Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775 -32 70 • Fax: 1 (202) 457 -8746 Email:
[email protected] Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency: The Nature of Attacks and Patterns and Cycles in the Conflict Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy
[email protected] Working Draft, Revised: February 3, 2006 Copyrig ht CSIS, all rights reserved. All further dissemination and reproduction must be done with the written permission of the CSIS Cordesman: Patterns in Iraq’s Evolving Insurgency 2/6/06 Page ii Executive Summary The war in Iraq does not as yet show any clear trend in the insurgency. MNF -I intelligence estimates that the number of insurgent attacks on coalition forces, Iraqi forces, and Iraqi civilians; and acts of sabotage; rose by 29% in 2005. The total rose from 26,496 in 2004 to 34,131 in 2005. 1 These attacks have had a relatively consistent average success rate of 24% (attacks that caus e damage or casualties.) 2 At the same time, there has been a shift to attacks on Iraqis, rather than Coalition troops. A total of 673 US troops were killed in 2005, versus 714 in 2004, and the number of wounded dropped from 7,990 to 5,639, a drop of 29%. 3 US forces saw fewer casualties largely because more Iraqi forces were in the field and there were no major urban battles like the battle of Fallujah, and also because the insurgents shifted to Iraqi targets that were more vulnerable and had far more pol itical impact at a point where it have become clear that the US and its coalition partners wanted to withdraw many of their forces.