DOCSLIB.ORG

The Development of the United Nations

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Development of the United Nations Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations 1947 The Development of the United Nations Martin Joseph Lowery Loyola University Chicago Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses Part of the Political History Commons Recommended Citation Lowery, Martin Joseph, "The Development of the United Nations" (1947). Master's Theses. 646. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/646 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 1947 Martin Joseph Lowery THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS Martin J.· Lowery A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Loyola University February 194? VITA Martin J. Lowery was born in vhicago Illinois, »ecember 23, 1919. He was graduated from Mt. varmel High School, Chicago, Illinois, in June, 1936. ~he Bachelor of Education degree was conferred by Chicago Teachers Oollege in June, 1941. From 1941 to 1943 the writer was em­ ployed as a photographer and Special Agent by the i'ederal Bureau of Investigation in Chicago, Illinois, nashington, D.C., and Norfolk, Virginia. J'rom 1944 to 1946 he was on active duty with the United ~tates Naval Reserve. During 1941, 1942, and 1946, the writer has devoted his time to graduate study in the field of History. Table of Contents Pert I THE :MEE'l'INGS OF THE MAJOR POWERS Chapter Page I. THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION........................ 1 World conditions-~ituation in United States-The Atlan- tic meeting-Writing the Charter-Political rights-Eco- nomic rights-Human rights-i~ur freedoms-Reaction to Charter-Self-4etermination-~he Declaration of the United Nations-Significance-Atlantic Charter today. II. THE MOSOOW CONFERENCE •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 20 War situation-Change in American attitude-EUlbright and Connally resolutions-Mackinac Declaration-Russian distrust-Preparations for meeting-Pre-MOscow "feelers"­ The meeting-The pronouncement-General security-$oTer­ eign equality-Declaration on Italy-Declaration on Austria-German atrocities-Reaction-Church criticism­ Compromise on principle-.l!'orewarning of things to come. III. THE CAIRO CONFERENCE •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 37 Secrecy-Press irritation-The meetinB-The declaration­ Unconditional surrender-Dismemberment or Japan-Recog­ nition of China-Mixed reaction. IV. THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• &2 Site symbolism-The meeting-Big ihree personalities­ ~econd front-Tito Bros-Partition of Poland-Division of influence-Tehran Declaration-FUture international or­ ganization-i~e peace-loving nations-Iran-Turkey and the Dardanelles-Amerioan reaction weak-First Show of power politics. V. THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONFERENCE ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 53 War situation-Origin of conference-The RooseTelt plan- The Soviet plan-Two meetings-Principles in proposals­ Atlantic Charter ignored-The tieneral Assembly-The Se­ curi~y Council-The International Court-The Secretariat­ Critical reaotion-RoosuTelt plan followed-Basis of general acceptance. Table of Contents Part I THE !V.::illETINGS OF TEE :V.AJOR POWERS - continued Chapter Page ~I. TEE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE •.•••.•..••...•..•...••••.•........• 65 War situation-Political situation-PoliSh crisis-~truggle in Greece-Yugoslav problem-Site difficulties-The meeting­ Occupation of Germany-~eparations-Security Council voting­ Liberated Europe-Poland-Yugoslav solution-Secret agree­ ments-Roosevelt and Middle East leaders-Enthusiastic reaction-Dream castles without principle. F Part II THE JrmETINGS OP mE NATIONS Chapter Page VII. THE CONFERENCE ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE.................. 83 Basic factors-Food plans-Press relations-Indefinite ob­ jectives-International commodity arrangements-Interim · Commission-~he constitution-~isinterest in the new or­ ganization-Significance. VIII. THE BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .... • • • • • 91 Young plan-London Economic Conference-Keynes plan- White plan-Key uurrency approach-The meeting-inter­ national Monetary bund-International Bank-~und and Bank relations-Significance. IX. THE ~~XICO CITY CONFER&NCE ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 107 Pan-American rela tiona-Argent ina-The meeting-Dumbarton Oaks criticism-Increased war effort-~onomic Charter of the Americas-Act of Chepultepec-Regional and world se­ curity-Argentina's isolation-Reaction go~. X. THE SA!~ FF.ANCISCO CONF.li:RENCE........................... 