity of oil.'117 Within the context of general British imperial interests in oil, it is understandable that British endeavored hard to incorporate the oil rich vilayet of Mosul into Mesopotamia despite the denial of British officials of any connection between oil and the British intention to do so. As Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon argued that 'it is supposed and alleged that the attitude of the British Government to the vilayet of Mosul is affected by the question of oil. The question of the oil of the Mosul vilayet has nothing to do with my argument. I have presented the case on its own merits and quite independently of any natural resources that may be in the country.'118

Despite the evident British interest in oil in the Mosul vilayet, and its affect on British policy to incorporate the vilayet and Southern Kurdistan into Iraq, this work claims that oil alone does not explain the formation and development of British policy with regard to Kurdistan in general, and Southern Kurdistan in particular.

Emphasizing oil as the main contributory factor in the division of Kurdistan, or

British policy in Southern Kurdistan would distract attention from other major factors.

It would be more appropriate to put the issue of Mosul oil in the wider context of local, regional and international political developments that had been unfolding.

Should there have been an independent Kurdish entity under the protection or mandate of the British Government, an aim to which most Kurdish nationalists aspired, Britain would have had the upper hand in oil resources in Kurdistan, as

294 Britain did in Iraq under its Mandate. In other words, what interested Britain was to secure the oil resources in Mesopotamia and Kurdistan for its imperial interests in the best political formulation attainable. Such a formulation had to be developed according to the local (the Kurdish nationalist activities), regional (the Turkish and the Arab nationalists), and the international (France and the United States) political and military balances.

While Britain made successive concessions to France and the US over the share of

Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC)119, thus securing its claim to Mosul, the only question remaining to be sorted out was the Turkish nationalists‘ claim to the vilayet.

As the Turkish nationalists filled the political vacuum in Northern Kurdistan and consolidated their position in Anatolia, they intensified their activity against the

British administration in the Mosul Vilayet. The contest over the vilayet between the

Kemalists and Britain gradually contributed towards the division of Ottoman

Kurdistan between Turkey and Iraq.

4. The Bolshevik Revolution

Most Soviet-educated historians argued that the advent of the Bolshevik revolution provided an impetus for the growth of Kurdish nationalism as Soviet foreign policy was based on the self-determination of oppressed nations under imperialist domination. 120 This account is not wholly correct, particularly on the issue of

Kurdistan. It is true that the initial Soviet policy was based on the principle of self- determination of oppressed peoples, which was the official policy of the Third

Communist International as well.121 However, having faced internal war aided by the

295 Allies and serious economic crisis, the Bolsheviks were forced to moderate their foreign policy from instigating international revolution ensuring instead the protection of the Soviet motherland.122

The Great Powers, Britain, France, Russia and Italy, throughout 1915-6, had engaged in a discussion on how to partition the Ottoman Empire, which concluded with the famous Sykes-Picot agreement. This became void when the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia and declared all their former ‗imperialist agreements‘ null. This in turn created a political vacuum in areas designated to Russia. The withdrawal of Russia from the war and post-war settlement provided ample opportunities for the Turkish nationalists to launch their struggle from the east, which Britain and France had neither the manpower, nor the financial resources, to occupy during the post-war period. It was not coincidental that the initial phase of the Turkish nationalist struggle had begun in those areas where the Great Powers had no presence. It is a hypothetical question to ask what would have happened had Russia occupied those areas left to her. It can be assumed that had such developments occurred, the Turkish nationalists‘ chances to consolidate their power in Anatolia and Kurdistan would have then been considerably diminished.

As the Bolsheviks engaged in a bloody civil war, they realized how desperately they needed peace to consolidate their power. In the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Bolsheviks agreed to ensure the immediate evacuation of the vilayets of eastern Anatolia and their return to Turkey. Russian withdrawal from the war and its army‘s disintegration provided the Ottomans with the opportunity to occupy territories all the way to Baku.

The Ottoman retreat from the Caucasus had taken place after the Mudros armistice,

296 but the army kept its strong position in eastern Anatolia. The Ottoman army in the east, compared to other fronts, was less exhausted. This was an important factor for the success of the Turkish nationalists. Once it was commanded by a hard-line

Turkish nationalists like Kazim Karabekir, the army provided a strong backing for the

Kemalists to use against the Istanbul Government as well as the Great Powers.123

‗The Turkish-Soviet co-operation,‘ argued Gokay, ‗consolidated first in the Caucasus, succeeded in counterbalancing British influence in the region. British sponsorship of the anti-Bolshevik Russian armies in Russia drove the Turkish nationalists and the

Bolsheviks into each other‘s arms.‘124 Though the Turkish nationalists and Bolsheviks alliance went back as far as early 1919, it became official in March 1921 in a treaty between Ankara and Moscow. This strengthened the Kemalists by providing them both with diplomatic support for their cause as well as arms, ammunition, and money—the things most needed to aid the Turkish nationalists in their fight against the Greek army in the west and the Armenians in the east.125

The Kemalists-Bolshevik alliance caused great anxiety amongst British policy- makers.126 In the long run, this was one of the significant factors forcing the Great

Powers to moderate their attitudes towards the Turkish nationalists.

5. France and Britain on the Revision of the Treaty of Sevres

In less than a year after the signing of the treaty of Sevres, French and British policy- makers were considering revising the treaty in order to accommodate Turkish nationalist demands.

297

As early as March 1921, France tried to get a separate agreement with the

Kemalists.127 In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies, the French President of the

Council reasoned that there was a necessity to reach an understanding with the

Kemalists:

‗the Treaty of Sevres are no longer practicable in view of the enormous

military and financial burdens involved…therefore France could not

keep 100,000 men indefinitely in a country which she is not to retain;

hence his [Franklin Bouillion] negotiations with Angora regarding

release of French prisoners, prevention of pillage and massacre on

French leaving Cilicia, and delimitation of frontiers. They are not yet

concluded, but France must choose between continued latent hostility

with Turkey –in which case it would be better to finish the matter at

once by a war- and resumption of former friendly relations; in latter

case frontier questions would become of secondary importance and

Syrian question would no longer exist.‘128

By late 1921, France and the Kemalists had concluded an agreement which was known as the Franklin-Bouillion accord. With this Franco-Turkish accord, France not only yielded Cilicia and a substantial portion of northern Syria, but more importantly, provided the Ankara Government with international recognition. At the same time it narrowed British policy options in regards to a peace settlement with Turkey. One side-affect of the accord was that it strengthened Turkish nationalist forces by allowing them to concentrate on the Mesopotamia frontier, as they were relieved from the front in Cilicia. Turkish troop‘s concentration alongside the Mesopotamia border

298 added further strains to British worries about a Kemalist plot in Southern

Kurdistan.129

Following Ismet İnönü‘s victory over the Greek army in January 1921, the Allies invited both the Turks (Ottoman and Ankara Governments) and the Greeks for a possible revision of the Treaty of Sevres. In the London Conference, the Ankara delegation headed by Bekir Sami requested the recognition of Turkey‘s independence with a minimum territorial claim, which was expressed in the Misak-i Milli (National

Pact). ‗The territories of the Ottoman Empire, excluding countries inhabited by an

Arab majority, which, in accordance with the declarations of the Allied Powers will be called upon to exercise their right to self-government, form an indivisible whole.

Turkey must enjoy in these territories full sovereign rights, primary conditions for the existence and the development of every independent state.‘130 Bekir Sami stated the

Ankara Government‘s views on articles 62 and 64 of the Treaty of Sevres that,

‗the populations of Kurdistan possessed complete representation in the

Grand National Assembly, since each Sancak, which had been taken as

the electoral unit, elected five Deputies. The Kurds were thus fully

represented at the Angora Assembly, and he could himself claim

legitimately to represent the Kurds as well as the Turks. Moreover, the

Kurds had always proclaimed that they constituted an indivisible

whole with Turkey: the two races were united by a common feeling, a

common culture and a common religion.‘ Though Sami acknowledged

that a few Kurds desired independence, like General Şerif Pasha and a

‗small committee‘, he argued that, they are ‗in no way represented the

populations for whom they claimed to speak.‘131

299 Despite the failure of the Conference to find a solution to the ‗Eastern Question‘, it nevertheless initiated reconsideration among the British policy-makers about radical revision to the Sevres Treaty, in particular the articles regarding Kurdistan. In a response to Cox‘s request to discuss the Kurdish issue with the Council of State, the statement of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is decisive on British policy reversal with respect to Kurdistan:

‗It will be noted from paragraph 2 and 3 of this report [Mesopotamian

Intelligence Report no 4 of December 31, 1920] that the contemplated

electoral law for Mesopotamia has been drafted to cover the Kurdish

areas but that Sir P. Cox has signified his intention of discussing their

treatment specially with the Council of State in view of the wording of

Article 64 of the Treaty of Sevres.

It is understood, however, that the question of the wording of this

article has already been raised by the Turkish delegates in the course of

the Conference here and that there is a possibility of the article being

modified in such a way as to omit all mention of a future independent

Kurdish state and therefore of the right of the Kurds of Southern

Kurdistan (within the frontier of Mesopotamia) to join such a

state.‘[Italics added]132

Kemalist victories both over the Greek army and in Armenia throughout 1921 and

1922; their successful diplomatic initiatives133; and their unquestionable strength and consolidation of power in Anatolia and Northern Kurdistan all paved the way to the

300 Lausanne Treaty, in which there was not a single reference to the Kurds and

Kurdistan as had been speculated by the Foreign Secretary just a year before.

British categorical rejection of support for the Kurdish nationalists against the

Kemalists in 1921 can be seen within this dramatic British policy reversal in 1921.

Halil Bedirhan and five members of the Kurdistan Teali Jamiyati approached Cox in

Baghdad with a view to secure British support for their planned revolt against Ankara.

They told Cox that they had been working for the last two years for a Kurdish revolt in the areas of Dersim, Diyarbakir, Bitlis, and Van which were to rise simultaneously in rebellion. They requested the help of British officers like Noel, as well as British guns, and other types of support. The Kurdish nationalists insisted that ‗we are heart and soul pro-British. We want a British Mandate and if Britain will assist us we on our part will be her buffer state between her Iraq and her enemies in Russia and

Turkey.‘ Cox recommended to Churchill that in case negotiations with Turkey failed and the French continued to be unsupportive of British policies in the Middle East, then Britain is ‗justified in seeking other means to secure what is vital to our existence,‘ in other words supporting Kurdish nationalists against the Kemalists.134

The Middle Eastern Department did discuss the Kurdish nationalists‘ proposals, as well as Cox‘s recommendations, but issued a categorical refusal of both proposals.135

In 1922 the prospect of stirring up the Kurds against the Kemalists had also been proposed by a British political-intelligent agent, Rawlinson. Rawlinson thought that instigating the Kurds to revolt would check the Turkish nationalist forces and deter them from the objectives of the National Pact. The Middle East Department refused the Rawlinson plan.136 Olson, thus, rightly argued that ‗the rejection of Rawlinson‘s scheme points out the rather dramatic evolution of British and Allied policy toward

301 the nationalist government after the Treaty of Sevres was signed on 10 August 1920.‘

He further inferred that ‗the British desire for peace with Turkey, on the best terms for itself, of course, subordinated Britain‘s Kurdish policy to this objective.‘137

Abandoning Northern Kurdistan to the Turkish nationalists and searching for a desired peace settlement with Turkey inevitably altered the British stance towards

Southern Kurdistan. It would now be impractical for Britain to allow, or remain indifferent to the establishment of an independent Kurdish entity in Southern

Kurdistan, while the greater part of Kurdistan would remain under Turkey. This settlement would have been inimical to Kurdish nationalism. Plus an independent

Kurdish entity in the south would have been a constant threat to the integrity of

Turkey. As Ernest Main acutely noted ‗both Turkey and Persia might have had good reasons to fear it (Iraqi Kurdistan) as a potential source of irredentist trouble. In such circumstances these independent Kurds of Iraq would have constituted a standing menace to peace in the Middle East.‘138 A similar view was expressed by Cox during the Lausanne negotiations. Cox suggested that 'it might considerably ease the frontier negotiations if we could give preliminary official pledge to Turkey that in the changed circumstances we have abandoned the idea of Kurdish autonomy included in the

Treaty of Sevres and that our aim is to incorporate in Iraq as far as may be feasible under normal Iraqi administration all the Kurdish areas which may fall on the Mosul side of the frontier as the result of the negotiations.'139

In conclusion, British policy regarding Kurdistan in general, particularly in Southern

Kurdistan had been ambiguous from 1918 to 1922. This provided opportunities and conditions which various actors attempted to exploit for their own benefit, the

Kemalists gaining most advantage from the situation.

302

Despite the initial policy of the British to create fringes of autonomous Kurdish states in Southern Kurdistan (1919), and later to establish a small but independent Kurdistan in north Kurdistan (Sevres Treaty 1920), such early policies never materialized. By the year 1921, British policy had changed radically against the creation of any sort of

Kurdish state.

A number of factors determined the British policy changes. They were the rise of

Turkish nationalism, the lack of coherent political organization and unity among the

Kurds, as well as Cox‘s determination to incorporate Southern Kurdistan into Iraq.

Moreover, these factors also included the lack of financial resources available to the

British Empire, British public discontent with the extension of war, thus pressure to stop further commitments in the Middle East, and the Bolshevik threat to spread revolution to eastern colonies. However, among such factors, the Kemalist one is the most crucial of all in changing and re-shaping the British and other powers‘ policies in areas of what they called the ‗National Pact‘. In that sense, the year 1921 was a most important year during which not only the fate of ‗Turkey‘, but also the fate of

Kurdistan was decided.

Within the framework of Turkish nationalist success and their collaboration with the

Bolsheviks, the role attributed to Cox by some authors as the one who, despite

Churchill‘s opposition, developed and implemented the policy of incorporating

Southern Kurdistan into Iraq, is not highly convincing. Cox‘s role was secondary and complementary to the larger developments rather than a decisive factor.

303 Reading the primary British documents on Kurdistan provides an obscure picture. The

British policymakers, Foreign Office, India Office, War Office, Colonial Office, Civil and High Commissioners in Istanbul and Baghdad, right from the end of the WWI to the commencement of the Lausanne Treaty, had failed to develop a consensus on what British policy should be on Kurdistan. They also failed to develop a clear and coherent policy to determine the future of Kurdistan as well. Various views and conflicting approaches in turn created suspicions, disappointments and doubts among the Kurds who, one way or the other, had relations with the British officials. This is what explains the stormy relations between Britain and the Kurds.

With the signing of the Turco-Franco accord in late 1921, and the commencement of the Lausanne Treaty in October 1922, the Kurdish nationalists‘ aspiration to obtain self-determination was obliterated. From then onwards, the Kurdish issue became an issue of a minority amid Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

304 CONCLUSION

This study has aimed to analyze three intrinsically linked questions in Kurdish historiography, beginning with the foundation of Kurdish nationalism. The first two questions were when did Kurdish nationalism emerge, and what were the main characteristics of the early Kurdish nationalists? This initial study into the nature of

Kurdish nationalism led to an attempt to discover answers to the third fundamental question: why did the early Kurdish nationalists fail to achieve their goal of self- determination?

This study has approached the emergence of Kurdish nationalism from a modernist‘s conception of nationalism. It has laid particular emphasis on the relationship between nation and state. It has suggested that a movement can only be classified as nationalist as long as the movement's aspirations are aimed at the establishment of a state for a particular group of people whom the nationalists claim constitute a nation. The author defined a nation as a politicized community, either in possession of a state, or in search of establishing a state. This study argued that the first manifestation of Kurdish nationalism appeared among the Kurdish elite with the establishment of the Kurdistan Teali Jamiyeti in late 1918. This marks the first occasion in which the Kurdish intelligentsia clearly employed a nationalist discourse, and they explicitly demanded the right to self-

305 determination for the Kurds. In their relations with the Great Powers and through their publication, Jin, the early Kurdish nationalists appealed for the establishment of a

Kurdish state. Şerif Pasha's memorandum to the Paris Peace Conference expressed this clearly.

As Chapter II discussed, the pre-war activities of the Kurdish elite were not nationalistic in essence, but can be more accurately categorized as cultural movements within the political boundaries of Ottomanism. However, this same Kurdish elite, so preoccupied with cultural activities in the pre-war period, managed to adopt a strongly nationalist discourse by the post-war period. The reasons for such a radical transformation were manifold. Firstly, this study has argued that the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, leading to its disintegration as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious entity, left little space for the Kurdish elite to accommodate their identity within it.

