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Involvement of Non-Eu European Nato Members in Common Security And

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Involvement of Non-Eu European Nato Members in Common Security And ANKARA ÜNĐVERSĐTESĐ AVRUPA TOPLULUKLARI ARATIRMA VE UYGULAMA MERKEZĐ Araştırma Dizisi No: 37 INVOLVEMENT OF NONEU EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS IN COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY: THE TURKISH CASE Dr. eyda HANBAY Ankara-2013 Involvement of NonEU European NATO Members in Common Security and Defense Policy: The Turkish Case ANKARA ÜNĐVERSĐTESĐ YAYINLARI NO: 368 ISBN: 978605-136090-4 Ankara Üniversitesi Avrupa Toplulukları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi, 2013 Tüm Hakları Saklıdır. Yayıncı izni olmadan, kısmen de olsa fotokopi, film vb. elektronik ve mekanik yöntemlerle çoğaltılamaz. Ankara Üniversitesi Avrupa Toplulukları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Araştırma Dizisi ATAUM Kitap Yayın Komisyonu Prof. Dr. Tuğrul ARAT Prof.Dr.Çınar ÖZEN Doç. Dr. Sanem BAYKAL Deniz SENEMOĞLU (ATAUM) Demet Halime SEZGEN (ATAUM) ATAUM Yönetim Kurulu Prof.Dr.Çağrı ERHAN Doç.Dr.Sanem BAYKAL Doç.Dr.Erdem DENK Prof.Dr.Celal GÖLE Prof.Dr.Tuğrul ARAT Prof.Dr.Erel TELLAL Prof.Dr.Fethi AÇIKEL Prof.Dr.Hasan ŞAHĐN Yrd.Doç.Dr.Đlke GÖÇMEN Murat YAPICI (Dış Ticaret Müsteşarlığı) Nazife GÜLGEN (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) Dr.Hakan KARABACAK (Maliye Bakanlığı) Pınar TANLAK (Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği) Kaya TÜRKMEN (Dışişleri Bakanlığı) Ankara Üniversitesi Avrupa Toplulukları Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Araştırma Dizisi No: 37 ANKARA ÜNĐVERSĐTESĐ BASIMEVĐ Đncitaşı Sokak No: 10 06510 Beşevler / ANKARA Tel: 0 (312) 213 66 55 Basım Tarihi: ……………. II CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES......................................................................................... VI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.......................................................................VII INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 FIRST CHAPTER THEORETICAL APPROACHES 1.1. Constructivist Approach as Explanatory Framework.............................. 25 1.2. Complementary Approaches................................................................... 35 1.2.1. Realism ................................................................................................ 35 1.2.2. Institutionalism .................................................................................... 41 SECOND CHAPTER EXPLAINING THE PRINCIPLES OF INVOLVEMENT OF NONEU EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS IN CSDP ACTIVITES 2.1. Development of CSDP and NATOEU Relations................................... 45 2.1.1. From ESDI to CSDP............................................................................ 45 2.1.2. The Context of NATOEU Cooperation .............................................. 59 2.2. The Principles of the Involvement Issue ................................................. 72 2.2.1. The Way to Determine the Principles of Involving Non-EU European NATO Members in CSDP ................................................................... 72 2.2.2. The Nice Implementation Document: Setting the Main Principles of NonEU NATO Members Involvement ............................................................. 75 2.3. Difficulties Regarding Non-EU European NATO Members’ Involvement in the CSDP Activities ............................................................................... 79 2.4. Indicative Examples on the Existing Difficulties of NonEU European NATO Members’ Involvement ........................................................................... 83 III THIRD CHAPTER FACTORS SHAPING TURKEY’S SECURITY POLICIES 3.1. General Parameters of Turkish Security Perceptions .............................. 85 3.2. Turkey’s Geographical Location as One of the Determiner of Its Security Perceptions........................................................................... 92 3.3. Westernization of Turkish Security Discourse........................................ 99 3.4. Turkey’s Position in NATO .................................................................. 107 3.4.1. Turkey’s Contributions to NATO ...................................................... 108 3.4.2. Turkey`s Position During the Preparations of NATO’s New Strategic Concept............................................................................... 115 FOURTH CHAPTER ANALYZING TURKEY’S EXPERIENCE WITHIN THE CSDP 4.1. The Core of the Problem....................................................................... 119 4.2. Turkey and the Western European Union ............................................. 126 4.2.1. The Role Assumed by the WEU in the European Security Architecture ......................................................................... 