ETT Report-No.32.V2

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

ETT Report-No.32.V2 DISPLACEMENT TRACKING MATRIX - Nigeria DTM Nigeria EMERGENCY TRACKING TOOL ETT Report: No. 32 | 12–18 September 2017 IOM OIM DTM Emergency Tracking Tool (ETT) is deployed to track and provide up-to-date information on sudden displacement and other population movements New IDP arrivals recorded during the period DTM and ETT Cumulative Number of IDPs by LGA Abadam Abadam Yusufari Lake Chad Kukawa Yusufari Yunusari Mobbar Lake Chad± Nguru Karasuwa Niger Machina Yunusari Mobbar Abadam Kukawa Lake Chad Bade Guzamala 79 Nguru Karasuwa Kukawa Bursari 14,105 Geidam Gubio Bade Bade Guzamala Monguno Mobbar Nganzai Jakusko Bursari 6240 Marte Geidam Gubio Bade Guzamala Ngala Tarmua Monguno Magumeri Nganzai Jakusko Yobe 122,844 Marte 43 Gubio Monguno Jere Dikwa 7 Mafa Kala/BalgeYobe Ngala Maiduguri M.C. 122 Tarmua Nganzai Nangere Fune Damaturu Jigawa Magumeri 42,686 Borno 18 Yobe Marte Potiskum Ngala Kaga Konduga Bama Jere Mafa Kala/Balge Magumeri Dikwa 17 30 73 Yobe 49,480 Fika Gujba Nangere Fune Damaturu Maiduguri Mafa 74,858 Jere Dikwa Gwoza Potiskum Kaga Borno308,807 Kala-Balge MaiduBornoguri Damboa 799 19,619 KondugaKonduga Bama Gulani Cameroon Kag1a05,678 56,748 Chibok Konduga Fika Gujba Bama Biu 11 Madagali Askira/Uba Gwoza Michika Damboa Cameroon Kwaya Kusar 73,966Gwoza Hawul Damboa Bauchi Gombe Bayo Mubi North 76,795 Hong Gulani Shani Chibok Gombi Mubi South Madagali Biu Biu 16,378Chibok Maiha Askira/Uba Askira-Uba Inaccessible area Guyuk Song Michika Shelleng IDP severity Kwaya KusarKwaya Kusar Hawul Adamawa Hawul Less t han 10,788 Bauchi Gombe Bayo Mubi North Lamurde Number of new Bayo 10,788 - 25,813 HongAdamawa Numan Girei arrivals Shani Cameroon 25,813 - 56,749 Demsa Inaccessible area Shani Gombi Mubi South Yola South 56,749 - 122,770 Yola North Gombe 0 15 30 60 Km 122,770 Above Fufore LGAChad Adamawa Plateau Mayo-Belwa Shelleng Maiha Guyuk Song STATE: Borno 73 individuals (INDs) arrived at Bama and 129 INDs le� Bama LGA: Kaga 17 INDs arrived at NYSC Camp from Musari in Konduga LGA. LGA: Bama during the repor�ngJada period. These include 17 INDs who arrived Trigger: Adamawa Lamurde Triggers: at Banki Camp from Gwoza town, 56 INDs who arrived at Banki Military opera�ons Voluntary reloca�on Numan Poor living condi�ons Girei Camp from 250-Housing Estate in Konduga LGA, 77 INDs who Demsa Ganye LGA: Kala Balge 7 INDsYola South arrived at Rann IDP Camp from Jarawa ward of Konduga le� General Hospital Camp for Konduga, Maiduguri M.C. and Trigger: Adamawa Yola North LGA. Fufore Taraba Voluntary reloca�on Jere LGAs and 52 INDs who le� BankiPlateau IDP Camp for Jiddari in Jere Poor living condi�onsMayo-Belwa LGA.Toungo LGA: Konduga 30 INDs arrived at Konduga during the repor�ng period. These Trigger: include 15 INDs who arrived at Boarding Primary School Camp LGA: Chibok 11 INDs arrived at Chibok during the repor�ng period. These Voluntary reloca�on Poor living condi�ons from Mairamri in Konduga LGA, 11 INDs (all children below the Trigger: include 6 INDs who arrived at Likama ward from Damaturu in Jada Voluntary reloca�on Yobe State and 5 INDs who arrived from Bulukutu in Maiduguri age of 16) who were brought by the Centre for Community M.C. LGA of Borno State. Health and Development Interna�onal (CHAD) to Federal GanyeTraining Centre Camp Konduga from General Hospital Camp in LGA: Damboa 51 INDs arrived at Damboa during the repor�ng period. These Bama LGA for probable reunion with their families and 4 INDs Trigger: include 28 INDs who arrived at Abori GateTaraba Camp from nearby who arrived at Boarding Primary School Camp from Dangala in Voluntary reloca�on Bama LGA. wards, 17 INDs who arrived at Damboa town from Maiduguri Toungo M.C. and 6 INDs who arrived at the town from Akko in Gombe LGA: Kukawa 79 INDs arrived at Kukawa during the repor�ng period. These State. Trigger: include 51 INDs who arrived at Kukawa town