Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union Volume 2009 Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Article 7 Conference on the European Union March 2012 NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After Evan Jaroff Claremont McKenna College Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu Part of the International Law Commons, International Relations Commons, Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the National Security Law Commons Recommended Citation Jaroff, Evan (2009) "NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After," Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union: Vol. 2009, Article 7. DOI: 10.5642/urceu.200901.07 Available at: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/7 This Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Claremont at Scholarship @ Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union by an authorized administrator of Scholarship @ Claremont. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Claremont- UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union 55 5 NATO EXPANSION DURING THE COLD WAR AND AFTER Evan Jaroff N ATO has undergon e five ro unds ofenlarge m ent sin ce its inception in 194 <), and it is poised to unde rgo another ro und q uite shortly, since Albania and C ro atia signe d accessio n protocols in 200tl. In order to understand future expa nsio ns, inclu ding th e proj ected entry of Albania and C ro atia, it is helpful to examine th e history of N ATO enlargement, and in particular the criteri a used to identify potential new members and th e process that they must undergo in order to j oin th e Allian ce. This paper demonstrates th at accession criteria used during th e Cold War, altho ug h never ex plicitly o utline d, we re quite sim ilar to th e suggeste d criteri a laid o ut in ;1 1995 rep ort (Study on Enlarge ment) that w as used to eva luate potential new m ember states for th e accessio ns of 19 <) () and 2004. H o wever , afte r the Cold W ar th e actual process of accession became more stru ctu red , regulated, and stringen t. U nd erstanding N ATO ex pansio n In th e past w ill help shed some light on how new member states co uld be admitted in th e future. NATO's FOUNDING MEMBER STATES Issues of NATO expansio n arose even before access io n talks w ith Greece and Turkey in 1<)52, sinc e the first real instance ofenla rgem ent occurred after the " W ashingt on Exp lo r­ atory T alks o n Security" (W ET ), which were negotiatio ns (held betw een 1<)4 8 and 1949) leadi ng up to NATO 's fo un di ng . 1 These n egoti ati ons produced th e "Washington Pa per" (in Septem be r 194 tl). which discu ssed th e states th at would be include d ,IS foundin g m ein­ bel'S of th e N orth A tlant ic Treaty Organiz ation." It laid o ut three gro ups of co untries and dubbed them the " har d co re, th e ste pping sto nes, and th e go ats" (Smith 26). The United States, Ca nada, the United Kin gdom, France, the Netherl an ds, Belgiulll. and Luxem bo urg made up th e hard core states, which " share d com m o n strat egic and ideological co ncerns , an d wo uld fo rm a close assoc iatio n that w ou ld be at the heart of the North Atlanti c Treaty" (Sm ith 26).N orway,D enma rk , Icelan d, Ireland, and Po rt ugal w ere th e stepp ing stones states, whose geogr'lp hic locations nude them o f strategic, mil itar y importance. T he fin al group , th e goats, was co m prised of Italy, Turkey, and G reece. None o f th ese three states "fit th e term "North Atla nt ic' III its ge ograp hic al or strategi c articulatio ns, o r (in the G ree k NATO Expansion During the Cold War and After 56 EVAN JAROFF Clarem ont McKenna College an d Turkish cases) its id eological o nes, but were nonetheless of key impo rtance to W este rn Eu rope" (Smith 27) . ITALY'S INCLUSION IN NATO Ital y's in clusion as a founding member of NATO is a particularly interesting e lse, sin ce it was "the clear est de partu re from the geograph ical co ncept of th e N orth Atlantic Tre.r­ ry, and th us is clear ev ide nce of th e political crite ria for membership" (Sm ith 57). When th e "hard co re " stat es de liberated over wh ich " ot he r" or "additio na l" stares to include in NATO, th ey did not have clear criteria to guide th eir evaluatio n (Sm ith 29) . This was qui te evide nt in Italy's case, whi ch was largely accepted becau se of Rom e's strong desire to j o in NAT O , and influeutial Fren ch support. T he italians ~ rgue d th at " Italy was, by din t of 'he r civili sation and he r mercantile and m aritim e traditio ns' a W estern Eu ro pean co untry" (Smith 30). However, th e US an d UK worried that incorporating Italy Into NATO could lead to an overex te nsio n of their military capab iliti es if th e ltalian s needed military assistanc e . Although thi s w as a valid co nce rn , it feU to the back ground as th e Fren ch backed Italy ill part because including the stat e in NATO wo uld make it more difficu lt to excl ude Algeri a (then a Fr en ch col ony) from th e organization 111 the future (Smi th 35) . The French m ade it cle ar th at th ey stro ngly supported Italy's cause, and w he n th e Italian ambassador sign aled Italy 's desire for N AT O m embershi p to th e USState De partme nt, it was a big ste p toward s its eventual inclusion. By directly appealin g to th e United States, ltal y acknow ledged Washington's ke y role in th e accessio n decision. Italy was " heavily dependen t o n th e U S fo r aid in its post- war reconstru cti on" an d felt th at j o ining N ATO would help en sur e th at U S-It ali ~n rela tions remained friendly (Sm ith 37 ). Italy would also economically be nefit fro m closer relatio ns with other NATO m ember states, usin g th e US as a springboard. Italy placed th e Am eri cans in a rather peril ous positio n by giving th e U S th e final decision in th eir accession. If th e U S chose to exclude Italy, then it wo uld not only co u nter stro ng Fren ch suppo rt, but it also ran the risk ofsett ing a p recedent for which co unt ries would be denied in th e fut ure.M oreo ver, ex clud ing Italy could h ave swayed the country to side w ith th e Sov iet Union in the future, so me thing that nei th er th e U S nor W estern Eu rope wanted to happ en . Ul timately , th e U S recomm ended th at Italy join N AT O based o n a relati ve consensus am ong th e " hard core" states, th e formal Italian request to join th e o rganizat io n, and th e possible geopolitical con­ seq ue nce s of rejecti ng a state . The co nseque nces of rej ecting a state's bid to j oin NATO were taken ve ry serio usly during th e Cold W ar , which helps explain w hy th ere is no evi de nce of un successful ap­ plications for en try into NATO during this perio d. As allud ed to w ith respect to Italy, th e conseq ue nces of an un su ccessful, delayed , or w ithdraw n appli cation co uld threaten the o rganizatio n's vitality. George Kennan. a member of the State Departme nt tha t negoti ated the N orth Atlantic T reaty, po ints o ut that if"individ udl co un tries rejected m embership o r were refused m embership, th e Russians co uld make political cap ital out of thi s, either way" (Sm ith 23) . 1n other words, NA T O not o nly had to be careful abo ut dealing with stat es that active ly so ught NATO m embership du ring th e Cold Wa r, but it also had to be particular about inviting states to join th e Alliance so that the orga nization would not be em barrassed by a rej ection . http://scholarship.claremont.edu/urceu/vol2009/iss1/7 Claremont-UC Und ergraduate Research Conference on th e European Unio n 57 ACCESSION CRITERIA DURING THE COLD WAR The guid ulg princip le used to det ermine which states would j oin NATO is o utlined in Article 10 o f the Washingt ou Treaty (also kn o w n us th e North Atlantic Treaty), which states : 'T he Patties ilia)', by unanimous ayteeuwm, invite '1IIy other European State ill a position tojimhcr II,e priuciplcs (!( this Treal)' and 10 contribut« 10 tlu: sccurit» (2f tlu: North Atlnntic area 10 accede 10 tltis Trcatv, AllY State so invited lIIay become ,7 Part y 10 the T reatv b)' dl'posil ill)!.