127 4.2.2. Turkey’s Rights Stemming From its Associate Membership Status in the WEU......................................................... 134 4.2.3. Was Turkey Satisfied With its Associate Membership Status in the WEU? ...................................................... 138 4.3. Comparing Turkey’s and the European Union’s Security Policies ....... 142 4.4. Analyzing the Involvement of NonEU NATO Members in CSDP Through Turkish Experience...................................................... 145 4.4.1. Different Interpretations of the NATO’s Washington Summit Communiqué...................................................................................... 145 4.4.2. Influences on the Operational Side .................................................... 147 4.4.3. Turkey’s Exclusion From European Defence Industry Cooperation Projects.......................................................................... 151 4.4.4. Why Can Turkey Not Conclude a Security Agreement With the EU? ............. 155 IV 4.5. NATOEU Cooperation ........................................................................ 157 4.5.1. NATOEU Relations Within the NATO’s New Strategic Concept.... 157 4.5.2. The Cases Related With the NATOEU Cooperation ........................ 161 4.5.2.1. NATOEU Cooperation and the Cyprus Question .......................... 161 4.5.2.2. Reflections of the Different Working Cultures of the EU and NATO ................................................................................ 167 4.5.2.3. Reading the Concept of NATOEU Cooperation Differently ......... 171 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................... 175 BIBLIOGRAHPY........................................................................................ 181 APPENDICES ............................................................................................. 205 Main Questions Asked at the Interviews ................................................... 205 List Of The Persons Interviewed ............................................................... 207 V LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Defence Expenditures of NATO Countries.................................... 112 Table 2. NATO Countries’ Armed Forces Annual Strength...................... 114 VI LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CESDP : Common European Security and Defense Policy CJTF : Combined Joint Task Forces CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy CONOPS: Concept of Operations CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy DSACEUR: Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe EDA: European Defence Agency ESDI: European Security and Defence Identity ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy EU: European Union EUMC: European Union Military Committee HR: High Representative IR: International Relations ISAF: International Security Assistance Force MD: Mediterranean Dialogue NAC: North Atlantic Council NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization NRF: NATO Response Force OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PfP: Partnership for Peace PMF: Political-Military Framework PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team PSC: Political and Security Committee SHAPE: Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe TGNA: Turkish Grand National Assembly UN: United Nations WEAG: Western European Armaments Group WEAO: Western European Armaments Organization WEU: Western European Union VII INTRODUCTION∗ The European Union (EU) has been building its security and defense policy since the 1990s. The evolution of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)1 process has affected the nonEU European NATO members’ position in the European security architecture. The differences in the compositions of NATO and EU members have created undesired issues in terms of participation in the CSDP activities. As a staunch NATO member and an accession country to the EU, Turkey has also been affected by the developments in the CSDP. This dissertation takes Turkey as a case study in analyzing the state of affairs on the involvement of nonEU European NATO members in the CSDP. NATO and the EU have 21 common members. Canada, Iceland, Norway, Turkey, Albania, Croatia2 and the United States are members of NATO, but not of the EU. Among these, except for Canada and the United States, five countries are non EU European NATO members and certain principles apply to their participation in the CSDP. The issue of involving those countries fully in CSDP has been on the agenda since the beginning of the process. Case study Turkey’s relations with the security institutions in Europe constitute an important aspect of its security policies and the balance created in terms of Turkey’s participation in the ∗ Views expressed here represent the author's own opinions and assessments. 1 With the entry into force of Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was renamed as Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In this dissertation we will refer to the term ESDP where necessary. 2Croatia is set to join the European Union on 1 July 2013.
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