from Maiduguri Improved security Poor living condi�ons M.C. LGA, 23 INDs who arrived at the town from Jere LGA and 5 LGA: Dikwa 122 INDs arrived at Dikwa during the repor�ng period. These INDs who arrived at the town from nearby communi�es. Benue Triggers: include 92 INDs who arrived at 20-Housing Estate from Voluntary reloca�on LGA: Maiduguri 18 INDs arrived at Bakasi Camp from Mintar ward of Monguno Military opera�ons Mudu/Kaza ward of Dikwa LGA, 24 INDs who arrived at Improved security M.C. LGA. 20-Housing Estate from Guzamala LGA and 6 INDs who arrived Trigger: at Bulabulin from Lagos State. Voluntary reloca�on LGA: Monguno 24 INDs arrived at Monguno during the repor�ng period. These LGA: Gwoza 799 INDs arrived at Gwoza during the repor�ng period. These Triggers: include 13 INDs who arrived at Shuwari community from Lawan� Voluntary reloca�on Triggers: Poor living condi�on Poor living condi�ons include 392 INDs who returned to Gwoza town from Yola North in Kukawa LGA, 7 INDs who arrived at Government Girls Second- Improved security and Mubi South LGAs in Adamawa State, 83 INDs who arrived at ary School Camp from Old Maiduguri in Jere and 4 INDs who Voluntary reloca�on Wege Arrival Centre from Bama LGA, 200 INDs who returned to arrived at Fulatari from Sabon Gari of Marte LGA. Gadamayo from Jere LGA, 49 INDs who arrived at Wege Camp 2 43 INDs arrived at Interna�onal School Camp Ngala during the from neighbouring villages in Gwoza and 75 INDs who arrived at LGA: Ngala Trigger: repor�ng period. These include 18 INDs who arrived at the camp Wege Camp 2 from Jere LGA. Voluntary reloca�on from Gulumba ward of Bama LGA and 25 INDs who arrived from Ndufu ward of Ngala. The depiction and use of boundaries, geographic names, and related data shown on maps and included in this report are not warranted to be error free nor do they imply judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries by IOM. For more information or to report an alert, please contact: Henry Kwenin, DTM Project Coordinator: [email protected] | +234 9038852524 Fouad Diab, Emergency Coordinator: [email protected] | +234 9075070001 Humanitarian Aid For more DTM information products: http://nigeria.iom.int/dtm And Civil Protec�on.
Recommended publications
  • Nigeria's Constitution of 1999
    PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, 16:42 constituteproject.org Nigeria's Constitution of 1999 This complete constitution has been generated from excerpts of texts from the repository of the Comparative Constitutions Project, and distributed on constituteproject.org. constituteproject.org PDF generated: 26 Aug 2021, 16:42 Table of contents Preamble . 5 Chapter I: General Provisions . 5 Part I: Federal Republic of Nigeria . 5 Part II: Powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria . 6 Chapter II: Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy . 13 Chapter III: Citizenship . 17 Chapter IV: Fundamental Rights . 20 Chapter V: The Legislature . 28 Part I: National Assembly . 28 A. Composition and Staff of National Assembly . 28 B. Procedure for Summoning and Dissolution of National Assembly . 29 C. Qualifications for Membership of National Assembly and Right of Attendance . 32 D. Elections to National Assembly . 35 E. Powers and Control over Public Funds . 36 Part II: House of Assembly of a State . 40 A. Composition and Staff of House of Assembly . 40 B. Procedure for Summoning and Dissolution of House of Assembly . 41 C. Qualification for Membership of House of Assembly and Right of Attendance . 43 D. Elections to a House of Assembly . 45 E. Powers and Control over Public Funds . 47 Chapter VI: The Executive . 50 Part I: Federal Executive . 50 A. The President of the Federation . 50 B. Establishment of Certain Federal Executive Bodies . 58 C. Public Revenue . 61 D. The Public Service of the Federation . 63 Part II: State Executive . 65 A. Governor of a State . 65 B. Establishment of Certain State Executive Bodies .