117 Invitations-Site-Delegations-Opening-Membership prob­ lems-Polish problem-Syria and Lebanon-~rieste-Role of .1rrance-Veto problem-c.;harter amendment-W'ithdrawal right­ Trusteeship problem-Purposes and principles-Membership agreement-The General Assembly-The Security Council- The International Court-The Secretariat-The Economic and Social council-Reaction-Evaluation. XI. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PEACE ••••••••••••••••••••••• 143 Peace factors-Coalition of power-Denial of principles- No conciliation at San Francisco-Weakness of United Nations power theory-Attitudes-Sovereignty-No lasting peace through United Nat.ions. CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES......................... 147 CHAPTER I THE ATLANTIC CHARTER AND THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION The year ns 1941,. one Which would be recorded in the annals of American history With even more emphasis than the fateful year of 1917. Europe was almost totally submerged beneath the callous am ruthless German armies. Britain, her back to the wall, frantically preparing to defend her- - self against the imminent invasion from the continent, successfUlly negotiated lend-lease aid from the United States in March. France, Norway, and the low countries were ending their first year of Nazi occupation. In June, the German armies, flushed with success and hoping tor a quick victory within the year, broke their non-aggression pact and began their invasion of ~ussia. Here in the United States, during these earth-shattering, de­ pressing, headline-making events, the majority of the populace continued their D.ormal, routine lives, disturbed occasio1:18.lly, on one. hand, by thoughts of the foolishness of economic and material aid to those nations who had not, after twenty prosperous years, paid their debts from the last war, but more or less satisfied, on the other, with the more prosperous conditions about them. With the aid of a1btle propaganda from the die hard isolationists, the de­ featists, and the business as usual gr~p, our thoughts were conditioned for continued peace. Baucous farewell pa~ies, jokes and stories of camp life, and tunes such as "Goodbye Dear I'll Be Back In a Year", formed the total l a con1iribu·Uon of aany to defense from the world. w1:1hout. abarso•e, cieclal'a- tions ot emerpnc7, p.eoline and fUel rationing, credit curbs and other re­ strictions were attacked as additional ft&ew Deal" methods ot e&1ntag more and more control over our P.raonal bUeinen. The President, in June wrote con- earning thoae without fervor toward the prosram ot detenae and active ai~ 4lthousb the7 were a minority, they to~ed a very .powerful· croup. They nre powertul be- cause they bad large twlds at their diapoaal tor propapnda purpoaea. They were powerful because they had the eupport ot some ot the larpat uwspapera arul newapaper ahaina in the country. They were powerful because they could command the service• ot a handful ot United States Senators who knew that they had the power to filibuster and who were willing to uee that power, it neoesaar,r, to taia their enda.l I'\ •• e"(ident that _.,. .Americane had aot yet leaned that our foreign polic7 and intereete •ere an ·intel%1ll pert of our d011eatio policY; that the communication, transportation, aad military adYBncee of the centur7 had made an bolated lite an 1m.posaib1lity; that the affairs ot the world wert affaire ot oure. Early in the year, reaop.islng its "t&lue 8hould we eater the war, the Baq ~-pe.rtmeat, with the approval of Great BrUain, authorised tile ao:a­ atruotioa ot a weather atation and Daval base in Placentia harbor, Jrgentia, Newfoundland. S&Uing the great circle routea, our ahipl to lurope could obta1n accurate information from this ltation on the state ot the weather, and receive here, en route, additional protective convoy acreening a,ainet the .ubmariae menace in the treaoherou1 North Atlantic waters. l Samu.el Roniiii8n, editor, !he Public Papere and Addreaeee ot :r.r&Dklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. IT (1940) Jlfaamillan Oompan771f•w York, l9ii', iifti. - 3. It was to this place that the ~Augusta, with President Roosevelt aboard, made its way through the mine-laid, netted outer harbor o:a the morning of August 9th for a rendezvous with the EMS Prince of Wales, which would bring Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of England~ Among the President's a ides and advisors were Sumner Welles, Averill Harriman, Admirals King and Stark, Generals Marshall and Arnold. In addition, a large group of technical advisors in all fields stood ready to fUrniSh specialized informa- tion when needed. About noon of the following day the EMS Prince £!_Wales, with it~ protective screen of light cruisers and destroyers, made its way slowly into the guarded harbor and dropped anchor near the President's flagship.2
Load more

Recommended publications