Secondly, the rise of other nationalisms from the fallen Ottoman Empire, including

Turkish, Arab, and Armenian nationalism, brought the question of 'us' or 'them' to the

Kurdish elite. Among these growing nationalisms, it was Armenian nationalism that contributed most significantly to the early development of Kurdish nationalism. Whereas the Kemalists employed an Islamic discourse in their very early period in order to secure the support of leading Kurdish local leaders, Armenian nationalism employed an ethnic discourse combined with a different religion. In addition, Armenian nationalists laid claim to Six-vilayets of the Ottoman Empire, considered by Kurds as part of Kurdistan. A large section of the Kurdish population and Kurdish elite in this early period, therefore

306 assumed that it was Armenian rather than Turkish nationalism that posed the greatest threat to the Kurds. This assumption was particularly understandable when taking into consideration the Armenians‘ close relations with the Great Powers. This fact not only explains Kemalist success in securing the considerable support of the Kurdish population, but also indicates the role of the Armenians as the 'other' in the formation of Kurdish nationalism as 'us'.

Thirdly, the impact of the Great Powers' nationalistic discourse must be considered when attempting to explain the development of Kurdish nationalism. The Wilson Principles and the Anglo-French declaration all contributed to the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. It is not surprising to note that the Kurdistan Teali Jamiyeti inscribed the Wilson Principles into its program.

Despite the immediate emergence of Kurdish nationalism following WWI, the Kurdish nationalists' endeavor to establish a Kurdish state was doomed by the Lausanne Treaty in late 1922. By the time the British, Turks, and other powers began to negotiate their final peace terms, the Kurdish issue had lost its importance and weight in international power politics. With the conclusion of the Lausanne Treaty, a new status quo was established in the Middle East that excluded a Kurdish entity, whether in independent or autonomous form. There was, however, a real opportunity for the Kurds to gain their independence during the period following WWI up until the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty. In the

Sevres Treaty the Great Powers even agreed to the establishment of an independent

Kurdish state, albeit only in a small part of what was considered Kurdistan. However, in a

307 very short period of time, from 1920 to 1922, the Sevres Treaty was abandoned by the powers that ratified it, paving the way for the Lausanne Treaty. In these years, the

Kurdish nationalists‘ dream of self-determination and their expectations of support from the Great Powers, failed entirely. The years from 1918 to late 1922 proved to be decisive for the future of Kurdish nationalism.

What were the main factors contributing to the failure of the Kurdish nationalists to achieve an independent Kurdish entity? The question is particularly significant in light of the crucial opportunities provided to Kurdish nationalists in the immediate aftermath of the First World War to establish an independent state.

Analysis of the period indicated that the Kurds failed in fostering a sense of national unity, and in developing a coherent political agenda and efficient political organization to mobilize the Kurdish masses for a common purpose. A lack of national unity and lack of a cohesive national political program were the most important factors leading to the failure of the Kurdish nationalists. Many scholars have attributed this to the tribal social structure of Kurdish society. Sluglett concluded that 'the desire for Kurdish autonomy did not, because of traditional tribal and clan rivalries, at this stage produce any coherent movement towards Kurdish unity.'1 McDowall similarly argued: 'The Kurds were politically inept in their response to the post-war situation. Poor communications, diffusion of society and the adversarial nature of intratribal relations made the presentation of a united political position virtually impossible.'2 Kirisci and Winrow emphasized 'the lack of ethnic self-awareness among the Kurds' as one of the main

308 reasons for the lack of a unified national movement in Kurdistan.3 Özoğlu suggested that

'in its infancy, Kurdish nationalism was heavily affected by pre-existing ties and rivalries.

These ties were shaped by the Kurds' own primordial ties and religious affiliations.

Struggles among the most powerful Kurdish notables continued in the form of opposing factions in Kurdish nationalist politics in the era immediately following World War I.'4

The abovementioned explanations have certainly addressed the issue from several crucial perspectives. This study, however, claims that such reasoning is not sufficient in explaining the lack of Kurdish unity. The common denominator of such explanations is their focus on the objective conditions of the Kurdish society during the period under analysis. By objective conditions this study refers to the existing social structure of the time, in effect, the tribalism, as well as denominational divisions, poor communications, underdeveloped infrastructure, and difficult geographical terrain. This study asserts that any work on the development and weakness of Kurdish nationalism is inadequate if it fails to analyze the subjective forces, in effect the role of human agency in making history.

This study has paid particular attention to the role of human agency in the formation, development and failure of early Kurdish nationalism. It suggested that the construction of nation and the formation of nationalism are primarily the result of deliberate human activities rather than evolutionary structural changes. Similarly the failure of early

Kurdish nationalism was also a result of the substantial role played by Kurdish agency placed in opposition and in conflict with other agencies. This suggests that the events of

309 the period under analysis were not predetermined by structural constraints, but rather developed according to the role of the various agencies fighting for opposing and conflicting interests.

By the time the Kurdish nationalists embarked upon nationalist politics at the end of

WWI, they were limited by the fragmented social structure in Kurdistan. This fragmentation was compounded with tribalism, denominational divisions, poor communication and transport system and war-torn devastated economy. Most studies on

Kurdish history blame this background for the lack of Kurdish unity and failure to establish a Kurdish nation-state. The implicit assumption here is that no matter what the

Kurdish nationalists tried, the end result would not have been altered. After all, structural changes do not occur in a short period of time. A structural based explanation does not provide an explanation for the other successfully realized nationalist developments in the former Ottoman lands. Kemalism initially operated in similar conditions, but managed to successfully set up a Turkish nation-state. It is noteworthy that the initial areas that the

Kemalists began their movement were mainly Kurdish populated areas. This suggests that tribalism or poor economy in Kurdistan was not itself a barrier for a national-political movement.

Paying particular emphasis to the role of agency is crucial in understanding the sharp and sudden emergence of Kurdish nationalism. As Chapter II suggested, the Kurdish elite was not involved in nationalistic discourse during the pre-war period, but was rather imbued with the idea of Ottomanism. Following WWI it can be noted that the idea of nationalism

310 emerged amongst the Kurdish intelligentsia. They were actively involved in the Kurdish nationalist politics. In spite of the fact that there were no significant structural changes in

Kurdistan or in Kurdish society, there was a radical change in the thoughts and action of the Kurdish elite in respect to nationalism. Explanation of this radical transformation in the political thought of the Kurdish elite is not possible from a structure based perspective. Instead an agency approach provides better tools to understand and evaluate the formation and development of Kurdish nationalism.

The assumption is not that agency is a power completely autonomous from the structure upon which it operates. This study approaches both agency and structure as complementary forces. Structure influences human behavior, and humans are capable of changing the social structures they inhabit. This study has paid particular emphasis to the role of agency in order to bring balance to Kurdish historiography, which generally works on a structure based explanation of Kurdish historical writings.

This study claims that the lack of national unity, and the failure of Kurdish nationalists to establish an independent Kurdish entity, was mainly due to the particular role played by the Kurdish elite during the period. The role of the Kurdish elite was pre-determined by their political understanding: the way in which they conceptualized the development of world politics, and their interpretation of the Great Powers' intentions towards the

Kurdish issue. It is true that the prevalent objective conditions in Kurdistan certainly complicated the efforts of the Kurdish nationalists. Analysis of Kurdish nationalists'

311 activities, however, did not reveal any precise effort to overcome such obstacles through their own actions.

As discussed in Chapter II, prior to WWI the leading Kurdish elite had not developed a nationalist discourse, nor had they engaged in nationalist activities. In this period, the

Kurdish elite were exclusively involved in Ottoman politics and identified themselves primarily with Ottomanism. Their efforts were entirely directed towards the reformation of the Ottoman institutions. The establishment of a number of Kurdish societies and the publication of journals by the Kurdish elite in the early 20th century did indicate a high level of ethnic self-awareness amongst Kurds. This awareness, however, did not translate into nationalist-oriented activities. Furthermore, this ethnic self-awareness came only third in the order of identity, following after Islam and Ottomanism. It is thus not surprising to learn that most leading Kurdish notables and intellectuals who participated in pre-war Kurdish establishments responded to the call of Jihad and were wholly committed to the Ottoman war effort. Had the Kurdish elite held nationalist aspirations, they most likely would have attempted to use the outbreak of war to their own advantage.

Despite the Kurdish elite‘s eventual demand for self-determination for the Kurds, they failed to recognize the importance of mobilizing mass popular support and national resistance in achieving their ends. Instead, the Kurdish elite placed undue emphasis on both Great Powers‘ policies and science as the sole method for solving social issues. This was clearly demonstrated by a leading Kurdish intellectual, A. Rahman, who claimed that

'the time for cannon and warfare has ended. It is time for everyone to know that the

312 protection of rights can be secured by the law of science, by the pen.'5 Such understanding did not allow space for grass-root political activities and the mobilization of mass resistance. Instead it was assumed by the Kurdish elite that the realization of national rights would be the outcome of an evolutionary process and the working of science. Therefore, in the worldview of the Kurdish elite, it was the scientific method and not political activities which would be instrumental in the development of a national consciousness. Just as the Kurdish elite had aimed for the betterment of Kurdish society through reforming the Ottoman institutions in the pre-war period, once these same institutions had collapsed, they turned their hopes to the Great Powers as the conduit for the realization of their aspirations. The Kurdish nationalists erroneously assumed that the post-war era was a new epoch in which democracy, justice, and peace would be the main tenets. National questions such as that of the Kurds would then be resolved according to the aforementioned principles.

The failure to realize the fundamental necessity of adopting a popular resistance movement obviated the leading Kurdish elite from engaging with the masses to establish nation-wide political and military organizations, which would then struggle for the state of Kurdistan. In the end, the Kurds‘ optimistic expectations of the Great Powers—in their view the embodiment of science and progress—proved to be short-lived, much to the embarrassment of the Kurdish elite. The Kurdish elite eventually came to understand that their perception of the West as their helper and savior ('the wind coming from these regions [west] is not poisoned; it is the breath of life') was not a sound interpretation of international politics.

313 Due to the leading Kurdish elite and nationalist leaders' failure to entertain grass root political activities among the people and their naïve trust at the Great Powers, they did not contemplate the idea of leaving the capital of the Empire for Kurdistan and bringing the diverse Kurdish groups and tribal forces under a single political roof. This study asserts that some of the leading Kurdish leaders, such as Seyyid Abdulkadir, and the sons and grandsons of Mir Bedirhan, enjoyed great influence and respect among the Kurdish tribes and people. Their physical presence in Kurdistan alone would have helped tremendously towards the unification of Kurdish society. Instead they chose to remain in

Istanbul, the capital of the Empire, where they were in close contact with the High

Commissioners of the Great Powers.

The lack of synergy between the Kurdish elite and local notables, tribal chiefs, and town dwellers in Kurdistan contributed significantly towards disunity among the Kurds. Local nationalist leaders' efforts to establish national organizations, such as in Koçgiri,

Diyarbakir, and other localities failed to fill the gap between the Kurdish elite and local notables. These national organizations operated locally rather than across the Kurdish nation. This localism and the absence of centrally coordinated political and military activities proved to be fatal to the aims and aspirations of the Kurdish nationalists.

This study claimed that the role of other agencies such as Great Powers' policies, the rise of Turkish and Arab nationalism and the claims of the Armenian nationalists, were complementary rather than determinant factors which contributed towards the failure of

Kurdish nationalism.

314 Other than Armenian nationalism, the Kurdish nationalists faced two further contending nationalisms during the period under analysis: Turkish and Arab nationalisms. Both nationalisms contested the territories claimed by the Kurds to be Kurdistan. Both the

Turkish and the Arab nationalists had advantages over the Kurds. The Turkish nationalists, or Kemalists, had more experience in managing state affairs. Having efficiently exploited their experience in setting up central political and military organizations with the implicit support of not-yet dismembered Ottoman central institutions, the Kemalists managed to exploit the weaknesses of the Kurdish nationalists by securing the support of a considerable number of Kurdish tribal chiefs, as well as the

Kurdish ulema. The Turkish nationalists were better equipped in international relations and politics, and were able to accurately analyze the politics set forth by the Great

Powers. The Kemalists‘ success in exploiting the differences that existed between Britain and France, and the conflict between the Allies and the Bolsheviks, proved detrimental to

Kurdish nationalism. The Kemalists managed to fill the political and military vacuum in

Kurdistan where the Kurdish nationalists failed to do so. Despite the fact that Armenian nationalism contributed to the formation of Kurdish nationalism, the Armenian nationalists‘ claim on the six-vilayets was exploited by the Kemalists to secure the support of a significant number of Kurds at the expense of Kurdish nationalism.

The Arab nationalists did not have the experience with state affairs of the Turkish nationalists. After all, the Arabs, like the Kurds, had been the subjects of the Ottomans.

However, the Arabs had the explicit support of Britain, and the commitment of pro-Arab high ranking British officials. The Arab states of Iraq and Syria were more the product of

315 the British and French policymakers than the activities of the Arab nationalists themselves.

The instrumental role of Great Powers policies, particularly the role of the British, in leading to the failure of Kurdish nationalism has erroneously been assumed by many

Kurdish nationalists as the most decisive factor. This study has claimed that the Great

Powers‘ role was contributory rather than the only decisive factor. As discussed in the final chapter, Britain‘s ambiguous, contradictory and evolving policy with regard to the

Kurds and Kurdistan was not intentional, but rather a response to local developments within the framework of British general policy and its relations with the other powers.

The fact that the Kurdish nationalists failed to organize their movement in northern

Kurdistan, thus enabling the Kemalists to control the region, had a significant effect on

British policy towards the Kurds both in northern Kurdistan as well as in Southern

Kurdistan, which was under British control. It is worth hypothesizing that should the

Kurdish nationalists have filled the political and military vacuum in northern Kurdistan,

British treatment of Sheikh Mahmut and the Sulaimania government would have been radically different.

It has been widely argued that the oil reserves in Mosul province determined British policy to integrate south Kurdistan into Mesopotamia, or as it was later called, Iraq.

Despite the fact that British oil policy played a significant role in the post-war period peace settlements and in the British desire to keep Mosul province under its control, this study states that the issue of Mosul oil did not contribute towards the failure of Kurdish

316 nationalism and division of Kurdistan. The reading of British primary sources indicates that during the war the British policy-makers were not convinced of the strength of

Kurdish nationalism, and the Kurdish nationalists‘ ability to set up and run an independent Kurdish state. These British concerns regarding Kurdish nationalism had materialized as a result of the failure of the Kurdish nationalists to create a unified national movement in Kurdistan. The early British policy in regards to Kurdistan can be summarized as 'wait and see' within the context of general British policy in the Middle

East, which encompassed: securing strategic routes to India, controlling oil reserves in

Mesopotamia and keeping in check the French position in the region. Once the British realized that the post-war political and military vacuum in eastern Anatolia had been filled by the Kemalists, and the Turkish nationalists achieved diplomatic success in establishing relations with France, Italy and the Bolsheviks, this left no space for British policy-makers to develop a coherent Kurdish policy in favor of Kurdish nationalism.

The advent of the Bolshevik revolution must also be seen as a crucial development in the failure of Kurdish nationalism. Firstly, the nullification of Sykes-Picot agreement and withdrawal of Russian troops from Ottoman territories made the post-war settlement more difficult, as disagreements over the control of former Ottoman lands intensified.

Secondly, Russian withdrawal from the Ottoman territories and Russian rejection of the areas designated to her in the Sykes-Picot agreement, made the task of Turkish nationalists much easier as it provided the Kemalists with space and time to consolidate their power in Anatolia. Once again it is worthwhile to hypothesize that should Russia have occupied territories in Ottoman Armenia and northern Kurdistan, the consolidation of the Turkish nationalists in Anatolia would have been extremely difficult. It is noted

317 that the Kemalists initially strengthened their position in Kurdistan, as indicated by the

Erzurum and Sivas Congresses, which were crucial in the consolidation of Kemalism.

The Lausanne Agreement was one of the most decisive political developments in the modern history of Kurdistan. With the Lausanne Agreement, the fate of Kurdistan was sealed by the Great Powers and the Turkish and the Arab nationalists. The Great Powers reached a consensus between themselves on their imperial interests in the Middle East through the Lausanne Agreement. The agreement established a political status quo in the region. Once the Great Powers arrived at a political balance in the region, it proved to be almost impossible for the Kurdish nationalists to realize their aspirations. Post-Lausanne, each mass uprising in Kurdistan, such as those of Sheikh Said, Ararat, Dersim and the continued struggle of Sheikh Mahmut Berzenji and later Mustafa Barzani in Iraqi

Kurdistan, failed to achieve their ends.

From WWI to the commencement of Lausanne Treaty, Kurdistan was a playing field of warring agencies each struggling for a different purpose, objectives, and interests with varying advantages and disadvantages on either side. In these clashes of agencies, the

Kurds failed to rise up to their own expectations. Their political thoughts combined with the fragmented Kurdish social, political, and economic structure provided ample opportunities for the Kemalists, and British and other powers to manipulate the Kurds to their own advantages.