    [Show full text]
  • Living Through Nigeria's Six-Year
    “When We Can’t See the Enemy, Civilians Become the Enemy” Living Through Nigeria’s Six-Year Insurgency About the Report This report explores the experiences of civilians and armed actors living through the conflict in northeastern Nigeria. The ultimate goal is to better understand the gaps in protection from all sides, how civilians perceive security actors, and what communities expect from those who are supposed to protect them from harm. With this understanding, we analyze the structural impediments to protecting civilians, and propose practical—and locally informed—solutions to improve civilian protection and response to the harm caused by all armed actors in this conflict. About Center for Civilians in Conflict Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) works to improve protection for civil- ians caught in conflicts around the world. We call on and advise international organizations, governments, militaries, and armed non-state actors to adopt and implement policies to prevent civilian harm. When civilians are harmed we advocate the provision of amends and post-harm assistance. We bring the voices of civilians themselves to those making decisions affecting their lives. The organization was founded as Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict in 2003 by Marla Ruzicka, a courageous humanitarian killed by a suicide bomber in 2005 while advocating for Iraqi families. T +1 202 558 6958 E [email protected] www.civiliansinconflict.org © 2015 Center for Civilians in Conflict “When We Can’t See the Enemy, Civilians Become the Enemy” Living Through Nigeria’s Six-Year Insurgency This report was authored by Kyle Dietrich, Senior Program Manager for Africa and Peacekeeping at CIVIC.
    [Show full text]
  • Nigeria Update to the IMB Nigeria
    Progress in Polio Eradication Initiative in Nigeria: Challenges and Mitigation Strategies 16th Independent Monitoring Board Meeting 1 November 2017 London 0 Outline 1. Epidemiology 2. Challenges and Mitigation strategies SIAs Surveillance Routine Immunization 3. Summary and way forward 1 Epidemiology 2 Polio Viruses in Nigeria, 2015-2017 Past 24 months Past 12 months 3 Nigeria has gone 13 months without Wild Polio Virus and 11 months without cVDPV2 13 months without WPV 11 months – cVDPV2 4 Challenges and Mitigation strategies 5 SIAs 6 Before the onset of the Wild Polio Virus Outbreak in July 2016, there were several unreached settlements in Borno Borno Accessibility Status by Ward, March 2016 # of Wards in % Partially LGAs % Fully Accessible % Inaccessible LGA Accessible Abadam 10 0% 0% 100% Askira-Uba 13 100% 0% 0% Bama 14 14% 0% 86% Bayo 10 100% 0% 0% Biu 11 91% 9% 0% Chibok 11 100% 0% 0% Damboa 10 20% 0% 80% Dikwa 10 10% 0% 90% Gubio 10 50% 10% 40% Guzamala 10 0% 0% 100% Gwoza 13 8% 8% 85% Hawul 12 83% 17% 0% Jere 12 50% 50% 0% Kaga 15 0% 7% 93% Kala-Balge 10 0% 0% 100% Konduga 11 0% 64% 36% Kukawa 10 20% 0% 80% Kwaya Kusar 10 100% 0% 0% Mafa 12 8% 0% 92% Magumeri 13 100% 0% 0% Maiduguri 15 100% 0% 0% Marte 13 0% 0% 100% Mobbar 10 0% 0% 100% Monguno 12 8% 0% 92% Ngala 11 0% 0% 100% Nganzai 12 17% 0% 83% Shani 11 100% 0% 0% State 311 41% 6% 53% 7 Source: Borno EOC Data team analysis Four Strategies were deployed to expand polio vaccination reach and increase population immunity in Borno state SIAs RES2 RIC4 Special interventions 12
    [Show full text]
  • Health Sector Bulletin March 2020
    Health Sector Bulletin March 2020 Northeast Nigeria Humanitarian Response COVID-19 Response 5.6 Million 4.4 Million 1.9 Million * x.x million people People in need targeted by the IDPs in the reached in 2020*** of health care Health Sector three States HIGHLIGHTS Health Sector • For countries already facing a humanitarian crisis, the COVID-19 45 HEALTH SECTOR PARTNERS outbreak will likely be much more difficult to control and (HRP & NON-HRP) potentially further exacerbate tensions. This includes countries currently affected by conflict, the desert locust outbreak, drought, HEALTH FACILITIES IN BAY STATE** economic or political crises. An additional layer of COVID-19 1372 (58%) FULLY FUNCTIONING impacts will add to the challenges that those areas are already 233 (9.8%) NON-FUNCTIONING facing and is likely to further increase the number of vulnerable 388 (16.4%) PARTIALLY FUNCTIONING people. Due to access constraints and the limitations of the health 374 (15.8%) FULLY DAMAGED sector capacity, it could have the potential to spread more rapidly CUMULATIVE CONSULTATIONS in hotspots and fragile settings and have more severe impacts that 4.9 million CONSULTATIONS**** will be difficult to diagnose and contain. 1580 REFERRALS • While there are no reports of confirmed cases in the northeast region yet, efforts to contain the virus have commenced with all 360,898 CONSULTATIONS THROUGH HARD TO REACH three states issuing directives restricting movement in and out of TEAMS their respective states. Unless the virus is completely eradicated EPIDEMIOLOGICAL WEEK 2019 within this time period – which is highly unlikely – the threat of a EARLY WARNING & ALERT RESPONSE spread persists and can be higher for populations in the BAY states.
