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USNATO READER TABLE OF CONTENTS Michael Newlin 1963-1967 Political-Military Officer, US Mission to Regional Organizations, Paris, France Thomas W. Wilson 1964-1968 Political Advisor, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Harlan Cleveland 1965-1969 U.S. Permanent Representative, Paris & Brussels Donald A. Kruse 1965-1968 Political Military Advisor, NATO, Paris 1968-1970 Assistant to NATO Security General, Paris Charles Anthony Gillespie 1967-1968 Administrative and Security Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Robert A. Martin 1967-1969 Arms Control and Disarmament Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Marten Van Heuven 1967-1970 Legal Advisor, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Joseph F. Donelan, Jr. 1968-1969 Comptroller, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Raymond L. Garthoff 1968-1970 Counselor for Political-Military Affairs, US Mission to NATO, Brussels John W. Kimball 1968-1969 Executive Assistant, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 1969-1971 Political Military Affairs, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Gerald B. Helman 1968-1973 Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Ralph Earle, II 1969-1972 Defense Advisor, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 1 Lucian Heichler 1970-1971 Senior Officer Training, NATO Defense College, Rome, Italy Perry W. Linder 1970-1973 Deputy Administrative Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Theodore Wilkinson 1970-1974 Political-Military Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Thomas M. T. Niles 1971-1973 Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to NATO, Brussels John Brayton Redecker 1972-1974 Executive Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Mark C. Lissfelt 1973-1976 Assistant Director, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Bruce W. Clark 1973-1977 Special Assistant to Ambassador, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Stephen J. Ledogar 1973-1976 Political Officer, Brussels 1981-1987 Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Pierre Shostal 1974-1977 Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Frank H. Perez 1974-1977 Political Advisor, US Mission to NATO, Brussels David T. Jones 1974-1976 NATO Desk Officer, European Bureau, Washington, DC 1976-1980 Political Military Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Miles S. Pendleton, Jr. 1976-1979 Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Jack Mendelsohn 1977-1979 Political-Military Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Lucian Heichler 1977-1980 Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, US Mission to NATO, Brussels 2 Maynard Wayne Glitman 1977-1981 Deputy Chief of Mission, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Reuben Lev 1980-1983 International Administrative Officer, Brussels John M. Evans 1983-1986 U.S. Mission to NATO, Brussels Rudolf V. Perina 1985-1987 Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Craig Dunkerley 1987-1991 Deputy Political Advisor/Political Advisor, US Mission to NATO, Brussels R. Barry Fulton 1987-1991 Public Affairs Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Phillip Merrill 1990-1992 Assistant Secretary General, US Mission to NATO, Brussels Robert M. Beecroft 1991-1994 Political Officer, US Mission to NATO, Brussels MICHAEL NEWLIN Political-Military Officer, US Mission to Regional Organizations Paris, France (1963-1967) Ambassador Michael Newlin was born in North Carolina in 1929. He received both his bachelor’s degree and master’s degree from Harvard University in 1949 and 1951, respectively. His career has included positions in Frankfort, Oslo, Paris, Brussels, Leopoldville/Kinshasa, Jerusalem, Vienna, and an ambassadorship to Algeria. Ambassador Newlin was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 1997 and by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006. Q: You left UNP in 1963 and moved to USRO. What do those initials stand for? NEWLIN: United States Mission to Regional Organizations. That was supposed to cover a variety of organizations, but basically it was the U.S. Mission to NATO. Q: The head of it at that time was Tom Finletter? NEWLIN: Thomas K. Finletter of the liberal wing of the Democratic Party of Stevenson, Eleanor Roosevelt. A former Secretary of the Air Force and New York lawyer. 