318 Appendix I

A meeting between the KTJ delegate and the Ottoman officials indicates the tension between the Kurds and the Ottoman Government.1

‗On an invitation of the ex-Sheikh-ul Islam, Haidari Zade, member of the

Cabinet, the Kurdish Committee composed of [Seyyid] Abdulkadir, Emin

Ali Bedirhan, Mevlanzade Rifat, Lt. Col. Emin Bey and Major Avni Bey

were received on the 10th July 1919 Thursday, at 4. p.m. by Haidari Zade

in the Grand Vizierate, where a little later, Abouk Pasha, ex-minister of

War and Avni Pasha, Minister of Marine, came to join them. The

following conversation took place:

Haidar Zade: From telegrams received from the Valis, concerning the

branch offices of the Kurdish High Committee, it is understood that you

are proceeding in Kurdistan to a lot of organizations tending to

independence, and refusing to recognize the Government. We are

authorized by the Government to invite you and understand exactly what

your demands are. Therefore will you please submit in writing to the

Cabinet your wishes.

Lt. Col. Emin Bey: We have given to our branches no orders at all which

are illegal. The contents of the telegrams which received from the Valis

are all untrue. If you will kindly show us the copies, we shall then give

you the necessary answers.

Haidari Zade: You must believe [us]. I know well too that the Kurds do

not want to separate themselves from the Ottoman Empire; but it is

319 possible that they may be deceived. In fact, England having occupied

[Sulaimania], is trying to form a big Kurdistan and annex to it the eastern

Vilayet. We see this.

Mevlan Zade Rifat: If so, England protects the [interests of Kurdistan and

consequently the interests of the Ottoman Empire] more than the Grand

[Vizier] Ferid Pasha. Because it suits better [for the interests of the

Ottomans to have a big Kurdistan [rather] than a big [Armenia], as thus, at

least one whole Moslem Community remains.

Haidari Zade: I did not quite understand what you mean.

Mevland Zade Rifat: As you know the Grand Vizier in his statements in

the Paris Peace Conference, which were published, declared that the

Government has [agreed] to give a vast autonomy to the Armenians; this

[has] naturally greatly afflicted the Kurdish nation.

Avni Pasha: This vast autonomy does not apply to our grounds. It

concerns the Armenian Republic in the Caucasus.

Mevlan Zade Rifat: I cannot understand how the Grand Vizier makes

promises regarding lands not belonging to us.

Abouk Pasha: [Rather angry] We [have given] orders to our Commanders

to protect our frontiers inch by inch, and took all the necessary measure

for it. Don‘t worry.

Major Avni Bey: Then give us also orders to take necessary measures in

Kurdistan.

Abouk Pasha: We are already enrolling Kurdish soldiers as well.

1 The Ottoman Officials were Haidari Zade [Sheikh-ul Islam], Avni Pasha, and Abouk Pasha

320 [Bedirhan] Emin: Then why do you complain and you want to attack us?

Haidari Zade: We do not complain. We are confident of the sincerity of the Kurds. But we wish to know the demands of your club.

Seyyid Abdulkadir: The Grand Vizier‘s statements are quite clear; he wants to sacrifice Kurdistan in favour of the Armenians.

Haidari Zade: We also found Ferid Pasha‘s statements bad [in principle].

And we [have] even decided to have them corrected.

Mevlan Zade: If so, why have you not up to now [calmed] the public opinion.

Haidari Zade: We are waiting the return of the Grand Vizier.

Avni Pasha: Let us talk openly; today our fate is quite unknown. It is necessary to work for one common end. Now we are expecting [your] assistance and obedience. (…) [If] we come to the point that we will not be able think about you, then I will tell you; now go on yourself and save your own heads.

Mevlan Zade: But in such a case won‘t it be too late for us to [look] after our business? The fate of everybody is now about to be fixed in the Paris

Conference. Every Government and every nation is compelled to yield to the decision which will be given there. Therefore our Club is trying to keep calmness and peace in Kurdistan for the salvation of the Kurdish nation.

[Bedirhan] Emin: Can the Ottoman Government assure from now the existence of Kurdistan? Can it give an autonomous government to it?

321 Avni Pasha: As for me, I accept it. The Government will not be able

hereafter to keep this shape. (…)

[Bedirhan] Emin: Well, as long as you wish to give privileges to

Kurdistan, would it not be better to send from now to Kurdistan a Kurdish

Vali and Kurdish officials?

Avni Pasha: Why not? Indicate to us the persons you consider fit.

Seyyid Abdulkadir: You know that formerly, on my insisting, the Cabinet

had chosen two Kurdish Valis for Diyarbakir and Mamuratal-Aziz. But

next day, Ferid Pasha annulled this decision. He is always against the

Kurds.

Avni Pasha: Sir, I assure you that it was not Ferid Pasha who had annulled

that decision.

Seyyid Abdulkadir: Well, who was it then?

Avni Pasha: I can not say now here.‘2

2 FO 371/4192, From British High Commissioner to E. Curzon, 23 July 1919

322 Appendix II

An article written by Yamulkizade encapsulates the basic parameters of the early Kurdish nationalists‘ vision of Kurdish history:

‗What was a Kurd, what does he want? If the old history of the Kurds,

their past life that has not been mentioned for centuries, is to be searched,

what great endeavors, what determination can be seen! Should comparison

be made between those endeavors, those determinations with today‘s

civilization, the Kurds‘ extraordinary efforts and extraordinary justice

would belittle the initiation (achievement) of contemporary civilization.

Mentioned with their heroic characteristics, centuries before B.C. in the

East, under their kings and statesmen like Farons, Xeras, Keyhusrevs, with

their ethical goodness, power of thought and material superiority, they had

been marching on the road of humanity, on the great path of civilization.

For centuries nothing, either internally or externally, could stop their

marching. The Kurdish people were not constituted a discordant people

with separate interests, connections and senses to prevent, slow or make

impossible their development and elevation. They had been constituted

alongside Meds and later Iranian people who were of the same race and

blood.

The existence of this people goes back for thousands of years, even the

science of history cannot determine their pre-historic period. Thanks to

323 their influence and power, civilization and welfare, they extended their borders to Belh, to the river of Sind, to Kizilirmak (Red River), and later crossed over Habeshistan‘s border and the Tuna River. This nation who arose so much and whose work of civilization has survived upto now has began to fall and its power gradually become weak, like some other people whose fall can be seen in history.

Residing in the west of Iran where almost all of the wars have taken place, the Kurds were affected most in their weak and falling period. Naturally, as a result of various conquest and divisions, the trouble and difficulties that the Kurds faced is impossible to depict.

With the advent of Islam, and later, divisions within Islam between Sunni and Shiite, and finally, division of Kurdistan between the Iranian and

Ottoman administration, prevented the Kurds from elevating and developing and resulted in their backwardness from civilization.

Although during the famous leadership of the Kurds and all Muslims, the

Sultan Salahaddin Ayyubi, they rose up again, this situation was not sustained long. The Kurds, during these conquests, had not let their intelligence be inactive. Their thoughts did slip into unproductiveness, with their utmost determination and power, they protected their

324 nationality, traditions, decent emotions, their power of thought and their

ability to distinguish wrong and right.‘3

3 Jin issue no:5, 12 December 1918, pp.1-3

325

326

327

328

329

330

331

Endnotes

Introduction

1 N. Fuccaro, ‗Kurds and Kurdish Nationalism in Mandatory Syria: Politics, Culture, and Identity‘, in A.Vali (ed), Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, Mazda Publishers, Inc, Costa Mesa, California, 2003, pp.191-192, pp.191-217 2 A.Vali, ‗Introduction‘ in A. Vali (ed), , op. cit., p.3 3 A. D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, Routledge, London and New York, 1998 4 Anthony Smith, National Identity, London, Penguin, 1991 5 A. Vali, op. cit., p.2 6 A. Vali, ‗Genealogies of the Kurds: Construction of Nation and National Identity in Kurdish Historical Writing‘, in A. Vali (ed) op. cit., p.59 7 Following the suppression of the Kurdish revolts in Turkey (Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1925, Ararat and Dersim uprisings, lasting until 1938) the first Kurdish organization was established in Turkey called Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocaklari (Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Associations). Its members were arrested during the military coup d’ etat in 1970 and tried. A six leading members of the DDKO defended themselves against the court by asserting the authenticity of Kurdish nation as one of the oldest in the Middle East. The 1970s also saw the proliferation of Kurdish political movements and the publication of Kurdish periodicals. For example, Rizgari, Özgürlük Yolu, Kawa and etc. See: Devrimci Dogu Kültür Ocakları Dava Dosyası, prepared and compiled by Komal Yayınevi (publishing House), Ankara, 1975; Rizgari (issue no:1-9) Ankara, 1976-79 8Tori, Kürtlerin Ilkcag Tarihi ve Kültürü, Berfin Yayinlari, Isanbul, 1997; E. Xemgin, Kürdistan’da Mitoloji ve Dini Inanclar, (Islamiyet Oncesi)) Doz Yayinlari, 2005; E. Xemgin, Kürdistan Tarihi, Islamiyete Kadar, Vol.I., Doz, İstanbul, 1997 (4th ed); C. Bender, Kürdistan Tarihi ve Uygarligi, Kaynak Yayınlari, İstanbul, 1991; J. Kurdo, Kürt Kültürünün Kaynaklari ve Uygarliklar Beşigi Kürdistan, Oz-Ge Yayınlari, Ankara, 1993; S. Bulut, Arkeolojiden Demirci Kawa’ya Isik, Komal, İstanbul, 1996, B. Amedi, Kürtler ve Kürdistan Tarihi, Firat-Dicle Yayınlari, Istanbul, 1991; S. Mihotuli, Arya Uygarliklarindan Kürtlere, Koral Yayınlari, İstanbul, 1992 9 Dr. Cemsid Bender, ibid., p.9 10 The Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish History Institute) and the Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Institute) were established in the 1930s to investigate scientifically the origin of the Turks. Both these institutions prepared the ground of what was later called official Turkish history. They published numerous books about Turkish history and language and attempted to disprove the existence of the Kurds. See: U. Igdemir, Cumhuriyetin 50. Yılında Türk Tarih Kurumu, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1973; Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları XVIII, Türk Ocagi Türk Tarihi Tetkik Heyeti Neşriyatı, Devlet Matbası, İstanbul, 1930; Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi, Konferanslar, Zabit Tutanakları, prepared and compiled by Maarif Vekaleti ve Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti; Tarih I, Tarihten Evvelki Zamanlar ve Eski Zamanlar,; Tarih II, Orta Zamanlar; Tarih III, Yeni ve Yakin Zamanlarda Osmanli Türk Tarihi; Tarih IV, Turkiye Cumhuriyeti, prepared by Türk Tarih Tetkik Cemiyeti, Devlet Matbasıi, İstanbul, 1931; S. Gunaltay, Türk Tarihinin Ilk Devrelerinde Yakın Şark Elam ve Mezopotamya, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1937; S. Gunaltay, Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatlari Müsvetteleri II, NO:33,Mezopotamya-Sumerler, İstanbul, 1943; K. Kemal, Anadolunun Dogusu ve Cenupdogusu, Folklor, Ankara, 1933; For a detailed and critical analysis see: I. Beşikci, Türk Tarih Tezi- Güneş-Dil Teorisi ve Kürt Sorunu, Bilim Yontemi Türk iyedeki Uygulama II, Yurt Kitap-Yayin, Ankara, 1991 (1st edition 1978, Ankara, Komal) 11 See: M. van Bruinessen, Agha , Sheikh and State: On the Social and Political Organisation of Kurdistan, PhD Thesis, Enroprint, Rijswijk, 1978; H. Özoğlu, 'Nationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman-Early Republican Era', in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.33, no:3, August, 2001, pp.383-410; R. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880- 1925, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1989; A. Vali (ed), op. cit.,; M.E. Aslan, Siyaseta Netewi u Helsengandina Tevgera Netewi ya Kurd, Istanbul, Weşanen War, 2002 12 R. Olson, op.cit., pp. 1-26; W. Jwaideh, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origins and Development, Syracuse University, PhD, 1960; Malmisanij, Yüzyılımızın Başlarında Kürd Milliyetciligi ve

332

Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, Jina Nu Yayınlari, Uppsala, 1986; B. Nikitin, Kürdler: Sosyolojik ve Tarihi Inceleme, Deng yayinlari, Istanbul, 1991; N. Kutlay, 21. Yuzyila Girerken Kürdler, Peri Yayınlari, Istanbul, 2002; F. Shakely, Kurdish Nationalism in Mem u Zin of Ehmedi Xani, Sweden (Uppsala), 1983; M. Ayhan, Kürdistanlı Filozof Ehmede Xani, Ankara, 1996; M. Ciwan, Dewra Ahmede Xani u Kurdeweriya wi, Cira, Issue No:2, June 1995, pp.13-29; J. Nebez, The Idea of the Kurdish Nation, Stockholm, 1984 13A. Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918-1985, Mellen Research University Press, San Francisco, 1992, pp. 49-68; A. Hassanpour, ‗The Making of Kurdish Identity: Pre-20th Century Historical and Literary Sources‘, in A. Vali (ed), op. cit., pp.106-162 14 A. Vali, ‗ Introduction‘, op. cit., p.13 15 A. Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914-1923, Routledge, London and New York, 2001, p.3 16 F. Halliday, ‗Can We Write a Modernist History of Kurdish Nationalism?‘, in F.A. Jabar and H. Dawod (ed), The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics, Saqi Books, London San Francsico Beirut, 2006, pp.11-20, pp.14-15 17 E.J. Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 9-10 18 Ibid., p.10 19 Ibid., p.47 20 For a general criticism of such modernist perception of nationalism see M. Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture: The Power of Identity, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2000 (edition), pp. 27-32 21 A.D. Smith, Nationalism and… op. cit., p.127 22 K.W. Deutsch, ‗Nationalism and Social Communication‘, in J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith(ed), Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford- New York, 1994, p.28 23 A.D. Smith, National Identity,…. op. cit., p.14 24 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London, 1983, p.49 25 E. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1984, p.1 26 B. Anderson, op. cit., p.15 27 E. Gellner, op. cit., p.48-9 28 P. Alter, Nationalism, Edward Arnold, London, 1985, p.9 29 E. Kedourie, Nationalism, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1971, p.9 30 M.Emin Aslan, op. cit. 31 This study categorically rejects the term ‗cultural nationalism‘ as it used by some scholars. For example H. Bozarslan claimed the period from late 19th century to the outbreak of the war to be essentially one of cultural nationalism. See H. Bozarslan, ‗Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919-1925)‘, in A. Vali (ed), op cit., pp.163-190, p.167 32 J. Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd ed, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993, p.2 24 S. Zubaida, Islam, the People and the State, Routledge, London- NewYork, 1989, pp.128-9 34 F. Halliday, Nation and Religion in the Middle East, Saqi Books, London, 2000, p.29 35 A. Roshwald, op. cit., p.2 36 P. Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism, London, 1980, p.19 37 K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Collected Works (50 Volumes), London, 1975, vol. XI, pp.103-4, 38 A. Callinicos, Making History: Agency, Structure and Change in Social Theory, Polity Press, Oxford, 1987, p.9 39L. Althusser, ‗Selected‘ Texts, in T. Eagleton (ed), Ideology, Longman, London and New York, 1996 (2nd ed), pp.87-111; E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays, Merlin Press, London, 1978, pp.193-384 40 A. Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism, London, 1981, p.172 41 See: Tori, Asiretten Millet Olma Yapılanmasında Kürtler, Doz Yayınları, Istanbul, 2005, Chapter. IV; O. Aydin, 1925 Kürt Ulus Hareketi, Doz Yayincilik, Istanul, 2006; H. Yildiz, Asiretten Ulusalliga Dogru Kürtler: Politik Felsefe Acisindan Kürt Toplumunun Bir Klasigi, Firat-Dicle Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1991 (First Edition: Stockholm, 1989) 42 H. Yildiz, ibid., p.109

333

43 O. F. Gençkaya, ‗The Kurdish Issue in Turkish Politics: An Overview’, Islamic World Report, Vol. 1, No. 3, 1996, pp. 94-101; Z. Yıldız, Kürd Gerçeği, Yeni Asya Yayınları, Istanbul, 1992; Ş. K. Seferoğlu, Anadolu'nun İlk Türk Sakinleri: Kürdler, Ayyıldız Matbaası, Ankara, 1982 44 S. Mihotuli, op. cit., ; E. C. Paşa, Kürdistan Kısa Tarihi, Doz, Istanbu, 1998; M.R. Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook, Crane Russak, Taylor&Francis International Publishers, Washington, London, 1992; Tori, op. cit., ; E. Xemgin, op. cit.,; E. Xemgin, op.cit.,; C. Bender, op. cit.,; J. Kurdo, op. cit.,; S. Bulut, op. cit.,; B. Amedi, op.cit.; 45 M. Izady, op. cit., pp. xiii-xiv; A critical analysis of the origin of the Kurds see: M. O‘Shea, ‗Tying Down the Territory: Conceptions and Misconceptions of Early Kurdish History‘, in F.A. Jaber & H. Dawod (ed), The Kurds: Nationalism and Politis, Saqi, London, San Francisco, Beirut., pp.113-129 46 D. McDowall, op. cit., pp.1-2; 47 Ibid., p.2