  • 1943 Tehran Conference
    O N F C E R N E A N R C H E E T T E E H C R N A E N R E C F O N Europe in December 1943 Tehran Territories – owned, occupied, controlled by: Axis Western Allies Soviet Union conference Neutral countries 28 November – Moscow SOVIET UNION UNITED Berlin KINGDOM 1 December NAZI 1943 GERMANY ITALY Tehran IRAN The first meeting between the Big Three took place at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, Iran. Iran had been occupied by the UK and USSR since 1941. Joseph Stalin selected and insisted on the location. The conference was codenamed Eureka. After the conference, the Big Three issued two public statements: “Declaration of the Three Powers” and “Declaration on Iran”. They also signed a confidential document concerning military actions. World map in December 1943 © Institute of European Network Remembrance and Solidarity. This infographic may be downloaded and printed be downloaded may infographic This Network Remembrance and Solidarity. © Institute of European purposes. https://hi-storylessons.eu educational and not-for-profit only for (citing its source) in unchanged form 22–26 November Circumstances First Cairo Conference – Chiang Kai-shek (leader of the Republic of China), Churchill and Roosevelt 194314-24 January 23 August discuss the fight against Japan Casablanca Conference (Churchill, Soviet victory over Germany at the until unconditional surrender and Roosevelt and Charles de Gaulle) Battle of Kursk. The Red Army’s the reclaiming of seized territories. – where the leaders resolved offensive begins on the Eastern to continue fighting until an Front. unconditional surrender (without 194114 August any guarantees to the defeated F.D.
    [Show full text]
  • Title of Thesis: ABSTRACT CLASSIFYING BIAS
    ABSTRACT Title of Thesis: CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis Directed By: Dr. David Zajic, Ph.D. Our project extends previous algorithmic approaches to finding bias in large text corpora. We used multilingual topic modeling to examine language-specific bias in the English, Spanish, and Russian versions of Wikipedia. In particular, we placed Spanish articles discussing the Cold War on a Russian-English viewpoint spectrum based on similarity in topic distribution. We then crowdsourced human annotations of Spanish Wikipedia articles for comparison to the topic model. Our hypothesis was that human annotators and topic modeling algorithms would provide correlated results for bias. However, that was not the case. Our annotators indicated that humans were more perceptive of sentiment in article text than topic distribution, which suggests that our classifier provides a different perspective on a text’s bias. CLASSIFYING BIAS IN LARGE MULTILINGUAL CORPORA VIA CROWDSOURCING AND TOPIC MODELING by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Gemstone Honors Program, University of Maryland, 2018 Advisory Committee: Dr. David Zajic, Chair Dr. Brian Butler Dr. Marine Carpuat Dr. Melanie Kill Dr. Philip Resnik Mr. Ed Summers © Copyright by Team BIASES: Brianna Caljean, Katherine Calvert, Ashley Chang, Elliot Frank, Rosana Garay Jáuregui, Geoffrey Palo, Ryan Rinker, Gareth Weakly, Nicolette Wolfrey, William Zhang 2018 Acknowledgements We would like to express our sincerest gratitude to our mentor, Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • The Consideration of the Yalta Conference As an Executive Agreement
    University of Nebraska at Omaha DigitalCommons@UNO Student Work 8-1-1973 The consideration of the Yalta Conference as an executive agreement John Brayman University of Nebraska at Omaha Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork Recommended Citation Brayman, John, "The consideration of the Yalta Conference as an executive agreement" (1973). Student Work. 372. https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/372 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE CONSIDERATION OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE AS AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT A Thesis Presented to the Department of History and the Faculty of the Graduate College University of Nebraska at Omaha In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts John Brayman August, 1973 UMI Number: EP73010 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI EP73010 Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code ProQuest ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 THESIS ACCEPTANCE Accepted for fee facility of The Graduate College of fee University of Nebraska at Omaha, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts, Graduate Committee: Name Departmin Chairman THE CONSITERATION GP :THS YALTA CONFERENCE AS AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT : The story of the Yalta Conference is a complex and a difficult one.