    [Show full text]
  • GENDER ASSESSMENT January 2020
    GENDER ASSESSMENT January 2020 Table of Contents List of graphs ....................................................................................................................................... ii List of table .......................................................................................................................................... ii Context .................................................................................................................................................... iii Objective .................................................................................................................................................. iii Methodology ........................................................................................................................................... iv Sampling .................................................................................................................................................. v Findings .................................................................................................................................................. vi Gender assessment analysis ................................................................................................................... 1 1. Socioeconomic activities and dynamics in the communities ........................................................ 2 1.1 Current daily activities of women compared to men ................................................................ 2 1.2 Type of livelihood
    [Show full text]
  • Yobe State Multisectoral Crisis Recovery Project (Mcrp)
    YOBE STATE MULTISECTORAL CRISIS RECOVERY PROJECT (MCRP) Environmental & Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) For Rehabilitation of 40km Gujba-Ngalda Road INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS UNDER COMPONENT 2 OF MCRP DRAFT REPORT MARCH, 2020 Yobe MCRP – Environmental & Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) for 40km Gujba-Ngalda Road Table of Contents List of Figures .................................................................................................. v List of Tables .................................................................................................. vi Acronyms and Abbreviations ............................................................................ vii Executive Summary ......................................................................................... ix CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 2 1.1 Background ........................................................................................ 2 1.1.1 Technical Approach and Methodology to the ESIA ................................. 3 1.1.2 Desktop Research ......................................................................... 3 1.1.3 Reconnaissance Survey and Field Visits ........................................... 3 1.2 Applicable Laws and International Regulatory Framework ........................ 4 1.3 International Treaties and Conventions on Environment ........................... 6 1.5 Gender-Based Violence ........................................................................ 7 1.5.1 International
    [Show full text]
  • Impacts of Boko Haram Insurgency on Agricultural Activities in Gujba Local Government Area, Yobe State, Nigeria
    Research Publisher: Manuscript central Available Online at www.ijcrr.info International Journal of Contemporary Research and Review ISSN 0976 – 4852 https://doi.org/10.15520/ijcrr.v9i12.628 December, 2018|Volume 09|Issue 12| Section: Agriculture Impacts of Boko Haram Insurgency on Agricultural Activities in Gujba Local Government Area, Yobe State, Nigeria. M. Babagana1, M. Ismail2, B. G. Mohammed3, M. A. Dilala4, Hussaini I5, I M. Zangoma6 1Department of Animal Health and Production Technology College of Agriculture Gujba Yobe State, Nigeria 2Department of Agricultural Technology College of Agriculture Gujba Yobe State, Nigeria 3Department of Agricultural Technology College of Agriculture Gujba Yobe State, Nigeria 4Department of Animal Health and Production Technology College of Agriculture Gujba Yobe State, Nigeria 5Department of Agricultural Technology College of Agriculture Gujba Yobe State, Nigeria 6Department of Agricultural Technology College of Agriculture Gujba Yobe State, Nigeria Corresponding Author: M. Babagana Received: 2018-11-14; Accepted 2018-12-06, Abstract: The study was conducted between the months of November-December 2018 to assess the impacts of Boko Haram insurgency on agricultural activities in Gujba Local Government Area of Yobe state, Nigeria. Six towns namely Buni Yadi, Gujba, Goniri, Katarko, Mutai and Wagir formed the study locations. These towns were the major agricultural strongholds of the Local Government. The study considered impacts of the insurgency on farming after the return of residents to these towns after almost two years of exile in other places as a result of displacement by the militants’ activities (2016-2018). Descriptive Survey design involving mixed methods was used in which a total of 394 respondents participated.