Chapter I 1 See for example: K. Kirisci & G.M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans- state Ethnic Conflict, Frank Cass, London, 1997; K.M. Ahmad, Kurdistan During the First World, Sadi Books, London, 1994; E. O‘Balance, The Kurdish Struggle 1920-94, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1996; D. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, I.B. Tauris, London-New York, 1996; Kendal, The Kurds Under the Ottoman Empire, in G. Chailand (ed), A People Without A Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1993 2For an analysis of tribe-state relations see: P. Khoury & J. Kostiner, Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, I.B. Tauris &Co Ltd. Publishers, London-New York, 1991; R. Tapper (ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan, London, 1983 3R. Tapper (ed.), op. cit., introduction, pp. 6-9 4I.M.Lapidus, ‗Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History‘, in Khoury & Kostiner (ed.), op. cit., p.27 5R. Tapper, ‗Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East‘, in Khoury & Kostiner (ed.), op. cit., pp.48-73, p.51 6T.J. Barfield, ‗Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective‘, in Khoury and Kostiner (ed.), op. cit., p.153 7 It must be noted these dynasties cannot be identified with Kurdishness but rather their identity based upon family ties, cultural tradition and Islam. These dynasties arose during the interval between the decline of the Abbasid caliphate and rise of Seljuqs, which asserted central control over the region. 8T.J. Barfield, ‗Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective‘, in Khoury and Kostiner (ed.), op. cit., p.157 9Ibid., pp.157-8 10Ibid., p. 161 11I. M. Lapidus, ‗Tribes …‘ in Khoury & Kostiner, (ed.), op. cit., p.29 12M. van Bruinessen, Agha , Sheikh and State: On the Social and Political Organisation of Kurdistan, PhD Thesis, Enroprint, Rijswijk, 1978 13A. Kassimlo, ‗The Kurds in Iran‘, in G. Chailand (ed.), op. cit., p.102 14M van Bruinessen, op. cit., p.40 15W. Jwaideh, op. cit., p.83; M. van Bruinessen, op. cit., p.147; E.B. Soane, Administrative Report of Sulaymaniya for the Year 1919, Baghdad, 1920, p.40 16When Soane, a British military officer, asked to a group of Kurdish warriors returning from a bloody engagement where fifty men were wounded, the cause of the conflict it became apparent that the men did not know the reason. ‗The chief told us to fight Hama Beg‘s men, and we did‘ was the response of the men. Soane, Report of Sulaimania, op. cit., p.40 17Quoted from W, Jwaideh, op. cit., p.79 18A. Kassimlo,‘The Kurds …‘ in G Chailand, op. cit., p.101: For instance, Ms Adilla who led the important Jaf tribe before the WWI.

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19M. van Bruinessen, op. cit., p.40; M. van Bruinessen, ‗Kurdish Tribes and States: Tribalism, Ethnicity and Nationalism‘, in F. A. Jabar & H. Dawod (ed), Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, Saqi, London, 2003, pp.165-183 20D.McDowall, op. cit., p.35 21Kendal, op. cit., p.15; M. Bayrak, 21. Yuzyila Girerken, op. cit., p.554 22Kendal, op.cit., p.15 23 D. McDowall, op. cit., p.23 24 W. Jwadieh, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Its Origins and Development, Syracuse University, PhD, 1960 ; M. van Bruinessen, op. cit.,; D. McDowall, op. cit., pp.23-24 25 G.H. Knapp, The Tradegy of Bitlis, Strendale Classics, London, 2000 (original publication by Fleming H. Revell Company in 1919), p.68 26 W. Jwaideh, op. cit., p. 38 27 Ibid., p. 38 28 H. Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age 1300-1600, Phoenix press, London, 2000, p.104 29For general Ottoman land and administrative policy see: M. van Bruinessen, op. cit., pp.181-189; I.M.Kurt, The Sultan’s Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650, Columbia University Press, New York, 1983; H. Inalcik, op. cit., pp.89-118; J. McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923, Longman, London and New York, 1997, pp.101-131 30Hakimuddin Idris-i Bitlisi was born in 1450 and died in 1520. He served the Akkoyunlu dynasty and later after the Ottoman defeated the Safavids in Çaldıran in 1514 he offered his service to the Ottoman Sultan. Kanun-i Sehinsahi was his work, which was assumed to have been presented to the Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent. See Y. Oğuzoğlu, Osmanli Devlet Anlayışı, Eren, Istanbul, 2000, p.182; M.K.Işik, Ünlü Kürd Bilgin ve Birinci Kuşak Aydınlar, Sorun Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2000 31 For a detailed analysis of the Ottoman administration in Kurdistan in the 16th century see: M. van Bruinessen, op. cit., pp.189-194; C. Celil, XIX Yüzyıl Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Kürdler, Ozge Yayınları, Ankara, 1992 32Ibid., p.29 33H. Yildiz, XX. Yüzyıl Başlarında Kürd Siyasasi ve Modernizm, Nujen yayinlari, Istanbul, 1996, p.14 34D. McDowall, op. cit., p.29 35 N. Machiavelli, The Prince, Penguin Books, London, 1995 (ed.), p.16 36Ibid., p.9 37H. Yildiz, op. cit., p.18 38D. McDowall, op. cit., p.30 39Ibid., pp. 30-1 40F. Başkaya, Paradigmanin Iflasi: Resmi Ideolojinin Eleştirisine Giriş, Doz Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1997, 6th ed. p.48; E. J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, I.B. Tauris & Co ltd Publishers, London- New York, 2003, pp.30-31 41 E.J.Zurcher, op. cit., pp.17-22 42Kendal, op. cit., p.19 43Ibid., p.19 44 S. Hakan, Osmanli Arsiv Belgelerinde Kurtler ve Kurt Direnisleri, 1817-1867, Doz Yayincilik, Istanbul, 2007, p.84 45D. McDowall, op. cit., p.51 46H. Özoğlu, ‗Nationalism and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman-Early Republican Era‘, in International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.33, no:3, August,2001, pp.383-410; Jwaideh, op. cit; R. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925, University of Texas Press, Austin. 47W. Jwaideh, op. cit., p.302 48Ibid., p.303 49 By Islamic state I refer to the idea that the state should run according to the Islamic laws (Shariat) which are based on not ethnicity but religion. An Islamic state envisages the unity of Muslim people regardless of their ethnic and racial background. 50M. Barzani, Barzani ve Kürt Ulusal Ozgürlük Hareketi, Vol.I, Doz Yayinlari, Istabul, 2003, p.32; W. Jwaideh, op. cit., p.305; see also D. McDowall, op. cit., p.98; The copies of the petition was also sent to the

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Kurdish leaders in Istanbul, such as Sheikh Abdulqadir, Emin Ali Bedirhan, and General Şerif Pasha. This also proves their ethnic awareness. 51H. Özoğlu, op. cit.,; W. Jwaideh, op. cit., 52Özoğlu, p.388 53Ibid., p.390 54Quoted from D. McDowall, op. cit., p.54 55Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 5 (1881), Ubeydullah to Dr. Cochran, 5 October 1880; it is also quoted at Özoğlu, op. cit., p.391; and A. Safrastiyan, Kurds and Kurdistan, Arwell, London, 1948, pp.62- 63 56Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 5 (1881), Trotter to Goschen, Therapia, 20 October 1880, it was also quoted at Özoğlu, op. cit., p.391, D. McDowall, op. cit., p.55 57F.O. 248/382 Abbott to Granville, Tabriz 1 October 1881; it was also quoted at D. McDowall, op. cit., pp.55-6 58Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 5, (1881), Emilius Clayton, Vice-Consul of Van to Henry Trotter 59Jwadieh, op. cit., p.31 60Özoğlu, op. cit., p.392 61D. McDowall, op. cit., p.53 62A. Pistor-Hatam, ‗Sheikh Ubaidullah's Revolt and the Kurdish Invasion of Iran- Attempts at a New Assessment‘, in The Journal of Kurdish Studies, Vol. IV, 2001-2002, Louvain Peeters Press, 2002, pp.19- 30, p.21 63Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No. 5, (1881) Vice-Consul Clayton to Major Trotter, Baskale, 11 July 1880; it is also quoted at Özoğlu, op. cit., p.390, and D. McDowall, op. cit., p.57 64D. McDowall, op. cit., p.57 65Ibid., pp.58-9 66P.I. Avriyanov, XIX. Yüzyılda Rusyan’nin Iran ve Türkiye ile Savaşlarinda Kürtler: Türkiye, Iran ve Rusya Kürtlerinin Günümüz Politik Durumu, published in Russian in Tiflis in 1920 and translated to Turkish and published in 1926, Ankara, in M. Bayrak Kürdoloji Belgeleri, op. cit., pp.343-344 67B. Kodaman, Sultan II Abdulhamit Devri Dogu Anadolu Politikasi, Ankara, 1987, pp.21-65; see also M. van Bruinessen, op. cit., p.233; R. Olson, op. cit., pp.7-15; S. Duguid, ‗The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia‘, in Middle Eastern Studies, vol.9, May 1973, No:2, pp.139-155; A. Akpinar, Osmanli Devletinde Aşiret Mektebleri, Goçebe Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1997 68M. E. Noel, Note on the Kurdish Situation, Baghdad, 1919, Enclosed in FO 371/3050, 44A/112202 69R. Olson, op. cit., p.8 70E. Zurcher, op. cit., p.87 71M.van Bruinessen, op. cit., p.234 72S. Duguid, op. cit., pp.139-155 73M van Bruinessen, op. cit., p.234 74Kurdistan, issue:28; R. Olson, op. cit., p.9 75For a detailed historical analysis of the Milan Confederation and Ibrahim Pasha see: M. van Bruinessen, op. cit., pp.237-239 76S. Duguid, op. cit., p.146 77R. Olson, op. cit., p.12 78M. van Bruinessen, op. cit., p.238 79R. Olson, op. cit., p.12 80Ibid., p.13 81H.F.B. Lynch, Armenia: Travels and Studies, 2 vol., London, 1901, vol.II, p.219; see also D. McDowall, op. cit., p.60 82Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, No:6 (1896), Hallward to Graves, Van, 10 September 1894 83D. McDowall, op. cit., 60 84 FO 424/169, p30 85 For a detailed analysis see: A. E. Redgate, op. cit., pp.266-273; C. J. Walker, op. cit., pp.133-173; 86D. McDowall, op. cit., p.63 87 K.M. Ahmad, Kurdistan During the First World War, Saqi Books, London, 1994, p.215 88A. Osman, National Liberation Movement of Kurdish People, 1905-1925, unpublished PhD thesis, Moscow, 1965 p.2; R. Hilmi, op. cit., p.18

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89L. Rambout, Les Kurdes, p.23 90M.E. Zeki, Kurdistan Tarihi (Original publication in Kurdish, Baghdad, 1931), Komal Yayinlari,(Turkish edition), Istanbul, 1977, p.162 91 L. van Sanders Five Years in Turkey, Mariland, 1927, p.40; see also S.S. Aydemir, Makedonya’dan Ortaasya’ya Enver Pasa (1908-1914), c.II, Istanbul, Remzi Kitabevi, 1972, pp.141-143 92O. Uzeri, Diyarbakir Revolution, pp.28-29; quoted in A. Osman, op. cit., p.9 93The Times, November, 15, 1919 94V.N.Dadrian ‗Correspondence‘, in Middle Eastern Studies, vol.33 No:3 July 1997, pp.641-642 95 K.M. Ahmad, op. cit., pp.218-219 96A. Powell, The Struggle for Power in Moslem Asia, New York Century, 1923, p.135 97E.H.Keeling, Adventures in Turkey and Russia, London, 1924, pp.209-210 98D. McDowall, op. cit., p.105 99Kurdistan, issue:5, 1919, pp. 45-47 100A. Osman, op. cit., p.14 101D. McDowall, op. cit., p.112 102G. Bell, Review of the Civil Administration from 1914 to the Summer of 1920, Cmd 1061, London, 1929, pp.46-7 103K. Mason, ‗Central Kurdistan‘, in The Geographical Journal, vol. LIV, No:6 December 1919, pp.329- 347, p.345 104A.T. Wilson, Loyalties: Mesopotamia, 1917-1920, London, 1930, pp.31-32 105 K.Mason, op. cit., p.330 106 K.M. Ahmad, Introduction, The First World.., op. cit.

Chapter II 1 R. Olson, op. cit., pp. 1-26; W. Jwaideh, op.cit.; Malmisanij, op. cit. 2 R. Olson, op. cit., chapter I 3 W. Jwaideh, op. cit., pp.297-299; R. Olson, op. cit., pp. 15-25; M.V. Bruinssen, op. cit., p. 369; Malmisanij, Yüzyılımızın, op.cit., p.9; C. Kutschera, Kürd Ulusal Hareketi, (Le Mouvement National Kurde) Avesta, Istanbul, 2001, pp.31-50; M. van Bruinessen, op. cit., pp.369-376; C. Celil, Kürd Aydinlanmasi, op. cit., pp.13-95; B. Nikitin, Kürdler: Sosyolojik ve Tarihi Inceleme, Deng yayinlari, Istanbul, 1991, pp.337-362 4 N.Entessar, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, Lynne Rienner Publications, Boulder and London, 1992, p.82 5 For periodization of Kurdish nationalism see introduction 6 E. Gellner, op. cit.,; E. Kedourie, op. cit.,; A.D. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, op. cit.,; B. Anderson, op. cit. 7 A. D. Smith, op. cit., p.56 8 M. Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985; see also A. Smith, Nationalism and…, op. cit., p.56 9 A. Smith, Nationalism and…, op. cit., p57 10 Ibid., p.57 11 Ibid., p.57; See also: N. Entessar, op.cit., pp.82-83 12 Kendal, op. cit., p.35 13 Quoted form Özoğlu, op. cit., p.386 14 E. Kedouri, Nationalism, op. cit., p2 15 Ibid., p.3 16 The Kurdish elite emphasis on literacy was reflecting a genuine need. In this period in Kurdistan the literacy rate was 5%. See: Malmisanij, Yüzyılımızın, op. cit., p.11 17 S.J. Shaw, ‗Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Reformers‘, in W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers (ed), Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1968, pp.29-39, pp.33-7 18 A. Hourani, ‗Ottoman Reform and Politics of Notables‘ in W.R. Polk and R.L. Chambers (ed), op.cit., pp.41-68 19 H. Özoğlu, op. cit., p.384 20 Ibid., p.385

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21 Ibid., p.385 22 Ibid., p.385 23 Sultan Abdulhamit II, Siyasi Hatiratim, Dergah Yayinlari, 6th ed. Istanbul, 1999, p.52 24 Kendal, op. cit., p.25 25 H. Özoğlu, op. cit., p.400; see also Malmisanij, Cizra Botanli Bedirhanler ve Bedirhan Ailesi Derneginin Tutanaklari, Sweden:APEC, 1994 26 C. Celil, Jiyana Rewshenbiri u Siyasi ya Kurdan, Jina Nu Yayinlari, Uppsala, 1985, p.39; see also Malmisanij, Abdurrahman Bedirhan ve Ilk Kürd Gazetesi: Kurdistan, Sweden, 1992, p.1 27 Kurdistan, Issue no: 31, 14 April 1902; see also Malmisanij, Abdurrahman … op. cit., p.14 28 I. Goldaş, Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti, Doz Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1991, p.54 29 Özoğlu, op. cit., p.392 30 Ibid., p.393; see also I. Goldaş, op. cit., pp.16-21; Dr. Nuri Dersimi, Dersim ve Kürd Milli Mucadelesine Dair Hatiratim, Oz-Ge Yayinlari, Ankara, 1992, pp.104-105 31 See Özoğlu, op. cit; Goldaş, op. cit.,; D. McDowall, op. cit; Yıldız, op. cit. 32 D. McDowall, op. cit., 33 H. Yıldız, op. cit., pp.30-31 34 D. McDowall, op. cit., p.97 35 H. Refik, op. cit., p.16 36 Ibid., p.18; Roji Neweh, issue no:7, 1960; A. Osman, op.cit.,p2 37 D.McDowall, op. cit., p.156 38 R. Hilmi, op. cit., p.17 39 Ibid., p.17 40 Quoted from Yıldız, op. cit., p.43 41 For a short biography of these Kurdish intellectuals see: M.K. Isik, Ünlü Kürd Bilgin ve Birinci Kuşak Aydinlar, Sorun Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2000, pp.143-180 42 Amongst these 70 members 8 were Members of Ottoman Parliament, 18 were military officers, 8 governors or qaimmaqams, 36 were writers, doctors, lecturers, journalists and so on. For further details see Göldaş, op. cit., pp.16-70 43 Içtihad, issue no:3, November 1907, quoted form Dr. M.S. Hanioglu, Bir Siyasal D ü ş ün ür olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Donemi, Ucdal Nesriyat, Istanbul, (1981?), p.217 44 S. Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri (1895-1908), Iletişim Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1983, 2nd ed. p.164 45 See Malmisanij, Abdurrahman… op. cit., 46 H. Yıldız, op. cit., p.44 47 Malmisanij, Yuzyilimizin…, p.7 48 For a detailed analysis of Dr. Abdullah Cevdet‘s thought see M.S. Hanioglu, Bir Siyasal Dusunur, op. cit., 49 Quoted in Yıldız, op. cit., p.32 (French Secret Documents: Young Turks File, vol.7, 5.68) 50 For details about Şerif Pasha, see: Ronahi, Bir Kürd Diplomatinin Firtinali Yillari: General Şerif Pasha, 1865-1944, APEC, Stockholm, 1995 51 Quoted in D. McDowall, op. cit., p.121 52 By umeras the writer refers to those Kurdish notables who had been serving in the Ottoman establishment. 53 K.C.Pasha Pasa (Zinar Silopi), Doza Kurdistan: Kürd Milletinin 60 Yillik Esaretten Kürtuluş Savaşı Hatiralari, Ozge Yay. Ankara, 1991 2nd ed,.p.28 54 H. Özoğlu, op. cit., p.400 55 S.J. Shaw, op. cit., p.37 56 It is also known as Kürd Taa'ali ve Taraqi Jamiyati (Kurdish Society for Progress and Union) 57 K.C. Pasha, op. cit., p.31 58 T.Z. Tunaya, Turkiyede Siyasal Partiler, vol.1 Ikinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi, Iletişim Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1988, p. 430 59 Halil Hayali was the first Kurdish intellectual who attempted to write a Kurdish language book for teaching purposes. On this book he worked together with Yusuf Ziya, who later became one of the most prominent of the Turkish nationalists and became known as Ziya Gokalp. However the first manuscript was burnt by Yusuf Ziya when he joined the CUP. Halil Hayali had to re-write the first Kurdish language book. See, Rohat, Ziya Gökalp’in Büyük Çilesi: Kürdler, Firat Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1992

