DOCSLIB.ORG

NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After Evan Jaroff Claremont Mckenna College

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After Evan Jaroff Claremont Mckenna College Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union Volume 2009 Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Article 7 Conference on the European Union March 2012 NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After Evan Jaroff Claremont McKenna College Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu Part of the International Law Commons, International Relations Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons Recommended Citation Jaroff, Evan (2009) "NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After," Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union: Vol. 2009, Article 7. DOI: 10.5642/urceu.200901.07 Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/7 This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Claremont- UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 55 5 NATO EXPANSION DURING THE COLD WAR AND AFTER Evan Jaroff N ATO has undergon e five ro unds ofenlarge m ent sin ce its inception in 194 <), and it is poised to unde rgo another ro und q uite shortly, since Albania and C ro atia signe d accessio n protocols in 200tl. In order to understand future expa nsio ns, inclu ding th e proj ected entry of Albania and C ro atia, it is helpful to examine th e history of N ATO enlargement, and in particular the criteri a used to identify potential new members and th e process that they must undergo in order to j oin th e Allian ce. This paper demonstrates th at accession criteria used during th e Cold War, altho ug h never ex plicitly o utline d, we re quite sim ilar to th e suggeste d criteri a laid o ut in ;1 1995 rep ort (Study on Enlarge ment) that w as used to eva luate potential new m ember states for th e accessio ns of 19 <) () and 2004. H o wever , afte r the Cold W ar th e actual process of accession became more stru ctu red , regulated, and stringen t. U nd erstanding N ATO ex pansio n In th e past w ill help shed some light on how new member states co uld be admitted in th e future. NATO's FOUNDING MEMBER STATES Issues of NATO expansio n arose even before access io n talks w ith Greece and Turkey in 1<)52, sinc e the first real instance ofenla rgem ent occurred after the " W ashingt on Exp lo r­ atory T alks o n Security" (W ET ), which were negotiatio ns (held betw een 1<)4 8 and 1949) leadi ng up to NATO 's fo un di ng . 1 These n egoti ati ons produced th e "Washington Pa per" (in Septem be r 194 tl). which discu ssed th e states th at would be include d ,IS foundin g m ein­ bel'S of th e N orth A tlant ic Treaty Organiz ation." It laid o ut three gro ups of co untries and dubbed them the " har d co re, th e ste pping sto nes, and th e go ats" (Smith 26). The United States, Ca nada, the United Kin gdom, France, the Netherl an ds, Belgiulll. and Luxem bo urg made up th e hard core states, which " share d com m o n strat egic and ideological co ncerns , an d wo uld fo rm a close assoc iatio n that w ou ld be at the heart of the North Atlanti c Treaty" (Sm ith 26).N orway,D enma rk , Icelan d, Ireland, and Po rt ugal w ere th e stepp ing stones states, whose geogr'lp hic locations nude them o f strategic, mil itar y importance. T he fin al group , th e goats, was co m prised of Italy, Turkey, and G reece. None o f th ese three states "fit th e term "North Atla nt ic' III its ge ograp hic al or strategi c articulatio ns, o r (in the G ree k NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After 56 EVAN JAROFF Clarem ont McKenna College an d Turkish cases) its id eological o nes, but were nonetheless of key impo rtance to W este rn Eu rope" (Smith 27) . ITALY'S INCLUSION IN NATO Ital y's in clusion as a founding member of NATO is a particularly interesting e lse, sin ce it was "the clear est de partu re from the geograph ical co ncept of th e N orth Atlantic Tre.r­ ry, and th us is clear ev ide nce of th e political crite ria for membership" (Sm ith 57). When th e "hard co re " stat es de liberated over wh ich " ot he r" or "additio na l" stares to include in NATO, th ey did not have clear criteria to guide th eir evaluatio n (Sm ith 29) . This was qui te evide nt in Italy's case, whi ch was largely accepted becau se of Rom e's strong desire to j o in NAT O , and influeutial Fren ch support. T he italians ~ rgue d th at " Italy was, by din t of 'he r civili sation and he r mercantile and m aritim e traditio ns' a W estern Eu ro pean co untry" (Smith 30). However, th e US an d UK worried that incorporating Italy Into NATO could lead to an overex te nsio n of their military capab iliti es if th e ltalian s needed military assistanc e . Although thi s w as a valid co nce rn , it feU to the back ground as th e Fren ch backed Italy ill part because including the stat e in NATO wo uld make it more difficu lt to excl ude Algeri a (then a Fr en ch col ony) from th e organization 111 the future (Smi th 35) . The French m ade it cle ar th at th ey stro ngly supported Italy's cause, and w he n th e Italian ambassador sign aled Italy 's desire for N AT O m embershi p to th e USState De partme nt, it was a big ste p toward s its eventual inclusion. By directly appealin g to th e United States, ltal y acknow ledged Washington's ke y role in th e accessio n decision. Italy was " heavily dependen t o n th e U S fo r aid in its post- war reconstru cti on" an d felt th at j o ining N ATO would help en sur e th at U S-It ali ~n rela tions remained friendly (Sm ith 37 ). Italy would also