    [Show full text]
  • NGA-Kwaya Kusar to Translate EN
    Situation Report on Kwaya Kusar Local Government Area of Borno State, 2015-2016 By Dr. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos Senior Researcher, Institut de recherche pour le développement, Paris Due to the fighting between Boko Haram and the security forces, Kwaya Kusar is the only local government area in Nigeria that researchers of the "Invisible Violence" project were not able to visit. Failing any better option, the following report is consequently based on interviews undertaken in Maiduguri in October 2015 and May 2016, with residents originating from Kwaya Kusar, in the South West of Borno State, comprising two civil servants from the ministry for public works, an officer from the immigration department and a school teacher born in the neighbouring local government area of Hawul. Their testimonies show that, despite a bank attack which was without victims in 2012, the local area was "miraculously" spared by the violence which struck the rest of the region.1 In late 2015, the local government area was one of the only ones in Borno State which continued to operate, with Maiduguri, Bayo, Biu and, according to contested official statements, Hawul, Chibok, Gubio, Jere and Kaga. In the neighbouring local government area of Shani, which included Kwaya Kusar until its partition in 1996, civil servants had not returned since the Emir fled after escaping an ambush in 2014. In the suburbs of Maiduguri, even the administrative centre of the local government area of Jere had not reopened. The South East of Borno was still prey to chaos despite the reassuring statements made by the army about the situation in Bama, Gwoza and Chibok.
    [Show full text]
  • YOBE STATE MINISTRY of HEALTH Situation Report
    YOBE STATE MINISTRY OF HEALTH Situation Report TITLE COVID-19 Pandemic Situation Report SERIAL NUMBER 17 EPID-WEEK 20 DATE 16 May 2020 HIGHLIGHTS: No new confirmed case(s) reported today Fifty-one (51) new contacts of the confirmed cases have been identified and line-listed by the contact tracing teams SMOH and WHO recruited, trained and deployed six (6) additional contact tracing teams in Gujba, Nguru, and Tarmuwa LGAs Seven (7) new alerts have been received and investigated in Nguru, Potiskum and Gujba LGAs Conducted high-level advocacy, led by the Hon Commissioner for Health (Vice-Chairman of State Task Force) and other members of State Rapid Response Team (SRRT), to Bade LGA emirate council to sensitize traditional leaders and community members on prevention of COVID-19 in their communities. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SUMMARY: The total number of confirmed COVID-19 cases remains thirty-two (32): Sixteen (16) cases from Damaturu, eight (8) cases from Bade, five (5) cases from Nguru, and one (1) case each from Geidam, Tarmuwa, and Gujba LGAs Total confirmed cases of COVID-19 amongst Health Care Workers (HCWs) in the state remain nine (9): Six (6) nurses, two (2) doctors, and one (1) laboratory scientist Twenty-four (24) confirmed cases are on admission in isolation centers. All are in stable condition Three (3) cases have recovered and discharged from the isolation center two days ago The total number of contacts who completed the 14-days follow-up as of today is one hundred and twenty-four (124). None of them developed any symptoms The total number of deaths due to COVID-19 in the state is five (5) The total number of samples taken for testing remains sixty-three (63).