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60 The aims of the KTTJ as declared in Article 1 in the form of a leaflet or bulletin under the heading of ‗Declaration of the Asssociation‘ published in the newspaper of the same association, Kürd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, Issue 1, 22 Tesrinisani 1324 (According to Miladi calender 5 December 1908), p. 1.; See for a complete text of the regulation of the KTTJ in the original Ottoman language , T.Z. Tunaya, op.cit., p. 435 The Ottoman language is suitable for construction of very long sentences. This habit of using long sentences was also a preferred practice. Article 1, for example, is written in one sentence without any full stops. Due to the difficulty of translating it literally I have preferred to summarise it under a few points. 61 The term Millet refers to all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire both Muslim and non-Muslim. In the modern lexicon of Turkey, Millet is used as nation. 62 The term Vatan referred to the territory of the Ottoman Empire where all the Muslim and non-Muslims live together. 63 Kendal, op.cit., p.27 64 Kürd Teavun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue No: 4 p.33 65 K.C. Pasha, op. cit., p. 28; Kendal, op. cit., p27 66 Ibid., p.29 67 Ibid., p. 28; M.V. Bruinessen, op.cit., p. 370 68 The founding members were as follows: Bedirhanzade Emin Ali Beg; Dr. Abdullah Cevdet Beg; Bedirhanzade Mithat Beg; Erzurum Meb‘usu (MP) Seyfullah Beg; Hakkari Mebusu Taha Efendi; Van Mebusu Tevfik Beg; Bedirhanzade Kamil Beg; Bedirhanzade Abdurrahman Beg; Genc Mebusu Mehmet Efendi; Mir Seyfettinzade Huseyin Avni Beg; Miralay (colonel) Mahmut Sami Beg; Diyerbekirli Mehmet Faik Efendi; Bediuzzeman Said Efendi; Mutkayli Halil Hayali Efendi; Kurdizade Ahmet Ramiz. These names are taken from T.Z.Tunaya, Türkiyede Siyasal Partiler, Vol. II Mütareke Dönemi, Iletişim Yayinlari, Istanbul,1999, p.224 69 See for the original charter of the association in the original Ottoman language, T.Z. Tunaya, op.cit, vol.II p.224 70 The date of the society is not definite. Emin Zeki, W. Jwaideh and Basil Nikitin suggest that it was established in 1910. Celile Celil on the other hand argues that 1910 was the year when most of the non- Turkish organisations were closed by the CUP. He states that 1912 might be the date as the Union and Progress was overthrown by Hurriyet and Itilaf Partisi. Kadri Cemil Pasha in his memoirs also puts the date as 1912. 71 Kadri Cemil Pasha, op. cit., p.34 72 Ibid., p34 73 The members include Kemal Fevzi, his brother Ziya Vehbi, Kerkuklu Necmeddin Huseyni, Babanzade Aziz, Arvasli Sefik, Mukuslu Hamza, Harputlu Tayyip Ali, Suleymaniyeli Abdulkerim, Diyarbakirli Mustafa Resat and Salih, Mahabatli Doctor Mustafa Sevki. See for a complete list, K.C. Pasha, ibid.,, p.35 74 Among the contributors to these two journals were Dr. Abdullah Cevdet, Constitutional professor Babanzade Ismail Hakki Beg, Memduh Salim Beg, Yusuf Ziya Beg (whom later became known as Ziya Gokalp) and Kemal Fevzi. 75 Naci Kutlay, Ittihat ve Terraki ve Kürdler, Beybun Yayınları, Ankara, 1992, p. 223 76 M.S. Sekban, Kürd Sorunu, Mentes Basim, 1970, p.19 77 Tayyip Ali was hanged in 1925 by the Kemalists for being involved in the Seikh Said Rebellion in 1925. see, C. Celil, op. cit., p. 74; K.C.Pasha, op. cit., p. 35 78 K. C. Pasha, op. cit., p. 35 79 E. C. Pasha, Muhtasar Hayatim, Bruksel Kürd Enstitusu, 1991, p.23; K.C. Pasha, ibid., p. 35; According to K.C.Pasha the members of Hevi branch in Lausanne included Ekrem, Semsettin Cemil Pasha, Babanzade Recai Nuzhet, and Dersimli Selim Sabit. 80 The Hevi society was activated after the First World War under Asui Bedirhan. It published several books including the epic story of Mem-u-Zin by Ahmede Khani and the Kurdish Learning Book by Ekrem Cemil Pasha. The society finally was closed under pressure from the Mustafa Kemal administration in 1922. see, C.Celil, Kürd Aydinlanmasi., op.cit., p.75 81 There are not any statistics in regard to the circulation of these publications. There is no information with regard to the numbers of each issue that had been sent to Kurdistan. Through the readers' letters in Kurdistan we know that the paper had reached Kurdistan and among literate people created enthusiasm. 82 Kurdistan was initially published in Cairo in 1898, and later, due to the Ottoman pressure on Egypt, it was published in Genoa and London.

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83 Kurdistan, issue :4, 3 June 1898, p.1 84 The term Ottoman Government used here in fact refers to the Ottoman state. 85 Kurdistan, issue:13, 2 April 1899, p.1 86 Kurdistan, issue: 16, 6 August 1899, p. 1 87 The term Vatan denotes the Ottoman territory. 88 Kurdistan, issue:22, 2 February 1900, p.3 89 Ibid., p.3 90 Kurdistan, issue:29, 14 October 1901, p.4 91 Kurdistan, issue:31, 14 April 1902 92 C. Celil, op. cit., p. 35; U.A. Petrosyan, Jön Türk Hareketi, Moskova, 1971, p, 271 93 Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue: 1, 5 December 1908, p. 2 94 Ibid., p.3 95 Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue:2, 12 Decenber 1908, p. 9 96 Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue: 4, 26 December 1908, p.32 97 Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue: 6, 9 January 1909, p. 41 98 By national unity the author refers to the unity of the Ottoman millet. 99 Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue:6, p. 42 100 Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue: 9, 30 January 1909, p. 85 101 See Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue no: 2 102 Roji Kurd, issue: 1, 1913, p.4 103 Kavim can be translated as tribe, people, nation. When it is used as nation it should not be understood in the modern sense of the term. It should be rather understood as a part of the whole Ottoman millet. 104 Roji Kurd, issue: 1, 1913, pp. 5-6 105 Ibid., p.6 106 It must be stated that modernisation and reformation attempts by the Ottomans and later Young Ottomans and Turks since the early period had always been formulated for the state and military institution. The wider social, economical and political issues had not been taken into account. 107 E. J. Zurcher, Turkey : A Modern History, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd Publishers, London/New York, 1998, p.21 108 The modernisation and reformation attempts included the Nizami-Cedid in the very early 19th century, and reform policies of the Sultan Mahmut II from 1826 onwards culminating in the Tanzimant (reform), which dominated the 19th and early 20th century. 109 Kurdistan, issues: 4,9,13,29; Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issues:1-9; The Roji Kurd, issues:1-3 110 Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue:3, p. 18 111 Milletler (nations) and Kavimler (tribe, nation, people, race). 112 Roji Kurd, issue: 1, p. 7 113 Kurdistan, issues: 1-2 114 Kurdistan, issue: 4, p.1 115 Kürd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue: 1, p. 4 116 Ibid., p.4 117 Kurdistan, issue:2, p. 4 118 Kurdistan, issue:8, p. 3 119 Kurdistan, issues: 8, 9, 11, 13, 14 120 Kurd Teavvun ve Teraqi Gazetesi, issue:4, p.33 121 Roji Kurd, issue:1, p. 4

Chapter III 1 For full members see Goldaş, op. cit., pp.39-45 2 Ibid., pp.39-45 3 K.C. Pasha, op. cit., p.53 4 I. Goldaş, op. cit., p.49

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5 See: K.C. Pasha, op. cit., p.55; B. Arda, ‗Dogu Kürdistan Dosyasi –Dogu Kürdistanda Siyasi Mücadelenin Tarihsel Gelişimi‘, in Medya Güneşi, issue no:6, November-December 1988, p.38; Kurdistan, issue no:7, 8 May 1919 6 Z. Tunaya, Türkiyede Siyasal Partiler, vol II. Hurriyet Vakfi Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1986, pp.205-212 7 Jin, issue no:21, 18 June 1919, pp2-7 8 Ibid., p.7 9 FO 371/4192, document no:163719, T.B. Hohler, British High Commission, Constantinople, 8 December, 1919 10 FO 371/4192, 114089, from Hohler, British High Commissioner in Constantinople to I. A. C. Titley, 11 FO371/5068/E4396/11/44, pp.210-217 12 FO371/5067/E1083/11/44, pp.169-173 13 After the Traeaty of Berlin, Erzurum province was divided into three provinces: Erzurum, Van and Bitlis. These three together with those of Sivas, Diyarbakir and Kharput became known as the ‗six vilayets‘ of the Ottoman Empire. See for C. J. Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation, Croom Helm London, St Martin‘s Press New York, 1980, p.122 14 C. J. Walker, op. cit., p.266 15 Quoted from C.J. Walker, op. cit., p.263 16 Quoted from ibid., p.264 17 Quoted from Hovanissan, The Republic of Armenia, vol.I The first Year 1918-1919, Berkeley, 1971, p.316; see also McDowall, op. cit., p.130 18 Şerif Pasha, Memorandum sur les Revendications du people Kurde; published in a Turkish version in M. Bayrak, Kürdoloji Belgeleri, op. cit., p.25 19 Jin, issue no:23, pp.1-2, 28 August 1919 20 K. C. Pasha, op. cit., p.57 21 By Military Court, the writer refers to the Paris Peace Conference. It is an indication of his anger and dissapointment. 22 Jin, issue no:15, 30 March 1919, pp.3-5 23 Jin, issue no:6, 25 December 1919, p.15 24 Jin, issue no:9, 16 January 1919, p.7 25 The Ottoman officials were Haidari Zade (Sheikh-ul Islam), Avni Pasha, and Abouk Pasha. 26 Quoted from C.J. Walker, op. cit., p.264 27 Quoted from, D. McDowall, op. cit., p.115 28 Jin, issue no:6, 25 December 1919, pp.14-5 29 Jin, issue no:1, 7 November 1918, p.5 30 FO 371/5063, E4396/11/44 from Admiral Richard Webb, Acting High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Foreign Office 31 Quoted from Yıldız, op. cit., p.40 32 Ibid., p.41 33 FO 371/4193, Hohler to Curzon, 12 November 1919 34 FO 371/5068, E.2432 Admiral de Robeck, British High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Earl Curzon, 29 March 1920 35 H. Özoğlu, op. cit., p.394 36 D. McDowall, op. cit., p.133 37 FO 371/4192, 163719, T.B. Hohler, British High Commission, Constantinople, 8 December, 1919 38 Ibid., 39 Quoted from D. McDowall, op.cit., p.152 40 N. Dersimi, Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim, Koln, Komkar Yainlari, 1988, p.120 ; N. Dersimi, Dersim ve Kürd Milli Mücadelesine Dair Hatiratim, Oz-Ge Yayinlari, Ankara, 1992, pp. 104-105 41 Ikdam, 27 February 1920, the English translation of the same article can be found in FO 371/5063/11/44, E.4396 42 FO 371/5063, E.4396/11/44, from Admiral Richard Webb, Acting Commissioner, Constantinople, to Foreign Office 43 There is a general consensus about the contributory factor of family rivalries in the split. See: D. McDowall, op. cit,; K.C. Pasha, op. cit.,; H. Özoğlu, op. cit.,; I. Göldaş, op. cit.,; H. Yildiz, op. cit., 44 FO 371/5068 E.6148/11/44, no: 725/m 1743/5

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45 H. Özoğlu, op. cit., p.400 46 I. Göldaş, op. cit., p.193 47 See: N. Dersimi, Kürdistan Tarihinde, op. cit.,; K.C. Pasha, op. cit; I. Göldaş, op. cit., 48 Full founding members were: E.A. Bedirhan (Botan); Ferit beg (Sulaimania); Şükrü Beg (Sulaimania); Fuat Beg (Sulaimania); Hikmet Baban Beg (Sulaimania); Dr. Abdullah Cevdet (Arapkir); Dr. Şükrü Mehmet Beg (Bakirmaden); Kemal Fevzi (Bitlis); Ekrem Cemil Pasha (Diyarbakir); Necmeddin Husey (Kirkuk); Mevlanzade Rifat Beg and Memduh Selim Beg (Van). 49 Vakit, 7 June 1920 50 I. Göldaş, op. cit., p.198 51 K.C.Pasha, op. cit., p.160; see also I. Göldaş, op. cit., p.199 52 H. Özoğlu, op. cit., p.401 53 Quoted from ibid., p.402 (Doc 194[E 6215/43/93] in British Documents: 2:300) 54 Jin, issue no:1, 7 November 1918, pp.7-11 55 Jin, issue no:3, 20 November 1918, pp.2-3 56 Ibid., pp.10-11 57 Jin, issue no:9, 16 January 1919, pp.9-12 58 Jin, issue no:10, p.11, 2 February 1919 59 Jin, issue no:10, pp.14-6 60 Jin, issue no:15, 30 March 1919pp.11-18 61 Jin, issue no:1, 7 November 1918, pp.7-11 62 Jin issue no:16, 10 April 1919, pp.5-8 63 Jin, issue no:25, 2 October 1919, p10 64 Ibid., p.4 65 Jin, issue no:20, 3 June 1919, p.13 66 Jin, issue no:3, 20 November 1918, pp.15-16 67 Jin, issue no:19, 22 May 1919, pp.12-14 68 Jin, issue no:10, 2 February 1919, pp.10-16 69 F. Anthias and N. Yuval-Davis, ‗Women and The Nation-State‘, in Hutchinson and Smith (ed), Nationalism, op. cit., pp.312-316, p.313 70 Ibid., p.313 71 J. Klein, ‗En-Gendering Nationalism: The 'Woman Question' in Kurdish Nationalist Discourse of the Late Ottoman Period‘, in S. Mojab (ed), Women of A Non-State Nation: The Kurds, Mazda Publishers, Inc., 2001, pp.25-51, p.32 72 Jin, issue no:20, pp.4-10, 4 June 1919 73 Jin, issue no:14, p.9, 10-30 March 1919? (The exact date of this issue is unknown.) 74 Ibid., p.10 75 Jin, issue no:20, 4 June 1919, p.14 76 Emine Khanim was the granddaughter of the famous governor of Egypt, Mehmed Ali Pasha, and her father was Halim Pasha. Se'id Halim Pasha, who for a time served as Grand Vizier, was her brother. Emine Khanim was greatly influenced by the European women's movement. She was particularly affected by two Swedish women's rights advocate, Fredrika Bremer and Ann-Margaret Holmgren. See: R. Alakom, ‗Kurdish Women in Constantinople at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century‘, in S. Mojab (ed), op. cit., pp.53-70; 77 For Slavophilism see: A. Wallicki, A History of Russian Thought, Clerendon Press Oxford, 1980; V.V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy, vol.1, Routledge, London. 1967; R. Hare, Pioneers of Russian Social Thought, Greenwood Press, 1967; L. Schapiro, Nationalism and Rationalism in Russian 19th CenturyPolitical Thought, Yale University Press, 1967 78 Jin issue no:17, 29 April 1919, pp.1-9 79 Jin, issue no:10, 2 February 1919, p.11 80 Ibid., pp.10-16 81 Jin issue no:6, 25 December 1918, p.11 82 Jin, issue no:7, 2 January 1919, pp.13-4 83 Jin, issue no:3, 20 November 1918, pp.4-5