3 Q: Did he take on a strong hands-on approach or did he let his staff run things? NEWLIN: Finletter's great goal was the Multilateral Force--the MLF--which was to put strategic nuclear weapons on cargo ships and then to have the Germans and others on board with us. And this was his great--like the ancient mariner preoccupation. (Laughter) As far as the Democratic Party was concerned, LBJ and Finletter were opposites. In one of his first visits to Washington after Kennedy's death Finletter managed to have a small meeting with LBJ at which he made a strong pitch for the multilateral force. Not all concerned agencies were present. LBJ told Finletter to go full steam ahead. As we know, not even a meeting with the President can guarantee the shelf life of a controversial policy. One needs constant broad-based support in Washington which was lacking. In spite of the green light, the administration did not push the MLF project but it was not formally dropped. After Harlan Cleveland angered LBJ over leaking a story on UN finances, he was sent to replace Finletter thereby dooming the MLF. Cleveland's "exile" to NATO was a great boon to the Alliance. Finletter told a story about a meeting he had with President Truman while he was serving as Secretary of the Air Force. An important policy decision had come up in which there were compelling arguments on both sides. Finletter, the good attorney he was, laid out the pros and cons dispassionately. Truman asked, "What is the right thing to do?" Finletter repeated his presentation after which Truman repeated his question. Cornered, Finletter then said what he would do if he were President. Truman said, "Always do the right thing; it will please your friends and annoy your enemies." Q: What was your position on the NATO delegation? NEWLIN: I started out as head of the Political/Military unit which had sort of languished because the idea of a Foreign Service Officer working on Political/Military affairs was not popular with the military side of the house. There were three of us in that office, officers more brilliant than I. We worked on the Multilateral Force and we worked on NATO infrastructure, and on the whole series of problems relating to de Gaulle's decision to make the military leave. I did a great deal of work during the time I was there on moving NATO from Paris to Brussels. Q: What about NATO nuclear forces? We were quite concerned at the time that the Germans not get their hands on any nuclear weapons. NEWLIN: Yes. That was the rationale for the MLF--that we blunt any desire on the part of the Germans to develop their own nuclear capabilities. That you associate them getting close to nuclear weapons but keep actual usage in U.S. hands. Also, I was involved in setting up something that has become a permanent thing--the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. That was started while I was there and I was the Group's first secretary. That was an initiative of McNamara. McNamara wanted, among other things, to educate the Europeans as to the realities of nuclear weapons. He used the Group to show what even tactical nuclear weapons would do to the population. I think that was useful. Everybody had to have special clearances. McNamara and other Defense Ministers would come. There were just a few people there. I had to take my turn taking notes. I think that was a useful thing to have done. 4 Q: What were your relations with the Supreme Allied Commander there, General Lemnitzer at the time, and his staff? NEWLIN: Finletter was a strong believer in the absolute supremacy of the North Atlantic Council--that you were the personal representative of the head of government and the chief of state and that he should be supreme. When General Norstad, SACEUR, left, he said, "One down, one to go." The other one was the NATO Secretary General, Stikker. There were no problems really with Lemnitzer other than once we got an instruction that I had to deliver in the middle of the night. The telegram instructed SACEUR to get involved with the Cyprus dispute. Lemnitzer read the instructions and said, "These are the damndest things I've ever seen." It was where the State Department wanted the Supreme Allied Commander to get involved in one of the intractable problems no one else had been able to solve. Lemnitzer successfully avoided the assignment. Q: Of course, you probably maintained close relations with the SACEUR political advisor on it, too. NEWLIN: Yes. That was John Burns. We had very good relations with him. Q: Some of the political issues that came up at that time was U.S. troop withdrawal from Europe. Did you get involved in that at all? NEWLIN: Well, certainly the mission as I recall, we strongly advised against anything like that. Q: Yes. And what about the French nuclear force? NEWLIN: Well, the French of course, went their own way. There was really very little that we could do. I guess we watched with restrained amusement when critics asked, "Who is your enemy? Why are you building this?" De Gaulle didn't want to say, of course, "I'm building it just out of national pride." He said, "It will be aimed a tout azimuths." (Laughter) I said to my French colleagues, "I hope for your sake that you don't accidentally fire one of those things towards the United States!" Q: Were you involved in the question of the flexible response, which was then the big issue in NATO? NEWLIN: Yes. Very, very much so. In the Political/Military Section we certainly were involved. Rather than massive retaliation, flexible response. Q: That again, played in with what became to McNamara and the new Administration the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.
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