economically be nefit fro m closer relatio ns with other NATO m ember states, usin g th e US as a springboard. Italy placed th e Am eri cans in a rather peril ous positio n by giving th e U S th e final decision in th eir accession. If th e U S chose to exclude Italy, then it wo uld not only co u nter stro ng Fren ch suppo rt, but it also ran the risk ofsett ing a p recedent for which co unt ries would be denied in th e fut ure.M oreo ver, ex clud ing Italy could h ave swayed the country to side w ith th e Sov iet Union in the future, so me thing that nei th er th e U S nor W estern Eu rope wanted to happ en . Ul timately , th e U S recomm ended th at Italy join N AT O based o n a relati ve consensus am ong th e " hard core" states, th e formal Italian request to join th e o rganizat io n, and th e possible geopolitical con­ seq ue nce s of rejecti ng a state . The co nseque nces of rej ecting a state's bid to j oin NATO were taken ve ry serio usly during th e Cold W ar , which helps explain w hy th ere is no evi de nce of un successful ap­ plications for en try into NATO during this perio d. As allud ed to w ith respect to Italy, th e conseq ue nces of an un su ccessful, delayed , or w ithdraw n appli cation co uld threaten the o rganizatio n's vitality. George Kennan. a member of the State Departme nt tha t negoti ated the N orth Atlantic T reaty, po ints o ut that if"individ udl co un tries rejected m embership o r were refused m embership, th e Russians co uld make political cap ital out of thi s, either way" (Sm ith 23) . 1n other words, NA T O not o nly had to be careful abo ut dealing with stat es that active ly so ught NATO m embership du ring th e Cold Wa r, but it also had to be particular about inviting states to join th e Alliance so that the orga nization would not be em barrassed by a rej ection . http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/7 Claremont-UC Und ergraduate Research Conference on th e European Unio n 57 ACCESSION CRITERIA DURING THE COLD WAR The guid ulg princip le used to det ermine which states would j oin NATO is o utlined in Article 10 o f the Washingt ou Treaty (also kn o w n us th e North Atlantic Treaty), which states : 'T he Patties ilia)', by unanimous ayteeuwm, invite '1IIy other European State ill a position tojimhcr II,e priuciplcs (!( this Treal)' and 10 contribut« 10 tlu: sccurit» (2f tlu: North Atlnntic area 10 accede 10 tltis Trcatv, AllY State so invited lIIay become ,7 Part y 10 the T reatv b)' dl'posil ill)!.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Mikhail Gorbachev and the NATO Enlargement Debate: Then and Now 443
    Mikhail Gorbachev and the NATO Enlargement Debate: Then and Now 443 Chapter 19 Mikhail Gorbachev and the NATO Enlargement Debate: Then and Now Pavel Palazhchenko The purpose of this chapter is to bring to the attention of research- ers materials relating to the antecedents of NATO enlargement that have not been widely cited in ongoing discussions. In the debate on NATO enlargement, both in Russia and in the West, the issue of the “assurances on non-enlargement of NATO” giv- en to Soviet leaders and specifically Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989-1990 has taken center stage since the mid-1990s. The matter is discussed not just by scholars, journalists and other non-policy-makers but also by major political figures, particularly in Russia, including President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In the West, there has recently been renewed interest in the subject following the publi- cation of some declassified material by the National Security Archive, a Washington, D.C., non-profit organization with a somewhat mislead- ing name. While some of the aspects of the discussion of the “assurances” are similar in Russia and the West (conflation of fact and opinion, of bind- ing obligations and remarks relating to expectation or intent) the sub- text is different. In Russia most commentators accuse Gorbachev of being gullible and naïve and blithely accepting the assurances instead of demanding a binding legal guarantee of non-enlargement. In the West, the subtext is more often of the West’s bad faith in breaking what is supposed to be an informal “pledge of non-enlargement” given to Gor- bachev.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Expansion: Benefits and Consequences
    University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 2001 NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences Jeffrey William Christiansen The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Christiansen, Jeffrey William, "NATO expansion: Benefits and consequences" (2001). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 8802. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/8802 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ■rr - Maween and Mike MANSFIELD LIBRARY The University of M ontana Permission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in published works and reports. **Please check "Yes" or "No" and provide signature** Yes, I grant permission X No, I do not grant permission ________ Author's Signature; Date:__ ^ ^ 0 / Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with the author's explicit consent. MSThe»i9\M«r«f»eld Library Permission Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. NATO EXPANSION: BENEFITS AND CONSEQUENCES by Jeffrey William Christiansen B.A. University of Montana, 2000 presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts The University of Montana 2001 Approved by: hairpers Dean, Graduate School 7 - 24- 0 ^ Date Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.