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Chapter IV 1 B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, London, 1961, p.1 2 A. Yıldız, Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları, 1919-1938, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2nd ed. 2004, pp.106-107; B. Lewis, op. cit., pp.347-48 3 B. Lewis, op. cit., pp.1-2 4 Quoted in D. Avcıoğlu, Türkiyenin Düzeni: Dün-Bugün-Yarın, Tekin Yayinevi, Istanbul,1998, p.283 5 B. Lewis, op. cit., p.329; A. Yıldız, op. cit., pp.50-2; B. Eryılmaz, Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi, Ağaç yayınları, İstanbul, 1992, p.11 6 Ş. Sami, Kamus-i Türki, vol.III, Tercüman, İstanbul, 1986, pp.881-882; see also, A. Yıldız, op. cit., pp. 50-2 7 B.Lewis, op. cit., p.329 8 See: D. Avcioglu, Milli Kürduluş Tarihi: 1838’den 1995’e, Istanbul Matbaasi, 1974; D. Avcioglu, Türkiyenin Düzeni, op. cit., S. Sonyel, Atatürk- The Founder of Modern Turkey, Turkish Historical Society Printing House, Ankara, 1989;S. Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement, SAGE Publications, London, 1975; S. Tansel, Mondros’tan Mudanya’ya Kadar, vol.I, Basbakanlik Basimevi, Ankara, 1973; T.Z.Tunaya, Turkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, vol.II :Muterake Dönemi, Iletisim Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1999 (1st edition by Dogan Yayinlari 1952); C. Kayra, Sevr Dosyasi, Boyut Kitaplari, Istanbul, 1997; Ş. S. Aydemir, Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal, 1919-1922, vol.II Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 1964; T. Sorgun, Mütareke Dönemi ve Bekirağa Bölüğü, Kum Saati Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003; D. Perinçek, Kemalist Devrim: Kurtuluş Savaşında Kürd Politikası, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999; Mim K. Oke, The Armenian Question, 1914-1923, K.Rustem& Brother, the University Printing House, Oxford, 1988; U. Mumcu, Kazim Karabekir Anlatiyor, um:ag Vakfi Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1990; U. Mumcu, Kürd Islam Ayaklanmasi 1919-25, um:ag Vakfi Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1991 9 See: H.E. Allen, Turkey’s Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development, Greenwood Press Pulishers, New York, 1968; R.D.Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, A Case Study in National Development, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963; A. Mango, Atatürk, John Murray, London, (Reprinted ed 2002); J.McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks, An Introductory History to 1923, Longman, London and New York, 1997; G. Lewis, Turkey, Ernest, Benn Limited, London, 1965; S.J. Shaw & E.K. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, vol.II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (Reprinted 1988); P.C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1974; B.Lewis, op. cit.,; W. Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, Frank Cass, London, 2000; L.Evans, United States Policy and the Partition of Turkey, 1914-1924, Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1965; M.E. Yapp, The Near East since the First World War: A History to 1995, 2nd ed. Longman, London, 1996; W. Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors 1801-1927, Frank Cass and Co Ltd., London, 1966; W. Yale, The Near East, A Modern History, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, London, 1958. 10 W. Yale, op. cit., p.275 11 R.D. Robinson, op. cit., p.37 12 W. Yale, op. cit., p.280 13 Ibid., p.287 14 See: F. Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey, Routledge, London and New York, (Reprinted 1998), pp.48-9; F. Başkaya, Paradigmanın İflası: Resmi İdeolojinin Eleştirisine Giriş, Doz, İstanbul, 1997, 6th ed. 15 M.E.Yapp, op. cit., p.151 16 A. Roshwald, op.cit., p.58 17 Zürcher, op. cit; Feroz Ahmad, op. cit; M. Yegen, Devlet Söyleminde Kürd Sorunu, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999; for a critical reading of this period see F. Başkaya, op. cit.,, and I. Küçükömer, Düzenin Yabancılaşması, Bağlam, 2nd ed. İstanbul, 2001 18 For a detailed analysis of this period see M. Yegen, op. cit., pp.66-75 19 A. Roshwald, op. cit., p.59; F. Ahmad, op. cit., p.33; M. Yegen, op. cit., p. 88 20 B. Lewis, op. cit., p.208 21 Ş. Mardin, Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908, İletişim, 7th ed. 2000, p.301 22 A. Roshwald, op. cit., p.59 23 B. Lewis, op. cit., p.214

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24 A. Roshwald, op. cit., p.59 25 O. Tiftikçi, Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Burjuvazinin Evrimi, El Yayınevi, İstanbul, 2003, pp.156-162; A. Özer, Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete: Siyasal Kurum ve Düşüncelerde Süreklilik ve Kopuş, Sis Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2000, pp.36-37 26 A. Özer, op. cit., p.36 27 F. Ahmad, op. cit., p.33 28 A. Roshwald, op. cit., p.63 29 Y. Akçura, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset, Türk Tarih Kurumu, Ankara, 1998, p.28 (the first edition of this article was published in Egypt in Turk newspaper in 1904) 30 Ibid., p.33 31 B. Lewis, op. cit., p.214 32 R. Melson, ‗Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry into the Armenian Genocide of 1915‘ in R. G. Hovannisian (ed) The Armenian Genocide in Perspective, Transaction Books, New Brunswick and Oxford, 1986, p.72, pp.61-84 33 A. Roshwald, op. cit., p.107 34 T.Z. Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler: İttihat ve Terakki, Bir Çağın, Bir Kuşağın, Bir Paritinin Tarihi, vol.III, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2000 (first edition 1952), p.293; M.Yegen, op. cit., p74 35 A. Roshwald, op.cit., p.106 36 Ibid., p.107 37 Ibid., p.110 38 N. Kutlay, İttihat Terakki ve Kürdler, Beybun Yayınları, Ankara, 1992, pp.259-276 39 F. Başkaya, op. cit., p.53 40 Z. Toprak, Türkiye’de ‘Milli İktisat’ 1908-1918, Ankara Yurt Yayınları A.Ş. 1982, pp.30-35;U. Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp, London, Luzac and Company, 1950, pp.140-46 41 S.H.Astourian, ‗Genocidal Process: Reflections on the Armeno-Turkish Polarization in the Armenian Genocide‘, in R.G. Hovannisian The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics, Macmillan, London, 1992, p.72, pp.53-79 42 Ibid., p.70 43 O. Tiftikçi, op. cit., p.258 44 F. Başkaya, op. cit., pp.55-7 45 S.H. Astourian, op. cit., pp.71-2 46 Ibid., p.72 47 K.M.Ahmad, Kurdistan During the First World War, Saqi Boks, London, 1994, pp.145-183 48 D. Avcıoğlu. Türkiyenin Düzeni, op. cit.,; F. Başkaya, op. cit.,; O. Tiftikçi, op. cit., 49 E. Zürcher, op. cit., p.138 50 J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Middle East, A Documentary Record, 1914-1956, vol.II, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc, Princeton, New Jersey, London, 1956, pp.36-7 51 E. Zürcher, op. cit., p.140 52 Ibid., p.140 53 O. Tiftikçi, op. cit., p.317 54 M.K. Atatürk, Nutuk, Mercek, İstanbul, 2002, p.7 55 A.J. Toynbee & K.P. Kirkwood, Turkey, London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1926, p.78 56 H.E. Allen, op. cit., p.46 57 R. D. Robinson, op. cit., p.20 and 91 58 P.C. Helmreich, op. cit., p.230 59 D. Avcioğlu, Türkiyenin…. op.cit., p.338 60 K. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, Emre Yayınları, İstanbul, pp.39-63; K. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizin Esasları, Emre Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995, pp.33-42; O. Tiftikçi, op. cit., pp.365-377 61 F. Ahmad, op. cit., p.49 62 The official Turkish historiography paid no or little attention to the activities of Mustafa Kemal in his stay in Istanbul prior to his dispatch to the interior on May 1919. 63 L. Kinross, Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation, Weidenfeld / Nicholson, London, 1964 64 O. Tiftikçi, op.cit., p.371 65 Ibid., p.376

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66 The General-Inspectorate covered the areas of Trabzon, Erzurum, Sivas and Van provinces and Erzurum and Samsun towns. The civil authorities of these provinces and towns were under the command of the General-Inspectorate. The army commanders of Diyarbakir, Bitlis, Elazig, Ankara, and Kastamonu provinces had also to obey the Inspectorate. 67 F. Başkaya, op. cit.,; F. Ahmad, op. cit; O. Tiftikçi, op. cit; 68 E. Zürcher. op. cit., p.154 69 F. Başkaya, op.cit.,p.56 70 Ş. Sureyya, op.cit., p.20 71 K.H.Karpat, ‗Introduction: Turks Remember Their Otoman Ancestors‘, in K.H.Karpat (ed) Otoman Past and Today’s Turkey, Brill-Leiden, 2000, p.xııı, pp.vıı-xxıı 72 D. Avcioğlu, Milli Kürduluş… op. cit., pp.8-9 73 See for example: D. Avcioğlu, Milli Kürduluş, op. cit., pp.6-9; H. İzzettin Dinamo, Kutsal Isyan: Milli Kürduluş Savaşının Gerçek Hikayesi, vol.5 May Yayınları, İstanbul, 1967, pp.163-4 74 İ. Beşikçi, Kürdistan üzerinde Emperyalist Bölüşüm Mücadelesi, 1915-1925, Yurt Kitap-Yayın, Ankara, 1992, pp. 178-184 75 FO 371/4158/96979, Clathrope to Curzon, despatch, Istanbul 21/6/1919, enclosing report by Captain L.H. Hurst, Samsun, 12/6/1919 76 E. Zürcher, op. cit., pp.138-167; O. Tiftikçi, op.cit., pp.390-500;B. Lewis, op.cit., pp.234-287 77 TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, vol.I Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, p.87 78 Ibid., p.88 79 For this proposal see: S. Ağaoğlu, Kuvayi Milliye Ruhu, İstanbul, 1964, pp.123-125; D. Avcıoğlu, Türkiye’nin ….., op.cit., pp.309-310; F. Başkaya, op. cit., p.66 80 Shaw and Shaw, op. cit., 344 81 Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., p.244; K. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizin Esasları, op. cit., pp.104-107 82 E. Zürcher, op. cit., p.144; O. Tiftikçi, op. cit., pp.404-409 83 E. Zürcher, op.cit., p.144; Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., p.348; K. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, op. cit., pp.466-467 84 E.Zürcher, op. cit., p.158 85 E.Zürcher, op. cit., p.167; Shaw and Shaw, op. cit., pp.365-6; M.E.Yapp, The Making of The Modern Near East 1792-1923, Longman, 1987, pp.317-322 86 See the deepnotes 8 and 9 of this chapter. 87 Ş. Sureyya, op.cit., p.30 88 Toynbee and Kirkwood, op.cit., p.85 89 B. Lewis, op. cit., p.287 90 M.K. Öke, op. cit., p.178 91 Ibid., p.197 92 M.E. Yapp, The Near East… op.cit., p.151 93 J. McCharty, op. cit., p.371 94 Shaw and Shaw, op.cit., p.376 95 E. J. Zücher, op. cit., pp.138-167 96 Nezan, ‗Kurdistan in Turkey‘, in G. Chaliand (ed) A People Without A Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1993 (1980), pp.46-49, pp.38-94 97 M.S. Lazarev, Emperyalizm ve Kürd Sorunu, 1917-1923, Özge Yayinlari, Ankara, p.111 98 C. Celil et all., Kürd Siyaset Tarihi, Peri Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998, p.127 99 W. Yale, op. cit., p.285 100 H.E. Allen, op.cit., p.141 101 W. Yale, op.cit., p.280 102 S. R. Sonyel, op. cit., p.34 103 Ibid., p.8 104 For the term millet see M. Yegen, op. cit., p.91; B. Eryılmaz, Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi, Ağaç Yayıncılık, 1992, p.11; A. Yıldız, op. cit., pp.50-2 105 F. Başkaya, op. cit., p.76 106 Shaw and Shaw, op. cit., p.376 107 P.C. Helmreich. op. cit., p.230

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108 One must note though that the CUP leaders to the end of their life worked for that purpose and gave their life for it. 109 See chapter VI 110 For a critical reading of Kemalism and anti-imperialism see F. Başkaya, Paradigmanın İflası, op. cit.; İsmail Beşikçi, Devletlerarası Sömürge Kürdistan, Alan Yayıncılık, İstanbul,1990; İ. Beşikçi, Türk Tarih Tezi, Güneş-Dil Teorisi ve Kürd Sorunu, Yurt Yayınları, Ankara, 1991;İ. Beşikçi-Bilim, Resmi İdeoloji, Devlet-Demokrasi ve Kürd Sorunu, Alan Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 1990 111 A. Roshwald, op. cit., p.186 112 W. Hale, op.cit., p.70 113 A. Mango, op. cit., p.xi 114 Ibid., p.537 115 K. Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz, op. cit., pp.46-48 116 K. Karabekir, Kürd Meselesi, Emre yayınları, İstanbul, 1994, p.10 117 K. Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz, op. cit., p.113 118 Atatürk: Atatürk’ün Bütün Eserleri, vol.II, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, p.288 119 Türk Parlamento Tarihi, 1919-1923, vol.II, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara, 1995, p.343 120 E.C. Paşa, Muhtasar Hayatım, Brüksel Kürd Enstitüsü, Bruxelles, 1991, pp.38-44; K.C. Paşa, Doza Kurdistan: Kürd Milletinin 60 Yıllık Esaretten Kürduluş Savaşı Hatıraları, Öz-ge Yayınları, Ankara, 1991 (1st ed. Beirut 1969), pp.54-56 121 See for example: T.Z.Tunaya, Mütareke Dönemi, op.cit, pp.208-214; C. Kayra. Sevr Dosyası, op. cit., p.118; D. Perinçek, Kemalist Devrim: Kürduluş Savaşında Kürd Politikası, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, pp.93-104; D. Avcıoğlu, Milli Kürduluş Tarihi, op.cit., pp.139-142 122 D. Avcıoğlu, Milli Kürduluş… op.cit., p142 123 E.C. Paşa, op.cit., p.44; K.C. Paşa, op.cit., p.56 124 Atatürkün Bütün Eserleri, vol.II. op. cit., p.379 125 FO 371/4193, 16 October 1919, 146642, from Kurdish Democratic Party to the British High Commissioner in Constantinople 126 Atatürk, Nutuk, Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1995, p.81

Chapter V 1 S. Bedirhan, Kürd Davası ve Hoybun, Med yayınları, İstanbul, 1994, p.42 2 FO371/ 4192 12 July 1919 [101503] and FO371/4193 7 November 1919, [149336] From Admiral de Robeck, Constantinople, to Political Baghdad 3 See chapters III and IV 4 There are no sufficient Kurdish primary sources to evaluate this period. This study has used the accounts of a few important authors who took part in the Kurdish nationalist movement and witnessed the period under analysis. These authors and their works are: E.C.Pasha, Muhtasar Hayatim (My Memoirs), Brüksel Kürd Enstitüsü, 1991; K.C. Pasha, Doza Kurdistan: Kürd Milletinin 60 Yillik Esaretten Kürdulus Savasi Hatiralari, Ozge Yayinlari, Ankara 1991; N.Dersimi, Dersim ve Kürd Milli Mücadelesine Dair Hatıratım, Özge Yayınları, Ankara, 1991; N. Dersimi, Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim, Ani Matbası, Aleppo, 1952; Ismail Haqqi Shways, ‗Şoreşi Koçgiri‘, 1920-1926, Roji Nuwi, issue no:3-4-5, Sulaimania, 1961. Though these works are important and valuable, one must be cautious about them as they reflect developments from a one sided perspective. It must also be stressed that the same Kurdish authors were not quite precise on historical dates. 5 This section is mostly based on E.C.Pasha‘s Muhtasar Hayatim, op. cit., and K.C. Pasha, Doza Kurdistan, op. cit., 6 E.Cemil Pasha, op. cit., p.29 7 Here E.Cemil Pasha‘s memoirs are not clear. If it can be recalled, the Kemalists themselves were also calling for unity (ittihad). Whether speakers were calling for the unity of Kurds or unity with the Ottoman Muslims is not very clear. 8 E.Cemil Pasha, op. cit., p.31