    [Show full text]
  • The Atlantic Charter (1941). Source: Samuel Rosenman (Ed.), Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D
    THE ATLANTIC CHARTER (1941). SOURCE: SAMUEL ROSENMAN (ED.), PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, VOL. 10, 1938-1950, 314 The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known cer- tain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world. First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other; Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forci- bly deprived of them; Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity; Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security; Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want; Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance; Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force.
    [Show full text]
  • YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1953- 1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation
    YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS, 1953- 1957: Normalization, Comradeship, Confrontation Svetozar Rajak Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy London School of Economics and Political Science University of London February 2004 UMI Number: U615474 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615474 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ” OF POUTICAL «, AN0 pi Th ^ s^ s £ £2^>3 ^7&2io 2 ABSTRACT The thesis chronologically presents the slow improvement of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, starting with Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953, through their full normalization in 1955 and 1956, to the renewed ideological confrontation at the end of 1956. The normalization of Yugoslav-Soviet relations brought to an end a conflict between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc, in existence since 1948, which threatened the status quo in Europe. The thesis represents the first effort at comprehensively presenting the reconciliation between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, between 1953 and 1957. It will also explain the motives that guided the leaderships of the two countries, in particular the two main protagonists, Josip Broz Tito and Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, throughout this process.
    [Show full text]
  • Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin: the Role of the Personal Factor in Success and Failure of the Grand Alliance
    Geoffrey Roberts Professor of Irish history at the national University of CORK, member of the Royal historical society, senior research fellow Nobel Institute Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin: The Role of the Personal Factor in Success and Failure of the Grand Alliance Introduction It is often said that Grand Alliance was forced into existence by Hitler and fell apart as soon as Nazi Germany was defeated. But neither the formation of the Grand Alliance nor its collapse was inevitable. Both were the result of personal choices by the leaders of the alliance. Without Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin there would have been no Grand Alliance against Hitler in the sense that we understand that term today.60 Hitler posed a dire existential threat to both Britain and the Soviet Union, and to the United States the prospect of perpetual conflict. Britain had been at war with Germany since September 1939 and it is not surprising that the three states formed a military coalition when Hitler attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941 and then, in December, declared war on the United States. But the Grand Alliance that developed during the war was much more than a military coalition of convenience; it was a far-reaching political, economic and ideological collaboration. At the heart of this collaboration were the personal roles, outlooks and interactions of the three heads of state. Without the personal alliance of Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin – the Big Three as they became known during the war - the Grand Alliance would have been stillborn or would 60 “Grand Alliance” is the term commonly used in the west to describe the anti-Hitler coalition of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • September 15, 1959 Mikihail Zimyanin's Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt)
    Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified September 15, 1959 Mikihail Zimyanin's Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt) Citation: “Mikihail Zimyanin's Background Report for Khrushchev on China (Excerpt),” September 15, 1959, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD Fond 5, Opis’ 30, Delo 307, Listy 49-79. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117030 Summary: Mikhail Zimyanin, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern department, reports to Khrushchev on the “new stage” in Sino-Soviet relations after the victory of the people’s revolution in China; China and the Soviet Union now share the common goal of developing socialist societies in their respective countries. Credits: This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation. Original Language: Russian Contents: English Translation The victory of the people’s revolution in China and the establishment of the Chinese People’s Republic marked the start of a qualitatively new stage in relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and China, based on a commonality of interests and a unity of goals in constructing a socialist and Communist society in both countries. … When discussing the overall success of the development of Soviet-Chinese relations during the first three years after the formation of the PRC, we must not overlook several negative features of these relations connected with the violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese People’s Republic, as reflected
    [Show full text]
  • Soviet-American Relations and the Origins of Containment 1941-1946: the Force of Tradition
    University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 1988 Soviet-American relations and the origins of containment 1941-1946: The force of tradition Anita Louise Coryell The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Coryell, Anita Louise, "Soviet-American relations and the origins of containment 1941-1946: The force of tradition" (1988). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5179. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5179 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 Th i s is an unpublished m a n u s c r ip t in w h ic h c o p y r ig h t s u b s i s t s . Any f u r t h e r r e p r in t in g of i t s c o n t e n t s m u st be APPROVED BY THE AUTHOR. Ma n s f i e l d L ib r a r y U n i v e r s i t y of Mo n ta n a Da t e : , 1 , SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THE ORIGINS OF CONTAINMENT, 1941-1946: THE FORCE OF TRADITION By Anita Louise Coryell B.A., Rutgers, The State University, 1974 Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA 1988 Approved by: Chairman, Board of Examiners Dean, Graduate School lusrt/J Date UMI Number: EP40643 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
    [Show full text]
  • Molotov and the Moscow Conference, October 1943* Introduction
    1 Derek Watson Derek Watson, "Molotov et la Centre for Russian and East European Studies Conférence de Moscou, Octobre The University of Birmingham 1943." Communisme, no. 74/75, 72-99. Original text in English. Molotov and the Moscow Conference, October 1943* Introduction Molotov served as head of NarkomIndel from May 1939 until 1949, and then again in the early Khrushchev era. He is often remembered as being involved in some of the most infamous episodes in the foreign policy of the USSR: the Nazi-Soviet pact, the dismemberment of Poland, the take-over of the Baltic states and the creation of the Soviet satellite empire in eastern Europe after 1945. His style was equally notorious: he was rude and abrupt, and the net over the smallest matter came to represent the inflexible and stubborn nature of Soviet negotiating techniques, at the post-war conferences of foreign ministers. He seemed to be insensitive to and lack understanding of western opinion, which unlike his predecessor Litvinov, and subordinates, like Maiskii, he was not prepared to make any effort to represent to his Kremlin colleagues.1 There was, however, a much more positive side to Molotov as commissar for Foreign Affairs. If the Triple Alliance negotiations of 1939 with Britain and France failed, their success might have prevented the Second World War; during his visit to Britain and the USA in 1942 the Grand Alliance which was responsible for the defeat of Hitler war was forged; and the Moscow foreign ministers conference of October 1943, which is generally taken as marking the peak of Molotov’s diplomatic career, was crucial in laying the foundations for the post-war world.