    [Show full text]
  • Law and Military Operations in Kosovo: 1999-2001, Lessons Learned For
    LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS IN KOSOVO: 1999-2001 LESSONS LEARNED FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) The Judge Advocate General’s School United States Army Charlottesville, Virginia CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS (CLAMO) Director COL David E. Graham Deputy Director LTC Stuart W. Risch Director, Domestic Operational Law (vacant) Director, Training & Support CPT Alton L. (Larry) Gwaltney, III Marine Representative Maj Cody M. Weston, USMC Advanced Operational Law Studies Fellows MAJ Keith E. Puls MAJ Daniel G. Jordan Automation Technician Mr. Ben R. Morgan Training Centers LTC Richard M. Whitaker Battle Command Training Program LTC James W. Herring Battle Command Training Program MAJ Phillip W. Jussell Battle Command Training Program CPT Michael L. Roberts Combat Maneuver Training Center MAJ Michael P. Ryan Joint Readiness Training Center CPT Peter R. Hayden Joint Readiness Training Center CPT Mark D. Matthews Joint Readiness Training Center SFC Michael A. Pascua Joint Readiness Training Center CPT Jonathan Howard National Training Center CPT Charles J. Kovats National Training Center Contact the Center The Center’s mission is to examine legal issues that arise during all phases of military operations and to devise training and resource strategies for addressing those issues. It seeks to fulfill this mission in five ways. First, it is the central repository within The Judge Advocate General's Corps for all-source data, information, memoranda, after-action materials and lessons learned pertaining to legal support to operations, foreign and domestic. Second, it supports judge advocates by analyzing all data and information, developing lessons learned across all military legal disciplines, and by disseminating these lessons learned and other operational information to the Army, Marine Corps, and Joint communities through publications, instruction, training, and databases accessible to operational forces, world-wide.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO Enlargement: Poland, the Baltics, Ukraine and Georgia
    University of Central Florida STARS Honors Undergraduate Theses UCF Theses and Dissertations 2018 NATO Enlargement: Poland, The Baltics, Ukraine and Georgia Christopher M. Radcliffe University of Central Florida Part of the Comparative Politics Commons, and the International Relations Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.ucf.edu This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the UCF Theses and Dissertations at STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Undergraduate Theses by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Radcliffe, Christopher M., "NATO Enlargement: Poland, The Baltics, Ukraine and Georgia" (2018). Honors Undergraduate Theses. 400. https://stars.library.ucf.edu/honorstheses/400 NATO ENLARGEMENT: POLAND, THE BALTICS, UKRAINE AND GEORGIA By CHRISTOPHER M. RADCLIFFE A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Honors in the Major Program in International and Global Studies in the College of Sciences and in the Burnett Honors College at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Spring Term, 2018 Thesis Chair: Houman Sadri, Ph.D. i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This is the most difficult project that I’ve ever taken on. At this time, I’d like to thank a number of people that helped me through this process. I’ve had the pleasure of working with two brilliant professors – Dr. Houman Sadri, who is my thesis chair and Dr. Vladimir Solonari, a member of my thesis committee. Thank you for all of the motivation over the past year and time you both have taken to assist me with completing this project.
    [Show full text]
  • Doubling NATO: Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance Ergodan Kurt Old Dominion University
    Old Dominion University ODU Digital Commons Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Graduate Program in International Studies Dissertations Spring 2010 Doubling NATO: Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance Ergodan Kurt Old Dominion University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds Part of the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Kurt, Ergodan. "Doubling NATO: Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance" (2010). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/4bgn-h798 https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/75 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DOUBLING NATO: FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE by Erdogan Kurt B.A. August 1996, Turkish Military Academy M.A. July 2001, Naval Postgraduate School A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY May 2010 Approved by: ©2010 Erdogan Kurt. All rights reserved. ABSTRACT DOUBLING NATO: FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE Erdogan Kurt Old Dominion University, 2010 Director: Dr. Regina Karp This dissertation studies NATO expansion as institutional adaptation. More specifically, it examines the interaction between NATO's functional and geographical enlargement. This study asserts that there is a close relationship between NATO's new functions and its enlargement.