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9 K.C. Pasha claimed the name of the Jamiyet was Kürd Teali Jamiyeti rather than Kurdistan Jamiyeti. I, however, have preferred Ekrem Cemil Pasha‘s account as he himself was the first chairman of the association. 10 H. Bozarslan, ‗Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919-1925)‘ in A. Vali (ed) Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, Mazda Publishers, Inc. California, 2003, pp.163-190, p.171 11 H. Bozarslan, op. cit., p. 171; D. McDowall, op. cit., p.187 12 E.C.Pasha, op.cit., p.42 13 Ekrem Cemil Pasha does not provide a precise date for this last meeting but it seems that it took place sometime in August 1919. 14 For further information about Major Noel see chapter VI 15 According to the memoirs of Ekrem Pasha, Major Noel had been in Diyarbakir 2 months before this meeting and became acquainted with Ekrem Pasha there. 16 E.C. Pasha, op. cit., p.48 17 Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, 1919-1927, Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Kurumu, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1995 ed., p.80 18 For a detailed Kemalist perspective on this issue see Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, op.cit., pp. 80-95 19See for example, S.R. Sonyel, Atatürk-The Founder of Modern Turkey, Atatürk Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History, Publication of Turkish Historical Society, serial: XVI –No.55, Turkish Historical Society Printing House, Ankara, 1989, p.34 20 FO371/4159, from Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, Constantinople, 19th September 1919; see also FO371/4192, from Admiral Sir J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, Constantinople, 27th September, 1919 21 FO371/4192 [112773 6August 1919] from British High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Mr. Titley, 21st July 1919 22 FO371/4193, [147752], 1 November 1919 23 M.K. Atatürk, Nutuk, op.cit., p.88-90 24 FO371/4192, 140436, 20th September 1919 25 FO371/4192, 140436, 20 September 1919 26 FO371/4192, from Admiral J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, 27th September 1919; FO371/5069 E9076, from Admiral de Robeck to Foreign Office, July 29, 19920 27 FO371/4193, from Vice-Admiral J. de Robeck to Earl Curzon, Constantinople, December, 9, 1919 28 FO371/4192, 140436, from Noel at Urfa to British High Commissioner (Constantinople) 20th September, 1919 29 FO371/5068, Diary of Major Noel on Special Duty in Kurdistan from June 14th to September 21st 1919 30 FO371/5068, Diary of Major Noel on Special Duty in Kurdistan from June 14th to September 21st 1919 31 S. Bedirhan, op. cit., p.42 32 FO371/5068, Diary of Major Noel on Special Duty in Kurdistan from June 14th to September 21st 1919 33 M. Ş. Fırat, Doğu İlleri ve Varto Tarihi, İstanbul, 1948, p.154 34 Ibid., p.155-156 35 The exact date of the formation of the Kurdish Independence Society is not known. According to Bruinessen the association was founded in 1923. Dersimi stated that it was founded in 1922 and Firat claimed the date to be 1921. R. Olson, using British official documents, confirmed the date as 1921. Ekrem Cemil Pasha on the other hand claimed the organisation was established after the signing of the Lausanne treaty. 36 M. van Bruinessen, Agha , Sheikh and State: On the social and Political Organisation of Kurdistan, PhD Thesis, Enroprint, Rijswijk, 1978, p.371 37 R. Olson, , The Emergence of Kurdish nationalism and the Seikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925, University of Texas press, Austin, p.27 38 B.C. Busch, Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s Frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, pp.209-212 39 For draft treaty articles concerning Kurdistan see FO371/5068-E3999/11/44, 28 April 1920 40 FO371/5068-E3999/11/44 41 FO371/5068 E4396/11/44 42 FO371/5068 E5063/11/44; E4184/11/44 43 FO371/5068 E5123/11/44

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44 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, Vol. II, New York, 1924. 45 Analysis of the Sevres Treaty will be dealt with in the next chapter. 46 Kendal, ‗The Kurds Under the Ottoman Empire‘, in G. Chailand (ed), A People Without A Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, Zed Books Ltd., London, 1993, p.35 47 M. van Bruinessen, op.cit., p.279 48 See I. Göldaş, Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti, Doz Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1991, pp.179-180; H. Bozarslan, op. cit., pp.170-172 49 A number of works have been written on the Koçgiri Movement in the Turkish language. The movement unfortunately has received less attention in the English language. The following are the main works in the Turkish language on the Koçgiri movement: Komal, Koçgiri Halk Hareketi, 1919-1921, Komal Araştırma Dizisi, Ankara, 1977; B. Öz, Belgelerle Koçgiri Olayı, Can Yayınları, Istanbul, 1999; R. Apak, Türk İstiklal Harbi-VI (İç Ayaklanmalar), Genelkurmay Başkanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1964; D. Rozerin, Cumhurbaşkanlığı Arşivinden Gizlenen Belgelerle Koçgiri İsyanı, Aydınlık Gazetesi, 6-18 December, 1993 (12 issues of continued articles); Kenan Esengin, Milli Mücadelede İç Ayaklanmalar, Ağrı Yayınları, İstanbul, 1982; S. Akgül, Dersim İsyanları ve Seyit Rıza, Berikan, Ankara, 2001; The main Kurdish sources on the movement are as follows: N.Dersimi, Dersim ve Kürd Milli Mücadelesine Dair Hatıratım, Özge Yayınları, Ankara, 1991; N. Dersimi, Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim, Ani Matbası, Aleppo, 1952; Ismail Haqqi Shways, ‗Şoreşi Koçgiri, 1920-1926‘, Roji Nuweh, issue no:3-4-5, Sulaimania, 1961. 50 D. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, I.B. Tauris, London-New York, 1996, p.185 51 Ismail Haqqi Shways, op. cit., issue no:3, pp.90-98, pp.91-2 52 R. Olson stated that Nuri Dersimi returned to Dersim in October 1920. This date is incorrect. Nuri Dersimi left Istanbul for Umraniye sometimes in June 1919. D. McDowall also confuses the dates of KTJ branches in Koçgiri and Dersim. He states that the branches were opened sometime in October 1920. However, the correct date is the Autumn of 1919. See R. Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish nationalism and the Seikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925, University of Texas press, Austin, p.28; D. McDowall, op. cit., p.185; N.Dersimi, Dersim ve Kürd Milli Mücadelesine Dair Hatıratım, Özge Yayınları, Ankara, 1991, p.106 53 M.N.Dersimi, Hatıratım, op.cit., pp.104-5 54 R. Apak, Türk Istiklal Harbi - Iç Ayaklanmalar (1919-1921), T. 6, Ankara 1964 (TC. Genelkurmay Baskanligi Harb Tarihi Dairesi Resmî Yayinlari. Seri No.: 1. Gnkur. Basimevi), p.152-153; N. Dersimi, Kürdistan Tarihinde Dersim, p. 121-122; N. Dersimi, Hatıratım, op. cit., p. 100. 55 Nazmi Sevgen, "Koçkirili Alişer", Tarih Dünyası, Sayı 9, İstanbul 1950, p.378; Doubt must be cast on the claim of Nazmi Sevgen due to his close involvement in the Dersim region as a lieutenant. 56 B. Öz, op. cit., p.105 57 Alishan‘s statement has some resonance with the ideas of Seyyid Abdulkadir, the president of the KTJ in Istanbul. 58 N. Dersimi, Kurdistan Tarihinde Dersim, op. cit., pp.122-124; also N. Dersimi, Hatiratim, op. cit., pp.106-7; I. H. Shaweys,op. cit., issue no:3, p.95. (Here Ismail Haqqi states the date of meeting as April 1920. However this date is incorrect as it happened in the year 1919) 59 N.Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., p.125 60 R. Olson, op. cit., p.29 61 N.Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., p126 62 Ibid., pp.126-7; I.H. Shaweys states the number to have been around 30,000, op. cit., issue no:4, pp.1-6, p.1 63 N. Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., p. 127 64 Seyyid Riza, the most influential tribal and spiritual leader of Hozat (Dersim) did not participate in this meeting as he did not trust the tribes in Hozat. See N.Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., p.128 65 It is interesting to note here that with this memorandum the Kurdish nationalist recognized the Ankara government, while the same government was at odds with both the Ottoman establishment and the Allied powers in Istanbul. 66 N. Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., pp.128-29; see also, R. Olson, op. cit. p.30; H.L. Kieser, Les Kurdes Alevis Face AU Nationalisme Turc Kemaliste: L’alévité du Dersim et son rôle dans le premier soulèvement kurde

348 contre Mustafa Kemal (Koçkiri 1919-1921), Version internet d‘un article paru comme Occasional Paper n° 18, MERA (Middle East Research Associates), Amsterdam, juillet 1993. 67 N.Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit. p.129; I.H. Shways, op. cit., issue no:4, p.5 68 N.Dersimi, Dersim., p.130 69 Ibid., p.130 70 R. Olson, op. cit., p.31 71 N. Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., pp.131-133 72 Ibid., p.133 73 Ibid.,p.139 74 Ibid., p.139; R. Olson translate this wrongly: ‗The Kurds thought the Ankara government planned to wait for the end of winter. When the roads to Dersim were open, the Kemalists would strive to coopt the Kurdish revolutionaries one by one and to destroy the Kurdish organisations, without firing a shot, they would arrest some of the nationalists and deport others in order to isolate Dersim and prevent the revolt from spreading.‘ R. Olson, op. cit., p.32 75 N. Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., p.141 76 Some Turkish historians deny the existence of the Kurdish Military Court claimed by Dersimi, claiming it to be an exaggeration of the Kurdish nationalists. See for example, B. Oz, op. cit., pp.138-9 77 N. Dersimi., Dersim, op. cit., p.141; I. H. Shways, op. cit., issue no:5, p.23 78 N. Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., p. 142 79 Ibid., p.143 80 Ibid., p.145; H. Ertuna, ‗İstiklal Harbinde Ayaklanmalar‘, Vol.VI., in Türk İstiklal Harbi Genelkurmay Basımevi, Ankara, 1974, p.263 81 This work does not go in to details about the way in which the Turkish troops and irregular militias engaged against the Kurdish uprisings. Their inhuman treatment of and barbarity against the Kurds, both civilian and military, was debated at the Grand National Assembly and later recognized by some Turkish historians. See Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Gizli Celse Zabıtları, vol.II, 17 March 1921 - 23 February 1922; R. Dogan, ‗Cumhurbaskanligi Arşivinden Gizlenen Belgelerle Kocçgiri İsyanı‘, in Aydınlık, 19 December 1993; B. Öz, op. cit. pp.189-204; For a first account of the Turkish army treatment of the Kurds by a Turkish governor serving in the region, see Ebubekir Hazim Tepeyran: E.H. Tepeyran, Belgelerle Kurtuluş Savaşi Anilari, Çağdaş Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1982. For a general knowledge of Nureddin Pasha and Topal Osman see: N.F.Taş, Nureddin Paşa ve Tarihi Gerçekler, Mehir Yayınları, İstanbul, 1997; C. Şener, Topal Osman Olayı, Ant Yayınları, Istanbul, 1998; I. Göldaş, ‗Koçgiri‘de Iki Kişilik: Sakalli Nurettin Paşa ve Ebubekir Hazim Bey‘, in War, issue no:1, Summer, 1997, pp.39-54 82 According to Dersimi, Murat Pasha was an agent of the Ankara government within the KTJ branch in Koçgiri. After the initial success of the Kurdish nationalists Murat Pasha asked for a pardon and participated in the uprising. See N. Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., pp.126 and 142 83 N. Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., p.157; C. Celil et all, Yeni ve Yakın Çağda Kürd Siyaset Tarihi, Peri Yayınları, İstanbul (ed), 1998, p.122 84 N. Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., pp.164-6; B. Öz, op. cit., p.246 85 B. Öz, op. cit., pp. 99-100&117-121; D. Perinçek, Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Kürd Politikası: Kemalist Devrim-4, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, pp.101-105; S. Akgul, op.cit., pp.17-20; R. Apak, op. cit., p.172 86 FO371/6346, E5242, from Sir H. Rumbold, High Commissioner, Constantinople to Baghdad, repeated to Foreign Office, May 4, 1921 87 FO371/6346, E5713, from H. Rumbold, High Commissioner, Constantinople, to Earl Curzon, May 18, 1921 88 H.L. Keiser, op. cit., 89 N. Dersimi, Hatıratım, op. cit., pp.83-86 90 D. McDowall, op. cit., p.184 91 H. Bozarslan, ‗Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919-1925)‘ in A. Vali (ed) Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism, Mazda Publishers, Inc. California, 2003, pp.163-190, p.173 92 It is not clear exactly when this memorandum was written and distributed. However, it seems that it is possible to guess the likelihood of its publication date given the content of the memorandum and the actual national developments that had taken place in Koçgiri. On 6 March 1921 the Kurdish forces attacked

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Umraniye and raised the Kurdish flag. In the same month the Greek army offensive against the Kemalist forces in the west was intensified. It is highly probable that the interim Koçgiri Kurdish government was established in early March 1921. 93 R. Dogan, op. cit., in Aydinlik, 13 December 1993 94 N. Dersimi, Dersim, op. cit., pp.170-2 95 M. van Bruinessen, op. cit., p.278 96 R. Olson, op. cit., p.36 97 M. van Bruinessen, op. cit., p.278 98 R. Olson, op. cit., p.37 99 R. Olson, op. cit., p.35 100 N. Dersimi, Hatıratım, op. cit., pp.103-4; H. Bozarslan, op. cit., p.174 101 H. Bozarslan, op. cit., p.169 102 FO 371/6347 E12643/43/93, Khalil Bedirhan‘s request forwarded to Foreign Office by Sir Percy Cox, 28 October, 1921 103 E. C. Pasha, op. cit., p.56 104 After the Malatya incident, Ekrem Pasha had gone to Istanbul and carried on his activities within the KTJ. Upon the KTJ internal division he sided with Bedirhans. As a result of a decision in Istanbul, he returned to Diyarbakir in mid-1921 and was active there with other Kurds. As a result of Kemalists pressure he decided to return again to Istanbul. However, on his way he was arrested and was taken to Ankara. He remained there and was brought to trial but later released and allowed back to Diyarbakir in the summer of 1922. See for details, ibid., pp.55-8 105 Ibid., pp.58-9 106 D. McDowall, op. cit., p.190 107 For the complete list of the reasons see Air 5/556, 27 November 1924; and Air 23/411, 8 November 1924; see also R. Olson, op. cit., pp.43-45

Chapter VI 1 E. Kedourie, ‗Great Britian, the Other Powers, and the Middle East before and after World War I‘, in U. Dann (ed), The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919-1939, Holmes & Meier, New York/London, 1988, pp.3-11, p.3 2 CAB/27/1, British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia: Report, Proceedings and Appendices of a Committee Appointed by the Prime Minister, 1915, p.4; for a general overview of the de Bunsen Committee, see: P.K. Davis, Ends and Means: The British Mesopotamian Campaign and Commission, Rutherford, Madison, Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1994, pp.96-112 3 For this point see: A.S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London, 1970, pp.28-30 4 For the ‗Eastern Question‘ see: A.L.Macfie, The Eastern Question 1774-1923, Longman, London and New York, 1996 (Revised edition); M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923, Macmillan, London, 1966; and The Great Powers and the Near East 1774-1923, Edward Arnold, London, 1970; W. Yale, The Near East, A Modern History, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, London, 1958 5 FO/371/2481/14967, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, 12 Feb 1915, tel.no.206 6 FO/371/2481/25821, Parliamentary Debates, 25 Feb 1915 7 FO/371/2481/24969, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, tel.no.249 8 FO/371/2481/25969, Sir George Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey, 10 March 1915, tel.no.329 9 CAB/27/1, p.3 10 CAB/27/1, Arthur Hitzel, ‘The Future Settlement of Eastern Turkey in Asia and Arabia’ , Note by the Secretary, Political, and Secret Department, India Office, March, 15, p.87 11 Ibid., p.86 12 Ibid., p. 86 13 CAB27/1, Sir M. Sykes, ‗Remarks on Sir A. Hirtzel‘s note‘, p.100 14 Ibid., pp. 101-102 15 Ibid., p.6