    [Show full text]
  • From the Tito-Stalin Split to Yugoslavia's Finnish Connection: Neutralism Before Non-Alignment, 1948-1958
    ABSTRACT Title of Document: FROM THE TITO-STALIN SPLIT TO YUGOSLAVIA'S FINNISH CONNECTION: NEUTRALISM BEFORE NON-ALIGNMENT, 1948-1958. Rinna Elina Kullaa, Doctor of Philosophy 2008 Directed By: Professor John R. Lampe Department of History After the Second World War the European continent stood divided between two clearly defined and competing systems of government, economic and social progress. Historians have repeatedly analyzed the formation of the Soviet bloc in the east, the subsequent superpower confrontation, and the resulting rise of Euro-Atlantic interconnection in the west. This dissertation provides a new view of how two borderlands steered clear of absorption into the Soviet bloc. It addresses the foreign relations of Yugoslavia and Finland with the Soviet Union and with each other between 1948 and 1958. Narrated here are their separate yet comparable and, to some extent, coordinated contests with the Soviet Union. Ending the presumed partnership with the Soviet Union, the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 launched Yugoslavia on a search for an alternative foreign policy, one that previously began before the split and helped to provoke it. After the split that search turned to avoiding violent conflict with the Soviet Union while creating alternative international partnerships to help the Communist state to survive in difficult postwar conditions. Finnish-Soviet relations between 1944 and 1948 showed the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry that in order to avoid invasion, it would have to demonstrate a commitment to minimizing security risks to the Soviet Union along its European political border and to not interfering in the Soviet domination of domestic politics elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
    [Show full text]
  • Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-War World Order: Planning for the Conference, the Big Three’S Strategies
    YALTA, A TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATION TO FORM THE POST-WAR WORLD ORDER: PLANNING FOR THE CONFERENCE, THE BIG THREE’S STRATEGIES Matthew M. Grossberg Submitted to the faculty of the University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Department of History, Indiana University August 2015 Accepted by the Graduate Faculty, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. Master’s Thesis Committee ______________________________ Kevin Cramer, Ph. D., Chair ______________________________ Michael Snodgrass, Ph. D. ______________________________ Monroe Little, Ph. D. ii ©2015 Matthew M. Grossberg iii Acknowledgements This work would not have been possible without the participation and assistance of so many of the History Department at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. Their contributions are greatly appreciated and sincerely acknowledged. However, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to the following: Dr. Anita Morgan, Dr. Nancy Robertson, and Dr. Eric Lindseth who rekindled my love of history and provided me the push I needed to embark on this project. Dr. Elizabeth Monroe and Dr. Robert Barrows for being confidants I could always turn to when this project became overwhelming. Special recognition goes to my committee Dr. Monroe Little and Dr. Michael Snodgrass. Both men provided me assistance upon and beyond the call of duty. Dr. Snodgrass patiently worked with me throughout my time at IUPUI, helping my writing progress immensely. Dr. Little came in at the last minute, saving me from a fate worse than death, another six months of grad school. Most importantly, all credit is due Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Yalta Conference, 1945
    Yalta Conference, 1945 DIRECTOR CRISIS MANAGER MODERATOR Roberto Fusciardi Lucy Faria Leila Farrow CRISIS ANALYSTS Tammy Cheng Sheldon Stern Rachel DeGasperis Maeve Redmond UTMUN 2020 Yalta Conference, 1945 Contents Content Disclaimer 2 UTMUN Policies 3 Equity Concerns and Accessibility Needs 3 A Letter from Your Director 4 Background 5 The War 5 Previous Conferences 7 Setting 10 Topics 11 Germany 11 Poland 11 Japan 12 Eastern Europe 12 The United Nations 13 Points to Remember 15 Allies and Loyalty 15 War and Diplomacy 15 Leaders and Subordinates 15 Characters 15 Bibliography 16 1 UTMUN 2020 Yalta Conference, 1945 Content Disclaimer At its core, Model United Nations (MUN) is a simulatory exercise of diplomatically embodying, presenting, hearing, dissecting, and negotiating various perspectives in debate. Such an exercise offers opportunities for delegates to meaningfully explore possibilities for conflict resolution on various issues and their complex, even controversial dimensions – which, we recognize, may be emotionally and intellectually challenging to engage with. As UTMUN seeks to provide an enriching educational experience that facilitates understanding of the real-world implications of issues, our committees’ contents may necessarily involve sensitive or controversial subject matter strictly for academic purposes. We ask for delegates to be respectful, professional, tactful, and diplomatic when engaging with all committee content, representing their assigned country’s or character’s position, communicating with staff and other delegates, and responding to opposing viewpoints. The below content warning is meant to warn you of potentially sensitive or triggering topics that are present in the formal content of this background guide, as well as content that may appear in other aspects of committee (e.g., debate, crisis updates, directives), so that you can either prepare yourself before reading this background guide or opt-out of reading it entirely: Some of the content discussed in this guide and this committee deals with sensitive subject matter.
    [Show full text]