    [Show full text]
  • Nato Enlargement: Qualifications and Contributions—Parts I–Iv Hearings
    S. HRG. 108–180 NATO ENLARGEMENT: QUALIFICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS—PARTS I–IV HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION MARCH 27, AND APRIL 1, 3 AND 8, 2003 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 90–325 PDF WASHINGTON : 2003 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:42 Nov 12, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 90325 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director (II) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 17:42 Nov 12, 2003 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 90325 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 CONTENTS Thursday, March 27, 2003—Part I Page Allen, Hon. George, U.S. Senator from Virginia, opening statement .................
    [Show full text]
  • The North Atlantic Treaty Organization the Origins of NATO the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
    The Origins of N A TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION European Economic Recovery power production), and dollar reserves to pay for necessary and European Integration imports. The war had rent the social fabric of many nations, setting social class against social class and ethnic group n the aftermath of the total defeat of Nazi Germany in against ethnic group. Political tensions were exacerbated by 1945, Europe struggled to recover from the ravages of the participation of many Europeans in collaborationist occupation and war. The wartime Grand Alliance be- regimes and others in armed resistance. Masses of Europe- tweenI the Western democracies and the Soviet Union ans, radicalized by the experience of war and German collapsed, and postwar negotiations for a peace settlement occupation, demanded major social and economic change foundered in the Council of Foreign Ministers. By 1947 and appeared ready to enforce these demands with violence. peace treaties with Italy and the defeated Axis satellites were The national Communist Parties of Western Europe stood finally concluded after protracted and acrimonious negotia- ready to exploit this discontent in order to advance the aims tions between the former allies, but the problem of a divided of the Soviet Union.2 and occupied Germany remained unsettled. U.S. leaders were acutely aware of both the dangers of In April 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall re- renewed conflict in Europe and of their ability to influence turned from a frustrating round of negotiations in the the shape of a postwar European political and social order. Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow to report that the Fresh from the wartime experience of providing major United States and the Soviet Union were at loggerheads over Lend-Lease aid to allied nations and assistance to millions of a prescription for the future of central Europe and that the refugees through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Soviets appeared ready to drag out talks.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO at Seventy (PDF)
    PROJECT ON EUROPE AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP NATO at Seventy An Alliance in Crisis Ambassador Douglas Lute Ambassador Nicholas Burns REPORT FEBRUARY 2019 Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 www.belfercenter.org/Transatlantic Statements and views expressed in this report are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by Harvard University, the Harvard Kennedy School, or the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. The authors of this report invite liberal use of the information provided in it for educational purposes, requiring only that the reproduced material clearly cite the source. Design and Layout by Andrew Facini Cover photo: A U.S. Marine carries cold weather equipment as he begins to march across the Icelandic terrain in preparation for NATO’s Trident Juncture 2018 exercise, October 19, 2018. (NATO Photo) Copyright 2019, President and Fellows of Harvard College Printed in the United States of America PROJECT ON EUROPE AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP NATO at Seventy An Alliance in Crisis Ambassador Douglas Lute Ambassador Nicholas Burns REPORT FEBRUARY 2019 About this Report “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis” is a report by the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. This Project aims to strengthen teaching, research, and policy-making on the relationship between the United States and Europe. This report is timed to coincide with the 70th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2019 as the world’s most successful alliance faces perhaps the most daunting and complex set of challenges in its history.
    [Show full text]
  • Present at the Transformation: an Insider's Reflection on NATO
    Present at the Transformation 425 Chapter 18 Present at the Transformation: An Insider’s Reflection on NATO Enlargement, NATO-Russia Relations, and Where We Go from Here Alexander Vershbow It’s now twenty years since NATO’s first post-Cold War enlarge- ment when Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic became the 17th, 18th and 19th members of the Alliance in March 1999. This began a process that has added a total of 13 new democracies from Central and Eastern Europe to NATO’s ranks, with Northern Macedonia set to become the 30th member in 2019. NATO enlargement was only one dimension of U.S. and NATO policy at the end of the Cold War aimed at consolidating peace and security across Europe, overcoming the division of the continent im- posed by Stalin at the end of World War II and ratified at the 1945 Yalta Summit. The enlargement of NATO membership went hand in hand with the forging of a strategic partnership with Russia, formalized in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997. A transformed NATO Al- liance and an institutionalized NATO-Russia partnership were envis- aged as the main pillars of a U.S.-led pan-European security system that sought to realize the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace first articulated by President George H.W. Bush and reaffirmed by President Bill Clinton. The ensuing twenty years have witnessed a lot of second-guessing about the wisdom of the decision to open NATO to the East, with more and more critics arguing that it was the “original sin” that led to the confrontational relationship with Moscow that we are dealing with today.