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16 Ibid., p.29 17 Ibid., p.24 18 In November 1914, Britain sent a message to Sharif Husayn to participate in the war against Turkey while in turn ‗Great Britain will promise not to intervene in any manner whatsoever, whether in things religious or otherwise…. Till now we have defended and befriended Islam in the person of the Turks: henceforward it shall be in that of the noble Arab… It would be well if your Highness could convey to your followers and devotees, who are found throughout the world in every country, the good tidings of the freedom of the Arabs and the rising of the sun over Arabia.‘ Quoted from A.S. Kliemann, op. cit., pp.7-8; for the correspondence of Husayn-McCohen see FO371/5066, Foreign Office Memorandum on Possible Negotiations with the Hedjaz, pp.11-15 19 FO371/5066, ibid., p.18 20 For a detailed analysis of both diplomats and their backgrounds see: C.M. Andrew, France, Britain, and the Peace Settlement: A Reconsideration, in U. Dann (ed), op. cit. pp.157-171 21 Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) Agreement for the Partition of the Ottoman Empire: Britain, France and Russia: 26 April-23 October 1916, pp.18-22 in J.C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record:1914-1956, vol.II., D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., Toronto, New York, London, 1956, p.19 22 Ibid., p.21 23 To the embarrassment of Britain, France, and Italy the Bolshevik government ‗announced that it would proceed with the publication of the secret treaties signed by Tsarist Russia and the Provisional Government with other capitalist countries… A total of seven collections were published.‘ B. Ponomaryov (ed), History of Soviet Foreign Policy: 1917-1945, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969 24 J.A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East, 1900-1939, The University of Minnesotta Press, Minneapolis, 1963, p.110 25 Ibid., p.110-111 26 Y. Ro‘i, ‗Official Soviet View on the Middle East, 1919-1939‘, in U.Dann (ed)., op. cit., pp.301-307, p.301 27 It may be argued here that the commencement of the containment policy can be extended to 1918 rather than to the post-Second World War as some historians have argued. See: T.G. Peterson, The Making and Unmaking of the Cold War, W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1992; G.J. Lewis, Strategies of Containment, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982; 28 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th series, Vols.130-36 (1920-22), p.145 29 FO371/3407, from Political Baghdad, 15 October 1918 30 FO371/4192, E.J.R., Precise of Affairs in Southern Kurdistan during the Great War, Office of Civil Commissioner, MES.EX. Force, 1919, pp.19-20 31 FO371/3407, From Political, Baghdad, 1 November 1918 32 Precise of Affairs, op. cit., p.7 33 Precise of Affairs, op. cit., pp.7-10 34 FO371/4149, Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs, Minutes of a Conference held at the Foreign Office on April 17, 1919 35Ibid., pp.1-5 36 A.T. Wilson, Mesopotamia, 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties, A Personal and Historical Record, Oxford University Press, London, 1931, p.147 37 A.T. Wilson, op. cit., p.134 38 FO371/5069, E.B. Soane, Administration Report of Sulaimaniayah Division for the year 1919, p.4 39 A.T. Wilson, op. cit., p.130 40 Administration Report, p.2-3 41 A.T. Wilson, op. cit., p.134 42 R. Hilmi, Anilar, Seyh Mahmud Berzenci Hareketi, Nujen Yayincilik, Istanbul, 1995, pp.20-29 43 Administration Report, op. cit., p.1-2 44 A Turkish scholar incorrectly argued that behind the Sheikh Mahmoud's revolt was the intrigue of a Turkish Pasha, Halil Pasha. See: H. B. Demirbaş, Musul Kerkuk Olayi ve Osmanli Imparatorlugunda Kuveyt Meselesi, Arba Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1995 2nd ed., pp.38-39

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45 E.J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks and Arabs, Politics, Travel and Research in North-Eastern Iraq, 1919-1925, Oxford University Press, London, p.30; H. Yildiz, Fransiz Belgeleriyle Sevr-Lozan-Musul Ucgeninde Kurdistan, Koral Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1991 2nd ed., pp.19-22 46 A.T. Wilson, op. cit., p.139 47 D. McDowall, op.cit., p.157 48 Administrative Report, op. cit., p.2 49 See chapter I 50 FO371/4191, from Secretary of State to the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 22 August 1919 51 FO371/4191, from Political, Baghdad, 29 August 1919 52 A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p.139 53 Fo371/5068, Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs, April 1920 54 FO371/5068 from Secretary of State to Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 23 March 1920 55 FO371/5068 Letter from India Office to Foreign Office, 20 December 1919 56 FO371/5068, from Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 25 March 1920 57 FO371/5068, Inter-Departmental Conference 58 FO371/5071/E2167 Cabinet Meeting held on 23 March 1920 59 FO371/5068, Inter-Departmental Conference; see also FO371/5071/E2464 A Preliminary Scheme for the Military Control of Mesopotamia by the Royal Air Force; FO371/5070/E1555/13/44 Air Ministry; E1628 India Office; P1784 From Civil Commissioner, Baghdad to India Office, 4 March 1920 60 R. Olson, op. cit., p.55-6 61 For a detailed account see: A.S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore and London, 1970, pp.46-8; G. Antonious, The Arab Awakening: The Story of Arab National Movement, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1945 (reprint), chapter XIV 62 A. Wilson, for example, stressed the alleged intervention of Syrian and Turkish nationalists aided by foreign interests: ‗At this point other foreign influences commenced to make themselves felt.. In this connection we know that £7,000 in Turkish gold reached the extremists in Karbala during May and June.‘ A. Wilson, Mesopotamia, op. cit., p.310; A British Special Intelligence officer, N.N.Bray, in his secret report ‗Mesopotamia, Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest‘ stated that ‗both the Nationalists and Pan- Islamist movements derive their inspiration from Berlin –through Switzerland and Moscow. The situation is further complicated with Italian, French and Bolshevist intrigues.‘ FO371/5230/E12339; see also A.Klieman, op. cit., 58 63 D.K. Fieldhouse, Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq 1918-44, I.B. Tauris Publishers, London-New York, 2002, p.9 64 A.Wilson, op. cit., p.320 65 Quoted in P. Sluglett, Britain 1914-1932, Ithaca Press London, 1976, p.42 66 The policy differences between Wilson and Cox was a subject discussed quiet widely. Fieldhouse argued that ‗it was the façade, not the reality, of Wilson‘s system that had been changed. Ultimate power in Iraq, as Mesopotamia was now to be called, still lay with the British authorities.‘ D.K. Fieldhouse, op. cit., p.14: see also on this subject, A.S. Klieman, op. cit., p.61 67 CAB21/186, C.P.2545, 7 February, 1921 68 S. Eskander, ‗Southern Kurdistan under Britain‘s Mesopotamian Mandate: From Separation to Incorporation, 1920-23‘ in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.37, Number 2, April 2001, pp.153-180, p.153 69 W.S. Churchill, ‗Mesopotamia and the New Government‘, in Empire Review, July 1923, pp.691-698; see also, P. Sluglett, op. cit., p.48 70 The committee included 7 members which were W. Churchill (chair), Major Hubert Young, Major E.W.C. Noel, Sir Percy Cox, Colonel T.E. Lawrence, Miss Gertrude Bell, and Major R.D. Babcock. 71 FO371/6343, Report on Middle East Conference Held in Cairo and Jerusalem, March 12th to 30th 1921, p.(29) 61 72 Ibid., p.(59) 76- (60)-77 73 Ibid., p.(3) 49 74 Ibid., p.208; see also CO/732/5 (13896), March 1921, for informal consultations 75 FO371/6342, From Prime Minister to Churchill, 22 March 1921 76 R. Olson, op. cit., p.59 77 CO730/2 from High Commissioner, Baghdad, to Secretary of State for Colonies, 2 June 1921

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78 CO730/2 from Secretary of State for Colonies to High Commissioner, Baghdad, 9 June 1921 79 R. Olson, op. cit., p.60; S. Eskander, op. cit., p.160-161 80 CO730/2 (31358), 23 June 1921, both dispatches can be seen in this file. 81 Ibid., 82 CO730/2, from High Commissioner to Secretary of State for Colonies, 21 June 1921; see also FO371/6346/E7286 83 R. Olson, op. cit., p.67 84 CO730/5 from High Commissioner, Iraq, to Secretary of State for Colonies, 20 September 1921 85 CO730/5 from Secretary of State for Colonies to High Commissioner to Iraq, 3 October 1921 86 S. Eskander, op. cit., p.163 87 In Kirkuk, for example, cast of vote indicates strong anti-Feisal tendency: Kirkuk Town 64 for pro-Feisal while 2786 anti-Feisal, Kirkuk district 197 for pro-Feisal while 720 anti-Feisal, Altun Kopru nil pro-Feisal 1500 anti-Feisal Tauq nil pro-Feisal 10,000 anti-Feisal Shu‘an nil pro-Feisal 1263 anti-Feisal FO371/6353 Intelligence Report no 19, Baghdad, 15 August 1921 88 FO371/6353 Intelligence Report no 23 15 October 1921; FO371/7771 Intelligence Report no 8, 15 April 1921 89 The Turkish nationalists' incursion into Southern Kurdistan was a policy developed by the Representative Committee on 27 June 1921. In an order to the El-Jezire front commandership, the Committee provided the fundamental policy to be pursued in regard to Southern Kurdistan. The order asked the army to instigate armed clashes between the Kurds and the British forces. For the full text of the order see: TBMM Gizli Celse Zabitlari, Vol.III, 6 March 1922 – 27 February 1923, Turkiye İş Bankasi, Kultur Yayinlari, Istanbul 3rd (ed) 1999, pp.550-551, 90 British Intelligence reports provide a great deal of information about disturbances in Southern Kurdistan. See: FO371/6352, Intelligence Report no 15 (15 June 1921) 16 (1 July 1921); FO371/6353, Intelligence Report no 17 (15 July 1921) 18 (1 August 1921) 19(15August 1921) 20(1 September1921) 91 For Kemalist intrigues see through FO371/6346, especially E7348 27 (June 1921) and E9843 (26 August 1921), from High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 92 FO371/7780, from High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 February 1922 93 FO371/7781 E6654, from High Commissioner of Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2 July 1922 94 S. Eskander, op. cit., p.164 95 FO371/7781, Intelligence Report no 12, 15 June 1922; see also S. Eskander, op. cit., pp.164-165 96 See chapter V 97 FO371/6342 E3592, Prime Minister to Churchill, 22 March 1921 98 For alleged Kemalist threat against Iraq see FO371/7781 E3467 from British Consulate, Aleppo, 30 march 1922; E5357 telegram from Mr Satow, 22 May 1922; E6079 General Officer Commanding Iraq, 14 June 1922 99 CO730/8 News Summary for Period ended 21 December 1921, Baghdad 100 S. Eskander, op. cit., p.166 101 S. Eskander, op. cit., p.167; D. McDowall, op. cit., p.161 102 CO730/4/ 45451, From High Commissioner for Iraq to the Secretary of State for Colonies, 30 August 1921 103 FO371/7781 E6864, from High Commissioner for Iraq to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 July 1922 104 FO371/7771, Intelligence Report no 14 15 July 1922, Baghdad 105 S. Eskander, op. cit., p.169; FO371/9004 C.J.Edmonds, Note on the Kurdish Situation, 4 January 1923 in Shuckburgh, Colonial Office, to Osborne, Foreign Office, 25 January 1923 106 Bang-i Kurdistan, issue no 10, 15 October 1922; for the English translation of this text see FO371/7772Intelligence Report no 21, 7November 1922, press supplement 107 FO371/7772 Intelligence Report no 22, 5 December 1922 108 S. Eskander, op. cit., p.169-170

353

109 R. Hilmi, Anilar (Memoirs): Sheikh Mahmud Berzenci Hareketi, Nujen Yayıncılık, Istanbul (ed) , 1995 110 FO371/7772, Intelligence Report no 23, 1 December 1922 111 Some Kurdish periodicals published in 1922 and 1923 provide detail information about the political development in Southern Kurdistan from the Kurdish point of view, see: Roji Kurdistan (published from 29 Febuary 1922), issue nos 1-15; Umedi Istiqlal (published from 27 September 1923) issue nos 1-18; Bangi Kurdistan (published from August 1922) issue nos 1-13. 112 FO371/7772 Intelligence Reports no 21-22, 23 November and 5 December 1922 113 S. Eskander, op. cit., 175 114 For British interest in Middle East oil reserves see: P. Sluglett Britian in Iraq, 1914-1932, The Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford, Ithaca Press, London, 1976; H. Mejcher, Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928, The Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford, Ithaca Press, London, 1976; S.H. Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East, Its Discovery and Development, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, London, New York, 1968; H. A. Foster, The Making of Modern Iraq: A Product of World Forces, Williams and Norgate ltd, Great Russel St., London, 1936; L. Rambout, Cagdas Kurdistan Tarihi, Dilan Yayinlari, Diyarbakir, 1992 115 P. Sluglett, op. cit., pp. 103-116 116 Quoted from P. Sluglett, op. cit., p.104 117 H.A. Foster, op.cit., p.128 118 CO 730/46/60792, Lord Curzon's speech at Lausanne , 23 January 1923 119 TPC had been confiscated during the war by the Custodian of Enemy Property. France and the US received %25 and %15 share of the company respectivly. See: P. Sluglett, op. cit, pp.103-116 120 M.S. Lazarev, Emperyalizm ve Kürd Sorunu, 1917-1923, Özge, Ankara; 120 C. Celil et all., Kürd Siyaset Tarihi, Peri Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998; Ş.X. Mıhoyan, İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Irakta Kürd Sorunu, Peri Yayınları, İstanbul, 1998 121 For the Bolshevik idea of self-determination see: V.I.Lenin, The National Liberation Movement in the East, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1957 122For the Foreign policy of Soviet Union see: E.H.Carr, A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-23, volume III, Macmillan and co. ltd., London, 1961; X.J. Eudin & R.C.North (ed), Soviet Russia and the East 1920-27, A Documentary Survey, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1957 123 Kazim Karabekir, a prominent Turkish nationalist and the commander of 15th Army Corps in Erzurum, provided detailed information in regard to his role in the nationalist movement and as well as in regard to Turkish-Bolshevik relations in the east. See: K. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimiz, Emre Yayınları, İstanbul, pp.39-63; K. Karabekir, İstiklal Harbimizin Esasları, Emre Yayınları, İstanbul, 1995 124 B. Gökay, A Clash of Empires: Turkey between Russian Bolshevism and British Imperialism, 1918- 1923, Tauris Academic Studies, London-New York, 1997, p.2 125 For a detail analysis of Turkish-Soviet relations see S. Yerasimos, Kürduluş Savaşında Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri 1917-1923, Boyut Kitapları, İstanbul, 2000(2nd ed); B. Gokay, op. cit.,; For a short analysis of British views on Turkish nationalists and Soviet relations see A.L.Mcfie, ‗British Views of the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia, 1919-1922‘, in Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 38, Number3, July 2002, pp.27-46 126FO371/5230/E12339 Mesopotamia, Preliminary Report on Causes of Unrest, by Major N.N.E. Bray, 14 September 1920 127 Informal relations between the Turkish nationalists and France went back to as early as 1919. According to Turkish documents, a member of the Representative Committee, Vasif Bey, had an informal meeting with French General d‘Esperey who warned Vasif Bey to avoid being Unionist and informed him that France contemplated a border for Turkey from the Island Sea (Aegean) to Iran and including part of northern Syria. The French General also informed him that British desired a great Arab Empire, but France desired a great Turkish state. See: U. Ozdemir, Heyet-i Temsiliye Tutanaklari(Minutes of Representative Committee), Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara, 1975, pp.133; see also I. Beşikçi, Kürdistan Üzerinde Emperyalist Bölşüm Mücadelesi, 1915-1925, Yurt Kitap Yayin, Ankara, 1992, pp.286-295 128 FO371/6343/E7957, Telegram from Sir M. Cheetham to the Marques Curzon of Keddleston, 11 July 1921 129 FO371/7781, Colonial Office to Foreign Office, March 1922

354

130 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First Series, Volume XV International Conferences and Conversations 1921, Her Majesty‘s Stationery Office, England, 1967, p.173 131 Ibid., p.213 132 FO371/6346/E3042, The Under Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs 133 Throughout 1921 the Kemalists concluded number of agreements and accords: Turkey-Afghanistan Treaty (1 March 1921); Turkey-Soviet Friendship Agreement (6 march 1921); Turkey-Armenia- Gurchistan-Azerbaijan Friendship Agreement (13 October 1921); Franco-Turco Accord, (20 October 1921). See: I. Sosyal, Tarihceleri ve Aciklamalari ile Birlikte T ü rkiyenin Siyasal Andlasmalari, Vol. I. 1920-1945, Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, Ankara, 1983, pp.24-60; J.C. Hurewitz, op. cit., pp.95-98 134 FO371/6347/E12643, The Residency, Baghdad, 28 October 1921; see also CO730/6 135 Ibid.; see also R. Olson, op. cit., pp.72-81 136 CO730/28 for Rawlinson‘s report and the Middle East Department‘s minutes on Rawlinson‘s report 137 R. Olson, op. cit., p.81 138 E. Main, Iraq from Mandate to Independence, George Allen & Unwin ltd., London, 1935, p.134 139 Quoted at P. Sluglett, Britian in Iraq, 1914-1932, The Middle East Centre, St Antony's College Oxford, Ithace Press, London, 1976

Conclusion 1P. Sluglett, op. cit., p.117 2 D. McDowall, op. cit. p.151 3 Kirisci and Winrow, op. cit., pp.78-9 4 H. Özoğlu, op.cit., pp.383-4 5 Jin, issue no:7, 2 January 1919, pp.13-4

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Periodicals and Papers

-Aydinlik

-Empire Review

-The Geographical Journal

-Ikdam

-International Journal of Middle East Studies

-Islamic World Report

-Middle East Journal

-Medya Gunesi

-Roji Neweh

-Tarih Dunyasi

-The Journal of Kurdish Studies

- The Times, November, 15, 1919

-Vakit, 7 June 1920

-War

371