    [Show full text]
  • States and Lcdas Codes.Cdr
    PFA CODES 28 UKANEFUN KPK AK 6 CHIBOK CBK BO 8 ETSAKO-EAST AGD ED 20 ONUIMO KWE IM 32 RIMIN-GADO RMG KN KWARA 9 IJEBU-NORTH JGB OG 30 OYO-EAST YYY OY YOBE 1 Stanbic IBTC Pension Managers Limited 0021 29 URU OFFONG ORUKO UFG AK 7 DAMBOA DAM BO 9 ETSAKO-WEST AUC ED 21 ORLU RLU IM 33 ROGO RGG KN S/N LGA NAME LGA STATE 10 IJEBU-NORTH-EAST JNE OG 31 SAKI-EAST GMD OY S/N LGA NAME LGA STATE 2 Premium Pension Limited 0022 30 URUAN DUU AK 8 DIKWA DKW BO 10 IGUEBEN GUE ED 22 ORSU AWT IM 34 SHANONO SNN KN CODE CODE 11 IJEBU-ODE JBD OG 32 SAKI-WEST SHK OY CODE CODE 3 Leadway Pensure PFA Limited 0023 31 UYO UYY AK 9 GUBIO GUB BO 11 IKPOBA-OKHA DGE ED 23 ORU-EAST MMA IM 35 SUMAILA SML KN 1 ASA AFN KW 12 IKENNE KNN OG 33 SURULERE RSD OY 1 BADE GSH YB 4 Sigma Pensions Limited 0024 10 GUZAMALA GZM BO 12 OREDO BEN ED 24 ORU-WEST NGB IM 36 TAKAI TAK KN 2 BARUTEN KSB KW 13 IMEKO-AFON MEK OG 2 BOSARI DPH YB 5 Pensions Alliance Limited 0025 ANAMBRA 11 GWOZA GZA BO 13 ORHIONMWON ABD ED 25 OWERRI-MUNICIPAL WER IM 37 TARAUNI TRN KN 3 EDU LAF KW 14 IPOKIA PKA OG PLATEAU 3 DAMATURU DTR YB 6 ARM Pension Managers Limited 0026 S/N LGA NAME LGA STATE 12 HAWUL HWL BO 14 OVIA-NORTH-EAST AKA ED 26 26 OWERRI-NORTH RRT IM 38 TOFA TEA KN 4 EKITI ARP KW 15 OBAFEMI OWODE WDE OG S/N LGA NAME LGA STATE 4 FIKA FKA YB 7 Trustfund Pensions Plc 0028 CODE CODE 13 JERE JRE BO 15 OVIA-SOUTH-WEST GBZ ED 27 27 OWERRI-WEST UMG IM 39 TSANYAWA TYW KN 5 IFELODUN SHA KW 16 ODEDAH DED OG CODE CODE 5 FUNE FUN YB 8 First Guarantee Pension Limited 0029 1 AGUATA AGU AN 14 KAGA KGG BO 16 OWAN-EAST
    [Show full text]
  • Through Our Eyes People's Perspectives on Building Peace In
    Policy paper April 2018 Through our eyes People’s perspectives on building peace in northeast Nigeria Key findings 1. Communities excluded from decision-making: 4. Proliferation of wider divisions in society: Local populations feel excluded from national The Boko Haram insurgency has led to wider and international responses to the Boko divisions within society that threaten the Haram insurgency. They feel their fears, needs long-term prospects for peace and reconciliation and concerns are not properly considered. in the region. The insurgency has created Communities resent this lack of engagement or exacerbated tensions between different and feel it leads to ineffective and inappropriate religious and ethnic groups, between Internally programming that is failing to reach the most Displaced People (IDPs) and host communities, vulnerable sections of society, and in some and between returning IDPs and members of cases is making the situation worse. their community who did not flee. 2. Dialogue with Boko Haram as part of a peace 5. Public mistrust of government and security strategy: The majority of people recognise that actors: Despite an improvement in relations a military approach alone will not bring peace to between civilians and government and security the region and support engagement in dialogue institutions since the early years of the insurgency, with Boko Haram as part of a multifaceted the relationship is still characterised by high approach to peace. levels of mistrust, fear and suspicion. 3. The risks of ‘imposed’ reintegration: 6. Concern about the future role of vigilante groups: Local populations feel that it is too soon While local populations are appreciative of the for people associated with Boko Haram to role that vigilante groups – including the Civilian be reintegrated into communities and that Joint Task Force – have played in improving the reintegration is being ‘imposed’, ignoring their security situation, they are fearful that vigilante fears and concerns.
    [Show full text]
  • Resilience Analysis in Borno State, Nigeria
    AnalysIng Resilience for better targeting and action and targeting better Resiliencefor AnalysIng RESILIENCE ANALYSIS ANALYSIS RESILIENCE IN BORNO STATE BORNO IN FAO resilience RESILIENCE INDEX MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS II y RIMA II analysis report No. 16 AnalysIng Resilience for better targeting and action FAO resilience analysis report No. 16 RESILIENCE ANALYSIS IN BORNO STATE I g e r i Na Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Rome, 2019 Required citation: FAO. 2019. Resilience analysis in Borno State, Nigeria. Rome. 44 pp. Licence: CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by FAO in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned. The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of FAO. © FAO, 2019 Some rights reserved. This work is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 IGO licence (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO; https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/igo/legalcode/legalcode). Under the terms of this licence, this work may be copied, redistributed and adapted for non-commercial purposes, provided that the work is appropriately cited.
    [Show full text]