    [Show full text]
  • The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 a Dissertation Presented
    The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 A dissertation presented to the faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy Robert Thomas Davis II August 2008 © 2008 Robert Thomas Davis II All Rights Reserved ii This dissertation titled The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 by ROBERT THOMAS DAVIS II has been approved for the Department of History and the College of Arts and Sciences by ______________________________ Peter John Brobst Associate Professor of History ______________________________ Benjamin M. Ogles Dean, College of Arts and Sciences iii Abstract DAVIS, ROBERT THOMAS II, Ph.D., August 2008, History The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968 (422 pp.) Director of Dissertation: Peter John Brobst This study is a reappraisal of the strategic dilemma of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Cold War. This dilemma revolves around the problem of articulating a strategic concept for a military alliance in the nuclear era. NATO was born of a perceived need to defend Western Europe from a Soviet onslaught. It was an imperative of the early alliance to develop a military strategy and force posture to defend Western Europe should such a war break out. It was not long after the first iteration of strategy took shape than the imperative for a military defense of Europe receded under the looming threat of thermonuclear war. The advent of thermonuclear arsenals in both the United States and Soviet Union brought with it the potential destruction of civilization should war break out. This realization made statesmen on both sides of the Iron Curtain undergo what has been referred to as an ongoing process of nuclear learning.
    [Show full text]
  • The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia
    Mark Kramer The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia In the latter half of the 1990s, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was preparing to expand its membership for the first time since the admission of Spain in 1982, Russian officials claimed that the entry of former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO would violate a solemn ‘‘pledge’’ made by the governments of West Germany and the United States in 1990 not to bring any former Communist states into the alliance.1 Anatolii Adamishin, who was Soviet deputy foreign minister in 1990, claimed in 1997 that ‘‘we were told during the German reunification process that NATO would not expand.’’2 Other former Soviet officials, including Mikhail Gorbachev, made similar assertions in 1996—1997. Some Western analysts and former officials, including Jack F. Matlock, who was the U.S. ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1990, endorsed this view, arguing that Gorbachev received a ‘‘clear commitment that if Germany united, and stayed in NATO, the borders of NATO would not move eastward.’’3 Pointing to comments recorded by the journalists Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, former U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara averred that ‘‘the United States pledged never to expand NATO eastward if Moscow would agree to the unification of Germany.’’4 According to this view, ‘‘the Clinton administration reneged on that commitment ...when it decided to expand NATO to Eastern Europe.’’5 These assertions were sharply challenged at the time by other observers, including former U.S. policymakers who played a direct role in the German reunification process.
    [Show full text]
  • NATO in the Beholder's Eye: Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-1956
    WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS Christian Ostermann, Lee H. Hamilton, NATO in the Beholder’s Eye: Director Director Soviet Perceptions and Policies, 1949-56 BOARD OF ADVISORY TRUSTEES: COMMITTEE: Vojtech Mastny Joseph A. Cari, Jr., William Taubman Chairman (Amherst College) Steven Alan Bennett, Working Paper No. 35 Chairman Vice Chairman PUBLIC MEMBERS Michael Beschloss (Historian, Author) The Secretary of State Colin Powell; The Librarian of James H. Billington Congress (Librarian of Congress) James H. Billington; The Archivist of the United States Warren I. Cohen John W. Carlin; (University of Maryland- The Chairman of the Baltimore) National Endowment for the Humanities Bruce Cole; John Lewis Gaddis The Secretary of the (Yale University) Smithsonian Institution Lawrence M. Small; The Secretary of James Hershberg Education (The George Washington Roderick R. Paige; University) The Secretary of Health & Human Services Tommy G. Thompson; Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Woodrow Wilson PRIVATE MEMBERS Washington, D.C. Center) Carol Cartwright, John H. Foster, March 2002 Sharon Wolchik Jean L. Hennessey, (The George Washington Daniel L. Lamaute, University) Doris O. Mausui, Thomas R. Reedy, Nancy M. Zirkin COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT THE COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT WORKING PAPER SERIES CHRISTIAN F. OSTERMANN, Series Editor This paper is one of a series of Working Papers published by the Cold War International History Project of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. Established in 1991 by a grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) disseminates new information and perspectives on the history of the Cold War as it emerges from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side” of the post-World War II superpower rivalry.
    [Show full text]